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# RED VILLAGES

THE 5-YEAR PLAN  
IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE

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by

Y. A. YAKOVLEV

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF AGRICULTURE, U.S.S.R.

TRANSLATED BY  
ANNA LOUISE STRONG



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## EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE Soviet Union's Five-Year Plan has drawn the attention of the world. Many books, reports and articles have been published regarding it, and the publishers of this volume have also issued a complete and authoritative account—*The Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union*, by G. T. Grinko, who, as vice-chairman of the State Planning Commission, participated in its drafting, and as the present Soviet Commissar of Finance is closely identified with its progress.

The present book as well is the work of a man intimately connected with it, the Soviet Commissar of Agriculture. *Red Villages* is a careful study of the Five-Year Plan in relation to agriculture, a field in which amazing successes have been recorded. The most archaic forms of cultivation and organization have been replaced by the tractor, the combine and other advanced agricultural machinery, and by modern technique. Vast tracts of unused land have been reclaimed; huge industrialized state farms, really grain factories, have been developed; and the multitudinous strips of land cultivated by individual peasants are being combined into large collectives.

The central idea of the Five-Year Plan for Soviet agriculture during 1928-1933 is the reorganization and socialization of the village. The program, in terms of state and collective farms, was successfully completed by the spring of 1931—in about half the time allotted by the Plan. Before the development of the collectivization movement there were about 25 million peasant households; to-day well over 12 million of them have been collectivized, and

by the end of the Plan period collectivization is expected to be universal in the country. The stupendous achievements in the mechanization and collectivization of Soviet agriculture have been likened to the revolution in manufacture which came with the industrial revolution and the establishment of the factory system.

Two years after the Plan was put into operation, the collectives sowed 36 million hectares—a third more than was called for in the final year, and the state farms also produced a third more than had been expected of them in 1933. Upon the completion of the Plan the machine and tractor stations were expected to have sown three million hectares of land for the collectives. As a matter of fact they will have done eight times as much in 1931.

In the first four chapters of this book, the reader will find a speech delivered by Commissar of Agriculture Yakovlev before the XVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in 1930. It has been translated from the Russian by Anna Louise Strong, long a resident of the Soviet Union and herself a close student and writer on the Russian village. The concluding remarks contained in the fifth chapter were delivered by Commissar Yakovlev after the discussion of his report. The appendix contains the theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Yakovlev report. It was later adopted as a resolution by the Congress and became the guiding policy for the Five-Year Plan in agriculture.

A. Bosse aided in editing this volume, bringing up to date, from later official sources, many figures already outdated by the rapid strides of the Soviet agricultural advance. The new data are in each case embodied in footnotes.

## CHAPTER I

### THE AMERICAN METHOD OF ORGANIZING LARGE-SCALE FARMING

AN adequate understanding of the progress and the present status of Soviet agriculture can not be obtained from a study of our country alone. In order not to err in our estimate of past results and future aims, it is necessary to begin with a brief comparison of the development of large-scale farming on the basis of new technical methods in the Soviet Union and in capitalist countries, principally the United States. Such a comparison will clearly reveal the special characteristics of this development in our country, and will facilitate an analysis of the strong and weak points of our work.

What are the characteristics of the process of the development of agriculture in the United States? The tremendous increase in the use of the tractor in the United States during the decade that followed the World War is well known to all. In this period the number of tractors in the United States increased more than fivefold—until it has reached nearly a million at present. The number of combines [combined harvesters and threshers, operated with tractors—*Ed.*] increased eightfold between 1920 and 1928, reaching 28,000. The figure now is probably about 45,000. Moreover, the increased utilization of combines, due to the very nature of these machines, has resulted in a corresponding increase in the number of automobile trucks. These latter, of which, according to the Hoover Commission, there were 600,000 in 1928, now

probably number about 800,000. Moreover, both the power of the tractors themselves and of the combines used with them has increased from year to year.

What is the significance of these basic figures: almost a million tractors, some 45,000 combines, and about 800,000 automobile trucks? They signify a tremendous revolution in the methods and forms of agricultural production. The importance of their effect on the future of agriculture can be compared only with the revolution which took place in the methods and forms of industry as a result of the invention of the steam-engine and the power-loom.

In any case, it cannot be doubted that this present revolution in the methods of agricultural production is incomparably more important than the transformation in agriculture brought about by the development of capitalism in the nineteenth century. While the technical revolution in agriculture then replaced hand sowing by the sowing machine, hand threshing by the horse-drawn thresher, and the sickle and scythe by the reaper and binder, it still maintained the same basic draft-power—the horse. The technical transformation which we witness to-day lies, first of all, in the change of that basic draft-power: the horse is replaced by the tractor. This new draft-power, which fundamentally alters the speed of the processes of agricultural production and the capacity of the accessory equipment, changes also the whole system of accessory machines, which are perfected to a new degree both as regards speed and the quality of the work they perform. The tractor and its accessories basically change the methods and forms of agricultural production, and thereby change also the corresponding socio-economic relationships.

In order to evaluate the results of this revolution in the methods of farming, it is not sufficient, however, merely to record the extent of the adoption of the new machinery,

although that is what many of our Soviet scientists do, who go every year to America, returning as Columbuses who have newly discovered that land.

In order to draw the lessons from the revolution taking place in American farming methods, one must take fully into account the causes of this revolution and its consequences as regards increase in agricultural production, the degree of well-being of the broad masses of the people, and consumption among the rural and urban population.

The introduction of 20 million horse power into agricultural production in the United States, in the form of nearly a million tractors, naturally leads one to expect an unusually flourishing agriculture, a change by the overwhelming majority of farmers to the use of tractors in cultivating the soil, and a correspondingly enormous growth of consumption in town and countryside. We are justified in expecting this from one fact alone—20 million horse power is enough to cultivate an area almost twice that farmed in the United States to-day.

But what do we really see? We shall analyze the actual conditions there solely by means of a few basic indices, utilizing, in order to avoid the charge of prejudice, only official sources—the Yearbooks of the Department of Agriculture and the reports of a number of officials of that department.

Although nearly a million tractors have been introduced into agriculture in the United States, the sown area has remained practically unchanged, for an increase of four million hectares<sup>1</sup> in a decade can hardly be called an increase when the use of the 20 million horse power could have doubled the sown area. A million tractors and an increase in the sown area of only four million hectares in a decade! Instead of doubling the sown area, which

<sup>1</sup> One hectare = 2.47 acres.—*Ed.*



was made possible by technical conditions, we find a feverish alternation between small decreases and unimportant increases, characteristic of a decaying economic order.

Even if we agree with the palpably inaccurate declarations of the well-known American agricultural economist, Dr. O. E. Baker of the United States Department of Agriculture, which portray conditions as better than they are, stating that in the five years after the war, farm production increased by 13.5 per cent as a result of the supplanting of less valuable by more valuable crops, and of low-grade by high-grade stock; still this—as compared to the extent to which new technique has been introduced—gives no satisfactory answer to the basic question: Why, in the face of so much technical improvement, are the results so small? <sup>2</sup>

That we are correct in our evaluation of the results of the technical revolution in the United States, from the standpoint of its effect on the extent of agricultural production, is shown by the character of the changes in the consumption of farm products. Official sources show that *in the first quarter of this century the per capita consumption of meat fell by 2.5 per cent,<sup>3</sup> and that of wheat by over 20 per cent.* At the same time there was no change in that of potatoes and fruit, and an increase only in the use of vegetables and sugar.<sup>4</sup>

But perhaps as a result of this “stabilization” of agricultural production the living conditions of the farmers themselves have improved? Perhaps the purchasing power of the farm population has increased and their taxes and

<sup>2</sup> O. E. Baker, “Do We Need More Farm Land?” A speech reprinted in the *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CXLII, No. 231, March, 1929, p. 97 ff.—Ed.

<sup>3</sup> *Recent Economic Changes*, New York, 1929, pp. 33, 34.

<sup>4</sup> O. E. Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-123.

debts lessened? Let us answer these questions too from official sources.

The purchasing power of the farm population in the United States has decreased during the post-war decade. The "scissors" caused by the post-war crisis were still so wide in 1929 that the index of prices for farm products was 138 (1909-1914 = 100) while that of industrial products purchased by the farmer was 161.<sup>5</sup> The purchasing power of the farmer's dollar, which fell catastrophically after the war, had not recovered even by 1929.

It cannot be said that the American government officials and bourgeois economists are ignorant of the incredibly difficult situation which results to the farmers from this decrease in their purchasing power. But, serving a capitalist society, they can find no better advice to give than to reduce agricultural production. With this reduction the Department of Agriculture of the United States is compelled to concern itself as one of its most important tasks. Contrast this with our Commissariat of Agriculture in the U.S.S.R.

We shall give one example to show how this reduction is accomplished. In the Department of Agriculture report for 1929, we read:

The most important single factor in the yearly variations in the farm price of potatoes in the past nine years has been the variation in the size of the crop in the United States. The relation between production and price has been such that a small crop of around 320 million bushels brought a price of around \$1.80 a bushel, while a large crop of 440 million bushels brought a price of around 80 cents, indicating that the value of the large crop (valued at \$352,000,000) was considerably *smaller* than that of the smaller crop (valued at \$576,000,000).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> U. S. Department of Agriculture, *Yearbook of Agriculture*, 1930, Washington, D. C., 1930, pp. 995, 997.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1930, p. 589.

A detailed study of the course of development of any of the farm products during the past decade shows that the total amount of money received by the farmer has remained practically unchanged from year to year. *An increase in production automatically causes such a fall in prices that, whether it results from an increase in sown area or a better than usual yield, it brings no increase in the sum received by the farmer.*

We are here considering the average farmer. The same thing, of course, does not apply to the upper strata in whose hands are concentrated the bulk of the new machinery and all the extra profits derived from their monopoly on the improved means of production.

The decrease in the purchasing power of the farmer and the stabilization of his income go hand in hand with a tremendous growth in taxes on farm property. From the data of the Department of Agriculture during the period, 1914-1928, we find that farm taxes increased two and a half times (262 per cent).<sup>7</sup> This tax rise continues without break. The *Yearbook* records that in recent years taxes have consumed from one- to two-thirds of the farmer's income, in some cases, as in that of certain Michigan counties, reaching as high as 90 per cent. The exact quotation follows:

Figures recently compiled for a number of rented farms in several Michigan counties show that for the last seven years taxes have taken about 90 per cent of what otherwise would have been the net return to the owners of these farms. It is believed that this is an exceptionally bad condition, but other studies in various sections indicate that in recent years a tax burden which takes from one-third to two-thirds of the return is by no means unusual.<sup>8</sup>

This has resulted in a tremendous growth of farm debts. The total mortgage indebtedness of American farmers in

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1930, p. 997.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1926, p. 698.



1928 reached almost 10 billion dollars.<sup>9</sup> This means that the *farmers pay annually \$800,000,000 in interest on their mortgage debts alone.* A billion and a half rubles every year in interest alone. This exceeds by many times the total receipts from farm taxation in the U.S.S.R.

According to data of the Hoover Commission, 17.5 per cent of the total farm income in 1927 went for payments on mortgages and loans.<sup>10</sup> It is not surprising that under such conditions the number of tenant farmers has greatly increased, reaching, in 1929, 40 per cent of the total. *Two-fifths of all American farmers are tenants.*

It is, finally, not surprising that the resulting degree of instability of the farm population may be gauged by the fact that during the past four years, 27 out of every thousand farms were sold "voluntarily," *i.e.*, as a result of the impossibility of continuing operations; and 22 out of each thousand were sold at sheriffs' sales—bankruptcy as a result of the impossibility of meeting mortgage payments.<sup>11</sup>

Such are the "achievements" of American agriculture as a result of the revolution in technique: a static sown area, an insignificant increase in agricultural production, a static level of consumption of farm products, and, simultaneously, a decrease in the farmer's purchasing power, a lack of stimulus to increased production, an increase in the farmer's taxes and in the number of tenant farmers, mass bankruptcy, the sale of mortgaged farms, etc.

To all this the average farmer, unable to wring from his farm an income sufficient for necessary capital re-equipment, answers only by abandoning his farm and fleeing to town. (In the past 20 years the farm population has decreased by more than four millions.) The farmer

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1930, p. 1010.

<sup>10</sup> *Recent Economic Changes*, Vol. II, p. 784.

<sup>11</sup> *Yearbook of Agriculture*, 1930, p. 1004.

could, perhaps, solve his problem in this manner during a period of "prosperity." But where shall he flee now that in the cities the ranks of the unemployed already number eight millions and are increasing every day?

What causes all this? Every Party member, every worker, every member of a collective farm, every peasant, will rightly raise the question: Isn't, perhaps, the tractor to blame? Aren't we making a mistake by letting these tractors and combines into our fields? Why, instead of progress, instead of an increase in the well-being of the masses, has the widespread introduction of modern technique into agricultural production in the United States of America led to the deterioration of agriculture and the accentuation of the agricultural crisis?

There can be only one answer. The cause is inherent in the capitalist system, in the private ownership of land. The fact is that under capitalism the tractor and the combine are unattainable for the great mass of the farmers, while the small minority of rich farmers who are able to reëquip their farms do so at the cost of the ever-greater oppression and ruin of the greatness of the farm population. With a million tractors, four-fifths of all the farmers in the United States have none. Moreover, of those farms which have tractors, the overwhelming majority are unable to use them to full capacity. It is an indisputable fact that those large farms which, during the past century, were the pioneers of technical progress (if one may call them that) are now too small for the tractor.

The Americans themselves usually consider that tractors and combines can be used to advantage only on farms of more than 200 hectares. We know that they can be fully utilized only on farms of more than 1,000 hectares. But let us agree with the Americans for a moment. How many 200 hectare farms are there in the United States? The

fact is that they make up less than 3.5 per cent of the total number.

Let us make a further concession to our opponents. Let us agree to add to the number of farms on which tractors can be used successfully, all those over 70 hectares; this, moreover, to be the full size of the farm and not merely of the sown area. Even in that case only 18 per cent of the farms in the United States would be included. That means that on four-fifths of the farms, tractors are altogether impracticable; and on the greater part of the remaining fifth they cannot be used to full advantage.

We often look for examples of the waste in the capitalist system in its present stage of decay. *A million tractors are predestined by the system of capitalist ownership to an effectiveness little greater than that of so many horses,* utilized, as we shall see later, only to about one-fourth their full capacity.

In this respect the United States of America is no exception. Let us take, for another example, Germany.

Here, farms of less than 20 hectares, *i.e.*, which in no case can use tractors, make up 95.7 per cent of the total. Only .01 per cent of them use tractors or steam plows. Farms larger than 100 hectares form only 0.4 per cent of the total, tractor and steam plows being used on 19 per cent of these. Is it then surprising that among bourgeois German economists and agronomists there is a widespread acceptance of the theory that the tractor is generally unprofitable, and that the horse is superior? Here the German economists are in the position of the fox in Æsop's fable who called the grapes sour because they were out of his reach. To this we may only say: it is amusing to read that in serious economic institutions in Germany the question is raised as to whether these small peasant holdings cannot be united into producers' coöperatives so as to

enable them to obtain a tractor. But for this they do not have in Germany the most important prerequisite—a Soviet government; the situation which exists there testifies to the inevitable decay of farming where the tractor remains the property of an insignificant group of the upper strata and can force its way to the land only over the bodies of small-scale farmers.

What general conclusions follow?

The greatest technical revolution in the methods of farming in the history of mankind calls forth, under capitalist conditions, *instead of the prosperity of agriculture, its decay!*

The tractor and the combine, concentrated in the hands of the capitalist upper strata of farmers, and even by them used to little advantage, are unattainable by the overwhelming majority. The tractor is stopped at the gates of four-fifths of the farmers by the barrier of private property in land. Large-scale farming hews a path through the ruin and destruction of the great mass of farmers, a ruin which proceeds at an even greater pace than did that of the handicraft workers in the first stages of large-scale industry.

The attempts of the bourgeoisie to improve the situation by such useless measures as the purchase of wheat by government organs in the United States and Canada, or by the fixing of tariffs on imported farm products in Germany, Italy and other countries, can only cause an objective observer to smile. They do not greatly differ from attempting to empty the Mississippi with a bucket, and lead in the end only to the narrowing of the market for farm products, and thus to a greater intensification of the crisis.

In the general system of decaying capitalism, the farm crisis plays no small rôle, and certainly intensifies its decay. The words of Stalin are fully substantiated: "The industrial crisis will intensify the agricultural, and the agricultural

crisis will protract the industrial, which cannot but lead to a deepening of the economic crisis as a whole."

And, finally, can any one challenge the statement that the technical revolution developing in the agriculture of capitalist countries may be symbolized by a small farmer, crushed under the weight of a heavy caterpillar tractor?

## CHAPTER II

### THE SOVIET METHOD OF ORGANIZING LARGE-SCALE FARMING

SUCH are the basic facts in the United States. They must be compared with what we are doing here. Every one of us knows that technically we are infinitely weaker than the United States in the fields of which we have been speaking. In America there are a million tractors; we have 70,000.<sup>1</sup> They have hundreds of thousands of motor trucks; we have only a few scattered here and there in our farming. When we had to help the Grain Trust to utilize its combines, we had literally to mobilize the auto trucks of the entire country. They have tens of thousands of combines; we have one and a half thousand. Such is the comparison between us in the matter of technical equipment, and it would appear that the results should correspond.<sup>2</sup>

In order to arrive at the actual results we shall use the following data. Together with the Statistical Bureau of the Gosplan (State Planning Commission) and the Collective Farm Center, we carried out a census of all collective farms on certain basic questions. Replies were received from almost all the collectives. The Statistical Bureau of the Gosplan compiled the data, and we are therefore able to establish the chief factors in the growth of our large-scale farming on the basis of data analogous to that we

<sup>1</sup> In 1931 the Soviet tractor industry will produce 56,000 tractors, as against 16,400 in 1930 and 4,500 in 1929.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> In the spring of 1931, the program calls for 6,000 combines on state farms alone, and for 7,000 auto trucks and cars.—*Ed.*



have just used in considering the situation in the United States of America.

### I. RAPID GROWTH OF LARGE-SCALE FARMING IN THE U.S.S.R.

The basic fact in the U.S.S.R. is that large-scale farm production—built not by ruining the small farmers but by uniting them, not by means of state gifts to the upper capitalist strata of farmers but by the organization of large state farms—*is growing at a speed unprecedented in the history of mankind, at a rate unattainable under capitalism.* This fact is of considerable importance. In 1929, for the first time since the war, the number of peasant farms ceased to increase, thereby refuting the assumptions of one of the learned committees of the State Planning Commission which drafted the general plan, to the effect that the number of peasant farms would grow with each year and would reach by 1941 30,984,888. In 1930 we already have a *decrease of at least four million* in the number of peasant farms, as a result of the uniting of several million peasants into 82,000 collective farms.<sup>3</sup>

One may also judge the extent of this process from the average size of a collective farm in the chief agricultural regions. Henceforth we shall give all data according to those districts into which the Central Committee of the Party divided the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the time allotted for completing the collectivization of agriculture. In the first zone (the North Caucasus, excluding the autonomous areas; the Middle Volga Region east of the river; the Lower Volga Region, excluding the Kalmyk and Astrakhan districts; and the steppe district of the Ukraine)

<sup>3</sup> Early in May, 1931, the number of peasant farms decreased further by more than 6,000,000, as a result of the great growth of collectivization.—*Ed.*

the average size of a collective farm has reached 1,200 hectares; in the second zone (comprising the rest of the grain-producing districts) the average size is 360 hectares; and in the third zone, the grain-consuming belt, 117 hectares. These figures do not refer to an insignificant number, but to 82,000 farms, which take in (counting winter and spring crops but excluding state farms) 27 per cent of the total sown area of the country; and (again excluding state farms) 36 per cent of the spring sown area, or, together with the state farms, 40 per cent. Compare this with the fact that in the United States the number of farms with more than 200 hectares was only 3.5 per cent of the total in 1925 while in Germany the number with over 100 hectares is only 0.4 per cent of the total.

