

CHOU EN LAI
and
the Chinese Revolution

by Debbie Davison and Mark Selden



Conversations
with
Americans

Interviews by William Hinton

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Contents

Chou En-lai and the Chinese Revolution

1

+ Chou En-lai, Conversations with Americans

37

- + Classes, Customs and Revolutionary Change / 40 *Rationale for class struggle under socialism*
- + Slogans and Hero Worship / 50 *on Stalin's models of socialist development*
- + The Cultural Revolution and the Struggle between Two Lines / 61 *origin & practice*
- + China and the US: Toward War or Peace? / 74 *Negotiations & Struggle; importance of pol. line*

The goal of the US-China Peoples Friendship Association is building friendship through mutual understanding between the American and Chinese people. The Association is issuing this book in recognition and appreciation of Chou En-lai's life-long contributions to this goal. For decades Chou stretched out his hand to Americans and helped to lay a firm foundation for friendship between our two peoples.

Chou En-lai's gentle, handsome face and outstretched hand symbolized to Americans the hopeful new phase of Sino-American relations which opened with the 1972 Nixon China visit and the Shanghai Communique but whose origins extend back to the 1930s and beyond with the work of such Americans as writer Edgar Snow and diplomat John Service. During a half century of Chinese revolution, no one except Mao Tse-tung played a more decisive role than Chou: a student activist in 1919 at the height of China's explosive May Fourth student movement; the principal organizer in the great insurrection of the Shanghai working class in 1927; a military leader during the epic Long March; and chief negotiator and statesman during the bitter years of the anti-Japanese resistance and Civil War which gave birth to a new China. As premier through the first quarter century of the People's Republic, he helped to construct and guide a new government along the tortuous path of uninterrupted revolutionary change. As Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and a ranking member of the Communist Party's Political Bureau, he was a pillar of strength and revolutionary commitment through the storms of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, all the while serving as China's leading statesman in an era of intense international strife.

Those who had the privilege of meeting him spoke of his warm handclasp, his wry turn of phrase, his attention to state affairs while always finding a way to respond to individual appeals for assistance; they recalled his tireless, wide ranging talks long into the night about China's foreign policy, the people's struggles to achieve socialism and to build a new nation, and events in every part of the world.

The biography of Chou En-lai is a history in microcosm of the Chinese people's modern revolution. While many around the world saw Chou as a great man, his importance, his real contribution, lay in his lifelong role as an integral part of a revolution linking China's workers and peasants in creating a new Chinese nation. His life spans the first seven decades of the twentieth century—the period of China's epic struggle to break the fetters of a decaying order and build the new. He was born in 1898 as the last of the great imperial dynasties

was tottering to its fall. The forces of revolution were rising everywhere, but the transition would be protracted and painful. Throughout his 78 years of life, Chou En-lai was involved in this struggle and served selflessly in the building of a new society.

Well before Chou's time, since 1839, foreign powers including Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States gradually seized more and more of China as their own private domains, tapping China's resources and labor and receiving special trade and political privileges. Not content simply to trade in silk, tea, spices and opium, the imperialists opened mines, built railroad and steamship lines, operated factories and banks and settled down to live in their own enclaves immune from Chinese law. Control over these leading sectors of China's industry, over communications, finance and even the power to tax, reinforced by the presence of foreign troops and gunboats, enabled foreign interests to dominate the economic life of the nation. The presence of large numbers of Christian missionaries with similar foreigners' privileges often increased the burden on the people while it tended to mask the exploitation behind a glaze of moral superiority.

Where there is oppression there is resistance. But Chinese resistance faced severe obstacles. A weak and corrupt Chinese government preoccupied with its own survival and personal profit offered little effective challenge to the foreign powers. The peasants, who comprised 85 percent of the population, labored under the triple yoke of foreign domination, landlord rule and a Confucian value system which emphasized passive acceptance of the harsh destiny meted out by heaven; to these burdens Chinese women added a fourth, laboring under heavy-handed male supremacy.

Yet throughout the final decades of the nineteenth century the Chinese people repeatedly rose in arms against their Manchu rulers and foreign oppressors. The great Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was one heroic manifestation of the floodtide of revolution. If these uprisings were brutally suppressed, they opened the way to new forces which became active in the decades that followed.

The search was on in earnest to re-shape China's destiny in an era in which the imperial Confucian order had proved its

bankruptcy. Royalist exponents of democratic constitutionalism such as K'ang Yu-wei sought to save the dynastic order by reform from above. But too late. Great revolutionaries, particularly Sun Yat-sen, worked to create the Nationalist Party which succeeded in overturning the monarchy and establishing the first Republic. But the way forward was strewn with obstacles. Self-serving militarists, Yuan Shih-k'ai and other warlords, quickly destroyed the Republic, to usher in an era of prolonged civil war which left China prostrate and divided in the face of continued foreign encroachment. Chiang Kai-shek, aligned with the landlords and the new capitalist forces, as head of the Kuomintang from 1925, fought to consolidate his power and to turn back the tide of revolution. To no avail. From the 1920s, the Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, led the way to a new, liberated China. Today, the Chinese people are continuing this revolutionary transition in the People's Republic of China. Their goal is to lift China towards even higher forms of human society—cooperative, productive and self-reliant. The transition to socialism in China represents no less than the fundamental political, economic, social and cultural transformation of an entire civilization.

Great revolutionaries emerge out of great historical struggles. China's revolution shaped and tempered Chou En-lai, and he in turn contributed to shaping the course of the revolution. Whatever the revolution demanded of him he learned to do, with determination, resourcefulness and consummate skill—as organizer, general, diplomat, and premier.

THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION: STUDENT ACTIVIST

The son of a prominent mandarin family, his grandfather a high official in the Manchu dynasty, his father a brilliant teacher, his mother well-educated and an avid reader of modern literature, Chou En-lai seemed destined for a career as a scholar. From early childhood he showed marked literary ability. But like many others of his generation who were educated in a period of national crisis and awakening, his interest in literature was deflected. In the years after the

democratic revolution of 1911 when Sun Yat-sen led the overthrow of the last imperial dynasty, China's literary revolution took a new course. Chou En-lai was among those swept into the mutually reinforcing movements for literary and social revolution.

Chou studied English and received a liberal education in Nankai Middle School and Nankai University, a liberal arts college in the North China city of Tientsin. As a student leader Chou was already calling on his fellow students to struggle for a united, modernized China free from foreign domination. He was arrested and imprisoned for a year in Tientsin. Among other young patriots jailed with him was a radical woman student of a Tientsin normal college, Teng Ying-chao, who later became his wife and lifelong comrade. In 1976 Teng Ying-ch'ao was elected a vice-chairman of the National People's Congress.

Like many activists of his generation, Chou spent two years of study in Japan. On his return he threw himself into the great mass demonstrations of Chinese workers, patriotic merchants, students and intellectuals against foreign domination and warlord politics, the May Fourth Movement of 1919. This popular upsurge was the Chinese patriots' response to a sinister deal among the victorious Western powers to turn German concessions in China's Shantung province over to Japan as the spoils of World War I.

By this time the victory of the October Revolution in Russia had infused many young Chinese with the inspiration of an alternative road to emancipation for their people. Marxism came to China under the impetus of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. In 1918 Chou joined a group of students at Peking University (including Mao Tse-Tung and others who would shortly found the Chinese Communist Party), in studying translations of the Communist Manifesto and other Marxist works.

