

# SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: EARLY YEARS

**ИЗВЕСТИЯ**  
Исполнительного Комитета  
и Петроградского Совета  
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## Декретъ о мирѣ,

принятый единогласно на засѣданіи  
Российскаго Съезда Советовъ Рабочих  
и Крестьянскихъ Депутатов  
26 октября 1917 г.

Справедливый как декрет  
о мире, так и декрет  
о земле, являются в истории  
нашего народа великими  
поворотными моментами в  
его жизни. Они означают  
переход от буржуазно-демократической  
революции к социалистической.  
Эти декреты являются  
основой для построения  
нового общества, основанного  
на принципах социализма.  
Они означают освобождение  
нашего народа от  
буржуазного гнета и  
установление справедливости  
и равенства между всеми  
гражданами.

Этот декрет о мире  
является одним из  
важнейших актов  
нашего правительства.  
Он означает отказ от  
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M. Trush

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## Introduction

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The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is usually described as a Leninist policy. It was Lenin who evolved the principles underlying socialist foreign policy not only formulating its basic propositions but also translating them into reality as head of the first socialist state in the world. It is no exaggeration to say that Lenin masterminded the elaboration of positions on all the cardinal problems of socialist foreign policy.

The nature and distinguishing features of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy stem from the very essence of the socialist social system.

Soviet foreign policy was a product of socialist revolution. It has always been—and is still—an instrument for the revolutionary transformation of society in the Soviet state. The task with which Lenin charged Soviet foreign policy immediately after the victory of the October Revolution was to defend the revolution's gains. To defend those gains and to secure the necessary external conditions for building a communist society remains its prime mission to this very day.

One of the first slogans of the October Rev-

olution advanced by Lenin was the slogan of peace. A consistent effort to achieve peace, security and friendship among peoples keynotes the entire foreign policy of the Soviet Union. To fight for peace means to isolate the most bellicose sections of the imperialist bourgeoisie, to turn public opinion against them and to frustrate their misanthropic plans. The history of the Soviet state is a history of incessant struggle against the aggressive policies of imperialism, a struggle to save the peoples from the scourge of war.

In the days immediately following the October Revolution Soviet Russia faced the fundamental problem of how to develop relations with the other states. To this question Lenin gave a lucid answer: peaceful coexistence. The experience of international relations corroborates the perspicacity of that answer. Peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems implies renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes, and their solution by negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries, consideration for each other's interests; non-interference in internal affairs, recognition of the right of every people to resolve their internal affairs by themselves; respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; promotion of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit.

Peaceful coexistence serves as a basis for peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale. But peaceful coexistence depends not only upon the countries of the socialist system. An essential prerequisite for peaceful coexistence is participation by the other side, namely the capitalist states. However, as this book will show, peaceful coexistence cannot be applied to the sphere of ideology.

Soviet foreign policy is profoundly internationalist as the interests of the Soviet people coincide with those of the vast majority of the people in all countries of the world. It is a policy aimed at preserving peace and securing good-neighbourly relations between all states. It is a policy of solidarity with all revolutionary and progressive forces in the world, an active factor in the struggle for new and more equitable social relations, for the liberation of all peoples from foreign domination and for the final elimination of all forms of colonialism.

The foes of socialism allege that the Soviet Union seeks to implant socialism in other countries by force of arms. Nothing could be more ridiculous. From the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist theory, which is the bedrock of Soviet foreign policy, revolutions are not imported from without, they break out as a result of deep-going socio-economic processes inside every country. They are brought about by the growth of the class struggle which is governed by objective laws of social development. As Lenin wrote, "The rule of capitalism is being undermined not because somebody is out to seize power... It would be impossible to put an end to the rule of capitalism if the whole course of economic development in the capitalist countries did not lead up to it."

Soviet foreign policy is aimed at safeguarding the people's interests. It has nothing to hide from the people. It advocates maximum publicity, and on major international issues, addresses itself not only to the governments of other states but also directly to their peoples.

The solid democratic foundation of Soviet foreign policy, on which the Soviet Union bases its relations with all other states, is genuine recog-

nition of the equality of all races and nationalities, of all nations, big and small.

The principles of Soviet foreign policy formulated under Lenin's leadership have been further developed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. To this very day these Leninist principles underlie the foreign policy of the USSR.

This book is an attempt to highlight Lenin's foreign policy activities, to explain his theoretical propositions and to show how he applied them in guiding the foreign policy of the first socialist state in the world.

Frequent reference has been made in this book to Lenin's works, to historical documents relating to the development of socialist foreign policy, to reminiscences of Lenin's relatives, friends and comrades-in-arms as well as to the memoirs of statesmen and diplomats who collaborated with him.

## The Root of It All

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The foreign policy of the USSR is a policy of peace, friendship and mutual understanding between peoples. Its fundamental principles were formulated under the leadership of Lenin even before the socialist revolution of 1917 and in the first years after the Soviet Republic came into existence.

In studying international relations on the basis of a materialistic conception of phenomena and events in the life of human society, Marx and Engels pointed to the need for a class attitude to foreign policy, and they rejected the "theory" of the abstract nature of a state's foreign policy activities.

"The simple laws of morality and justice which individuals must use as a guide in their relationships must be made to become the supreme laws in relations between nations as well. The struggle for such a foreign policy constitutes a part of the general struggle for the liberation of the working class."

Lenin developed further the Marxist theses

on foreign policy and pointed to the dialectical balance between politics and economy.

He emphasised that politics rested upon the material basis and, in the final analysis, was determined by the production relations within society and by its economic system. This idea was expounded by Lenin with exceptional lucidity in his article, *The Separation of Liberalism from Democracy*, where he wrote: "...the Russian foreign political line is determined by the line in home policy."

Throughout his whole life Lenin concerned himself with questions of foreign policy as connected with specific historical conditions, or "concrete situations," to use the words of G. V. Chicherin, the first Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Lenin continuously developed and generalised, added to and made more precise the propositions he had previously evolved.

In his early works Lenin made a comprehensive study of the socio-economic system of tsarist Russia and of its economic development and class relationships. On the basis of his analysis Lenin singled out the most vital questions of the Social-Democratic movement, including the attitude of the Marxist party to foreign policy questions.

At the turn of the century the national question assumed especial acuteness. At that time the territorial division of the world between the major imperialist powers was practically completed. A system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation of the vast majority of the world's population by several powerful states was taking shape.

In 1903, Lenin wrote the articles *On the Manifesto of the Armenian Social Democrats* and *The National Question in Our Programme*. In them he emphasised that it was the duty of all So-

cial Democrats to demand the right to self-determination for every nationality in a state, that the party of the proletariat must oppose national oppression. In elucidating the concept of the right to national self-determination espoused by revolutionary Marxists, Lenin pointed out that they subordinated support for demands for national independence to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle. "It is this," wrote Lenin, "that makes all the difference between our approach to the national question and the bourgeois-democratic approach."

Lenin's general approach to the national question and to the problems of the national-liberation movement explains why he devoted so much attention to exposing the colonialist policies of the European powers in Asia and their suppression of the struggle of the peoples of Iran, India and China for national freedom.

He gave much thought to the danger of world war which became obvious in the first decade of the 20th century and to the need to struggle against it. In several of his works he cited factual material to show that under the veil of diplomatic verbiage about strengthening peace the ruling quarters of imperialist states were concluding overt and covert agreements to set up military alliances and prepare for war. Lenin called upon the parties of the working class to combat militarism and to avert imperialist wars, and he laid special emphasis on anti-imperialist actions by revolutionary Social Democrats and on the need to disseminate the ideas of international solidarity among the working people.

In 1912, Lenin attended the All-Russia Conference of Bolsheviks in Prague. Along with other items the conference discussed problems of the international revolutionary movement and

adopted three resolutions on foreign policy: "The Russian Government's Attack of Persia," "The Chinese Revolution," and "The Policy of the Tsarist Government in Finland." These resolutions reflected the idea of proletarian internationalism, a cardinal principle that was later to form the mainstay of Soviet foreign policy.

October 1912 saw the outbreak of the Balkan War. The Party's Appeal "To All the Citizens of Russia," which was written by Lenin, together with several of his articles, presented a profound analysis of the international situation, revealed the essence of the Balkan crisis and clearly defined the attitude of the Bolshevik Party and the Russian working class to the Balkan War. Lenin made a clear-cut distinction between the predatory aspirations of the bourgeois nationalists and the emancipatory goals of the Balkan peoples in the war. Thus, in his article, *The Social Significance of the Serbo-Bulgarian Victories*, Lenin stressed the general positive result of the military successes of the Balkan states viewing them as a blow to the remnants of medievalism in the Balkans and completion of the liberation of the Balkan peoples from the Turkish yoke. Lenin very carefully studied relationships between the countries of the East and West. This is evident in his *Essayed Summary of World History Data After 1870*. This was the first work to present a scientific classification of the principal developments in international politics and the role of the Great Powers between 1871 and 1914. The experience amassed in compiling the book was of signal importance for Lenin in formulating the foreign policy programme of the Soviet state in later years.

On August 1, 1914, Lenin, who was in Austria-Hungary at the time, learned that Germany had declared war on Russia. Lenin's attitude to



the war is apparent from his conversation with the Polish journalist Alfred Majkosen.

"You do not want war?" Majkosen asked.

"No, I do not," Lenin replied briskly. "Why should I? I am doing and I shall go on doing all I can to impede mobilisation and war. I do not want millions of proletarians to destroy one another, paying with their blood for the madness of capitalism. Such is my viewpoint on this question."

The words of the Russian revolutionary leader made a tremendous impression on Majkosen. After all, Lenin had been described to him as a man who was prepared to set fire to the whole world.

"Objectively to anticipate war and to try and take the best possible advantage of it if it breaks out is one thing," Lenin went on to say. "To want war or to work for it is quite another."

Between 1914 and 1917, Lenin made a new contribution to the development of the Marxist theory with regard to war. He classified the types of wars in the epoch of imperialism, dividing them into unjust wars of aggrandizement (they were to be opposed) and just wars—revolutionary civil wars of the working people against the exploiters, defensive wars of the triumphant proletariat and national-liberation wars. Just wars were supported by the Marxists.

After the declaration of war Lenin was the first to call upon the working people of the world to rise in struggle against the organisers of the imperialist blood-bath. He was the first to show the workers the one and only way out of the war. Thus, the manifesto of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy," drafted with Lenin's participation, gives a Marxist assessment of the war as an

imperialist war, a war of aggrandizement on both sides. "Seizure of territory and subjugation of other nations," the manifesto read, "the ruining of competing nations and the plunder of their wealth, distracting the attention of the working masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, Britain and other countries, disuniting and nationalist stultification of the workers, and the extermination of their vanguard so as to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat—these comprise the sole actual content, importance and significance of the present war."

Lenin advanced the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war. He held that the policy of defeat for their imperialist governments was one that should be pursued by revolutionary Marxists in all the belligerent states. In a reactionary war the revolutionary class cannot fail to wish to see its government defeated, Lenin said. With the publication of the manifesto the Bolshevik Party and the international revolutionary movement obtained an effective programme of struggle against the imperialist war, for socialist revolution.

Lenin's approach to the slogan of peace depended on the specific historical situation. Before the First World War he fought to keep the peace and prevent war. He regarded the slogan of peace as a political appeal to the masses to mobilise them for a revolutionary struggle against the threat of world war. But when war could no longer be averted and the flames from Europe had engulfed the whole world, the situation became quite different. In these conditions the slogan of peace, devoid of the demand to overthrow the imperialist governments, was nothing but an appeal to those very governments. It gave the impression that the imperial-

ist governments were themselves capable of halting the butchery and making peace—and that the peace would be a democratic peace, not an imperialist one.

## The Concept of Peaceful Coexistence

The thesis of the inevitability of, and need for, peaceful coexistence of the two opposing socio-economic systems—socialist and capitalist—stems directly from Lenin's theory of socialist revolution and his doctrine concerning imperialism.

In analysing monopoly capitalism, which forms the socio-economic basis of imperialism, and in studying the law of its uneven economic and political development, Lenin concluded it was possible for the socialist revolution to triumph in several countries, or initially even in one separate country.

While studying the monopoly phase of capitalist society, Lenin observed the effects of the law of the uneven development of capitalism on the world revolutionary process. He concluded that the prerequisites for the socialist revolution did not mature at one and the same time. In some countries objective conditions for a revolutionary upheaval matured earlier, in others later.

But what happens after a revolution has been triumphant? What should be the attitude of the victorious people to the world that surrounds them? In his article, *On the Slogan for a United States of Europe* (1915), Lenin wrote that due to the uneven economic and political development of capitalism the victory of the revolution was possible initially in several or even in one country, which implied the inevitability of that country's coexistence with other countries where

Q the revolution had not yet occurred. In the article, *Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution*, Lenin quite unequivocally stated: "The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in different countries. It cannot be otherwise under commodity production. From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois."

Q Lenin's statement provided a lucid answer to the question of the attitude to be taken to the surrounding world by the people of a country where the socialist revolution has triumphed. It advanced the idea of peaceful coexistence of the two systems. In other words, if a revolution wins in one country, that socialist country will not fly away to the Moon, it will inevitably coexist side by side with capitalist countries. Thus life itself advances the thesis of one or several socialist countries existing side by side with countries where a capitalist or even a pre-capitalist mode of production prevails. Or, as Lenin put it, "The rate of capitalist development in different countries varies; this development takes place under different conditions, in various ways and by various means. A socialist republic in one country exists alongside all the capitalist countries of the world." Lenin held that this coexistence was an objective law which would apply for quite some time, in fact, throughout the entire epoch of transition from capitalism to communism on a world-wide scale.

Naturally enough, the foreign policy programme of the Party founded and led by Lenin could not be implemented until after the victory of the socialist revolution. This, however, did not at all mean that until then it was wrong to

fight to realise such a programme, or at least part of it. "To the question of what the party of the proletariat would do," wrote Lenin in 1915 in *Several Theses*, "if the revolution placed power in its hands in the present war, our answer is as follows: we would propose peace to *all* the belligerents on the condition that freedom is given to the colonies and *all* peoples that are dependent, oppressed and deprived of rights."

Convinced that struggle for victory of the socialist revolution under conditions of a world imperialist war was the only real way out of the war, Lenin wrote: "...It is *impossible* to ... achieve a democratic, non-coercive peace without overthrowing the power of capital and transferring state power to *another* class, the proletariat."

Lenin's proposition was developed in the Resolution on the War adopted by the All-Russia Conference of the Bolshevik Party in April 1917. The resolution read: "The revolutionary class that would take state power in Russia into its hands would take several measures undermining the economic domination of the capitalists and measures leading to their complete political neutralisation; it would immediately and openly propose a democratic peace to all peoples on the basis of complete renunciation of all annexations and indemnities. These measures and this open proposal of peace would generate the complete trust of the workers of the belligerent countries in each other and would inevitably result in uprisings of the proletariat against those imperialist governments that resisted the proposed peace."

In *Letters From Afar* which Lenin wrote in Switzerland after the 1917 February Revolution in Russia, he discussed the peace programme of the future Soviet Government. The programme

called for publication of the tsarist government's secret treaties with imperialist countries, the immediate offer of peace to all belligerent powers, an appeal to the workers of all countries to overthrow their governments, etc.

In the article, *The Tasks of the Revolution*, written in the first half of September, i.e., shortly before the October Revolution, Lenin wrote: "The Soviet Government must *straight away* offer to all the belligerent peoples (i.e., simultaneously both to their governments and to the worker and peasant masses) to conclude an immediate armistice (even if only for three months)."

According to Lenin's concept, the prime condition for a democratic peace was that each and every people without exception, both in Europe and in the colonies, should be granted freedom and an opportunity to decide whether it wanted to form an independent state or become part of any other state.

The Bolshevik Party led by Lenin advanced towards the proletarian revolution with a clear-cut and consistent programme for the creation of a new state and social system and the establishment of a new socialist state pursuing a completely new foreign policy.

From Triumphant  
Revolution to the Brest  
Peace Treaty.

Lenin and  
the Struggle of the Soviet State  
for Withdrawal from the  
Imperialist War

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(November 1917-March 1918)

The revolution has triumphed. "The ice has broken, the way is open, the road has been shown,"—thus Lenin described the internal significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution, the theory that socialism could win in one capitalist country, was borne out. The world was split into two systems, socialist and capitalist. With the triumph of the revolution "foreign

policy and international relations have been the main questions facing us," said Lenin. For the first time in history there appeared a state which in its very first law, the Decree on Peace, proclaimed the slogan of a general democratic peace and laid down new principles of international relations: peace between all peoples, recognition of the equality of nations, and the independence of all states. Addressing its Decree on Peace to the peoples and governments, the Communist Party headed by Lenin extended to them the hand of peace, friendship and cooperation. The Decree on Peace especially stressed the internationalist essence of Soviet foreign policy. It defined the kind of peace the Soviet Government regarded as just. "The workers' and peasants' government," the Decree stated, "calls upon all the belligerent peoples and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace—by such a peace the government means an immediate peace without annexations (i.e., without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forcible incorporation of foreign nations) and without indemnities." The Decree called for the abolition of secret diplomacy, the publication of secret treaties and conducting completely open negotiations.

Q In the Decree on Peace Lenin expressed the Soviet Government's readiness to discuss any other peace terms, thereby translating into reality the idea that peaceful coexistence was possible between states with different social systems and that they could settle their differences through negotiation. "We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these," Lenin declared at the Second Congress of Soviets.



On November 15, 1917, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia was published. It set forth a practical programme for the emancipation of the oppressed peoples of tsarist Russia and enunciated the basic principles of the Soviet Government's nationalities policy:

"1. Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.

"2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination up to secession and the formation of an independent state.

"3. Abrogation of all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions.

"4. Free development of the national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia."

Thus was condemned the bourgeois-landowner policy of inciting oppressed nations against one another, a policy of national enmity.

Lenin took the helm to guide the first socialist state, the Land of Soviets, forced to wage a struggle against innumerable enemies which did not abate for a single minute, a struggle which virtually gave the young workers' and peasants' government no chance to get its breath.

In the early days of the Soviet Republic it was surrounded by enemies. "Everyone was against us," wrote People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin. "Even those who pretended they wanted to live in peace with us assumed that role but temporarily."

At that critical time Lenin, heading the Soviet Government, personally concerned himself with all matters of foreign policy. "...In connection with my work as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs," Chicherin wrote, "I was in almost continuous contact with him. In the first years of the existence of our Republic I talked with him on the telephone several times

a day, sometimes for quite a time, in addition to private conversations, and frequently I would discuss with him all the details of current diplomatic affairs of any importance."

The Soviet Government called upon the toiling masses to oppose the war. It adhered to the principle of self-determination of all nations. It abolished secret diplomacy, and published secret treaties which exposed the imperialist policy.

At that time the Soviet Government granted independence to Finland and Poland, annulled all predatory treaties and came out in defence of the rights of enslaved peoples. The Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, dated December 31, 1917 and signed by Lenin, on recognition of Finland's independence was handed by Lenin personally at the Smolny Institute to a representative of the Finnish delegation on January 13, 1918, i.e., before Finland's independence was recognised by any other state.

The right to self-determination was granted to all nations inhabiting Russia, notably the Baltic peoples—Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians. On December 7, 1918 Lenin signed the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR recognising the independence of the Estonian Soviet Republic. On December 22 he signed similar decrees concerning the Latvian Soviet Republic and the Lithuanian Soviet Republic.

The 1917 October Revolution was the starting point of the liberation of the peoples of the East. On December 3, 1917 the Soviet Government published a message to the working Moslems of Russia and of the East. Enunciating the basic principles of its policy, it assured the toiling Moslems of Russia: "From now on your faiths and customs, your national and cultural institutions are declared free and inviolable. Arrange your national life freely and without hindrance.

You have the right to this. Know that your rights, like those of all the other peoples of Russia, are protected by the might of the revolution and its organs, the Soviets of Workers,' Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies." This and several other documents reflected the cardinal principles of the Soviet Government's policy towards all oppressed nations. It was a great moral and political help to the oppressed nations.

With the victory of the October Revolution the newly emergent Soviet state found itself confronted with questions of such magnitude as how to proceed to build a socialist society and develop relations with the capitalist countries. Lenin continued to elaborate his plan for the building of socialist society in a world where a socialist state had to exist alongside capitalist states. This was a new phase in the development of Marxism—a phase of world-historic significance.

Seeking answers to these questions, Lenin advanced the formula of peaceful coexistence of the two systems which provided the most favourable conditions for building socialism both in one country and on an international scale. It is precisely in the absence of war that the working classes can take advantage of the benefits of peace to build a socialist society. Peaceful coexistence is most conducive to the consolidation of socialism.

The enunciation and consistent implementation by the new social system of the ideas of peace, equality and cooperation in international relations encourage a public outcry against war. Lenin opposed those who wanted to base foreign policy upon ultimatums, upon total disregard for the governments of the capitalist countries surrounding Soviet Russia. "I shall vigorously oppose lending our demand for peace the form of an ultimatum," he said. "An ultimatum

may prove fatal to our whole cause." History has shown that the foreign policy line of the world's first socialist state was a correct one. Without ending the war and securing peace it would have been impossible to tackle the tasks of socialist construction. Therefore "...from the very beginning of the October Revolution," wrote Lenin, "our chief aim has been to put a stop to the imperialist war..." The Soviet Government waged a revolutionary struggle to conclude a general, just and democratic peace in the interests of all nations.

Lenin held that peace, and peace alone, was the prime condition for the struggle for socialism at that time. He emphasised: "What... could be more conclusive and clear than the following truth: a government that gave Soviet power, land, workers' control and *peace* to a people tortured by three years of predatory war would be invincible? Peace is the chief thing."

Lenin pointed out that after the dictatorship of the proletariat had triumphed in one country the foreign policy of that country should be aimed at securing the best possible conditions for consolidating the gains of the socialist revolution.

"The position of the socialist revolution in Russia," Lenin asserted, "must form the basis of any definition of the international tasks of our Soviet power."

On November 8, 1917, the Soviet Government called on all belligerent governments and peoples to start immediate talks for a general democratic peace. On November 9 the diplomats of the Allied Powers gathered at the residence of US ambassador David R. Francis and decided not to respond to the Soviet proposal, nor to enter into any contact with the Soviet Government. This was a deliberate attempt to boycott the

Soviet state. The Entente powers and the United States not only refused to participate in peace talks, but from the very first days they began to prepare actively for a struggle against the Soviet regime in Russia.

"It was the Anglo-French and the American bourgeoisie who refused to accept our proposal; it was they who even refused to talk to us about a general peace! It was *they* who betrayed the interests of all nations; it was they who prolonged the imperialist slaughter!

"It was they who, banking on the possibility of dragging Russia back into the imperialist war, refused to take part in the peace negotiations and thereby gave a free hand to the no less predatory German capitalists who imposed the annexationist and harsh Brest Peace upon Russia!"

When Britain, France and the United States left the proposal for a general peace unanswered, the Soviet Government decided to begin talks with the countries of the Austro-German bloc.

In the early hours of November 21 Lenin signed a radiogram from the Council of People's Commissars to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, General Dukhonin, instructing him to propose to the command of the enemy armies an immediate suspension of hostilities and the start of peace talks. The radiogram was sent off at 4 a.m.

On November 21, the Council of People's Commissars, having received no reply from General Dukhonin, authorised Lenin, Stalin and N. V. Krylenko to get in touch with Dukhonin on a direct telegraph line and ask about the reasons for the delay in starting armistice talks.

At 2 a.m. Lenin arrived at the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District and talked with General Dukhonin's headquarters until

4.30 a.m. Convincing himself that General Dukhonin was reluctant to obey the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars, Lenin went over to the radio station where he wrote out the text of an Appeal to be broadcast to all regimental, division, corps, army and other committees, to all soldiers of the revolutionary army and sailors of the revolutionary navy. The Appeal announced the dismissal of General Dukhonin for disobeying the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars to initiate armistice talks and the appointment of N. V. Krylenko as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

"Soldiers," the Appeal stated, "the cause of peace is in your hands! Do not allow the counter-revolutionary generals to frustrate the great cause of peace, place them under guard in order to avert acts of summary justice unworthy of a revolutionary army and to prevent these generals from escaping the trial that awaits them. Maintain the strictest revolutionary and military order.

"Let the regiments at the front immediately elect representatives to start formal negotiations for an armistice with the enemy.

"The Council of People's Commissars authorises you to do this.

"Do everything possible to keep us informed of every step in the negotiations. The Council of People's Commissars is alone authorised to sign the final armistice agreement.

"Soldiers, the cause of peace is in your hands! Maintain vigilance, restraint and energy, and the cause of peace will triumph!"

On November 22, Lenin attended a conference of delegates from the front which heard a report by N. V. Krylenko on the measures taken by the Council of People's Commissars to conclude an armistice with Germany. All the parti-

cipants in the conference were requested forthwith to return to their units and inform the soldiers of the events in Petrograd, to organise the election of regimental representatives and immediately to take into their hands the initiative for an armistice on all fronts.

On November 23, Lenin presented a report on the negotiations with Dukhonin to the meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and later summed up the debate. "It was clear to us," Lenin said, "that we were dealing with an opponent of the people's will and an enemy of the revolution. Dukhonin resorted to all manner of shifts and dodges to delay matters. Doubt was expressed as to the authenticity of our message, and the query was not addressed to Krylenko but to General Manikovsky. Thus, the generals have stolen at least one full day in this important and vital matter of peace. General Dukhonin came to the apparatus only when we said we would refer the matter to the soldiers. We told Dukhonin of our demand that he should start armistice negotiations immediately, and nothing more. Dukhonin was not empowered to conclude an armistice. Not only was the conclusion of an armistice outside Dukhonin's competence, but his every step in the matter of the armistice negotiations was to have been under the control of the People's Commissars."

In his concluding remarks Lenin emphasised: "Until Dukhonin's exposure and removal, the army was never sure that it was conducting an international policy of peace. It now has this assurance: the only way to fight Dukhonin is to appeal to the sense of discipline and initiative of the masses of soldiers. Peace cannot be concluded only from above. Peace must be won from below. We put no trust in the German generals, but we have faith in the German peo-

ple. A peace concluded by the commanders-in-chief, without the active participation of the soldiers, would be precarious."

On November 23, Lenin signed a radiogram from the Council of People's Commissars "To All Army Organisations, Military-Revolutionary Committees, to All Soldiers at the Front." It emphasised that "the struggle for peace has come up against the resistance of the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary generals. Soldiers, workers and peasants, selflessly support Soviet power and the struggle for an immediate armistice."

On November 24, Lenin talked with N. V. Krylenko and A. A. Ioffe shortly before their departure to the Northern front on the decision of the Council of People's Commissars. He instructed them about the conduct of armistice negotiations with the command of the German forces.

Arriving at the front, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Krylenko sent three truce envoys across the lines in the Dvinsk area on the morning of November 26. They were instructed to get in touch with the ranking German army commander wherever they made contact and find out if he would agree to send his authorised representatives to initiate immediate talks for an armistice on all fronts with a view to beginning peace negotiations.

On receiving an affirmative reply from the German command, Krylenko ordered the army and navy to cease fire at once and to engage in combat only in response to enemy action.

Once Germany had agreed to hold armistice talks the Soviet Government proposed that the negotiations be postponed for five days, until December 2, "so as once again to request the



Allied Governments to define their attitude to the matter of peace negotiations."

On November 28, the radio broadcast an Appeal by the Soviet Government "To the Governments and Peoples of the Belligerent Countries to Join in the Armistice Negotiations." "A decisive step has been taken," the Appeal stated. "The victorious workers' and peasants' revolution in Russia has put the question of peace point-blank. The period of vacillation, procrastination and bureaucratic conciliation is over. Today all the Governments, all the classes and all the parties of the belligerent countries are called upon to answer categorically whether they are prepared to join with us on December 2 in negotiations for an immediate armistice and general peace. Yes or no... The Russian army and the Russian people neither can nor want to wait any longer. On December 2 we are beginning peace negotiations. If the Allied peoples do not send their representatives we shall conduct the negotiations with the Germans alone. But if the bourgeoisie of the Allied countries forces us to sign a separate peace, the responsibility will rest squarely on its shoulders." The Soviet Government's Appeal was left unanswered by the governments of Britain, France and the United States.

On November 29, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs once again emphasised that "...the Soviet Government wants a general and not a separate peace." Inasmuch as the Entente powers ignored the proposal for armistice talks, Soviet Russia was forced to begin them alone. Nonetheless the Soviet Government informed the Allied Governments in a statement issued by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on November 30 that "The Council of People's Commissars reiterates that it considers it neces-

sary to conduct simultaneous negotiations with all the allies for the purpose of securing the earliest possible armistice on all fronts and ensuring a general, democratic peace."

The armistice talks between representatives of Soviet Russia, on the one hand, and Germany and her allies, on the other, began on December 3 at Brest-Litovsk, where the headquarters of the German Eastern Front Command was stationed. The Brest-Litovsk meeting between representatives of the two opposing systems was a great political victory for the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin. It was the first step of the emergent Soviet state along the thorny path of establishing peaceful relations with Western countries.

### Lenin and the Brest-Litovsk Talks

Lenin began to prepare the Soviet delegation for the talks long before they actually started. On November 28, Lenin wrote a letter to Major-General Odintsov requesting him to convene a commission of staff officers and generals in the morning of October 29 to work out the technical questions of the armistice with Germany. "I request you, due to the extreme urgency of the matter, to assemble your group tomorrow morning and to send me by tomorrow night at least a brief summary of the main questions, items and considerations of the armistice agreement (definition of the front line, the terms of the non-transfer of troops to other fronts, measures for control and so forth) and to name the person or persons who could, with full knowledge of things, personally participate in the negotiations."

On November 30, Lenin heard a report on

dispatches from the front announcing the start of armistice talks on the Western Front and presided over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars to discuss the report of the Soviet peace delegation which was about to leave for Brest-Litovsk. Lenin also signed an Appeal by the Council of People's Commissars to the German soldiers calling upon them to support the struggle of the working people of Soviet Russia for an immediate democratic peace.

On December 8, Lenin signed a telegram to Krylenko requesting the military experts, who had been attached to the peace delegation leaving for Brest-Litovsk to continue the armistice talks, to arrive at the Smolny Institute on the morning of December 9 to draft a peace treaty; Lenin also signed a Council of People's Commissars order for the receipt of cables sent by the Secretary of the Soviet delegation, Lev Karakhan, from Brest-Litovsk in the German language, and wrote out an order for Colonel Fokke, Military Consultant of the Soviet peace delegation at Brest-Litovsk, to be granted a direct line of communication to Pskov.

On December 15, a 28-day armistice was signed. On December 22 peace talks between Soviet Russia, on the one hand, and Germany and her allies, on the other, began at Brest-Litovsk, in an old Russian fortress captured by the German forces.

The Brest-Litovsk negotiations fell into three periods: from 22nd to 28th December 1917, from 9th January to 10th February 1918, and from 1st to 3rd March 1918. The first period consisted of preliminary talks about the principles of a future peace treaty between the belligerent countries.