Such are the relative possibilities of capitalism and socialism in the organization of large-scale farming.

If, only a year ago our statisticians, in grouping farms by size, used as the larger group "above 44 hectares," to-day, when analyzing the collective farms, this limit must evidently be taken as a minimum. The unit of measurement is changing; we used to consider 15 to 20 hectares large for a kulak's <sup>4</sup> farm; for a collective farm it is already the smallest size possible.

To make still clearer what is happening to farming in the U.S.S.R., let us compare the rôle of various class groups at three different dates, pre-war, 1927, and 1930 with regard to the area sown to grain and marketable surplus. We find that the landlords and kulaks before the war sowed to grain about 35 million hectares; the kulak in 1927 sowed 10 million; but in the spring of 1930, the

<sup>4</sup> Literally "fist." The word has long since been used in Russian idiom to denote a peasant who, through usury and exploitation of the poorer peasant, has amassed sufficient wealth to enable him to still further exploit the poorer element of the village.—*Ed.*



first spring of mass collective sowing, we have in the socialized sector about 35 million hectares sown to grain, as a result of the uniting of six million peasant families in collective farms. It follows *that in this first spring of mass collective farm sowing, the grain area of the state and collective farms has equaled the pre-war area sown by the big landowners and the kulaks and more than tripled the area sown three years ago by the kulaks.*<sup>5</sup>

Though the marketable grain surplus of the state and collective farms has not yet surpassed that of the landowners and kulaks, yet here also the relation between the various class groups producing grain is most striking. In 1913 about two-thirds of the total marketable grain, (*i.e.*, that marketed outside the village) came from the big landowners and kulaks; in 1927 the kulak contributed about one-fifth of the total marketable grain; and this year the socialized sector (collective and state farms) will provide *more than half of all the marketable grain*. This means that in this first spring of collective sowing, socialist large-scale farming has equaled in sown area not only the large-scale farming of the kulaks but even that of the pre-war landowners, and has become the chief supplier of the grain market. Large-scale farming—formerly represented by the big landowner's estate, based upon the half-feudal, ruthless exploitation of the peasant, and by the parasitic kulak's farm—now, under the Soviet power, is represented by the state farms and the union of the poorest peasants in the collective farms.

To conclude this examination of the speed of development of collectivization, let us look at the last two years,

<sup>5</sup> In 1930 collective farms alone sowed 43 million hectares, while in 1931 the program called for 65 million, most of it to grain. In addition, the State Grain Trust farms are sowing 5 million hectares and other state farms additional acreages of industrial and other crops.—*Ed.*

not only as regards the U.S.S.R. as a whole, but also with reference to the three zones into which the U.S.S.R. was divided by the decision of the Central Committee on January 5, 1930. This is important because it will allow us to determine in what respects the collective farm movement is alike or varies in the different zones.

*The first zone:* Here, in 1929, collectivization embraced 7.4 per cent of all farms. In 1930 this figure increased sevenfold, taking in almost half the total number of farms.

*The second zone* (the rest of the grain-producing districts): The figure here for 1929 was less than four per cent, but in 1930 it had increased approximately sixfold, which is to say that one-fourth of its farms were brought into collectives.

*The third zone* (the grain-consuming regions): Starting, in 1929, with 1.5 per cent collectivization, grew sixfold in one year. In 1930, 8.5 per cent of the peasant households in this zone were united in collective farms.<sup>6</sup>

Not unimportant in this connection is the fact that in the first zone the machine-tractor stations<sup>7</sup> plowed and sowed 11.5 per cent of the total area sown to spring crops in the collective farms; in the second zone 5.7 per cent, and in the third zone 3.4 per cent.

These data will probably surprise many, particularly the Rights, who are trying to advance the theory that col-

<sup>6</sup> By February, 1931, these figures had grown as follows: first zone—67 per cent of all farms were in collectives; second zone—35 per cent; third zone—19 per cent.—*Ed.*

<sup>7</sup> Machine-tractor stations are state-owned depots with tractors and other farm machinery, whose function it is to plow the collectives' fields on contract. Two hundred such stations were established during 1930, greatly assisting the collective farms. In the spring of 1931, over 1,100 were to be in operation, by the end of 1931, over 1,400 were to be organized, and soon thereafter, 3,000. The original Five-Year Plan set an area of 3 million hectares for the stations for 1933. This spring they are to plow 25 million, and by 1933 70-80 million hectares.—*Ed.*

lectivization is advantageous only in certain grain districts. Actually, as is apparent from these data, the difference is not that in some districts the peasant is susceptible to collectivization and in others he is not, but rather that in some regions better preparations were made, greater technical resources were available. There were more state farms and machine-tractor stations, heavier pressure on the kulak, etc. No "Left" stupidities can hide the basic fact that this spring, in spite of all differences of conditions in the various zones, collectivization went forward not only in the first group of grain districts, but also in the other districts.

Moreover, we must not forget for a moment the fact that in the whole grain-consuming zone there are only 52 districts left in which less than 3 per cent of the households are collectivized. In other words, the example of the collective farm has been created; a collective farm wedge has been driven into almost every district of the consuming zone. An organization has already been formed there which will serve as an example to the surrounding peasants, which will show them that a collective farm is a reality and not simply a creation of the Bolshevik imagination. From this institution will be drawn cadres for the collective farms; it will serve as a point of departure for the further development of the collectivization movement in the coming years. It is one thing when the peasant in the grain-consuming zone knows that somewhere in the southern Ukraine the collective farms have justified themselves in the eyes of the peasantry. It is quite another thing when he has the opportunity to investigate the collective farm in his own village, or district. *The peculiarity of the consuming zone does not lie in our renouncing collectivization here nor in the process of collectivization dragging out for ten to twenty years, but in the need for a*

*special approach, special methods, and specially extensive preparation* (the organization of state farms and machine and tractor stations), for a more powerful attack upon the kulak, a careful attitude toward the collective farms—all of which ought in the near future to give the same results as have already been attained in the grain-producing zones.

And this should be carefully noted by those Rights who are ready to use the mistakes of the "Left" blockheads as excuse for refraining from steady, systematic work in the organization of collective farms in the consuming zones.

Such are the factors which characterize the speed of organization of large-scale progressive farming capable of using complex machinery, in our country and in the United States.

## 2. WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF FUNDS OF COLLECTIVE FARMS?

In order to characterize the speed of organizing a large-scale agriculture capable of using modern machinery, it might be enough, perhaps, to limit oneself to the data already given. But then we hear the voices of the Rights, outspoken and in secret, claiming that "the peasants came into the collective farm empty-handed, that they have sold off all their horses, butchered their cows and pigs and joined the collectives without any property, as if to say 'Give us the means of production and we are ready to become members at state expense'"; and that they came into the collective farms anxious for government gifts, to use government tractors, money, etc.

Such a legend is widely current. However, the facts disprove it completely. They show that this is not merely a "harmless" legend, but an actual slander caused by a desire to discredit and injure the collective farm movement.

Let us compare the number of peasant households which

have entered the collective farms with the number of horses and cows which they brought with them. If this were to show that the peasants who joined the collective farms came into them without horses and cows or even with only half the number which they possessed before joining, then we would have to recognize that the slanderers were justified, and apologize to them for our accusations.

What are the actual facts? *In the first zone of collectivization 48.8 per cent of all the households joined the collective farms, and brought with them 49.2 per cent of all the horses in that zone.* This, in spite of the fact that there were more peasants without horses among those who joined the collective farms than among those who remained outside. What will the upholders of the theory that the peasants came in to the collective farms empty-handed say to that? In the second zone the collective farms embrace 25.5 per cent of the peasants entering the collectives who brought with them 22.6 per cent of all the horses in that zone. In the consuming zone, 8.5 per cent of all the peasant households have been collectivized, and these farms have 6.8 per cent of the horses.

If one takes into account the fact that in the consuming zone the proportion of peasants without horses among the collective farm members is especially large, that the collectives here have not yet embraced the great mass of middle peasants, then it will be acknowledged that I am justified in drawing this conclusion: *the peasants joining the collective farms have, as a rule, brought their horses with them.* This does not mean that there are not tens of thousands of peasants who did kill their horses. But it is not a matter of tens of thousands, but of the great mass who joined the collective farms with serious intent, bringing their means of production with them.

Let us see now what actually happened with the cows.



There was, above all, much talk about how the peasants, before entering the collective farms, butchered all their cows. In the first zone, where collectivization embraces 48.8 per cent of the peasant households, the collective farm members possess 42.7 per cent of all the cows; in the second zone, where 25.5 per cent of the peasants are collectivized, they possess 22.1 per cent of the cows; in the third zone, the 8.5 per cent of the peasant households in the collective farms possess over 7.5 per cent of all the cows. These figures include both the cows that are socialized as the property of the collective farms and those kept for the individual use of the members.

In the face of these facts what can be said by those who sneer about the empty-handed peasants who joined the collective farms to receive gifts from the Soviet government!

Certainly this does not mean that the collective farms were formed exclusively with their own resources. This would contradict Lenin's statement that "every social order originates only with the financial support of a definite class."

The rôle of the proletarian state in this respect is not small. An analysis of the basic capital of the collective farms shows that they owe the state an amount equal to about two-fifths of their basic capital. If it is kept in mind that approximately half this indebtedness is long-term credit, it can be established that the share of the state in the basic capital of the collective farms amounts to about one-fifth of the total. To this must be added the fact that the resources of liquidated kulaks constitute about 15 per cent of the basic capital of the collective farms; in the first zone 14.8 per cent, in the second zone 16.1 per cent, and in the third zone 22.3 per cent.

Here we must acknowledge our "indebtedness," if not

to the kulak, then to the policy of "liquidating the kulak as a class."

The actual sources of the capital with which our collective farms went through the spring were: first (the basic source) the means of the collective farms themselves, obtained by combining the resources of the peasants who joined them; second—state aid in the form of machines and credit; third—the resources of the kulaks who had been liquidated as a class. Such were the resources of that large-scale farming which in the first spring of mass collective farm sowing equaled in sown area that of the former landowners and the kulaks and set a record in the rapid organization of large-scale farming unprecedented in the history of mankind.

It wouldn't be a bad idea if the German economists, who are now philosophizing upon the question of the desirability of organizing producers' coöperatives of small German farmers in order to create a land area large enough to utilize a tractor, thought a bit about these sources of collectivization! One cannot doubt that, if the German government should agree to help the small farmers by liquidating the kulaks as a class and in addition to this should render their farmers aid in production to the extent it is rendered in our country, there also the tractor would be within the reach of the small farmers.

### 3. PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR ON COLLECTIVE FARMS

We have examined two sets of facts, those characterizing the growth of large-scale farming in the form of state and collective farms and those determining the origin of their basic capital. We must now see how this capital was used in the first spring of Bolshevik sowing. Were the collective

farms able this first spring to make the most of the advantages of large-scale farming?

It is clear that, if the collective farms were unable to use their resources to greater advantage than the small-scale farms and the kulaks, all the conclusions towards which my report is leading will be built upon sand.

We shall find an answer to this problem, partly from the data contained in the current report of the Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. and partly from that obtained in reply to the special questionnaire sent out to all the collective farms by this Commissariat, the Statistical Bureau of the State Planning Commission, and the Collective Farm Center. These show—and this should be known not only by every Party member and every collective farm member, but by every individual peasant—that as a result of the organization of collective farms the sown area of those peasants who joined them increased by 45 per cent over the area sown the previous year.<sup>8</sup> To be on the safe side, we are taking a minimum figure. In some districts the increase reached 100 per cent. It may be considered as an established fact that the 36 million hectares sown on the collective farms in 1930 represent an increase of 50 per cent over the area sown in 1929 (24 million hectares) by these peasants before joining the collective farms. These figures are the result of a direct canvassing of collective farm members as to the extent of the area sown by them last year.

These results were obtained in spite of the fact that up to half of our collective farms worked without any norms of work, and surely a collective without these is merely an embryo from which a collective farm will de-

<sup>8</sup> In 1930 the income of collectivized peasants increased 50 per cent as compared with those of individual peasants. The former used their horses 50-100 per cent more effectively.—*Ed.*



velop. In any case, it is not a farm which has already fully revealed its possibilities.

Yet, even under such conditions, in the first zone the collective farms, embracing slightly less than half the peasant households, sowed more than two-thirds of the total area of spring crops; in the second zone the collectives, constituting one-fourth of all the peasant households, sowed more than one-third the total spring-crop area; while in the third zone, in which they comprised a twelfth of the peasant households, they sowed an eighth of the spring-crop area.

In the United States nearly a million tractors, used on capitalist farms, resulted in an increase in sown area amounting to four million hectares in the course of 10 years. Only four million hectares! In our country, with an infinitely smaller number of these steel horses, and, indeed, chiefly by simply bringing together the antiquated peasant means of production, our collective farmers have increased their sown area 2 million hectares over what they had sown as individual peasants. This has enabled us not only to cover the decrease in the sown area caused by the liquidation of the kulak *but even to increase the total sown area in a single year by about 7.4 million hectares!*

In order to verify these data for all the collective farms of the U.S.S.R. we, together with the Statistical Bureau of the State Planning Commission and the Collective Farm Center, analyzed for the same zones the sown area per worker, per power unit, per unit of population, and per farm, and checked the different sets of figures, one against the other. The result was always the same—the collective farms recorded an increase of from 40 to 50 per cent in the effective utilization of labor power and of the means of production as compared with the individual peasant farm. And this in the first year of widespread collectiviza-

tion! From this we can estimate what reserves we have for the improvement of farming. These reserves will be brought into action at once in the extension of collectivization and by the further development of the state farms. The essence of these reserves consists in the qualitative improvement of peasant labor by 40 to 50 per cent as a result of the transition from individual to collective farming. This proves that we can set before ourselves aims of which no capitalist land can dream and of which we ourselves could not have thought yesterday when we had a basically different system of farming.

With these facts, we as a Party appeal to the poor and middle peasants still carrying on individual farming. We regard them, moreover, no longer simply as individual farmers, but as *nekolkhozniki* [non-members of collective farms] "who do not yet wish to join them, but who will, in a comparatively short period of time, undoubtedly be convinced by the mass experience of the collectives of the necessity of entering upon the path of collectivization."

For these non-members I wish to add a few additional facts. The agricultural artel "Answer-to-the-Kulaks," in the Rossoshansky district, worked 8.7 hectares per horse, while the individual peasants nearby worked 3.58 hectares per horse. In the artels of the Kamensky township of the Penza district the sowing program was exceeded by 32 per cent. There was unused land adjoining the artels; it also was sown. As a result in the collectives six hectares were sown per family, while the average individual family in the same township sowed two hectares. The collective farm of the village of Nikolayev in the Akmolinsk district sowed 17 hectares per household, while in 1929 each family averaged two or three hectares. In the village of Seyten in the same district most of the members of the collective were farm laborers, who in their own words



Peasants on a Collective Farm in the Orenburg District Returning From the Fields. The Inscription on the Banner Reads: "Our Common Work on Common Land is the Guarantee of Good Crops."



Threshing by Machine on a Soviet Farm in the North Caucasus.



"were picking up crumbs from the kulaks' table last year." This year they sowed 11 hectares per household. The collective farm of Suvorovsk, in Nizhni-Chirsk township, sowed 3.4 hectares per family last year and this year 8.4 hectares. The "Storm-bird" collective in Dubrovsk township sowed 11 hectares per household last year and this year 15.5 hectares. In the same township the members of the "Beacon" collective sowed 7.5 hectares as individual farmers, and this year as a collective they sowed 14.5 hectares per household. We may "prophesy" that in the coming weeks the collective will send in reports of tens of thousands of similar examples and we hope our papers will print them. This will constitute the best propaganda for the collective farms.

Much land formerly considered unsuitable for cultivation was found this spring to be entirely suitable. But the period of unearthing the possibilities of "Russian unsuitabilities" has only just begun.

Despite all mistakes, despite the fact that we have neither trained workers nor persons capable of organizing agricultural production, despite the absence of norms of labor payment on almost half the collective farms, despite the extreme weakness of our mechanical basis, despite all this, *the strength of socialist large-scale production in the form of state and collective farms has revealed itself most clearly; and that is the basic point.*

#### 4. MECHANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN THE UNITED STATES

Although the increase in the sown area of the collective farms this year is in the main the result of a simple pooling of the implements of production belonging to the peasants themselves, we must not, even at the present stage of

development, underestimate the rôle of mechanical power. Only a few years ago the number of our agricultural machines was so small that it would have been absurd to have attempted to make a comparison between ourselves and the United States in the field of the mechanization of agriculture.

Although the value of our agricultural machinery output amounted to 120 million rubles in 1913, it had dropped to 12 million rubles in 1922. This was the lowest point. From that time there has been a steady rise. From year to year we have doubled the supply of agricultural machinery—in 1923-24, in 1925-26, in 1929-30, and finally in 1930-31 when, according to the program approved by the Central Committee of the Party, it will reach the sum of 800 million rubles (without tractors) as against the 400 million rubles in 1930.

*In the United States* the value of the annual supply of machinery, starting at a very high figure, has become more or less stabilized at about 400 million rubles (without tractors). Only in 1928 did it rise to 500 million rubles.

If we take the value of agricultural machinery including tractors, we find that in America in 1928 it reached 800 million rubles; in our country in 1929 it was 500 million, and next year, according to the program, it will be over a billion rubles. In other words, in the coming year we shall not only equal America but already surpass her in this respect. Unfortunately, so far this refers only to quantity but not to quality nor assortment.

Corresponding to the increase in the supply of farm machinery, the amount of such machinery used in agricultural production has likewise increased. While in 1913 it amounted to 7 rubles per hectare, in 1929-30 it had already reached to about 15 rubles (including tractors) and in 1930-31, if the Supreme Council of Economy does not fail us,

it will be, again including tractors, 20 rubles per hectare. This shows how the collective farm movement, which is developing from below, coöperates with the active rôle of the state, how that rôle expresses itself and how this movement is being strengthened.

And finally, last in our list but not least in importance, comes the extent to which our tractors are used. An examination of the respective figures will reveal that "tractorization" in our country and in capitalist states, for example the United States, are totally different things. In the West they used to laugh at us, saying that for us the tractor was an object of prayer and worship, while in capitalist countries it would seem to be an ordinary household necessity. Is this so? Let them rather laugh at themselves, in view of the fact that the output of work per tractor in our country is several times higher than that in the foremost capitalist country.

That this is true may be seen from the following figures. The outstanding fact is that in the autumn of 1929 and the spring of 1930 our tractors—of which we had 450,000 horsepower in the autumn and 900,000 horsepower in the spring—increased our sown area by 12 million hectares.