In 1920, he left for France on a work-study program where he continued as an effective leader of Chinese students, helping to introduce them to Marxist ideas. Ho Chi Minh, whom he met in Paris at that time, described Chou as "already a mature Marxist" and affectionately referred to him as "my elder brother."

The historic First Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) met in Shanghai in 1921. Almost simultaneously in France, Chou and fellow worker-students founded the Communist Youth League. As Chou later recalled: "Our Communist Youth League sent delegates to Shanghai in 1922 to request admission to the Party. Our petition being granted, the CYL became formally affiliated with the Party, and thus I became a Communist." After two years of working, studying French and devoting himself to politics, Chou proceeded to London and then to Germany. Among his recruits to communism at this time was Chu Teh, who became one of China's outstanding military and political leaders.

A LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION: 1920-1927

Already a well-known revolutionary organizer, Chou returned to China in 1924. During the next three years a united front brought the young Communist Party and Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) together with the support of the Soviet Union in an effort to unify the Chinese nation. Chou and other Communists simultaneously held positions in the Communist Party and in the Kuomintang while working to mobilize workers and peasants to overthrow the warlords, military barons who continued to divide and oppress the nation. While military power was concentrated under the Kuomintang, the Communists' success in organizing the workers and peasants was the source of much of the dynamic of the United Front.

At twenty-six, Chou was appointed to work at the Kuomintang's Whampoa Military Academy in Canton. As chief of Whampoa's political department, he played an important part in training a new generation of radical cadets.

Starting from a small territorial base in Southeast China, the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition of 1926-1927, under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, sought to drive out the warlords and unify the country. Chou En-lai was given responsibility to organize an uprising which could lead to the capture of Shanghai from local warlord forces. Edgar Snow described him at this time: "A youth of twenty-eight, with no formal military training, little experience with the

working class (from which, as son of a wealthy bourgeois family, he had been isolated), with no guidebook to show him how to make an insurrection, and none to advise him (the chief Russian advisers being with Chiang Kai-shek), Chou arrived in Shanghai equipped with only a revolutionary determination and a theoretical knowledge of Marxism."

In the spring of 1927 Chou and other labor leaders who had worked for more than a year in organizing militant strikes secretly gave military training to 2,000 workers in the French enclave of Shanghai. With Mausers smuggled into the city, an "iron band" of 300 marksmen became the first armed force of the Shanghai workers.

On March 21, 1927, as the Northern Expedition swept toward the city, the Communists called a general strike which closed all the industries of Shanghai and put 600,000 militant workers behind the barricades of revolution. They seized first the police stations, next the arsenal, then the army garrison; after that, victory. Five thousand workers were armed, six battalions or revolutionary troops created, and a "citizens' government" was proclaimed.

When Chiang Kai-shek arrived at the head of an army on the outskirts of Shanghai a few days later, he was able to enter the city without firing a shot. He received power from a triumphant workers' army. Within a month, Chiang staged his own rightwing coup in an effort to secure personal control of the Northern Expedition and wrest leadership of the United Front from the Communists and the hundreds of thousands of working people which they represented and led. As the killing of radicals and working people began, first on the list of the condemned with an \$80,000 price on his head was the youthful organizer, Chou En-lai. Shanghai's workers and the Communist Party learned the bitter lesson that the working class would require an army of its own to defeat the armed forces of reaction. Armed counter-revolution could only be defeated by armed forces of the revolution supported by the masses of the Chinese people.

Dozens of Chou's close co-workers in the Shanghai uprising were seized and executed. He has estimated the toll of the "Shanghai massacre" at 5,000 lives. He himself was captured by the Kuomintang Second Division, and warlord General Pai Ch'ung-hsi issued an order for his execution. But

the brother of the division commander who had been Chou's student at Whampoa helped him escape. Chou and his soldiers were now fugitives from the Kuomintang. They fled to Wuhan and then to Nanchang. There they helped instigate another great worker uprising on August 1, 1927, the date now celebrated as the first action of the independent Red Army. The uprising in Nanchang, and later worker revolts in Swatow and Canton in which Chou participated, were so bloodily suppressed and the Communist underground so ruthlessly hunted down that retreat to the countryside was the only alternative. The opening of a new path of revolution was at hand.

ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE CHINESE COUNTRYSIDE

The remnants of the Chinese Communist Party, a few hundred ragged and half-starved but determined revolutionaries, regrouped in the mountains of Kiangsi province and began to build an army of several tens of thousands of workers and peasants. In this base area, a new strategy emerged that would eventually carry it to victory: protracted guerrilla struggle linked to revolutionary change in the countryside. The countryside would surround the cities in a sea of revolution. Chou continued to work underground in Shanghai until 1931 when he entered the central revolutionary base in Kiangsi province in South Central China. There he took up leading positions in the liberated areas government and in the Red Army.

In Kiangsi, Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung brought the message of revolutionary armed struggle to the countryside. This meant, most concretely, land revolution, the confiscation by the peasants themselves of land from the landlords and the equal partition of that land among the peasants. The struggle for the land quickly spread among the poor and landless peasant majority which toiled long hours on rented land only to pay 50% or more of their harvest to the landlord.

By 1930 the Communists, administering territorial bases with nearly ten million people posed so serious a threat to Kuomintang rule that Chiang Kai-shek hurled five large-scale

offensives against them. By the time of the fifth encirclement campaign, hundreds of thousands of people had been killed or starved to death in the Communist-led Kiangsi Soviet area alone. It was this last campaign that ultimately forced the Communists to withdraw from Kiangsi and other southern and central bases.

Beginning in the autumn of 1934 with over 90,000 men, women and children, the Red Army set off on the epic Long March. In the course of one year it logged more than 6,000 miles, fording 24 rivers and crossing 18 mountain ranges under continuous enemy fire. Chou En-lai helped plan the evacuation and during the march he was head of the military committee, sharing with Mao the final responsibility for survival. Upholding morale in the face of hunger, disease, impassable terrain, and the pursuing Nationalist troops, Chou En-lai kept the Party marching.

In January 1935, in the midst of the Long March, a historic party conference took place at Tsunyi in Kweichow province. Here Mao Tse-tung succeeded in uniting the party under his leadership. He is reputed to have said then: "Whoever wins the peasants will win China. Whoever solves the land question will win the peasant." Here also, the long and trusted friendship between Mao and Chou was born, a relationship which would span the next 40 years. After the conference, Chou served as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee under the leadership of Chairman Mao.

The Long March ended with the Communist nucleus intact in October, 1935. Despite heavy casualties, the Red Army had survived the rigors of sustained attack and reached its new base at Yen-an in Shensi province. A new task was now at hand: resistance to Japanese aggression in China. In 1936 the young American journalist Edgar Snow penetrated the Kuomintang blockade and arrived in the Yen-an area. There he met Chou for the first time. Snow recorded his vivid impressions:

He was of slender stature, of medium height, with a slight wiry frame, boyish in appearance despite his long black beard, and with large, warm, deep-set eyes. There was certainly a kind of magnetism about him that seemed to derive from a curious combination of shyness, personal charm and complete assurance of command. . . . Renunciation of the key philosophy of ancient

China, the philosophy of umbrella-truces and face-saving; matchless capacity for punishment and hardship; selfless adherence to an ideology, and a tenacity that did not know when it was beaten—all these seemed implicit in this story of the Red Army as it was revealed to me in the story of one man who helped make it. Chou must be a fanatic, I told myself, and I looked for the fatal gleam in the retina. But if it was there, I failed to discern it. He talked on slowly, quietly, thoughtfully.

