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**Solzhenitsyn's
Archipelago
of Lies**

As a historian I find it highly distasteful to have to write about these things. There are several reasons for this, among them a feeling of sheer disgust and the deplorable necessity to take time away from my work. However, being unable to keep silent any longer, I overcame this feeling of unpleasantness and decided to take a few hours from my academic duties. Lately, in my field of work (American studies, and international relations) I have more and more often come across the dirty footprints left by a group of persons known as dissidents, or rather I have observed the effects of their doings in the realm of speech and the printed word, which are inflated a thousand-fold by imperialist propaganda, and turned, by the well-known tactics of psychological warfare, into accepted patterns of thinking in the West.

The echo of what the "dissidents" are saying is being immensely magnified by technical facilities—radio and television—and has literally overwhelmed some people outside our country, creating in their minds wrong and dangerous notions about the USSR. It thus complicates American-Soviet relations by adding fuel to the dying embers of the "cold war."

For more than fifty years the world has been divided into two opposing socio-economic systems: socialism and capitalism. Thanks to the growing power and prestige of the Soviet Union, the principles of peaceful coexistence are gaining increasing acceptance in international relations.

Sober-minded people in the West have realized that in an age of missiles and nuclear weapons there is no alternative to this. To bring home this simple truth to those who entertain views opposite to ours, our entire nation had to make tremendous efforts and sacrifices which have made the Soviet Union what it is today.

With the existing correlation of forces in the world, armed adventures against socialism are doomed. It is not adherence to the principle of peace by the governments of capitalist countries, but their understanding of the need for peace that has eventually placed the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a peaceful basis and now, moreover, on a firm foundation of businesslike cooperation. For many years the United States has been searching for means that could be used against socialism. It took stock of their material and human resources and of all kinds of ideological weapons. When the question of American policy towards the Soviet Union was discussed in the ruling circles of Washington, the role of "dissidents" loomed large in their plans. But although extreme anti-Communists placed great hopes on the "dissidents," the more practical politicians in the United States have finally concluded that their aims go against the country's best interests. And there is probably no one in the United States who has expressed this view so clearly as George F. Kennan has done lately.

This ex-diplomat, whose activities at times came close to those of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be 70 years old in 1974. It is time to look back over the years, and this is what Kennan did in his memoirs published last year. Having nothing to lose, being a man approaching 70 years of age, Professor

Kennan, in terms that suggest contrition for his past activity in the diplomatic field, and as an admonition to present and future American politicians, expounded his views on Washington's policy regarding the Soviet Union. His views are not those of a dilettante, because Kennan has, for more than 50 years from his student days to the present, been in one way or another engaged in a study of the Soviet Union.

He states that each time the question of starting a war against the Soviet Union was raised in Washington, among those who responded most eagerly and urged immediate action against the USSR were the "dissidents," including nationalists of all breeds, who due to different circumstances settled in the United States.

"It was the existence in our country of one vocal and not uninfluential element that not only wanted a war with Russia but have a very clear idea of the purposes for which, in its own view, such a war should be fought," Kennan noted. "I have in mind the escapees and immigrants, mostly recent ones, from the non-Russian portions of the postwar Soviet Union, as well as from some of the Eastern European satellite states. Their idea, to which they were passionately and sometimes ruthlessly attached, was simply that the United States should, for their benefit, fight a war against the Russian people to achieve the final breakup of the traditional Russian state and the establishment of themselves as the regimes of various 'liberated' territories. . . .

"They appealed successfully at times to religious feelings, and even more importantly, to the prevailing anti-Communist hysteria. An idea of the political power they possessed can be had from the fact that some years later (1959) they were

able to recommend to Congress, through their friends there, the text of a resolution—the so-called Captive Nations Resolution—every word of which was written (on his own published admission) by their spokesman, Dr. Lev E. Dobriensky, then associate professor at Georgetown University, and to get this document solemnly adopted by the Congress as a statement of American policy. This resolution committed the United States, insofar as Congress had the power to do so, to the 'liberation' of twenty-two 'nations,' two of which had never had any real existence, and the name of one of which appears to have been invented in the Nazi propaganda ministry during the recent war. This, the writing of a congressional statement of policy on Russia and Eastern Europe, was more than I, with many years of official service in that part of the world, could ever have hoped to achieve.

"I could think of nothing worse than what these people wanted us to do. To commit ourselves politically and militarily not only against the Soviet regime but also against the strongest and most numerous element in the traditional Russian land... this would have been a folly of such stupendous dimensions that even the later venture in Vietnam now pales to insignificance beside the thought of it... I had also some awareness of the limits of our own power and I knew what was being asked and expected of us here far exceeded these limits."¹

Kennan's assessment of the nationalists is one of the many arguments in support of his general view that by giving serious consideration to the opinion of these "dissidents" Washington would

¹ G. Kennan. *Memoirs. 1950-1963*, Vol. 2, Boston, 1972, pp. 97-99.

only do harm to itself in terms of its policy toward the Soviet Union. A worsening of relations with the Soviet Union to the point of war would not make sense with respect to the national interests of the United States, Kennan had pointed out at official meetings in Washington and now again notes in his memoirs. This would only play into the hands of "dissidents," and Kennan's book is full of contempt for them:

"The thought of war with Russia was sickening enough just from the standpoint of the slaughter and destruction it would involve, even if nuclear weapons, as one scarcely dared hope, should not be used . . . Even more persuasive as evidence of the unreality of such expectations was the fact, of which I was well aware and which I had tried to bring home to my War College students, that in a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, there could be no complete military victory. . . In the rest of vast Russia—in the part the US and its leaders might conceive themselves to have occupied—the Soviet leaders, ruthless, experienced, and operating on familiar ground, would mount a resistance movement that would make anything known since World War II look tiny. . .

"Many Americans may have conceived that having occupied a portion of Russian territory, we would install in power there, again on the World War II pattern, a nice pro-American government made up of 'democratic elements' among the Russian population; and this regime would be popular with a liberated people to whom the American 'message' had got through. . .

"Everything I had learned about Russia taught me that if there was ever a fatuous daydream, it was this. There were no significant 'democratic elements' in Russia (of course, in Kennan's under-

standing—*Author*)... Our experience with Soviet defectors had shown us that however such people might hate their Soviet masters, their ideas... were consisting often only of the expectation that they would be permitted and encouraged by us to line their recent political adversaries up against the wall... after which they would continue to rule, with our help, by their own brand of dictatorship.”¹

These defectors must have greatly irritated American statesmen like Kennan, for even after so many years Kennan cannot write about them without a feeling of revulsion.

There are many politicians in the United States with similar views, but they are not always the ones who shape the political climate. The span covered by the political pendulum in the country is very great. In the United States there are powerful forces at work which are interested, in some instances for reasons of pure profit, in perpetuating the “cold war.” The main factor behind the “cold war” has always been hostility toward the Soviet Union, and anyone, especially if he lives in the USSR, who is opposed to socialism becomes a natural ally of these forces.

The haters of communism in the United States are at the same time zealous proponents of “one hundred per cent Americanism” and consider themselves the greatest enemies of totalitarianism. They are perfectly satisfied with the bourgeois-democratic system. That is why, in the long run, politically speaking, they and the “dissidents” will inevitably part company, because they clearly see that these dissenters are adherents to totalitarian doctrines. But nevertheless they find it convenient to support any and every enemy of the Soviet sys-

¹ G. Kennan. *Op. cit.*, pp. 94-97.

tem. It is significant that none of them has said openly that Kennan is wrong on this question.

Reactionaries in the United States have always attached special importance to the subversive activities of the "dissidents" in the field of ideology. This is the only reason why the views of such front-rank "dissidents" as Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov have been so widely propagandized in the West. Both of them are, although possibly for different motives, zealously stoking the furnace of the campaign of slander which amounts to the assertion that it is impossible to deal with the Soviet Union and that therefore detente is nothing but a utopian dream. By making this assertion American anti-Communists also seek to strengthen their positions in their own country where they would thus appear as guardians of what they call the interests of the American people.

Such is the sinister spiral of anti-communism which, among other things, means the continuation of the dangerous arms drive. Everything is interconnected, and if one at times grumbles about a shortage of some thing or another, or about certain difficulties, one would do well to remember that this is a direct result of the "cold war."

The blame for such development of events lies with the instigators of the "cold war," with all those who are trying to justify the arms drive in the West, pointing to alleged aggressiveness of the Soviet Union; it lies with those who maliciously attribute to our society such features which, if they really existed, would make our country an outcast in the family of nations. The entire activities of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are concentrated in this direction. Therefore the time when detente has become a fact is just the right time to analyze their views and positions.

Pseudo-Historian and Traitor

All of them are united by a common goal—to discredit their country by whatever means. They also have in common an amazing lack of intellectual capacity. At every step of the way they make some startling “discovery” but fail to see, through ignorance or by deliberately closing their eyes, what any person with some knowledge of history can see. Thus, the “dissidents” use the same outworn arguments and walk the beaten track which our enemies had trodden long ago.

Solzhenitsyn's *August, 1914* is nostalgic lament over the possibilities which in his opinion were so carelessly let go by the Russian big capital and the military. The book would most certainly evoke memories in those who have lived through the events it describes. *August, 1914* is a belated indictment of the autocratic regime from the positions of the bourgeoisie. The fervent speeches which the author put into the mouths of his heroes are in effect a tedious paraphrase of the harsh denunciations of autocracy made by the most ruthless spokesmen of Russian capitalism who sought to establish a dictatorship of their own.