In the United States, where there are a million tractors aggregating at least 20 million horsepower, with which it might be possible to increase the sown area by 300 million hectares, four-fifths of the farmers have no tractors and the average load per tractor on most of the farms where they are used is not above 400 to 600 hours per year. Only on the *seven* best, largest and "model" capitalist farms does the load per tractor rise as high as 1,500 hours per year.

In our case, however, according to the investigation of the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, we were, as early as in 1928, working our tractors 1,400 hours per year on our state farms, 1,300 hours in our com-

munes, 1,200 hours in our artels, and 1,100 hours in the Associations for the Joint Cultivation of the Land. During the spring of 1930 alone, we worked our tractors an average of from 750 to 1,000 hours in the stations of the Tractor Center. This fully guarantees an annual tractor-load of 2,500 hours, instead of the 400 to 600 hours prevalent in America. Judging by this spring's results, the tractors of the State Grain Trust and other organizations will work just as many hours.<sup>9</sup>

I mention these facts, not so that any one shall become conceited about them: they are not the result of any special merit and ability of our managing organizations. They are a direct result, a direct by-product of our social order, *different* from that of the United States. Nor do I mention them so that any one may think that we can be satisfied with the present quality of our tractor work. I could make a special report here about how we break tractors, how we ruin them, how many hours they stand crippled, etc., etc. At the same time, contrast our 2,500 hours of work with the 400-600 hours in America!

We are now in a position to draw conclusions from the first two parts of our report:

In the United States the tractor is the monopoly of the well-to-do farmer; with us it is the monopoly of the state and the collective farms representing the union of small peasants.

The rich farmer works some 100 or 200 hectares of land; our collective farm works a thousand hectares, and our state farms, tens of thousands.

In the United States the overwhelming majority of the farmers *cannot* have tractors. They are beyond the reach

<sup>9</sup> A recent decision of the Tractor Center and the Grain Trust states that henceforth tractors are to be used 22-23 hours daily on the state and collective farms.—*Ed.*



of at least four-fifths of them. In our country the tractor can be obtained by the overwhelming majority of the peasants, who have joined the collective farms: it is out of reach only of the kulak.

There, the tractors are scattered; well-to-do farmers have one apiece. In our country tractors are concentrated, dozens of them on one machine-tractor station, on one state farm.

In other words, in that country the capitalists rule, in our country the working class.

That is why, though our tractors are driven by semi-literate agricultural laborers, who but yesterday bent their backs from 16 to 18 hours a day for the kulak, *these farm-hands now get four times the productivity from a tractor that is obtained by the civilized American farmer.*

That is why our speed in the development of large-scale farming has no precedents in the history of mankind. It has literally never before been seen in the world.

That is why large-scale farming, in conformity with varied degrees of preparedness, is developing in varying degrees in different parts of our Union, but it is developing throughout the whole of the U.S.S.R. It is the law of development of Soviet agriculture.

That is why we are hastening to increase the supply of agricultural machinery. Our industry has turned its face toward the reorganization of agriculture. We wish to change, and within the next few years we shall change fully the technical basis of agriculture in the U.S.S.R.

Now we may justly compare that future with which our opponents from various camps threatened us a few months ago with the actual facts of to-day.

Prophecy number one: In the spring of 1930, a professor in the Russian Scientific Institute of Berlin, a former pro-

fessor of the Agricultural College in Petrograd, Boris Brutskus, wrote in a German paper:

Soviet Russia therefore faces the danger that as a direct result of collectivization 10 to 20 million hectares will not be cultivated at all this year, because of the lack of draft animals and seed.<sup>10</sup>

This was the first prophecy: "Ten to 20 million hectares will not be cultivated." Against this we put the fact that the collective farms have increased their sown area by 50 per cent, and that the total area under cultivation has increased by more than seven million hectares.

The second prophecy, that of Mr. Dalin:

The productive result, *i.e.*, the amount of bread, meat, milk, leather, etc., produced by an equal number of people will certainly be found much less after collectivization than before.<sup>11</sup>

As you see, a complete coincidence. That is the second fact.

Prophecy number three, that of a friend of Dalin and Brutskus, Mr. Trotsky:

From peasant nags and wooden plows, however combined, you cannot create large-scale farming any more than a combination of fishermen's rowboats can make a steamer. . . . The socialist reconstruction of farming we view as a matter of decades.<sup>12</sup>

Prophecy number four: "The state and collective farms will give the required amount of grain in five or ten years, but we must find a way out *to-day*." I think you all know the author of this prophecy.

These are Bukharin's words, taken from the stenographic

<sup>10</sup> *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, March 7, 1930.

<sup>11</sup> D. Dalin, "Prospects of Collectivization," *Sotzialisticheskyy Vestnik* (*Socialist Herald*), Berlin, April 12, 1930, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Editorial by Trotsky in the *Bulletin of the Opposition*, February-March, 1930.

report of the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, January 30, 1929, page 20.

That is the fourth prophecy. Now that we have laid these four prophecies one beside the other, they correspond almost exactly.

Aren't we correct then in saying to Trotsky, to Brutskus, to Dalin, and to Bukharin, who (in the words of Comrades Rykov and Tomsy) "unconsciously" joined the other three: "Please, now, account for your attitude toward collectivization not only to the Communist Party and the working class but to that new support of the Soviet power, authentic, real and firm, which grew up in the spring of 1930—the members of the collective farms."

Please, Comrade Bukharin, explain the strange coincidence between your opinion and that of the above-named gentlemen, explain it, not only to the Party but to the millions of members of collective farms, who have developed as a firm and real support of the Soviet power. And let Comrade Bukharin take care lest, at such a meeting of collective farm members, his only applause (if he gets any at all) comes from a kulak who accidentally slipped into the meeting.

## CHAPTER III

### NEW TASKS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

I PASS now to the practical part of my report.

In connection with the tremendous possibilities for the further development of our agriculture, which have been disclosed to us in the course of the spring of 1930, this question arises: What new tasks in the domain of agricultural development may we set ourselves on the basis of the extension of state and collective farming and the introduction of the new technique into farm production?

#### I. NEED OF RADICAL REVISION OF OUR PLAN OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

In answering this question the Five-Year Plan is of very little help, because, as has been seen from Comrade Stalin's report, we have already more than carried out its program for collectivization.

And all the other plans we had before, such as a previous plan for five years, and the original draft of the general plan, cannot be used as material, because they did not in any way set the aim of reconstructing agricultural economy.

Here are a few examples from these former plans for agricultural development.

Take the first five-year plan, worked out by the planning department of the Commissariat of Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R. Its chief authors were Kondratiev and Maka-

rov.<sup>1</sup> It was based upon "an analysis of the tendencies of the actual spontaneous expansion of agriculture." It was based upon the supposition that the same tendencies which characterized the development of pre-revolutionary farming would hold good for the present day.

How "brilliant" that method was, the following facts show. The plan "foresaw" a sown area of 101 million hectares in 1928-29. We actually had in 1928-29 a sown area of 120 million hectares, in spite of the extremely meager productivity of the small peasant household which is the dominating type. The plan "foresaw" a supply of farm machinery for the five-year period to the value of 183 million rubles. We actually supplied it to the value of 740 million rubles.

The second five-year plan was prepared under the supervision of the agricultural section of the State Planning Commission and was published in 1927. According to its authors, Oganovsky and Vishnevsky, it was based on the extrapolation of the tendencies inherent in the development of agriculture in the past. Its philosophy was thus formulated: "rather fore-guess than foresee." To show how accurate these "fore-guesses" were, a single figure will suffice. This plan "fore-guessed" that in 1930-31 we should have a sown area of 119 million hectares, but the U.S.S.R., not heeding their "fore-guesses," had already in 1929-30 a sown area of 129 million hectares.

The third document: a draft of a general plan for the development of agricultural production, worked out by a committee of the State Planning Commission in 1928. This draft, though it was not considered by the Presidium of

<sup>1</sup> Members of the so-called Party of Working Peasants supporting the Kulak elements of the village and working in close coöperation with the counter-revolutionary Industrial Party in performing acts of sabotage against the Five-Year Plan and in the attempt to bring about foreign military intervention.—*Ed.*

the State Planning Commission and did not get any official approval, deserves our attention because it shows the type of agricultural development which the bourgeois specialists are not adverse to imposing on our country. It was here proposed that, in 1940, we should have 1.5 million hectares sown to cotton, whereas in 1930 we have already sown 267,000 hectares above that. They proposed 1.2 million hectares for sugar beets by 1940, and in 1930 we already have 1.114 million. According to this draft of the committee we were to have 1.25 million horsepower of tractors by 1940; in 1930 the number is already almost a million. It was proposed to increase the area of state farms to 1.5 million hectares and we already have 3.8 million hectares.

In conclusion we must recall that this draft of a general plan proposed an increase in the number of individual farms to 31 million (for if everything else grows why should they not as well?). And do not forget that all these figures were projected for 1940!

If we are experiencing difficulties in supplying urban communities with agricultural products at the present tempo of development of agriculture it would be difficult to guess what would have been the condition if agricultural development had been held strictly to the above "fore-guesses" of the Five-Year Plan and the "draft of a general plan."

As a characteristic of the bourgeois conception of the development of our agriculture, I must offer one more example. No longer ago than the summer of 1928, in a discussion between the representatives of the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissariat of Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R., on the question of supplies of agricultural machinery, the figure for these supplies for the last year of the new, new (!) Five-Year Plan, which stood at 300 million rubles, was contested by the representative of the



Commissariat of Agriculture as excessive, and he proposed to cut it to 230 million.

He reasoned thus: "The outlay of 7 per cent of the total marketable volume of farm products mentioned here is spent by the peasant economy for implements only in the period of restoration of agriculture, which we may now consider completed; in the future this percentage cannot be maintained. We must take the percentage which existed in pre-war times, with a slight increase, *i.e.*, a maximum of 5 or 6 per cent. If we also take into consideration the overhead charges added to the factory prices, then the utmost expenditure for farm machinery at the end of the Five-Year Plan will be 230 to 240 million rubles, rather than the 300 millions proposed by the speaker."

Finally, a last comparison—with the Five-Year Plan officially adopted. This, as contrasted with the drafts quoted, is a program for the complete reconstruction of economy, yet the tasks set by it in the field of reconstruction have already been fulfilled or are on the verge of fulfillment. The program it set for the organization of collective farms has more than been carried out in two years; its program for the development of state farms will be more than accomplished in the third year of the Five-Year Plan.

From this we see clearly why the Central Committee of the Party, in the theses on my report, proposes "a radical revision of the Five-Year Plan for the development of agriculture, on the basis of the tempo of collectivization provided for in the decision of the Central Committee of January 5, which has been completely justified in practice."

What are the basic tasks, which we must set for ourselves and fulfill in the remaining years of the Five-Year Plan period? They were formulated in the report of Comrade Stalin.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> J. Stalin, *Political Report to the Sixteenth Party Congress*, pp. 53, 54.

1. The problem of consolidating the position of industrial crops.
2. The problem of reviving stock-breeding and solving the meat problem.
3. The problem of finally settling the question of grain production.

## 2. THE TASKS OF DEVELOPING ANIMAL-BREEDING ON THE BASIS OF STATE AND COLLECTIVE FARMS

I shall begin with animal-breeding, because we have in it the least favorable initial position and the most difficult problem to solve.

Between March of 1929 and 1930, there was a considerable decrease in the number of livestock, estimated by the statistical section of the State Planning Commission as follows: beef cattle decreased by one-fifth, dairy cows by one-eighth, sheep by one-third, and hogs by two-fifths.

The fundamental method of solving the problem of animal-breeding is determined by the fact that its unsatisfactory condition is, as Comrade Stalin says in his report, caused by the "instability and economic unreliability of petty animal-breeding," with a low production for the market. This was also the cause of the backwardness in grain farming in the past. The principal method for solving the problem of stock-breeding, as stated in the theses of the Central Committee on my report, is first of all "in the organization of special state stock-breeding farms analogous to the state grain farms, and also in the widespread creation of collective stock-breeding farms with a high marketable surplus." However, it is clear that in order to get down to practical work we owe it to the state and collective farms and to the entire country to answer the following questions:

1. Upon what kinds of livestock must we concentrate in order to get the maximum immediate results, even during

this year, and at the same time settle the meat problem finally by the end of the period covered by the Five-Year Plan?

2. By what means shall we organize the necessary fodder base?<sup>2</sup>

The available data indicate that hogs will help us to settle the meat problem most quickly. Hogs have two fundamental and extremely valuable advantages, which must be understood by the entire Party and the country as a whole. They produce meat faster than any other kind of livestock and they give more meat per unit of fodder than do cattle. These two advantages put hogs in the first place.

According to the data of the Institute of Livestock-Breeding of the Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., the hogs of English breed and those cross-bred with ours (I call especial attention to the fact that what follows refers also to the cross-breeds) give meat equal to that of four oxen—54 poods in a period of 14 months as compared to the 14 poods produced by cattle. At the same time it requires five kilograms of fodder, in grain units, to produce one kilogram of pork and 15 kilograms of fodder to produce one of beef. Hence our conclusion is: hogs are our chief meat-producing machines during the coming years. On them our chief attention and that of the state and collective farms must be centered. Hence the aim set before the Hog-Breeding Trust by the Central Committee in the theses on my report: a marketable production reaching 400,000 head in 1930-31, not less than three million head in 1931-32, and not less than seven million in 1932-33.

Hence, we have also the measures with regard to increas-

<sup>2</sup> Fodder is used here usually in the sense of forage (cultivated and pasturage food, roughages and concentrates, etc.).—*Ed.*

ing the breeding of sows on the collective farms, both in collectively-owned droves and in the individual households of the collective farm members.

The meaning of these measures becomes clearer if we keep in mind that the Hog-Breeding Trust alone is to make available in 1932-33, according to its program as indicated in the theses, one and a half times as much meat as the total which the Commissariat of Trade procured in 1928-29. (Seven hundred million kilograms of meat will be the marketable surplus of this Trust, while the entire amount of meat handled by the Commissariat of Trade was 460 million.)

The task is not an easy one. We can solve it if we avoid two possible "deviations." The first lies in a policy of constructing unnecessary buildings for hogs—a sheer waste, when it is quite clear that we must get along with the absolute minimum of building materials, and that these must preferably be of local origin. We have had this same danger in industry. You all know how, in its time, we built Shatura<sup>4</sup>; its walls will last for many decades longer than the station itself will exist. We, therefore, certainly face the danger that pigsties will be erected which the pigs can do without. In this, the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection will no doubt help us, fighting all tendencies to spend even an extra kopek on buildings, when it is possible to do without them.

The second "deviation" consists in the idea that pigs feed on dung and sleep in dung and don't need anything more, when actually in order to produce seven million marketable head for the Hog-Breeding Trust in the last year of the Five-Year Plan, we must give them 200 million poods of grain as fodder. And this does not include the care of such hogs as are raised on the collective farms.

<sup>4</sup> A large power station 80 miles from Moscow.—*Ed.*

This indicates the size of the "factory" which the Central Committee has decided to build. This shows that it is a matter of setting up a new task of great importance to the state, a task no smaller than that of creating our grain farms.

The second factory, chiefly for milk production, is the cow. While in the care of hogs the chief task is the maximum increase of the droves and of marketable meat per unit of fodder, the problem is somewhat different with regard to cattle.

What is the situation here? In order for a cow to give the present average of milk (about 1,000 kilograms a year) she needs 1,700 fodder units (in terms of grain). For this same cow to give twice the present quantity it appears that the fodder must be increased by only 30 per cent (and not doubled, as might at first appear.) And for this cow to treble her milk supply, her fodder need be increased by only 60 or 65 per cent.

All of this is clear from elementary textbooks. Perhaps it is hardly worthy, at a Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to speak of such things. My task in general is not to popularize farm and livestock primers, but to make elementary facts a weapon for the practical work of the Party; and on this basis at least to double the consumption of milk in the Soviet Union by the time the Five-Year Plan is finished.

There is nothing fantastic in this. Many considered as sheer fantasy the proposals of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection for increasing the grain yield 30 to 35 per cent an acre by the end of the Plan period. But when the Party brought home to the wide masses these measures which agronomists said would take decades to realize; and when, without much ado, they began to be carried through together with other tasks, then we began to solve in practice



the problem of reaching those standards of production which were indicated in the resolution of the Central Committee on the report of the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

An analogous task is now before us in the domain of livestock. There is no doubt that even such an apparently fantastic task as to double the consumption of meat and milk can be set and fulfilled by us if we take our stand on the development of state and collective farms, grasp the right levers and operate them in real Bolshevik fashion. Such levers at present are the development of hog-raising and the improvements of fodder for cows.

That this is not merely our own imagination, nor an arm-chair invention, and that the solution of our livestock problem is precisely in this direction, is shown also by the experience of the United States, where in the last decade the number of cattle has decreased, while the number of milch cows has remained stable and the output per cow increased; and with a sharp fluctuation in the number of hogs, the output of bacon and other meat per head has grown as much as one-third from 1920-26. This process goes on there in an unorganized fashion.

That which in America proceeds in an unorganized manner, we should organize consciously on the basis of state and collective farms. This is the key to our livestock problem.

### 3. THE CREATION OF A FODDER BASE

From what has already been said, it is obvious that we shall be unable to solve the livestock problem without organizing an efficient fodder base. What are our resources in this respect at the present time?

The situation is not exactly bright. While in the United





An Agronomist Instructing Members of the Collective Farm, "Forward," in Scientific Farming.



The Board of the Collective Farm "Advance Guard" Divides the Profits Among the Members.



States over 60 per cent of the total cultivated area is sown to fodder plants (not including pastures, grass sown meadows, etc.), in our country only 30 per cent of the cultivated area is used for growing fodder. This fact sets the leading task for the next few years: the creation of a suitable fodder base for livestock breeding, by increasing the area under cultivation to fodder, and by improving the pastures and meadows.

What is our program for the organization of a fodder base for socialized animal-breeding?

It is very easy to say: "Let us double our milk supply by giving the cows 30 per cent more food!" The only question is, at whose expense this is to be done. The case with hogs is the same. Unfortunately, there are still many among us who believe that the hog does not require feeding, that it will forage for itself. Perhaps at the present time it will; but it is not on this basis that we shall solve the meat problem.

What, then, is our program? The Institute for Livestock-Breeding has calculated that in order to double our consumption of meat and milk we shall have to increase the fodder resources of our country by about 50 per cent. The essential point of this task is that this increase does not mean that we are simply to add to the millions of poods of straw at our disposal still another 50 per cent of the same fodder. Our cattle already receive sufficient roughage, so much of it that, so far as quantity is concerned, the milk supply might well be trebled. We must not forget that at the present time more than two-thirds of our feed consists of hay, straw, chaff, etc., while a "meat- and milk-yielding machine," if it is to work productively, must receive at least two-thirds concentrated food. Therefore, the solution of the problem of doubling the production of meat and milk is not simply a matter of providing so much

more fodder, but of insuring increased nutriment in the form of the proper kind of feed.

And this means that the whole Five-Year Plan of agricultural development must be so revised as to secure at least an additional 40 million hectares for fodder plants.