TOWARD NATIONAL LIBERATION

The Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931 and began a murderous campaign of conquest that penetrated deep into China and lasted fourteen years. Striking into north China in 1935 they met with little resistance as Kuomintang troops continued to attack the Communist “bandits.”

As invading armies pushed relentlessly into North China, the Chinese Communist Party called repeatedly for cessation of the civil war and a united mobilization against the aggressor. The CCP also demanded that the masses be armed and the people given their democratic rights. But Chiang Kai-shek insisted on pulling troops back from the Japanese front in the Northeast to attack the Communists in the Northwest. By 1936 China's situation was so intolerable that even some of Chiang's most able generals were calling for united action against Japan. Massive demonstrations by patriotic students and thousands of defections by KMT troops to the Communists placed Chiang under enormous pressure. Still he coldly ignored all appeals for unity and pursued his policy of “mopping up Red remnants.” Mao Tse-tung, during the summer of 1936, stated:

There must be a day of decision, a day when he [Chiang] must either oppose Japan or be overthrown by his subordinates . . . The increasing pressures from his own generals and the anti-Japanese mass movement may compel Chiang to realize his mistake . . . We will welcome this change and cooperate wholeheartedly . . . but only Chiang can determine this for himself. The decision cannot be much longer delayed.

When Chiang landed in Sian in December, 1936 to direct yet another Communist extermination campaign, he was arrested by a group of his own generals who intended to use their captive as a lever to achieve Communist-Kuomintang

unity against Japan. This event, the Sian Incident, set the stage for Chou's first important diplomatic assignment.

At the request of KMT General Chang Hsueh-liang, Chou and two other CCP representatives flew to Sian in Chiang's private plane to join in negotiations to end the civil war. Many people assumed that the Communists would demand Chiang's death for the war of annihilation he had waged against them. Quite the contrary, Chou En-lai, the party's chief political representative, urged a peaceful settlement, the release of Chiang and his return to leadership in Nanking.

This policy toward Chiang Kai-shek reflected the Communist commitment to end the civil war in order to meet head on the main enemy, an aggressive Japan. Chou's fidelity to the new united front policy, this time based on the armed participation of Communist forces, is captured in Edgar Snow's brief description of a meeting between Chou and Chiang during the negotiations.

Shortly after his arrival, the head of the Communist delegation, Chou En-lai, went to see Chiang Kai-shek. One can easily imagine the effect of this meeting on the Generalissimo. Still physically weak and psychologically deeply shaken by his experiences, Chiang is said to have turned pale with apprehension when Chou En-lai, his former political attache, for whose head he had once offered \$80,000, entered the room and gave him a friendly greeting. He must have at once concluded that the Red Army had entered Sian, and that he was to be turned over to it as captive!

But the Generalissimo was quickly relieved of this apprehension by Chou and the Marshal (Chang Hsueh-liang), both of whom acknowledged him as Commander-in-Chief and sat down to explain the attitude of the Communists toward the national crisis. At first frigidly silent, Chiang gradually thawed as he listened, for the first time during his decade of war against it, to the Communist point of view.

Chou not only had to win Chiang Kai-shek's support for a united front against Japan, but that of younger radical officers of the Northeastern and Northwestern armies and also some Communists who saw the opportunity to execute their hated enemy. Chou now worked tirelessly, often talking through the entire night, explaining and re-explaining the reasons for the CCP's policy of uniting with the Kuomintang under Chiang to resist Japan. The weeks of negotiations proved fruitful in the end, and Chou together with the

northern generals and Chiang Kai-shek agreed on eight principles which ended the civil war and established the national United Front against Japan.

Chou continued as negotiator between the Communists and the Kuomintang throughout the war years as the Communists became the major resistance force in North China. While the Kuomintang retreated to the far Southwest, the Communist-led Eighth Route Army offered stiff resistance in the face of Japanese advances, and despite the brunt of Japanese attack, organized areas with a population of 100 million formed behind Japanese lines. Uniting the Chinese people behind the national resistance to Japan on the basis of a program of democracy and social reform, featuring the reduction of rent and interest, in the course of the war years the Communists emerged as a dynamic force mobilizing and leading the population of the base areas. This was people's war. The Kuomintang, meanwhile, committed to preserving the landlord order and the privilege of its own leaders, sank into corruption, repression, and bureaucratic infighting, exposing its weaknesses to all in the course of the war. Once again, rather than fight the foreign enemy, the Kuomintang concentrated its forces against the Communists. During the eight years of war, Chou spent much of his time as the principal Communist negotiator in Chungking, capital of the Nationalist government, under constant threat of arrest and death.

With Japan's defeat in 1945, Chou joined Mao in Chungking for United States-sponsored negotiations with the KMT, to establish a coalition government in order to prevent renewed war. When the KMT, enjoying U.S. military and financial backing, destroyed that agreement, civil war erupted again. Chou returned to Yen-an. Although he continued throughout 1946-47 to serve as chief negotiator with the U.S. representative in China, General George Marshall, the future would be decided on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table. Chou threw himself into planning for the final campaigns of the war.

In the summer of 1946, a U.S.-backed Chiang Kai-shek led another major offensive against the Communist base areas, penetrating as far north as Yen-an and seizing the Communist capital. The Communists, having made a strategic retreat, lost

few men during the battles that ensued and by mid '47 they had halted the KMT advances. From 1947, as the land revolution once again swung into high gear, the People's Liberation Army, enjoying overwhelming popular support, turned to the offensive. Demoralized KMT armies collapsed like a sheet of loose sand. Thousands threw down their arms and fled, others joined the advancing Communist armies. The victory came swiftly as Kuomintang forces, supplied, financed and advised by the United States, fled by boat to Taiwan province.

PEOPLE'S CHINA: PUTTING POLITICS IN COMMAND

At the founding of the People's Republic of China on Oct. 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed: "The Chinese people have stood up." During the next 27 years, Chou En-lai as Premier, as Foreign Minister, and as Vice Chairman of the Communist Party, worked tirelessly to understand and lead the people through the challenges of the new era: to continue and deepen the revolution and to build a prosperous, self-reliant modern China.

The revolution quickly accomplished several monumental goals. It eradicated the landlord-ridden social order which had condemned the vast majority to a life of desperation and poverty and it simultaneously ended foreign military and economic domination. China took control of her own resources and began making impressive strides in industrialization and economic growth. But revolutions may die; one of China's great contributions to human progress stems from the fact that the victories of 1949 and the struggle for land reform were but the first steps on a long march toward full equality and control by working people in reshaping society to serve their interests.