Solzhenitsyn's position on the events that took place during the first months of the war of 1914-1918 fully coincides with the position, well-known to historians, taken by Alexander Guchkov, leader of the Octobrists, and his associates. Even Pavel Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats (the Cadets), was taken aback by some of Guchkov's statements. Miliukov wrote: “Acting in harmony with his own temperament and smarting visibly from his failure to get himself elected to the Duma, he (Guchkov) back in 1913 spoke at a con-

gress of the Octobrists at which he urged to 'strenuously oppose and fight' not the debilitated government but the irresponsible 'dark forces'. He threatened that otherwise the country would face 'imminent catastrophe', that Russia would be plunged into 'enduring chaos', etc. When the war broke out he immediately declared that 'it would be lost,' and in December, 1914, having gathered representatives of 'law-making institutions' (I was not present) presented the whole situation as utterly hopeless. But at that time neither his own faction, nor we shared his gloomy sentiments."¹

There is no need to enter into a discussion on who was right—the Cadets or the Octobrists. The matter has been settled by history. What we are concerned with here is the fact that in August, 1914, the Russian bourgeoisie, which was represented by the Cadets and the Octobrists, set out on a more or less determined drive for power so as to bring the imperialist war to a "victorious conclusion."

The Great October Revolution brought justice to those in Tsarskoye Selo and Mogilev and also to the intrigues at the Tavrishesky Palace in Petrograd. Russia was saved by the Bolshevik party and the revolution cleared the country of all pretenders to the position of domination over the great nation. That was the time when the recent champions of the "peoples' good" showed their true face. For example, in a sharply anti-Soviet book a Western "Sovietologist," George Katkov, writes about Guchkov's last years as follows:

"He emigrated when the White armies were evacuated from south Russia and immediately

¹ P. Miliukov. *Vospominaniya* (1859-1917) (Memoirs), Vol. 2, New York, 1955, p. 198.

launched his own anti-Bolshevik campaign abroad. He gradually developed strong pro-German sentiments, and while living in Paris maintained secret links with the German General Staff. He was supported by a small group of politicians... He died in 1936, a disillusioned and unhappy man, betrayed by many of those he trusted, and trusted by none of those for whose political support he had hoped."¹

Such was the career of a man like Guchkov who started by preaching a cheap, sentimental patriotism in 1914 and ended by doing small favours for the Nazis.

In the field of literature his spiritual double, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in *August, 1914* took his "first step" in exactly the same direction. The similarity between Guchkov's speeches then and Solzhenitsyn's arguments now (even when he speaks on his own behalf and not through his heroes) is striking indeed. This is ideological plagiarism, pure and simple. He wrote the following in 1971 as though he had made an important discovery: "During the four years of the war which sapped the spirit of the nation, who can know which was the decisive battle? There were many battles, more inglorious than glorious... And still one can say that the *first* Russian defeat set the entire course of the war for Russia: as we started the first battle so ill-prepared... so were we for the rest of the war—ill-prepared. Right from the first encounter with the enemy, our fighting spirit was at a low ebb and we never recovered our former assurance; right from the start both enemies and allies wilted—that is the kind of fighters we are, and we fought to the end of the

¹ G. Katkov. *Russia, 1917*, London, 1967, p. 389.

war with this stigma of contempt until disintegration was complete. . .”¹

Such was the view held by the Russian bourgeoisie which was then in opposition and which turned the defeat in East Prussia into a trump card in its gamble for power. For the reasons mentioned above Russian capitalists deliberately painted a much gloomier picture than the situation at the front warranted. What did happen at the front—this was a subject of heated discussions among White émigrés long after the Socialist Revolution of 1917. But even they began to understand things better and thus came to see the facts. For example, N. N. Golovin, a former Lieutenant General in the White Guard and an émigré, wrote in his book on the war which was published many years after the events he described there:

“On the Russian front, the strategic effect of the setbacks suffered by the armies of General Rennenkampf and General Zhilinsky were compensated for by the rout of the four Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia. Hundreds of thousands of officers and men were taken prisoner by the glorious troops fighting on the South-Western Front; the whole of Galicia was cleared of the enemy who rapidly withdrew the remnants of his defeated armies towards Krakow and across the Carpathians. Although this victory occurred almost at the same time as our defeat in East Prussia, nevertheless the success could not mitigate the oppression caused by the latter. . . In the rear. . . the opposition elements easily yielded to pessimism. A. I. Guchkov. . . maintained that as early as August, 1914, ‘he was convinced that the war had

¹ A. Solzhenitsyn, *August chetyrnadtsatogo* (August, 1914), Paris, 1971, pp. 349-350.

been lost,' and the reason for this pessimistic prediction was 'the first impressions he had of the theatre of the war, the defeat at Soldau' (where the left flank of General Samsonov's army was engaged). This is what panic can do to some of the more energetic men in the service of society, and one can only imagine what effect it had on ordinary civilians... The Germans were dealing out their propaganda very cleverly in this direction. By inflating their successes in East Prussia they undermined the allies' trust in the Russian army; they also weakened the confidence of the troops in their strength."¹

This is the origin of the central idea of *August, 1914* which, moreover, coincides with the theme of the military propaganda of Kaiser Germany. Once he took this line, Solzhenitsyn continued to harp on it, vilifying all things Russian. However, the description of the fighting in East Prussia in August, 1914, as given in Guchkov's and Solzhenitsyn's books, was a far cry from the actual facts. It is important to keep in mind that Western propaganda has gone to great lengths to present Solzhenitsyn as an authority on the events which he describes supposedly on the basis of his own experience. It is true that Solzhenitsyn once served in the artillery. But every would-be officer in a military school is expected to have a fair knowledge of military history; he should know, for instance, that during the First World War about three quarters of the men killed were victims of artillery fire.

Yet our "truth-seeker" tries to convince his

¹ N. Golovin. *Voyennye usiliya Rossii v mirovoi voine* (Russia's Military Effort in the World War), Vol. 2, Paris, 1939, pp. 133-134.

readers that in this respect the Germans had the monopoly. In *August, 1914* German artillery fire always thundered, but there was no sign of the presence of Russian artillery anywhere in the book. At one point the book says that "in the fourteenth year of the twentieth century, the Dorogobushovites had nothing to use against the German artillery but the Russian bayonet."¹

The enemy, however, did speak of our Russian artillery. In a well-documented study on this question, the author, E. Barsukov, a Soviet expert in this field, writes: "In August, 1914, after the rout of the 2nd Russian Army under Samsonov in East Prussia, German newspapers and magazines were filled with articles praising their generals and their victorious army. Unexpectedly, a short newspaper item appeared in praise of the Russian artillery. The very headline itself was meant to be sensational: Hats off to Russian artillery!"²

In his book Solzhenitsyn tried to bring back to life events of bygone days for the purpose of belittling the Soviet people. These events really did take place and are still remembered very well, but not in the way Solzhenitsyn has presented them. During the First World War many people in the West understood that in 1914 it was Russia that saved France. In his book, *Russia I Believe In*, Samuel N. Harper, an American authority on Russia of that period, who was a special advisor to the American Ambassador in Petrograd, David R. Francis, writes: "The Russian invasion of East Prussia, however, tended to raise the prestige of Russian arms in American opinion. Even at the

¹ A. Solzhenitsyn. *Op. cit.*, p. 354.

² E. Barsukov. *Russkaya artilleriya v mirovoi voine* (Russia's Artillery in the World War), Vol. 2, Moscow, 1940, p. 53.

time, this invasion was recognized as having in large measure saved Paris from the German attack."¹

On the eve of the Second World War, when the Nazis threatened to engulf the whole world, certain sober-minded politicians in the West referred to the events of 1914 in an attempt to show that the Western countries could survive only in alliance with our country. Speaking in the House of Commons in April, 1939, David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain in the days of the First World War, pointed out that if it had not been for the sacrifices sustained by Russia in 1914, German troops would not only have taken Paris but their garrisons would still be stationed in Belgium and France. When faced with mortal danger people tend to say what they really think. Lloyd George's statement in Parliament is an instance of this. His words were borne out by the events which occurred a few years later.

In November, 1942, the 6th Nazi Army under von Paulus was encircled at Stalingrad. The first thing the grey-haired officers of the Wehrmacht remembered was the year 1914. And they were not thinking of the rout of Samsonov's army, but of the defeat of the Kaiser's troops that followed on the heels of this rout. Army General Seidlitz, who was in command of the 51th corps that was encircled at Stalingrad, began to speak about the lessons of the Lodz operation (the 'layer cake' of Lodz). In that operation, in November, 1914, General Scheffer tried to repeat the pincers movement which had worked so successfully against Samsonov's army, but was himself encircled and 40

¹ S. Harper. *Russia I Believe In*, Chicago, 1969, p. 82.

thousand (i.e., 80 per cent) of his men were lost while the rest barely managed to get away.¹

Reconnaissance officer of the 6th German Army, Joachim Wieder, who participated in Stalingrad battle, later recalled that as soon as the Nazi troops found themselves encircled "Seidlitz gathered the senior officers of his eight divisions and said that the army had a choice—either Cannae or Brzeziny, having in mind the well-known breakthrough at the Russian front at Lodz in 1914 in which he, then a young officer, had taken part."² This statement, which was made not for the sake of argument, but at a staff meeting where questions of life and death were being discussed, dismayed the Nazis in the face of the advancing Soviet armed forces. In this emergency situation German army officers who had had an encounter with the Russian army in 1914 were clearly frightened by the prospect of another crushing defeat.

* * *

Thirty years had passed since 1914. The end of the Second World War was in sight, this time victorious for the USSR. Soviet troops came close to the centre of the Nazi forces—Germany. The Third Army commanded by General A. Gorbatov, which was part of the 2nd Byelorussian Group of Armies, moved up from the south and now stood ready at the border with East Prussia, its final aim being to take the coast of the Baltic Sea.

"Each one of our commanders," wrote A. Gorbatov, "was hoping he would be the first to cross the

¹ See *Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal* (Journal of Military History), 1964, No. 11, pp. 127-128.

² J. Wieder, *Stalingrad und die Verantwortung des Soldaten*, München, 1962, S. 31.

border of East Prussia. It was the 1172nd Rifle Regiment under Colonel Lieutenant Seryogin that had the honour to do so on January 20, 1945, during the day. It is easy to say 'crossed the border,' but. . . .