How are these 40 million hectares best to be utilized? In the grain districts of the south we must plant about seven million hectares to corn and soy beans (for ensilage) and to green fodder and grain (in the United States the area under corn half again as large as that of wheat, 85 per cent of the corn being used as fodder); one to two million hectares in sorghum (in the United States 2.4 million hectares); and various further fodder plants such as alfalfa and other hay (in the United States up to 25 million hectares, but in our country only 5.5 million). In the grain-consuming zone we must plant eight to ten million hectares more than at present to potatoes (chiefly as hog food), swedes<sup>5</sup> and other turnips. I need not detail here such plants as sunflowers, field beans and peas suitable for fodder which must be accorded a proper place in the program of the 40 million hectares of additional land allotted to fodder plants.

An indispensable part of the feed program is the improvement of the pastures and meadows. According to the calculations of some economists, agronomists and experts in livestock breeding, up to 50 per cent of the required fodder will be attained by this means. For this work we require an active program, carried out with the same energy and perseverance, and with the same participation of the masses as was required for the realization of the program of the "agrominimum."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Rutabaga, or Swedish turnips, used as fodder.—*Ed.*

<sup>6</sup> A minimum program of improvements to be introduced in agriculture.—*Ed.*



The program for the improvement of meadows and pastures is not complicated: the cattle are to be sent out to pasture one week later and brought back one week earlier than at present; the entire pasture is not to be grazed bare at once, but in strips; weeds are to be removed, if only by the most primitive methods; marshy pastures to receive the most necessary drainage, fertilizers (potash) must be used, and harrowing practiced; there must be division of the pastures for various kinds of animals—all measures demanding no great expense and which can be carried out in a very short time.

If we undertake this program in its entirety, if we tackle it with the same energy and determination with which we are solving the grain problem, and if we work for its accomplishment despite all difficulties, without shrinking because of difficulties or the loose talk of ossified bureaucrats, then we shall fulfill this new task of the Five-Year Plan—to increase the area under cultivation to fodder plants by 40 million hectares, and improve the pastures and meadows, thereby rendering it quite possible to double our reserves of meat and milk.

We are convinced that when this immense task is under way on the state farms, then the collective farms too, having before them many exemplary large-scale animal-breeding enterprises working on a modern technical and scientific basis, will follow their example. Socialized livestock-breeding on these lines will enable us to satisfy the needs of the collective farm members to a much greater extent, and will greatly increase the marketable output to be sent to the cities.

The rôle played by the state farms will be a very important one here, perhaps even more important than in grain production. There can be no doubt that the collective farms will adopt the same methods. One guarantee of this

is the fact that on the collectives we have at present, among the socialized farm stock, 1.3 million cows. If we succeed in solving the problem so far as these 1.3 million cows are concerned—providing heated stalls and suitable feed for them—we shall be able to increase our milk production greatly within the present year.

In order to emphasize the urgency of our feed program, I shall refer to a few further examples. The Hog-Breeding Trust requires approximately two million hectares for growing succulent fodder plants which cannot easily be brought from the outside, and for the organization of pasture lands. The Cattle-Breeding Trust requires, if it is to increase its stock to 10 million head by the last year of the Plan, up to 50 million hectares, chiefly in newly opened districts. One-half of this land is needed as pasture and about one-third as meadow land for hay production. Besides that, the Cattle-Breeding Trust must utilize the uncultivated tracts of land belonging to the Grain Trust as pasture (up to 15 million hectares) the whole of the straw and other grain waste products of this Trust. The Sheep-Breeding Trust requires an equal amount of land; to it falls the responsible tasks of creating the bases of a state undertaking and setting an example of efficiency to those branches of farming which are of such great importance in all the eastern national republics of the Soviet Union. In addition, it is not only of immense importance from the standpoint of increasing the meat reserves, but even more so from the point of view of organizing our raw wool supplies.

This is the Bolshevist program, which we must carry out at all costs, and which we can be certain the Party will carry out as efficiently as it has solved the grain problem.



#### 4. NEW TASKS OF THE GRAIN-CONSUMING ZONE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND COLLECTIVE FARMS

I pass now to the new tasks set by agriculture in the so-called grain-consuming zone, and shall deal with these in part in connection with livestock breeding, and in part independently of it. The Institute for the Economics and Organization of Socialist Agriculture (attached to the Commissariat of Agriculture) has divided the Soviet Union tentatively into a number of principal agricultural zones. The so-called grain-consuming zone extends over a vast territory, from the Leningrad and Western Regions, via Moscow, to the Urals.

What does this grain-consuming zone represent from the standpoint of agriculture, and how are its agricultural possibilities, especially in livestock breeding, being utilized? The only answer is to be found in the following data: Only 24 per cent of the total area is tilled. In the Western Region, only 30 per cent; in the Leningrad Region no more than 6.5 per cent; in the Moscow Region 43 per cent; in the Ivanov Region 25 per cent; and in the Nizhni Novgorod Region 33 per cent. In other words, the greater part of the land is not cultivated. Is it, then, used as meadow or pasture? Not at all! This land is largely wasted. The arable land itself is tilled by the most primitive methods. In these regions fallow and waste lands average 27 per cent of the cultivated area: in the Leningrad Region 31 per cent; in the Western Region 22 per cent; in the Ivanov and Moscow Regions 29 per cent; and in the Nizhni Novgorod Region 25 per cent. And only 13 per cent serves as pasture and meadow.

This is the way the land is utilized in the various grain consuming regions. But perhaps the objective conditions

do not permit of the development of the various branches of agriculture here? Perhaps it is impossible to cultivate additional land in these districts? Perhaps the sun shines too little here? Perhaps there is a lack of water? Perhaps the soil is poor? Perhaps fallowing of the land here is based on the law of progressive agriculture?

Happily for the grain-consuming zone we can reply to all these question in the negative. In these regions the conditions are extremely favorable for the cultivation of many fodder crops. There is ample sunshine and water (indeed a superfluity of the latter). Conditions are most advantageous for growing various roots and tuber crops, especially the potato.

Fallow land in this district is indubitably a solecism. It must be done away with at all speed. In Germany fallow land has been practically liquidated—reduced to only 1 per cent. In the United States too it has been practically liquidated, though hitherto the supporters of the idea of fallow land always have liked to refer to that country. However, its fallow and waste lands comprise only 14 per cent of the total plowed land. It must not be forgotten that the Department of Agriculture in the United States in its classifications does not divide waste from fallow land, and that there is a large proportion of such land in a number of wheat- and cotton-growing districts. In the United States (waste lands being deducted) there are not more than five to six million hectares of fallow lands. In our consuming region alone there are seven million hectares of waste and fallow land. If we add the Ural and the Central Black Soil Regions, the figure swells to 16 million hectares. This is a reserve which might be utilized immediately, and yet it is wastefully disregarded. If we utilize it within one or at most two years, it will be possible for us to make

immediate and gigantic strides toward the solution of the livestock problem.

Besides this, we must take into account that in this zone there are great tracts of land suitable for flax growing, while at present flax is cultivated here only on 2 to 3 per cent of the total sown area. Is this not a waste? Even keeping in mind the famous theory that flax draws an enormous amount of strength out of the soil, we can still increase the flax-growing area to 25 per cent of the total sown, at least in the large and most suitable regions of the consuming zone.

We must strike out of our vocabulary the conception of a "consuming region," and replace it by hammering into the minds of all Party members, of all collective farm members, and of all who are "as yet non-collective farm members," the conception of a milk and flax district, tending in places to hog-breeding and in others to vegetable growing.

The tasks arising for us in the milk and flax district become immediately apparent:

1. During the next few years we must create a wide fodder basis for livestock breeding here, covering an additional territory of 15 to 20 million hectares. The theory that in this zone the cultivated areas are bound to decrease, we reject as a bourgeois deviation. These additional 15 to 20 million hectares must at all costs be made available within the next two or three years. This can be done by cultivating the fallow land and cleared woodland and by drainage. Why do fodder plants cover four-fifths of the sown area of the corresponding "consuming zone" of the United States, and only one-third in our country? Why are the American consuming zones utilized to 47 per cent of their cultivated area for growing grass plants, while in ours the figure is only 10 per cent? What are the reasons for this? There are none. It is simply a matter of bar-

baric economic methods, the accursed inheritance of the past.

By the end of the Five-Year Plan period we shall be cultivating fodder on an additional 15 to 20 million hectares in the milk, flax, and vegetable districts. We shall grow a mixture of oats and vetch, timothy and clover, sunflowers (for silos), stock beets, potatoes (six to seven million hectares in potatoes alone as a basis for hog-breeding), turnips, beans and field peas. By these means we shall lay a firm foundation for large-scale livestock breeding.

2. To this zone we must send the largest part of the Putilov type of tractors (a small type made at the Putilov Works in Leningrad.—*Ed.*), and also a smaller number of the heavier tractors, required to break up the virgin soil. In the wheat districts we have been successful in accomplishing our tasks with the aid of suitable tractors, and here we shall be equally successful with the help of another type of tractor. The milk and flax district will be best aided by the Putilov type of tractor. These are eminently adapted to the soil conditions obtaining here.

3. The Khibini apatite and Solikamsk potash deposits can supply us with the necessary mineral fertilizers for improving the pastures and meadows.

4. Members of regional and district committees of the milk, vegetable, and flax zone, *turn to livestock breeding!* We must put an end to the state of affairs still obtaining in the spring of 1930 when the Central Committee and Comrade Stalin had to use pressure to turn the regional and district committees of this zone toward agriculture. In spite of a number of decisions passed by the Central Committee of the Party, these organizations did not even always answer the inquiries of the Central Committee on the progress of the preparations for the sowing campaign.

This, of course, is due to an incorrect view of the possibilities of these regions.

These are the tasks of the milk, vegetable, and flax regions, the new tasks which we can and must set the Party in the consuming zone in view of the development of the state and collective farms.

#### 5. NEW TASKS IMPOSED ON THE WHEAT-GROWING ZONE BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND COLLECTIVE FARMS

The region to which I must next draw attention is the wheat growing. This zone begins in the south of the Ukraine and extends through the lower and middle Trans-Volga regions and Kazakstan to southwest Siberia. In a great part of this zone, especially in its western part, an increased yield is of decisive importance in increasing the output of grain. Here an increase in the yield of 30 to 35 per cent per acre by the end of the Five-Year Plan remains our minimum task.

The grain problem is, however, not solved by this alone. This does not exhaust all the possibilities of the state and collective farms. In order to avoid misunderstandings I must here emphasize that wheat growing should not be confined solely to the regions yielding the best crops. I refer again to the experience of America. Here the best wheat crops were obtained in the Northeast. And what do we see now? Comparatively little wheat is sown there. Dairy farming is regarded as more advantageous, since it is just in this part of the United States that the great industrial centers are concentrated. In America wheat is grown more in the West, in the prairie districts.

In the Soviet Union the best wheat crops can, of course, be grown in the Kuban, in the Armavir district. But is it advisable to specialize these districts for wheat growing,



when other and more valuable crops can be cultivated there, which do not thrive in other regions?

We shall grow wheat only where the more valuable crops do not grow, and where the tractor can be used for 24 hours per day.

What reserves have we in the wheat-growing zone for extending the cultivation of wheat? We have vast reserves in the Middle Volga Region: only nine million out of 23 million hectares of suitable land are under cultivation there. The Middle Volga Region must increase its cultivation of wheat by at least three to four million hectares in the course of the next three sowing campaigns. In the Lower Volga Region only 7.7 million hectares of the 28 millions of suitable land are used for wheat growing.

From this it may clearly be seen that by the end of the present five-year period we must have an additional six to eight million hectares of land under wheat in the Lower and Middle Trans-Volga Regions.

I pass now to Kazakstan. In 1929, out of the total area of 300 million hectares, there were only nine million hectares, or 3 per cent of the total, plowed; and of this only half was sown.

According to the calculations made by the new candidate to membership in the All-Union Communist Party, Professor Tulaikov, who possesses exceptional knowledge of the agriculture of the arid or semi-arid or dryland regions, 50 to 55 million hectares in Kazakstan may be regarded as suitable for cultivation; of these, nearly 36 million are situated in the northern districts bordering on the Siberian and Ural Regions: Aktyubinsk, Kustanai, Petropavlovsk, Akmolinsk, Pavlodar, and Semipalatinsk. Here only 5 per cent of the arable land is used for wheat growing. If we grow wheat on about 30 per cent of these 36 million hectares, then by the end of the Five-Year Plan, we can



have an additional 8 to 10 million hectares in Kazakstan alone, and obtain an average harvest of six or seven metric tons per hectare. I have given the average minimum figures for the crops, taking into consideration that in the eastern part of the wheat district drought periods are inevitable.

Finally, let us take Siberia. Here only nine million hectares are cultivated out of 50 million suitable for cultivation and about 500 million hectares of forest. Siberia must extend its wheat area by at least four to five million hectares.

The Central Black Soil Region, the Middle and Lower Trans-Volga Regions, Kazakstan, southwestern Siberia, and the eastern part of the Soviet Union taken together can increase the area sown to wheat by 20 to 25 million hectares by the end of the Five-Year Plan. This, in combination with the wheat production of the Ukraine, which plays at the moment the important rôle of main granary to the Soviet Union, will enable us to raise wheat production to a level worthy of our country.

Can we solve this task? Is it fantastic? We can and shall accomplish it by the time the Five-Year Plan is completed. We shall do so on the basis of the state farms and machine and tractor stations. We shall transform this "fantasy" also into reality with the aid of powerful tractors and combines.

How do we expect to accomplish this task? It must be taken into account that we shall have to solve the wheat problem in very thinly populated districts, in districts where the character of the land will make it possible to utilize the tractor and the combines most effectively. If this is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that the fulfillment of our program is a matter of the complete mechanization of production.

In order to solve this task, we shall have to assign 700,000

to a million horse power of the four million additional to be supplied to agriculture by the end of the Five-Year Plan. One quarter of the horse power which will be assigned to agricultural production during the next few years must be set to the task of sowing 20 to 25 million additional hectares to wheat. In my opinion we can and shall do this.

From an organizational standpoint, the pivot on which the accomplishment of this task swings is the minimum use of the man power and draft animals so that we have no need of great reserves in the case of failures of crops. Besides complete mechanization a very necessary item is the full utilization of the tractor, of every machine, of every unit of labor power. We must take as starting point the premise that each person shall work 200 hectares. That this is possible may be seen from the fact that, according to the production and financial plan of the Grain Trust, 210 hectares are figured per person for the current year. And this is not the limit. We shall not call a halt here.

It will be seen that we can solve the wheat problem in these districts with practically the existing population and with no great number of new settlers. The distribution of population must be in complete accord with the needs of agricultural production, so that each unit of labor is applied with an effect at least fifteen times greater than at the present time.

For this reason we shall have to organize our manpower through the state farms and machine and tractor stations. The present type of state farm is scarcely suitable to fulfill this task. What we need is not state farms with an area of ten thousand hectares, but of a hundred thousand, farms differing from the existing farms of the Grain Trust in that the network of farm buildings will

be considerably reduced, or, to express myself more correctly, the buildings of the present farms must in the first place serve a much wider territory than at present; and in the second place the number of auxiliary implements must be greatly reduced. A less thorough working of the soil must be compensated for by an increase in the sown area.

The land survey must be basic. The entire territory must be divided into cultivated sections by roads running from north to south and from east to west. The sections lying between the roads form the main working units of the state farm or the machine and tractor station within which all the work must be performed. No other farm buildings should be erected on these sections except tents for the workers.

And, finally, the area cultivated must be rotated, occupying either a section or an entire state farm.

These are the conditions under which we shall be sure of the accomplishment of the task set: an increase in the area sown to wheat of 20 to 25 million hectares by the spring of 1933.

On this basis "fantasy" may be made reality.

I repeat that the risk of periodical crop failures still exists. At present there is no guarantee against crop failure in the arid regions. Guarantees must be furnished, not against crop failures, but against famine. In this connection there is only one possible guarantee, and that is the extension of the cultivated area and the accumulation of food and seed reserves against crop failures in these districts.

In order not to digress too far from the main theme, I shall refer only briefly to the other agricultural zones. The Institute for the Economics and Organization of Socialist Agriculture of the Commissariat of Agriculture,

which is a part of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences in Moscow, has made the following provisional zonal division:

*Industrial crops and intensive livestock breeding zone:* in the southeastern Ukraine and the Central Black Soil Region: sugar beets, hemp, corn; in the Kuban district and in part in the Far Eastern Region: soy beans (which are of the utmost importance), clover, sunflowers, cotton, tobacco, kenaf, etc. A real intensification of agriculture through the development of industrial crops and intensive livestock breeding will become the general task in the Ukraine and in a considerable portion of the North Caucasus during the next few years. This task can only be fulfilled by the development of state and collective farms.

*Vegetable crop zone:* chiefly in combination with dairy farming in the suburbs of all large cities, especially Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donetz Basin and the Ural Region (by greatly facilitating the work of the peasantry, we can set ourselves the task of tripling the production of vegetables during the last three years of the Five-Year Plan period).

*Sub-tropical crop zone:* in Transcaucasia, along the southern coast of the Crimea, and in Central Asia. Our slogan must be: Oust corn from Transcaucasia. Is it not a disgrace that corn is grown here, on a soil where cotton, tea, rami, fruits (grapes, oranges, etc.) thrive? Is this not a senseless waste? Here the California and the Florida of the Soviet Union can and must arise!

*Zone of mountain and steppe pasture for livestock breeding:* this is provided chiefly in some parts of Kazakhstan, in the southeastern districts of the Lower Volga and North Caucasus Regions, in southern Siberia, in the Buriat-

Mongol Republic, etc. Thither the Cattle- and Sheep-Breeding Trusts will go.

Lastly there is *the forest zone*: our future reserves of arable land. It is not by accident that we have subordinated these to the authority of the Supreme Economic Council. The Supreme Economic Council will help us to extend the territory suitable for cultivation in the northwest, where the forests are the cause of the marshy condition of the soil, and in the entire north of the Soviet Union, where the forests in their present extent are proof of the extreme backwardness of our country.

## 6. COTTON AND FLAX

I shall deal in somewhat greater detail with cotton and flax. Their cultivation is the best illustration of the tempo of our work and organization of our economy which will enable us rapidly to create a raw materials base for industry.

An entirely new tempo has been achieved not only in cotton growing, but, in the spring of 1930, in the cultivation of all industrial crops, as the result of this spring's tilling with the aid of tractors, of the work of the state farms' and machine and tractor stations', and of the provisioning of cotton growers with grain. It is no wonder that this year we have surpassed even our own sowing plan. The state farms and machine and tractor stations have cultivated 200,000 hectares of cotton, thereby winning over the decisive masses of the petty peasants of Central Asia.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The state farms will increase the area sown to cotton from 70,000 in 1930 to 378,000 hectares in 1931. The state farms and machine and tractor stations will increase their area under cotton by 750,000 hectares. The total area under cotton in the U.S.S.R. in the spring of 1931 will be 2,300,000 hectares or 45 per cent over that of 1930, with a yield of 80 per cent higher due to improved methods of cultivation.—*Ed.*



The timely correction of the errors committed in the early spring assured the rapid realization of our plans.

The experience gained this spring shows that by the development of the state farms and the organization of a network of machine and tractor stations, we shall be able to carry out completely the program laid down by the Central Committee for a cotton crop of 48 million poods by the end of the Five-Year Plan. The principal requirements for this are:

1. *Development of the state farms*, especially of those cultivating Egyptian cotton, on the areas opened up by the new irrigation projects. At least 200,000 to 300,000 hectares must be reserved for cotton cultivation on the state farms.