In the land revolution which swept the countryside between 1947 and 1952, a new generation of peasant activists rose to destroy the grip of the landlord class and distributed the land equitably. This in turn opened the way to the overall development of the rural economy and society. The peasantry then seized the initiative and began to transform China's age-old system of individual cultivation by

a series of steps—and sometimes leaps. First mutual-aid teams, then cooperatives which preserved private ownership of land, and, finally, in the high tide of socialization in the countryside in 1955, collectives were established which transferred ownership and operation of the land to the local community.

Meanwhile control of factories passed from the hands of foreign and national capitalists and the former Kuomintang government into the hands of the new Chinese state while small scale industry flourished and began the step by step transition toward state ownership.

Despite the impressive growth rates and overall advances during China's First Five Year Plan (1952-57), modeled on the Soviet Union's development strategy, dark clouds hovered on the horizon. On the one hand, with overriding emphasis on investment in heavy industry, agricultural production tended to lag, and thus threatened the overall prospects for development. On the other, economic differences appeared as some peasants prospered and even began to hire labor while others were less successful in farming their land. There were also increasingly pronounced tendencies toward bureaucratic rigidification in the factories and state structure, and a mounting economic, cultural and political gap between city and countryside. These tendencies threatened the goals of an egalitarian and participatory society advancing toward Communism. In 1958 China attacked the problems head on in the bold Great Leap Forward, a national development plan which led to the formation of higher and enlarged forms of agricultural collectives, the people's communes, and produced an outburst of creative energy by workers and peasants.

During the Great Leap China sought to speed the pace of advance emphasizing anew the role of local initiative and self-reliance in provinces and cities, in factories and communes. Now China would attempt to "walk on two legs," rapidly expanding heavy industry as well as light industry and agriculture; building up both the cities and the countryside, advanced and backward areas; relying not only on high technology but on intermediate technology, and above all on the mobilized energies of the Chinese people: peasants, cooperatively organizing productive energies on an unprece-

dented scale in the communes not only to build vast new irrigation works but to industrialize the countryside through construction of small scale and local industry; workers, through the drive for worker control of the factories and through expanded worker participation in technical advance; women, freed en masse from household chores with the creation of nurseries, day care centers and dining halls, assuming new productive roles in both city and countryside. In the Great Leap Forward China opened the way to a fully independent and self-reliant development strategy rooted in the mobilization of the full energies of China's working people through new and expanded cooperative and state institutions.

In the hard years after 1958, as three years of unprecedented natural disaster coupled with the Soviet Union's treacherous withdrawal of all advisors, but also as a result of inexperience and excesses in planning and implementation by the Chinese, the economy suffered severe setbacks and the struggle—forward with socialism or back toward capitalism—sharpened. But the basic institution of the Great Leap, the People's Commune, weathered the storm of the three hard years and continued to provide the vehicle for the socialist transformation of the countryside.

In the Great Leap and after, outstanding production units were selected as models for the whole country. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai personally initiated campaigns to publicize their accomplishments, furnishing concrete examples as a guide to action. The results were the educational campaigns to "Learn from Tachai" in agriculture and "Learn from Tach'ing" in industry, both universally propagated throughout China.

At the beginning of these campaigns in 1964, Chou explained the significance of Tachai to Edgar Snow:

We are now giving publicity to the example of the Tachai Production Brigade. This brigade is in the Taihang Mountain area (in Shansi province) and is a place which entirely consists of sloping land where gullies are found everywhere and where the soil used to be lean and barren. But precisely such a people have, solely through self-reliant efforts in a decade and more, turned the entire sloping land into terraced fields, developed production, and transformed the poor valley into a rich valley.

... During the past eleven years this place borrowed money from

the state only once, and repaid it in the following year. It had been developed entirely through self-reliance. It is true that some big water conservancy projects are being developed [in Shansi] but those in Tachai were entirely built by the inhabitants. For the past eleven years each household in Tachai had on an average sold an annual amount of one metric ton of grain to the state [through the collective]. That is really something wonderful. The amount sold this year even greatly surpassed that figure. Tachai is, of course, quite a good example and such examples can be found in all provinces of China. China has a total rural population of more than 120 million households. If the amount of grain sold to the states by each commune or production brigade [all over China] all at once reached an average of one metric ton per household, the total would be well over 120 million metric tons. This of course cannot be realized yet but it is necessary for us to promote the spirit of Tachai, and there is indeed the possibility for that in the future.

In singling out Tachai the Chinese leadership stressed the self-reliant development of a community whose only resource in the face of implacable natural hardship was the organized, energetic and creative activity of its people. In the end, not the machine but politically conscious human communities would be decisive in shaping the future.

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA

Powerful internal and external pressures to revert back to authoritarian and elitist approaches to industrialization along capitalist lines or to China's own feudal tradition, where leadership was monopolized by a few personally ambitious or highly trained individuals, have been felt throughout the quarter century since liberation. William Hinton recently described these pressures and the means to overcome them:

At each stage where you had a struggle over the future of China and whether to look forward and further transform or not to go forward, you had an opponent standing put who was essentially saying the revolution is over.

Liu Shao-ch'i [the President of China before being deposed during the Cultural Revolution] dragged his feet about the land reform to start with, but once it got on the way, he carried it to the extremes, and when it was over, he said, 'Now we are going to have a long period of new democracy and we should guarantee the four freedoms.' These amounted to: the freedom to hire

people with wages, to issue usurious loans, to buy and sell land, and the freedom to set up private enterprise—the four freedoms to exploit others.

... Later, Lin Piao [formerly Defense Minister, killed (in a plane crash) while trying to flee to the Soviet Union] put forward that the revolution was over and now we should get down to production. Both Liu Shao-ch'i's and Lin Piao's lines said that only material incentives (houses, higher pay, extra time off, etc.) could get the Chinese people to work.

In 1966, Mao Tse-tung, firmly grasping the danger of trends leading toward the reimposition of privilege, the special prerogatives of an elite and, ultimately if unchecked, the restoration of capitalism, concluded that another great campaign was required to assure that China would continue the advance to socialism. In this way also a new generation which had tasted neither the bitterness of the old order nor the exhilaration of the land revolution could be trained and tested as revolutionary successors.

In response to a burst of criticism initiated by students at Peking University, Mao put forward his personal big character poster "Bombard the Headquarters," opening the way to an outpouring of tumultuous political debate about the future of the Chinese revolution. In the course of the subsequent seven years, vigorous debate and sharp struggle penetrated to every production, educational, military and political unit in every province and involved the entire people in setting China's future course. Mao sought to mobilize the Chinese people not in support of an entrenched party or government leadership but in defense of the highest ideals of the revolution itself, hammered out and tested in the battlefields of the anti-Japanese war and civil war, in the course of the land revolution and the Great Leap Forward. In the process Mao joined hands with those who dared to rebel, to challenge tendencies toward elitism, rigidification and corruption in the state and within the upper reaches of the Communist Party itself. The goals included revitalizing the leadership as well as training a new leadership generation which could only merit the designation of revolutionary by directly experiencing revolutionary struggle. In this way leadership came to the fore steeled in the struggles of the 1960s and legitimized by its ties to an alert and active population.