"I recalled raging battles of the last days of the war, and also the battles fought near Moscow in that fateful autumn of 1941, and the bloody battle on the Volga and the struggle for Orel which led to the first artillery salute to mark a Soviet victory. There were so many of them later! And every order that came from the top military quarters thanking the men and acknowledging their supreme bravery urged us to remember those who had fallen in battle for the freedom of their country and their people. I recalled the faces of my brothers-in-arms. Many of them were no more. . . .

"That is what the words 'crossed the border' of Prussia meant.

"I climbed a tall belfry and looked down upon fires on every side, with broken streaks of black smoke rising to the sky."¹ Straight ahead was East Prussia and continuous fighting day and night for several months to come.

That snowy winter Soviet troops went down the same roads as did the soldiers of the Samsonov army, choking with dust, bear their cross in August, 1914. History seems to be repeating itself. "The Third Army fought its way across the line of fortifications built long before the war," recalled Marshal K. Rokossovsky. "We saw here full-size reinforced-concrete trenches, blindages, barbed wire entanglements, armoured turrets, artil-

¹ A. Gorbатов. *Gody i voiny* (The Years and Wars), Moscow, 1965, pp. 331-332.

lery caponiers, shelters." ¹ The similarity ended at that point. "The advancement of the troops was so swift that the enemy did not have a chance to entrench themselves." ²

The front-line dispatches of those days were full of the names of cities and towns: Neidenburg, Osterode, Allenstein. . . At Allenstein our troops crashed through the second zone of the fortified area, clearing the way into East Prussia. The Fifth Tank Army, which was thrown into the breach thus formed, "poured towards the sea, sweeping out of its path disorganized enemy units which were taken by surprise, giving them no chance to dig in," wrote K. Rokossovsky. ³ The assignment of the Fifth Tank Army was completed by the Second Striking Force which followed it and which smashed the pockets of resistance that the tanks could not reach. As early as January 25, 1945, Soviet tanks reached the seacoast, having cut off the lines of retreat for the German troops from East Prussia. In 1945, it took the tankmen of the Second Byelorussian Group of Armies less than a week to carry out the manoeuvre which the Second Army of General Samsonov had failed to accomplish.

In the cold January of 1945 the land shook under the tracks of Soviet tanks. East Prussia was shaken by the tremors which called to mind the sound of the tramping of Samsonov's soldiers in the hot month of August, 1914. The new generation of Russian soldiers who in 1945 brought the flames of war into the nest of Prussian militarism, honoured the memory of their countrymen who

¹ K. Rokossovsky. *Soldatsky dolg* (The Soldiers' Duty), Moscow, 1968, pp. 315-316.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

had fallen here many years before. The dead-tired tankmen remembered not only the combat orders they were to carry out but history as well. These men knew that their thrust constituted a new page in the heroic history of the Russian Army.

When on January 21, 1945, the 183rd Tank Brigade drove the Germans from Tannenberg, everyone at the command post of the 5th Tank Army was in a holiday mood. Generals and officers congratulated one another. Major General F. I. Galkin recorded what the unit commanders, whose names are now well known to Soviet people, said on that memorable day.

"This is the third Tannenberg!" said Georgi Stepanovich Sidorovich. "There was a lot of Slavic blood spilled on this land."

"That's true," said Volsky (Colonel General, army commander). "The Germans could not forget the defeat of their Teutonic Knights in 1410, and therefore regarded their victory over Samsonov's army in the first imperialist war as a kind of revanche, and called it the Battle of Tannenberg."

"This is a telling blow at the prestige of the German military," remarked General P. G. Grishin. "For thirty years it has been dinned into the heads of their youths that the battle of Tannenberg proved that German arms are invincible. Take a look at the streets of their cities, at all those monuments which at every step scream about the invincibility of Germany. The whole of the Tannenberg area! This is a real breeding ground of revanchism. Did you see that huge stone slab that stands on the outskirts of the city? That rock proclaims to the Aryans that here, in 1914, stood the command post of the great generals—Hindenburg and Ludendorff—who mounted a new campaign against the Slavs..."

"Yes, it's true, they were dreaming of new glory at Tannenberg. Only it didn't happen," said Vassili Timofeyevich...

"And not only dreaming. They were actually fomenting revanchist ideas," continued Volsky. "A war correspondent, the writer Mikhail Bragin, told me that a short distance from Hohenstein the revanchists have erected a war memorial. There they brought the remains of old generals from all over Germany and held a grand funeral for those half-rotted bones. Hitler himself attended the ceremony."¹

Soviet tanks brought retribution to a land where the militarists had for centuries been sworn enemies of the Slavs. The image of Tannenberg as a symbol of glory of the German robber militarists grew dim and then became lost. Some of the Soviet army units which distinguished themselves in the battle for Tannenberg were named after that city.

In the long and heavy fighting in 1945 the age-long Teutonic doctrine of "Drang nach Osten" was shattered for all time. The troops of the Third Byelorussian Group of Armies which entered East Prussia from the East in January, 1945, were taking the same towns and villages that their fathers in the First Russian Army had fought for in August, 1914. On the approaches to Gumbinnen the chief political officer of a battalion of the 130th Rifle Division, Captain Sergei Ivanovich Gusev, led his company in an attack at a critical moment. He fell in hand-to-hand combat at the city gates. S. I. Gusev was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and Gumbinnen was renamed after him.

¹ F. Galkin. *Tanki vozvrashchayutsya v boi* (The Tanks Are Returning to Battle), Moscow, 1964, pp. 285-286.

The fierce battle exacted a tremendous sacrifice—many Soviet soldiers, officers and generals died, hugging the frozen earth—the earth of their ancestors which had now been returned to our people for good.

In his book, *The Cause of My Life*, Marshal Vassilevsky said: "It was here, on the East-Prussian border, on June 22, 1941, that the commander of the 28th Tank Division, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, who was then a colonel, met the war head on. And here that he gave up his life after three and a half years of fighting the Nazi aggressor. Today the city of Insterburg over which the Soviet flag was raised on January 22, 1945, bears the name of General Chernyakhovsky, twice awarded the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

"A heroic battle was fought during the storming of Königsberg by the 16th Rifle Corps, under the command of Major General S. S. Guriev. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union when his troops surrounded this old citadel of the German Knights. After the fall of Königsberg, his corps moved on to Pillau, a German naval stronghold, and here, on the approaches to that city, the life of Stepan Savelyevich Guriev was cut short by the enemy. In honour of the memory of this brave general the town of Neuhausen was renamed Guriensk.

"The former town of Stallupönen has been named after the second in command of a tank corps, S. K. Nesterov, who died in East Prussia."¹ Pobethen has been renamed for a battalion commander of the 182nd Rifle Division, Pyotr Ilyich Romanov, who died fighting for that town. The

¹ A. Vassilevsky. *Delo vsei zhizni* (The Cause of My Life), "Novyi Mir," 1973, No. 12, pp. 156-157.

village of Ludwigsort now bears the name of the commander of a tank company, Ivan Martynovich Ladushkin, and Heiligenbeil is now called Mamonovo after the commander of the 331st Rifle Regiment, Nikolai Vassilievich Mamonov, who was killed in the battle for that town. . .

Thus it was owing to the bravery of Russian soldiers that those cities and towns are no longer associated with the sinister pictures of Prussian militarism.

And what was Solzhenitsyn doing at a time when the Soviet army—from soldier to general—and the entire Soviet people were carrying out their duty at the cost of their lives, this man who, according to the anti-communist yardstick, is a "true Russian patriot"? As soon as the Red Army came to the place where the military campaigns against the USSR had been masterminded, Solzhenitsyn could contain himself no longer. He saw the destruction of those whom he had always worshipped—the Prussian militarists, and he began spreading slanderous rumours aimed at undermining the morale of Soviet troops. Under war-time laws, he was removed from the army. Millions of soldiers went on to destroy the fascist beast, while Solzhenitsyn was shipped to the rear and to prison.

There, seething with anger against his own people, he nurtured his "revenge,"—the slanderous book which was to appear many years later under the title *August, 1914*, but which in fact had been conceived in his younger years, long before the war. In the epilogue to his book, Solzhenitsyn said that it was only the first part of a work which would take him at least twenty years to complete. "The general scheme of this book of which that first part is the opening, took shape in my head back in 1936 when I had just finished school. I have

not parted with this idea ever since, and regard it as the main purpose of my life, though I took time off for other books, because of certain particulars of my life and the multiplicity of impressions of our day and age. I went ahead with my work, I collected more and more material thus moving closer to the realization of my literary scheme."¹

In distorting the events of August, 1914 Solzhenitsyn lied about the Russian people in pre-Soviet times, and prepared the way for carrying out his main purpose: to lie about the Soviet political system, to make people think that a socialist revolution could be accomplished and a socialist system could be built only in a country which (according to Solzhenitsyn) is despised by all. And this has been the goal of all "dissidents" without exception.

Serving Capitalism

The Great October Socialist Revolution has been a subject of thorough research and study by historians in the West, while the "Sovietologists" have made it the subject of their lifework. This tremendous interest in what happened in Russia in 1917 has to do, not with their quest for knowledge, but with more practical motives.

Professor James H. Billington of the United States has indicated the reason for the keen interest throughout the West in the October Revolution in Russia:

"If a central problem for any nineteenth-century thinker was that of defining his attitude toward the

¹ A. Solzhenitsyn. *Op. cit.*, p. 572.