On December 10, the Council of People's Commissars after discussing the composition of

the peace delegation and the directives for conducting the negotiations decided the delegation should include A. A. Ioffe, head of the delegation, L. B. Kamenev and A. A. Bitsenko. Rear-Admiral V. M. Altfater, General A. A. Samoilo and several others were attached to the delegation as military consultants.

On the same day, December 10, Lenin drafted an *Outline Programme for Peace Negotiations*.

This was the principal directive for the Soviet peace delegation at Brest-Litovsk. It emphasised that "the main theme of the political talks and the basic principle should be: '*No annexations or indemnities*'."

The programme specified the six points which the Soviet delegation proposed as a basis for the talks:

1) No forcible annexation of territories conquered during the war. Troops occupying such territories to be speedily withdrawn.

2) Political independence to be fully restored to peoples who had been deprived of their independence during the war.

3) National groups which were not politically independent before the war were to be guaranteed the opportunity of freely deciding the question of their allegiance to one state or another or their state independence by means of a referendum.

4) In territories inhabited by several nationalities the right of the minority to cultural and national independence and, where actually possible, to administrative autonomy were to be protected by special laws.

5) No belligerent country was to be required to pay another country any so-called war costs. Indemnities already collected were to be paid back.

6) Colonial questions were to be settled in conformity with the principles of self-determination.\*

From the very outset the Soviet delegation wanted to get Britain, France and the United States to join the talks on a general peace. It therefore promptly suggested transferring the talks from German occupied Brest-Litovsk to neutral country, where it would have been easier to inform the public in Europe and particularly the working masses about the progress being made. But the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance rejected the Soviet proposal.

In the first phase of the talks the German imperialists countered the clear-cut programme presented by the Soviet delegation with a demand that governments to their liking be set up in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—in effect a demand for German control over those territories.

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\* The German delegation was led by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Herr von Kühlmann and included Major-General Max Hoffmann, Minister von Rosenberg, Director of the Law Department Herr von Kriege, Counsellor Podolny, Captain 1st Class Horn, Major Brinkmann, Director of the Economic Department Herr Johannes.

The Austro-Hungarian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Count Czernin and included Ambassador von Mervay, Minister von Wiesner, Legation Counsellor Count Collorodo, Legation Secretary Count Chukie, Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal von Chicherich, Ober Lieutenant Pokorny and Major von Gleise.

The Bulgarian delegation led by Justice Minister Popov included Minister Kossov, Minister Stoyanovich, Colonel Ganchev, Legation Secretary Anastasov.

The Turkish delegation led by Grand Visier Talaat-Pasha included Foreign Minister Ahmed Nasim-Bey, Ambassador Ibrahim Hakki-Pasha, General of Cavalry Tseki-Pasha, and Legation Secretary Reshad Hikmet-Bey.

Thus, by December 28, when the first phase of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference ended, the parties had merely stated their fundamental positions without arriving at any agreement.

The 10-day recess in the talks was used by the Soviet Government for a renewed appeal to the Entente nations to join the peace negotiations. On December 30, an Appeal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Peoples and Governments of the Allied Countries was published. It stated: "But if the Allied Governments, with the blind obstinacy characteristic of declining and dying classes, again reject participation in the negotiations the working class will be faced with the absolute necessity of wresting the government from the hands of those who cannot or will not give the peoples peace.

"In these ten days the fate of hundreds of thousands and millions of lives is being decided...

"Addressing ourselves to the Governments with this last proposal to take part in the peace negotiations, we simultaneously promise our full support for the working class of every country that rebels against its national imperialists, its chauvinists, and its militarists under the banner of peace, the brotherhood of peoples, and the socialist transformation of society."

Lenin made a comprehensive study of the obtaining situation and analysed the mood within the Party, among the workers and the peasants, and in the army. This was essential for the elaboration of correct tactics for the talks to come.

From December 9, 1917 to January 16, 1918 an All-Army Congress on Demobilisation was held in Petrograd. Lenin took part in a conference of Congress delegates to try to ascertain for himself whether the army could still fight

the Germans. At this conference Lenin jotted down ten questions to the Congress delegates:

“(1) Is the likelihood of the Germans starting an offensive in the near future great or small—

“(a) from the viewpoint of the physical and technical possibility of a winter offensive;

“(b) from the viewpoint of the mood of the mass of the German soldiers; is that mood capable of preventing an offensive, or at least of retarding it?

“(2) Can it be assumed that the Germans, if we immediately break off peace negotiations, and if their troops immediately take the offensive, are capable of inflicting a decisive defeat upon us? Will they be able to take Petrograd?

“(3) Is it to be feared that the news of the peace negotiations having been broken off will result in widespread anarchist sentiments in the army and in desertions from the front, or may we be confident that the army will staunchly hold the front even after the receipt of such news?

“(4) Would our army be capable, from the military viewpoint, of resisting a German offensive, if it began on January 1? If not, when would our army be in a position to resist a German offensive?

“(5) In the event of a swift German advance, could our army retire in good order and preserve its artillery and, if so, could the Germans' advance into the heart of Russia be held up for long?

“(6) General conclusion: from the point of view of the state of the army, should we strive to drag out the peace negotiations, or would it be preferable to break them off immediately in a revolutionary fashion, because of the Germans' annexationist policy and as a decisive and

firm step which would prepare the ground for a possible revolutionary war?

"(7) Should we at once undertake intensive agitation against the Germans' annexationist policy, and for a revolutionary war?

"(8) Would it be possible at very short notice (5-10 days, say) to arrange a canvass of fairly wide sections of the army at the front with a view to obtaining fuller replies to the above questions in more suitable form?

"(9) Is it to be hoped that the dissensions with the Ukrainians will weaken, or even give way to a firm consolidation of forces when they hear of the Germans' annexationist demands, or is it to be expected that the Ukrainians will take advantage of the Great Russians' greater difficulties to step up the struggle against them?

"(10) If the army could vote, would it be in favour of immediate peace on annexationist (loss of the occupied regions) and economically very harsh terms for Russia, or would it favour the maximum effort for a revolutionary war, i.e., resistance to the Germans?"

The answers to these questions helped convince Lenin that it was not possible to continue the war against the Germans. They were also taken into account in devising the tactics of the Soviet side in the peace talks. The answers to Lenin's questions were debated at a meeting of the Soviet Government on December 31, where Krylenko reported on the situation at the front and on the state of the army. The Council of People's Commissars decreed that the results of the poll be considered exhaustive and adopted a draft resolution submitted by Lenin stipulating the following: "1. Intensified agitation against the annexationist policy of the Germans. 2. Allocation of additional funds for this agitation. 3. Transfer of peace negotiations to Stockholm.



4. Continuation of peace negotiations and resistance to their speed-up by the Germans. 5. Greater efforts to reorganise the army, reducing its strength and enhancing its defence potential. 6. Urgent measures for defence in the event of a breakthrough to Petrograd. 7. Propaganda and agitation on the necessity for a revolutionary war."

This tactical line gave the young socialist Republic time to build up a combat-worthy army.

The second phase of the Brest-Litovsk conference lasted from January 9 to February 10, 1918.

While the delegations of the Quadruple Alliance remained substantially the same, the Soviet delegation was now made up as follows: L. D. Trotsky (chairman), A. A. Ioffe, L. B. Kamenev, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, L. B. Karakhan (secretary); Rear-Admiral V. M. Altfater, Captain V. Lipsky, General A. A. Samoilo (military consultants); K. B. Radek, P. I. Stučka, S. Bobinsky, V. Micevičius-Kapsukas (consultants on national questions).

The delegation was instructed to do its utmost to stave off a direct military confrontation with international imperialism. But Trotsky acted quite the contrary.

It became clear before the start of the talks that the Entente powers would not agree to participate. In Germany the war party of Ludendorff, Hoffmann and von Hindenburg had gained the upper hand. A delegation from the bourgeois Ukrainian Rada also arrived in Brest-Litovsk and entered into separate peace talks with Germany.

According to the recollections of the delegation's military consultant, General Samoilo, the resumed talks "boiled down chiefly to verbal

duels between Trotsky and Hoffman, with Czerin and Kühlmann participating from time to time."

At a meeting of the Political Commission on January 18, General Hoffmann presented the Soviet delegation with the demands of the Quadruple Alliance. Poland, Lithuania, Courland (now part of the Latvian SSR), parts of Livonia (now part of the Latvian SSR and the Estonian SSR) and of Estland (now part of the Estonian SSR), and part of Grodno Province were to be cut off from Russia. These were rapacious peace terms. German imperialism was out to "legalise" the occupation of these territories indefinitely. The boundary line proposed by Germany hacked off over 150,000 square kilometres from Russia. "The peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk," Lenin wrote, "have by now—January 7, 1918—made it perfectly clear that the war party has undoubtedly gained the upper hand in the German Government (which has the other governments of the Quadruple Alliance at its beck and call) and has virtually presented Russia with an ultimatum (and it is to be expected, most certainly to be expected, that any day now it will be presented formally). The ultimatum is as follows: either continuation of the war, or a peace with annexations."

In this situation the Soviet delegation on instructions from Lenin resolutely protested against the demands of the German side, and called for a ten-day adjournment.

## Lenin's Struggle for an Immediate Peace

The German Government's ultimatum confronted the Soviet Government with the dilemma of whether to sign a peace treaty on such one-

rous and rapacious terms or not. For Lenin the question of peace was a question of life or death of the Soviet Republic. He was convinced that to save the Republic a peace treaty with imperialist Germany must be signed even at the cost of great sacrifices.

Lenin was well aware that if hostilities were renewed the Germans would start an offensive which would threaten Petrograd and the revolution itself. The Republic did not yet have a new army, and the disintegrating old army was in no state to offer any resistance. The people wanted peace.

Lenin was opposed by the "Left" Communists and Trotsky together with the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties of Russia. They mounted a struggle against Lenin's line, advocated a "revolutionary" war against Germany and called for the termination of peace talks.

Between January 18 and 20, Lenin drafted a plan which he then developed into his *Theses on the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace*. On January 21, Lenin read out these theses at a meeting of members of the Party Central Committee and Communist delegates to the Third Congress of Soviets. He pointed out that in view of the severe economic havoc in the country, the lack of a combat-worthy army and the presence of counter-revolution inside the country, fighting was out of the question. The conclusion of peace would give Soviet Russia a necessary breathing space for strengthening Soviet power and developing socialist construction. Lenin argued that the hopes of the "Left" Communists for a speedy revolution in Germany were quite untenable, for revolutions cannot be made to order or scheduled for a definite day or hour. Therefore it was wrong to base a policy on such hopes.

On January 24, the question of peace was debated at a meeting of the Party Central Committee.

The report on peace was presented by Lenin. He warned that if the Soviet Government refused to sign a peace treaty with Germany and German troops began an offensive, it would be compelled to sign a peace treaty on still more onerous terms.

On January 27, the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets passed a resolution on peace expressing its full support for the Soviet Government and approving "all statements and steps of the Soviet Government aimed at achieving a general and democratic peace."

On February 1, a Central Committee meeting decided, on Lenin's proposal, to convene the Seventh Congress of the Party on March 5.

On February 3, again on Lenin's initiative, there was a conference of representatives where various views were voiced on the future of negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. The following ten questions were submitted for discussion:

I. Is peace between a socialist and an imperialist state admissible in general?

II. Is it admissible to sign a German annexationist peace treaty now?

III. Should the talks be dragged out or not?

IV. Should they be delayed until they are broken off by the Germans?

V. Should the talks be broken off immediately?

VI. Is it admissible to sign a German annexationist peace treaty in the event of the Germans breaking off the negotiations or tendering an ultimatum?

VII. Should a peace treaty be signed in this case?

VIII. Should a peace treaty be signed if Kühl-

mann, because of pressure of the revolutionary movement inside Germany, agrees to our delegation's original terms?

IX. Should a Red Army be created?

X. Are economic treaties between a socialist state and an imperialist state admissible?

We can now see how Lenin, in consultation with the masses, pursued the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems.

A majority of participants in the meeting replied to these questions in the affirmative. This was a great victory in Lenin's struggle for the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty and for Russia's withdrawal from the war.

On February 9, having signed a treaty with the bourgeois-nationalist Central Rada in the Ukraine, the German delegation demanded that the Russian delegation state categorically whether Soviet Russia agreed to sign a peace treaty providing for the transfer to Germany of Poland, Lithuania, parts of Latvia, Estonia, and Byelorussia occupied by the German troops during the war, and the payment of an indemnity of 6,000 million roubles in gold—allegedly to pay for the upkeep of Russian prisoners of war.

The situation had now changed drastically. The talks could be delayed no longer. A peace treaty had to be signed. Lenin's proposal to drag out the negotiations was a temporary tactical stratagem in the struggle for peace in those conditions. Lenin believed that the talks could be dragged out only until a German ultimatum. After it further deliberate procrastination became meaningless and threatened the very existence of the Soviet Republic.

On January 28, Trotsky asked the Soviet Government what was to be done.

Lenin replied: "You know our standpoint; it has lately been confirmed..."

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Before the Soviet delegation's departure for Brest-Litovsk Lenin had given Trotsky clear-cut instructions which he later made known to the Seventh Party Congress. "...it was agreed between us," he said, "that we would hold out until the Germans presented an ultimatum, and then we would give way... I proposed quite definitely that peace be concluded."

Q !!!  
Ignoring this directive Trotsky responded to the German ultimatum by declaring: "We are not signing the peace. We are not waging war. We are demobilising the army." Trotsky thus disrupted the talks. The door was now open for German troops to advance into the heart of Soviet Russia. The socialist Republic was in mortal danger.

At 12 noon on February 18, German forces mounted an offensive against Soviet Russia along the entire front. On the same day there were two sessions of the Party Central Committee.

Addressing the second session, Lenin said: "We cannot afford to wait, which would mean consigning the Russian revolution to the scrap-heap. If the Germans said that they wanted to overthrow Bolshevik power, we would naturally have to fight; no more procrastination is permissible. It is now no longer a matter of the past but of the present. If we apply to the Germans, all we have is a piece of paper. You can't call that a policy. The only thing we can do is offer the Germans a resumption of the talks. There is no half-way house in this. If it is to be revolutionary war it must be declared, and the demobilisation stopped, but we can't go on in this manner. While we engage in paperwork, they take warehouses and railway cars, leaving us to perish. The issue now is that while playing

with war we have been surrendering the revolution to the Germans.

"History will say that you have surrendered the revolution. We could have concluded a peace which held no threat to the revolution... An offer of peace must be made to the Germans."

After an acute struggle Lenin succeeded in winning a majority vote in favour of signing a peace treaty.

This is how V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich described that struggle: "Vladimir Ilyich was all afire. He became incredibly tense. He clearly felt that everything was at stake. The slightest delay was enough for Soviet rule, as yet unstable and unorganised, to be washed off the face of the earth in an instant. So he left aside all his other affairs and devoted his entire vigour to this most important business."

At 5.15 a.m. on February 19, Lenin sent a wireless message to the German Government on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars protesting against the German offensive and declaring his willingness to sign peace on the terms proposed by the German Government. "The Council of People's Commissars," the message read, "finds itself forced, in the situation that has arisen, to declare its readiness formally to conclude peace on the terms the German Government demanded at Brest-Litovsk."

However, the German authorities deliberately delayed their reply and continued the offensive.

"The week from February 18 to 24, 1918," Lenin wrote, "has been one that will be remembered as a great turning-point in the history of the Russian—and the international—revolution." That week of imperialist Germany's military offensive against the Soviet Socialist Republic was, in Lenin's words, a bitter, disappointing, severe, but necessary lesson.

A meeting of the Soviet Government on February 19 discussed ways to organise the defence of Soviet Russia and conduct a revolutionary war. It was decided to form a Provisional Executive Committee of the Council of People's Commissars to act as an emergency organ of state power in order to ensure complete continuity of work. It met under Lenin's chairmanship until the early hours of the morning. Its first act was to issue an Appeal "To the Working Population of Russia" about the situation in the country following the invasion of Soviet Russia by German troops. It called on the people to rise in defence of the revolutionary gains of October.

On February 21, the Council of People's Commissars issued an Appeal, "The Socialist Motherland Is in Danger!", which had been written by Lenin. "In order to save this exhausted and ravaged country from new ordeals of war we decided to make a very great sacrifice and informed the Germans of our readiness to sign their terms of peace... (1) *The country's entire manpower and resources are placed entirely at the service of revolutionary defence.* (2) *All Soviets and revolutionary organisations are ordered to defend every position to the last drop of blood.*"

The workers responded to Lenin's appeal by joining the ranks of the Red Army in great numbers. In bitter battles at Pskov, Revel (Tallinn) and Narva the German forces suffered a defeat. The Red Army of the Soviet Republic was being born in battle.

In the early hours of February 23, the German command replied to the Soviet Government's message of February 19. It presented even harsher terms for peace. Germany now claimed the whole of Latvia and Estonia, and insisted on



recognition of the treaty between the bourgeois Ukrainian Central Rada and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance whereby the Ukraine became in effect a German colony. Kars, Ardahan and Batum were to be cut off from Russia. Soviet Russia was to demobilise her army and sign extremely unfavourable economic agreements with Germany.

On February 23, addressing a meeting of the Party Central Committee which discussed the new German ultimatum, Lenin categorically called for immediate acceptance of the German peace terms. "...The policy of the revolutionary phrase is over," Lenin said, adding that if that policy was continued he would resign from the Government and from the Central Committee. A revolutionary war required an army, but there was none. That meant the terms had to be accepted.

On that day *Pravda* printed a brief report on Lenin's speech at the meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee quoting his words: "...The terms put to us by the representatives of German imperialism are unprecedentedly severe, immeasurably oppressive, predatory terms. The German imperialists, taking advantage of the weakness of Russia, have their knee on our chest. Not to conceal from you the bitter truth of which I am deeply convinced, the situation being what it is, I must tell you that we have no other way out than to subscribe to these terms. And that any other proposal means to incur, either voluntarily or involuntarily, still worse evils and further... complete subjection of the Soviet Republic, its enslavement to German imperialism."

A session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee devoted to the question of signing a peace treaty with Germany opened on February

24 at 3 a.m. Lenin made a report on the German peace terms. The Committee endorsed the resolution submitted by the Bolsheviks on accepting the terms.

From March 1 to 3, 1918, the peace talks went into their third phase. The Soviet delegation included G. V. Chicherin, G. I. Petrovsky, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, L. M. Karakhan as secretary, A. A. Ioffe as political consultant, Rear-Admiral V. M. Altfater as military consultant and others.

On March 3, the Soviet delegation signed the treaty without discussing it, so as to emphasise the forcible and rapacious nature of the peace. In his article, *An Unfortunate Peace*, Lenin wrote: "It is incredibly, unprecedentedly hard to sign an unfortunate, immeasurably severe, infinitely humiliating peace when the strong has the weak by the throat."

From March 6 to 8, the Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the Party was held in Petrograd.

As expected, a bitter debate ensued at the Congress between the "Left" Communists and Lenin and his supporters. It reflected two fundamentally differing views on the question of peace. It was a dispute not only over whether or not to ratify the Brest Treaty but also over the cardinal principles of Soviet foreign policy: whether it was to be based on a struggle for peace and for the establishment of business ties with capitalist states or a desire to unleash military conflicts, whether peaceful agreements and compromises with capitalist states were possible, etc.

On March 7, at the second meeting of the Congress, Lenin delivered the political report of the Central Committee. He made a deep-going analysis of the international and internal situation, discussed the alignment of class forces, and

described the problems facing the Party and the country in building socialism.

The debate following Lenin's report to the Congress developed into an acute inner-Party struggle. How tense the atmosphere at the Congress was can be judged by the fact that Lenin had to take the floor 17 times. D. Kondakov and S. Perstova who attended the Congress thus described the situation:

"We who attended the Congress remember full well the very heated and tense atmosphere that could be felt in those days at the Taurida Palace. The tension was generated by the 'Left' Communists. Bukharin, Ryazanov and other advocates of a 'revolutionary war' would constantly make remarks and jump up from their seats. Sometimes they would even leave the meetings to discuss their factionalist affairs. Many of their speeches were reminiscent of hysteria... We representatives of the provinces would listen with bated breath to the passionate and well argumented speeches of Vladimir Ilyich against the 'Left' Communists and their leaders, against Bukharin."

Having approved the report of the Central Committee, the Congress adopted a resolution on war and peace which endorsed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

From March 14 to 16, the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Soviets met in Moscow. On the opening day Lenin delivered a report and on March 15 made a concluding statement on the ratification of the peace treaty. The Congress endorsed the policy of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the question of war and peace. On March 15 the Congress adopted Lenin's resolution on the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.

By March 15, 1918, the Soviet Republic was 129 days old.

This was how, in a highly complex international situation, the Soviet state pulled out of the imperialist war by signing the Brest Peace Treaty. The attempt by world reaction to crush the Soviet Republic with the armed might of German imperialism failed. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty was the first of the diplomatic acts that summed up the events of the four years of war. The war that had been started by the imperialists to redivide spheres of influence resulted in a different division of the world—and one they could never have foreseen. Now Soviet Russia existed alongside the capitalist countries. Emerging from the war, the Soviet Republic gained the first peaceful respite it needed to strengthen its positions and develop the socialist revolution further.

The Brest Peace Treaty is one of the numerous examples of the correctness of Lenin's theory and the flexibility of his tactics. Lenin regarded the Brest Peace Treaty as an example of sensible political compromise between a socialist state and capitalist countries arrived at in the interests of peace and socialism. "It was indeed," he wrote, "a compromise with the imperialists, but it was a compromise which, under the circumstances, *had to be made.*"

The Brest-Litovsk Conference was the first international forum where a Soviet delegation demonstrated for the first time the new principles of socialist foreign policy.

In the time that passed between the October Revolution and the Brest Peace Treaty Lenin varied the forms and methods of the struggle for peace in conformity with the changing situation and the alignment of class forces both inside the country and on an international scale. The plans

of the struggle for peace changed with the changing situation. From an appeal for a general democratic peace to a separate treaty with the countries of the Austro-German bloc and the struggle to gain a breathing spell—such were the three principal slogans with which Lenin led Soviet Russia out of the imperialist war. The first attempts of international counter-revolution to destroy Soviet rule were beaten back. The peace policy won an important victory.

Lenin and the People's  
Commissariat for  
Foreign Affairs

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Having laid down the fundamental principles of the Soviet state's foreign policy, Lenin took an active personal interest in establishing the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. A diplomatic apparatus was essential to deal with the new foreign policy problems facing the country and to uphold and protect the interests of the workers' and peasants' state.

It proved to be no easy task to take over the apparatus of the old tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to reorganise it from top to bottom and make it serve the new Government of the working people.

Foreign policy problems were always uppermost in Lenin's mind. Lenin realised that the problem was not simply to rename a government agency—it required an entirely new diplomacy. He mentioned it in a letter to the Soviet envoy in Berlin, A. A. Ioffe, and the Con-

sul-General, V. R. Menzhinsky, on May 24, 1918: "To correct the old (and to create a new) diplomacy is a difficult thing. *Festina lente.*"

Hasten slowly! Lenin was reminding Soviet diplomats that a great task should not be tackled with too much haste; it required a good knowledge of the situation, an ability to analyse it and see the historical perspective. The present and the future must be gauged not through superficial phenomena, but through factors that really determine the situation. A study of Lenin's letters, notes or comments on various foreign policy documents which Lenin received from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, or from Soviet missions abroad, Lenin's meetings with Chicherin, and telephone conversations, described in reminiscences by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin, and People's Commissar for Foreign Trade L. B. Krasin (such meetings and telephone conversations occurred several times a day), prompt the conclusion that politically speaking the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was in fact headed by Lenin. Not a single foreign policy act, not a single important—or even minor—measure bypassed Lenin. There was hardly another government department, except the People's Commissariat for Food, to which Lenin devoted so much attention.

The problems involved in creating a Soviet diplomatic apparatus lay not only in selecting dedicated and adequately trained experts for the diplomatic service but also in devising sound methods of implementing the new foreign policy principles, in finding the correct forms of relations with other states and in determining the place of the diplomatic agency within the Soviet Government.

The foreign policy apparatus of the Soviet state was built upon the principle of the "...flexible amalgamation of a Soviet institution with a Party institution" which became, by Lenin's definition, "a source of great strength in our politics."

In several of his works, in letters and notes to Soviet diplomats, particularly to Chicherin, Krasin and Vorovsky, in his conversations with them, in the drafts of notes to foreign states, in decrees, and in speeches at congresses, Central Committee plenary meetings, at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council for Labour and Defence Lenin expounded the scientific principles which formed the basis for the determination of new relationships between the Soviet state and capitalist countries. He stressed the new qualities and features which a diplomat of the socialist society should possess. In the Decree on the Institution of a Workers' and Peasants' Government, the Council of People's Commissars, which was adopted on October 26 by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Lenin envisaged the establishment of a commission "for foreign affairs" along with 13 other commissions for "the management of individual branches of state activity."

On November 9, 1917, the Foreign Affairs Commission was renamed People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

The actual process of organising the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was a fairly difficult and complex one for the Soviet state. No other former tsarist ministry was so packed with noblemen and aristocrats as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The staff of 550 included 32 princes, 39 barons and many other aristocrats.

Utterly alien to the people, they assumed a hostile posture towards the Soviet regime and refused to cooperate.



Information about the first days in the life of the new People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs\* is available in documents and the recollections of eye-witnesses. For three days after the October Revolution no one interrupted the stately life of the former tsarist ministry which was housed in Petrograd at 6 Dvortsovaya Street (near the Pevchii Bridge). Its employees still kept their usual hours. On the fourth day the news that some Bolsheviks had entered the premises of the ministry "struck like a thunderbolt," recalled a former ministry courier, Makhotin. "There was complete confusion. Counsellors of state, officials with court titles: Gentlemen in Attendance, Gentlemen of the Emperor's Bed-Chamber and other officials; the service staff: couriers, janitors, sweepers, the kitchen staff and the rest—the whole crowd surged into the hall and stood there spellbound." Among them were two Assistant Foreign Ministers, Neratov and Petriayev. They had stopped at the entrance to the hall and by their whole demeanour sought to display their complete indifference to all that was going on, as if to intimate that authorities come and go but ministries remain.

The Soviet representatives explained the principles which were henceforth to govern Russian foreign policy. The response was a far from diplomatic hooting. The officials were plainly bent on making a scene. Quietly but firmly they were told: "Those who are with us step to the left: those who are against us to the right."

\* On December 13, 1936, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was renamed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. A law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 15, 1946 gave all the People's Commissariats of the USSR the title of Ministries. Since that time the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has been called Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Seeing that this was no laughing matter the officials asked for time to think things over and went into a neighbouring hall. The time dragged on. Finally it transpired that none of the officials "would serve the new regime." They all took a stand of "unequivocal and overt opposition." The Soviet representatives left.

Several days later I. A. Zalkind who had been appointed to assist M. S. Uritsky, the chairman of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), was detailed to discharge the saboteurs and take over the old ministry.

"To be on the safe side I took along arrest warrants signed by Comrade Uritsky and together with Polivanov \* I arrived at the Ministry at the appointed hour," Zalkind recalls.

"To my amazement I found the building ablaze with lights, and when we ascended to the top floor our eyes beheld a spectacle reminiscent of something like a gala reception: the big hall was filled with officials and dignitaries. All those we had summoned were there—and many others besides whom we had not invited at all. The Ministry was out in full. Polivanov introduced me to Assistant Minister Petriayev who, in turn, gave me the names of a great many chiefs and heads of various departments and sections. I made a brief speech, pointing out that I had come on behalf of the Workers' and Peasants' Government to finally ascertain the attitude of the Ministry officials to their duties. I said that this was a time of war and that the functions of the Ministry were in a category that in the interests of the country brooked not a moment's interruption.

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\* Polivanov had served in the Ministry's Asian department and later offered his services to the Soviet Government.

“After my remarks a leading group of officials headed by Petriayev held a whispered discussion after which the latter made a statement to the effect that their decision in principle remained unchanged: they could not serve the present government.”

At the same time, seeking to hinder the normalisation of work in the former Foreign Ministry, they declared their readiness to “guard” the premises and to carry out certain routine functions (questions relating to prisoners of war, consular affairs and the transfer of money abroad).

Seeing, however, that the representatives of the Soviet government were firmly resolved to take foreign policy matters into their own hands, the officials of all Foreign Ministry departments stopped working and announced a boycott of the new regime. “Only the couriers and the service staff immediately and quite definitely told us of their willingness to serve the new government.”

But the enemies of the revolution miscalculated. The new regime resolutely began to get rid of the old state apparatus. The heads of the Foreign Ministry departments and sections were requested to hand over the keys to the archives, the safes containing the codes and the storages of official papers. Detachments of workers, Red Army men and Baltic sailors were assigned to guard the premises. The saboteurs who refused to recognise the Soviet Government were dismissed by a special order of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. “Such employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who fail to present themselves for work by the morning of December 13,” the order declared, “shall be regarded as having been dismissed with deprivation of the

right to a state pension and all privileges of military service."

On November 14, the Military Revolutionary Committee passed a decision to arrest the strike committee which had been supervising the actions of the former Foreign Ministry officials. The tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs ceased to exist.

α! At first Trotsky was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. But he displayed a scornful attitude to the job never believing it to be a serious business. He once remarked: "But we are not going to have any diplomatic work, are we? I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations, and then shut up shop." As was to be expected, he did not hold the post for long. Quite rightly therefore it is Georgi V. Chicherin who is regarded by the Soviet people as the first People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Republic. He headed the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for 12 years running, from May 30, 1918, and in those 12 years he added more than one brilliant page to the history of Leninist diplomacy.

Lenin attached particular importance to picking the right people to serve in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. His numerous letters as well as the recollections of diplomats attest to Lenin's personal participation in selecting personnel for the Commissariat. He familiarised himself with the qualifications of nominees, frequently naming candidates not only for the top echelon of the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, but also for lesser jobs.

Well known, for example, is the recommendation Lenin gave an old Party member, N. A. Yemelyanov, for a tour of duty abroad: "I believe it to be very, very important to draw him

more closely into the affairs of the Foreign Trade Commissariat, as there is a shortage of experienced Party men among the foreign-based employees of the Foreign Trade Commissariat. . .”

On January 21, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars authorised Chicherin to organise the foreign service of the Soviet Republic and turn it into an active instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Called in to serve in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs along with veteran Bolsheviks who had been active in the international working-class movement and who possessed considerable political experience and a knowledge of foreign languages, were workers and sailors who, apart from their revolutionary enthusiasm, were totally unfamiliar with diplomacy. None of them had ever drafted a diplomatic note, or knew a foreign language, or were versed in the niceties of diplomatic customs. Soviet diplomats therefore had to be infected with a love for their profession, to be persuaded to study and to be brought to realise that diplomacy was frequently stronger than guns, that diplomacy was essential for the Soviet state and that it was necessary to raise the political and moral prestige of the new Russia. The Communists, workers and sailors alike, justified the trust in them. N. G. Markin, a sailor, was the driving force behind the publication of secret documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments. Between December 1917 and January 1918 a group of translators selected by Markin translated into Russian and published over 100 diplomatic documents. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs printed a *Collection of Documents from the Archives of the Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs* which consisted of nine separate volumes. The publication of these secret documents was a serious blow at imperialist diplomacy,

exposing it to the world and showing up its role in preparing and unleashing the imperialist war.