2. *Rapid extension of the network of machine and tractor stations*, having in view the task of cultivating the greater part of the region sown to cotton by the spring of 1932, by tractors and of cultivating at least a million hectares with the aid of tractors in the spring of 1931. The method of organization which will be used results from the experience gained this year. The machine and tractor stations undertake the plowing and sowing, and all other field work is performed by the peasants who are united into collective farms.

3. *The rapid extension of the cultivation of perennial cotton on non-irrigated lands*. This year we have made an experiment with the cultivation of 150,000 hectares of such land. Next year, if the experiment is successful, we shall extend it to 300,000 hectares, and shall devote further attention to the rapid expansion of cotton, including that on non-irrigated lands. This would be justified by a yield amounting to only half, or even a third of that from irrigated fields.

4. *Exclusive cultivation of cotton on irrigated fields*. If

this is to be carried out, the requirements of the cotton growers for grain must be fully met.

5. And, finally, it is time—and this does not exceed our powers—to begin to carry out two or three irrigation projects which will open up new and wide tracts of land for cotton growing in Central Asia.

These are our tasks, and these are the methods which have already stood the test of experience. Their solution depends upon the tractor and the grain supply.

Now a few words on flax. Flax must follow the same path as cotton. It is solely because this path has not been followed until now that we have attained no satisfactory results in the extension of flax cultivation, and in the increase in the flax yield. This means that next spring we must begin with the mass application of the following measures:

1. *Specialization of certain districts in flax cultivation*, with the proviso that 25 per cent of their area is to be reserved for flax. The area to be sown to flax must be set aside. An excellent method of insuring this would be to reserve this year about 2.5 million hectares of the winter sown area for flax, thereby guaranteeing that as early as the autumn of 1931 this area will be set aside for the cultivation of flax.<sup>8</sup>

2. *The extension of the network of state farms and machine and tractor stations*. The tractors—chiefly of the Putilov (lighter—*Ed.*) type, and only occasionally of the Stalingrad (heavier—*Ed.*) type—must be allotted to the machine and tractor stations, which have as their main task the reservation and extension of the area sown to flax.

In this manner the system of necessary levers will be in our hands, I repeat, on the basis of state and collective

<sup>8</sup> The area to be sown to long-fiber flax in 1931 is 2,100,000 hectares, or 25 per cent more than in 1930.—*Ed.*

farms. There is no other way of developing flax growing. In the consuming zone tractors must be supplied immediately to satisfy the requirements of flax growing, particularly in those sections where virgin soil must be cultivated.

3. *The flax grower must be supplied with grain in the same manner as the cotton grower.*

4. And, finally, we must solve the problem of suitable machinery for the preliminary treatment of the flax. It is an intolerable state of affairs, at the present time, that great quantities of flax fiber, enough to keep our factories working for a month, are left unutilized. Means can, and certainly must, be found for obtaining the necessary machines, even if they are not of the very latest type.

The same applies to all other industrial crops. The path to their accelerated development and consequently to the rapid satisfaction of the requirements of the country, leads through the development of the state farms, the organization of machine and tractor stations, and the efficient supplying of grain.

Such are the further tasks which we can set our agriculture in connection with the development of state and collective farms.

I make no special reference here, and quite deliberately, to a number of other important tasks (mineral fertilizers, measures against insects and other pests, electrification of agriculture, development of horse-breeding, improvement of seeds, especially for fodder crops, etc.), not because these are of lesser importance, but because I must confine myself to a few decisive problems. Discussion of them will clearly show not only to the whole Party, but to the peasants of our country, the new possibilities offered for the raising of our agricultural level by the development of state and collective farms.

## 7. THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR NEW METHOD OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

In conclusion may I be permitted to return to the question: What is the meaning of the revolution which we are witnessing in agricultural production?

We have seen that this revolution is taking entirely different forms in the United States and in our country. In the one case, that of America, it is the rich who enjoy all the advantages of the new methods, while the small and middle farmers are at a disadvantage; in the other case, that of the Soviet Union, it is the poor and middle farmers who enjoy the advantage, while all disadvantages are borne by the kulaks. In both cases, however, the change in the methods of production remains an incontestable fact.

What is the essence of the change? Not merely that this or that machine is replaced by another and more perfect one, but that the use of the tractor and all of its accessory machinery by state and collective farms has altered the very method of agricultural production. This fact is best confirmed by the actual change in the basic components of the cost of producing wheat as compared with those of agriculture under the old system.

According to the production and financial plan of the Grain Trust for 1930, the cost of the wheat crop per hectare is made up chiefly of the price of the metals and the oil products used: amortization and materials (that is, chiefly of metal) make up 34 per cent; gasoline and lubricating oil 17 per cent; seed 21 per cent; wages 28 per cent. If the seed, as a transferable item, is counted neither in receipts nor expenditures, the data supplied by the Grain Trust show the following costs: amortization and materials 43 per cent, gasoline and lubricating oil 21 per cent, wages 36 per cent. The figures supplied by the

administration of the machine and tractor stations (the Tractor Center) are similar, except that a somewhat larger share falls to wages, inasmuch as the calculations of the Tractor Center are not based upon the work of combines, but upon that of the sheaf-binders and threshing machines driven by the tractors.

I quote further the cost of cultivating one hectare by the machine and tractor stations for eight such stations, the figures resulting from an inquiry made by the Institute for Large-Scale Farming, attached to the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. The items are as follows: repairs 10 per cent, amortization 23 per cent, gasoline and lubricating oil 29 per cent, wages of tractor drivers 11 per cent, costs of management 11 per cent, miscellaneous 16 per cent. These are the facts. What are the conclusions?

In the earlier stages of the development of mankind, the products of agriculture were chiefly the result of enormous quantities of human energy (at best, combined with horsepower) expended directly on the soil; at the present time, agricultural products are the result of the application of metals and oil to the soil. In other words, the main part of the work required for the growing of wheat is no longer performed in the field itself, but in the iron and steel works and oil fields. In agricultural production the metals and oil supplied by mankind to the soil in the form of tractors and accessory machines are transformed into grain. The individual peasant farm of former days required 230 working hours to grow spring wheat on one hectare of land and 281 hours for winter wheat (I have taken the lowest calculation supplied by the Central Statistical Administration of the Soviet Union). But the state farms of the Grain Trust require only nine man-hours to perform the same work, the heavy track-laying type of tractor being in use for  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours of this time. After the working methods and



the mechanization of a number of processes have been further perfected, and more accessory machines brought into use, only six and two hours respectively will be required. This applies to all field work, from plowing to harvesting. Nine hours of field work instead of 280, and in the near future only six! It must, of course, not be supposed that a total of nine hours is all that is required to cultivate a hectare of wheat. It is the field work, the immediate agricultural work, which is reduced to nine hours, while the other part of the work required for the production of wheat is transferred from the fields to the mines, ironworks, factories, and oil fields.

Metals and oil instead of the sweat of the peasant's brow, praised by liberal poets—this is what counts.

All this means that agriculture, organized to an increasing degree by modern technique, is more and more approaching industry in its methods. This becomes apparent to an extent also when we compare the structure of the capital invested in the Grain Trust with that of the big factories of the metal industry. We see that on the modern state farms of the Grain Trust the organic structure of capital is almost the same as in the large-scale metal undertakings. This is the real essence of the change in agricultural production. Therefore I have devoted the first two parts of this report to an analysis of the different manners in which the revolution in agriculture is being carried out by capitalist and by socialist methods.

The technical revolution in the agricultural production of the Soviet Union is secured by the Five-Year Plan. It is secured—and this is most important of all—by the general line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in socialist forms, on the basis of the development of state and collective farms. Our perspectives of development are determined in this manner: we are accumulating the deci-

sive possibilities for the changing of the technical basis of agriculture. Our collective farms need not wait much longer for the day when the tractor and its accessories replace the present system of machines. In the last year of the Five-Year Plan, by using the five million horse power of tractors, we shall cultivate approximately 100 million hectares. We shall utilize the capacity of our tractors to such an extent that by the spring of 1934 the greater part of the sowing (which in that year will cover 200 million hectares of land) will be carried out by them. This means that a new plan of agricultural machine-building is urgently needed. The nine million horse power of tractors which will be used on our fields in the spring of 1934 must be reënforced by corresponding accessories (and it is not necessary that these be copied exactly from the machines in use in capitalist countries, where the machinery is adapted to the scale of production there obtaining). The caterpillar type of tractor on a state farm of 100,000 hectares does not require those accessory machines which are supplied by modern industry under capitalist conditions. We need our own accessories.

Experience has shown us that we can insure a supply of suitable machinery to our agriculture by reconstructing old plants and by building new ones, provided we do not cling to yesterday, but realize at once that in the next few years it will not be foreign but domestic industry which will have to supply the greater part of the accessory machinery required for the five million horse power of our tractors.

These are the bases on which we must take up the work of revising the Five-Year Plan for the organization of agriculture. The tasks which we set ourselves for the last three years of the Plan must take as their starting point the fact that by the end of the Five-Year Plan the decisive masses of the peasantry will be members of collective farms,

and the state farms will cover the area set in the decision of the Central Committee.

Whatever difficulties may stand in the way of the accomplishment of this gigantic task, we know at least that their fulfillment will be obtained at a price very much lower than that which the farmers in the United States have to pay for the triumphal march of technical progress under capitalist conditions. There, in the United States, the agricultural revolution is being dragged out for decades. This means that the process of ruining the overwhelming majority of the farmers, and enriching a thin topmost layer is going to last for decades. It means that the process of advancing capitalist agriculture will force the farmers to pass through all the stages of impoverishment and ruin, long ago described by Marx in *Capital*:

The expropriation of the immediate producers is being carried out with relentless vandalism, under the stimulus of the vilest, dirtiest, and most petty and spiteful passions. (Vol. I, pp. 835-6.)

The path which we have taken, on the other hand, means raising the standard of living of the overwhelming majority of the peasantry, the abolition of slavery to the kulak, the abolition of the kulaks (who represent an insignificant minority of the peasantry) as a class, the transformation of millions of peasants into free collaborators in a socialist society. In pursuing this path, we are realizing the theses of the Central Committee:

On the basis of collectivization, the development of the machine and tractor stations, and the organization of state farms, the Party will be able to begin to realize the slogan of "to equal and surpass" the capitalist countries of the world, and not only with regard to industry, where the advantages of large-scale production have long been strikingly illustrated, *but also in the sphere of agriculture*, the tempo of development of which has hitherto been

determined by the overwhelming preponderance of small, even dwarf farms of extremely low productivity. Its tempo will now be determined by the accelerated development of the state and collective farms, which represent an entirely new form of economy, unique in the history of mankind, called into existence for the first time by the experience of economic reconstruction in the Soviet Union.

Derisive laughter from every camp accompanies us on this path, both from our open enemies and from our bureaucratic officials. They exclaim: What, with meat on ration tickets (and often not enough of it at that)! Soon they will not have any goods at all for which one must not have to stand lined up in a queue! And just look at what they are doing! Instead of working themselves out of the situation slowly and without extra effort they set themselves fantastic tasks, such as the doubling of the consumption of meat and milk, an enormous increase in the consumption of wheat, etc.

We shall encounter many such scoffers on our path! We shall take no notice of them, but shall go forward on our way, guided by the general line laid down by the Party, basing ourselves now not only on our own experience and convictions, but also on the experience gained by hundreds of thousands of collective farmers, who will become the best agitators and organizers of large-scale farming. And we may state with full conviction that, on this basis, having overcome inevitable difficulties, we shall be able within the next few years not only to liquidate completely our food supply difficulties since these difficulties arise from the small productive powers of the small farms, but we shall also secure in the shortest historical period a degree of progress in the satisfaction of the requirements of the working masses in the Soviet Union such as has never yet been known in the history of the capitalist world.

## CHAPTER IV

### ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN AND DEVELOP COLLECTIVE FARMS

It remains for me only to mention some of the absolutely essential organizational measures, measures which are most important from the point of view of strengthening the collective farms. Since the portion of the theses dealing with this phase is familiar to all of you, permit me to dwell very briefly upon this part of my report.

In solving organizational problems we must start from certain basic propositions, which are as follows:

The fundamental proposition is the fact that, in spite of the enormous number of elements of the past which the *artel* (collective) form of husbandry has not outlived, there has been created by the peasant masses a new type of farming, introduced not in one village or in a dozen, but *over an enormous territory*, with a sown area exceeding 30 million hectares.<sup>1</sup>

Of course, one should not idealize the *artel*. One should not assume that it represents the highest socialist form of economy. As the theses of the Central Committee on my report point out: "*The artel does not perfect, but only begins the creation of a new social discipline and the training of the peasants in socialist construction.*" But what is important, and historically valuable, what constitutes a step forward in the world-historical development of socialism—

<sup>1</sup> Early in May, 1931, the collectives had over 12,000,000 peasant households, or 50 per cent of the total in the country.—*Ed.*



is the fact that in the artel there has been created a new type of socialized agriculture, in which private ownership of the means of production has been eliminated, the class exploitation of one collectivized farmer by another has been abolished, and this means the disappearance of that base which, in Lenin's words, "gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, elementally and on a mass scale."<sup>2</sup>

One should not idealize the members of the artel. They were but yesterday petty proprietors, small property-owners. Consider their psychology. It is understandable that at first their efforts will often be directed toward escaping from the strenuous toil of the small farm, toward securing somewhat more of life's blessings which they did not get on their small farms but which the artel can provide. *They will often try to snatch at leisure, to be lazy, to shove work on to others.* This tendency will doubtless be widespread and serious for a long time to come. It is evident that a *certain amount of time* is required for this type of collective farmer not only to see but actually to feel that simply to grab at leisure and to seize things for himself is unpermissible, that it leads to the ruin of the artel.

*The transition from small to large-scale farming, which is now taking place, is impossible without wavering and vacillations, without attempts by disruptive elements, by kulak elements (bound by a thousand ties to the small peasantry) to take action in one form or another.*

On collective farms the peasants will definitely outgrow the psychology of petty property-owners and their greed for private accumulation, handed down by generations of small proprietors. This tendency will be overcome only after years of stubborn work in establishing for the collective farms a basis of large-scale

<sup>2</sup>*Infantile Sickness of "Left" Communism.—Ed.*

mechanized production; years of effort in the formation of cadres from among the collective farm members; and by raising the cultural level of the entire collective farm membership.<sup>3</sup>

Only in the process of such work, only by setting against the anarchy of the petty producer and small property-owner of yesterday the principle of genuine organizational order and labor discipline, only by laying the foundation for a new socialist conscientiousness on the part of the members of the collective farmers shall we be able to develop and strengthen the socialist character of the artel. In regard to this we hide nothing from the members of the artel. We state frankly that we are not driving any one into the artel by force. What is more, we declare that we regard those persons who attempt to force peasants to join artels as enemies of the Party and of the Soviet power, as accomplices of the kulaks. But at the same time, to those who have joined an artel, we also say frankly: there can be no joint undertaking without elementary discipline, without a conscious and conscientious regard for communal property. You joined the artel voluntarily, but that does not mean that you may pillage it whenever it strikes your fancy. Once you have joined, you have taken upon yourself the obligation of submitting to the statutes adopted by its members and to its discipline; otherwise, I repeat, there will be no increase in the productivity of labor, no improvement in the standard of living.

These preliminary facts must be kept in mind whenever we undertake to solve basic organizational and political problems. Of these we must first of all consider the following questions: the middle peasantry, the poor peasantry, relations with the individual peasants, withdrawals from the collectives, and the training of cadres.

<sup>3</sup> Theses of the Central Committee on Yakovlev's Report.—*Ed.*

## I. THE MIDDLE PEASANTRY

Let us take the question of the middle peasantry. What is the basic factor here? The answer is to be found in the theses:

The transition from individual to collective farming can be achieved only on the basis of an alliance of the working class and poor peasants with the middle peasants. This implies the obligation of systematically drawing the *middle peasants into the management of the collective farms*.

The slogan "alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants" determines the development of the village prior to the establishment of the collective farms. It also determines a number of practical problems with regard to the middle peasants, especially the question of enlisting the services of the middle peasants in the management of the collective farms.

The degree of stability of the collective farm depends to a great extent on whether or not the middle peasants participate in its management. Dozens of instances show that when the middle peasants have taken part in the management of the collective farms there have been fewer withdrawals and fewer stupid mistakes.

There are not a few instances in which every attempt has been made to prevent the middle peasants from participating in the management of the collective farms. I could mention dozens of examples of middle peasants not being allowed to occupy the post of stable manager under the pretext of "struggle against Right deviation"; of the removal of middle peasants from positions as foreman under the pretext that "we need only poor peasants"; of middle peasants not being allowed to participate in the management, with the result that they withdrew from the collec-

tives. Often the middle peasants are granted positions of quasi-leadership; they are elected to the management but given no work. I have known middle peasants, who on paper were listed as belonging to the management of the collective, but whose job was that of watchman or storehouse man. The percentage is attained and there the matter ends! In such cases the middle peasant feels offended. He feels himself thrust to one side in the collective farm. Demands are made of him, but he is given no work, nor invited to meetings.

Of course this does not in the least mean that the entire management should be turned over to the middle peasants. The management certainly must remain in the hands of the working class, the agricultural laborers and the poor peasantry. But without the participation of the middle peasantry a stable collective farm cannot be established.

In certain half-learned circles in our country there was for a time a widespread theory that the collective farm was not advantageous for the middle peasant. Various "learned circles" attempted to prove that the middle peasant joined the collective only because he was forced to do so or in order to escape the grain-collections. They upheld this theory by asserting that during the first few years of the collective's existence the middle peasant had to give up a certain portion of his income in favor of the poor peasant, and gained nothing from the collective. Experience has completely refuted this theory. It is disproved by the fact that the increase in the production of a collective farm resulting from the increased area under cultivation and the higher productivity of labor is in an enormous number of cases so great that it is sufficient not only to raise the income of the poor peasant to that formerly obtained by the middle peasant but also to increase the income of the middle peasant who has joined it.

In view of the importance of this question, I call it to the attention not only of the Party Congress but also of all members of collective farms and all those peasants "not yet collectivized."

A special commission of the Communist Academy, sent this year to the Kuban district, brought out the following facts:

This year the collective farm, "October," will attain a production valued at an average of 690 rubles per affiliated household, assuming that this year's harvest will be equal to last year's. This means that the gross production of the poor peasant in the collective is more than double that of his previous average income of 330 rubles (assuming that he derives no supplementary income), while that of the middle peasant increases from 540 rubles, farming to 802 rubles, *i.e.*, by 50 per cent (assuming that he derives supplementary income from individual farming). These figures are based on an average harvest. With the harvest expected this year, the increase of gross production falling to the share of the poor and middle peasants will be still greater. This is explained by the fact that last year the average poor peasant farm totaled four hectares and middle peasant farm 6.7 hectares, while this year the average area sown per family on the collective farms was 8.2 hectares, with an additional 0.3 hectares sown individually.

Such is the situation as regards gross production; as regards income it is practically the same. If we take the total income and subtract all the payments required by the statutes of the collective [various reserve funds—*Ed.*] we find that the *income of the middle peasant family in the collective exceeds that of last year, while that of the poor peasant exceeds the former income of the middle peasant.*

To avoid any misunderstanding it is well to state that in



these calculations it is also assumed that the former poor peasant has only his share of the income from socialized production, while the former middle peasant has an additional income, determined by investigation, from his individual farm.