Chou En-lai throughout the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution—perhaps the most demanding of his career—remained a pillar of commitment to its twin ideals symbolized in the correct principle “Grasp revolution, promote production.” Chou firmly supported the advancing revolution while insuring fulfillment of the administrative and productive tasks of the state. To make revolution meant to engage in political struggle; but it also had to meet the test of continuing China’s advance as a developing nation attempting to break the grip of poverty just as the land reform and Great Leap had earlier contributed both to social justice and economic growth; it meant uniting the many to defeat the few, avoiding not only errors born of conservatism and bureaucratic rigidity but also such ultra-leftist excesses as advocating all struggle, no unity which periodically threatened to derail the revolution: it meant overcoming all barriers and continuing to advance toward a Communist society in which both poverty and inequality were eliminated. Thus Chou told a 1966 rally of students at part-work part-study schools that those who engage in productive work and labor must also study in order to gradually eliminate the differences between workers and peasants, between the city and country, and between mental labor and physical labor.

In round-the-clock sessions with worker and student revolutionaries Chou exhibited the immense breadth of heart to work with the overwhelming majority, not only with those who agreed with him, but even some who disagreed or had even been proven wrong in practice. He never lost sight of the ultimate goal of higher levels of unity in order to accomplish the goals of the Chinese revolution, nor did he ever lose his grasp of the principles underlying this unity. He achieved great skill both in conducting principled struggle and in striving for principled unity.

For most of two days and two nights in August, 1967, Chou remained a poised figure in a sea of Red Guards engulfing the Great Hall of the People. In his dialogue with them he kept or won the confidence of so many that those who had selected him as a target could not move against him. He told them: “The working class knows best the importance of alliance. The workers want alliance. They want to grasp revolution and at the same time stimulate production. The

YOUTH AND REVOLUTION

Thus it came to pass that on April 14, 1971, among the guests in the reception room of the Great Hall of the People in Peking, was Glenn Cowan, a nineteen-year-old member of the U.S. ping pong team with shoulder-length hair and a floral shirt. "I'm curious to know what Premier Chou thinks," he asked, breaking through the formality of diplomatic receptions, "about the hippie movement which excites the youth of the U.S.A. today." "First, I'm not very clear about it," Chou responded, "so I can only say something rather superficial. Perhaps youth in the world today are dissatisfied with the present situation and want to seek the truth. Through this there come changes in ideology which are likely to assume various forms. Such forms cannot be said to be final because in their search for truth youth must go through various processes.

"It should be permitted for young people to try out different kinds of activity. When we were young, we did the same. Therefore I understand the thinking of young people. They are very curious about things.

"Through the development of mankind, through the progress of mankind, universal truth is bound to be found in the end. It is the same with the laws of nature. We agree that young people should want to try out various ways of getting at the truth. But one thing is that you should always try to find something in common with the great majority of mankind, and in this way the majority can make progress and achieve happiness."

"Men's ideas change through a change of spiritual growth," Cowan responded.

"But the spiritual must be transformed into material force before one can change the world," Chou replied. "And one must have the agreement of the majority of the people—that is the law of development."

Thus as he had throughout a revolutionary lifetime and above all in the difficult tests of the Cultural Revolution, Chou looked to and encouraged the revolutionary spirit of youth in the service of the people.

majority faction should welcome the minority faction back into the fold. You must treat others as equals and not discriminate against them.”

Apart from his other vast overall responsibilities, he served repeatedly as a troubleshooter—a consequence of the decline in the number of vice premiers from seven to two. At one time, in the absence of a Minister of Railroads, it fell his lot to insure that the trains would continue to run.

Chou encouraged new ways of doing things that emerged during the Cultural Revolution. He resourcefully carried out the principle of setting up at every echelon “three-in-one” combinations—that is, leadership teams that united cadres,* technicians and rank and file workers while assuring representation that included the old, the middle aged and the young, so that each would benefit by learning from the special qualities of the other, whether it be wisdom, experience, dedication or innovative zeal. Chou utilized his immense leadership skills to mobilize cadres and the whole people to put their best efforts into everyday endeavor. Chou lauded the nurturing of the new socialist being along the “May 7th Road,” that is, people with one specialization but many capacities in manual and mental labor and social action. He fully supported the revolution in literature, art, education, and health; the barefoot doctors; the mass migration of school graduates to the mountainous and rural areas, and the study and use of philosophy by workers, peasants and soldiers.

His deep commitment to these goals was reflected in the priorities he established for his own work, where small

* A cadre is someone who holds a formal leadership position in any group or organization. Cadres include, for example, a factory manager or shop steward, a commune or team leader, a military officer, a party secretary, a school or hospital administrator, and so on. The practice of the Chinese revolution has infused the concept of the cadre with special leadership implications. The cadre provides leadership not by divorcing him or herself from the people and from the onerous task of physical labor or fighting under wartime conditions, but by establishing an intimate relationship with the rank and file and sharing their hardship, responding to their needs and criticisms as well as to the larger goals of the revolution. As the tasks of the revolution after 1949 increasingly demanded the resolution of economic problems, the cadre increasingly was called upon to be both “red and expert,” uniting political commitment and leadership sensitivity with technical skills, theoretical study with practical investigation and experience.

advances in many different fields were accorded equally detailed attention as weighty matters of state. Edgar Snow tells an illuminating story:

“Experimentation with acupuncture as anesthesia for abortion operation began in 1968 and by now is in widespread use. However, the proved success of the method—important especially in rural areas where professional anesthetists are few—had not yet been announced. Some days later (after visiting a hospital demonstrating this procedure) I was asked about my visit by Premier Chou En-lai. He said he had for some weeks had on his desk, awaiting official approval, a news story about the use of acupuncture. Now he was satisfied, he said, and personally released a report of my hospital visit for publication. I could not imagine President Nixon or Premier Kosygin finding time for such a detail of responsibility. How could one man find the time? Chou is at least several.”

Chou was acutely aware that it was beyond human capacity to avoid mistakes. He was always more relentless and demanding of himself than of others, and quick to recognize and criticize his own errors. In an interview with young American scholars in China in 1971, Chou reflected on the need to continue to change, “rectifying wrong ideas” he called it. “It is not brainwashing, it is rectifying erroneous ideas. I haven’t thought of a way to have my brain washed because I also have old ideas in my mind. I have already passed seventy-three, how can it be that I have no old ideas in my head, because I came over from the old society?” There was no way to avoid mistakes entirely, Chou insisted, the important thing is that “when mistakes do occur, to cure the patient, not doctor him to death.”

In his final major government report made to the Fourth National People’s Congress in 1975 Chou En-lai held firmly to Mao Tse-tung’s principle of “grasping revolution, promoting production and other work and preparedness against war.” He proceeded to outline the goals for China’s two stage development in the final decades of the twentieth century: “The first stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system . . . before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of

the world.” This program, framed initially under the direction of Chairman Mao, has been given the highest priority by the new Chinese government under the leadership of Hua Kuo-feng.

Chou embodied that combination of revolutionary toughness and compassion which China’s greatest modern writer Lu Hsun singled out as exemplifying the revolutionary: “With level gaze, I stare defiantly at a thousand accusing fingers. With bowed head, I serve the children willingly, like an ox.” Often it is the second task which poses the more difficult challenge, but it is one which Chou En-lai embodied well as Premier and as China’s leading diplomat.