By mid-December 1917, the general structure of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had been determined and the first departments established. These comprised a department of relations with Western countries and a department of relations with Eastern countries (with special desks for the Far East and the Moslem press), as well as special departments dealing with visas, economic affairs, legal matters, prisoner-of-war questions, money loans, and translations from the press, a general management department, a secretariat and several other offices. At that time the staff of the Commissariat numbered 126 people.

Lenin's personal participation in organising the work of the new Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is evident, in particular, from the minutes of the Meeting on the Organisation of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Russian Missions Abroad.

The meeting was held on June 30, 1918 and was attended by Lenin, Chicherin, Vorovsky and Radek. "The conference reached the following conclusions as regards the internal structure of the Commissariat. (a) An administrative manager of the entire Commissariat is required whose functions shall be: (1) distribution of incoming material among the departments, (2) supervision of technical staff and affairs, and (3) responsibility for liaison with other government offices.

"(b) Heads of departments shall deal with their sphere of daily matters arising in connection with developments concerning the object of their work; they shall keep the People's Commissar abreast of affairs relating to the situation

in countries assigned to be kept under their observation, providing him with continuous synopses from the press and literature of the country concerned. They shall enter into negotiations with representatives of foreign countries insofar as the People's Commissar himself may not deem it necessary to conduct such negotiations personally.

"The People's Commissar shall, in turn, keep the heads of departments informed of the general policy line and, pending a decision on questions pertaining to a country with which a department's work is concerned, shall call upon the department heads for information and consultations."

In 1918, the staff of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was substantially increased.

Its structure at that time was as follows:

1. Office of the People's Commissar;

2. Office of the Assistant Commissar for Western Affairs with a separate section for prisoner-of-war affairs. The office comprised eight desks: (1) Finland, Sweden, Norway; (2) Germany; (3) Austria; (4) Poland and the Ukraine; (5) Great Britain and Holland; (6) France and Belgium; (7) Italy, Spain and Portugal; (8) Switzerland, Luxemburg and Monaco.

3. Office of the Assistant Commissar for Eastern Affairs with eight separate desks: (1) Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece; (2) Turkey, Egypt, Abyssinia, Palestine, African and Moslem lands; (3) Persia, Armenia, Kurdistan; (4) Bukhara, Afghanistan, India, Tibet; (5) China, Mongolia, Manchuria; (6) Japan, Korea; (7) South Sea colonies, African colonies, Australia, the Philippines and the Straits; (8) America.

The following other departments were also established: (1) a legal department with desks

for administrative, legislative, international law, civil, exterritorial and jurisconsult affairs; (2) a personnel and general management department; (3) a money transfer and loan department; (4) a visa department; (5) a press bureau; (6) a department of foreign political literature; (7) a coding department; (8) a department of oriental language translations. The Foreign Commissariat also incorporated the Commission for Rumanian Affairs, the Inter-Departmental Commission for Implementation of the Peace Treaty, the archives (in Petrograd and Moscow) and the Academy. For some time the Petrograd office was also a part of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

By 1919, the intervention and blockade resulted in Soviet Russia's growing international isolation; so the scale of Soviet state's diplomatic activity fell off. Naturally, the staff of the Foreign Commissariat had to be considerably reduced.

A role of decisive importance was played in the work of the Foreign Commissariat by its Collegium. In April 1919, Chicherin described the functions of the Collegium as follows: "The close-knit Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs consists of a small group of people who actually carry out the duties of the Commissariat, and act as the business executive body to handle the current work. For a long time it used to meet daily. Now it meets three times a week, but can at any time easily be convened for an emergency meeting. It conducts the collective work of the Commissariat. Its close-knit, businesslike composition is essential for its successful functioning; experience has shown the usefulness of this type of Collegium."

The Soviet diplomacy made headway in 1920 and 1921. By January 1, 1921, Soviet Russia had



eight permanent diplomatic missions and special missions abroad. By 1922, the number of plenipotentiary missions rose to seventeen.

On November 12, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved the new Rules of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This document took fully into account Lenin's advice and instructions regarding the features and prospects for the development of Soviet diplomacy. The Rules of the Foreign Commissariat consisted of six chapters which lucidly defined the tasks involved in conducting the diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union and its constituent Republics with other states. Chapters three and four specified the structure, rights and responsibilities of the Commissariat's departments: "The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR," Chapter Three stated, "consists of: (a) the People's Commissar and a Collegium under him; (b) a Secretariat; (c) a General Management Division; (d) a Western Department; (e) an Eastern Department; (f) a Department of Economic and Legal Affairs; (g) a Press Department."

Chapter Six dealt with the procedure for the appointment and recall of Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad. Soviet plenipotentiary representatives accredited to foreign governments "are appointed and recalled by a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR." Heads of missions, delegations and special missions not vested with the rights of plenipotentiary representatives are appointed and recalled by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was authorised to appoint: (a) *chargés d'affaires* to deputise for plenipotentiary repre-

sentatives in their absence or after their recall and pending the appointment of a new plenipotentiary representative; (b) representatives of Soviet delegations, international mixed commissions established pursuant to treaties entered into by the USSR; (c) agents, counsellors, secretaries and attachés of plenipotentiary missions or other diplomatic missions and delegations, as well as members of international mixed commissions established pursuant to treaties entered into by the USSR.

Subsequently, with the expansion of the Soviet Union's international cooperation with other countries, the scale of activities and the structure of the Foreign Commissariat underwent changes and improvements.

## Soviet Diplomatic Missions Abroad

The establishment of diplomatic missions abroad was a far more difficult task than organising a foreign policy department at home. Capitalist states stubbornly refused to recognise the Soviet state. They did not believe in the stability of the Soviet regime and did their utmost to obstruct the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the newly emergent Soviet Republic. The old diplomatic machinery which had served the tsarist and the provisional governments could not pursue the revolutionary foreign policy of the workers' and peasants' state. The Soviet Government had to set up its diplomatic missions abroad starting from scratch. It was necessary, first of all, to ascertain whether the personnel of Russian embassies abroad agreed to conduct the "foreign policy prescribed by the Congress of Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers'

Deputies and by the Congress of Peasants' Deputies and reflected in measures aimed at the prompt conclusion of peace."

Those diplomats who refused to conduct the Soviet policy were ordered "immediately to vacate their posts and turn over their duties to junior employees, regardless of the post they had held since they refuse to obey the Soviet Government."

Most of the Russian diplomatic representatives abroad refused to serve the Soviet Government, with the exception of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal, Ungern-Sternberg, and the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Spain, Yu. Ya. Solovyov. But their telegrams expressing willingness to serve the new government were held up by foreign states and they were subjected to attacks and persecution.

On December 9, 1917, an "Order of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs" announced the dismissal of ambassadors, ministers and members of embassies, who refused "to work under the leadership of the Soviet Government on the basis of the platform adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress."

In the following months the Soviet Government made several requests to the governments of various countries to deprive diplomatic representatives of old Russia of their rights and privileges. However, the capitalist states ignored the Soviet Government's requests and continued their official relations with the tsarist ambassadors. Some of them maintained these relations for many years after the October Revolution. The United States, for instance, maintained ties with Bakhmetyev, the Ambassador of the Provisional Government, until 1922, and Yugoslavia did so until 1940. For some time France maintained "official" relations with Maklakov,

the Ambassador of the Provisional Government, whom the Soviet Government had divested of all rights on November 30, 1917.

One of the first decrees of the Soviet Government with regard to organising the diplomatic service abroad was issued by the Council of People's Commissars and signed by Lenin and Chicherin on May 22, 1918. It was entitled "Abolition of the Ranks of Diplomatic Representatives and the Naming of Such Plenipotentiary Representatives of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic."

Of signal importance in organising and formulating the functions of Soviet mission abroad was paragraph two of the Protocol of the Meeting on the Organisation of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Russian Missions Abroad, which was adopted at the above-mentioned conference in Lenin's presence on June 30, 1918 and was entitled "Foreign Missions of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs." The Minutes stated: "(a) On questions of state importance our foreign missions shall tender requests for directives from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs prior to taking any decision binding upon the Soviet Republic. Departures from this rule are possible only if the postponement of a decision is fraught with grave danger. In such extreme cases our representative's unauthorised decision is admissible, but on his personal political responsibility to the government; (b) The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs shall keep our foreign missions supplied with all necessary printed matter giving information on the government's domestic and foreign policy, draft memoranda for them on all important current issues, send them circular telegrams and reports and thereby direct their activities; (c) Contacts between for-

eign missions of the Soviet Republic and other departments of the Republic shall be maintained through the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; (d) The foreign missions of the Republic shall establish their own information divisions which shall regularly provide the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with the leading press organs of the country concerned, with magazine and book material necessary for information purposes, and supply a daily summary of facts clarifying the internal situation in the country concerned and the international situation."

On October 18, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars passed a decree instituting Consulates. The decree envisaged the establishment of Consulates in countries with which the RSFSR and its citizens maintained business relationships. The Foreign Commissariat was granted the right to have one person attend to both consular and general diplomatic functions and to invest Consulates and Consuls with duties relating to protection of the economic, legal and social interests of individual citizens of the Russian Republic or their associations (organisations).

The first Soviet diplomatic representatives were V. V. Vorovsky and M. M. Litvinov. A decision to appoint Vorovsky Soviet Plenipotentiary representative in Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) was taken on November 10, 1917. There was no communication with Petrograd, so Vorovsky, at that time in Stockholm, knew nothing about his appointment. "Rumour has spread through Stockholm that I am the Red Ambassador, but officially I know nothing about it," Vorovsky told Frederick Ström, a Left-wing Social Democrat and Swedish Rikstag deputy. Soon afterwards Vorovsky received, through a diplomatic courier, the official document appointing him Pleni-

potentiary Representative of the Foreign Commissariat in the Scandinavian countries.

The Soviet Government did its utmost to facilitate the functioning of the first diplomatic representatives abroad in the complex international situation. "The Organisational Bureau of the Central Committee," wrote Chicherin, "gave us many men for our foreign missions." After the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty a Soviet plenipotentiary mission was established in Germany headed by A. A. Ioffe, and a Consulate General was set up in Berlin under V. R. Menzhinsky. On April 5, 1918 a mission was set up in Switzerland headed by Ambassador Ya. A. Berzin. Ya. Z. Surits operated in Denmark under the direction of Vorovsky. In the summer of 1918 Soviet envoy I. O. Kolomiytsev was sent to Iran and Bravin to Afghanistan.

Though hounded by the British intelligence service Kolomiytsev was very active in Iran. But soon the Soviet mission was raided. Kolomiytsev managed to escape. In July Kolomiytsev, bearing Letters of Credence from the Soviet Government, led another special mission to Iran. However, on his way to Teheran he was seized by British interventionists and Russian White Guards and brutally murdered. He was one of the first envoys of the Soviet Republic to lose his life in carrying out a diplomatic assignment.

In London Litvinov organised a "Russian People's Embassy." He was never officially recognised by the British Government as an Ambassador, though the authorities did maintain de facto relations with him.

In November 1918, there were a series of provocations against the Soviet mission in Berlin. Soviet diplomats were falsely accused of bringing political literature into Germany for propaganda purposes and expelled from that country. The

Government of Switzerland also broke off relations with the Soviet Government. A month later the Swedish Government recalled its embassy from Moscow and requested Vorovsky to leave Sweden. Soviet diplomacy found the doors to the outside world closed in its face. With the stepping up of foreign intervention in Soviet Russia diplomatic relations were ruptured with almost all countries. The only state with which the RSFSR maintained diplomatic relations during the period of intervention and blockade was Afghanistan.

In 1919, the Soviet Government took steps to establish a mission in the United States of America. In January, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs appointed L. K. Martens Soviet envoy to the United States. On March 19 Martens handed over to the US Secretary of State an official certificate of his appointment together with a memorandum in which the Soviet Government proposed the establishment of friendly relations with the United States. The US Government ignored Martens and took hostile action against him. In view of this Martens was forced to leave the United States. On December 24, 1920 the Foreign Commissariat sent a cable to the American Government emphasising that Martens had made sincere efforts to establish trade relations with the American bourgeoisie, and to bring about the restoration of political relations with the United States and the recognition of Soviet Russia by the US Government.

From 1918 to 1921, there was a Soviet Consulate in Australia. It was headed by Pyotr Simonov, a Russian revolutionary émigré. In several countries the Soviet Government appointed local citizens to carry out consular functions. In Britain, for instance, the noted trade unionist,

John McLean, was appointed Honorary Consul of Soviet Russia in Glasgow. In Stockholm F. Ström performed the same duties. In the first months after the revolution the Soviet Government invested John Reed with the duties of Honorary Consul in the United States.

However, the Soviet Consulate was unable to function because of US Government opposition.

In 1921, the Russian Republic had 30 Consulates in European and Asian countries.

To improve the functioning of consular agencies on April 6, 1921 the Foreign Commissariat issued special instructions for Consuls. The "Instructions for Consuls" differed greatly from the consular statutes of all bourgeois states. They obliged all Soviet Consuls to obey the laws of the country concerned, not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and to protect the interests of Soviet citizens and organisations.

On May 26, 1921, the Council of People's Commissars issued special regulations on Soviet missions abroad. The document stipulated that the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR was the sole resident Soviet representative who was entitled to conduct political intercourse on behalf of his government with the government of the foreign state to which he was accredited. No longer were these functions entrusted to Soviet Consuls. According to the regulations all representatives of other Soviet agencies and bodies residing in the territory of the country concerned were administratively subordinated to the plenipotentiary representative.

Thus, surmounting great obstacles, the Communist Party headed by Lenin gradually established the diplomatic machinery of the first socialist state which was soon destined not only to take an important place in the Soviet state ap-



paratus but also to find correct forms of relationships with the other countries.

On more than one occasion Lenin spoke highly of the work done by the Foreign Commissariat and its staff: "...This apparatus," he wrote, "is an exceptional component of our state apparatus. We have not admitted a single influential person from the old tsarist apparatus. All sections with any authority are composed of Communists. That is why it has already won for itself (this may be said boldly) the name of a reliable Communist apparatus purged to an incomparably greater extent of the old tsarist bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements than that which we have had to make do with in other People's Commissariats."

### Education of Diplomats of the Leninist School

Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to the education and training of Soviet diplomats. "...politics is a science and an art," he wrote, "that does not fall from the skies or come gratis, and, if it wants to overcome the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must train its *own* proletarian 'class politicians,' of a kind in no way inferior to bourgeois politicians."

Lenin frequently met with Soviet diplomats before their departure abroad or after their return. He would discuss with them in detail foreign policy tasks, counsel them as to their behaviour in the country concerned, and call upon them to master the science of diplomacy.

His advice to Soviet diplomats was that they should always study, that in all circumstances they should find time to increase their know-

ledge, to train themselves always to be self-controlled and perspicacious, and to know how to approach matters from state and class positions. Dedication to communist principles and convictions were another quality which Lenin regarded as a must for all diplomats.

Conversations with Lenin helped diplomats master the intricacies of the international situation and gain a clearer view of the current tasks. The importance of such conversations has been repeatedly emphasised by G. Y. Chicherin, V. V. Vorovsky, L. B. Krasin, L. K. Martens, S. I. Aralov, and many other diplomats. On June 8, 1918, Vorovsky returned from Sweden to Moscow where he was received by Lenin on the same day. With the impressions of the meeting still fresh in his memory, Vorovsky wrote to his wife in Stockholm: "I spoke with Vladimir Ilyich on Saturday and came out with a very good impression. A completely clear and calm view of events, a sober and unembellished appraisal of all negative phenomena, a great will to overcome them and a conviction that it is already proving possible to create something positive."

A conversation with Lenin made an equally strong impression on Martens, who met Lenin on February 18, 1921.

Personal contacts with Lenin and collaboration with him were highly instrumental in generating the new qualities and the new style of work of Soviet diplomats. They always recalled Lenin with great warmth. "Vladimir Ilyich was a teacher in the full sense of the word," Chicherin said. "Association with him was truly educational. He taught through the force of his example, his instructions, his guidance, and his entire personality." From Lenin diplomats learned "unexampled political realism" and the skill of

combining flexibility with firmness in diplomacy. They admired his "inimitable mastery of conducting policy."

Lenin could not stand bragging. On April 2, 1921, at a very critical time for the Soviet national economy, Lenin advised the chairman of Azneft in Baku, the noted Soviet oil expert A. P. Serebrovsky, to persuade the comrades in Baku to take a correct view of concessions. Lenin wrote that a situation might arise when it would become necessary to give up "a quarter (perhaps even one-half) of Baku to concessionaires (in return for aid from abroad in food and equipment over and above the quantities necessary for the concessionaire). Only then would there be a hope of overtaking (and later even outstripping) modern advanced capitalism on the remaining three-quarters (or half). Any other view boils down to the most harmful attitudes, like 'we can win hands down' or 'we can do it ourselves' and other such nonsense which is all the more dangerous when it is decked out in 'purely communist' attire.

"If you still have in Baku some traces—even the slightest—of these most harmful views and prejudices (among the workers and the intelligentsia), write to me immediately: do you undertake to overcome these prejudices fully by yourself and to ensure the most loyal implementation of the Congress decision (in favour of concessions) or is my help required. Remember once and for all and let others remember: concessions are highly desirable. Nothing is more harmful or detrimental for communism than communist bragging—'we can do it ourselves.'"

Lenin taught Soviet diplomats political realism, in other words, the skill of taking into account the specific situation and of deeply analysing events. He demanded that Soviet foreign

policy methods be viable and flexible, and based on a profound understanding of the international situation and the country's tasks. Lenin patiently taught Soviet diplomats and trade representatives abroad the skill of conducting trade with foreign states. In this question Lenin delved into the minutest details. In 1920, when talks were going on in London with the British Government about the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet trade and political agreement and recognition of the Soviet Government, Lenin closely followed the progress of the talks, analysed them and reached the conclusion that "with England it is *only* a matter of trade." And he immediately wrote to Kamenev and Chicherin: "*Only* a 'merchant' must be sent to England: if they give you something for two and a quarter copecks, bargain for one and three-quarters." At the same time Lenin counselled firmness. A day earlier he wrote to the members of the Political Bureau: "I propose giving Krasin and the entire delegation the directive: 'Be firmer and do not fear a temporary suspension of the talks.'"

On the basis of his association with Lenin, Chicherin characterised Soviet diplomacy as follows in a letter to a Soviet representative: "Diplomacy must consist not in giving kind replies to kind overtures, not in throwing someone down the stairs in the absence of kind overtures or in sitting motionless in the chair if the other side is motionless. Diplomacy must utilise a million diverse means, but it must go forward, not mark time. It must be active, not simply note what the other side is doing. Diplomacy must not proceed from the assumption that everyone is going to throw himself into our embrace. Diplomacy must actively prepare the desires of others to move closer to us. To this end it must use every opportunity, and let none of them pass..."

One example of Lenin's diplomatic skill is his letter to Chicherin of June 22, 1920 about the Curzon note of June 11, 1920 whereby Britain attempted to frustrate the Soviet military offensive against the White Poles. In his letter Lenin counsels: "Curzon to be replied to *in two days* (not earlier; why spoil them)... The reply to be extra polite on the following lines: if *Britain* (+France+?+?) wants a general, i.e., a *real* peace, *we* have long been *for it*. In that case *remove Wrangel*, since he is *your man*, kept by you, and then we begin negotiations at once.

"If Poland wants peace, we are *for it*; we've said it clearly and we repeat it, let her make an offer.

"If you interrupt *trade* negotiations, we are very sorry, but you expose *yourselves* as departing from the truth, because you began these negotiations *during* Poland's war and *promised an armistice*. Calmly and precisely expose their contradictions.

"The draft reply to be approved by telephone through the members of the Political Bureau on Friday or Saturday, July 23 or 24."

This letter shows that Lenin demanded that decisions on important political matters be taken collectively in the Central Committee or in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Concern for the education of diplomats is evident in all the instructions issued by Lenin and the leaders of the Foreign Commissariat regarding their behaviour and their everyday life.

They emphasised that the modesty and the simple way of life of Russian representatives must conform to the nature of our system and our state which is a state of workers and peasants. Each little detail in the way of life of our representatives abroad shows that responsible

Soviet officials are simply people who carry out more important functions, and in no way a privileged class enjoying the good things of life that are inaccessible to others. Plenipotentiary representatives of the Soviet Republic had no time for formal wear in the first difficult years after the revolution. In sailors' pea-jackets and soldiers' shirts, bearing a mandate that did not always spell safety, they blazed new trails for Soviet diplomacy. Soviet diplomacy was opposed first and foremost by British diplomacy which is too flexible and adaptable, then by French diplomacy. Britain, Chicherin wrote, is world politics. France is continental politics. Britain is the cream of capitalist society, the upper crust of capitalist society with the broadest outlook and far-reaching perspectives, rich in diplomatic experience and in all manner of political subtleties in the conduct of foreign policy. The Soviet diplomats did not retreat when faced with difficulties. They were guided by Lenin's advice that to achieve the objectives of Soviet diplomacy regular contacts are needed. Without contacts it is impossible to obtain information about a country's politics. Therefore a diplomat must not lock himself within the walls of his office, he must seek greater contact with diverse foreign official and semi-official persons. It requires extensive ties to analyse opposing points of view and, in comparing them, to draw correct conclusions. This is a must for diplomacy if it wants to remain the fine art of political action, not an occupation for pipe dreamers. It is indispensable, without it all is futile.

Lenin warned diplomats against the danger of restricting their attention to one question without considering the situation as a whole.

He taught Soviet diplomats to be cautious and firm. Girding for battle against us, he pointed

out, are the most refined representatives of a statecraft which has developed throughout many generations, but communist diplomacy responds to these attempts with unshakable vigilance and firmness.

Lenin advised the staff of the Foreign Commissariat to make their notes easily readable so that common people could read them and understand the foreign policies of the socialist state, and know what their own government is doing in the international arena. In notes, Lenin demanded, the working masses must be told the truth about the real state of international affairs.

Thanks to the great concern displayed by Lenin and in spite of incredible adversities a Soviet school of diplomats was built up in a short space of time.

By the early 20s, when the Civil War was over and the interventionists expelled, new tasks faced the Soviet state apparatus, including the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In this period the Commissariat finally developed as a militant instrument of foreign policy.

Lenin's Leadership of  
Soviet Foreign Policy During  
the Foreign Armed  
Intervention and the Civil War

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Having signed the Brest Peace Treaty with Germany and its allies, Soviet Russia withdrew from the imperialist war and began peaceful construction. "However that may be," Lenin said, "we have extricated ourselves from the war. We are not saying that we have extricated ourselves without giving anything in return, without paying a price. But we managed to get out of the war. We gave the people a breathing space."

Lenin stressed the importance of this respite in the following way: "...after three years of war torment, every week of respite is a very great boon."

The conclusion of peace was a considerable achievement for Soviet foreign policy. "The Soviet Government," Chicherin wrote, "deliberat-



ely accepted the grim trials brought about by the Brest Treaty, fully aware that the workers' and peasants' revolution would be stronger than imperialism and that the breathing spell was the road to victory."

During the breathing spell the first phase of the struggle against the bourgeoisie—a period of the "Red Guard attack on capital"—proceeded successfully. The Soviet Government nationalised land, the banks, transport, and the bigger industrial enterprises. Coming to the fore as a top priority task was the systematic creation of conditions ensuring that the bourgeoisie, as a class, could never again appear.

However, the Soviet state was still encircled by hostile imperialist powers which were preparing to mount a military intervention against it. The exploiter classes of Russia were also putting up bitter resistance. The problems of socialist construction were complicated by the fact that the country's national economy had been severely undermined and wrecked by the First World War.

In these conditions Lenin displayed firmness, flexibility and circumspection in guiding the Party and the state. By that time the Soviet Government had moved to Moscow. This fact was announced on March 12, 1918 in a special broadcast by the Khodynka radio station: "Paris, London, Sofia, Berlin, New York, Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, Christiania, Stockholm, Helsingfors, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Geneva, Zurich, Tokyo, Peking, Madrid, Lisbon, Brussels, Belgrade. To all Soviets of Deputies. To one and all. The Government of the Federative Soviet Republic, the Council of People's Commissars, and the Supreme organ of power in the country, the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies,

have arrived in Moscow. They can be reached at the following address: The Kremlin, Moscow."

The foreign policy situation after the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty was exceedingly complex. Having emerged from the war Soviet Russia immediately found itself being pressed by the imperialist powers. Now it was the Anglo-French group of predators that hurled itself upon the young Soviet state. And again the war question came to the forefront as the principal and fundamental question of the revolution. To recall Marx's phrase, the bayonet took the place of diplomatic notes on the agenda.

In the critical situation that developed after Brest Lenin continued to take a most active part in deciding all matters of foreign policy. In his article, *Lenin and Foreign Policy*, Chicherin wrote: ". . . On my return from Brest I immediately had the closest contact with Vladimir Ilyich and until the very moment of the attempt on his life I worked in effect together with him. His inimitable political realism frequently saved us from errors."

After the Brest Peace, relations with Germany remained tense. German troops constantly violated the demarcation line. On Lenin's initiative, the Soviet Government invited the German Government to start new talks. They ended on August 27 with a supplementary agreement on economic matters and on the evacuation of Germans from occupied provinces. "Vladimir Ilyich carefully followed all the twists and turns of these negotiations, combining timely concessions with firmness in cases when a limit had to be put to the excessive demands of the other side," Chicherin recalled.

On July 6, two Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs), Blyumkin and Andreyev, assassinated the

German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Wilhelm Mirbach, so as to wreck the Brest Peace and provoke war with Germany. An exceedingly acute situation arose. On the same day Lenin together with Sverdlov called at the German Embassy and expressed condolences to the staff. He also sent a telegram to Plenipotentiary Representative A. A. Ioffe in Berlin. "At 2 p. m. today," the telegram read, "two unidentified persons made their way into the German Embassy with forged documents from the Extraordinary Commission and threw a bomb into the office of Count Mirbach. The Count died from severe wounds. The Government, whose representatives immediately called at the German Embassy and expressed their indignation at this act of political provocation, is taking every possible measure to find the assassins and bring them before an extraordinary revolutionary tribunal." Ioffe was instructed to call on the German Foreign Minister and Mirbach's family to express condolences.

On July 14, the German representative in Moscow, K. Riezler presented the Soviet Government with a demand that a battalion of German soldiers be allowed into Moscow to protect the German Embassy. He insisted on the promptest possible transportation of the troops to Moscow.

"At this moment," wrote Chicherin, "I had several lengthy conversations with Vladimir Ilyich. He quite rightly assessed the difficulties that an offensive against Moscow would pose for Germany..." and he considered it necessary to reject the demand.

On July 15, Lenin addressed a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (VTSIK) and categorically rejected the German Government's demand. Then he signed an appeal to the workers, peasants and Red Army men emphasising that the Soviet Government was scrupulously

standing by the terms of the Brest Peace Treaty. In the appeal Lenin resolutely warned the German Government that although the Soviet Government was fulfilling the severe terms of the treaty, "...there are limits beyond which even the most peace-loving masses of the working people will be compelled to rise, and will rise, as one man to defend their country with arms in hand."

Lenin profoundly analysed the situation in Germany and arrived at the conclusion that German imperialism was too weak to strike a blow at the Soviet state. "His instinct did not deceive him and the compromise achieved was in accordance with the assessment he had made in conversations with me," Chicherin recalled in his book, *The Great Leader*.

(1918)

The complications arising out of Mirbach's assassination were smoothed over and on July 28 the new German envoy, Helfferich, arrived in Moscow. In relations with Germany, Lenin and the Foreign Commissariat now focused their main attention on shaping and developing close economic relations to the advantage of both countries.

At the same time Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to the foreign diplomatic corps. He took a keen interest in all matters concerning relationships between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and foreign representatives. He regularly conferred with G. V. Chicherin and V. V. Vorovsky on subjects relating to the work of the Foreign Commissariat and the representatives of the RSFSR abroad.

After March 1918, the foreign diplomatic corps which had previously resided in Petrograd began a gradual exodus. Most of the Entente ambassadors moved to Vologda. Envoys of some neutral nations left for Finland or the Far East. Only a

few ambassadors stayed on in Petrograd. The Foreign Commissariat's relationships with ambassadors of the Entente powers had never been very cordial, and with the start of the intervention they grew increasingly strained. On July 19 the Soviet Government sent a telegram to all the embassies residing in Vologda inviting them to move to Moscow. The Entente diplomats declined the invitation. On July 22, they left for Arkhangelsk, and from there a week later they all moved to Kandalaksha. After the departure of the ambassadors and the arrest of Bruce Lockhart in September 1918 foreign missions and embassies began to move out of Russia en masse. The representatives of the United States were allowed to leave the territory of the Soviet Republic freely because of the special position taken at that time by the US Government towards the Soviet state. The representatives of other powers were permitted to leave only in exchange for Russian revolutionaries detained in the Entente countries. For instance, in exchange for the return to Russia from Britain of M. M. Litvinov and several others the Soviet authorities released the French and British diplomats. But the French military mission remained in Russia pending an exchange for Russian soldiers interned in France. Following the departure of foreign diplomats from Soviet Russia Soviet envoys abroad also began to return. A. A. Berzin came back from Switzerland, V. V. Vorovsky from Sweden, and so forth. In describing this side of Lenin's activities, Chicherin emphasised that "Vladimir Ilyich always, where necessary, applied flexibility to avoid needless complications. We convinced the Entente ambassadors who were sitting tight in Vologda of the need to leave, first suggesting that they move to Moscow which they refused to do. As a result, their departure from Russia came about in a pro-

per manner and this facilitated our future relations with their states.”

Lenin took a keen interest in the important question of the exchange of prisoners of war. After the Brest Peace the exchange of and assistance to prisoners of war was of great political significance. The question was debated on several occasions at meetings of the Party Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars with Lenin's participation. Thus, at a Soviet Government meeting on April 6, 1918 a draft decree was discussed on the establishment of a Supreme Council for Prisoner-of-War Affairs. On April 23 during a Government debate on the decree to institute a Central Collegium for Prisoner-of-War and Refugee Affairs, Lenin, stressing the importance of the question of prisoners of war, submitted an amendment: “The Central Collegium shall act as an independent agency within the Commissariat (of Internal Affairs) and be entitled to present reports to the Council of People's Commissars.”\*

After the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty the Soviet Government began devising plans for the development of commercial and economic relations with capitalist countries to ensure the supply of the means of production for the country's basic industries and agriculture. Considerable importance in this regard was attached to establishing economic ties with the United States.

On May 14, Lenin wrote a letter to Colonel Raymond Robins who then headed the US Red Cross mission in Russia. Lenin offered a prelimi-

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\* On April 23, 1918, Lenin signed a decree establishing the Central Collegium for Prisoner-of-War and Refugee Affairs.

nary plan for economic relations with the United States.\*

To develop trade it offered to ensure payment for the goods imported from the United States by concessions to be granted on certain conditions to American businessmen.

However, Soviet Russia was not able to develop its foreign trade with capitalist countries at that time. It was frustrated by the Entente powers, which began an armed intervention and economic blockade of Soviet Russia. The Soviet Republic was compelled to suspend peaceful construction. The effort to considerably prolong the breathing spell after the Brest Peace failed.