On the "October" collective the marketable surplus this year, in spite of the increase in home consumption, will attain a value of 500,000 rubles, with an average harvest, and of one million rubles with a good harvest, as against last year's 200,000 rubles from these same households. Since it was not long ago that the peasant was ready to attribute every bad harvest to the collective farms, let us in compensation attribute a certain part of this year's good harvest to the collective farms and their members.

Similar data have resulted from a number of other investigations. That carried on by the instructors of the Collective Farm Center shows that on the collective farm, "Wave of Revolution," in the Borisoglebsk district near Vovonezh, the gross production from the socialized field work amounted to 545 rubles per collectivized household. For the poor peasants Mitin, F. Sergeyev, and P. Sergeyev, this was three and a half times their last year's gross production, which amounted to only 150 rubles. For the poor peasants, Suslov and Bobkov, who in 1929 had a gross production valued at 340-400 rubles, this was an increase of 50 per cent. For the middle peasants an increase of 120-130 rubles is shown.

Another investigation, carried on by an instructor of the Collective Farm Center on the collective farm, "Stalin," in the North Caucasus, shows that the poor peasants Brezhnev and Shcherban will increase their incomes by 100 per cent, Shimko and Basov by 150 per cent, and Yalin by 300 per cent, while the middle peasants average a 50 per cent in-

crease (again calculating the income after deducting the sums levied according to the statutes).

The Bashkir collective, "Red Lighthouse," in the Urals, is expected to attain an average output of 95 poods of marketable grain per household this year, while last year its members, who had been agricultural laborers, had no sown area at all. Its poor peasants sowed one to three hectares, and its middle peasants five to seven hectares, the latter producing about 60 poods of marketable grain per household.

What does this show? It shows that the advantages of large-scale farming already make it possible in the first spring for the income of poor peasants in the collective farms to attain the level of the former middle peasants, while the income of the latter is raised at the same time.

That is why the middle peasants are joining the collective farms. That is why we expect *all* the middle peasants to join! That is why, in the chief grain-producing regions, during the present stage of development, we can already divide the village into "members of collective farms" and "peasants not yet collectivized." Herein, I again repeat, lies the difference between the path of development of large-scale farming in the U.S.S.R. and in the United States.

## 2. INEQUALITY AMONG ARTEL MEMBERS

The next group of questions relates to the problem of the inequality of the members of an artel.

The principle involved here is quite clear. In the average collective farm there are no kulaks with the exception of those who under one pretext or another have crept in and have not yet been cleaned out; hence there is no exploitation. But in the collective there still exists inequality between the poor and middle peasant, even though the basic



Cotton Pickers in the Fields of Turkestan.



A Modern Dairy Building in White Russia.

means of production have been socialized, inasmuch as the middle peasant has a larger individual holding than the poor peasant. As a result of this, some (the poor peasants) will more quickly outlive the prejudices of small owners, others (the middle peasants) more slowly; some (the middle peasants) will be more influenced by kulak agitation than others (the poor peasants); some (the middle peasants) will be drawn more and others (the poor peasants) less toward an increase in the individual holdings.

At the same time, of course, we should keep in mind the fact that the inequality of property among the members of a collective farm does not signify antagonistic relations since there is no appropriation by part of the members of the unpaid labor of another part. *Hence, that property inequality existing in a collective farm has nothing in common with the inequality between the poor peasant and the kulak.* Nor is it the same sort of inequality that exists in the factories of our country.

As regards this there are two deviations, which were clearly revealed in the discussions prior to the Party Congress. Some say that in the collective farm we have the same inequality as we have in our factories; in other words, that the middle peasant is "equal" to the poor peasant. Others, on the contrary, say that the middle and poor peasant are opposed to each other within the collective just as outside it. Both these standpoints are, of course, absolutely incorrect.

The inequality still prevailing among mill and factory workers in the U.S.S.R. is caused mainly by diversity in the quantity and quality of their labor, by the difference in skill among the workers. In the collectives, where the production of socialized economy is divided chiefly in accordance with the quantity and quality of labor, we have this same type of inequality, but in addition to it we have



another inequality, arising from difference as to property holdings, *i.e.*, from the difference in size of the supplementary individual holdings of the middle and poor peasantry.

Not to see this is equivalent to covering up difficulties and representing the situation of the artel as better than it really is.

This additional inequality and the resulting difference in the situation of the poor and middle peasant in the artel will continue to exist for some time to come, inasmuch as we do not think that it would be correct to liquidate by any hasty administrative measures the remaining individual holdings of the artel members.

In this regard the theses state:

To demand that the peasant, on joining an artel, should immediately abandon all individualist habits and interests; and should surrender the possibility of carrying on individual farming (of cows, sheep, poultry, and vegetables) in addition to the socialized farming; should forgo any opportunity of earning money on the side, is to forget the ABC of Marxism and Leninism.

If within the working class itself, as predicted by Marx in his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, a certain inequality is "unavoidable even in the first stage of a Communist society," then certainly this proposition of Marx applies even more to members of artels.

So the matter stands as regards the first deviation, which is characterized by an under-estimation of a certain inequality between the middle and poor peasantry, which still exists and will inevitably exist in the first stage of development of an artel.

Nor is it better with the second deviation, which interprets this inequality still existing between the poor and middle peasantry as a class antagonism and, on the strength of this, tries to apply to the collective farms the laws of

the class struggle between the poor peasant and the kulak.

Such a representation of the interrelations of the poor and middle peasantry constitutes, of course, pure Trotskyism. Only Trotsky could say: "If the collective farms offer considerable advantages as compared with the scattered farms, in the collective farms differentiation will proceed even more rapidly than before."<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand, we propose—with the help of the poor peasants and agricultural laborers who are members of the collective farms—to develop the work of increasing in every way the socialized part of their income, which will inevitably lessen the proportion of individual income to total income, and more and more reduce the inequality among artel members to a point where it constitutes mainly an inequality arising from diversity in the quantity and quality of their labor. We shall accomplish this without undue haste, without nervousness, carrying out this work in conformity with the growth of the socialized sector of our national economy.

### 3. ORGANIZATION OF GROUPS OF POOR PEASANTS AND AGRICULTURAL LABORERS

These principles give a complete answer to the question of where and under what conditions one should organize groups of poor peasants in the collective farms. The theses answer this question thus:

The work of the groups of poor peasants in the elementary forms of collective farms should be improved and strengthened, inasmuch as the transition from the simplest associations to a higher stages of collectivization can be secured only with the aid of the poor peasants. The Party units in the collective farms must see to it that the work of the groups of poor peasants is

<sup>4</sup> *Bulletin of the Opposition*, February-March, 1930.

conducted in such a way as not only to protect the immediate interests of the poor peasantry, but also to aid the consolidation of the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasantry with the middle peasantry.

This means that special attention should be paid to the Associations for the Joint Cultivation of the Land and to certain artels, in which for some reason there is danger that socialized production may be utilized for private accumulation, and into which kulak influence is penetrating (the kulak may exert influence even after he has been liquidated as a class). *At the same time we must intensify our work among the poor peasantry even in those cases where no special group of poor peasants has been formed in the collective farm.* The experience already gained in work among the poor peasantry, both in those cases where groups of poor peasants have been formed and in those where none exists, has shown that it is necessary in the collective farm, to avoid substituting the group of poor peasants for the general meeting; to avoid converting the group of poor peasants into a collective manager of the farm, bossing the middle peasants; to combat the tendency to convert the group of poor peasants into an organ of distribution, so that every one works but only the poor peasant group has the distribution in its hands.

Only if we succeed in avoiding these errors will the work with poor peasants attain its aim, *i.e.*, both to contribute to the defense of the immediate interests of the poor peasantry and *to strengthen the rôle of the members of collective farms as the main support of the Soviet Power in the village.*

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF COLLECTIVE FARMS  
AND INDIVIDUAL PEASANTS

The fourth group of questions concerns the relations between the members of collective farms and individual peasants. In some districts there has been an incorrect attitude toward the individual peasants, a hounding of them that is outwardly dictated by a special devotion to the cause of collective farming but actually injures that cause. This incorrect attitude toward the individual peasant has in some cases been expressed by cutting down the share of land for individual peasants, even when there was enough land both for them and the collective farms; in appropriating for the collective farms winter fallow plowed by individual peasants; in a refusal to admit new members into the collective farms; in a refusal by local authorities to carry on any work among the individual peasants, and to include their holdings in the sowing plan; in a refusal, as a display of power, to supply the individual peasants with even those goods of which there was no deficiency. It need not be said that such an attitude is grossly incorrect and fundamentally contradictory to the theses, which regard all poor and middle individual peasants as potential members of collective farms:

It must not be forgotten that henceforth in the chief grain-growing districts of the Soviet Union the village is divided into two main sections: the collective farm members, who constitute a real and firm support of the Soviet Power; and the poor and middle peasants, who are not collective farm members, and who do not yet wish to join them but who will, in a comparatively short period of time, undoubtedly be convinced by the mass experience of the collective farms of the necessity of entering upon the path of collectivization.

It is extremely important to keep in mind also the second part of this statement. For this passage in the theses not

only puts forth the slogan of leaning for support on the members of the collective farms, as the most important slogan of the present period, but in addition comprises a second part, of immense theoretical and practical importance, with reference to the individual peasants who within a comparatively short time will enter upon the path of collectivization.

Outside the collective farms there is undoubtedly a very large number of peasants in "semi-collectives"—"unofficial collectives"—awaiting the results of the distribution of the harvest before joining a collective farm. Many of these "semi-collectivized" peasants, while not joining collective farms, adopted this spring the methods of work used on the collective farms.

Here are some examples: In one of the village Soviets in the Urals during the spring sowing the individual peasants were organized into brigades, and to each brigade was attached a member of the village Soviet, who was responsible for its fulfillment of the sowing plan. The village Soviet, together with the collective farm, placed at the disposal of the individual peasants 16 seeders, with a capacity of 75 hectares per seeder. On April 27 all the individual peasants went to the fields in an organized fashion.

Another example: In the village of Lopatino, in the Middle Volga Region, the individual peasants went to the field as a unit, wiping out all the boundary strips between their fields.

In the settlement of Yablonovo, in the Central Black Soil Region, the poor peasants coöperated with the middle peasants in "harnessing pairs." To the suggestion that they formally organize some sort of collective farm, they gave a categorical refusal: "We shall wait till autumn and see how the crops are distributed."



In the village of Antonovo in Siberia there are one agricultural artel and twelve cases of "harnessing pairs," in many of which they have socialized the implements.

In the village of Kozimka in the Stavropol district (Middle Volga Region), the poor and middle peasants organized an "unofficial" collective, divided themselves into brigades and sowed in a continuous furrow. When asked why they did not set up a collective farm, they replied: "We don't understand these collective farms, how the peasants live and work."

In the village of Permas (Veliki Ustyug, Northern Region) the individual peasants joined the collective farm brigade during the time of sowing.

In the village of Upper Tsaritsin, in the Stalingrad district of the North Caucasus, the individual peasants sowed in one continuous furrow; plowing up the boundary strips, and afterwards joined the collective farm.

What does this show? It shows that outside the collective farms there is a large stratum of peasantry, already nearly ripe for entrance into collective farms. The speed of their entrance will depend on the help given, on the establishment of neighborly relations on the part of the collective farm toward them—in a word, on the actual realization of the slogan in the theses: "Do not hound the individual peasants but render them all possible aid and in every way induce them to join the collective farms."

The second factor which should be mentioned in regard to relations with the individual peasants is the rôle played by competition between the individual peasants and the members of collective farms in the sowings of the past spring. Our press gave little attention to this, although it was a factor of great importance. How did it happen that in the spring of 1930 we sowed almost 90 million hectares? Here competition played the chief rôle. When almost one-

fourth of all the peasant households had joined collective farms, when the tremendous possibilities of the collective in extending the sown area had been revealed by actual field work, then the individual peasants set to work, though tardily, to sow, in order not to be obliged to turn over their land to the collective farms.

The following report from the collective farm in the village of Lokotz, in the Tver district, reflects this process of competition with almost stenographic accuracy:

Orlov, a collective farm member, declared: "I am over fifty years old, but I have never before seen such work. Isn't it a miracle that we with horses have plowed at the rate of one hectare per day? Was such a thing ever seen? Only it's too bad that there's no sugar. We come from work and gulp only a mug of cold water. We must demand sugar; for three months we've had none."

Ivanov (individual peasant): "The collective farm has plowed all the ends of the strips. We should propose to the whole village to plow the upper ends of our strips. We could get there another five hectares."

Ivan Ydin (individual peasant): "I cleared a plot of underbrush without waiting for any one to propose it. We must arouse the others to activity."

Ivan Yelkin (individual peasant): "Beyond Zhokov's strip I shall plow an extra half desyatina. Further one can't go, it's swamp."

Yefrem Yelkin: "I have been reproached here for not having plowed part of my land. The ground has been too wet there, comrades, up to now. I shall plow it to-morrow."

Resolution adopted: "That an inventory be taken of all unplowed lands and that they be plowed in common."

Connected with this is the question of the attitude to be adopted toward the so-called "runaways" or "deserters" or whatever they may be called in the various districts, *i.e.*, toward those who have withdrawn from the collective farms either on account of excesses committed or just because they

got frightened. There are quite a number of these "run-aways," of these "deserters." The question as to what is to become of them is of considerable importance.

It is natural that a man, who resisted the temptation to leave the collective farm, who took upon himself the risk of the first attempt to organize farming on new lines, is not inclined to trust the "deserters," who rushed out of the collectives, even if now they return confessing their error. But from the political viewpoint such an attitude is very injurious, if it leads to closing the doors of the collective farms. Here is an example:

In the village of Veshki, in the Lower Volga Region, after the publication of Comrade Stalin's article, "A Reply to the Comrades on Collective Farms," a score of former members applied for readmission to the collective. Here is one of these applications: "My wife, Yevdokiya Kochetkova, and I send our greetings to Comrade Stalin, for his true words. I move that a resolution be adopted in line with his words, as my wife Yevdokiya, my son Paul, my daughters Alexandra and little Simka and I are again all agreed to be in the collective farm. Just wait, to-morrow we shall go out to plow with a team of horses and mended harness. We shall give them over to the commune. The horses and foal have been fed in good peasant style, and the plow-shares are new. I move that we be admitted into the collective farm, in accordance with the explanation of dear Comrade Stalin. Good health to him! And give the text of the resolution to Simka."

The members of the collective farm resolved: That the "runaways" be accepted as "candidates"; that they be organized into a "punishment brigade"; that they plow separately and that a special brigade foreman be placed over them. As a result, those who had turned in their applications refused to go into the "punishment brigade"

and remained individual peasant farmers. The members of the collective farms, who imagined that they had acted so "radically," actually thrust their neighbors back into individual farming.

Hence, as regards admission into an artel, there can be only one restriction, a restriction as to time. Perhaps in the interests of the sowing, it may be advisable to close admission into the collective farms for one or two months prior to the sowing season, so as not to break up the fields of either the collective farms or of the individual peasants, but this question must, of course, be settled locally, in accordance with local conditions. In this matter we must not surrender to the feelings of the members of the collective farms. We must fight the tendency to close the doors of the collective farms. Of course, it would be very easy, after the results of this spring's sowing, to close the doors of the collective farms and entrench one's position, but then the decay of the entire collective farm movement would begin. We cannot issue such slogans! We regard the individual peasant farmers of to-day as collective farm members of to-morrow and we shall carry on a struggle to the end that the present stratum of collective farm members shall be augmented by numerous additions beginning with this autumn. We now take up the struggle to win these new additions. This follows from our theses. In this lies the essence of our relations with the individual peasants, with the poor and middle peasants.

##### 5. VOLUNTARY ENTRY AND CONDITIONS OF WITHDRAWAL

With all this is bound up the question of the relation between the voluntary entry into a collective farm and the conditions of withdrawal from it.

In the general introduction to this part of my report I

have already stated that without certain elements of discipline it is impossible to organize socialized farming. But we must *differentiate* between the withdrawals from the collective farms which took place this spring and those which may possibly take place now and during this autumn.

The withdrawals were principally of those who had been forced to join the collective farms—of “dead souls” who were registered as collective farm members, but who actually never belonged. *Those thus registered involuntarily left the collectives as soon as it became apparent that there was no compulsion.* By allowing those who had been forced to join the collective farms to withdraw, and by exposing the pressure put upon the middle peasants as a direct violation of the Party directives and the Soviet laws, the Central Committee of the Party saved the collective farms.

The second possible type of withdrawal is that of peasants now leaving the collectives, as a result of poor organization or lack of labor discipline. The case here is that of a collective farm which has been unable to organize its farming and which has not been helped in time to extricate itself from its disorganized state. There is consequently a tendency to leave, especially on the part of the middle peasant, who has something to fall back upon for the organization of an individual farm. We can frankly state that if there is at present a tendency to leave a collective farm, it means that the collective farm is bad, that its work is poorly organized, that there is no order or discipline, and that the agricultural and collective farm organs are to blame for not having given help in time.

If members leave a collective farm because they see that there are more stablemen than horses in the stables, that there are foremen and sub-foremen, men in charge and their assistants, stable cleaners and stable superintendents, fodder-procurers and buyers and managers, and with all



this the horses stand knee-deep in manure, then there is only one method of guarding against resignations: to rid the collective farm of this excess apparatus and really help its members to organize their farming. Hence, in such cases the question of withdrawal is a question of organization. That during the first spring 40 per cent of the artels had no norms for the division of labor was understandable and pardonable, but in the second spring we shall regard such a situation as a crime to be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities.

*And finally there are the withdrawals inspired by the kulak.* The kulak wages war against the collective farm. In the collective farms there are quite a number of kulaks, and elements inclined toward the kulaks, ready to take for themselves 10 or 15 hectares of land sown by joint labor, besides their horses and implements, and even to receive in addition a guarantee that they are not to be classified as kulaks. The better the sowing, the greater the tendency among such elements to leave, so as to use the first collective sowing for their individual enrichment. Such elements can only be regarded as deserters. *Any liberality toward them, going as far as readiness at any moment to allot to them a portion of the land of the collective farm in spite of this being strictly forbidden by the statutes, must be regarded as giving direct support to the kulak.*

The confused extremist—who at first drove the peasants by force into the collective farms and now is ready at any moment to let them out again, dividing up the sown area among them—is the most dangerous enemy of the collective farm.

The artel is not a passageway, which any one can enter and leave at pleasure. Millions of peasants did not join together in collective farms in the spring of 1930 and sow 33 million hectares in order that any kulak or elements

inclined toward the kulaks, should be allowed to break up the collective farm. *The collective farm is not a passageway. Every peasant must understand this before he joins.* Voluntary entry does not in the least imply dividing up at will. The rules for withdrawal are stipulated by the statutes. The statutes provide: The combined area belonging to the artel must not in any circumstances be reduced; . . . members leaving the artel can receive land only from the free land reserves in the possession of the state; settlements are made with those withdrawing from the collective farms after harvest; the indivisible capital, however, remains inviolable. I have talked with dozens of collective farm members on this subject and have asked them whether this was not contradictory to the principle of voluntary entry into the collective farms. They all gave me the same reply: "Otherwise you can't build a farm; voluntary entry doesn't mean converting the collective farm into a passageway." This we declare openly not only to the members of collective farms but to the individual peasants wishing to join them.