CHINA AND THE WORLD

As foreign Minister from 1949 to 1957, and as the principal spokesman for China’s international policy until 1975, Chou En-lai played an exemplary role in articulating and applying the basic foreign policy principles advanced by Mao Tse-tung based on proletarian internationalism: vigorous support for the struggles and unity of oppressed people and nations, and the development of relations with countries of all social systems based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence—principles which have enabled China to restore her dignity as a unified nation and become a full and respected member of the international community.

As Foreign Minister in the early days of the People’s Republic, Chou moved quickly to establish relations with other nations. On October 1, 1949 Chou invited all countries to establish diplomatic relations “on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and sovereignty.” Within six months, by April 1950, China had opened diplomatic relations with 26 nations including eight in Asia. He also negotiated successfully the difficult problems of defining China’s borders with more than a dozen countries—one of the legacies of the imperialist division of the area—leaving only the borders of India and the Soviet Union as unresolved problems. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the new Chinese state found itself blockaded by the United States and threatened with bombing and invasion as General MacArthur led U.S. troops

toward the Yalu River dividing China and Korea. Under these circumstances, China, which had not even recovered from the ravages of decades of war, came to the aid of its beleaguered Korean ally. The U.S., which had fought the Chinese Communists by proxy during the Civil War, now found itself locked in combat with People's Liberation Army volunteers in Korea. Once again Chou En-lai was entrusted with the tasks of negotiating the ceasefire in Korea. Today more than twenty-five years after the ceasefire, and two decades after the withdrawal of all Chinese troops, there is as yet no peace treaty and the U.S. continues to maintain 42,000 troops and nuclear weapons in Korea, a dagger at the heart of China and a threat to peace in the area.

China and the Third World

Chou set forth many basic concepts which have played an increasingly important role in international relations in recent decades. He represented China at the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, an historic meeting which marked a large step in consolidating the unity of the Third World and the active participation of China as a member of the Third World. There Chou presented the basis for China's relations with countries with different social systems in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: 1) mutual respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty; 2) non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; 5) peaceful co-existence. These same principles have continued to govern China's state-to-state relations and subsequently formed the basis for many agreements including the 1972 Shanghai Communique which opened the way toward diplomatic relations between the United States and China. The Five Principles also now constitute the basis for state to state relations among many developing countries.

At this and other meetings, Chou became known as an international statesman dedicated to the struggle to unite the forces in the world desiring to combat all forms of foreign aggression, colonialism and efforts by imperialist powers to divide the world in order to serve their own interests. At Bandung, Chou introduced China's newly developed perspective on international alliance in contrast to the traditional

communist-capitalist division. In seeking to promote understanding and unity, he spoke persuasively to the Third World representatives:

In the interest of defending world peace, we Asian and African countries, which are more or less under similar circumstances, should be the first to cooperate with one another in a friendly manner and put peaceful coexistence into practice. The discord and separation created among the Asian and African countries by colonial rule in the past should no longer be there. We Asian and African countries should respect one another, and eliminate any suspicion and fear which may exist between us.

China has sought to make those sentiments a reality. During his visit to ten African countries in 1964, Chou introduced the eight principles of equality and mutual aid which have been consistent policy for China's international economic aid and a model for aid giving in general. The principles emphasize the role of aid in stimulating self-reliant development, thus offering alternatives to the relations of dominance and dependence and the pattern of debt trap characteristic of the aid provided by many other countries in order to serve their own narrow national interests.

A striking example of these principles in action is China's support of Tanzania and Zambia in building a railway essential for their development and for breaking landlocked Zambia's dependence on white racist Rhodesia for rail contact with port facilities. China agreed to assist after the United States and the World Bank had refused to cooperate. Aid for the railroad, which was completed in 1976, was provided in the form of 400 million U.S. dollars in interest-free loans with payment deferred for 15 years, and technical assistance in the form of equipment, engineers, workers, and material to build factories for maintenance of the railroad. The Chinese trained Tanzanian and Zambian workers and engineers and worked side by side with them in constructing the 1100 mile line across rugged terrain, joining in the hardest manual labor and living under the same conditions as the African workers themselves. Most importantly, China's involvement in the project had "no strings attached." Salim Ahmed Salim, presently the Tanzanian ambassador to the UN, commented in an interview for *New China Magazine*:

China's Eight Principles of Economic Aid

First, the Chinese Government consistently abides by the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but regards aid as always mutual.

Second, in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.

Third, the Chinese Government provides economic assistance by giving interest-free or low-interest loans and where necessary extends the time limit for the repayment so as to alleviate as far as possible the burden of the recipient countries.

Fourth, the purpose of the Chinese Government's foreign aid is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them to embark on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development step by step.

Fifth, the projects which the Chinese Government helps the recipient countries build are those which will, as far as possible, require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.

Sixth, the Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.

Seventh, in giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.

Eighth, the experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient countries. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

China's Eight Principles of Economic Aid, set forth more than a decade ago, represent an entirely new approach to development—a socialist approach. This policy has been unique in practice as well as principle; its provisions have been literally interpreted and strictly adhered to.

They have never attempted to interfere in our political affairs in any way. They collaborate fully with the workers and technicians. They never attempt to use or impose anything. They never asked for port facilities. They never asked for military or naval visits. Everything they've done has been strictly in accordance with specific agreements with the Tanzanian government. As for being brought under Chinese influence, I must say they have never asked us to support them—not even in the United Nations, and not even on the question of their admission to the United Nations. There has only been mutual respect, not a hint of interference, and certainly no political price whatever.

Salim had additional impressions of his relations with Chou En-lai in Peking during the long period of negotiations concerning the railroad.

As the Tanzanian Ambassador I was accorded the most extraordinary cooperation. I saw Premier Chou En-lai, whom I had met previously in 1963, five or six times. Sometimes I met him at 11 or 12 midnight and once at 2 o'clock in the morning. I wondered—when does the man ever sleep! He is surely one of the hardest-working prime ministers in the world. It is exciting to conduct business with him. He has such a vast knowledge of world affairs and not only of broad trends but also a command of the particulars, of figures and statistics. I was particularly impressed by my treatment as an African diplomat. I was received everywhere with respect, warmth, and friendliness; I could see anyone with whom I wanted to speak with the greatest ease. All Africans, not only the Tanzanians, were accorded this extraordinary cooperation and respect. I found that Third World representatives in China have a privileged position to facilitate their work.

In 1976 a Chinese spokesman commented that “We often receive thanks for our aid, but we seek no gratitude because support is mutual. For example, Vietnam suffered heavy losses, so what does our aid amount to next to their sacrifices? It is we who must thank them, for without them U.S. imperialism would have been pressuring us.”

The Three Worlds

China views the alignment of the world's peoples in terms of “Three Worlds.” Since the 1960s when profound changes occurred in the international situation, China has defined the first world as that of the United States and the Soviet Union each seeking global control. The contention between the two imperialist superpowers, which is merely masked by the

illusions of detente, threatens the people of the world and poses the inevitability of war. The second world consists of those developed capitalist nations, such as Japan and the countries of Western Europe, which simultaneously seek to safeguard their independence in the face of threats by the superpowers yet still maintain relations of exploitation with the poorer developing nations of the third world, including many of their former colonies.