On March 9, 1918, Anglo-French and US troops landed in Murmansk. A Czechoslovak army corps bribed by the Entente mutinied in Siberia. On April 5, Japanese forces landed in Vladivostok, soon to be followed by US and British troops.

On April 5 and April 6, Lenin sent off telegrams to the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Siberia in Irkutsk calling for preparations for defence.

Under Lenin's guidance a note of protest against Japanese interference in the affairs of the Soviet state was drafted and transmitted to the representatives of Entente countries.

The summer of 1918 brought with it new trials for the young Soviet state. Units of the mutinous Czechoslovak corps captured Penza on May 9, Omsk on June 7, and Samara (now Kuibyshev), on June 8. On June 19, the Right SRs mutinied in Tambov. On the 20th, they were joined by rebels from Kozlov (now Michurinsk) and Yekate-

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\* The plan was elaborated in detail by the Commission for Foreign Trade of the Committee for Economic Policy of the All-Russia National Economic Council.

rinburg (now Sverdlovsk). On June 5, the Czechoslovaks occupied Ufa. From June 6 to 11, White Guard uprisings took place in Moscow, Yaroslavl, Rybinsk, Murom, and Simbirsk (Lenin's birthplace, now Ulyanovsk). At the same time Denikin's army overran the Tikhoretskaya railway junction and the town of Armavir in the Northern Caucasus. On May 21 and 25, the Czechoslovaks captured Simbirsk and Yekaterinburg. On August 4, British troops landed in Baku. British intervention was launched in Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The Baltic area, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Georgia were occupied by German forces.

A civil war began. By late August the interventionists and White Guards had seized three-quarters of the territory of Soviet Russia inhabited by 82 million people. The Soviet Republic was deprived of its principal food, raw material and fuel producing areas. It found itself inside a flaming circle of battle fronts. The summer of 1918 may be considered one of the most difficult, the most severe and the most critical periods of our revolution, said Lenin at a joint meeting of the VTSIK, the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies and trade unions on June 4. The peaceful breathing spell was over. "We are now entering... one of the most severe and difficult periods of the revolution," Lenin wrote.

On July 29, Lenin presented a report on the situation of the Soviet Republic at a joint meeting of the VTSIK, the Moscow Soviet, factory and plant committees and trade unions of Moscow. In his report he revealed the true goals of the Anglo-American and French imperialists who, while hiding behind hypocritical phrases about democracy, about "liberating" the Russian people "from anarchy" and "the tyranny of Bolshe-



vism," were in effect pursuing an imperialist policy of stifling the Soviet Republic.

Throughout this period Lenin frequently addressed the working people of Moscow, explaining the policy of the Soviet Government and exposing the Entente imperialists.\*

By the autumn of 1918, the situation became particularly grave.

On October 22, addressing a joint meeting of the VTSIK, the Moscow Soviet, factory and plant committees and trade unions, Lenin pointed out that the victory of the Entente in the First World War which had by then become a fact, had left her hands free for intensifying and expanding armed intervention against the Soviet Republic.

Lenin emphasised this idea with still greater insistence in a speech on the international situation at the Sixth All-Russia Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of Workers, Peasants, Cossacks and Red Armymen's Deputies on November 8. "The imperialists," he said, "were busy

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\* In August Lenin spoke:

on the 2nd of August, at rallies in the Butyrsky and Zamoskvoretsky districts, in the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment and at army men's rallies at Khodynka Field;

on the 9th, at rallies in the Sokolniki district;

on the 16th, at a meeting of the Moscow Party Committee;

on the 23rd, at a meeting in the Alexeyev People's House;

on the 28th, at the First All-Russia Congress on Education;

on the 30th, at rallies in the Basmanny district and at the Michelson plant.

After the Michelson plant rally at 7.30 p.m. a dastardly attempt was made on Lenin's life in the plant courtyard. The terrorist, F. Kaplan, acting on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Right SRs, seriously wounded Lenin with two shots from a revolver firing poisoned bullets.

among themselves, but now one group has been wiped out by the Anglo-French-American group, which considers its main task to be the extermination of world Bolshevism and the strangulation of its main centre, the Russian Soviet Republic."

In his speech Lenin revealed the essence of the tactics of the German bourgeoisie aimed at making a class peace with its recent enemy, the bourgeoisie of the Entente countries, to fight Soviet Russia.

The Soviet people were now confronted with the task of defending the revolution at all costs, of smashing the interventionists and internal counter-revolution and of winning the peace that was so essential for building socialism. It was necessary to reshape the entire life of the nation along military lines. One of the cardinal factors that could secure a victory for the working people of Soviet Russia over the united forces of world imperialism and the White Guards was, Lenin believed, the pursuit of a correct foreign policy.

In this period Soviet foreign policy concentrated on exposing the predatory aims of the imperialists, splitting the enemies, preventing them from forming a united front of capitalist states against Soviet Russia, breaking the political and economic blockade and creating an international situation conducive to the rout of the interventionists.

New aims called for new practical methods. Of considerable importance were the Soviet Government's protests against aggressive actions by the imperialist powers. These protests were expressed in public statements, in the press, by radio, or by way of neutral states.

Between 1918 and 1920, Lenin emphasised, "all our endeavours were aimed at switching from

our relations of war with the capitalist countries to relations of peace and trade."

To this end the Soviet Government made repeated peace proposals to the Entente countries. For the sake of peace it declared its willingness to make several major economic concessions provided they did not threaten the further development of the Soviet state. The Soviet Government's peace proposals showed the masses in the Entente countries the falsity of accusations about Soviet Russia being an aggressive state bent on exporting socialist revolution to other countries.

"Throughout the intervention," recalled Chicherin, "Vladimir Ilyich insisted that we address peace proposals to our adversaries. He was not the least bit afraid this might create an impression of weakness. On the contrary, he believed this to be one of the most effective ways of bringing pressure to bear on militant interventionism in the Entente countries."

In a letter to Chicherin and Karakhan dated October 10 Lenin wrote: "But we deem it our duty, in any event, to offer peace even to the governments of capitalists and multi-millionaires so as to try and stop the bloodshed, and to *open the eyes of the peoples.*"

Lenin's idea of making the Entente understand that peace would bring it economic advantages gradually took hold and was evident, in particular, in the Soviet Government's attitude to the attempt by the imperialist powers to convene a conference on the Princes Islands. Lloyd George and Wilson wanted to organise a conference of the Entente countries, together with all the governments then existing, on Russian territory supposedly for the purpose of putting an end to the fighting and restoring peace in Russia. Seeking to discredit the Soviet Government in the eyes of the masses, the Entente governments did

not include it among the suggested participants listed in their statement of January 22, 1919. Learning of this from foreign radio broadcasts, Lenin immediately decided the Soviet Government should send its own proposal to the Entente powers without waiting for their invitation.

Accordingly, a "Note of the Government of the RSFSR to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, the USA and Japan" was drafted on February 4. In it Soviet Russia offered the Entente a system of concessions. On May 6, Lenin wrote in a letter to Chicherin and Litvinov: "...an *armistice* for peace is what we proposed; we agree, we did not wreck the Princes Islands conference, we shall always agree to talks with those who are *really to blame* for the war."

In early March Lenin personally participated in talks with William C. Bullitt, who had come to Moscow on behalf of President Wilson of the United States bearing proposals which laid down the terms for an end to the hostilities. The proposals had previously been approved by Prime Minister Lloyd George of Great Britain.

The Soviet Government put forward its own counter-proposals. Their essence was that the Allied and Associated Governments were to suspend hostilities throughout the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland, lift the economic blockade and establish trade relations with Russia. After the signing of the agreement all troops were to be withdrawn from Russia and all aid to the anti-Soviet governments set up in former tsarist Russia stopped. "Each word in our proposals to Bullitt was carefully weighed by Vladimir Ilyich," wrote Chicherin. "And a limit was set beyond which the proposals became invalid."

"Vladimir Ilyich," Chicherin recalls, "said at the time: 'if they do not accept our proposals now,

they will not get such advantageous terms from us next time.'” The Entente did not accept them.

At meetings of the Politbureau on September 6 and 11 Lenin proposed concluding peace with Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Appeals to their governments were adopted. But these too were rejected by the Entente.

At the 7th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1919 Lenin moved a draft resolution expressing the Soviet Government's steadfast desire to pursue a policy of peace.

This document was proof of the Soviet Government's desire to coexist peacefully with capitalist countries. The Congress proposed that Britain, France, Italy and Japan should, jointly or separately, begin immediate peace talks with Soviet Russia and it authorised the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the Foreign Commissariat systematically to continue the peace policy and to take all necessary measures to ensure its success. The resolution of the 8th All-Russia Conference of the RCP(B) of December 2 lists ten Soviet peace overtures to Western governments: an Appeal to President Wilson on October 24, 1918; an Appeal to the governments of all Entente countries through representatives of neutral countries on November 3, 1918; an Appeal on behalf of the 6th All-Russia Congress of Soviets on November 7, 1918; a note to the Entente countries on December 23, 1918; Appeals to the Entente powers on January 12, January 17 and March 12, 1919; the Bullitt draft treaty on March 12, 1919; an Appeal on the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with Soviet Russia transmitted through Fridtjof Nansen on May 7, 1919.

Chicherin recalled that Lenin carefully followed the reaction to all these initiatives. “In my continuous efforts to reach agreement with the

Entente which, even if unsuccessful, could at least have put off the rupture that threatened us," the Foreign Commissar wrote, "Vladimir Ilyich, in his daily telephone conversations, gave me the most precise advice, displaying amazing flexibility and a talent for dodging the blows of the enemy. And here again, thanks to his personal intervention, it proved possible to take the sharper edges off the problems that arose."

Thus, on May, 6, 1919, Lenin sent Chicherin and Litvinov his comments on the draft reply to the League of Nations High Commissioner for Prisoners of War, Fridtjof Nansen, and urged them to reveal the true objectives of the Entente which "while easily concealing all our other documents from everyone, cannot, as an exception, conceal *this one reply*."

In the critical years of the Civil War the Soviet people continued the drive to fulfil the charted plans of socialist construction. Writing on this subject, Lincoln Steffens, the noted American author who visited Russia in March 1919 with Bullitt, commented: "I have seen the future and it works." In his report to Bullitt, Steffens pointed out that the whole of Russia had begun the job of restoration, that it understood the ideas behind the plans put forward for the future and was interested creatively. Destruction was a temporary satisfaction for an oppressed, cheated and supremely distressed people. But violence was never a part of its nature. As long ago as that Steffens saw that Russia had begun the work of restoration to produce everything in abundance for all.

This, Steffens wrote, was what made the people, sick and tired of the war, send its most capable and strongest men to the new, courageous and well-trained army to defend not their frontiers but their new workers' system, their common

life, and this was what made Lenin and his stern communist government call for peace.

At the time of the armed intervention and the Civil War Lenin believed it was very important to inform the working people of capitalist countries about what was really happening in Russia. For instance, in his Letter to American Workers Lenin wrote about the October Revolution in Russia. He described the great revolutionary transformations carried through in the Soviet Republic and the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Government. "The workers of the whole world," Lenin wrote, "no matter in what country they live, greet us, sympathise with us, applaud us for breaking the iron ring of imperialist ties, of sordid imperialist treaties, of imperialist chains—for breaking through to freedom, and making the heaviest sacrifices in doing so—for, as a socialist republic, although torn and plundered by the imperialists, keeping out of the imperialist war and raising the banner of peace, the banner of socialism for the whole world to see."

Soviet Russia's peace policy influenced the working people in the capitalist countries and to a great extent blocked the predatory plans of the imperialists in Russia. "The chief reason for our victory," Lenin pointed out, "was that the workers of the advanced West European countries were on our side; and this fact determined the issue of our war."

Under the slogan "Hands Off Russia" the working people in many countries went on strike, held mass rallies and demonstrations, and spoke out in the press. This was a broad and sincere manifestation of proletarian internationalism towards the first workers' and peasants' state in the world.

A new form of proletarian solidarity in action was the armed defence of the October Socialist

Revolution by foreign workers and peasants who fought in international units of the Red Army. Hungarians, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Chinese, Frenchmen, Britons, Americans and people from many other countries joined the Red Army or formed their own units to render the Soviet people fraternal aid in their struggle for freedom and socialism on the battle fronts of the Civil War.

Addressing a rally of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment leaving for the front, Lenin declared that in jointly upholding, with arms in hand, the gains of the first socialist revolution against the exploiters, bandits and looters, the revolutionaries of different nations were giving practical effect to the international brotherhood of peoples.

The working people of Soviet Russia, for their part, also helped the working class and the masses of other countries in their struggle for liberation from imperialist exploitation. They enthusiastically saluted the German workers, who revolted in Germany in November 1918, and hailed the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919.

Soviet diplomacy did its utmost to foster peaceful relations with capitalist countries.

The trend towards business ties with Soviet Russia gradually met with response among the ruling quarters of capitalist countries.

Lenin believed it was very important to normalise relations with those capitalist countries which did not belong to the Entente and frequently took a neutral stand at the time of the armed intervention.

In a dispatch to the Foreign Affairs and Trade Commissariats dated July 14, 1918, Vorovsky, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Scandinavia, referred to the development of foreign trade between the Soviet Republic and the



Scandinavian countries. "Due to the almost complete cessation of raw material imports to Scandinavia from America and Britain," he wrote, "Russia is practically the one and only source capable of supplying the industries of those countries."

On February 11, 1919, the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Trade discussed the question of trade with Scandinavia and took the following decision: "To obtain from Comrade Vorovsky a detailed report on all commercial transactions with Scandinavia, on the fate of ships, and to ascertain the state of Scandinavia's trade market."

The Soviet Government's consistent struggle for economic relations with Scandinavia culminated in the successful negotiation of several trade agreements with Sweden,\* Finland, Denmark and Norway.

On January 16, 1920, the Supreme Allied Council, comprising Britain, France and Italy, officially announced the resumption of trade relations with Soviet Russia—not, however, with the Soviet Government directly, but with cooperatives. The Soviet Government agreed to conduct trade through Centrosoyuz (the cooperative organisation) whose governing board appointed Litvinov to be its representative abroad.

This question was discussed at a meeting of the Politbureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee in January 1920. It adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin which said that in view of the Entente's intentions of exchanging goods through the cooperatives—obviously with the aim of using them as an instrument for the restoration of capitalism—the Central Committee authorised the

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\* In May 1918, a Swedish trade mission headed by Consul General Viderström conducted talks in Moscow.

Chairman of Centrosoyuz, the People's Commissar for Food, the Chairman of the Supreme National Economic Council and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to discuss the question of cooperatives most thoroughly with this aim in mind, and promptly to devise measures to ensure our complete control of the cooperative apparatus, particularly in all those areas through which the exchange of goods could be arranged (the Ukraine, the Far East), etc. Such measures were devised.

Early in 1920, L. B. Krasin went to Britain for talks on the development of trade.

"Taking the greatest possible care," wrote Chicherin, "to see that the other side should not lure us into any kind of trap, and carefully studying each proposal, Vladimir Ilyich on the whole took a firm line in favour of a trade agreement with Britain. When Comrade Krasin returned from London in mid-1920 with the four conditions of Lloyd George, Vladimir Ilyich insisted on their acceptance in substance as a basis for negotiations."

Reports of possible trade ties with Soviet Russia evoked broad response in the business community of Canada and the United States. Interviewed by Lincoln Eyre of the American newspaper *The World* on February 21, 1920, Lenin emphasised:

"I know of no reason why a socialist commonwealth like ours cannot do business indefinitely with capitalist countries. We don't mind taking their capitalist locomotives and farming machinery, so why should they mind taking our socialist wheat, flax and platinum?" In emphasising the need for mutually advantageous business cooperation, Lenin proceeded from the principle of the peaceful coexistence and economic competition of the two opposite socio-economic systems.

The exchange of goods between Soviet Russia

and capitalist countries gradually expanded. The aggregate value of Soviet exports was 28,247,000 roubles in 1918; 349,000 roubles in 1919; and 4,869,000 roubles in 1920. The value of imports was 366,573,000 roubles in 1918; 11,069,000 roubles in 1919; and 100,109,000 roubles in 1920.

On December 22, 1920, in a report on the activities of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin pointed out "that the Entente's policy, which aims at military intervention and the armed suppression of the Soviets, is steadily coming to nought, and that we are winning over to our policy of peace a steadily increasing number of states which are undoubtedly hostile towards the Soviets."

The Soviet Government's stand in favour of peaceful coexistence in this period was also emphasised by Chicherin at a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920. "Our slogan," he said, "has been and remains the same; peaceful coexistence with other governments whatever their nature. Reality itself has led us and other states to the need for the establishment of long-term relationships between the workers' and peasants' government and capitalist governments. These long-term relationships are being imperatively imposed upon us by economic reality. Economic reality requires the exchange of goods, the entry into permanent settled relations with the whole world, and that same economic reality requires it of other governments, however hostile they might be towards our system."

Soviet diplomacy continued its persistent quest for ways to weaken the forces of the interventionists and to thwart their armed campaign against Soviet Russia.

To this end it ably took advantage of contradictions in the Far East and in Kamchatka between

Japan and the United States both of which wanted to gain control of these territories. "Today," Lenin said in a speech to the 8th Congress of Soviets, "we are giving America Kamchatka, which in any case is not actually ours because it is held by Japanese troops. At the moment we are in no condition to fight Japan. We are giving America, for economic exploitation, a territory where we have absolutely no naval or military forces, and where we cannot send them. By doing so we are setting American imperialism against Japanese imperialism and against the bourgeoisie closest to us, the Japanese bourgeoisie, which still maintains its hold on the Far Eastern Republic." \*

Serious contradictions arose in the course of the intervention between Britain and France. On December 21, 1920, Lenin told the 8th Congress of Soviets: "Since there is no political unity between Britain and France, our position imposes on us the duty of even incurring a certain risk, if only we succeed in hampering a military alliance between Britain and France against us."

As subsequent developments were to prove, this is exactly what the Soviet Government did.

Soviet Russia also actively and successfully exploited the contradictions between the imperialist powers of the Entente and smaller countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland. The Entente tried to bring political and economic pressure to bear on these countries to involve them in the fighting against Soviet Russia. But fearing to lose their national sovereignty, bourgeois Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland thought better of it. The ruling quarters of the

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\* Although no agreement on Kamchatka was ever signed, the talks with the United States were of important political significance as such. The Soviet Republic succeeded in weakening US and Japanese pressure on Soviet Russia.

Baltic states, which were wavering between the imperialists and Soviet Russia, did not join in the anti-Soviet adventure and refused to participate in the Entente's second campaign. As Lenin put it, they assumed a neutral posture towards Soviet Russia and thereby went against the Entente.

Thus, the Soviet Government, through its wise Leninist foreign policy in combination with the ever more telling blows of the Red Army, thwarted the campaign of 14 imperialist states against the RSFSR. The interventionists were forced to retreat. In July and August 1919, French and American troops were sent home from the Northern Front. In September and October the remnants of British troops ignominiously took flight from Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. In the spring of 1920, US troops left the Far East. "The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force," declared Lloyd George, "is pure madness."

A signal success in the struggle against the Entente was the conclusion on February 2, 1920, with Lenin's active participation, of a peace treaty with Estonia which the Entente had tried to use in its anti-Soviet campaign. The treaty opened up an avenue for trade between Soviet Russia and the West. This was advantageous for Estonia's national economy as well. It was a "window into Europe," but a window opened not with a bayonet and not for the conquest of new territory, but through a peaceful policy and for the development of normal relations with other countries.

In Chicherin's words, "the treaty with Estonia became, so to speak, a dress rehearsal for an agreement with the Entente; it became the first experience of breaching the blockade and a first experiment in peaceful coexistence with bourgeois states.

Following Estonia, peace treaties with Soviet

Russia were signed in 1920 by the bourgeois republics of Lithuania (July 12), Latvia (August 11), and Finland (October 14). The treaties with these countries were also based on the principles of the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of states with different socio-economic systems—the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in one another's internal affairs and mutual benefit. This was a new achievement of Soviet foreign policy.

In early 1920, it seemed that the Soviet Republic had reached the final phase in the struggle against intervention and could now direct its efforts to peaceful socialist construction. However, such a course of events did not at all suit the aggressive quarters in the Entente countries and they set about organising a new, third Entente campaign against Soviet Russia.

The Soviet Government carefully watched the changing international situation. It authorised Chicherin to take all measures to intensify propaganda about the contemplated intervention by Britain and other Entente countries, and to expose their aggressive designs against the RSFSR both in diplomatic notes and in the press. Chicherin was also instructed to report on what action he was taking.

On May 25, 1920, the Party Politbureau, on Lenin's proposal, instructed the Foreign Affairs Commissariat to take steps to inform the countries of Western Europe that the Soviet Government was prepared to offer serious and effective guarantees of its sincere peacefulness towards Britain in the East and that it was ready for all manner of far-reaching treaties.

The last campaign against Soviet Russia began with an attack by Poland on April 25 and an offensive by Wrangel's army in the summer of 1920.

But this campaign ended in complete failure too. As a result of the military successes of the Red Army, Poland, finding itself in a critical situation, was compelled to propose peace talks with Soviet Russia.

On July 11, 1920, when the Red Army offensive was still in progress, Lord Curzon sent a note to the Soviet Government on behalf of his government. It proposed an armistice between Poland and Soviet Russia as well as "between the forces of Soviet Russia and General Wrangel." Curzon also suggested establishing the boundary between the RSFSR and Poland proposed by the Entente at the end of 1919. This boundary has gone down in history as the "Curzon Line." It passed through Grodno, Valovoe, Nemirov, Brest, Dorogobuzh and Ustilug, running east of Grubeshov, via Krylov, and thence west of Rava Ruskaya, east of Peremyshl to the Carpathians. The British Government offered to mediate in concluding an armistice between Soviet Russia and Poland.

This "solicitude" of the British Government was prompted by the triumphant offensive of the Red Army which threatened to intensify the revolutionary movement in the rest of Europe. The British proposal was calculated to give the Polish landowners and capitalists an opportunity to pool their forces, receive aid from France, Britain and the USA, and renew its offensive against Soviet Russia. As for the British proposals for an armistice with Wrangel, their purpose was to turn the Crimean Peninsula into a refuge for White Guards and preserve a counter-revolutionary bastion in the south of Russia.

On July 17, the Soviet Government replied to the Curzon Note with a statement reminding Britain of the role it had played in organising intervention against Soviet Russia and rejecting British mediation because of the British Government's

“lack of sufficient information” about the relations between Russia and her neighbours. This wrecked the attempt to halt the successful offensive of the Red Army and prevent it from routing the White Poles. At the same time it exposed the hopes of the British Government to have the imperialist powers control relations between Soviet Russia and her neighbours.

On June 22, the Polish Government proposed an armistice and direct peace talks with the Government of the RSFSR. The Soviet Government accepted the proposal.

Lenin made a great personal contribution to elaborating the terms of the peace treaty with Poland and to drafting the directives for the Soviet delegation. K. Kh. Danishevsky, a member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, was appointed to head the peace delegation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR in the talks with Poland in Minsk. Prior to his departure Lenin talked with Danishevsky, briefed him on the situation in Europe, particularly in Britain and Germany, and on the policy of the Soviet Government, read the draft of his introductory statement at the opening of the talks and suggested several amendments and additions.

During the talks Lenin was in constant touch with Minsk. Thus on August 1, he sent a telegram to Minsk mentioning certain new developments in Soviet-Polish relations and requesting the delegation to continue to act on the basis of his directives. On August 11, Lenin dispatched another telegram to Danishevsky informing him of the Soviet diplomatic success in Britain and instructing him about further talks with the Poles.

As Danishevsky recalled, Lenin gave “additional instructions, requested firm compliance with the adopted line, suggested wordings and proposals for the coming meetings, settled disputes be-



tween myself and other members of the delegation and with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.

"In short, Vladimir Ilyich personally guided the policy and tactics of the delegation from Moscow."

On August 14, Lenin wrote a letter to Chicherin requesting him to inform L. B. Kamenev, the Soviet representative in London, that France and Poland were bent on wrecking the peace talks and therefore the utmost vigilance was necessary. In the same letter Lenin made several suggestions about the conduct of the talks with Poland. "Danishevsky," he wrote to Chicherin, "must be told that he should start with a solemn statement:

- "a) independence and sovereignty
- "b) frontiers—more than Curzon offers
- "c) no indemnities."

Describing Lenin's role in the negotiations with Poland, Chicherin pointed out: "At the onset of the talks with Poland Vladimir Ilyich personally suggested a marvellous idea: to counter Entente influence by offering Poland at once more territory than had been offered to her by Clemenceau and Curzon."

After a recess requested by the Polish Government the talks were transferred from Minsk, which was too close to the front line, to Riga. The talks were resumed on September 21. This time the Soviet delegation was led by A. A. Ioffe. Lenin continued to follow the talks very closely. In a telegram to Ioffe of September 23, Lenin wrote: "For us the entire essence of the matter is: first, to have an armistice promptly, second, and most important, to have a real guarantee of genuine peace within ten days. Your task is to secure this and to verify the guarantees of genuine implementation."

During the talks in Riga the Pilsudski Govern-

ment sought to secure a revision of the frontier in Poland's favour. However, Lenin firmly insisted on compliance with the ethnic principle. On September 23, he sent Chicherin a map indicating the new Soviet-Polish frontier. In an accompanying note he wrote: "Comrade Chicherin, this is the frontier—maximum. Adopted by the Central Committee, it must be repeated precisely."

On October 12, 1920, preliminary peace terms were signed in Riga and on March 18, 1921, the actual peace treaty with Poland was concluded. Under it Poland acquired the Western regions of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia.

With the failure of the Entente's third campaign the period of the Civil War and foreign intervention came to a close. Only Japanese occupation continued in the Far East (until October 1922, and on Sakhalin Island until 1925). The young Soviet Republic thereby won a great victory over the united forces of international imperialism. Lenin was later to describe this victory in the following terms: "We have not only held out, however, we have won a victory."

In the armed bout between the socialist and the capitalist systems capitalism sustained a defeat. The Soviet Republic upheld its existence and was able to proceed to peaceful construction.

Soviet Russia began a long period of coexistence with capitalist states. "... We have entered a new period," wrote Lenin in October 1920, "in which we have won the right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states."

Lenin pointed out that the victory over the foreign armed intervention and over the internal counter-revolution in the Civil War was "a lesson of the utmost importance to us, for it shows by the example... that no matter what attempts are made to invade Russia and no matter what

military moves are made against us—and in all probability many more will be made—all these attempts will go up in smoke as we know from our actual experience, which has steeled us. After every such attempt by our enemies, we shall emerge stronger than ever.”

A great deal of the credit for the victory belonged to Soviet diplomacy which was guided by Lenin. This guidance was an important factor in enhancing the international prestige of the socialist state. “The success we have achieved in this respect,” said Lenin at the 8th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920, “. . . goes to show that the present principles of our foreign policy are correct and that the improvement in our international position rests on a firm basis.”

By routing international and internal counter-revolution the young Republic proved that the Soviet system was invincible. The victories won from 1917 to 1920 by Soviet Russia under Lenin’s leadership have gone down in history as gains of world-historic magnitude.

In 1921, Soviet Russia entered a period of peaceful development and growth of its productive forces. A start was made in establishing diplomatic and trade relations between Soviet Russia and capitalist countries. In 1921, the period of coexistence of socialist and capitalist systems, which had begun in 1917, entered a new phase—that of peaceful coexistence. It lasted for nearly twenty years, until the attack by nazi Germany in 1941.

## The Struggle for Peace and Peaceful Coexistence

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### Development by Lenin of Questions Pertaining to Peaceful Coexistence

The Soviet people's victories over the interventionists and the internal counter-revolution greatly boosted Soviet Russia's international prestige. On November 21, 1920, in a speech at the Moscow regional conference of the RCP(B) Lenin described the international position of the Soviet Republic at that time in the following words: "We are in a position of having won conditions enabling us to exist side by side with capitalist powers, who are now compelled to enter into trade relations with us. In the course of this struggle we have won the right to an independent existence." Soviet Russia now had a chance to begin implementing the plan for the construction of a socialist society.

In the field of international relations the basic

task of the Soviet Government was to keep the peace and prevent the outbreak of a new war, or in other words, to promote by diplomatic means the creation of conditions enabling a socialist society to be built in one country surrounded by the capitalist world.

In his report to the 9th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1921 Lenin declared: "...we shall do our utmost to preserve peace in the future..." This idea keynotes many of his other pronouncements too. It was recalled by Chicherin in his interview with a correspondent of *L'Humanite* on June 24, 1921: "The development of production is the alpha and omega of our present-day policy. It is the key to the system and to all the 'combinations' of our Soviet diplomacy. Our foreign policy, like the policy we are pursuing inside Russia, is a policy of production."

Soviet Russia's economic problems were very formidable indeed. The situation prompted Lenin to compare Russia after the war to a man beaten almost to death. Four years of imperialist war, followed by three years of Civil War and foreign armed intervention, had left the national economy in ruin and disarray. There were dire shortages of bread, fuel, raw materials and other essentials. In 1920, the industry turned out just a little over one-seventh of the 1913 output. The output of steel was less than one-twentieth. Agricultural production was a mere 65 per cent of the output of tsarist Russia. It was necessary within the shortest possible period of time to heal the wounds inflicted by war, and to rehabilitate the country's productive forces. In analysing the international situation in May 1921, Lenin qualified it as an equilibrium of forces between socialism and capitalism. In his words, "some sort of a temporary, unstable equilibrium, but equilibrium for all that, has been established." It was an equi-

librium conditioned by the fact that the ruling quarters of bourgeois states, having suffered a defeat in their attempts to crush the emergent Soviet state by force, were compelled to reconcile themselves to its existence. However, they did not cease their struggle against the Soviet Republic—they now conducted it by other means. The main emphasis was on attempts to exploit Soviet Russia's domestic problems, on imposing financial and economic boycotts, and on a policy of isolation through refusal to recognise the Soviet Government.

Notably, the capitalist countries wanted to take advantage of the famine of 1921 caused by a drought and the effects of the blockade, the foreign military intervention and the Civil War, in order to stifle the Soviet regime. This disaster affected 34 provinces of Soviet Russia with a total population of 30 million in the Volga Region, Southern Urals, Northern Caucasus, the Crimea and Southern Ukraine.

The United States Government acted through the American Relief Administration (ARA), a "charitable" organisation (in effect under government control) headed by Herbert Hoover. ARA had had a lot of previous experience in combating revolutionary movements in Europe by economic means. Under the pretext of aiding the hungry the bourgeois quarters of the United States were planning subversion against the Soviet regime, coupled with economic and political intelligence operations.

On August 25, 1921, the Supreme Allied Council set up a special Commission to study the possibilities of relief for the famine victims. It was headed by Joseph Noulens, the former French Ambassador to Russia. The Noulens Commission began its operations by gathering intelligence information.

The governments of Britain, the USA and France also tried to use the so-called public committee for aid to the hungry for purposes of forming a bourgeois government in Russia. But the Soviet Government foiled their plans.