#### 6. ASSOCIATIONS FOR THE JOINT CULTIVATION OF THE SOIL, ARTELS, AND COMMUNES

A few words more on the various forms of collective farms. The basic form of collective farm as set forth in the decision of the Central Committee of January 5, and fully confirmed by experience is the agricultural artel. The artel is the fundamental form in our present stage of collective farm development because in it the basic means of production are socialized; and this socialized economy is supplemented by a certain additional individual economy in forms acceptable to the middle peasant, while the further expansion of the socialized part of the income is guaranteed.

The income of the artel is divided, in the main, according to the labor performed by the members of the artel and their families.

The model statutes of the artel are known to all.<sup>5</sup> In the course of the spring of 1930 a number of supplementary changes were made in them, in the form of the so-called interpretations of the Commissariat of Agriculture and the Collective Farm Center. It is obvious that in the future, as our growing experience will dictate, many more changes will have to be made.

In this connection we must see to it that the model statutes shall really be "model," *i.e.*, a form on the basis of which the members of collectives work out *their own* statutes which shall be binding for them.

*The Association for the Joint Cultivation of the Soil is a transitional form to the artel.* What are the basic characteristics of this association? The means of production are socialized or, more correctly, are used in common, only *during the time of field work*. The proceeds are divided according to the amount of property placed at the disposal of their socialized labor by each member of the Association. The Association is permissible as a transitional stage to the artel and may for a time become widespread in a number of districts in the grain-consuming belt and in the national republics.

What should the commune be? Prior to the collectivization movement the commune was characterized by common housing and complete equality. What is important to-day is not common housing and equality of distribution, for even in the first stage of a Communist society the products of labor must inevitably be distributed according to the quantity and quality of work done (otherwise a man just

<sup>5</sup> For an English translation of these statutes, see the *Soviet Union Review*, April, 1930, p. 57.—*Ed.*

emerged from the old society will not work). The most important feature—and this is the basic distinction between the commune and the artel—is *the complete socialization of all the means of production.*

Dozens of examples might be given of communes which have increased their income several times over and have organized their work most successfully, thanks to the fact that they concentrated their efforts not on the immediate building of a common dwelling-house, not on the absolute equality of all the members of the commune, not on the separation of children from parents, *but on the development of dairying, hog-raising and market-gardening*, to an extent not only sufficient to satisfy the needs of their members but urban needs as well, while maintaining the principle of dividing the proceeds according to the quantity and quality of labor performed.

We must openly admit that when commune members ask our advice as to how to spend their money on the building of a common dwelling-house or on the building of socialized pigsties, we answer: *First organize* your socialized animal husbandry, your socialized barns. On this basis your resources will begin to grow literally week by week, and after two or three years you will be able to build any kind of dwelling-house you like. *If on the other hand, you begin with a common dwelling-house and equality of distribution, your undertaking may turn out badly.*

All this makes it clear, as pointed out in the theses, that we shall have to draw up in the immediate future model statutes for the artels, for the Associations for the Joint Cultivation of the Land, and for the communes.

#### 7. PROBLEM OF CADRES

Finally, the last problem—that of cadres.

Here the most important thing is to make use of the

cadres which are developing from below, to strengthen and to train them. Of all the organizational problems involved in the building of collective farms, the problem of cadres is probably the decisive one.

What do we need in the way of cadres during the next three years?

If by the end of the Five-Year Plan period (1933) we have 400,000 tractors this means that we must have a minimum of one million tractor drivers, drawn chiefly from the ranks of the agricultural laborers and the Communist youth. Former agricultural laborers provide cadres of tractor drivers of exceptional value. These are workers for whom service in the new economy is combined with personal liberation from bondage to the kulak.

Next come the "brigade-foreman" (leaders in field-work, in animal husbandry, etc.). Their position is the same as that of foremen in a factory. Persons with the necessary qualifications are as yet entirely lacking, and we shall have to train the needed personnel. We need about a million and a half such foremen.

Then there is the directing staff of medium rank, such as mechanics for the tractor stations, and agronomist-technicians capable not only of drawing up a production plan for the collective farm but also of carrying it out. These are not agronomists in the old sense of the word, who were only advisers of the peasants; they must also be the organizers of agricultural undertakings. They must be agronomist-technicians. The peculiarity of our task here lies in the fact that there has been an amazing gulf between specialists of the highest qualifications and the peasants. We must bridge this gulf in the shortest possible time. Furthermore, since at present we have, for each agronomist of the highest qualifications, only  $1\frac{1}{3}$  agronomists of me-





A Peasant Woman Driver at the Head of a Column of Tractors on  
a Collective Farm.



The Peasant Hut is Giving Way to Modern Houses for Agricultural Workers on the State Farms.



Along a Street of the "Workers' City" Built About the Newly Completed Agricultural Machinery Factory at Rostov.

dium qualifications, we must change this proportion to 1:6. We need as many as 500,000 agronomist-technicians.

Last come the agronomists of the highest qualifications. Here again we do not need them in the old sense of the term: we need agronomist-engineers, agronomists who can carry on specialized agriculture, agronomist-managers, agronomist-mechanizers. For this we must retrain the old staff of agronomists and train new ones along the new lines. We need about 90,000 such specialists.

Any country, any social order, might consider this task impossible of accomplishment. I have mentioned these figures in order to emphasize the full magnitude of the task confronting us, for the realization of which we must concentrate our utmost efforts. This applies primarily to the Collective Farm Center, because most of the work of creating new cadres will be done through it. The significance of the problem of cadres is well evaluated by our opponents, who are already chuckling in advance in expectation of our failure. Here is what the Mensheviks write:

The Russian village, as it is now, is perhaps capable of submitting to authority and joining the collective farms in crews; but it is not yet capable of bringing forth the greater number of captains of economy needed for the Socialist ships.<sup>6</sup>

It is not an easy task to create tractor drivers from illiterate or semi-literate peasants, to turn yesterday's owners of individual farms, whose economic initiative did not extend beyond the limits of a five-hectare farm, into managers of tracts of land covering hundreds and thousands of hectares. But we have now had considerable experience. In solving the problem of cadres we have always been guided by the principle that ". . . there is much organiza-

<sup>6</sup> Dalin, "The Perspectives of Collectivization," in *Sotzialisticheskyy Vestnik*, April 12, 1930, No. 6-7.

tional talent in the peasantry and working class, and this talent is only just beginning to be conscious of itself, to awaken, to stretch out toward great virile and creative work, to take up independently the building of a Socialist society.”<sup>7</sup>

We are convinced that with every step which we take in the development of large-scale collective farming there will “. . . emerge organizational talents which will develop capability for participation in the administration of the state. There are many such talents among the people. They have only been suppressed. We must help them to develop. They, *and only they*, with the support of the masses, will be able to save Russia and the cause of Socialism.”<sup>8</sup>

These, comrades, are the fundamental problems. Tremendous difficulties lie ahead of us. We shall have to accomplish the new tasks under conditions in which difficulties as regards food supplies arising from our small-scale farming will be very great, especially in the matter of livestock.

Years and years will be needed really to make the peasant over, to overcome the prejudices of the petty property-owner, to convert the artel into a truly free association of free workers.

Years of determined struggle will be needed before the kulak is definitely liquidated as a class. Many battles, violent and inexorable, will have to be waged against him and his agents, for it is a matter of course that the kulak will not give up his position without struggle. Not a single class doomed to extinction has ever done so.

*More than once, as a reflection of the resistance of the*

<sup>7</sup> Lenin: “How to Organize Competitions.” *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII, p. 162. Second Russian edition.

<sup>8</sup> Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 167.

*classes we are liquidating with both "Left" and Right deviations again raise their heads in our Party, particularly the latter, which at present constitutes the main danger, expressing the ideology of the kulak. There will be attempts to exploit this or that inevitable difficulty in order to sidetrack the Party from its general line.*

But whatever the difficulties ahead may be, we can say with pride: "For years we have fostered the growth of our industry and made the greatest sacrifices in the name of strengthening industry as the determining and basic support for the development of Socialism, *but in regard to collectivization we were only propagandists.* We said to the peasants: 'Here are examples; study them.'"

*It was only at the XV Party Congress<sup>9</sup> that we for the first time set ourselves the task of organizing collective farms as a direct task of the Party.*

Between the XV and the XVI Party Congress we created—in the form of state farms and in the persons of millions of collective farm members who withstood the spring waverings and remained on the collectives—a new point of departure for future advances in the field of the organization of Socialist agriculture, from north to south, from east to west, from grain-raising to animal husbandry and the cultivation of industrial crops.

With this experience behind us, we can boldly state that on the basis of the general line of the Party, boldly correcting all errors, wherever and by whomever committed, we shall let no one hinder us in carrying out collectivization to its end. That end is the creation of a Socialist society!

<sup>9</sup> In 1928.—*Ed.*



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUDING REMARKS <sup>1</sup>

I SHALL say only a few words about the horse. It is a matter of course that to underestimate the significance of the horse at the present stage in the reorganization of our agriculture would be in the highest degree incorrect. The successes attained by us in the spring of 1930 are the result of combining the power of the tractor with the horse, and such a combination of tractor and horse in field work will have its place in our country for a number of years to come. At least during this time we should cherish the horse. And all the other tasks about which Comrade Budenny spoke here are by no means among those which the Party can pass by.

I desire likewise to point out a certain special and important characteristic of the discussion. I mean the spirit of competition among the various districts and republics.

Hitherto this competitive spirit has found its place primarily in the realm of industry. In agriculture it has developed to a very insignificant extent. Of course, now, when the development of agriculture proceeds mainly along the lines of state and collective farms, *such competition* between districts, between collective and state farms, will become the same sort of *mighty weapon* for the advancement of agriculture as it already is in the field of industry.

Of the practical questions let me deal only with two.

<sup>1</sup> After an exhaustive discussion of his report by the delegates to the Congress, Commissar Yakovlev summed up the discussion and replied to several questions.—*Ed.*

These were brought up by a number of speakers. The first is that of coöperation; the second, that of the division of the harvest on the collective farms. On the question of coöperation the point of view of the Central Committee is set forth most clearly in the theses. We can no longer endure a situation in which agricultural coöperation, which costs our national economy 250 million rubles, actually serves neither the needs of the collective farm members nor of the individual peasants.

Hardly any one of our coöperators will have the boldness to say that at the present moment, so important for our agriculture, coöperation in its present form has proved itself capable of real help to the collective farm members. Nobody can say this. And if at the same time the situation is such that in a number of districts in the grain-consuming zone where the collective farms, as is well known, constitute only a small percentage, there remain *only* the collective farm coöperatives with a total absence of any other co-operative organization serving the needs of the individual peasants, this in itself testifies sufficiently to the great need for creating a special organization to serve the collective farm members and another organization to serve the individual farmers, by way of guiding their production activities. This is the only way to overcome the multiplicity and overlapping we have at present. If there are in the Central Black Soil Region with its 170 counties, 500 county coöperatives, 28 district coöperatives, and 11 regional co-operatives, and in a number of the counties five to 80 county coöperatives alleged to be specialized collective-farm coöperatives; and, as a result of this we get, instead of leadership and help for the collective farms, confusion, red tape and a waste of public funds, this is beyond all endurance.

To the enormous, unbelievably expensive, and poorly

justified coöperative apparatus, some of the collective farms are beginning to attach a supplementary apparatus which likewise is far from justifying itself. I personally have been on a number of collective farms where the expenses for the apparatus and the office are mounting up to almost one-third of what is coming to the collective farm members for their labor. Such a situation must be wiped out, so that in not a single district, in not a single village, on not a single collective, shall any one become addicted to the custom of squandering that enormous increase in productivity attained by collective farming on the creation of a new, cumbersome apparatus, which only hinders the strengthening of the collective farms.

This is the basis for the proposals of the Central Committee regarding coöperation, which may be summed up as follows: A special organization shall be created to serve the needs of the collective farms for the supervision of production, and it shall have three functions: the formation of cadres, the management of the technical bases (including in this system the Tractor Center, which handles most of the tractors and which in future will specialize according to the various branches of agriculture), and the organization of labor in the collective farms through instructors and inspectors. And in addition to this there shall be a coöperative organization which will fulfill the function of collecting the marketable surplus of products and aiding the production activities of the individual peasants.

The second and last question is that of the distribution of the harvest. Here a number of comrades have put forth the demand for suitable directives, orders, instructions, etc. It is hard to understand what prompts these comrades to make such demands. The basic instructions were given by the Central Committee of the Party in the form of the decisions published in the name of the Commissariat of

Agriculture and the Collective Farm Center. You are all familiar with these decisions: the sale to the government by the collective farms in the grain-producing regions of from one-third to one-fourth of their grain in an average harvest (in a good harvest, of course, more); the preservation of private ownership of the winter grain sown by present collective farm members as individuals before joining the collective farms; and, after the deduction of the necessary minimum contributions to the common fund, *the distribution of the remainder among the collective farm members* in accordance with the quantity and quality of labor performed by them or their families (except for 5 per cent of the gross crop, which is divided among the members according to the amount of property they have contributed to the collective farm).

Do we need in addition to regulate every step of the collective farms? The Central Committee considers that this is not necessary. We know that in some places there were such attempts. They took the form of instructions with hundreds of diagrams, with the aid of which our comrades wanted to foresee from the regional headquarters how the harvest should be divided among the members of each separate collective. But that was only a bureaucratic dream and nothing came of it. We must limit ourselves to that which is important politically, and this is fully indicated in the decisions of the Central Committee.

Some comrades say: "But we wish to consider the size of the family in the distribution of the harvest." Do you really need instructions for that? Could any one possibly have any objections, if the collective farm members in any place should decide to set aside a certain portion of the proceeds of production to help the members with large families? For this is it necessary to write instructions with hundreds of diagrams which only confuse people?

Such bureaucracy should not be permitted, and in the future, instead of new instructions, we must see to it that questions regarding the distribution of the harvest are settled, not behind the backs of the collective farm members in some office or other, but by the collective farm members themselves in their general meeting, or with the approval of that general meeting, on the basis of the directives of the Central Committee of the Party. That will be the best guarantee against mistakes.

That is all that is important, comrades. Let me close with a reminder of the general conclusions of my report.

My main conclusion was that on the basis of collectivization and on the basis of the state farms, we shall undoubtedly be able to overtake other nations more rapidly than heretofore. Now a swifter development of agriculture is guaranteed in our country, whereas the shackles of private property impose an insurmountable obstacle to rapid progress in capitalist lands.

Secondly there follows the deduction as stated by Lenin. Comrade Lenin declared at the XI Congress<sup>2</sup> of the Party that by forming an alliance with peasant husbandry and overcoming capitalism, we would be an absolutely unconquerable force. We should remember this statement of Comrade Lenin now, when we are bringing about collectivization in our land, when on the basis of collectivization we are uprooting capitalism, are changing the middle peasant, yesterday's ally of the working class, into a real and firm support of the Soviet Power.

Whatever may be the difficulties yet before us, we know that this line of development makes us really unconquerable.

Hail to the working class, building a socialist society!

<sup>2</sup> In 1922.—*Ed.*



## APPENDIX

### THE COLLECTIVE FARM MOVEMENT AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF AGRICULTURE <sup>1</sup>

#### I. SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE FARM MOVEMENT

THE two and a half years that have elapsed since the XV Congress of the Party formed a period in which a decisive change in the development of agriculture took place in the Soviet Union.

This change is characterized by the fact that in the chief grain-growing regions, on May 1, 1930, collectivization embraced from 40 to 50 per cent of the peasant households, in place of the 2 or 3 per cent in the spring of 1928, while the sown area of the collective farms throughout the Soviet Union increased as had been forecast in the decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. of January 5, from 1.5 million hectares in the spring of 1928 to 30 or 35 million hectares in the spring of 1930, without reckoning the area sown to winter grain. As a result, already this year the collective farms, together with the state farms, will provide the main part of the output of marketable grain, in contradistinction to the period between the XV Congress and the XVI Conference, when the overwhelming proportion of the output of marketable grain was produced by the individual peasant farms, including kulak farms. Thus, the Party is actually solving the basic and most difficult problem of agriculture—the grain problem.

<sup>1</sup> Resolution of the XVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted unanimously on the report of Commissar Yakovlev. This resolution was prepared by the Central Committee in the form of theses on Yakovlev's report and submitted to the Congress.—*Ed.*

The world-historical significance of the turning point which has taken place in the development of the Soviet Union lies in these facts:

1. A considerable section of the *middle-peasant masses*, in the most important grain-growing regions, following the lead of the poor peasants, have come to understand the advantages of large-scale socialized economy, have voluntarily united into collective farms and carried out the sowing on collectivized fields, and have turned to the path of socialism. Thereby it has not only been demonstrated theoretically, but proved by the experience of millions of people that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, a *direct transition* is possible from backward, poorly-productive, small-scale individual peasant economy to large-scale, collectivized, highly-productive economy.

2. On the basis of the growth of universal collectivization in a number of districts of the Soviet Union the Party, from its previous policy of circumscribing and crowding out the capitalist elements in the village, has passed to a new policy—that of *liquidating the kulaks as a class*, and carrying out this policy as an inseparable and integral part of the universal collectivization which is being brought about by the poor- and middle-peasant masses.

3. As a result of the development of collective and state farms on a mass scale and the beginning of the liquidation of the kulaks, the *actual inter-relation of the various economic systems in the economy of the Soviet Union is changing*, insofar as, in addition to the socialist elements in industry, there are growing up socialist elements in Soviet agriculture which are crowding out the capitalist elements.

4. Socialist elements in the Soviet Union, which hitherto have been based almost exclusively on socialist industry, *are now beginning to base themselves also on the rapidly developing socialist sector in agriculture* (large-scale pro-

duction in the shape of collective and state farms). This opens up the possibility of overcoming the greatest difficulty of the proletarian revolution, which lies in the fact that a proletarian power "does not receive" socialist relationships "ready made," "if we exclude the most highly developed forms of capitalism, which in reality have embraced only a few high spots in industry and have yet hardly touched agriculture." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII, Second Russian Edition, p. 316.)

5. As a result of all these facts, the question of the support of the Soviet power in the village assumes a new form. Henceforth in the chief grain-growing districts of the Soviet Union *the village will divide into two main sections: the collective farm members, who constitute a real and firm support of the Soviet power; and the poor and middle peasants who are not members of collective farms and who do not yet wish to join them, but who will in a comparatively short period of time undoubtedly be convinced by the mass experience of the collectives of the necessity of entering upon the path of collectivization.*

The Congress considers it necessary to record that the Party has achieved this change in the development of the agriculture of the Soviet Union only as a result of:

a. the rapid tempo of industrial development, which is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture on collectivist principles;

b. the mass development of coöperation, the organization of machine and tractor stations, and the development of state farms;

c. the offensive against the capitalist elements of the village (the kulaks) on the basis of an alliance with the middle peasants, who at the present moment constitute the basis of collective farm development;

- d. the extension of the work of organizing the poor peasants and agricultural laborers ;
- e. the smashing of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and the Right deviation.

## II. CONSOLIDATION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ERRORS

The consolidation of the successes achieved in the sphere of collectivization and its further development on this basis are possible only provided the following *fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles of the collective farm movement* are consistently carried into practice. Any deviation from them would constitute a severe crime against the dictatorship of the proletariat :

1. Collective farms can be built up only on the *principle of voluntary entry*. Any attempt to apply force or administrative compulsion to the poor- and middle-peasant masses with the object of bringing them into the collective farms is a gross infraction of the Party line and an abuse of power.