French Revolution, a central one for contemporary man is his appraisal of the Russian Revolution. The latter problem is even more critical, for nearly one billion people explicitly claim to be heirs and defenders of the Russian Revolution. Forces called into being by the upheaval of 1917 are even more forcefully mobilized and tangibly powerful than those called into being by the French Revolution of 1789 and the 'age of the democratic revolution'.¹

On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, there appeared a number of publications in the West offering a summing-up of the research done by Western scholars on this subject. Professor W. Laqueur, specialist in Soviet history, wrote in his study *The Fate of the Revolution. Interpretations of Soviet History*:

"Most historians now agree that tsarism as it existed in 1914 could not survive for long; whether peaceful change was still possible is doubtful. The war and military defeat accelerated its downfall. They also agree that great tensions, bitter class hatred, general resentment accumulated as the result of the inequities of the old regime. The prerequisites for a major eruption all existed. And there is the widest disagreement as to whether the actual form it took was accidental or inevitable. Russian émigrés and probably the majority of Anglo-American scholars have traditionally emphasized the accidental elements. Their sceptical empiricism, as Professor Billington notes, 'inclines them to reject deeper pattern of explanation, their native political traditions subtly incline them to

¹ J. Billington, *Six Views of the Russian Revolution*, "World Politics," April, 1966, p. 452.

regard sudden and convulsive change as a distasteful aberration from the norm in human events'.¹

Although wishful thinking is a habit of Western ideologists, i.e., they tend to put the emphasis on the "accidental," the fact is that even the most rabid anti-Communists no longer deny the inevitability of the 1917 Revolution in Russia. This is the conclusion reached by most historians in the West, though only after much debate. One can imagine the embarrassment of these people, who are generally not easily embarrassed, when the "dissidents" began smuggling out of the USSR big "scholarly" works full of the kind of arguments which they themselves had already rejected. The value of these arguments, even from the point of view of "Sovietology," is nil, for they consist of nonsense and had they come from a Western author they would never have found their way into print at all.

In his *Gulag Archipelago*, for example, Solzhenitsyn tried to prove that the Revolution, this "creation of the diabolical theory of history," was not an outcome of Russia's development but was forced upon it, that in fact there were no objective prerequisites for it, that the revolution was a historical freak, and that the establishment of Soviet power prevented Russia from developing in quite a different direction. What direction?

Predictably, Solzhenitsyn started out by praising what lay at the basis of the political programme of Guchkov's Octobrist Party which was formed after the well-known tsarist Manifesto of October 17, 1905. He writes: "All of us have learned, from the history we were taught at school, that this

¹ W. Laqueur. *The Fate of the Revolution. Interpretations of Soviet History*, New York, 1967, p. 55.

provocative and base manifesto was a mockery of freedom, that the tsar had ordered: 'freedom for the dead, prison for the living'. This epigram is false. Under the October Manifesto, all political parties were permitted to function, the Duma was called into existence, and an honest and wide amnesty was granted." ¹

Our inventor has certainly spared no rosy colour in painting his picture of the tsar's concession which was wrested from him by the masses. A. Tirkova-Williams, a well-known journalist at that time and a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party (Constitutional Democratic Party), years later described the situation in Russia following the October Manifesto as follows: "The old system has not collapsed. The tsar, and his court, the ministries, the provincial administration have remained intact... A special electoral law was issued for the State Duma... Amidst the general excitement and intoxication, even those who had desired to see the people represented in the legislature failed to appreciate it. After all it was only a Duma... while everybody was shouting that the new system could be set up only by a Constituent Assembly." ²

Thus, to judge from his views, Solzhenitsyn clearly belongs to the extreme right wing of the Cadets. He sheds bitter tears over the fate that befell all the bourgeois parties in Russia after the Great October Socialist Revolution. It is well known that in the Civil War that followed, at stake was the very existence of the greatest gain that working people had ever achieved throughout

¹ A. Solzhenitsyn. *Gulag Archipelago*, Paris, 1973, p. 198.

² A. Tirkova-Williams. *Na putyakh k svobode* (On the Roads to Freedom), New York, 1952, pp. 215, 228.

history—Soviet power. In that war both foreign and domestic counter-revolution consolidated their forces. The Cadets were among the many open and secret conspirators against the Soviet government, and naturally they were dealt with harshly by the Revolution which was fighting for its own survival. History has confirmed the correctness of the measures taken by the Soviet government against its enemies.

According to Solzhenitsyn the armed conspirators, members of various white "governments," were peaceful people who had been badly treated by the Soviet government without any good reason. He writes: "One of the first blows was directed at the Cadets (who under the tsar were regarded as the worst plague of the revolution, and under the proletarian rule as the worst plague of the reactionaries)." The last part of the sentence is a correct statement of fact; certain Cadets were put on trial for their criminal activities, including 28 involved in the case known as "The Tactical Centre" (the trial was held in August, 1920 in Moscow). They were charged with conspiracy and were convicted, but, considering that the Civil War was on the wane, the court ruled that the prisoners be put in a concentration camp until the end of the war. "For what crime?" asks Solzhenitsyn fifty years later about the court sentence passed on those who had been working to overthrow Soviet power. "In modern scientific language," he continues, "what they were actually doing was studying alternate possibilities."

Who were these Cadets anyway, who according to Solzhenitsyn were innocent of any crime? Here Solzhenitsyn throws off all sense of restraint: "Intellectuals, who were close to the Cadets were scooped up in droves and sent to jail. What does

'close to the Cadets' mean? It means that they were neither monarchists nor socialists: they were scientists, university professors, artists, writers and practically all the engineers. As a matter of fact, all those intellectuals who were not extremist authors, theologians or theoreticians of socialism, in other words 80 per cent of the intellectual force of the country, fell into that group of the intelligentsia which was 'close to the Cadets'.¹ Really, Mr. Solzhenitsyn! The Cadet leaders probably did not even dream of having such a strong following. Here are some facts. In the Duma of the last (fourth) convocation, for example, out of a total of about 450 deputies, 59 were Cadets and those who stood close to them.² In the elections to the Constituent Assembly the Cadets received only 4.7 per cent of the votes.³ As for the social composition of the party, Tirkova-Williams probably knew better; she wrote that "the backbone of the Cadets is the landed gentry" and therefore "as the ruling class they would have been part of the power machine and they would have wielded political power which their ancestors did long before them."⁴

As we know, the question of power is the most important one in any revolution. Thus the repression against the more active counter-revolutionaries—the Cadets—is explained, not by their being members of the intelligentsia, which is nonsense and obvious falsification, but by the necessary

¹ A. Solzhenitsyn. *Gulag Archipelago*, Paris, 1973, pp. 39, 386, 44.

² P. Miliukov. *Op. cit.*, p. 396.

³ L. Spirin. *Klassy i partii v grazhdanskoi voine v Rossii, 1917-1920* (Classes and Parties in the Civil War in Russia), Moscow, 1968, p. 85.

⁴ A. Tirkova-Williams. *Op. cit.*, p. 245.

struggle against those of the representatives of the old ruling class who had refused to lay down their arms. The repressive measures taken against the "Tactical Centre," which Solzhenitsyn so loudly bemoans, did not represent the principal method used by the Soviet government in dealing with members of the old ruling class, which was persuasion.

To say that the Cadets made up 80 per cent of the intelligentsia, or at any event, all the engineers—this is an obvious lie. The very idea that political power in the country was now in the hands of the working people seems to drive Solzhenitsyn mad: "O, bards of the 20's, who represent them with such a turbulence of joy! But how can anyone forget them once he has come in contact with them—even a little, even just in childhood! Those mugs, those muzzles who persecuted the engineers. In the 20's they grew fat on this. And now we see that they did so back in 1918." (pp. 345-346) Such is the form of expression to which class hatred can lead—the truly genetic class hatred of a descendant of a family that had lost its property during the revolution. Where are Solzhenitsyn's professed ideals of "humility," which Western propaganda is making so much of?

The book is filled with impotent fury over the fact that a socialist revolution has taken place in Russia. And as may be expected, the author holds up the United States and some other countries where there is no socialism as the finest countries in the world. But, as we shall see later, the state of affairs in the United States do not at all suit Solzhenitsyn, who stands much further to the right than the capitalist class in that country. Nevertheless he was pleased with the fact that there is no revolution in the United States. He has

high praise for an old anti-Sovieteer who had shared a prison cell with him and who, long before the First World War, had lived in the United States and Canada. "The free and easy way of life in these countries quite overwhelmed" Solzhenitsyn's erstwhile cell-mate, whose conclusion was that "there will be no proletarian revolution in these countries, and there is no necessity for such a revolution there" (p. 200). And then there is their democracy, including "the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution under which 'no one is allowed to testify against himself.' Not allowed! (The same is true of the Bill of Rights of the 17th century)" (p. 112).

Here our author shows his poor knowledge of history. He apparently does not know that the Bill of Rights was adopted at the end of the 18th century and that the 5th Amendment is part of this document. This provides an illuminating comment on the erudition of a man who undertakes to judge history, and on the factual side of his writing. An eighth grader in a Soviet school, who studies this subject in his history classes, would get a bad mark for not knowing this. But the important point here is that by reviling the October Revolution Solzhenitsyn consciously seeks to obscure the fact that in any revolution the rights of those formerly in power are restricted.

The American revolution at the end of the 18th century was far from idyllic for those who opposed it. As the historian Herbert Aptheker has pointed out:

"There were, during the Revolution, perhaps 600,000 to 700,000 people who were loyal to the King, and of these, many thousands were active in asserting that loyalty. From them, the Revolu-

lionists, including Jefferson, took away the right to vote or hold office; they were forbidden to teach or to preach or to practice any profession. Those, who were wealthy, found their property confiscated (without trial); many suffered serious physical harm; many were jailed (without trial) and served long years of forced labour; some were executed (including some without trial); the presses of the Tories were confiscated; over 100,000 of them were forced into exile...