Lenin wrote with indignation about the "American hucksters" from ARA. He said it would be wrong to allow "the slightest trace of interference, either political or even administrative." The Soviet Government also categorically rejected the demand of the Commission for the study of possibilities for relief for the famine victims to institute its control over the distribution of food and to send a "commission of experts" to Soviet Russia, or, as Lenin termed it, a "commission of spies under the title of a commission of experts." He was indignant at this demand. "Here it is impossible to give way," he wrote to the Politbureau of the CC RCP(B), suggesting that a reply be drafted "in the sharpest possible terms." A reply in the form of a note was sent on September 7, 1921 to the governments of Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. It pointed out that "the hunger and suffering of the working people of Russia are an excuse for the Commission to try and learn what resources and means the Soviet Government had at its disposal."

Great assistance was rendered to Soviet Russia in the grim years of the famine by the common people of the world. The workers of other countries warmly responded to Lenin's appeal of August 2, 1921 to the international proletariat for aid to the hungry. An international workers' committee for aid to the hungry was formed in August 1921 under the auspices of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. It was headed by Clara Zetkin and included Henri Barbusse and Martin Andersen Nexö. Also active in the campaign to aid the victims of the famine in Russia

were Fridtjof Nansen, George Bernard Shaw, Albert Einstein, Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair and many others. A great deal of useful work was done by the Executive Committee for International Aid to Russia set up by a Red Cross conference in Geneva and headed by Nansen.

Despite these adverse conditions the Soviet Government continued to devote much attention to foreign policy problems. In his first works written after the intervention and the Civil War Lenin further developed his concept of the peaceful coexistence and economic competition of the two systems. He emphasised the need to develop diplomatic relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equality; to settle differences as good neighbours, but on no account to allow the imperialists to discriminate against or to blackmail the Soviet Republic.

Lenin thought it necessary to explain the substance and meaning of the Party's policies to the working masses so that the peoples not only in Soviet Russia but also in other countries could understand and correctly evaluate them. He stressed the need to fight tirelessly and unremittingly for the policy of peace, to fight with all one's strength, economically consolidating the Soviet Republic and morally strengthening its defences.

In Lenin's view, the principal contradiction of the modern epoch—the contradiction between the socialist and the capitalist systems—can and certainly will be resolved through peaceful economic competition in which socialism will inevitably demonstrate its superiority over capitalism. Addressing the Moscow Party organisation on December 6, 1920, Lenin said: "That... is a duel between two methods, two political and economic systems—the communist and the capitalist. We shall prove that we are the stronger... Of course, the task is a difficult one, but we have said, and



still say, that socialism has the force of example. Coercion is effective against those who want to restore their rule. But at this stage the significance of force ends and after that only influence and example are effective. We must show the significance of communism in practice, by example."

In another speech delivered in May 1921, Lenin elaborated on this idea and emphasised the world-historic importance of the economic development of the socialist state. "We are now," he said, "exercising our main influence on the international revolution through our economic policy. . . . The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale."

While attaching great importance to the international solidarity of working people in the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence, Lenin also noted that some sections of the bourgeoisie were tending towards political and economic ties with the socialist Republic. This shift in their attitude was determined by the objective laws of economic development, by the necessity of developing international trade and the interest in it of most countries belonging to the capitalist system. "There is a force more powerful than the wishes, the will and the decisions of any of the governments or classes that are hostile to us. That force is world general economic relations which compel them to make contact with us," Lenin declared at the 9th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1921.

In establishing peaceful relations with capitalist countries Lenin counselled the utmost consideration to the small nations.

In several works he made a profound analysis of the situation of small nations and indicated the correct way to establish friendly relations with

them. In discussing the nature and the essence of the foreign policy of minor countries and in analysing their relationships with major capitalist states, Lenin affirmed that the small nations, facing a constant threat of political and economic enslavement by the imperialist predators, invariably turned to Soviet Russia. "...the minor powers," he wrote, "and they form the majority of the world's population, are therefore all inclined to make peace with us."

Developing this idea, Lenin stressed the need to expose the policies of the great powers and their imperialistic objectives. The peoples, Lenin said, should be taught to see the difference between those policies and a genuine and truly democratic policy of equal relations with small countries; consideration should be given to the interests of the small countries; reasonable concessions should be made to them, and their sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected. The foreign policy pursued by Soviet Russia promoted a rapprochement of the small nations with the socialist Republic. This was an important factor attesting to the possibility of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Commenting on attempts by the great powers to range the small nations against Soviet Russia, Lenin wrote: "It is well known what pressure the Entente brought to bear on those small countries that had been hastily formed, were weak and wholly dependent on the Entente even in such basic questions as that of food and in all other respects. They cannot break away from that dependence. All kinds of pressure—financial, food, military—have been applied to force Estonia, Finland, and no doubt Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as well, to force that whole group of states to make war on us."

Lenin was particularly attentive to those states that had previously formed part of the Russian empire. "We have to show," he said, "the greatest willingness to compromise with these nations, to dispel the age-old suspicions generated by the old oppression, and to lay the foundation for a union of workers and peasants of various nations which once suffered together at the hands of tsarism and the Russian landowners, and now suffer at the hands of imperialism."

Soviet Russia's foreign policy in the early twenties did encourage the small nations to draw closer to the socialist state. "Our relations with Estonia," wrote Foreign Commissar Chicherin on March 22, 1920, in a letter to I. E. Gukovsky, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs representative in Estonia, "must be the touchstone of the possibilities for our peaceful coexistence with bourgeois countries. . . . We have to remove everything that may obstruct this policy."

### Lenin on the Forms of Peaceful Coexistence

The new tasks of Soviet foreign policy were aimed at turning the newly won breathing space into a prolonged peace and establishing stable and more lasting peaceful relations with all countries.

These tasks called for new forms and methods in foreign policy. The Soviet Government constantly developed and elaborated these forms and methods to bring them in line with new historical conditions. It constantly searched for ways to give practical effect to the principle of peaceful coexistence. Economic cooperation was one such form. Therefore the establishment of trade ties with capitalist countries and the conclusion of

mutually advantageous treaties became a task of prime importance. "...We must," Lenin declared, "seize the opportunity and bend every effort to achieve trade relations even at the cost of maximum concessions."

Lenin pointed out on several occasions that the *bourgeois countries had to trade with Russia*: they were aware that without some form of economic relationships disruption in their countries was bound to continue; despite all their marvellous victories, despite all the endless bragging with which they crammed the newspapers and telegrams of the entire world, their economy was nonetheless falling apart. . . .

To secure the development of political and trade relations with capitalist countries Soviet diplomacy strove above all to end the maritime and financial blockade. In Lenin's own words "...the lifting of the blockade implies not only the passage of ships bearing our goods, it implies a genuine restoration of relations. Words are of no consequence for us. Official recognition is of secondary importance. We need *de facto* and effective recognition, the lifting of the ban that lies on us, in consequence of which we can go nowhere, except some persons with special permission, and they run the risk of being expelled and sent back to Russia at any moment. We need an effective lifting of the blockade—personal, maritime and financial—and this alone will give us a possibility for effective exchanges of goods and effective economic intercourse with other countries."

The Soviet Government negotiated advantageous trade agreements with its clients. They were essential above all for raising the productive forces of Soviet Russia. Lenin looked far ahead and saw the prospects for a continuous strengthening and development of Soviet Russia's eco-

conomic ties with all countries of the world. He saw that the struggle with capitalist countries was being carried over into the sphere of economic competition.

This in fact was the aim of the New Economic Policy (NEP).

"The essence of the new economic policy is a union of the proletariat and the peasantry," Lenin said. Economically and politically the NEP guaranteed the possibility of building the fundamentals of a socialist economy. In the competition between state-owned and capitalist enterprises—commercial and industrial, Russian and foreign—the NEP gave socialism a chance of winning. The token of success was the fact that all political power was in the hands of the working class of Soviet Russia. In Lenin's words, "the economic power in the hands of the proletarian state of Russia is quite adequate to ensure the transition to communism."

The New Economic Policy was destined to prove in practice that in competition with capitalism socialism can generate higher labour productivity and more powerful productive forces, which are the prerequisites for improving the wellbeing of all participants in communist construction. The aim of the economic competition was to achieve a radical uplift in material production, which constituted the major condition for the ultimate victory of socialism.

Bourgeois ideologists cherished hopes of winning out in that struggle. The bourgeois press in the United States, Britain, France and other countries regarded the transition to the NEP as "bankruptcy of the Soviet system," as "an end to the communist phase of the revolution." Lloyd George hastened to make a statement in the British House of Commons about the complete collapse of the communist system, and about the re-

nunciation by the Bolsheviks of Marxist doctrines. But history has shown that the New Economic Policy was in no way a departure from Marxism. It was a policy of the proletarian dictatorship aimed at overcoming the resistance of capitalist elements and building a socialist society in Soviet Russia.

In justifying the introduction of the NEP, Lenin said that economic competition with capitalism was a specific form of the class struggle in which the socialist state had to utilise in its interests the possibilities of international economic co-operation.

Lenin attached great importance to using foreign experience, foreign technology and equipment, and to attracting foreign capital. "To grasp with both hands," he said, "what is good from abroad: Soviet power+Prussian order on the railways+American technology and the organisation of trusts+American public education etc. . . . = socialism."

On Lenin's advice the Soviet Government took steps to establish economic, scientific and technological cooperation with foreign countries. In 1921 a Bureau of Foreign Science and Technology was set up in Berlin under the All-Russia Council of National Economy to deal with the organisation and exchange of new scientific and technological information between the Western countries and Soviet Russia. The Bureau also had branch offices in several major cities of Germany, Austria, Britain, Belgium, Italy, the United States and other countries. The Bureau and its branch offices were responsible for collecting information about the organisation of labour, the functioning of higher and secondary technical colleges, the organisation of vocational training and the work of experimental laboratories and also for studying the latest technological developments and data

provided by various companies about various inventions that could be utilised in Soviet Russia, and so forth.

In Lenin's view concessions were one of the important practical ways of involving foreign capital in the development of Soviet Russia's natural resources in the obtaining situation. He regarded them as a means of establishing economic ties between the Soviet state and the business circles of the capitalist world in the interests of reviving and raising the country's national economy and assuring its peaceful development. "The existence of concessions is an economic and political argument against war," Lenin wrote.

Business relations with foreign circles would, he felt, make it difficult "for capitalist powers that enter into deals with us to take part in military action against us."

Lenin personally dealt with major questions pertaining to the implementation of the concession policy and to propaganda abroad concerning the decree on concessions. On March 29, 1921 a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars adopted the "Basic Principles of Concession Treaties." According to that decree, the concessionaire was obliged to ensure the constant improvement of the welfare of Russian workers, cater to their vital needs, obey the laws of the RSFSR, etc.

The question of concessions was discussed several times by the Politbureau of the CC RCP(B). On October 17, 1921, it adopted Lenin's draft of the Decree on the Establishment of a Single Commission for Concessions.

On March 11, 1922, Lenin wrote a note to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, Chairman of the Concession Committee of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), recommending that the committee collect and concentrate in its hands detailed

information on all negotiations and other matters dealing with concessions granted by the RSFSR to foreign capitalists, and conducted both in Russia and abroad.

Lenin made many references to the subjects of concessions in his writings and speeches. Some of these materials have recently been published for the first time. In them Lenin emphasises that the speedy economic rehabilitation of Russia and the restoration of its productive forces "can be accelerated many times over by the involvement of foreign state and communal establishments, private enterprises, shareholding companies, co-operatives and workers' organisations of other countries in the mining and processing of Russia's natural resources."

Noteworthy among these documents is Lenin's *Letter to the Politbureau of the CC RCP(B) on the Treaty with the Consortium of German Firms*.\*

On March 23, 1922, the RSFSR Government signed a concession agreement with Friedrich Krupp-in-Essen on the renting by that company of 50,000 desyatins of land in the Salsk district of the Don province for a term of 24 years. However, the agreement was never honoured by the

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\* The agreement between the RSFSR Government and the consortium of German firms headed by Otto Wolff was signed in Berlin on October 9, 1922. It consisted of a protocol and three treaties. According to the agreement a mixed Russo-German Trade Corporation was set up. The protocol on the establishment of the corporation was signed in Berlin on November 16, 1922. By the spring of 1923, the corporation had opened up branches in Moscow, Petrograd, Rostov-on-Don and other cities. This agreement made a great impression abroad and generated a favourable atmosphere for negotiations with other representatives and companies. However, Otto Wolff subsequently went back on his obligations under the agreement and in 1924 he withdrew from the corporation altogether.



company because its directors refused to endorse it.

In his bid to develop economic ties with capitalist countries, Lenin also considered doing business with American companies such as the Allied Drug and Medical Corporation.

In contacts with American firms Lenin saw a way to establish trade relations between the Soviet Republic and the United States. "This is a small path leading to the American 'business' world and it must be utilised in *every possible way*," Lenin emphasised in a letter to the Politbureau of the CC RCP(B) dated May 4.

An important element of Lenin's theoretical and practical legacy in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy is the proposition that in the interests of peaceful coexistence and of strengthening the positions of socialism the socialist state, under certain conditions, can and must accept compromises with, and make concessions to, capitalist countries on some issues.

Lenin defined the conditions and the forms of compromises. He stressed their role and significance in the class struggle of the proletariat and in the tactics of the revolutionary party. "The task of a truly revolutionary party," he wrote, "is not to declare that it is impossible to renounce all compromises, but to be able, *through all compromises*, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose."

Of interest in this connection are the ideas expressed by Lenin in a document, recently published for the first time, relating to January 1921. It concerns negotiations with the reactionary Horthy Government about the exchange of arrested People's Commissars of the Hungarian Soviet Republic for hostages detained in Soviet Russia. Chicherin was evidently in a quandary

as to the course of action. He therefore wrote Lenin a letter saying: "I should like to know your attitude in principle to the admissibility of our conducting political negotiations with a Black-Hundred Government on a question concerning our external security." Lenin replied to Chicherin: "*In principle it is of course admissible*" (emphasis mine—M.T.).

This goes to prove that in its foreign policy the Soviet Government can and must accept compromises with bourgeois states, where necessary. "...An advocate of proletarian revolution," Lenin wrote, "may conclude compromises or agreements with capitalists. It all depends on *what kind* of agreement is concluded and *under what circumstances*."

In conceding the possibility of concessions by a socialist state, Lenin pointed out at the same time that an indispensable condition for such concessions should be the receipt of "more or less equal concessions from the international bourgeoisie in respect of Soviet Russia or in respect of all contingents of the international proletariat fighting against capitalism."

In discussing the question of compromises, Lenin drew a distinct line beyond which a compromise became its very opposite, and caused harm instead of being useful. He pointed out that there was no ready-made recipe that could provide an answer for all contingencies. It all depended on the specific historical situation. Lenin indicated that Communists should be intractable and irreconcilable "...with respect to the basic, fundamental and, for all nations, identical questions of the proletarian struggle, the questions of proletarian dictatorship..." This also applies to questions of Marxist ideology, the principles of proletarian internationalism, the historic gains of the working class in the struggle for social and

national liberation, for peace, for the construction of socialism and communism.

Lenin's attitude to compromises underlies the principal foreign policy agreements of the Soviet Union which are aimed at creating favourable conditions for the construction of communism in the USSR and in other socialist countries. By ably resorting to compromises the Soviet Government succeeded in solving many highly complex international problems and in successfully strengthening world peace.

### The First International Agreements

The very first foreign policy agreements of the Soviet state showed that the Leninist policy of peace and peaceful coexistence was yielding practical results. The peace treaties with the Baltic states, and the treaties with Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey strengthened the positions of Soviet Russia in the international arena.

Of great importance in this respect was the trade agreement with Britain signed in March 1921.

Lenin paid considerable attention to the negotiations on this agreement. In a telegram to the Soviet representatives conducting the talks in London Lenin wrote on July 17, 1920: "The utmost attention must be directed to collecting British literature showing that trade agreements with the Soviet Republics are of greater benefit to the British bourgeoisie than profitless and even ruinous attempts to suppress them."

On November 19, 1920, Lenin wrote to Chicherin: "Comrade Chicherin, the news from Britain, especially from Krasin (and the press cuttings), and particularly the news that America will promptly join (Russia's trade agreement with

Britain) make the question of a trade agreement with Britain an urgent and extremely important one." And he emphasised: "This question must be very urgently prepared *in all its component parts.*"

After Chicherin had submitted the draft of the trade agreement Lenin noted on December 4, 1920: "The Politbureau approves Comrade Chicherin's proposals on the trade treaty with Britain. . ."

"The treaty with Britain," Lenin pointed out, "was a treaty between the socialist republic and a bourgeois state, a treaty which imposed a certain burden on us. . . but the consequences showed that due to that treaty we opened a little window."

After this Lenin set Soviet foreign policy the task of doing its utmost to broaden the sphere of political and economic agreements. It is important for us, he pointed out in April 1921, to open one little window after another.

The question now arose of negotiating agreements with other countries, notably with Germany. On November 2, 1920, Y. Lomonosov, the Soviet trade representative in Germany, wrote that Germany was anxious to trade with the Soviet Republic. This was natural: Germany needed Russian grain, and only if it catered to the markets of Soviet Russia could Germany stop the growth of unemployment in the country. Germany was in a position to supply Russia with 1,200 new locomotives a year and to repair old ones, to supply the country with machine tools, equipment and, most important, with the products of its electrical engineering which were essential for carrying out the plan to electrify the Soviet Republic.

German banks were prepared to finance this trade but the Versailles Peace Treaty banned

German transactions with Soviet Russia. In other words, to trade with Germany it was necessary to have some kind of intermediary who could buy gold from the Soviet state and give German currency in exchange. The role of such intermediaries could be played by neutral countries or, after the agreement with Britain, by British banks. Therefore, the trade agreement with Britain was necessary not only to trade with that country and its colonies, but also to trade with Germany. After the conclusion of the agreement British banks could cooperate with German banks in financing Russian orders. On Lenin's proposal bilateral negotiations were started in Berlin and Moscow. On May 6, 1921, a "Provisional Agreement on the Resumption of Trade Relations and the Appointment of Reciprocal Missions" was signed between the RSFSR and Germany. Similar agreements were signed with Norway on September 2, and with Austria on December 7. On October 15, 1921, the Council of People's Commissars passed a decision to resume trade relations with Bohemia, Norway and Denmark.

At a conference in Riga between representatives of the RSFSR, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in October 1921 agreements were signed on the transit of goods, on railway communications and on several other matters. These agreements yielded palpable results already by the end of 1921.

In estimating the first successes of Soviet foreign policy Lenin told the 9th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1921 that the possibilities of peaceful coexistence between the socialist Republic and capitalist countries had already been proven in practice, "this was already a fact." Commenting on the development of trade relations in 1921, Lenin emphasised: "we made

considerable progress." Indeed, while in the first three years, 1918 to 1920, foreign imports had amounted to a little over 17 million poods, in 1921 they reached the figure of 50 million poods, registering a threefold growth. In the same period exports had increased from 2.5 to 11.5 million poods. Lenin noted that "these figures are infinitesimally, miserably, ridiculously small... But for all that, it is a beginning."

Lenin attached great importance to the normalisation of relations with the United States of America. On his initiative the Soviet Government took several steps to establish trade and diplomatic relations with the USA.\* This is borne out by many documents, notably the remark written by Lenin on Chicherin's letter to the CC RCP(B) of March 18, 1921. In that letter Chicherin reported that according to information received from Washington B. Vanderlip, a representative of American trade and industrial circles then on a visit to Soviet Russia, US President Warren Harding had pronounced himself in favour of establishing trade ties with the Soviet Republic. Chicherin believed that the forthcoming session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee should adopt an appeal expressing the desirability of trade relations between Soviet Russia and the United States. Lenin read the letter and wrote on the margin: "Fully in favour. Lenin."

"Chicherin to be authorised to prepare the draft of an appeal for passage at this very session of the VTSIK. Lenin."

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\* On August 5, 1918, in a Foreign Commissariat communication to American representative Poole, on October 24, 1918, in a message to President Wilson, and on February 4, 1919, in a draft treaty drawn up with the representative of President Bullitt.

The second session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted the appeal to the US Congress and the President. Harding, however, denied through the press that he had ever spoken in favour of establishing trade relations with Soviet Russia.

Thus, in 1921, two different lines of policy towards Soviet Russia became clearly defined in the leading capitalist countries. On the one hand, the ruling quarters of several countries convinced that the Soviet Republic could not be strangled by force of arms, chose the path of peaceful trade with the RSFSR. On the other hand, the governments of France, Japan, the United States and some others were reluctant to enter into any relations with the Soviet Republic and pursued a policy of economic and political boycotts which, they believed, would bring about the downfall of the Soviet Government.

## Lenin and the East

Lenin attached great importance to the establishment of friendly relations between the Soviet state and the countries of the East. "We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger with the Mongolians, Persians, Indians, Egyptians." This Leninist thesis became the guiding principle for the development of the Soviet Republic's relations with Eastern countries. Every single step in our Eastern policy, Chicherin emphasised, was linked with Lenin's name.

Lenin considered the national-liberation movement of the oppressed peoples of colonial and dependent countries a powerful ally of the proletariat in the struggle against imperialism. "The period of the awakening of the East in the contemporary revolution," he wrote, "is being succe-

ceded by a period in which all the Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world, so as not to be simply objects of the enrichment of others. The peoples of the East are becoming alive to the need for practical action, the need for every nation to take part in shaping the destiny of all mankind."

At the same time Lenin specially emphasised that "the revolutionary movement of Eastern peoples can at present develop successfully, but it can develop only in direct connection with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism."

Of definite interest are the ideas expounded by Lenin in several documents dealing with the problems of the East which have been published for the first time in the latest Russian edition of his complete works. They add to our knowledge of Lenin's approach to the formulation of Soviet foreign policy towards Eastern countries, national-liberation movements, the non-capitalist path of development of underdeveloped states with support from socialist countries, aid to newly liberated countries in their economic development and in training personnel. Lenin's ideas on all these problems help make a correct analysis of the present-day revolutionary processes in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Even at that time Lenin saw that the Eastern peoples were emerging en masse into the arena of world politics. "For our entire Weltpolitik (*world policy*—M. T.) it is devilishly important to *win* the trust of the natives; win it three and four times; to *prove* that we are *not* imperialists, that we shall *not* tolerate a *tendency* in that direction. This is a world issue, without exaggeration a world issue.

"We must be extremely strict in this matter. This will have its effect on India, on the East,



we must not joke about this, here we must exercise a thousandfold caution."

It is interesting to note the remark Lenin made on a letter from Chicherin of March 10, 1922. "The new feature of our international scheme must consist in that the Negroid as well as *other colonial peoples should participate on an equal footing* with European peoples in conferences and commissions and have the right *not to allow interference* in their internal life."

He underscored these phrases in the letter several times and wrote in the margin "Correct!"

The birth of the new, socialist state brought into being fundamentally new objective conditions for the struggle of the working people in all countries against imperialism. In Lenin's view this was bound to affect the course and prospects of socialist revolutions in other countries as "the socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie—no, it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism."

How then did Soviet Russia develop relations with Eastern countries in practice? At first, the development of business relations with these countries was impeded by deeply rooted mistrust dating back to the policies of the tsarist government and by the Western imperialist governments' policy of fanning animosities. Soviet diplomacy had to convince public opinion in those countries that Soviet Russia was not a colonialist but a friend, and that it had made a clean break with the old policies. In its relations with Eastern countries Soviet diplomacy was guided by the all-important tenets of Marxist-Leninist science on the national question—non-interference in internal affairs, equality, assistance, self-

lessness, mutual advantage, sympathy and support in the struggle against the common enemy, imperialism.

Various forces were at work in Eastern countries. Among them were many that incited those countries against Soviet Russia. Soviet diplomacy had to decide whether those forces could be neutralised. Conventional yardsticks could not be applied to relations with Eastern countries. Instead of being disappointed at the fact that the national-liberation movement in this or that country was headed by the emergent national bourgeoisie, it was necessary to support its progressive initiatives and not to insist on immediate and full-scale relations with Soviet Russia.

In its ties with Eastern countries Soviet diplomacy was always guided—and still is—by Lenin's thesis on equitable relationships. The Soviet attitude is that there can be no second-rate relations just as there can be no second-rate peoples. The size of territory, and the racial, religious or other peculiarities of the peoples that inhabit them cannot be taken as the criteria determining the importance of relations. Soviet diplomats serving in Eastern countries have always been required to comply with national traditions and local customs. A diplomat is always a guest who must respect the hospitality of his host. This is no empty phrase. In contrast to imperialist governments, the socialist state has once and for all proclaimed and is firmly committed to the principle of respect for other countries and non-interference in their internal affairs. Our policy in the East has never been a policy of offensive, but always a policy of national liberation of the peoples, Foreign Commissar Chicherin repeatedly emphasised.

Today the Soviet Union's economic ties with

the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America hold a special place in economic relations with foreign countries. They are relations between countries with different economic systems, yet at the same time they are keynoted by international cooperation of a new type, which embodies the socialist ideals of solidarity and disinterested aid. Soviet economic assistance to developing nations rests on the principle of proletarian internationalism which Lenin described as "working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in *one's own* country, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy, and material aid) *this struggle, this and only this*, line, in every country without exception."

Soviet economic relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America are a form of support by socialism of the national-liberation movement, a form of union between the two great revolutionary torrents of today.

The Soviet Union has established commercial and economic relations with 47 developing nations. It has signed agreements on various forms of technological and economic cooperation with 35 countries.

Since 1965 Soviet trade with developing countries has grown sixfold.

The average annual growth rate of Soviet trade with developing nations in the last decade has been approximately 15 per cent as against the 3.2 per cent average annual growth of the total trade of those countries.

As regards the immediate prospects for the development of the Soviet Union's foreign trade with developing nations, according to Soviet economists, in terms of monetary value it may be expected to reach the sum of 3.3 thousand million roubles by 1970.

## Fraternal Friendship with People's Mongolia

After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution Soviet Russia began to develop relations with Mongolia on the same conditions as with other Eastern countries. In 1921, with the establishment of people's power in that country, Soviet-Mongolian relations became an example of fraternal relations between two nations.

The Moscow talks in 1920 paved the way for friendly ties between Soviet Russia and the patriotic forces of Mongolia.

Lenin took a keen interest in Soviet-Mongolian friendship from the very outset. Noteworthy in this respect is his conversation with a delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic in the Kremlin on November 5, 1921. During that meeting Lenin, replying to a question about his attitude to the creation of the People's Revolutionary Party in Mongolia, emphasised that the one and only correct path for the working people of Mongolia "is a struggle for state and economic independence in alliance with the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia. That struggle," he said, "cannot be waged in isolation; therefore the creation of a party of the Mongolian arats is a condition for the success of their struggle."

Lenin went on to discuss in detail the question of Mongolia's non-capitalist development—a subject he had earlier mentioned at the Second Congress of the Comintern on July 26, 1920 in the "Report of the Commission on the National and the Colonial Question."

In practice the non-capitalist path meant that the Mongolian people had to end the economic domination of feudalism. This implied eliminating the class of feudal owners and preventing the

development of capitalist elements, curbing all attempts by foreign capital—Japanese, American, and British—to gain a foothold in the country, and ousting Chinese trade and usury capital from Mongolia. To achieve these ends, in 1921 and 1922 the Mongolian People's Government abolished all class privileges of feudal lords and all requisitions for their upkeep. It also abolished serfdom and nationalised the lands. To eliminate feudal political rule it set up democratic organs of power, People's Khurals, throughout the country.

Soviet-Mongolian relations and their gradual consolidation, coupled with Soviet assistance to the Mongolian people, were a decisive factor in achieving these general democratic objectives of the Mongolian revolution.

Along with military, political, economic and cultural assistance the Soviet Government took several other measures to help Mongolia assert its economic independence. In 1924 the Soviet People's Commissariat of Finance helped establish the Mongolian Trade and Industrial Bank which became an important agency in strengthening economic relations between the USSR and Mongolia, developing the country's trade and industry and strengthening Mongolia's finances.

The establishment of the Mongolian National Bank—the first Asian bank to be set up without the financial capital of imperialist states—enabled Mongolia to introduce its own currency in 1925. To assure the normal functioning of the bank the Soviet Union granted Mongolia a loan of one million roubles.

Soviet-Mongolian trade has been for years growing steadily. The development of fraternal relations between the two countries was further enhanced by the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Economic

and Cultural Cooperation signed in February 1946. In 1966, the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was prolonged for another 20 years.

### The First Soviet-Iranian Treaty

The Soviet-Iranian Treaty was signed in Moscow on February 26, 1921. It was the first equitable treaty concluded by Iran with a great power in the last two centuries. It embodied the Leninist principles of Soviet Russia's nationalities policy.

In the Treaty the Soviet Government renounced all the privileges and concessions of the tsarist and provisional governments of Russia in Iran. It cancelled all treaties, conventions and agreements signed by tsarist Russia with third powers "to the detriment of Persia and with respect to it."

Of signal importance were Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty. Article 5 obliged both sides to prevent the formation or presence on their territory of organisations or armed groups hostile to the other side. "The two High Contracting Parties," the treaty stated, "agree that in the event that third powers, by means of armed intervention, shall attempt to implement a policy of aggrandisement on Persian territory or use Persian territory as a base for military operations against Russia, in the event that the frontiers of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic or of its allies are menaced and if, after the warning of the Russian Soviet Government, the Persian Government is unable to avert this menace, the Russian Soviet Government shall have the right to advance its troops into Persian territory, in order to take the necessary military action in self-defence. Upon removal of the said menace the

Russian Soviet Government undertakes immediately to withdraw its troops from Persian territory."

The significance of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty ranged far beyond the relations between the two countries. It enabled Iran to strengthen its positions in relations with other countries and it became an important factor of peace and security in the Middle East.

Another important landmark in the development of Soviet-Iranian relations was the trade agreement of 1927. As a result, by 1929 the trade turnover between the two countries exceeded the trade turnover between tsarist Russia and Iran before the First World War. Today Soviet-Iranian trade continues to develop. The new, recently signed agreements provide even greater prospects for trade between the two countries.

## Treaty of Friendship with Afghanistan

The national-liberation movement of the Afghan people, which gained added impetus under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution, put an end to British domination in Afghanistan, which had been stepped up after the Gandamak Treaty of 1879.

Amanullah Khan, who came to power in February 1919, declared the political independence of Afghanistan, and his government promptly proposed the establishment of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. "Inasmuch as you," Amanullah Khan wrote in his message, "and your associates—friends of mankind—have undertaken the honourable and lofty mission of safeguarding the peace and wellbeing of nations and have proclaimed the principles of freedom and equality of the countries and peoples of the whole world, I

am happy to be the first on behalf of the Afghan people, who desire progress, to send you this friendly message from independent and freedom-loving Afghanistan."

On March 27, 1919, the Soviet Government declared its recognition of Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty and informed Amanullah Khan that the old tsarist treaties signed in 1907 between Russian and Britain were annulled. On May 27, 1919, Kalinin, the Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, and Lenin, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, sent a message of reply to the King greeting the independence of Afghanistan. This created a favourable basis for good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

A plenipotentiary Afghan mission led by Mohammed Wali Khan arrived in Tashkent. On October 14, 1919, Wali Khan was received by Lenin in Moscow. Lenin greeted the envoy as the "representative of the friendly Afghan people, who are suffering from and struggling against imperialist oppression."