China did not always see the globe divided in this fashion. In the 1950s China saw herself as a developing nation which was part of a growing socialist bloc closely aligned with the Soviet Union, while the United States was the leader of an imperialist camp which included Europe and Japan and threatened the interests both of the underdeveloped and the socialist nations. The combination of declining United States power, the transformation of the Soviet Union into a dangerous aggressive power with global hegemonic designs, led China to a new understanding of the more dangerous nature of contemporary imperialism.

A key point in the sharpening clash between China and the Soviet Union came in 1961 at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There, following Khrushchev's vitriolic denunciation of Albania which persisted in its criticism of Soviet revisionism, and in the context of sharp Soviet attacks on China during the preceding years, Chou En-lai led the walkout of Chinese representatives which marked the end of China's participation in and recognition of a unified Communist bloc of nations.

In 1968, on the day following the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia, at a reception given by the Romanian ambassador to China, Chou condemned Soviet aggression and expansion. For the first time he declared that the Soviet Union had degenerated into social imperialism, that is, socialism in word but imperialism in deed. In meetings with foreign guests over the years Chou frequently said that if China should one day become a superpower and attempt to dominate other countries, the world's people should expose and oppose the Chinese government.

While the alignment of forces in the world has changed drastically in the last 25 years, China has consistently identified with and supported the great majority of people

who comprise the third world of poor and developing nations struggling for liberation from imperialism, revisionism and reaction in their myriad forms. In implementing the Chinese Communist Party's foreign policy Chou En-lai tirelessly worked for unity among third world countries to enable them to stand up to the imperialist powers, particularly, in the 1970s, to the two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. At China's Fourth National Congress in 1975, Chou summed up China's analysis of the main dangers of the contemporary world and the prospects for war and revolution:

The present international situation is still characterized by great disorder under heaven, a disorder which is growing greater and greater. The capitalist world is facing the most serious economic crisis since the war, and all the basic contradictions in the world are sharpening. On the one hand, the trend of revolution by the people of the world is actively developing; countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution—this has become an irresistible historical current. On the other hand, the contention for world hegemony between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is becoming more and more intense. Their contention has extended to every corner of the world, the focus of their contention being Europe. Soviet social-imperialism "makes a feint to the east while attacking the west." The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are the biggest international oppressors and exploiters today, and they are the source of a new world war. Their fierce contention is bound to lead to world war some day. The people of all countries must get prepared. Detente and peace are being talked about everywhere in the world; it is precisely this that shows there is no detente, let alone lasting peace, in this world. At present, the factors for both revolution and war are increasing. Whether war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents war, in either case the international situation will develop in a direction favorable to the people and the future of the world will be bright.

THIRD WORLD LEADERS COMMENT ON CHOU EN-LAI

Message From
Ton Duc Thang, Le Tuan, Truong Chinh
and Pham Van Dong

Comrade Chou En-lai was an outstanding Communist fighter, an eminent son of the Chinese people, one of the most outstanding leaders of the Chinese party and state, and a great and close friend of the Vietnamese people.

Ton Duc Thang, President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee, Vietnam Workers' Party, Truong Chinh, Chairman, Standing Committee, National Assembly, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, Premier, Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Message from Julius Nyerere

Throughout his life Chou En-lai served the people of his country with selfless dedication, putting his great abilities at their disposal for use in whatever way they deemed appropriate. His contribution to the liberation and to the progress of the Chinese People's Republic would be difficult to over-estimate. And his memorial lies in the achievements of his colleagues and himself.

But Premier Chou En-lai was one of the great men of China who belonged to the whole world because of the part they have played in the advancement of human dignity and revolutionary international solidarity. His visit to Tanzania is remembered with affection and gratitude by our people. They recognized him as a great human being, a great friend of humanity, and an inspiring leader. Those of us who have met Premier Chou again on other occasions were also consistently impressed by his breadth and depth of understanding and his commitment to the cause of human freedom, justice, and international peace.

Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania

Message from Kim Il Sung

Comrade Chou En-lai, a tested and outstanding leader of the Party and state of China, a distinguished proletarian revolutionary, a prominent figure of the international Communist movement and working-class movement and a close comrade-in-arms of the Korean people, after embarking on the road of revolution at his young age, made a great contribution to the overthrow of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism and to the great victory of the people's revolution in China under the wise leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people. Comrade Chou En-lai devoted all his wisdom and energies to converting once backward China into a modern socialist power, vigorously waging the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, frustrating the scheme of the revisionists to restore capitalism, strengthening the proletarian dictatorship in China and promoting the cause of the international Communist movement.

Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

But it is above all for his contributions to U.S.-China relations that Americans will remember Chou En-lai. Throughout the last decades of U.S. efforts to impose embargo and isolation in order to bring the Chinese revolution to its knees, Chou En-lai continued to work for a breakthrough in diplomatic relations. As Chou put it in January 1957, "The U.S. always wants other parties to make concessions while it itself does not want to make any

concessions. That is why compromise cannot be reached. Only when both parties move forward can they shake hands. But in the case of the U.S. even when we extended our hand they refused to take it." Throughout the long decades of American hostility, in the face of possible U.S. invasion and repeated threat of nuclear attack,* Chou continued to work for the dual goals of normalization of U.S.-China relations and reunification of Taiwan province with the mainland.

Taiwan Province, a medium-sized island lying directly across from Fukien Province, was settled by Chinese farmers centuries ago and came under the direct administration of the Chinese central government as early as 1683. The Japanese seized the island by force in 1895 and ruled it as a colony until they were defeated in 1945. All countries participating in the Potsdam agreements at the close of World War II agreed at that time that Taiwan Province belonged to the central government of China, and it was returned to China that year. When members of the Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek began arriving in Taiwan in large numbers in 1947, the people of Taiwan Province found the Nationalists' oppressive military rule as intolerable as had their compatriots on the mainland. They rose in island-wide rebellion on February 28. The bloody suppression of that rebellion made possible the use of the island as a haven for the defeated. In 1949 Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government arrived, and by June of 1950 the Peoples' Liberation Army were massed in Fukien, ready to complete the liberation of the country. The United States government knew that Taiwan Province was to be liberated, and in January of 1950 had already alerted its embassies around the world to this fact, having realized that there was nothing the U.S. could do to prevent it from happening. At that time the U.S. restricted its expression of hostility to newly liberated China to the imposition of an economic blockade at the very moment when trade, tech-

* For example, President Eisenhower describes the first of several nuclear threats during the Korean War in his memoirs, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 179-81, in the following warning to China: Unless progress was made toward a ceasefire, "we intended to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula."

nology and capital were urgently needed for her recovery from 20 devastating years of war. Mao Tse-tung responded resolutely to these actions: "We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China."

But when civil war broke out in Korea on June 26, 1950, the U.S. government labelled it "Communist aggression." Overnight the U.S. 7th Fleet was moved between Taiwan Province and the mainland, preventing its liberation. Within twenty-four hours, Chou En-lai denounced this act as "armed aggression against the territory of China in total violation of the United Nations Charter," which it was. Again in 1955 Chou brought up the question. At the Bandung Conference he made a public offer to enter into negotiations with the United States government "to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area." This invitation to talk resulted in five months of discussion in Geneva from August to December of 1955. Chou En-lai insisted that the U.S. government recognize that Taiwan was a province of China and as such belonged ultimately to the central government in Peking. He also insisted that the U.S. abrogate its "Mutual Defense Treaty" of 1954 in which the U.S. gave the remnant Nationalists guarantees against any attempt by the People's Republic to reclaim Taiwan Province. The U.S. government would not agree to either principle.