"Here was a living question of all kinds of rights—press, speech, assemblage, suffrage, due process of law, etc.—and they were deliberately denied scores of thousands of people for some 12 to 13 years. But if there is one word denouncing or deprecating this in the writings of Jefferson or Madison or Monroe or Henry or Washington, or the Adamses, this writer, after prolonged searching, has failed to uncover it."¹

That is how the American revolution dealt with its enemies from the right, not doubting for a moment the legitimacy of such actions. As a result of this revolution the United States constitution, together with the Bill of Rights and other legal documents, was adopted. The constitution was adopted through a "clever and deceptive" electoral system whereby a mere 100,000 votes, the population of the United States being four million at that time, were needed for its adoption (altogether 160,000 took part in presidential elections in those years). Such is the origin of American democracy which is so dear to the "dissidents," a democracy which deprived the overwhelming majority of the right to vote.

¹ H. Aptheker. *The Nature of Democracy, Freedom and Revolution*, New York, 1967, p. 11.

Gulag Archipelago brings to a logical conclusion what was outlined first in *August, 1914*. The book is the manifesto of a vicious enemy of the Russian people. We read on page 277:

"There is a simple truth, but it must be suffered and lived through: in war it is not victories but defeats that must be blessed. For it is governments that need victories, the people need defeats... The victory of the Russian troops at Poltava brought nothing but misfortune to Russia: two centuries of great strain, ruin and slavery, and more wars... We are so used to being proud of our victory over Napoleon that we leave out a very important thing: it is because of that victory that the emancipation of peasants did not take place half a century earlier, it is because of this victory that the Russian tsar, whose position became much stronger than before, managed to smash the Decembrists. (As for the French, they could not possibly have occupied Russia)."

This monstrous hodgepodge needs no other comment but this: that in making this admission of hatred for everything that is sacred to a Russian, the slanderer has exposed himself.

The above-quoted passage may be regarded as a kind of introduction to Solzhenitsyn's treatment of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people (1941-1945). It is hard to believe, but he is genuinely sorry that we won a victory in the life-and-death struggle with Nazism and saved humanity from Nazi enslavement. The Soviet people rejoiced in the victory which finally came on May 9, 1945, but for Solzhenitsyn "that wearisome spring with its music of Victory marches became the spring of retribution for my generation" (p. 244).

Elsewhere in the book he says: "My God, could we really have missed it all? While we were trampling the mud of bridgeheads, crouching in bomb craters and peering through stereo-binoculars while hidden in the bushes, another crop of youth has grown up and is now on the move! *Where* is it moving? Not by any chance in a direction that we would not have dared to think of moving? For we were brought up differently. Our generation of men will return home, hand in their weapons and, clinking their medals, proudly tell about combat episodes, while their younger brothers will only screw up their faces and think 'oh, what lubbers you must all be!'" (p. 606). That, according to Solzhenitsyn, was what the Soviet youth thought and spoke of in the years that followed the war!

And whereas Soviet soldiers in the Great Patriotic War did wrong, according to Solzhenitsyn, because they did not allow the enemy to defeat them and because they successfully defended their country and liberated the people of Europe, our enemies, in his book, were endowed with every imaginable virtue. Among them were the traitors—Vlasov and his followers—who pointed their guns at their own people. By joining the Wehrmacht they, too, allegedly "stroved to assert themselves and to tell the world about their formidable experience: that they also are a small part of Russia and want to play a role in its future" (p. 266). There is just one hitch here: "The smug and arrogant Germans would allow them to die for their Reich, but would not allow them even to think about an independent destiny of Russia" (p. 267). What a pity that Solzhenitsyn had not been appointed adviser to the Führer. He could have put Hitler right.

Many pages in the book are devoted to a description of the noble-hearted Vlasovites, and as for their leader, General Andrei Vlasov, our author ran out of words of praise. Of course he blamed others for Vlasov's bungling and leading his 2nd Striking Force in 1942 straight into the arms of the Germans. And he compares Vlasov's 2nd Army to Samsonov's 2nd Army which "had been plunged into encirclement in the same reckless manner." As is known, the Soviet Supreme Command made tremendous efforts to rescue the officers and men who came to grief through Vlasov's incompetence. Many of them managed to escape, but without their commander, although a special detachment had been sent to find him. "Unlike Samsonov," writes Solzhenitsyn, "Vlasov did not commit suicide." For the Germans needed him. "What they did not have was a real figure to fill the gap. And it was Vlasov who did it" (p. 258).

In this context, the author makes one of the most slanderous statements in his book: "This war has showed us that the worst thing in the world is to be a Russian" (p. 261). Solzhenitsyn includes in this category all the soldiers and officers of the Red Army who fought to the last in the struggle against fascism. They must have been fighting against their will though this, of course, was known only to Solzhenitsyn to whom "the victory at Stalingrad was due to the penal squads" (p. 92).

As for the Germans, they were of course exceedingly kind and charitable everywhere, including the concentration camps (p. 142). As for their treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, "it was not the Germans that were at fault. The

trouble is that the USSR does not recognize the Russian signature on the Hague convention on prisoners of war" (p. 225). The Hague convention had been signed by old Russia; as to the Geneva convention of 1929, the USSR did not sign it because one of its clauses provides for the segregation of POW's according to race. To recognize the convention in that form would be to agree, to some extent, with the racist policy of the Nazis. This is something which the Soviet Union would not do. Hitler distorted the reasons for the Soviet refusal to sign the Geneva convention and used it in his propaganda. But even if the Soviet Union had signed the convention, this would certainly not have deterred the Nazis from committing the monstrous crimes they did against those who had fallen into their hands. As we all know, Nazi Germany trampled underfoot many international agreements and conventions during the last war. . .

The whole of the *Gulag Archipelago*, from first page to last, is one continuous chain of slander about our people, slander which has surpassed the wildest inventions of the Western Sovietologists. A plain statement of the essence of Solzhenitsyn's views, as given above, can only arouse anger and indignation in all honest men, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the world. Solzhenitsyn and those who are with him are probably aware of this, for they clothe their slander with irresponsible and provocative discussions of a subject which deeply pains us: the violation of socialist legality in the years of the personality cult. Solzhenitsyn is trying to rub salt into old wounds and by stirring up emotions to make people pay attention to his slander about the USSR and about socialism in general.

This is a separate question in itself, and about this question there can be no ambiguity. It is not a matter of seeking excuses for what happened; there are no excuses. Crimes had been committed against many Soviet people, and great damage had been done to our country.

But this is our affair, our sorrow and our pain. And it is vile, for the purpose of titillating the bored philistine in the West in search of excitement, to speculate on the memory of those who perished in the period of the personality cult. In the years that have elapsed since that time there have been no violations of socialist legality.

An article in *Pravda* on the publication abroad of *Gulag Archipelago* points out the following: "Western propaganda is trying to suggest that Solzhenitsyn's books are not published in the Soviet Union because he tells the truth about some dramatic episodes in the history of the Soviet state, notably about the illegal repressions.

"This is malicious slander. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has openly and uncompromisingly criticized the violations of socialist legality in connection with the personality cult; it has fully restored Leninist principles and standards in Party work and in society, and has taken steps to ensure the growth of socialist democracy.

"In our country a number of literary works have been published containing criticism of shortcomings and mistakes of the past, and the Soviet public has responded positively to these works because their authors try to present truth instead of taking a one-sided view of things, and without losing a sense of historical perspective.

"As for Solzhenitsyn, he deals with these questions from an entirely different position. He is trying to prove that the violations of legality were

not a deviation from the norms of socialist society, but they stemmed from the very nature of socialism.”¹

Moreover, the tragedy in the history of our country is for Solzhenitsyn an occasion for jeering at and gloating over what people had gone through who had been imprisoned but who have retained their faith in the Party. There is not one word showing respect for such men in the thick book. Only mockery. Solzhenitsyn has other idols—people whom he met in prison. One of them was “a German, tall and young, and silent (that because he did not speak a word of Russian)” (p. 594). That “silent” young man was a German ace-pilot who had fought in the last war against the Soviet Union and who had strafed women and children, a war criminal who was jailed for his crimes.

Another criminal who confided in Solzhenitsyn was a Romanian saboteur who, in his own words, had worked his way into a Soviet parachute depot and there, “at break-neck speed, in about eight hours spoiled two thousand parachutes.” This was how he carried out his assignment. He had “leaned a ladder against the stacks of chutes and, without disturbing the covers,” cut the main shroud-lines down to “four-fifths of their thickness” with his scissors, so that it would snap in the air. Did it really happen? Not likely (fifteen seconds per parachute!) However, the words of that saboteur impressed Solzhenitsyn. “I destroyed a whole Soviet airborne division!” he said with a glint in his eyes” (p. 601).

Let us assume for a moment that what that Romanian said was true, and that on baling out

¹ *Pravda*, January 14, 1974.

the Soviet soldiers lost their lives. Well, probably not 2,000 men. Let us for the sake of argument say that at least one Soviet soldier, some young fellow crouched in his jump, with a submachine gun in his hands and with his pack on his shoulders, met his death as the result of the enemy's cunning. What should one call the man who was responsible for the death of this soldier? Here is Solzhenitsyn's answer: "You won't see another hero like this one in the whole of this long prison chronicle.¹ Over the eleven years that I spent in prison, in camp and in exile I had only one such encounter, while others may have had no such encounters at all. Our mass-produced comics are fooling our youth when they say that all the state security organs do is catch such people" (p. 602). Only a scoundrel is capable of such cynicism and sacrilege!

But that was not a momentary outburst of spite. It is a part of the strategy of this Cato of modern times: the Soviet Union must be destroyed! Every action towards this end is good, and those in the West who are slow about carrying out this goal deserve the most severe criticism. Why, asks an enraged Solzhenitsyn, did the West fail to take action against the Soviet Union towards the end of the war on a scale commensurate with the military might of the United States and Britain, since there were plenty of "heroes" like that despicable scoundrel, the Romanian saboteur?