The Treaty of Friendship between the RSFSR and Afghanistan was signed on February 28, 1921. The Soviet-Afghan Treaty was Afghanistan's first equitable treaty with a great power.

Under it the two countries recognised each other's independence and bound themselves to respect it. "The High Contracting Parties," the treaty declared, "accept the freedom of the nations of the East on the basis of independence and in accordance with the general wish of each nation."

The RSFSR and Afghanistan further pledged themselves not to enter into any military or political alliances to the detriment of one another's interests. The Soviet Government granted Afghanistan the right of free and untaxed transit



through her territory of goods purchased in Soviet Russia or in other countries and promised to give Afghanistan financial and other material assistance.

The foundations of friendly relations between Russia and Afghanistan laid in Lenin's lifetime were greatly developed in the years to come.

Lenin highly appraised the importance of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty. In early May 1921, he wrote: "The Russian Soviet Government and the Afghan state have common interests in the East, and both states value their independence and want to see each other and all the Eastern peoples independent and free. The two states are drawn to each other not only by the above circumstances but also, and in particular, by the fact that between Afghanistan and Russia there are no issues that can give rise to differences or cast even a shadow on Russo-Afghan friendship." Emphasising that the old imperialist Russia had disappeared forever and that Afghanistan now had as its northern neighbour Soviet Russia, which had stretched out its hand of friendship and fraternity to all the peoples of the East, and the Afghan people in particular, Lenin noted: "The Afghan state was one of the first countries whose representatives we joyfully welcomed in Moscow, and we are happy to note that the first treaty of friendship signed by the Afghan people was the treaty with Russia."

On August 31, 1926, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression. The two countries undertook to observe neutrality in the event of either being involved in war. On August 6, 1965, the treaty was extended for another 10 years.

In the mid-1940s, favourable conditions appeared for the development of Soviet-Afghan trade and economic relations. In 1950, the first Soviet-

Afghan Trade and Payments Agreement was signed. This agreement became an important factor in expanding commercial and economic ties between the two countries. In the post-World War II period Afghanistan has become a major trade partner of the Soviet Union.

On August 16, 1965, a Soviet-Afghan communique on the visit to the USSR by the King of Afghanistan was published. It stated that "assistance by the Soviet Union has played an important role in implementing Afghanistan's first and second five-year development plans," and that "continuation of that assistance with a view to implementing the third five-year plan will have a great and positive effect on the economic development of Afghanistan."

### Soviet-Turkish Relations

The sultanate government of Turkey responded to repeated appeals by the Soviet Government for peace and friendship with an aggressive drive into the Transcaucasus. Practical possibilities for the establishment of friendly Soviet-Turkish relations appeared only after the formation of the National Government headed by Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the Turkish people's struggle against foreign imperialism and the reactionary government of the Sultan. On April 26, 1920 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sent a message to Lenin expressing his desire to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries and requesting assistance for Turkey's struggle for independence.

"We undertake," wrote Kemal Atatürk, "to join our entire efforts and all our military operations with the Russian Bolsheviks whose objecti-

ves are a struggle against imperialist governments and liberation of all oppressed from their rule."

The message was reported to Lenin on whose instructions a reply was sent to the National Government of Turkey on June 3, 1920 expressing satisfaction at Kemal Atatürk's message. Shortly thereafter Kemal Atatürk sent a delegation to Moscow for talks on a Soviet-Turkish Treaty. The Turkish representatives were received by Lenin. On August 24, 1920, delegates of the RSFSR and Turkey initialled the draft of the treaty which laid down the basic principles of relations between the two countries. Agreement was also reached on granting Turkish patriots financial aid and supplies of arms and materiel.

During the Moscow talks Kemal's envoy Bekir Sami-Bey contravened his instructions and did his utmost to prevent agreement. In his dispatches to Ankara he misrepresented the Soviet Eastern policy. In the autumn of 1920, the Entente powers succeeded in provoking a war between Kemalist Turkey and Dashnak Armenia. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey refused to ratify the draft treaty initialled in Moscow. The Kemalist armies smashed the Dashnak forces and seized a sizable portion of Armenia.

In November 1920, the working people of Armenia rebelled against the Dashnaks and declared Armenia a Soviet Republic. Nonetheless, the Turkish Government signed the Alexandropol Treaty with the Dashnak Government which no longer represented anyone. The governments of Soviet Armenia and the RSFSR categorically refused to recognise this unjust treaty which reflected the predatory aspirations of expansionist circles in the Turkish Government.

The Dashnak-Kemalist war complicated the situation in the Caucasus and caused tension in Soviet-Turkish relations. But the plans of the En-

tente powers were destined to fail. As Lenin pointed out: "The Turkish offensive was planned against us. The Entente had been laying a trap for us, but fell into it itself, for we gained Soviet Armenia."

New talks between Turkey and Soviet Russia began in Moscow in February 1921. Lenin followed these talks very closely as is evident from several entries in the diary of Lenin's secretariat for this period.

Addressing a plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet on February 26, Lenin referred to the beginning of the Soviet-Turkish talks: "The first is our conference with Turkish delegates which has opened here in Moscow. This is an especially welcome fact, because there had been many obstacles to direct negotiations with the Turkish Government delegation, and now that there is an opportunity of reaching an understanding here in Moscow, we feel sure that a firm foundation will be laid for closer relations and friendship. Of course, this will not be achieved through diplomatic machinations (in which, we are not afraid to admit, our adversaries have the edge on us), but through the fact that over the past few years both nations have had to endure untold suffering at the hands of the imperialist powers. . . We know that these negotiations will proceed within a very modest framework, but they are important because the workers and peasants of all countries are drawing steadily closer together, despite all the formidable obstructions. This is something we should bear in mind when assessing our present difficulties."

A Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity was signed by the RSFSR and Turkey on March 16, 1921 in Moscow. It was followed on October 13 by the signing in Kars of a Treaty of Friendship

between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics—Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Underlying these treaties were the principles of mutual respect and equality. The Soviet side recognised the Grand National Assembly and the Kemal Government as the sole legal national government of the sovereign and independent Turkey. It also recognised the established frontiers. The Black Sea Straits were declared open for the merchant shipping of all nations.

The question of the final status of the Straits was to be turned over to a conference of Black Sea powers on condition that such a conference should safeguard the sovereignty and independence of Turkey and the security of Istanbul. The Soviet-Turkish treaties also contained several provisions concerning consular, financial and commercial relations.

On March 15, 1961, on the 40th anniversary of the treaty of 1921, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet sent the Turkish head of state and the Prime Minister a telegram stating: "This historic treaty, concluded between our countries with the participation of V. I. Lenin and Kemal Atatürk at a time when the two countries were fighting the imperialist forces, facilitated the victory of the Turkish people in their national-liberation war and the establishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic."

Simultaneously with the signing of the Moscow Treaty on March 16, 1921, agreement was reached by the representatives of the RSFSR and Turkey on financial aid to Turkey amounting to 10 million gold roubles for the purchase of arms and supplies for the army. Of this sum 5.4 million roubles were transferred to Turkey in instalments in April, May and June 1921.

“As a result of our friendship with the Russians,” Atatürk pointed out, “we obtained chiefly from them a considerable number of cannon, rifles and shells.”

Relations between the two countries were greatly promoted by the mission to Turkey in 1921-22 of Mikhail Frunze, the outstanding Soviet military leader. On January 2, 1922, the special Soviet mission led by him signed in Ankara a Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity between Turkey and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Atatürk highly appreciated Frunze's visit to Turkey. In a telegram to M. I. Kalinin, Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, and G. I. Petrovsky, Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, he wrote: “The fact that with the purpose of signing a treaty of friendship with us and still more concretely reaffirming the political, economic and other relations existing between our two peoples, the Government of the Ukrainian Republic has sent to us Mr. Frunze, one of the most prominent political leaders and the Commander-in-Chief, and also one of the most valiant and heroic commanders of the Red Army, and the fact that this decision was communicated to us on the eve of the battle of Sakarya (in which the Turks defeated the Greeks—*Ed.*) and at a time when the enemy had announced to the world that our final defeat was a matter of the near future, evokes a particularly deep feeling of gratitude among the members of the National Assembly.”

The Soviet Government took great care to ensure that it met all its obligations to Turkey. For instance, when in February 1922 Sokolnikov proposed postponing payments to Turkey under the Moscow Treaty, Chicherin immediately sent a letter to the Politbureau insisting on the prompt

fulfilment of all such obligations. Lenin supported Chicherin.\* In a note to the Politbureau he wrote: "I believe Chicherin is absolutely right and I suggest that the Politbureau decide: 'Chicherin's point of view is confirmed. What has been promised shall be paid out unconditionally and at the appointed time.'" The Politbureau did confirm Chicherin's viewpoint.

The above examples demonstrate that, guided by Lenin, the Soviet foreign policy in the East provided moral and political support for the colonial and semi-colonial peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence. Lenin pointed out that the Soviet Socialist Republic was acting in the East not only as a representative of the proletarians of all countries but also as a representative of the oppressed peoples and that the Bolsheviks were creating completely different international relations which gave all oppressed peoples an opportunity to rid themselves of the imperialist yoke. "...events," Lenin declared, "are teaching the people to regard Russia as a centre of attraction."

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\* On the next day Chicherin again referred to this question: "I do not feel at all well. I have had to cancel some of my business for today... I have been deeply affected by the demand for a violation of the treaty with Turkey; I cannot recall ever having been so distressed. Today I can hardly move."

## Lenin and the Ideological Struggle in the Period of Peaceful Coexistence

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After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, Lenin said that there were two forces in the world that could determine the destiny of mankind. One force was international capitalism and the other the international proletariat which was fighting for socialist revolution.

These two forces embody the two opposed ideologies. This is why Lenin laid such emphasis on the use of socialism's force of example. With the victory of the socialist revolution in one country the principal class contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie embraced the field of international relations as well. The struggle between these two forces is the major problem of both past and present international relations.

Each of the two socio-economic systems is dominated by a certain class—the capitalist class in the capitalist system and the working class in



the socialist system. An irreconcilable struggle is in progress between them and this struggle makes up the main content of our epoch. Ideology is known as the conscience of a class and the theoretically conceived expression of its fundamental interests. Since various classes hold different positions in the system of social production, they also espouse different ideologies. These differing ideological views and contradictions will exist as long as the two different systems exist.

Relations between the two systems are not restricted to inter-state relations alone. Their very existence is an expression of the struggle for the minds of men and for the choice by mankind of a better form of the organisation of society.

We are living in an epoch of momentous social transformations and extremely acute ideological battles. The ideological struggle does not cease for a single moment. It is no longer the domain of individual theoreticians: it has extended far beyond the studies of isolated scholars. As Lenin pointed out, "its arena is the whole world, its audience are all the peoples of the planet, its participants are all the political contingents of the present time—states, parties, social organisations."

In the ideological struggle the Soviet system has never yielded its positions, and never will. "The *only* choice," Lenin emphasised, "is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a 'third' ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology)."

There can be no reconciliation between these ideologies. The bourgeois countries, Lenin emphasised, prevented the new system brought into being by the October Revolution "from at once taking the step forward that would have justi-

fied the forecasts of the socialists, that would have enabled the latter to develop the productive forces with enormous speed, to develop all the potentialities which, taken together, would have produced socialism; socialists would thus have proved to all and sundry that socialism contains within itself gigantic forces and that mankind had now entered into a new stage of development of extraordinarily brilliant prospects."

Socialism gradually achieved one success after another, thereby increasing its influence on working people in other countries. The first decrees of the Soviet government ensuring freedom and peace to the peoples, land to the peasants, an eight-hour working day, free education and free medical care attracted the attention of the peoples. The bourgeois ideologists realised this at once. A very apt pronouncement was made on this score by the American publicist Gilbert Green in his book *The Enemy Forgotten*: Before there was a Soviet Union it was possible to get large numbers of people to believe that economic crises were unavoidable and unexplainable. Hard times had to be taken as just plain hard luck. Depressions were explained by sun-spot theories, as the will of God, or what have you.

But these views, he said, could not stand up when the Soviet Union did away with unemployment and proved its immunity to economic crisis during the 'thirties, at a time when the whole capitalist world was being ravaged by the worst economic crisis in history. Thus, for the first time in American history the majority of the American people began to hold the social system and the government responsible for unemployment and depression.

In relationships with the bourgeoisie Lenin regarded "the strictest possible dedication to the

ideas of communism and no concessions in the field of ideology" as a paramount duty. He sharply criticised those who ventured even to mention such concessions.

Once Chicherin suggested to Lenin that the Soviet Constitution should be amended so as to make an ideological concession for the sake of achieving a treaty with America. In a letter to Lenin dated January 20, 1922, Chicherin wrote: "Dear Vladimir Ilyich, if the Americans insist very much on representative institutions, don't you think *it would be possible* in return for a decent compensation, to introduce a slight change in our Constitution, very important in principle and ideologically, but practically of no consequence: to grant representation in the Soviets also to the parasitic elements, in their own assemblies.\*

"Next to an election meeting of workers of such and such a factory or of Red Army men of such and such a unit there would be an election meeting of parasites, and for every 2,000 members of the Soviet they would have two or three representatives. To the Americans we would explain that we have group representation. Representative des intérêts. This *even*\*\* recalls the drafts of the French monarchists, like King Philip VIII. And all this with universal suffrage. With Communist greetings, Chicherin."

Lenin was indignant. In a letter of January 23, 1922 to members of the Politbureau he wrote: "I have just received two letters from Chicherin (dated 20th and 22nd). He asks whether we might not, for a decent compensation, agree to slight amendments to our Constitution, namely

\* Next to these words Lenin wrote in the margin: "Madness!"

\*\* Lenin underscored this word twice.

representation for parasitic elements in the Soviets. To do this as a favour to the Americans.

"Chicherin's proposal shows, in my view, that he should immediately be sent to a sanatorium; any kind of connivance in this respect, any postponement and so forth, will, in my view, greatly endanger the entire talks."

This episode graphically illustrates Lenin's irreconcilable approach to the ideological struggle in the period of peaceful coexistence.

It should be emphasised that peaceful coexistence does not imply an end to the class struggle or, consequently, an end to the struggle in the ideological sphere. Since ideas are embraced by the broad masses, it is for the masses themselves to judge how true they are, how scientifically justified and progressive, and how well they reflect their interests.

The ideology of the working class is Marxism-Leninism. That ideology is the highest achievement of science and culture, and it reflects most correctly the laws governing the changes and the development of reality—nature, society and the working people's interests.

Taking root in the minds of the working masses, the Marxist-Leninist ideology has become a powerful material force. In five decades it has become part of the very lifeblood of the working people in socialist society.

Does the ideological struggle waged by the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties abroad contradict the idea of peaceful coexistence? Does the ideological struggle carry a threat to peaceful coexistence? Does the one contradict the other? The answer to these questions is "No." In fact, the ideological struggle promotes peaceful coexistence which grips the minds and hearts of ever increasing numbers of people in various countries. The

struggle between the socialist and the bourgeois ideologies helps to distinguish between those forces that support peaceful coexistence and favour its consolidation and development, and those that oppose it.

The vitality of the socialist ideology helps to expose the enemies of peaceful coexistence. It helps to multiply the peace-loving forces, and to promote their political awareness, their confidence in the struggle for peace and peaceful co-operation.

In the struggle between the two camps Lenin attached decisive importance to the young Soviet state which became the centre of attraction for all anti-imperialist forces. The Soviet Russian Republic, he said, "groups around it, on the one hand, the Soviet movements of advanced workers of all countries and, on the other hand, all the national-liberation movements of the colonies and of the oppressed peoples."

In analysing the ideological struggle between the young socialist Republic and capitalist countries, Lenin stressed the paramount importance of the levels of economic development and military might. But he did not reduce the concept of the alignment of forces of the opposed systems merely to a comparison of material forces and military potentials.

In his practical and theoretical activities Lenin devoted great attention to moral and political factors. He wrote in 1921: "Materially—economically and militarily—we are extremely weak; but morally—by which, of course, I mean not abstract morals, but the alignment of the real forces of all classes in all countries—we are the strongest of all. This has been proved in practice; it has been proved not merely by words but by deeds..."

In the ideological struggle Lenin attached particular significance to providing the working masses in capitalist countries with true information about developments in Soviet Russia. He sought to utilise every opportunity to tell them the truth about the first Republic of Soviets, about its plans, its achievements and its problems, about the fundamentals of its foreign and home policies. He exposed all kinds of slanderous statements by bourgeois ideologists and by the bourgeois press. Lenin realized the significance of statements in the bourgeois press because he was fully aware that millions of working people in the capitalist countries were its readers.

Lenin called upon his comrades-in-arms closely to follow ideological trends abroad. In a telegram to Litvinov of December 28, 1919, he recommended the collection in all languages of "all the documents, resolutions, pamphlets, newspaper articles and speeches dealing with the ideological trends in Left-wing socialism and communism, especially anarcho-syndicalist, distortions of communism or attacks on communism."

Attempts by bourgeois politicians to impose on socialism peaceful coexistence in the sphere of ideology constitute direct ideological subversion, whose objective is to disarm millions of builders of the communist society spiritually and ideologically, and to get them to capitulate "peacefully" to imperialism.

Peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle by peaceful means which has appeared in the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism.

It is a struggle between the two opposite formations waged in political, economic and ideological forms.

The political struggle carried on by the socia-

list camp in the international arena is, first and foremost, a struggle for peace and against the unleashing of a new war, a struggle for disarmament. The socialist countries consistently expose aggressive imperialist policies and strengthen and broaden the ranks of champions of peace. In this way they render great moral and political support to the forces fighting for peace in the capitalist countries and to the national-liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries.

The economic struggle between socialism and capitalism takes the form of competition between the two socio-economic systems. Many years ago Lenin declared that in the final analysis socialism would win out in peaceful competition by securing a higher productivity of labour than could be achieved in a capitalist society. Lenin's prediction is today becoming reality.

As regards the ideological struggle, the absolute irreconcilability of the socialist and the bourgeois ideologies is a fact of life. It stems from the fundamental differences between the coexisting socialist and capitalist social systems, and from the antagonistic contradictions between them. Objectively, these contradictions spring from the complete dissimilarity of the basic interests of the dominating classes of the two systems—the working classes in socialist states and the exploiting classes in capitalist states. The clash of these interests forms the very essence of the class struggle, which manifests itself in various forms, including the ideological form.

Bourgeois ideology is reactionary because it is the product of the old, moribund system, the product of the exploiting classes. Communists struggle against the bourgeois ideology and for dissemination of socialist ideology.

The ruling quarters and ideologists of the bourgeois system, who wish to destroy the socialist system or at least to weaken its revolutionising influence on the world, are mounting a powerful offensive on the ideological front. Bourgeois politicians and ideologists, reformists and various revisionists seek, on the one hand, to weaken the impression made by the swift growth of the economic and political might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist system as a whole, and to slander socialism, and, on the other hand, to embellish capitalist reality and to prove, in the face of facts, that in the peaceful coexistence and economic competition of the two systems capitalism will be the winner. The ideologists of American imperialism even go so far as to assert that in the United States socialism is a thing of the past. For instance, in 1952, the historians of the Du Pont Corporation declared: "A century ago, Karl Marx dreamed and wrote of a Utopia where the people would own the tools of production and share in their output. His dream has come true, not in the communist state founded on the theories he propounded so ardently, but in capitalistic America."

However, the more sober-minded people in the West do not hesitate to admit that modern capitalism lacks a goal, an ideal which could light up the hearts of men. This idea has been expressed by the West German scholar W. Schenke. He wrote that capitalism should counter communism "...with its own ideal of a social system which would be more in accord than Marxism with the man of today and with eternal natural order and justice." This problem was also discussed at an international conference in Oslo organised by the Norwegian Nobel Institute in June 1955. Its participants declared that the West was vulnerable as it had no "spiritual ideal" that could unite the



masses.

That is why bourgeois ideologists and politicians call for "additional emphasis" on the elaboration of an ideological programme that would make it possible to win over man's mind and heart. Lacking such ideals, the spiritual spear-carriers of capitalism resort to all manner of falsifications, so as to create at least a semblance of such ideals. In their futile attempts to hold back the spread of communist ideas, and to weaken their attractive force they use new concepts and forms of propaganda to mislead the working people. They preach the theories of "people's capitalism" and the "welfare state," "human relationships in production," and reformist and revisionist assertions that present-day capitalism is ridding itself, or can rid itself, of its evils and that it is gradually being transformed into "democratic socialism."

The main ideological and political weapon of imperialism is anti-communism—a political and propaganda effort aimed at combatting communism. Anti-communism is distinguished from other trends of bourgeois policy by its extremely bellicose nature, by the fact that it subordinates all economic, political and other forces to one goal—the destruction of communism.

The methods of anti-communism include slander of the socialist countries, falsification of the policies of Communist Parties and of the theory of Marxism-Leninism. It is no secret that imperialist reaction is mobilising all means of ideological influence on the masses in its attempts to defend the world of exploitation and rightlessness, the world of military adventures, and to smear communism and its aims. The varieties and forms of bourgeois ideology and the methods and means of influencing the masses are manifold.

But their essence is always the defence of the moribund capitalist system.

The "old" anti-communism that existed in the time of Marx and Engels used extremely crude, primitive and unsophisticated methods, such as ruthless terror against revolutionaries. This was because the working-class movement was then still in an infancy stage. At that time the ideas of scientific communism had only just begun to spread among the more advanced workers—they were a "spectre," little known to the masses of working people. At that time anti-communism had the support of a broader social basis, and all organisations of the bourgeoisie were, in the main, united in their struggle against the "enemies of property and order," the Communists.

With the spread of the ideology of scientific communism and the growth of the working-class movement at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries the situation changed. The bourgeois ideologists were compelled to alter their crude methods and to devise special "scientific" theories for the struggle against communism, and to start criticising it all along the line. The struggle between scientific communism and its opponents thus became the hub of the entire ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism.

After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the successes achieved in building socialist society it became increasingly difficult for bourgeois ideologists to depict communism as a negative force. They had to devise a new strategy and tactics.

With the formation of the world socialist system, which has achieved signal successes in its economic, scientific, technological and cultural development, anti-communism was again compelled to regroup. The ideologists of anti-commu-

nism include "theoreticians" of the most diverse types, but all of them seek to smear the policy of peaceful coexistence. Some of them openly call for an outright armed struggle against communism. For instance, the West German journalist W. Schlamm writes that since communism thrives on the soil of peace, wants peace and triumphs in conditions of peace it should be destroyed by means of war.

The American anti-communists Walt Rostow, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Frenchman R. Aron preach the theory of the gradual convergence of socialism and capitalism as a result of the transformation of socialism into an "industrial" society of the capitalist type. Then, they believe, "the hostile ideologies which today give us so much trouble will die a natural death."

One of the trends in anti-communist propaganda are attempts to discredit Marxism-Leninism, the scientific outlook of Communists. Today the critics of communism allege that Marxism-Leninism is obsolete and incompatible with the present-day epoch. Marxism-Leninism is criticised from a standpoint of "ethics" or "human values." It is asserted that Marxism-Leninism disregards these values, that it ignores the freedom of the individual and implants violence.

With the development of the mass media national boundaries become a very relative barrier for the dissemination of ideas and views. The modern mass media bring the common man closer to events, no matter how far away they occur. This makes it possible for the masses themselves to assess the activities of a party or a government. This they do quite successfully in familiarising themselves with the situation in the socialist countries and with the successes they are achieving in economic, scientific, cultural and

other fields of development. Interest in Marxism-Leninism grows with the growth of socialism and its prestige. Familiarisation with Marxism helps honest men and women in various countries to break with the bourgeois ideology and to form Left-wing trends in the bourgeois ideological schools.

The weakness of the positions of anti-communism is caused by several objective factors. Most important among them are the radical changes that have taken place and are continuing to take place in a world divided into two opposite camps, the successes of the socialist system and the changes in the alignment of social forces in the capitalist countries, all of which narrow down the social basis of anti-communism.

Of course, the bourgeois ideology prevails to this day in the capitalist world. But its influence on the masses is slackening because its ideas no longer reflect the genuine requirements of social development or the interests of the bulk of the population. Today overtones of pessimism can be heard in bourgeois ideology—its proponents are beginning to realise that what the future holds out for capitalism is not boundless opportunities but unavoidable collapse.

This is the content of the more popular and influential trends in the modern bourgeois "philosophy of history." One example in this respect is the "cyclic" theory which was originally formulated by the German philosopher Oswald Spengler, and which is today upheld by the British historian and sociologist Arnold Toynbee and others.

According to this theory, history is divided into civilisations that are isolated from one another and each of which passes through sequences of birth, uplift, efflorescence, decline and downfall. When one cycle has been completed the

next cycle begins from the same starting point and travels the same circle. The meaning of this theory is clear. Bourgeois ideologists are trying to prove that the replacement of capitalism by socialism implies not the progress but the regression of human civilisation.

Official Western bourgeois propaganda is increasing its clamour about freedom of democracy, about human values, about the rights and dignity of the individual. In reality, however, the system of political ideas in the capitalist countries serves to intensify interference in all spheres of the life of the working people.

It would be wrong to assert that the greater part of the population in the capitalist countries has been won over to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In many countries there is still a long way to go before this goal can be reached. But certain views and ideals have become deeply rooted among the masses of the working class, and they have helped them become aware of their true interests. Under the influence of these ideals the working people are growing increasingly aware of the abnormality of a situation where economic power is exclusively concentrated in the hands of a small group of monopolies. As a result they are losing their belief in private property and state power.

This is why in the world-wide struggle for the minds and souls of men imperialism finds itself in the peculiar situation of having either to act under slogans it has stolen from its class opponents or else to turn to its bourgeois-democratic predecessors.

In analysing the ideological processes underway in capitalist countries today, it would be quite wrong to oversimplify the situation. It goes without saying that the espousal of progressive ideas

by the masses constitutes a complex and contradictory process, not a single and instantaneous act. During that process bourgeois ideas, views and prejudices are overcome gradually. Situations may sometimes appear when the advanced ideology wins not in "peaceful coexistence" but in struggle and acute clashes.

It should also be borne in mind in examining the ideology of the ruling bourgeois class that an ideological struggle proceeds within that class as well, a struggle between the moderates and the "fanatics." But this does not alter the decisive fact—the "division" of the official ideological doctrine of the ruling bourgeoisie into an ideology "for itself" and an ideology "for the masses." This is laid bare with particular clarity when the bourgeois ideals directly clash with the ideals of socialism and communism, chiefly in the field of foreign policy propaganda.

In this sphere the bourgeois class has been disguising its true goals since time immemorial. Today it is posing as a champion of peace, while trying to shift the blame for the war threat onto the socialist countries. It has also had to resort to new terms, such as the "free world," the "Western democracies" and so forth. In this way it attempts, first, to increase the appeal of bourgeois ideas and, secondly, to mask the principal conflict in society—the struggle between classes—behind a rosy picture of peace and accord, to make it appear as if the ruling system has long since ceased to be capitalism and has transformed itself into a "people's", "democratic" capitalism or an "enterprising" democracy. The struggle, it is alleged, is between "Western freedom" and "communist totalitarianism."

This complicates the struggle, since politically unsophisticated are sometimes misled, confused and deluded. Ultimately, however, the outcome

of the struggle will undoubtedly be decided by objective factors through the peaceful competition of the two systems. And the decisive role will belong not to words, but to deeds, and to the practical contribution that is made to implementing the ideals that attract increasing segments of mankind to its banners.

Bourgeois propaganda mounts its fiercest attacks against the foreign policy of the socialist countries. It seeks to picture it as an "agressive" policy and to make the masses believe that the Soviet Union threatens the peace.

Its allegations are to the advantage of the bourgeoisie in many respects. It uses them, in the first place, to disguise the real purposes of its own foreign policy, its main trends and the causes of the war threat, and thereby to justify its own actions. Bourgeois propaganda endeavours to discredit the true situation in socialist countries. It would be hard indeed to find a single aspect of life that has not been the target of attacks by bourgeois propaganda. They include the system of state, the culture, morals, the Communist Parties, and various practical measures carried out in the socialist countries.

The recipes for these attacks were formulated long ago. Their forms and methods are clearly defined. Bourgeois ideologists try to portray the Communist Parties as an "anti-national" force which is allegedly operating "from without," on the instructions of a foreign state, namely the Soviet Union. They completely distort the tactical principles of Communist Parties by alleging that these parties resort to each and every possible means to achieve their objectives—from lies to acts of terror.

It is not fortuitous that in many countries of the bourgeois world a broad study has been undertaken of communist ideology, the history of

the socialist countries, and their economy and social relations. Dozens of special institutes and research centres operate in the United States, Britain, Federal Germany and several other countries to study the USSR and other socialist countries and to train "experts." A wealth of special literature on this subject is being published.

In the past, when the ideologists of the bourgeoisie could rely on the strength of their own ideas, when they believed those ideas could ensure their spiritual domination in society, they staked on "free competition" of ideas. But times have changed. Today the bourgeois ideologists can no longer ensure the spiritual domination of their ideas in society through free competition. That is why the ideological struggle has become in many countries an instrument of state policy.

The best illustration of this change is the policy of state-monopoly capitalism which provides unlimited opportunities for interference in all spheres of life. The state maintains a big apparatus for this purpose. Suffice it to name several radio stations and propaganda centres associated with the "Crusade for Freedom" which was founded in 1949. They include Radio Free Europe, the Committee for Free Asia, Radio Liberation and others. In the same category are organisations like Moral Rearmament, The Common Cause, Peace and Freedom, and others.

Extensive use is also made of private firms, mostly owned by the monopolies, such as newspapers and publishing organisations, motion picture and broadcasting companies.

The bourgeoisie is shifting the centre of gravity in the ideological struggle to the perfection of techniques, methods and tactics of propaganda. Writing on this subject, the progressive American philosopher Charles S. Seely has pointed



out that the situation obtaining in the world is very favourable to socialism since the philosophy of capitalism contains many ideas that have been discredited or are plainly obsolete. The upshot of this situation, which undermines the defences of capitalism, is that the extremely sophisticated propaganda techniques, designed to build up powerful emotions so as to mislead and confuse the ignorant, become indispensable for the effective dissemination of the discredited and obsolete ideas on which capitalism depends for support. Without these techniques capitalism would soon find itself defeated.

Why is it then that the socialist world—the Soviet Union and all socialist countries—do not renounce the ideological struggle while advocating peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world? Why do they not extend peaceful coexistence to the ideological struggle?

The essence of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence is—and this is the basic reason why peaceful coexistence is linked with the ideological struggle—that it implies not a coexistence of state systems, but of states belonging to opposite socio-political systems. Relations between systems cannot be reduced merely to inter-state relations as each system is based on the rule of contrary classes—the working class in one case, and the capitalists in the other.

The two opposing systems are headed by two irreconcilable classes. The struggle between them is continuing and it is this struggle that will decide which of the two systems can prove its superiority. The struggle began in October 1917 and it will continue until the complete victory of socialism, as the most progressive social system, throughout the world.

Such is the law of history. No one can either rescind or alter it. It exists objectively.