In 1958 Chou once again raised the issue of Taiwan Province. On September 6 he made a public offer to resume Sino-American ambassadorial talks. They did resume, this time in Warsaw. The ambassadors continued to talk until November, 1961. Chou En-lai insisted that the issue of Taiwan Province be settled first, only then could other matters be considered. And he said that the only question that concerned the U.S. government was its removal from Taiwan Province; the question of its future disposition was strictly an internal matter, to be solved between Peking and Taipei. Furthermore, even before any serious negotiations could begin, the U.S. government must agree to withdraw its

armed forces from the area. The U.S. did not agree, and nothing came of the talks. In August 1960 Chou told Edgar Snow that the crux of the dispute between the People's Republic and the U.S. was still the issue of Taiwan. Again in 1971 Chou explained to James Reston of the *New York Times* the basis for China's insistence that the U.S. must recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people, and that it must respect China's territorial integrity with respect to Taiwan Province: "I've said on many occasions that the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair, which brooks no foreign interference. That is still our position now. At the same time, I've said that the United States has committed aggression against and occupied China's Taiwan province and the Taiwan Strait, so we are willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government for a settlement of this question."

In 1971, the United States, facing the humiliation of defeat in its attempt to prevent the People's Republic of China from attaining its rightful place in the United Nations, was at last forced to concede on several issues. In what has been called the diplomatic triumph of the century, Chou En-lai guided the delicate negotiations which ended U.S. efforts to isolate and destroy the People's Republic and paved the way for China's full emergence in international affairs.

Thus, it is only fitting that the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972, states in its opening paragraph, "This agreement followed discussions between the visiting United States delegation . . . and high officials of the People's Republic of China, led by Premier Chou En-lai." In this Communique the United States and the People's Republic of China endorsed as the basis for their relations China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: "Countries regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." They agreed that progress toward normalization of relations between the two countries is in the interest of all countries, and they rejected attempts by any country to establish great

power hegemony. The Shanghai Communique also charted the way forward toward overcoming the one critical road-block which barred normalization of relations between the two countries by endorsing the principle of one China and the necessity for the United States to withdraw all forces from China's Taiwan province. In the words of the Communique:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

Six years later, the continued presence of U.S. military forces on Taiwan and maintenance of the 1954 Mutual Aid Treaty with Taiwan continue to block the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, leaving the United States the only major power which has failed to do so. The Shanghai Communique nevertheless remains the basis for future development of full U.S.-China relations and a lasting monument to the diplomatic efforts and wisdom of Chou En-lai.

As occupied as he was with affairs of state, Chou never failed to emphasize people-to-people friendship as an integral part of China's foreign relations. Edgar Snow's 1936 encounter with Chou and the American doctor George Hatem (Ma Hai-teh) in Shensi began a Sino-American relationship which epitomizes both Chou's capacity for warm friendship and Chou's comprehension of the importance of international understanding of the Chinese revolution. Whenever Snow returned to China, Chou gave him hours of his time and saw that he got the information that he needed to chronicle China's progress. It was Chou who encouraged Snow to join Mao on the balcony of Tien An Men in 1971 at the celebration of the twenty-first anniversary of the People's Republic, signaling the opening of a new page in Sino-American relations. In 1960 Chou told Edgar Snow, "There is no conflict of basic interest between the peoples of China

Message from Former President Richard Nixon

I am profoundly saddened by the death of Premier Chou En-lai. Only a handful of men in the 20th century will ever match Premier Chou's impact in the history of the world. Of the more than hundred heads of government that I have had the privilege to meet in the past 25 years, there is none who surpassed him in the keen intellect, philosophical breadth and the experienced wisdom which made him a great leader.

It is largely because of Premier Chou and Chairman Mao's vision and sense of history that the People's Republic of China and the United States of America were able to come together in the winter of 1972 to end a generation of confrontation and begin a period of negotiation and reconciliation between our two nations.

During my visit to the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou said in a toast, "The strength of the people is powerful and that whatever the zigzags and reverses there will be in the development of history, the general trend of the world is definitely toward light and not darkness."

Message from Former President Gerald Ford

Premier Chou's deep understanding of world affairs and his qualities of statesmanship and foresight made an important contribution to the new relationship which is growing between our two countries on the principles of the Shanghai communique.

During our recent meeting, I reaffirmed my determination to complete the normalization of relations between our two countries. Americans will always remember Premier Chou for his major role in this historical process.

and the United States and friendship will eventually prevail." It was also Chou who later sent Dr. Ma Hai-teh at the head of a team of Chinese physicians to Switzerland to treat Snow as he lay dying of cancer. And the inscription on Snow's monument at Peking University, "Edgar Snow, an American Friend of the Chinese People," is written in Chou's calligraphy.

At Geneva in 1954 Chou offered his hand to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and though Dulles spurned it, the hard logic of events forced Dulles' successors to grasp it, with important positive results.

Diplomats from countries with very different social systems recognized Chou En-lai's remarkable qualities and called it charisma. But in China the conviction is that he possessed these qualities because he was a fine Communist and a great revolutionary. Did he have a "phenomenal memory"—or was he deeply interested in people because he understood their importance to China's future and the future of mankind? Did he attend to details because he was a "good housekeeper"—or because he saw their connection with the overall needs of the revolution? His drawing out of people—wasn't he learning from the masses?

We must remember that there was much more to Chou than the affability of a diplomat—that his life was a life of revolutionary struggle and sometimes of anguish and pain, but that he never lost sight of the bright future. Memories of Chou's outstretched hand can well serve Americans in striving to break down the barriers between the American and Chinese people.

At Shanghai, where he was the responsible organizer of the 1927 workers' insurrection that opened the gates to Chiang Kai-shek's troops, he saw apparent victory turn into counter-revolutionary terror, and, in the words of a poem by Lu Hsun, was "compelled to watch companions turned newly into ghosts." General Chu Teh later recalled that Chou was called the "man of iron" by his comrades in those days, but he was ill with malaria when he escaped in a small boat to Hong Kong after the rout of the revolutionary forces at Swatow. He was ill through the summer of 1932 in Kiangsi and the Long March left him gaunt and his wife, Teng Ying-chao, tubercular. His right arm was partially stiffened in

a horseback accident. He escaped ambush in Shensi in 1936 and assassination attempts in Chungking in October, 1945, and later en route to Bandung. A foreigner who had a late night interview with him during the Cultural Revolution found him whitened by fatigue and so shaky he could not light a cigarette.

Chou En-lai's devotion to hard work has been attested to by many. He himself once observed, somewhat surprised, that he had never taken a vacation. It is said that he knew he was ill with cancer in 1971, but, because there were so many important things to do in connection with the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao affair, told his doctor to say nothing. He viewed physical work as a way to keep in touch with reality.

Chou tendered various extraordinary services to the cause of China's continuing revolution. He helped both to shape and realize policy. His style of work was exemplary. He worked hard, lived simply, and showed his affection for those who worked with him. He helped give birth to a new China, to steer it through its days of darkest trial and to win friends around the world.