"In their own countries," Solzhenitsyn goes on, "Roosevelt and Churchill are regarded as models of statesmanship. But from our prison cells we Russians could clearly see their obvious political

¹ Thus far only two of the planned seven parts of *Gulag Archipelago* have been published (p. 476).

near-sightedness bordering on stupidity. How could they, skidding down from 1941 to 1945, fail to provide security and independence for Eastern Europe? How could they give up the vast territories in Saxony and Thuringia in exchange for that ridiculous toy of a Berlin divided into four zones (their future heel of Achilles)? . . . This was supposed to be the payment to Stalin for his agreement to participate in the war against Japan. And even when they had an atomic bomb in their hands, they still went on paying Stalin . . . What is that but poor political strategy? And in later years when Mikolajczyk was ousted, when Beneš and Masaryk died, when Berlin was besieged, when Budapest was choking in flames, when Korea was a mass of smouldering ruins, and when the Conservatives showed a clean pair of heels at Suez, how could it be possible that even at that time none of them so much as recalled the policy pursued by Roosevelt and Churchill!" (p. 265.)

Very likely Solzhenitsyn had talked like this to people like himself while he was in prison. This, incidentally, confirms what George Kennan said about the "dissidents": they are a group of vicious renegades who hope that the West will use its military might to smash the Soviet Union and will do what Solzhenitsyn and others like him are not able to do, i.e., to destroy communism. The "dissidents" must have an exaggerated notion about what the West can, and will, do.

In his appalling ignorance, Solzhenitsyn has raised a question which has long since been settled in the West, using the arguments of the most rabid anti-Communists. Significantly, American reactionaries spoke of F.D. Roosevelt in exactly the same terms as Solzhenitsyn. One of them, George Crocker, in a book published in 1959, wrote: "In

this . . . war . . . we find Franklin D. Roosevelt almost invariably charging ahead on the side of Soviet Russia. In fact his support was the *sine qua non* of its successful launching. His mission, which he performed implacably, was to put weapons in Stalin's hands and, with American military might, to demolish all of the dikes that held back the pressing tides of Communist expansion in Europe and Asia . . .

"The American people, living in a thickening miasma of propaganda diffusing out from the White House, had little understanding that what Roosevelt and Hopkins were seeing in their crystal ball was the domination of Europe by Communist Russia."¹

The withdrawal of US troops from the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, and the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan had long been a subject of discussion in the West, and not only among anti-Communists, but also, especially shortly after the war, among American scholars who had failed to grasp the meaning of the events of those years.

During the MacCarthy years this campaign reached its peak. Official circles in the United States had had to explain the true motives of American foreign policy and to restrain the political adventurists who demanded immediate military action against the Soviet people. Government leaders in the United States could not have known, of course, that in those years sympathizers with MacCarthyism who were in Soviet prisons were cursing the West for not displaying enough anti-communist fervour. "We railed at

¹ G. Crocker. *Roosevelt's Road to Russia*, Chicago, 1959, pp. 21, 191.

Churchill and Roosevelt," says Solzhenitsyn, "we complained about the West because Stalin dared to blockade Berlin¹ and could get away with it with flying colours." (p. 548). The provocateurs behind bars were dismayed to think that the Soviet people, who had just come out of a hard-won war, were not being forced to fight a war with invading imperialists!

The fact that relations between the West and the USSR did not reach a state of crisis that could lead to a war is explained, not by a sudden outburst of love for peace on the part of the leaders of the United States and Britain, but by the balance of power between imperialism and socialism which was then established thanks to the great feat of the Soviet people and their Red Army in the war of 1941-1945. Full realization of this fact in Washington and London led to the agreement between the West and the Soviet Union, an agreement which enraged Solzhenitsyn and caused him to curse Roosevelt and Churchill for their "mistakes." But it was not a question of the American and British leaders making mistakes; it was just that they understood the great strength of the Soviet Union.

What Solzhenitsyn proposes belatedly in his book—not to withdraw the US troops from parts of Saxony and Thuringia which they had occupied towards the end of the war, and which under a tripartite treaty were included in the Soviet occupation zone—fully coincides with Churchill's intentions in those days. On June 4, 1945 he sent a hysterical cable to Truman saying that he "viewed

¹ A reference to the measures taken by the Soviet administration in 1948-1949 to restrict entry into West Berlin owing to provocative actions taken by the Western powers.

with profound misgivings the retreat of the American army to our line of occupation in the Central Sector, thus bringing the Soviet Power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of an iron curtain between us and everything to the eastward.”¹ Churchill insisted that this question be discussed with a view to bringing pressure to bear upon the USSR.²

Truman sought the counsel of his military chiefs. In his cable to the President, sent from Germany, Dwight D. Eisenhower said: “To me, such an attitude seemed indefensible. I was certain, and was always supported in this attitude by the War Department, that to start off our first direct association with Russia on the basis of refusing to carry out an arrangement in which the good faith of our government was involved would wreck the whole co-operative attempt at its very beginning.”³ In his memoirs Truman frankly wrote the following about his decision to withdraw US troops:

“I took this position after consultations with our military chiefs... There were powerful military considerations which we could not and should not disregard.”⁴ What kind of considerations?

On instructions from their governments the military chiefs of Britain and the United States, long before the end of hostilities against the Axis powers, began to study the question of the possibility of starting a war against the Soviet Union. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, for its part, came to

¹ H. Truman. *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, New York, 1965, p. 335.

² *Ibid.*

³ D. Eisenhower. *Grusade in Europe*, New York, 1961, p. 474.

⁴ H. Truman. *Op. cit.*, p. 332.

the conclusion that it would be impossible to win a war against the USSR. This conclusion, made on the eve of the three-power summit conferences at Yalta and Potsdam, contained an analysis of the political possibilities of the United States in the international arena. It was just not strong enough to pursue a policy of *diktat*.

On the other hand, Churchill, who was then British Prime Minister, was prepared to start a new crusade against communism without delay. But since Britain did not have the strength for that, the generals in that country had a hard time restraining this venturesome politician. The prospects for bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union were gloomy indeed. The Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Alanbrooke made this entry in his diary, on May 24, 1945: "This evening I went carefully through the Planners' report on the possibility of taking on Russia should trouble arise in our future discussions with her. We were instructed to carry out this investigation. The idea is, of course, fantastic and the chances of success quite impossible. There is no doubt that from now onwards Russia is all-powerful in Europe."¹

The fact that the imperialists were not powerful enough to wage a war against us was not some kind of miracle, sent down from heaven, but the result of the policy we have followed from the time of the revolution. Under the leadership of the Party our people have transformed the country; they have liquidated the harsh legacy of the foreign military intervention and the Civil War,

¹ A. Bryant. *The Triumph in the West*, London, 1959, p. 470.

built a powerful economy, and have brought the country to the forefront of science, technology and culture. Only he who does not want to see what Russia was under tsarism and under the bourgeois rule, and what it has become under the Communists, could find solace in the hope that the West would try to cross swords with our country and to settle controversial issues by force. At any rate, Churchill and Roosevelt and many other statesmen in later years saw further and more clearly than the "dissidents." They realized that that would be a suicidal undertaking. What happened to Nazi Germany served as a warning even for political blockheads, and the impotence of the atomic bomb in settling outstanding issues with the existing correlation of forces in the world, had been convincingly proven by Western strategists.

Military experts in capitalist countries have been carefully studying the figures showing the economic potential of the socialist countries. The reality that stands behind these figures fills them with a feeling of respect and none of them would say as Solzhenitsyn does in his book: "Someday soon, somebody will write a history of the technology of these years! He will give you all sorts of examples and illustrations. He will also give a proper analysis of your convulsive five-year-plan-in-four-years. . . We will then learn about how all the best projects were doomed, and how the worst ones were invariably carried out and in the worst possible way. But what can you expect if the hunweipings have been put in charge of experts in diamond cutting?" (p. 386.)

If any of the Sovietologists in the West should adopt this "analysis" he would immediately lose his job. Obviously real facts are needed in work-

ing out any policy; otherwise the policy will come to grief. But at the same time Western press, radio, and television are describing Solzhenitsyn, with a fervour which is highly profitable for them, as some kind of monopolist on "truth" about the USSR. The mercenary scriblers and the falsifiers at radio and television stations know very well that the man lies, yet they are trying hard to present the lies as truth. What they are doing is fulfilling a social order handed down to them from the most reactionary quarters in Western countries—to vilify socialism, to smear it by all possible means.

Unfortunately the world has already for decades suffered from the effects of the "cold war," and therefore the study of its origin is no idle pastime. Like the anti-communist propagandists, the "dissidents" maintain that none other than the Soviet Union is to blame for the sad state of affairs in the world. And this is the central theme of *Gulag Archipelago*.

But such a view has long been rejected by Western historians. One can say with confidence that in recent years American historiography does not support views such as those expounded by Solzhenitsyn.

The policy of the Soviet Union had indeed been interpreted that way by some statesmen in Washington in the late 1940's and early 1950's. But even at that time, when the "cold war" was at its height, many scholars disagreed with such an interpretation of Soviet policy. They, said Dean Acheson, who was Secretary of State in those years, "challenged the belief which I shared with the planners that the Kremlin gave top priority to world domination in their scheme of things. They contended that we attributed more

of a Trotskyite than Leninist view to Stalin..."¹ The treatment the dissenting scholars received at the hands of Washington's political elite was rough: they were sacked. "But," continued Acheson summing up this episode in his memoirs, published in 1969, "a decade and a half later a school of academic criticism has concluded that we overreacted to Stalin... This may be true."²

This "overreacting" led to attempts to restore the "sanitary cordon" in Europe. This, incidentally, was the main cause of the Berlin crisis. All that has been carefully documented in numerous studies by historians belonging to the above mentioned school of historiography in the United States, such as G. Kolko, W. A. Williams, and D. Fleming.