But the choice of directions, forms and methods in the ideological struggle does largely depend on governments and on the skill of the ruling parties. In concentrating attention on peaceful coexistence, the Communist Parties proceed from the fact that it is precisely through the peaceful coexistence of the opposed systems that this struggle can be prevented from developing into an armed conflict between states and channelled into a course that is in the interests of mankind. Communists believe that it is not wars between states but the will of the peoples that must decide which of the two systems can secure for the working classes a higher level of wellbeing and freedom, and the best conditions for the development of the individual.

Peaceful coexistence, economic competition and ideological struggle are what Marxist-Leninists offer as an alternative to world nuclear war—today mankind has no other alternative.

In contrast to bourgeois ideologists and the imperialist policy of predatory wars the Communists consider it their main duty to uphold the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and oppose the export of counter-revolution.

Naturally enough, the Communists cannot fail to express their fraternal solidarity with those who are fighting for their social and national liberation. They deem it their international duty to assist a nation that has risen in struggle against its oppressors. Marxist-Leninists have always opposed the export of revolution—but at the same time they have never recognised, nor will they ever recognise, anyone's right to export counter-revolution.

The export of counter-revolution is a major international crime, and Communists mobilise all the progressive social forces to prevent this

from ever happening and to defend the principles of peaceful coexistence. In this way they are rendering mankind an inestimable service.

Why cannot the concept of "ideological unity" be applied in conditions of peaceful coexistence and ideological struggle?

In practice this would imply the acceptance by the whole world of either of two ideologies—the bourgeois or the socialist. But since neither side wants to capitulate ideologically, this would only serve to intensify the struggle for the "true faith."

In capitalist countries the struggle between bourgeois and socialist ideas goes on continuously and without any outside interference. It began long before any socialist states appeared in the world. This struggle is also going on in the socialist countries, where even after the victory of the working class bourgeois ideology still has a foothold in the minds and traditions of the people. Can these two trends be "ideological neighbours"? Of course not.

Some Western ideologists are exhorting their governments to demand that the socialist countries end the ideological struggle as a condition for peaceful coexistence. The political implications of this demand boil down to an attempt to help bourgeois ideology penetrate the socialist countries and thereby bring about a bourgeois degeneration of socialist ideology.

Bourgeois ideologists fly into a rage when they hear Communists affirming that their ideas will ultimately win. But this is what the Communists believe. Their adversaries are free to disagree with them. The important thing is to decide the argument without the use of arms.

The ideological struggle does not impede the consolidation of peace or the development of bu-

business ties between the countries belonging to the opposite systems.

History shows that it is not the ideological struggle or ideological differences that underlie most of the problems causing the threat of war or international tensions. In actual fact international tension is engendered by the lust of the monopolies for the super-profits to be had from pursuing a rapacious and predatory policy. After all, in the last five decades, for instance, wars have broken out not over ideological differences but for the sake of material profits, the conquest of new lands, sources of raw materials and markets.

There were conflicts and wars between states before the socialist countries appeared in the world. The establishment of the socialist system certainly intensified the ideological struggle, but socialism itself became a deterrent of war.

Differences in ideology did not prevent the Soviet Union and capitalist powers such as the USA, Britain, France and others from cooperating in the Second World War. In our time the Soviet Union, India, Afghanistan, Finland and many other states espouse differing ideologies, which does not hinder their peaceful coexistence.

What is really necessary is the struggle of ideas, and discussions about the interpretation and evaluation of various phenomena, about the achievements or advantages of one system or the other. This argument, if it is conducted in a correct manner, cannot hinder the improvement of relations between capitalist and socialist countries.

It is quite another matter when a campaign of slander is conducted, when there is incitement to commit sabotage, when various rumours are spread to cause havoc and confusion. Such propaganda is not ideological struggle. It is sub-

version and interference in the internal affairs of states. This is incompatible with peaceful co-existence. In upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence the Communists are not suggesting or demanding that the bourgeoisie should reverse its thinking on any ideological subject. At the same time the Soviet Union rejects all attempts to get it to betray the communist ideals.

The experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the struggle for peace proves that a consistent and principled ideological struggle is a prime condition for the defence of peace.

### Lenin on the Anti-Marxist Substance of the Theory of the Export of Revolution

According to Marxist-Leninist ideology, the prime cause of the development of phenomena of nature or of society lies within those phenomena, not outside them, and internal, not external, causes are the basis of change. Marxism-Leninism believes that the victory of socialism on a world-wide scale will come about not through the overthrow of the capitalist order from without, but through the internal effects of revolutionary forces inside the capitalist countries.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels showed convincingly that "...revolutions cannot be made deliberately or arbitrarily and that revolutions have always and everywhere been the necessary consequence of circumstances..."

Marxist-Leninists firmly adhere to these views.

Lenin ruled out the export of revolution to other countries. He regarded revolution as a product of the development of internal social conditions in one country or another and he cate-

gorically rejected the "pushing" of a revolution, for "such a push can be given only by war, never by peace."

From the rostrum of the 8th Congress of the RCP(B) he declared for all the world to hear on March 19, 1919: "Not through violence is communism implanted, not through the 'export' of revolution, not 'on Red Army bayonets,' not through conquest is Bolshevism implanted."

It should be pointed out that the theory of the export of revolution as such is a very harmful one for it deprives the working-class movement, the Communist Parties and the masses of initiative, it dooms them to passivity, to a mood of waiting for the day when someone brings in the revolution from outside. At the same time the idea of the export of revolution promotes the revival of nationalism and other petty bourgeois prejudices, isolates the revolutionary vanguard and retards the development of revolution or the victory of socialism.

The export of revolution would be particularly dangerous in modern times because the forcible imposition of revolution on the peoples would be an adventure that could result in a disastrous nuclear war.

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia proved in practice that revolutions are not exported or made to order. The socialist revolution of 1917 was the logical result of internal revolutionary processes in which the conditions essential for its victory came into being over a long period of time. The emergence of socialism beyond the limits of one country and its growth into a world system were not the outcome of the export of revolution either—they were the outcome of internal and logical revolutionary processes which had been going on inside each of the countries concerned.

Lenin always rebutted allegations about the interference of Soviet Russia in the domestic affairs of other countries with a view to establishing revolutionary regimes in them. "Of course," he said in 1918, "there are people who believe that revolution can break out in a foreign country to order, by agreement. These people are either mad or they are provocateurs. We have experienced two revolutions during the past twelve years. We know that revolutions cannot be made to order, or by agreement; they break out when tens of millions of people come to the conclusion that it is impossible to live in the old way any longer."

Lenin sharply criticised the "Left" Communists who demanded that Soviet Russia should "push" the revolutions in other countries. "Such a 'theory,'" he said, "would be completely at variance with Marxism, for Marxism has always been opposed to 'pushing' revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions."

On October 5, 1919, responding to the question "Is the Soviet Government prepared to guarantee absolute non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states?" put by a correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, Lenin replied: "We are willing to guarantee it."

Allegations about the export of revolution are also rebutted by the fact that the forms of the transition of various countries to socialism are determined by the concrete internal conditions in the country concerned. "All nations," Lenin said, "will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate

of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life."

Life has fully corroborated the correctness of Lenin's thesis. Today along with the Soviet form of the transformation of society along socialist lines there also exists the form of a people's democracy. As regards the future, it was pointed out at the 20th Congress of the CPSU that the forms of the transition of various countries to socialism could be still more diverse.

Bourgeois ideologists are doing their utmost to ascribe to Communists non-existent methods of imposing Marxist ideas upon other peoples and countries by force, of eliminating capitalism and forcibly establishing a socialist regime. On this score Lenin said: "...any Russian who contemplated the task of overthrowing international imperialism on the basis of Russian forces would be a lunatic."

The scientific theory of social development and the experience of history teach that the replacement of the capitalist system by a higher social formation—socialism—is inevitable. Hence the unshakable belief of the Communists that communism will triumph in all countries. But this change can occur only when the appropriate objective conditions come into being inside each country. And whether this process takes place peacefully or violently is something that depends on the resistance of the moribund exploiting classes. In his time Friedrich Engels pointed out that "in the place of moribund reality comes a new, viable reality—peacefully if the old has enough intelligence to go to its death without a struggle; forcibly if it resists this necessity."

Today the fallacious theory of the export of revolution is invoked under a variety of guises—in the form of assertions about the danger of "indirect aggression" and so forth. The authors



of these "theories" seek to depict matters as if eternal peace and tranquillity would reign supreme in the capitalist world were it not for the "subversive activity" of the Soviet Union, the "Kremlin intrigues" or the "hand of Moscow." Charges that Communists want to export revolution are completely devoid of foundation. "The rule of capitalism," Lenin emphasised on several occasions, "is being undermined not because somebody is out to seize power. 'Seizure' of power would be senseless. It would be impossible to put an end to the rule of capitalism if the whole course of economic development in the capitalist countries did not lead up to it... No power could destroy capitalism if it were not sapped and undermined by history."

It is beyond all doubt that the capitalist system, which no longer meets the interests of mankind's progressive development, will have to give way to the socialist system. What forms the transition to the socialist organisation of society will take and, in this connection, what forms the peaceful coexistence of the two systems will take, is something that depends on the historical conditions and on the peoples of the capitalist countries who alone can decide the destinies of their states. Socialism will triumph throughout the world—this is beyond question. But it will do so not through the armed interference of the states of the socialist system in the internal affairs of capitalist countries, not through the forcible imposition of socialism from without, not through a military invasion, but because the socialist system compared with the capitalist system offers a stage of labour organisation that is more in keeping with the fundamental interests of all mankind.

The socialist countries intend to cooperate peacefully with capitalist countries throughout the

entire period of transition, in which, due to the singularity of the economic process of the replacement of one social system by another in the epoch of imperialism, both the world capitalist system and the world socialist system are compelled to exist and develop on one planet.

Lenin predicted that "...no matter what attempts are made to invade Russia... all these attempts will go up in smoke." One such attempt was made in 1941 by German fascism. The war was waged simultaneously on military, economic, diplomatic and ideological fronts. In that war the Soviet Union was defending Marxist-Leninist ideology, while Hitler's Germany was armed with the ideology of the most rapacious imperialism—the fascist ideology whose basis was anti-communism, racial theories, geopolitics and militarism. The socialist system and its ideology triumphed. The Soviet Union upheld the great gains of socialism, including its foreign policy positions, and it weakened still further the world capitalist system as a whole, it struck a blow at the ideology and policy of imperialism. The fundamental shift in the alignment of forces in the world engendered a new situation which was favourable for the development of the world revolutionary process. Imperialism found itself powerless to hold up socialist revolutions in several European and Asian countries. The establishment of the world socialist system, which by the very fact of its existence is revolutionising the minds of the working people in capitalist countries, was a new triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

Soviet Russia  
at International Conferences:  
in Genoa, the Hague  
and Lausanne

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The principles we upheld  
at Genoa are among the most  
outstanding achievements of Lenin's  
genius.

*G. U. Chicherin*

Lenin's sagacity in directing Soviet foreign policy and his keen perception of the alignment of forces in the world were especially evident at the time of the International Economic and Financial Conference in Genoa (April 10 to May 19, 1922).

At the Genoa Conference the young Soviet state, with Lenin at its head, experienced its first diplomatic confrontation with the countries of Western Europe, which were led by such astute politicians as Lloyd George and Lord Curzon of Britain, Jean Louis Barthou and Raymond Poincaré of France, and Reich Chancellor Jo-

seph Wirth and Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau of Germany.

On January 27, 1922, an extraordinary session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee appointed Lenin Chairman of the Soviet delegation. Although he was unable to go to Genoa\* he devoted a great deal of attention to the work of the Soviet delegation, which was made up of M. M. Litvinov, L. B. Krasin, V. V. Vorovsky, Ya. E. Rudzutak, N. N. Narimanov and other representatives of the Soviet Republics. The delegation was led by Foreign Commissar Chicherin.

The story of the Genoa Conference has been told in great detail in both Soviet and foreign literature. A verbatim account of the conference was published in Soviet Russia as early as 1922. Many of the conference materials have appeared in collections of documents. Special research papers and monographs have been put out on Genoa. Participants have written memoirs about it. Official documents and papers relating to the Genoa Conference have been published in Britain, France, Germany and the United States, and it has been discussed in a variety of books.

For a long time researchers on the Genoa Conference in the Soviet Union were unable to reconstruct it fully or to assess the role Lenin played in the work of the Soviet delegation because many important documents were unknown. The inclu-

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\* The question of whether Lenin should go to the conference was widely debated by the working people of the Soviet Republic. In numerous letters they expressed concern for Lenin's security and opposed his travelling to Genoa. Furthermore, Lenin was prevented from going to Genoa by the pressure of government business and by state of his health. The Central Committee of the RCP(B) passed a special decision on this question. On March 25, 1922, Lenin signed a statement on the transfer of chairmanship powers to Chicherin.

sion in Lenin's *Collected Works* of over 300 new papers relating to Soviet foreign policy, notably to the Genoa Conference, helped complete the picture.

These papers contain several fundamental theoretical conclusions and concepts regarding the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy, the methods employed by Soviet diplomacy and the nature of foreign policy compromises.

### Preparations for the Conference

The Genoa Conference came in for a good deal of discussion. There was a great hubbub in the West over Lenin's expected attendance. This question aroused lively discussion in the foreign press, particularly from November 1921 until the conference opened. The reactionary press resented the very idea of Lenin participating in solving the problems of the economic restoration of Europe. The leader of the Soviet Government—his speeches, reports, statements, articles and interviews—evoked world-wide interest. Commentators for the liberal newspapers declared that Genoa was the world's only salvation.

"The business world," emphasised Chicherin, "is wondering whether business can be done with the Soviet Government. British ministers keep telling us: confidence must be created. Capitalists will not fork out without confidence."

The situation on the eve of the conference called for careful and thorough preparation by Soviet Russia so as to explain to the Western world the Soviet Government's position on international issues then in the centre of attention. The Party's Central Committee therefore authorised a special Soviet Preparatory Commission to submit to the Politbureau a draft resolution on the propa-

ganda campaign prior to the conference. On March 6, 1922, Chicherin presented the draft. It formulated the following main tasks: "1. Systematically to watch for false information about Soviet Russia in the political and economic fields, and to refute such information; 2. To explain that the method of preparing for the conference employed at present by the Entente and the Little Entente may wreck it; 3. In view of the fact that with respect to Western Europe the Soviet regime not only possesses inexhaustible natural wealth but also vast political and economic experience, the result of the latter should be clarified; 4. To expose the preparatory White-guard effort being made simultaneously with the conference, which, in the event of the unsuccessful outcome of the conference, could be the starting point for a new intervention against us that could be the start of war; from a military viewpoint we do not fear intervention, but from the economic viewpoint it could frustrate the programme of peaceful economic restoration; 5. To determine whether it is possible for the capitalist states to raise their economy without Russia's participation in international economic life; 6. To use contradictions between the capitalist states; 7. To elaborate the concept of Russia's inclusion in a world concern for the consolidation of universal peace; 8. To intimate that the wrecking of the conference or departures from agreements with Soviet Russia could mean an early general war."

By the time of the Genoa Conference Soviet Russia's international situation had become fairly stable. The European capitalist countries were displaying increasing interest in establishing economic ties and trade with it.

On September 13, 1922, the Politbureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee discussed the subject

of Russian debts to foreign states which had been raised by the Entente powers. The results of the discussion were set forth by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in its note of October 28, 1921, addressed to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. The Soviet Government proposed that an international economic conference should be convened on condition that the capitalist states recognised the socialist system of ownership and that Soviet Russia participated on an equal footing with other states. For its part, the Soviet Government agreed to honour the debts incurred under state loans contracted by the tsarist government prior to 1914 but on favourable conditions which would provide it with the practical possibility of meeting these obligations. As regards disputed issues and mutual claims, both sides should make equal concessions. The Soviet proposals gave the capitalist countries broad opportunities to restore economic relations with Russia.

The first reply to the note came from the British Government. On December 24, 1921, through L. B. Krasin, the Soviet representative in London, it consented to negotiate on the *de jure* recognition of Soviet Russia and on rendering it economic and financial aid. But at the same time Britain demanded recognition of all the financial obligations of the tsarist and provisional governments, together with full compensation of all losses sustained by foreign governments and private individuals as a result of the decrees of the Soviet Government. Lenin saw that the British conditions were clearly unacceptable. He suggested a Foreign Commissariat reply stating that the question of claims and debts was one that the Soviet Government was prepared to discuss during the conference.

On January 5, 1922, the Politbureau passed a

decision forming a Foreign Commissariat Commission, under the chairmanship of Chicherin, to prepare for the conference. The Commission included M. M. Litvinov, A. M. Lezhava, N. N. Krestinsky, G. Ya. Sokolnikov and A. A. Ioffe. Later L. B. Krasin, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, S. S. Pilyavsky and several others were also made members of the Commission. This body was authorised to draft political directives and to look into various technical matters, including the problem of communication with Moscow. During the preparations for the conference Lenin had several meetings with almost all the members of the delegation. He looked through the drafts of their speeches and gave them advice. Reports on the work of the Preparatory Commission were sent to him on a regular basis.

Chicherin was later to recall that in the winter of 1921-22 Lenin spent a long time out of Moscow, but on questions relating to the Genoa Conference he maintained close contact with the members of the delegation, helping them to formulate the fundamentals of the Soviet position. In his notes to members of the Politbureau and to Chicherin, Litvinov and Krasin, Lenin set the Soviet delegation the tasks of establishing trade relations with the capitalist countries, obtaining credits on advantageous terms in exchange for certain concessions, and securing *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government.

The Preparatory Commission went to work on January 7, 1922. It held altogether 22 meetings and recruited the cooperation of all interested commissariats and departments starting with the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). As Chicherin pointed out in his letter to the Central Committee of February 20, the Commission concentrated chiefly on formulating policies that fell into three categories: plans for economic restora-



tion in all fields; the plan for concessions, elucidation of the general picture and elaboration of concrete projects; questions of guarantees of debt repayment on loans, counterclaims arising out of the damages caused by the intervention and the Civil War. On all these subjects the Commission heard reports by representatives of Commissariats and experts.\*

The Commission also collected material on the general diplomatic history of Europe and America, on the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties and subsequent agreements between the great powers. The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Gosplan conducted this work "with the utmost haste," in Chicherin's words, "and piles of ma-

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\* On January 7, for instance, the Commission discussed the following questions: 1. Preliminary concessions of the Soviet Government; 2. Demands for the political recognition of the Soviet Government; 3. An international consortium and our participation in the agreement; 4. Our specific guarantees; 5. The overall sum and forms of credit to the Soviet Government; 6. Technical questions. On January 9, the Commission discussed the instructions to be given to N. N. Krestinsky regarding the diplomatic effort to be made in Berlin with a view to concluding several economic agreements with Germany and on talks with France. On January 14, the Commission heard a report by I. A. Teodorovich on the papers and briefs prepared by the People's Commissariat for Land. On January 23, it heard a report by P. A. Bogdanov on the work of the Supreme Council of National Economy. The Commission decided to appoint as special experts N. I. Iordansky, E. S. Varga, Yu. Kluchnikov and several others. Varga was authorised to present a paper on the theory and practice of state bankruptcy. On January 26, the Commission heard a report by N. N. Lyubimov on the work of the Special Commission of the Institute for Economic Research of the People's Commissariat of Finances. On January 30, it discussed the question of Soviet claims arising out of the destruction of railway transport facilities as a result of the Civil War and foreign intervention, etc.

terial from the Commissariats together with the conclusions were sent to Gosplan which coordinated the entire work."

Lenin looked into every question relating to the preparations for the conference down to the smallest detail. On January 16 he wrote two letters to the members of the Politbureau. In one of them, besides making some suggestions about the composition of the delegation, he wrote: "Should we not forthwith initiate exclusively personal (without any piece of paper) talks with the Germans in Berlin and Moscow about our *contacts* with them at Genoa? . . . Should we not forthwith secretly request *all* plenipotentiary representatives to explore whether the appropriate governments might not agree to begin *informal* secret talks with us about the *preliminary* formulation of the *line* to be taken at Genoa?"

An example of Lenin's meticulous approach to the conference is also provided by his attitude to the Cannes Resolution of January 6 which set forth the Entente's demands with respect to repayment of the debts of the tsarist and provisional governments. The text of the resolution had been officially dispatched to the Soviet Government on January 13, 1922, in a telegram from the Italian Prime Minister I. Bonomi together with an invitation to attend the Genoa Conference. Lenin noticed a substantial discrepancy in the resolution and requested Chicherin in a letter to send him the official text ". . . in the language in which you received it," together with the text of paragraph 1 of the resolution as quoted in an influential Entente newspaper with the words "system of ownership," not simply "system." At the same time Lenin instructed the foreign division of the Russian Telegraph Agency to check "whether any foreign paper has used the words 'system of ownership,' and if so, please, send that

paper to me.”

Lenin had a good reason for being interested in the authentic text. In the French newspaper *Le Petit Parisien* of January 8, 1922, paragraph 1 of the Cannes Resolution read as follows: “Nations can claim no right to dictate to each other the principles on which they are to regulate their systems of ownership, internal economy and government. It is for every nation to choose for itself the system which it prefers in this respect.” But in the text of Bonomi’s cable the words “système de propriété” (system of ownership) had been dropped. Lenin attached cardinal importance to the concept of the “system of ownership.” It had a direct bearing on the recognition of the right to existence of differing socio-economic systems. If it was recognised, then paragraph 1, with the words “system of ownership,” opened the door for negotiations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist states. Lenin referred to paragraph 1 of the Cannes Resolution on several occasions. He urged the Soviet delegates to cite the paragraph in their speeches and statements, emphasising the words “system of ownership,” not just “system.” Its substance, Lenin pointed out, lay in the fact that by recognising the *equality* of the two *property systems* (capitalist or private property, and communist property, *so far* accepted only in the RSFSR), it was compelled to recognise, even if only indirectly, the collapse, the bankruptcy of the first property system and the inevitability of its coming to an *agreement* with the second, on terms of equality. The other provisions of the Cannes Resolution, Lenin noted, were inconsequential, since they “are in contradiction to this and are, therefore, still-born.”

Lenin devoted much time to elaborating the programme of the Soviet delegation and its line of conduct at the Genoa Conference. “The Cen-

tral Committee," Lenin told the 11th Congress of the RCP(B), "has drawn up sufficiently detailed instructions for our diplomats at the Genoa Conference; we spent a long time discussing these instructions and considered and reconsidered them several times." On January 22, in a letter to the Politbureau Lenin proposed giving the Soviet delegation the following preliminary directives: "(a) We shall on no account recognise any debts except the ones promised by Chicherin; \* (b) these debts we shall recognise *only* on condition that our counterclaims *cover* them; (c) we shall offer guarantees (if we are given a loan) only of timber in the north, and so forth; (d) we interpret paragraph 1 of the Bonomi conditions in the broadest possible sense. . ."

Lenin attached particular importance to providing theoretical substantiation for the economic and political sections of the delegation's programme, to questions of tactics and to the definition of Soviet Russia's claims against the countries that had participated in the intervention and blockade. On February 1 Lenin wrote a "Draft Directive to the Vice-Chairman and to All Members of the Genoa Delegation."

With a few omissions, this document read as follows:

"I propose the endorsement of the following directive to the Vice-Chairman and to all members of the Genoa Delegation:

"1. All members of the delegation shall prepare in general for all political and financial questions that may arise at the conference. Furthermore, each member of the delegation shall

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\* The reference is to the note of the RSFSR Government to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of October 28, 1921.

prepare specially, in particular detail, and exhaustively for one major diplomatic and one major financial question. Chicherin and Litvinov shall be responsible for the allotment of such questions among all members of the delegation.

"2. For the meeting on February 22 (with the CC Politbureau) each member of the delegation shall prepare a most succinct (two or three pages maximum in telegraphic style) summary of his programme of views and policies on all the most important questions, both diplomatic and financial.

"3. On the responsibility of Chicherin and Litvinov all the relevant literature in various languages as well as a systematic collection of documents in the Russian language shall be compiled and handed out to the members of the delegation in good time.

"4. In view of the special importance and special complexity of the financial question Chicherin and Litvinov, in coordination with the People's Commissariat of Finances, Gosplan and A. D. Tsyurupa, shall draw up a list of financial experts and a plan for the allotment of work among them; time—one week.

"5. All the members of the delegation shall have a *perfect knowledge* of the book by Keynes ("Economic Consequences of the Peace") and similar bourgeois and bourgeois-pacifist books and *parts of books* (Lansing on the 'imperialist' nature of the war and the peace of 1918 and so forth). Preparations should follow this pattern: in speeches and statements briefly to set forth the *communist* viewpoint, qualifying this exposition by saying that although I am a Communist and have such and such communist views, for this audience I wish not to quote Communists but to pose the question of the need to annul all debts and the like from a bourgeois point of view.

"6. The sum total of the speeches and statements of our delegates at the conference shall be so designed in advance that regardless of the course and outcome of the conference (even in the event of a precipitate collapse which we shall of course try to impede) the end result should be a brief but lucid exposition of the complete set of communist views (on questions of international relations and economy) and a detailed exposition of bourgeois and bourgeois-pacifist views on the irreconcilable contradictions of the imperialist world and the imperialist peace."

This was a remarkably precise and lucid formulation of policy. Provision was made for every likely contingency and exhaustive instructions were given. Lenin foresaw the probable course of the "battle" and indicated exactly what was to be done in the situation that might arise.

In the same document he mapped out a plan for the Soviet delegation's offensive against the delegations of the capitalist countries participating in the conference.

He continued:

"9. Paragraph 1 of the Cannes conditions shall be quoted by our delegates in their speeches and statements particularly often, and, firstly, exclusively in the wording 'système de propriété,' i.e., with the words 'system of ownership,' not just 'system'; secondly, these words and the paragraph shall be interpreted in the broadest possible sense, namely as implying recognition of the inevitability of the capitalist system of ownership being replaced by a communist system of ownership and that the only question at issue 'between us' is now the question of when this replacement will occur and how it will occur, that is according to the Russian method of 1917-20 or according to the Lloyd George method of a 'truncated revolution' of the 1921 Irish type or the 1922 Egypt-

tian type.”\*

Lenin emphasised that the Soviet delegation should discuss at Genoa the political conditions for trade with the capitalist countries and achieve certain advantages for the Soviet state. Lenin emphasised that the Soviet delegation should present itself at Genoa as a good merchant and evoke the confidence of the business world in the Soviet state, convincing it that trade with Soviet Russia was possible. The same idea was propounded by Chicherin in his draft plan of action at the Genoa Conference. “It is therefore to our advantage,” he wrote, “that there should be less conflict-fraught material at Genoa. The British ministers keep saying: create confidence, then business will be done with you. . . . If, on the contrary, the conference demonstrates the impossibility of agreement between us and the rest of the world and the impossibility of doing business with us, we shall be deprived of loans and concessionaires.” Chicherin went on to conclude: “Our basic line is that we retain our outlook (we shall briefly outline it in our speech), you retain your outlook but both the one and the other remain on the sidelines in this case, for we are meeting as merchants. But using this world rostrum, we shall attract to this basic line the sympathies of the broad bourgeois and working masses, suffering from the ruin, with brilliant plans for the economic revival of the world under the existing system. . . .”

On February 6, Lenin wrote several additions to the directives of the Central Committee for the delegation to the Genoa Conference which were approved by the Politbureau on February 8. In

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\* Lenin was referring to the policy of partial concessions which had been pursued in the early 1920s by the Lloyd George Government in Britain to suppress the national-liberation movements in Ireland and Egypt.

them he set forth a tentative list of basic points of the delegation's programme: "(1) annulment of all debts; (2) application to all colonies and dependent countries and nations of the 'Irish' solution; (3) radical revision of the Versailles Treaty; (4) granting on favourable conditions of loans to countries that had been most severely ravaged by the war... (6) agreement by several countries on measures to counter inflation and the depreciation of money... (7) agreement by several countries on measures to combat the fuel crisis and on measures to secure the most rational and economic utilisation of sources of power on the basis of a single planned electrification scheme; (8) the same with regard to the most vital—from the viewpoint of the possibility of delivering raw materials and food—measures of reorganising and improving international transport. And so forth."

In elaborating the delegation's programme, Lenin developed the concept of the Communist Party's attitude to bourgeois pacifism, a concept he had advanced in the years of the First World War. He insisted that the Soviet delegation should advocate a "broad pacifist programme". In the "Draft Resolution of the CC RCP(B) on the Objectives of the Soviet Delegation at Genoa" Lenin explained that "one of the main objectives, if not the principal, political one in Genoa" was to single out the pacifist wing of the bourgeois camp and to do all that was possible to strengthen it. He emphasised on several occasions that the foreign policy programme and strategy of the Communist Party differed in principle from bourgeois pacifism. But Lenin urged support for those quarters in capitalist countries that wished to preserve the peace and establish business relations with Soviet Russia. He advocated seeking both commercial and political agreement with the pacifist wing of the bourgeois camp.



In a letter to Lenin dated March 10, 1922, Chicherin outlined his concept of the delegation's foreign policy programme. Lenin studied the letter very thoroughly and singled out 13 points: (1) involvement of colonial peoples on the basis of complete equality; (2) participation of workers' organisations in international conferences; (3) the principle of non-interference by international organisations in the affairs of peoples; (4) convocation of a world congress to resolve fundamental international issues; (5) creation of a court of arbitration to resolve disputed issues, on the basis of equal representation from bourgeois and communist states; (6) universal disarmament; (7) prohibition of weapons of mass destruction; (8) the setting up by the world congress of technical commissions to carry out a programme of economic revival; (9) aid to weak states; (10) the building of a London-Moscow-Peking superhighway; (11) a draft for the even distribution of the navy; (12) loans to the weakened countries; (13) planned world-wide distribution of essential commodities for implementation of the restoration programme.

To these 13 points Lenin added another two: (§ 14) abolition of *all* war debts and (§15) *revision* (on the basis of our 13 points) of the Versailles and *all* war treaties.

The 14th point suggested by Lenin was of great practical significance both at Genoa and at all subsequent conferences on debts and credits.

All the points in the programme were incorporated in the first speech made by Chicherin at the Genoa Conference on April 10, 1922.

Returning Chicherin's letter with the underscored 13 points, Lenin wrote: "Comrade Chicherin, I have read your letter of March 10. It seems to me that you yourself have made an excellent presentation of the pacifist programme.

The whole art consists in stating it and our mercantile proposals clearly and loudly before the dispersal (if 'they' bring things to an early dispersal)." In all probability Lenin was not sure that the conference would not be wrecked before the Russian delegation had a chance to state its programme. He went on to emphasise: "At all times a 'tiny' reservation: we, as Communists, have our communist programme (the Third International), *but* we consider it our duty *as merchants to support* (even on a one in ten thousand chance) *the pacifists* in the other, that is, the bourgeois camp (including in it the Second and Second-and-a-Half International)." Pronouncing himself in favour of Chicherin's "pacifist programme," Lenin pointed out that "we will not make a deal that is disadvantageous to us."

When the Central Committee discussed the draft of Chicherin's opening speech at the conference Lenin cautioned against using invectives and "fearsome words." He emphasised that the principle underlying the speeches of the Soviet delegation at Genoa must be the "'merchant' principle 'on the basis of agreement', for we, acting *here* as merchants, *cannot* put forward any other principle, except the merchant principle."