2. At the present stage *the basic form of the collective farm* is the *agricultural artel*. To demand that the peasant on joining an artel should immediately abandon all individualist habits and interests ; should surrender the possibility of carrying on individual farming enterprise (of cows, sheep, poultry, and vegetables) in addition to the socialized farming ; should forgo any opportunity of earning money on the side, is to forget the ABC of Marxism and Leninism.

3. The form of the collective farm must be guided by the economic peculiarities of each given district and each branch of agriculture. In certain grain-consuming regions, as well as in the national republics of the East, *associations for the joint cultivation of the land* may at first assume a

widespread character, existing side by side with the artel and acting as a transition form to it.

4. The collective farm movement can rise to a higher form—the *commune*—as a result of the improvement of the technical basis, the growth of collective farm cadres, and the raising of the cultural level of the members of the collective farms; but this on the absolute condition that the peasants themselves approve of the respective changes in the statutes, and that the changes are initiated from below.

5. The creation in the collective farms of a new social discipline, which is essential in order to obtain the highest possible productivity of labor, can be achieved only on the basis of genuine individual initiative, and the active participation of the members of the collective farms, male and female, in their management.

6. As Lenin repeatedly pointed out, the transition to collective agriculture can be brought about only on the condition that the collective farms are assisted by the Soviet state by far-reaching organizational, material, and financial aid: "Every social order arises only with the financial support of a definite class." (Lenin, "On Co-operation.")

7. Any attempt to apply the organizational system of management of the state farms to the collective farm is anti-Leninist, since the collective, *in contradistinction to the state farm*, which is a *state* enterprise organized with state funds, is a voluntary social organization of peasants, created *with the funds of the peasants themselves*, and subject to all the consequences that follow therefrom.

8. The transition from individual to collective farming can be achieved only on the basis of an alliance of the working class and poor peasants with the middle peasants. This implies the obligation of systematically drawing the



*middle peasants into the management of the collective farms.*

On the basis of the foregoing the Congress considers it of extreme importance that every member of the Party should clearly understand the nature of the errors and distortions of the Party line, which were committed this spring in the practical carrying out of collectivization.

These errors and distortions found expression in measures of force and compulsion applied to the middle and poor peasants during the formation of the collective farms; in the socialization of the barnyard stock and cows belonging to members of the artels, and which were sufficient only for their own household requirements; in applying to the grain-consuming regions the tempo of collectivization which had been established in the decisions of the Central Committee and justified by practical experience only for the grain-growing regions; in the premature creation of communes without the requisite material and organizational preparation; in the organization of lifeless bureaucratic organizations conducted by dictatorial methods, under the guise of giant collective farms; in holding back credits assigned by the government to the collective farms and depriving collective farm members of the tax exemptions accorded them by the government; in gross and ultra-administrative methods exercised in relation to the collective farms and their members and the substitution of appointments from above and orders for elections; in ignoring the middle peasant and failing to use his agricultural experience, and in applying to him the methods of struggle used against the kulak ("de-kulakization," disfranchisement, etc.).

The nature of these errors and of the chief distortions of the Party line, which were especially widespread in a number of districts in the grain-consuming regions and in

the national republics and eastern regions of the Soviet Union, were defined by the Central Committee in its statement of April 2, 1930, as follows:

The policy of strengthening the alliance with the middle peasant, while leaning for support on the poor peasant and conducting a merciless struggle against the kulak, has begun to be replaced by a policy of commands issued to the middle peasant, a policy thoroughly inimical to Leninism.

In a number of districts these errors not only caused anti-collective farm manifestations but also their transformation, under the influence of the kulaks, into anti-Soviet demonstrations. Most alarming of all was the fact that:

There were not infrequent attempts on the part of Party organizations to gloss over the situation that had arisen and, instead of admitting their errors and shortcomings and correcting them, to attribute everything to the vacillations of the middle peasant. (*Idem*).

Had these errors not been corrected in time by the Central Committee of the Party (decisions of the Central Committee, of February 20, March 15, and April 2, 1930, and Comrade Stalin's articles, "Dizziness from Success"<sup>2</sup> and "Reply to the Comrades on the Collective Farms"),<sup>3</sup> they would have threatened the breakdown of the cause of collectivization and the collapse of the very foundation of the Soviet State—the alliance of the working class with the peasantry.

All the measures adopted by the Central Committee for the correction of the errors committed in the practical work of collectivization were directed in the long run toward the reestablishment of the correct Leninist attitude toward

<sup>2</sup> *Soviet Union Review*, April, 1930, p. 54.—*Ed.*

<sup>3</sup> *International Press Correspondence*, No. 18, 1930.—*Ed.*

the middle peasant, which had been violated in a number of districts; and toward consolidation of the successes achieved in the collective farm movement, and the carrying out of the policy of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class on the basis of universal collectivization in alliance with the middle peasant.

As a consequence of the correction of the errors committed by the Party and Soviet organs, the main part of the sowing in the key grain-growing regions was performed by the collective farms; while in the grain-consuming regions the individual peasants are sowing energetically, and at the same time a number of the stronger collectives there are being held intact, which preservation may become the kernel of a future collective farm movement for the main mass of the peasants in these districts.

### III. TEMPO OF COLLECTIVIZATION AND TASKS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

The progress of the spring sowing campaign of 1930 shows that on the basis of collectivization and the creation of state farms, the Party is succeeding in solving the very difficult grain problem. The solution of the grain problem will, in its turn, not only facilitate the development of industrial crops and animal husbandry, but will also, by means of the development of collective and state farms, solve the problem of extricating the other branches of agriculture from the difficulties which are insurmountable for poorly-productive and small-scale economy.

The speed which it will be possible to attain in the development of grain production and in overcoming the crisis in animal husbandry will be determined by those vast potentialities for the development of productive forces which are latent in the collective farms.

Already this spring, not only the inter-village machine and tractor stations and the old collective farms, but also those new collective farms formed by the simple pooling of farm implements and not yet possessing sufficient organizational and economic experience *were able to extend considerably* the sown area and to bring under cultivation abandoned and virgin lands. Moreover, the importance of the prospects opened up by the development of state farms is shown by the fact that the state farms (old and new) will, in the present year, already provide about 100 million poods of marketable grain and next year no less than *250 million poods*. This shows that, on the basis of collectivization, the development of machine and tractor stations, and the organization of state farms, the Party will be able to begin to realize the slogan of "to equal and surpass" the capitalist countries of the world, and not only in industry, where the advantages of large-scale production have long ago been strikingly illustrated, *but also in the sphere of agriculture*, the tempo of development of which has hitherto been determined by the overwhelming preponderance of small-scale farms of extremely low productivity. Its tempo will now be determined by the accelerated development of collective and state farms, which represent an entirely new form of economy, unique in the history of mankind, called into existence for the first time by the experience of economic reconstruction in the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the foregoing, the Congress considers it necessary:

1. *To undertake a profound revision of the Five-Year Plan for the development of agriculture* on the basis of the tempo of collectivization established in the decision of the Central Committee of January 5 and completely justified by practical experience, with the object of securing, in addi-

tion to the accelerated development of grain and industrial crops, the improvement and *intensified development of animal husbandry*, primarily by organizing special state farms for animal breeding, analogous to the state grain farms; but also by the widespread organization of collective farms with a high market output, and by the rapid expansion of fodder supplies.

2. In addition to the unconditional preservation of the tax exemptions for collective farms and their members provided for by Party decisions, to double the credits extended to collective farms in 1930-31 as compared to the present year, *i.e.*, to increase them to a billion rubles.

3. To insure that the Grain Trust shall sow next year not less than 4.5 million hectares and make preparations for sowing 9 million hectares in 1932.

4. To insure that the marketable output of hogs by the Hog-Breeding Trust in 1930-31 shall be no less than 400,000 head; in 1931-32 no less than 3 million head; and in 1932-33 no less than 7 millions.

5. To increase the cattle herds of the Cattle-Breeding Trust to 3.23 million head in 1930-31; to 5.5 millions in 1931-32; and to 9 to 10 millions in 1932-33.

6. To develop the animal-breeding branches of the collective farms, applying a considerable portion of agricultural credits for this purpose.

7. Bearing in mind that for a number of years to come both the tractor and the horse will be used for field labor, it is necessary that the horse should be duly appreciated and that special state farms and associations for horse-breeding should be organized in appropriate places.

8. To instruct the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences to investigate the problem of the rational distribution of agriculture throughout the territories of the Soviet Union according to the branch of agriculture and the nature



of the crop; the problem of the substitution of more profitable for less profitable crops; the problem of guaranteeing the Soviet Union independent supplies of the chief food and industrial crops; and the problem of the maximum utilization for agricultural purposes of local sources of power.

In view of the tasks to be imposed on the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, to provide the necessary technical conditions for its work in accordance with the latest achievements of science, and to reënforce it by Communist cadres.

9. To extend the work of the Institute for Collective Farming, so as to afford it the possibility of making timely scientific investigations and practical decisions as to the forms and methods of collective farm organization and generalizations from local experience.

10. To insure the complete fulfillment of the program of tractor and combine production, the production of spare parts and tractor-drawn implements in the volume provided for by the decisions of the Central Committee, as well as the extension of the production of mineral fertilizers, particularly of insecticides.

Above all, attention must be directed to the improvement of the quality of tractor-drawn implements.

#### IV. PREPARATIONS FOR A MASS COLLECTIVE FARM MOVEMENT IN THE GRAIN-IMPORTING REGIONS

The Congress directs the attention of all Party units in the grain-consuming regions, as well as in the Eastern republics and regions of the Soviet Union, to the necessity of undertaking widespread preparatory work for a mass collective farm movement.

This preparatory work should consist primarily of:

1. The development of the coöperative organization of the poor and middle peasantry, beginning with the village coöperatives and special coöperative associations for production and supply

2. The widespread extension of Associations for the Joint Cultivation of the Soil as the primary form of collective farm, transitional to the artel

3. The reënforcement in every possible way of existing collective farms and the extension of the network of machine and tractor stations

4. The organization of state farms, especially for cotton, dairying, vegetables, flax, hog- and sheep-breeding

5. A more intensive attack on the kulak in the sense of a further limitation of his growth and power to exploit, at the same time developing the organizations of the poor peasant and agricultural laborer in every possible way

6. Intensified work in developing types of large-scale farms in the various branches of agriculture peculiar to the respective districts, and the organization of the production of machinery necessary for each type of farm—machines for the sowing, harvesting and treatment of flax, hemp and cotton, for the sowing and cultivation of potatoes, implements for market gardening, equipment for large-scale dairy farms, etc.

The Congress draws the special attention of the Party units in what is known as the grain-consuming zone to the fact that, on the basis of the development of state and collective farms, the Party must in the immediate future proceed to the development of agriculture in the consuming zone by transforming it into an important district for dairy farming, market gardening, hog-breeding and flax growing.

The Congress draws particular attention to the fact that it is absolutely impossible to *underestimate the value of the existing collective farms in these regions* solely on the

ground that there were only 7 to 8 per cent of them in the spring of this year (1930) instead of the vastly exaggerated percentage formerly figured on paper. The Congress does this as a result of the experience in the development of collectivization in the grain-producing zone, where last year the number of collective farms did not exceed the number now existing in the consuming zone, and where this small number of collective farms played a most important rôle in the subsequent expansion of the entire collective farm movement, inasmuch as the collective farms were a model for all the rest of the peasant masses, and since in these collective farms were forged the cadres who became the organizers of mass collectivization during the subsequent expansion of the collective farm movement.

#### V. RELATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE FARMS AND THE INDIVIDUAL PEASANTS

Bearing in mind the complexity of the complete transition during the next few years from petty individual economy to large-scale collective economy, particularly in view of the existence in the vast Eastern territories of the Soviet Union of a pre-capitalistic system and the absence of many large-scale farms in any of the grain-consuming regions, the Congress warns the Party organizations against ignoring in any way individual economy, which in a number of sections of the country will continue to exist for a comparatively long period of time.

The establishment of a correct attitude toward individual economy, which can subsequently facilitate collectivization, is to a large measure a question of the relations between the collective farm members and the individual peasants. The strained relations which arose in the spring of this year in a number of localities as a result of the withdrawals

of many from the collective farms and the struggle of the most active collective farm members, loyal to the cause of collectivization, to preserve the collectives, are a hindrance to further collectivization. The Congress, therefore, lays on every Party organization the duty of seeing to it that the relations between the collective farm members and the individual peasants are based on the slogan: *do not hound the individual peasants but render them all possible aid and in every way induce them to join the collective farms.*

The Congress categorically *condemns* the not infrequent cases in which the coöperative forms of organization of the individual poor and middle peasants are ignored. This type of development is one of the most important conditions for the gradual transition to collective farms. The Congress considers as grossly incorrect the practical liquidation of the lower types of simple coöperative organizations (village associations and specific production and supply co-operatives) which have been formed in a number of regions where the collective farm movement is poorly developed, and calls upon all Party organizations immediately to insure the restoration and further growth of these coöperative organizations and to give them the necessary organizational and financial support.

## VI. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM MOVEMENT

1. *The creation of collective farm cadres* is one of the most important conditions for the consolidation of collectivization. The basis of this work must be the promotion of new cadres from among the mass of collective farm members themselves. This was also the main purpose of sending 25,000 workers to work on the collective farms. Many of them have already proved excellent organizers of collec-

tive farm economy and have won standing for themselves among the collective farm members, particularly when they made it their chief task to aid in raising cadres from among the collective farm workers themselves. The Party takes the position that in the next year or two, under the influence exerted by the advanced workers, there will certainly spring up from the mass of collective farm members tens of thousands with genuine organizing talent, who will become real builders of socialism in agriculture.

1. The chief tasks in this sphere are:

a. To organize a system of promotion of collective farm members to leading positions.

b. To organize short courses of training for collective farm cadres on a mass scale in connection with state farms, schools for the peasant youth, universities, technical agricultural schools, secondary schools, and machine and tractor stations.

c. To secure the wider attendance at agricultural universities and technical schools by the youth of the collective farms.

d. To develop on a broad scale, mass political-educational work on the collective farms.

e. To develop widespread socialist competition in all collective farm work, as well as the organization and work of production conferences and delegate meetings in the collective farms.

f. To organize delegate meetings of women members of the collective farms, and organize their work to provide for the training of collective farm cadres from among them and for their promotion to responsible positions.

2. The present condition of the coöperative organization and the coöperative apparatus, *which have ceased to serve the mass of individual peasants, and which have in no way adapted themselves to the task of the organizational and productive guidance of the collective farms, is not to be tolerated.* The Congress considers, therefore, that a profound *revision* of the whole organizational structure of the collective-farm coöperative system should not be delayed. For this purpose it is necessary:



a. That the functions of leadership of all the collective farms in production and in organization (cadres, labor and machine organization) in any given district should be concentrated in a single district collective-farm coöperative. The functions of serving and guiding the production activities on the individual farms and among the simple forms of association, as well as the functions of provisioning farms of all kinds, should be concentrated in the district agricultural coöperative. The carrying out of these measures should be begun with those regions and districts in which there is a considerable degree of collectivization.

b. *That the intermediary district links in the collective-farm coöperative system should be liquidated;* and that its lower links should be decidedly strengthened.

c. That the number of special centers should be revised and specialized centers maintained only for the chief branches of agriculture.

d. That the administrative apparatus of the coöperatives should be drastically reduced and the most determined measures taken to put an end to the inflation of staffs on the collective farms, the execution of administrative functions being as a rule given to persons elected from among the members.

3. The work of the groups of poor peasants in the elementary forms of collective farms should be improved and strengthened, inasmuch as the transition from the simplest associations to the higher stages of collectivization can be secured only with the aid of the poor peasants. The Party units in the collective farms must see to it that the work of the groups of poor peasants is conducted in such a way as not only to protect the immediate interests of the poor peasantry, but also to aid in the consolidation of the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasantry with the middle peasantry.

4. Such necessary changes must be introduced into the Model Statutes for Agricultural Artels as shall be indicated by the practical experience of the artels.

5. Model Statutes must be drawn up for the Associations

for the Joint Cultivation of the Soil and for the communes.

The basis for the Model Statutes for the Associations for the Joint Cultivation of the Soil should be the common labor of the members of the Association during harvesting and sowing; and the acquisition, through the funds of the Association, of complex machinery and other means of production for joint ownership and use.

*The basis of the Model Statutes for the communes* should be the complete *socialization of all means of production without exception*, as well as the gradual creation of institutions and enterprises for serving the needs of the members of the collective farms (dining-rooms, social and residential buildings). These tasks must in no case be confused with unnecessary and harmful socialization of the petty appurtenances of social life.

In the period between the XV and XVI Congresses, the Party has been able to achieve a decisive turn in the cause of the collectivization of agriculture.

If the confiscation of the land of the landowners was the *first* step taken by the October Revolution in the village, the transition to the collective farms is the *second* step, and, moreover, a decisive one, which marks a most important stage in the task of laying the foundations of a socialist society in the Soviet Union.

It is natural that so tremendous a revolution in the lives of tens of millions of people as is represented by the transition from individual petty peasant economy to large-scale socialized economy must inevitably meet with a number of tremendous difficulties, called forth within the country by the intensification of the resistance of the class enemies, and outside by the existence of the capitalist encirclement. Only bureaucrats and petty officials, but not revolutionists,

can expect that a revolution of such character as to affect the very foundations of economic system and the lives of the vast masses of the people can be accomplished without difficulties, without the intensification of the class struggle, and without the vacillations on the part of the middle peasantry which arise therefrom.

The kulaks have not yet been completely defeated; they will offer savage resistance to the triumphant advance of collectivization. The liquidation of the kulaks as a class will demand a *protracted and stubborn* struggle against them and systematic efforts to carry out collectivization. It must be conducted in complete conformity to and as an inseparable part of, with the process of advancing universal collectivization.

*The artel does not perfect, but only begins* the creation of a new social discipline and the training of the peasants in socialist construction. On the collective farms the peasants will definitely outgrow the psychology of petty property-owners and their greed for private accumulation, handed down by generations of small proprietors. This tendency will be overcome only after years of stubborn work in establishing for the collective farms a basis of large-scale mechanized production; years of effort in the formation of cadres from among the collective farm members; and by raising the cultural level of the entire collective farm membership.

The Party has made a decisive change in the methods used in furthering the cause of collectivization thanks only to the crushing, both of counter-revolutionary Trotzkyism—the policy which led inevitably to rupture of the alliance with the basic masses of the peasantry, and of the Right deviators, whose policy rejected the industrialization of the country as carried through by the Party—the organization

of state farms and the development of collective farms. Their policy was one of capitulation to the kulaks.

The Party has made a decisive change in the cause of collectivization by carrying out an undeviating policy of industrialization, thereby creating the conditions for the successful development of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, and strengthening the union of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the middle peasantry.

Only in this way could the Party create the conditions necessary for the building of collective farms. Only in this way can the Party not only consolidate the successes already achieved, *but also complete the task of collectivization, and thereby lay the foundation of a socialist society.*

## TABLE OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

One hectare = 2.47 acres.

One pood = 36 pounds.

One metric ton = 2205 pounds.

One kilogram = 2.2 pounds.

One kilometer = .625 miles.

One desyatin = 2.7 acres (1.09 hectares).

One ruble = \$.525.

The Soviet fiscal year extended from October 1 to September 30. It was replaced by the calendar year at the end of 1930.



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