The ideas and notions of the "dissidents" collapse as soon as they come in contact with facts; moreover, they do not accord with the views held by historians in the West today. On the other hand, they fit in well with anti-communist propaganda of the cheapest kind designed for people who do not know any better. And such ideas and notions can be used by reactionary forces in the West, not for the purpose of policy planning (the real worth of the "dissidents" is well known among government circles in the West), but in their "psychological warfare" whose only weapons are lies and slander. That is why the "dissidents" are given not just crocodile tears over the fate of the "fighters" against communism, but also financial handouts. Solzhenitsyn had, in 1973, 1.5

¹ D. Acheson. *Present at the Creation*, New York, 1969, p. 753.

² *Ibid.*

million dollars on his bank accounts in Switzerland. Each one of these dollars is covered with dirt.

The Dregs of the Scientific and Technological Revolution

The scientific and technological revolution poses serious social problems. In the West joy over the opportunities offered by science and technology often turns into a deep pessimism as people begin to ponder over the evil purposes which the wonders of the 20th century may be made to serve in the hands of morally corrupt men. How should society be organized? How should the stupendous achievements of science be integrated into human society without destroying it? Concerning this question there have sprung up various conceptions of "technocracy" which equate technical knowledge with an ability to manage society.

The extravagant claims made by the advocates of technocracy are a subject of study by futurologists and of ridicule by science fiction writers. In his story "Absolute Technocracy" Lino Aldani, one of the fathers of science fiction, satirizes the notion of technocracy through his hero:

"Steve began to reflect on technocracy... There was a time when human society was hardly organized at all; the most incompetent people were made executives while someone of great intellectual ability might spend his whole life in miserable conditions. Anyway, that was what the text-books said. Barbarism flourished in the 20th century. Power was held, not by technical experts.

but by politicians—a breed of men afflicted with megalomania and excessive fervour. It disappeared with the coming of the era of cybernetics and absolute technocracy. . . . Steve did not quite understand what was so good about absolute technocracy. He knew just one thing, namely, that absolute technocracy was considered a real blessing to mankind. He grew up with a religious reverence for society's laws and accepted them as instinctively as a child learns to speak."¹

Steve, an imaginary man of the future, was in a tragicomical situation. His thoughts on technocracy came to him as he was taking in subjects including non-euclidian geometry and the theory of relativity, to qualify for the job of second-grade street sweeper. Aldani invites the readers to have a good laugh at the excesses to which the theory of technocracy would logically lead. They are laughable, but not at all funny.

The characters in our story are far more clever than the simple-minded Steve. They know exactly what the blessings of technocracy are. It is true that Solzhenitsyn, a mathematician by training, and the physicist Sakharov know very little about the human sciences. Another thing they do not know is that the Industrial Revolution gave rise to anarchism in its day, and the current technological revolution also has its price—some people, for instance, try in vain to find for themselves what they would regard as a fitting place in society. But that does not disturb them. In letter to the Party and Government leaders, dated March 19, 1970, Sakharov, touching on some of the most complex social questions, attempts to analyze

¹ *A Moon of Twenty Hands. A Collection of Science Fiction Stories*, translated from the Italian, Moscow, 1967, pp. 52-53.

them "in the first approximation," as he puts it using professional jargon, saying that "the important thing is, as mathematicians say, to prove the theorem that a solution exists." Perhaps he was hinting at his own importance by using such expressions.

Equipped with a method as precise and appropriate as that, they build a model of ideal society. Solzhenitsyn first took up this difficult task in his *August, 1914*, where the heroes talk about what a good thing it would be for mankind if order were introduced into the disorder in which it now lives. Archangorodski, a successful businessman, addressing some revolutionaries, says: "There are thousands of you, and it's a long time since any of you did some work. Does anybody ask why? It is not done. Nor are you exploiters. But you have never stopped consuming the national product. It will all be repaid by the revolution, you say" (p. 534). This uncommonly shrewd gentleman rejects all known forms of society's organization. "Don't you think that a republic is a delicious dish of which you can never have enough. A hundred ambitious barristers—the greatest gabbers of all—will get together and gab their heads off. Anyway, the people won't be ever able to govern itself" (p. 536).

Solzhenitsyn's basic idea is, therefore, that politics and political parties are an unnecessary burden for mankind. The "hundred ambitious barristers" in the US Senate have sadly blundered. While they are wasting the taxpayers' money on supporting subversive radio stations that foul the air with Solzhenitsyn's poisonous rubbish, Solzhenitsyn has already written them off as utterly useless. However, that is their problem.

Another sage, lovingly portrayed in the book

and referred to as an engineer, adds: "What I think is that an Engineers' Association could easily become a power in Russia. And it could be far more important and effective than any political party . . . Shrewd, intelligent people do not administrate—they build and transform. Government is a dead toad. But if it should stand in the nation's way—well, then I guess it would have to be taken" (p. 527). Well, that did not take place, for the October Revolution occurred in Russia. Solzhenitsyn returns to these plans in *Gulag Archipelago*, and speaks this time for himself.

Grossly falsifying history, he asserts that the dictatorship of the proletariat is spearheaded against the technologists. He resorts to demagoguery by deliberately mixing up the political concept of proletarian dictatorship and the actual management of economy. The October Revolution opened up tremendous possibilities for the development of science and technology, but according to Solzhenitsyn it was the other way round. "How could *engineers* accept *dictatorship from workers*—their mere helpers in industry, little skilled and knowing well neither the physical nor the economic laws of production, who nevertheless installed themselves at the biggest desks, to tell the engineers what to do?" (p. 392). Where could Solzhenitsyn have seen this except in the declarations of the so-called Workers' Opposition which was repudiated by the Communist Party? None of that nonsense would be worth mentioning but for the fact that it throws some light on Solzhenitsyn's overriding idea that society should be dominated by technocracy. Although he tried hard, Solzhenitsyn has managed to say no more than the hero of the above-mentioned story by Aldani, and in very much the same way too. Solzhenitsyn

writes: "Why shouldn't engineers think it more natural for society to have a pattern putting those in the lead who can intelligently regulate its activities? (And, excepting *moral* regulation alone, isn't it all that social cybernetics is about? Aren't professional politicians just boils on society's neck, preventing it from turning its head freely and moving its arms about?) Why shouldn't engineers have political views? After all, politics are not even a science, they are an empirical field not described by any mathematical apparatus and subject to boot to man's egoism and blind passions" (pp. 392-393).

So here is Solzhenitsyn's main thesis, which, as we have seen, is succinctly stated by a science fiction writer in a short satirical story. In Solzhenitsyn's case, however, it is presented to us as something of an oracle in a novel several hundred pages long.

Since Solzhenitsyn mentions "social cybernetics," whatever that is, let us see what Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, thought about the usefulness of mathematical methods, cybernetics, etc., to society. Although he was a broad-minded man and had a passionate commitment to the new hypotheses, Wiener was well aware that "the human sciences are very poor testing-grounds for a new mathematical technique", "there is much which we must leave, whether we like it or not, to the 'un-scientific', narrative method of the professional historian."¹ In his fascinating *God and Golem, Inc.* Wiener wrote: "Render unto man the things which are man's and unto the

¹ N. Wiener. *Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, New York and London, 1961, p. 25.

computer the things which are the computer's." ¹

When cybernetics first emerged, all advocates of technocracy went mad. Long before Solzhenitsyn, they were inventing all kinds of argument to support the idea that the exact sciences are of great significance to society. As he looked on the modern Laputans and the fuss they made, Norbert Wiener spoke of the vain hopes that were pinned on the new methods evolved by the exact sciences. "They are certain," he wrote, "that our control over our material environment has far outgrown our control over our social environment and our understanding thereof. Therefore, they consider that the main task of the immediate future is to extend to the fields of anthropology, of sociology, of economics, the methods of the natural sciences, in the hope of achieving a like measure of success in the social fields. From believing this necessary, they come to believe it possible. In this, I maintain, they show an excessive optimism, and a misunderstanding of the nature of all scientific achievement." ²

And to illustrate his idea, Norbert Wiener wrote in a somewhat facetious vein: "...we cannot attribute too much value to this type of wishful thinking. It is the mode of thought of the mice when faced with the problem of belling the cat. Undoubtedly it would be very pleasant for us mice if the predatory cats of this world were to be belled, but—who is going to do it? Who is to assure us that ruthless power will not find its way back into the hands of those most avid for it?" ³ Wiener

¹ N. Wiener. *God and Golem, Inc.*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964, p. 73.

² N. Wiener. *Cybernetics of Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, New York and London, 1961, p. 162.

³ *Ibid.*

was perfectly aware that some learned mice had evil intentions. That this is indeed so is clear not only from the slanderous writings of Solzhenitsyn, from which little can be expected by way of scientific knowledge, but also from Academician Sakharov's sallies into the realm of politics.

Whereas Solzhenitsyn has had to fill up thousands of pages (to which he is threatening to add some more "sections" and "parts"), Sakharov is laudably laconic. His 38-page brochure entitled *Reflections on Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom* contains all his ideas. Since 1968, when he composed it, Sakharov has added nothing to his interesting reflections. Setting off for unfamiliar territory, Sakharov duly acknowledges his debt to his guiding light, the "eminent" author Solzhenitsyn (p.22). Having drawn his wisdom from that unlikely source, Sakharov proceeded to talk nonsense and rubbish as he strove to present his notion of an ideal society, the Soviet state being not to his liking.

Not only is he anti-Soviet; he wallows in his anti-Sovietism. "Disgraceful" is his epithet for everything Soviet.¹ Why? Because, Sakharov explains, there is no "democratization" in the USSR and no account is taken of the opinions of the wise (meaning, no doubt, Sakharov himself and his friends). Harping on this subject is to Sakharov what harping on violations of socialist legality is to Solzhenitsyn—they serve as a kind of fine wrapping for their views, to make them more presentable. This wrapping, incidentally, is

¹ A detailed exposition of Sakharov's views is contained in the article *Relations and the Ideological Struggle*, "Kommunist," 1973, No. 14, pp. 16-22.

shabby enough, having been used by the Cadets to sell their ideas to the gullible a long time ago.

The Cadets called themselves the "brains of the nation" and asked the masses to support them for that reason. In the stormy autumn of 1917, they flooded Russian towns with leaflets calling on people to vote for Ticket No.1, that is, the Cadets or the "People's Freedom" Party, at the elections to the Provisional Government. The text placed at the bottom of their election poster reads: "The People's Freedom Party has always stood for people's power. . . The Freedom Party has always nominated public-spirited men who are capable and well-informed." Of course in Russia at that time people understood quickly enough the intentions of those who tried to present themselves as the most intelligent. Sakharov's views are clearly a reversion to the Cadet creed, allowing for the technological revolution. For he sees eye to eye with the Cadets on the main point—that power should belong to the capitalists.

According to Sakharov socialism should be integrated into capitalism, the capitalist system allegedly being a more perfect system. What a wonderful country indeed—"the fact that there are millionaires in the United States is not really a serious economic burden since there are few of them. The aggregate consumption of the 'rich' is under 20 per cent or less of the total growth of national consumption over a five-year period. From this point of view, a revolution which slows down economic progress for more than five years cannot be considered economically advantageous for the working people" (p. 29).

The question is: just how is one to extend the wonderful system to the whole of mankind? Sci-

ence will come to the aid, of course; "international politics must be thoroughly pervaded by scientific methodology" (p. 8). It only remains to do away with Marxism and take a "realistic" stand and lo! the miracle happens—by the year 2000 a world government will have emerged upon earth. All proponents of technocracy have long been hankering after it. They try to drum up support for their precious chimaera among people innocent of any knowledge of it. The American physicist and notorious "father" of the atomic bomb Edward Teller wrote about this quite seriously: "I cannot rid myself of the thought that President Roosevelt may have planned to use the existence of the atomic bomb, after the war, as a powerful driving force toward world government."¹ In Roosevelt's lifetime there were no atomic weapons in existence, while arguments like Teller's, as the American historian W. A. Williams stressed, cannot be tested for "the charge, later made by some, that Roosevelt should have gazed three months into the future of atomic physics is absurd."²

The idea of world government was for a time entertained by the great physicist Albert Einstein. When, after the Second World War, he began to discuss the question, Soviet scientists believed that they should state frankly what they thought about the subject. In an open letter, entitled "On Some Misconceptions on the Part of Professor Albert Einstein" [*Novoe vremya* (New Time), Oct. 26, 1947], Academicians Vavilov, Ioffe, Semyonov and

¹ E. Teller. A. Brown. *The Legacy of Hiroshima*, New York, 1962, p. 24.

² W. Williams. *American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947*, New York, 1952, p. 277.

Frumkin paid tribute to Einstein who had repeatedly spoken out against Nazi barbarism and, after the war, against the threat of a new war and against the attempts of US monopolies to make science serve their interests. Soviet scientists, the letter continued, like the entire Soviet people, hailed the Einstein's activities prompted by genuine humanist beliefs.

But, said Vavilov, Ioffe, Semyonov and Frumkin, talk of world government "seems to us not only erroneous but dangerous to the cause of peace to which Einstein is committed." They explained what the appeal for world government meant in present-day conditions. "The slogan of a supranational superstate merely gives a nice façade to world domination by the monopolies... Ironically, Einstein has been brought to support what are in fact the schemes of the worst enemies of peace and international cooperation. It is just because we have such a high regard for Einstein both as scientist and public figure that we consider it our duty to say all this frankly, without resorting to diplomatic niceties..."¹ Sakharov, a physicist, would do well to re-read today this letter written by his senior colleagues.

And what blessings, one might ask, will "world government" bestow on mankind, apart from putting it under the iron heel of American monopoly capital? Very many, according to Sakharov. After referring to the dangers posed by technocracy mentioned by Wiener in his *Cybernetics*, and after saying that he, Sakharov, had no desire to turn people into "chickens or rats" with electrodes implanted in their brains for behaviour control

¹ L. Lvov. *Zhizn Alberta Einsteina* (The Life of Albert Einstein), Moscow, 1959, pp. 297-298.

(pp. 20-21), Sakharov proceeded to unfold just such a perspective. This is what he says in part: a world government will have many possibilities, for with its inauguration "the achievements of biology (at that time and later on) can be used for effective control and regulation of all vital processes at the biochemical, cytological, executive, ecological and social levels, including birth rate and the process of ageing, psychic processes and heredity" (p.35).

A delightful prospect indeed, which the technocrats have painted for us. This is where Cadet ideology takes one in an age of technological revolution. A world of living robots under the watchful eye and supervision of an oligarchy of moneybags! But to make such a world it would require iron nerves, at least on the part of the initiators of the whole inhuman arrangement. Have the "dissidents" got such nerves? Never fear, says Solzhenitsyn reassuringly, we are determined men. In *Gulag Archipelago* he declares himself and his friends to be ready for anything. "The same man," he tells us, "does not behave in the same way at different ages and in different situations in which life may place him. Sometimes he is not unlike a fiend, at other times not unlike a saint. But he goes under the same name and so everything is ascribed to one and the same person. . .

"Had Maliuta Skuratov needed us, we wouldn't have disappointed him, I think" (p.176).

It is easy to imagine Solzhenitsyn, with his clearly criminally bent psychology, in that role, but not Sakharov. Sakharov's notions are certainly preposterous but still they are the notions of a well-meaning "technocrat" and one can dismiss them by having a good laugh at them. One feels like advising Sakharov to do what is essential in

any scholarly effort—to have a critical look at himself, if only in the mirror. Then many things may become clearer. The attire of an executioner, a helper of Maliuta Skuratov, does not suit him at all.

* * *

Such are the theoretical beliefs of the “dissidents,” and they form the basis of their practice, which is subversion of the Motherland. There are many ways of carrying out this subversion. The most notable one at present is to send appeals to Western government circles respectfully begging them to put stronger and stronger pressure on the Soviet Union in every field. Sakharov, being politically naïve, begs the US Congress not to grant the Soviet Union the most favoured nation status in trade. Solzhenitsyn, with greater malice, insists that business contacts with the Soviet Union are “another Munich,” and so on. In short, they are trying to wreck detente for they need the “cold war” which gives them a chance to undermine and destroy socialism.

The “dissidents” are making “war on communism,” but they do harm to everyone of us. Every single family stands to gain from detente and expansion of international trade. So this is the price of their “concern” for the people.

The “dissidents’” efforts are duly appreciated by Western reactionary circles for what they recommend is in accord with the current strategy of anti-communism. As a scientist, Sakharov should be able to draw the logical conclusions from this.

Imperialism is building up armaments. The US military budget is approaching the hundred billion dollars mark. In view of this, the Soviet Union must see to her defence. The most ardent supporters in the West of that mode of action which

could be called an "attrition strategy," would like to hamper in this way economic progress in the Soviet Union and cause shortages so as to affect the morale of the Soviet people.

It is probably from this angle that they regard the "dissidents'" activity. Look, they seem to say, there are some people in the Soviet Union who are calling for capitulation to imperialism. And they are encouraged to use subtle methods of subversion against the Soviet Union, for a purely military solution has no chance of success.

In his book *Seven Roads to Moscow*, published in the late fifties, W. G. Jackson, an expert in military theory, reviewed the various attempts to invade Russia since the early times, counted seven such invasions, and concluded:

"Jumping the fence, on the other hand, has always failed, as stories of Swedish, French and German roads have proved. Moreover, there has been a progressive increase in the magnitudes of disasters which have overwhelmed each successive invasion. The only lasting road to Moscow was the Viking Road that provided the constructive services which the Russian people themselves wanted, and for which they themselves asked. Let us hope that no one will ever be tempted to emulate Charles, Napoleon or Hitler in imposing a military solution of a kind which history has shown must fail, and which may well bring nuclear annihilation to mankind."¹

That, in effect, is what the "dissidents" are asking. Come and rule over us, and we shall help you. The paranoid nature of such thinking and of the "Viking" concept itself is no secret to Soviet people. But the "dissidents'" efforts give much

¹ W. Jackson. *Seven Roads to Moscow*, London, 1957, p. 319.

encouragement to some people in the West who begin to think that the great Soviet Union is torn by internal strife and is, after all, a colossus on clay feet. They believe that the cherished hopes of the enemies of this country have finally come true, as our people are no longer united. But here is the lesson Clausewitz drew from Napoleon's invasion of Russia:

"Russia is not such a country that one can really conquer, i.e., occupy; this, at least, is something that the modern European states cannot do, and that the 500,000 men whom Buonaparte had brought there for the purpose, could not do. Russia is a country which can be brought to submission only through its weakness and through the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike at the vulnerable spots of its political body Russia would have to be stirred up at the very centre... The march of 1812 failed because the enemy government proved firm and the people stayed loyal and tenacious, i.e., it failed because it could not succeed."¹

Pentagon strategists, while analyzing the experience of the Second World War before American military cadets, never fail to cite that passage from Clausewitz and to show "how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz advice."²

The "dissidents'" activities in the current situation are clearly an attempt to help the enemies of the Soviet Union correct their errors and to urge them to take the toughest line towards it. Solzhe-

¹ K. Clausewitz. *On War*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1933, pp. 127, 129, Russ. Ed.

² *The German Campaign in Russia (1940-1942)*, Washington, 1955, p. 111.

nilsyn and others are provocateurs prepared even to help unleash war to achieve their rabid anti-communist aims. Surely these people are craving for something which they will never get, but their incitement against and slander of the Soviet Union serve to complicate the international situation and undermine world peace, for they are furnishing anti-Communists with a pretext for launching new campaigns against the USSR. In other words, they provide a cover for the designs of the most aggressive circles of world reaction.

Н. ЯКОВЛЕВ
АРХИПЕЛАГ ЛЖИ СОЛЖЕНИЦЫНА
на английском языке

Цена 8 коп.