Lenin advised Chicherin to couch his speech in calm terms that would promote agreement with the powers at Genoa and *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government. Lenin attached great importance to the selection of experts for the Soviet delegation. In accordance with his instructions the Foreign Commissariat enrolled such prominent economists as N. N. Lyubimov, A. M. Smirnov, and I. A. Trakhtenberg; the lawyers I. A. Blinov and Y. V. Klyuchnikov; member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy A. N. Dolgov; military expert E. A. Berens and others.

Many economic topics were picked out for special study by members of the delegation and its experts. Most important among them were: (1) Russia's isolation and world economic ruin (A. M. Lezhava); (2) credits and loans for Russia (A. A. Joffe); (3) concessions (M. M. Litvinov); (4) restoration of agriculture (G. V. Chicherin); (5) circulation of money, currency, banks of issue; (6) recognition of Russian debts; (7) the legal system in Russia and operations by foreigners; (8) the oil industry (L. B. Krasin). Noteworthy among the diplomatic topics were: (1) the Far East and the Chinese Eastern Railway; (2) counter-revolution from the West; (3) Karelia and the Aland Islands; (4) the Versailles and other similar treaties, their further development; (5) the Turkish question; (6) Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia (G. V. Chicherin); (7) disarmament, international administrative and financial questions; (8) international relationships and Russia's role in connection with them; (9) the struggle of political forces at the Genoa Conference (A. A. Ioffe); (10) Russia and the outlying states.

The resultant reports and briefs were studied, corrected and amplified by Lenin. His handwritten comments are preserved on many of them.

On February 6 Lenin called the attention of the Politbureau to the need for extensive coverage of the Genoa Conference in the Soviet press. In line with his instructions, the Preparatory Commission decided that articles should be published in the press on the following topics: (1) the long-term plan for the development of Russian industry in the coming years; (2) forms of the participation of foreign capital in the industry of the RSFSR; (3) the coal industry; (4) the Genoa Conference and maritime transport; (5) financial questions in the programme of the International Conference, and several others. In a letter to Chicherin of

March 8, 1922, Lenin suggested the type of articles to be prepared for publication in British newspapers. "It is precisely now," he wrote, "when the likelihood of Genoa being wrecked by the French is threatening to become greater, our articles must be turned into a militant action, that is, including a well-defined plan for the restoration of Russia on a non-capitalist basis. . ."

A Politbureau resolution of March 8, 1922, named responsible persons to edit a series of articles for publication in the *Manchester Guardian*. These articles were of great importance as they helped to expose the enemies of the Soviet state who were accusing the Bolsheviks of merely seeking "a rostrum for Comintern propaganda" instead of being concerned with economic rehabilitation.

Of substantial significance in strengthening Soviet Russia's stand at the conference was the decision of the Soviet Republics on joint representation at Genoa.

On February 22, 1922, an agreement was signed in Moscow on the representation and protection by the RSFSR Government at the Genoa Conference of the interests of the Allied Republics—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Byelorussia, Bukhara, Georgia, the Ukraine, Khorezm and the Far Eastern Republic. M. I. Kalinin, Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, signed a statement which read: "The Government of the Russian Republic will take all measures to ensure the adequate protection at the conference of the interests of all the states linked with it by unbreakable fraternal and allied bonds. It will vigilantly see to it that the delegation authorised by the Government of the Russian Republic to represent Russia and its allies at the All-European Conference staunchly safeguards their interests at the Conference, and that it invariably informs

the Governments of the Allied and Fraternal Republics of the progress of the conference."

The newly formed united diplomatic front of the Soviet Republics served to consolidate the political and international legal status of the Soviet state.

On March 23, shortly before the departure of the delegation for Genoa, the Central Committee Politbureau, discussing the preparedness of the Soviet delegation for the conference, passed a decision to make several additions to the delegation's instructions. The decision stated that the Central Committee was proceeding from the fact that questions of principle had been decided on in Moscow and the Chairman of the delegation should therefore be guided entirely by those decisions. In the event of any unforeseen questions of principle requiring new decisions arising at the conference, the Chairman should, where possible, submit such questions for discussion by the diplomatic staff of the delegation and subsequently communicate all opinions and proposals to the Politbureau. Lenin's idea of the subordination of Soviet diplomacy to the Central Committee of the Party was unequivocally reflected in the formulation that no treaties must be concluded without special telegraphic consent by the Central Committee. The decision authorised the Chairman of the delegation to submit various questions for discussion either by the Bureau of the delegation,\* or by the entire delegation, if necessitated by circumstances, with the Chairman retaining the right to take the cardinal decision on all questions without exception. In the event of divergencies with

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\* The Bureau of the delegation included G. V. Chicherin (chairman), M. M. Litvinov, L. B. Krasin, C. G. Rakovsky, A. A. Ioffe, V. V. Vorovsky and Ya. E. Rudzutak.

other members of the delegation the Chairman was empowered to carry out his decision forthwith, notifying the Central Committee of this and communicating exact formulations of all dissenting opinions on the question at issue.

On March 27, 1922, the Soviet delegation led by Chicherin left Moscow for Genoa.

Before his departure Chicherin was interviewed by correspondents of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. In the interview Chicherin emphasised that the Soviet delegation would uphold the inviolability of the Soviet system and the sovereign rights of the Russian state and those economic foundations of Soviet rule departure from which would risk the danger of the enslavement of the working masses of Russia.

The Soviet delegation travelled through the Baltic states, Germany, Austria and Trieste. On March 29 and 30, the Soviet delegation conferred in Riga with representatives of Latvia, Poland and Estonia. The participants in the Riga Conference recognised the desirability of coordinating their actions at the Genoa Conference on matters relating to economic rehabilitation, the development of commercial relations and the consolidation of peace in Eastern Europe. The Riga Conference also called for the formal recognition of the Soviet Government and registered its support for the principle of the limitation of armaments in all states.

The decisions of the Riga Conference proved that Lenin was quite right in urging preliminary discussions with some of the capitalist states. They made a rift in the united front of the Baltic states which France had been trying to form against Soviet Russia. On the other hand the Riga conference showed that although many leaders of the Baltic countries wanted to reach understanding on certain questions with the RSFSR, before

the start of the Genoa Conference, fear of the Entente and the pressure of reactionary circles in their own countries prevented them from negotiating any concrete agreements with Soviet Russia.

On April 1, the Soviet delegation arrived in Berlin. On the same day it met with the chief of the Eastern Section of the German Foreign Ministry, Baron von Maltzan. On the next day the talks were continued at Chicherin's hotel. On April 3, Chicherin and Litvinov were received by Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth and Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau.

During these discussions it was agreed to draft a Soviet-German agreement envisaging resumption of diplomatic relations and renunciation of mutual claims, including the claims of private individuals arising out of losses caused by the nationalisation of property in Soviet Russia, on condition that the Soviet Government rejected similar claims by other states.

On April 4, Chicherin conducted negotiations with Maltzan intending to reach a final understanding on the draft of the agreement. However, Maltzan proposed a draft in which the claims clause was formulated as follows: "Germany reserves the right to demand compensation, but is prepared to waive that right if others do so." This wording, which Maltzan asserted, had been endorsed by Rathenau, indicated that Germany was reluctant to renounce its claims arising out of nationalisation.

Acting against Soviet Russia in Germany was a bourgeois-"socialist" front, from the extreme Right-wing parties to the independents. Quite different, however, was the position of those circles in Germany that favoured expansion of trade ties with the Soviet Republic. Reflecting their views, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* wrote: "If

Germany enters into direct relationships with Russia it will feel freer at the Genoa Conference." The paper emphasised that the existence of a strong independent Russia was in line with the most vital interests of Germany in the future.

Although no agreement was reached in Berlin, the two sides reached an understanding that they would maintain contact at Genoa and "inform and support each other."

Thus, the first talks on what subsequently became known as the Rapallo Treaty took place before the Genoa Conference opened. The Soviet delegation arrived at Genoa at midday on April 6. It was given accommodations at the hotel *Palazzo Imperiale* in the resort of Santa Margherita (a suburb of Rapallo, about 30 km from Genoa).

## The Genoa Conference

The Genoa Conference opened on April 10, 1922, at 3:05 p.m. at the San Jorgio palace in the presence of representatives of 29 countries (34 with the British dominions).

Prime Minister Luigi Facta of Italy delivered the opening speech and, having read a telegram of greetings from the King of Italy, wished the conference success. On Lloyd George's proposal Facta was elected president of the conference. The second speaker was Lloyd George who was followed in succession by Foreign Minister Louis Barthou of France, Premier George Theunis of Belgium, Count Ishii of Japan and Chancellor Joseph Wirth of Germany. Finally it was Chicherin's turn to address the conference, the moment everyone had been eagerly waiting for. This is how Chicherin's speech was described in their reminiscences by two of the conference participants, Lyubimov and Erlich: "Facta, the presi-



dent, rises and declares: 'I call upon the first delegate of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin.' A hush falls over the hall.

"All those present at the meeting turned their gaze to the modest figure of Chicherin. He stood silently for several seconds, then began his speech in French, which he knew to perfection.\*

"Chicherin spoke calmly, in a soft singsong voice which could be heard by everyone in the hall. His speech, couched in the spirit of the major fundamental propositions of Lenin's programme, lasted over 20 minutes.

"Peaceful economic coexistence between the two systems of ownership—capitalist and socialist.

"—Equality of the two systems of ownership.

"—Universal arms reductions for all states.

"—A plan for the comprehensive economic restoration of Soviet Russia with foreign capital participating in exploiting the natural resources, but with complete retention of the sovereignty of the RSFSR.

"—Convocation of a world congress for the establishment of universal peace with the participation of workers' organisations.

"—Internationalisation of world transport routes.

"— Redistribution of gold reserves between all countries.

"— Planned distribution of the products of industry, fuel and commercial activities.

"Winding up his speech, Chicherin announced Soviet Russia's readiness 'to support all attempts

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\* When the speech was over Chicherin repeated it in English so that Lloyd George and other English-speaking delegates could hear directly from him what he had been saying in French.

to achieve at least a palliative improvement of world economy and removal of the threat of new wars.'

"The conference listened to Chicherin's speech with rapt attention, respect and good will, in complete silence. No one moved. Chicherin spoke from memory, glancing only occasionally into the sheets of paper lying in front of him on the table."

An Italian journalist wrote at the time: "The bourgeois world sent to Genoa its most outstanding statesmen, trusting that they would reduce the representatives of the proletariat to silence. But in the very first clashes the Red Diplomats demonstrated their superiority over the adversary. The bourgeoisie felt like a tortoise with its shell torn off."

Chicherin's speech at the first plenary meeting of the conference had great repercussions all over the world. Heard for the first time from an international rostrum were the clear-cut and concrete propositions of the Soviet programme for economic rehabilitation and development of all countries on the basis of businesslike cooperation, equality and mutual benefit. Chicherin had expounded the Leninist principles of peaceful co-existence of the two economic systems: non interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, complete equality in relations, the settlement of all conflicts by peaceful means, economic cooperation, development of trade ties. The programme set forth by the Soviet delegation at Genoa was in line with the interests of all peoples and was aimed at strengthening universal peace. So great was its effect that the *New York Times* headlined its story on the opening of the Genoa Conference "Lenin at Genoa!"

In his April 11 and 12 reports to Moscow on the progress of the conference Chicherin wrote

that "in the programme speech the broadest pacifist programme has been expounded." Highly inopportune therefore was Barthou's statement opposing the Soviet proposal on disarmament and the convocation of a world peace congress. "It is quite clear," Chicherin continued, "that the pacifist tactics place our opponents—both the national bloc of France and the British Right-wingers—in a most awkward situation. Obviously, the more astute of their number realised at once that such tactics, which demoralised them, were far more dangerous for them than the tactics of 1919. . . . Conversations with a great many people with whom we have had occasion to meet show that this pacifist programme has made an extremely strong impression."

Bourgeois diplomacy had been counting on winning concessions from Soviet Russia at Genoa. But after the very first days of the conference they had to give up their hopes. They then decided to try their luck at closed meetings of the conference. On April 14, Wise of Britain and Jung of Italy informed Chicherin that Lloyd George wished to see him the following morning and that the meeting was also going to be attended by Barthou, Schanzer, a member of the Italian delegation, and Theunis, the leader of the Belgian delegation. The meeting, Wise said, was to try to reach a basis for agreement. Representatives of the Soviet delegation were invited to a closed meeting at the residence of the British Prime Minister, the Villa d'Albertis. The Soviet delegation (Chicherin, Krasin and Litvinov) categorically rejected the unfounded demands advanced by the representatives of the Western powers and, in turn, tendered counterclaims for compensation of losses inflicted on Soviet Russia by the intervention, which came to over twice the amount of Russia's old debts.

The Western allies bluntly refused to recognise the Soviet counterclaims. The meeting developed into a heated dispute. Chicherin supplied profound arguments refuting Lloyd George's contention that the Soviet demands were unfounded. Chicherin emphasised the Entente's responsibility for the immense damage Soviet Russia had sustained during the intervention and the Civil War. He showed that the White-guards had been completely routed and only Entente aid in money and arms had revived their military strength. The Allied Powers, Chicherin declared, wanted to crush the new Russia that had arisen out of the revolution but had failed to do so. Thereby they had freed the new Russia of all obligations to the Entente. Chicherin also rejected the demands of the Entente powers for the restitution of the properties of foreigners which had been nationalised in Russia. The meeting at the Villa d'Albertis culminated in Lloyd George presenting the Soviet delegation with what amounted to an ultimatum on behalf of the Entente.

Lenin, who attentively followed the course of the Genoa Conference, realised that the manoeuvres undertaken by the Western powers were designed to involve the Soviet delegation in protracted negotiations as a result of which Soviet Russia would have to accept the demands of the Allied Powers. "All the news from Genoa indicates," Lenin wrote in the draft of a telegram to Chicherin on April 19 "that we are succumbing to a deception. Lloyd George, who is thundering about France, is thereby disguising his chief aim—to force us to pay debts in general and the debts of former owners in particular. It is time to begin systematically exposing this customary manoeuvre of the British diplomats."

On April 17 having received a report on the situation at the conference, the Politbureau of the

RCP(B) Central Committee sent the Soviet delegation a directive on the terms of a possible agreement, specifying that war debts and interest on pre-war debts were to be covered by Soviet counterclaims; restitutions (restoration of private property) were rejected absolutely; a maximum concession could be recognition of the preferential right of foreign ex-owners to lease or be granted a concession to develop former property, all other conditions being equal; payments arising out of recognised pre-war debts were to begin after 15 years (10 years at the earliest); the Soviet Government would see to the interests of small holders. The Politbureau regarded as an indispensable condition for these concessions the immediate granting of a big loan to the Soviet Government. The directive emphasised that these terms were the limit of what the Soviet Government could concede.

On April 20, 1922, Chicherin sent Lloyd George a letter expressing agreement to make certain concessions. This was a step taken by the Soviet delegation to create a basis for further talks. Chicherin indicated that provided the war debts and interest on all debts were annulled, and adequate financial help was given to Russia and the Soviet Government was recognised *de jure*, "it would be willing to restore to its former owners the use of property, nationalised or withheld or, where this is not possible, to satisfy the just claims of the former owners, either by direct agreement with them or in accordance with arrangements, the details of which would be discussed during the present conference.

Lenin's assessment of the position taken by Lloyd George and other leading Western statesmen which he formulated in telegrams to the Soviet delegation at Genoa, was borne out in the course of the conference. In the following days

the British delegation went back even on the agreement to accept Chicherin's letter of April 20 as a basis for the continuation of discussions. In his letter of April 28 to the President of the conference Chicherin pointed out that if the Western powers were renouncing their consent to accept the points of the letter of April 20 as a basis for negotiations the Soviet delegation would not consider itself bound by that letter and it would revert to the view set forth in its memorandum.

The meeting at Lloyd George's villa failed to yield results, and the German delegation, which had come to Genoa in the hope of softening the terms of the Versailles Treaty, decided to take advantage of the situation. Before Genoa the German Government, though willing to talk things over, had refused to sign any agreement with Soviet Russia. Now, on April 16, 1922, a Soviet-German Treaty was signed at Rapallo, a suburb of Genoa. "The Rapallo Treaty," Chicherin pointed out, "was the end of the first post-war period of the triumph of the victors. From Genoa, where the Entente had hoped to bring the refractory Soviet Russia to its knees and where Poincare had caused the question of German reparations to be withdrawn, the victor powers returned home empty-handed."

By signing the Rapallo Treaty, the Soviet Government strengthened the international position of Soviet Russia. The treaty established the equality of the two property systems and defined the principles on whose basis the Soviet Government subsequently normalised relations with bourgeois countries. The Rapallo Treaty was of great political and economic significance both for Soviet Russia and for Germany. It paved the way for the development of equitable and mutually advantageous economic and commercial ties with

Soviet Russia. History has proved that the importance of the Rapallo Treaty went far beyond the direct interests of Germany and Soviet Russia alone. "True equality," Lenin wrote, "of the two property systems—if only as a temporary state, until such time as the entire world abandons private property and the economic chaos and wars engendered by it for the higher property system—is found only in the Treaty of Rapallo."

The Rapallo Treaty incorporated the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy as formulated by Lenin. With the signing of the treaty the situation at the Genoa Conference underwent a substantial change. The unity of the bourgeois camp had been breached. The Entente's attempts to invalidate the Rapallo Treaty came to naught. Lenin, who had immediately fathomed the change in the situation, suggested that the Soviet delegation be given a new directive—to grant no concessions on the question of debts. In subsequent telegrams Chicherin reported that the conference had decided to hand down the "Russian question" to a new conference, which was to meet in three months' time. To this Lenin responded in a telegram to Chicherin of April 30: "A new conference in about three months or so is to our greatest advantage. At the close of the Genoa Conference you are on no account to assume even the shadow of financial obligations, even a half-recognition of debts, and generally do not fear a rupture."

In a memorandum of the Allied Powers of May 2, 1922, which was sent to the Soviet delegation on May 3, the Entente countries once again demanded that the Soviet Government accept liability for the settlement of all debts and obligations of the tsarist and the provisional governments and make restitution for nationalised property to foreign nationals. At the same time the allies cate-

gorically refused to compensate for the damage Soviet Russia suffered from the intervention and the blockade.

On May 9, Lenin submitted for discussion by the Politbureau a draft telegram to Chicherin giving new instructions regarding policies to be followed and methods of applying them. This telegram sent to Genoa read: "Considering the significance of the Russo-German Treaty, its acceptance by Germany, its influence of Italy and the bickering of the powers over the oil concessions, we are coming to the conclusion that the right thing for us to do is to start building our entire foreign policy so that for a certain period of no less than several months all and sundry is based solely on the Russo-German Treaty, which shall be declared the one and only model to be departed from only and exclusively for the sake of big advantages. Try to prepare this in the form of a rupture. Together with ratification of the Russo-German Treaty we want to include such a statement in the declaration of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Telegraph your opinion promptly."

Carrying out the Central Committee's directives, the Soviet delegation sent the Entente nations a statement on May 11 in which it rejected their demands, pointing out that without their recognition of the principle of reciprocity in the matter of claims Soviet Russia would agree to no concessions. To examine financial disputes the Soviet delegation proposed the establishment of a mixed commission of experts.

Analysing the situation at Genoa after the Soviet statement, Lenin suggested that the Politbureau should discuss a new telegram, which was approved on May 14 and sent to Chicherin. It read: "If we have correctly understood the press comments as to the situation generated by our



reply, Lloyd George is prepared to separate the immediate political agreement on peace from financial and economic agreements, which are to be transferred to a long-term commission. This would be the most advantageous outcome and an unquestionable victory. . . .”

On May 19, the Genoa Conference closed without having resolved the problems facing it. Their discussion was to be resumed at a new conference, this time at the Hague.

A role of no small importance in wrecking the Genoa Conference was played by the American and British oil monopolies. An acute struggle for Russian oil had flared up between two concerns—Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell headed by Deterding, which owned sizable shares in the former oil companies at Baku, and the American Standard Oil Co. Unofficial representatives of both these oil giants were present at Genoa.

Standard Oil was out to get concessions to develop Baku oil. The US Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes instructed the American Ambassador to Italy, Robert Child, who was the US observer at the Genoa Conference, to obtain assurances from the British Government that it would enter into no agreements with the Government of Soviet Russia which might harm the interests of American nationals in Russia. According to a story in *The Times* of London the British Government did offer assurances that it would not permit any agreement giving any oil company a substantial monopoly in Russia.

When it was reported that some companies seemed likely to reach agreement with Soviet Russia on oil concessions, Child advised the State Department that prompt measures should be taken to wreck the conference. On the instruction of his government he began actively to help the

French and Belgian delegations which also wanted to torpedo the conference.

The efforts of the Soviet delegation at Genoa were approved in a special resolution passed by a session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on May 17, 1922. Lenin's personal participation in the preparations for the conference predetermined the Soviet delegation's line of conduct. Lenin's articles, letters, notes and telegrams relating to the Genoa Conference were all keyed by his passionate desire to uphold the equality of the Soviet state, and to achieve peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation with countries belonging to the capitalist system. The policy of hinging the question of debts on the granting of credits, the exploitation of contradictions between the imperialist powers, the emergence of Soviet Russia from isolation and the demand for universal disarmament—all this constituted an important page in the history of Leninist diplomacy and was of immense significance for the entire subsequent development of Soviet foreign policy.

## The Hague Conference

The Hague Conference was a continuation of the Genoa Conference. It lasted from June 15 to July 20, 1922. Invitations were sent to all the countries that had been represented at Genoa, with the exception of Germany. The attitude of the United States to the Hague Conference was very much like what it had been at Genoa. It named as its observer US Ambassador to the Netherlands Sasssdorf, who actively interfered in the affairs of the conference. The Western countries were represented not by plenipotentiary represen-

tatives of the respective governments but only by experts—big monopolists and former owners of undertakings that had been nationalised in Soviet Russia.

Officially, the Hague Conference opened on June 26. Two commissions were formed—a Russian Commission and a Non-Russian Commission. The representatives of the bourgeois countries assembled ten days before the Soviet delegation arrived. The Non-Russian Commission passed a decision forbidding separate talks or bilateral agreements between individual delegates and Soviet Russia. The Non-Russian Commission consisted of three sub-commissions: on private property, on debts, and on credits. The decisive role was played by the sub-commission on private property. At the very first meeting it demanded of Soviet Russia the restitution of all nationalised foreign property or the payment of full compensation to the former owners. The sub-commission on debts declared that Soviet Russia could receive credits only if it recognised all debts. The sub-commission on credits demanded that Soviet Russia relinquish its foreign trade monopoly.

The Soviet Government refused to recognise the right of former owners to restitution of private property or to compensation, but it was prepared to enter into negotiations on granting them concessions.

On July 7, the Soviet delegation submitted a long list of properties—mines, oil fields, forestries and the like—for which concessions could be granted to foreign capitalists, with direction in the management of the national economy remaining in the hands of the Soviet Government. On behalf of the Soviet delegation L. B. Krasin advised the former owners firmly and forever to understand that “under no circumstances can there be any question of restoring the rights of

former owners. The Soviet Government will never agree to this."

The Soviet Government was prepared partially to refund the pre-war debts, provided it received a big loan. To this end the Soviet delegation proposed that credits to the amount of 3,224 million gold roubles be extended to it over the next three years for the restoration of Soviet Russia's industry, transport, agriculture, trade and finances. But the question of credits was not even discussed. In mid-July 1922, the reluctance of the delegates from bourgeois countries to enter into normal business cooperation with Soviet Russia led the conference into an impasse, which, as at Genoa, was largely engineered by the United States. The American "observers" did all they could to block agreement between Soviet Russia and the capitalist countries of Europe. Rumours of Britain attempting to set up an international consortium under its auspices for the exploitation of Russia's oil wealth prompted the US Government to hasten the disruption of the Hague Conference. In this, as at Genoa, it was aided to a large extent by the ruling circles of France and Belgium.

After July 10, the sub-commissions on private property, on debts and on credits confronted the Soviet delegation with ultimatums designed to achieve restoration of capitalism in Soviet Russia. These demands were rejected and the chairman of the Non-Russian Commission, Paten, informed the Soviet delegation on July 15 that further talks were pointless.

On July 19, wishing to prevent the disruption of the conference, the Soviet delegation declared its recognition in principle of the need to refund the pre-war debts and compensate the losses of former owners in the form of concessions or otherwise, provided the Soviet Government was ac-

corded *de jure* recognition. At the closing meeting of the Non-Russian Commission on July 19, 1922, a resolution was passed stating that even such concessions by Soviet Russia as the recognition of pre-war debts, a pledge to pay compensation to former owners and other foreigners, Russia's agreement to forego discussion of government and government-guaranteed credits and of the Soviet counterclaims could not be a sufficient basis for the conclusion of a general agreement with Russia. As a result the conference broke up.

After the conference, the Non-Russian Commission reassembled and on a proposal moved by the Belgian representative Cattier passed a resolution recommending that all the governments that had participated in the Hague Conference, as well as other powers, should refrain from assisting their nationals in acquiring properties in Russia which had previously belonged to foreign nationals and had been confiscated after November 1, 1919, without the agreement of their foreign owners or concessionaires. This resolution also ruled out any possibility of bilateral agreements. It was perfectly obvious that some of the Non-Russian Commission members wanted to continue the financial and economic blockade of Russia. The resolution was supported by the United States. On July 20, 1922, the US State Department declared that the United States would not permit any agreements with Soviet Russia.

Although the economic talks in Genoa and the Hague were unproductive, the Soviet Republic achieved important political successes. Soviet Russia's participation in these major conferences as an equal partner implied its *de facto* recognition by the major capitalist states. At Genoa and at the Hague as stressed in a July 27, 1922 decision of the Central Committee Politbureau, the right

of Soviet Russia to socialist development was upheld.

Attempts by the imperialists to isolate Soviet Russia and cordon it off through a political and economic blockade collapsed one after the other. With the expulsion of the Japanese interventionists from the Far East the policy of military provocations against Soviet Russia sustained a final defeat. By the beginning of 1923, Soviet Russia's plenipotentiary representatives were stationed in 12 states with which it maintained *de jure* relations, and in another seven countries with which it had *de facto* relations.

## The Lausanne Conference

Of great importance for the destinies of peace was Soviet Russia's participation in the Lausanne Conference which was held from November 20, 1922 to July 24, 1923.

While consistently pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Government did its utmost to strengthen the prestige of the Soviet state.

Lenin supervised preparations of the Soviet delegation for the Lausanne Conference. Chicherin had this to say about Lenin's personal role in the preparations: "After my return from abroad in the autumn of 1922 I stayed in Moscow for six weeks. The main topic was the Turkish question; arrangements were in progress for the Lausanne Conference. The programme to be defended at Lausanne was discussed and adopted with the most active personal participation of Vladimir Ilyich. This was his last important contribution to our foreign policy. The discussion of the Straits problem with Vladimir Ilyich was the last

I ever had with him. It was also my last meeting with him."

The question of the Lausanne Conference, and of the programme, tactics and composition of the Soviet delegation was debated several times by the Central Committee Politbureau. In his letter of October 31, 1922, to Chicherin and the members of the Politbureau concerning a note to the Entente powers about the Lausanne Conference Lenin wrote: "I do not have enough time at present to weigh seriously enough all the phrases in the draft of the note to the Entente which I consider very important. I feel that every word must be checked two and three times so that it should not imply our refusal to go to the conference. In this sense the note must be especially 'diplomatic.' It seemed to me that at the end of the note, which I looked through very briefly, there are some phrases which in this sense are not sufficiently diplomatic."

The sponsors of the conference—Britain, the USA, France, Italy and other countries—took every possible step to block Soviet participation in the talks in which Middle East problems were the major issues. Through the Lausanne Conference the imperialists wanted to gain control over the Black Sea Straits and thereby establish their domination in the Black Sea. This would have enabled them to engineer military provocations against Soviet Russia at any moment.

In notes to the sponsors of the conference on September 12 and 24, 1922, the Soviet Government made it plain that it was opposed to non-Black Sea powers arrogating the right to regulate the regime of the Straits without Russia's participation and against its interests. The Soviet Government exposed the true intentions of Britain as the chief sponsor and declared that it

would not recognise any decisions taken without its participation.

The organisers of the conference were compelled to heed the Soviet Government's protest. They agreed to invite a Soviet delegation to the conference provided it attended only those meetings where the problem of the Straits was to be discussed.

On October 31, 1922, Lenin emphasised in a speech at the fourth session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the 9th convocation that "in the near future our diplomats will once again have to display their skill in a matter of immense importance, and one in which we are vitally interested. I have in mind the Middle East Conference that Great Britain is convening in Lausanne on November 13. I am sure that there, too, our diplomats will prove their mettle, and that we shall be able to vindicate the interests of all our federated republics, and of the RSFSR. At all events, we shall succeed in revealing to the masses where and what the obstacle is, and to what extent it is an obstacle to the legitimate desires and aspirations not only of ourselves, but of all countries interested in the question of the Straits."

The Soviet programme on the Straits problem was formulated by Lenin on October 27, 1922 in an interview given to Michael Farbman, a correspondent of the *London Observer*. Our most important task, Lenin pointed out, was to: (1) satisfy the national aspirations of Turkey; (2) create conditions ruling out any possibility of conflicts over the Straits, in other words, to close the Straits to all armed ships in peace as well as in war; (3) to provide full freedom for commercial shipping.

Lenin also set the Soviet delegation the task of rendering aid to the peoples of the East in their struggle for independence. In this, he said, not



only the countries whose territories butt up against the Straits are interested. "...On this and on similar questions, we should like to see a minimum of general assurances, solemn promises and grandiloquent formulas and the greatest possible number of the simplest and most obvious decisions and measures that would certainly lead to peace, if not to the complete elimination of the war danger."

The Soviet Government's views were expounded at the conference by Chicherin, who led the Soviet delegation. Along with the interests of Soviet Russia the Soviet delegation upheld the interests of Turkey, though the latter assumed an inconsistent position and failed to give all-out support to the Soviet proposals in the hope of obtaining concessions from the Western powers on other issues. In its notes of January 7, 13 and 20, 1923, the Soviet delegation protested against separate negotiations between the Western delegations and Turkey.

In a statement of February 1, 1923, Chicherin rejected the draft of a Straits Convention as being unacceptable to Soviet Russia.

To get rid of the Soviet delegation, the leader of the British delegation, Lord Curzon, had the Conference adjourned. On the pretext that the agenda did not include the Straits problem, the Soviet delegation was not admitted to the second stage of the Lausanne talks, which began on April 23, 1923.

Despite this, the Soviet Government sent its plenipotentiary representative in Italy, V. V. Vorovsky, to Lausanne as a member of the Soviet delegation. However, the conference organisers deprived him of his diplomatic privileges and rights, fearing that he might expose their aggressive policies in the eyes of the peace-loving public.

The final act in the intolerable atmosphere that was created around Vorovsky was his heinous murder on May 10, 1923, by the Whiteguard Konradi. "It is the Swiss Government," said Chicherin, "that is directly to blame for his murder. . . . But the general responsibility for his murder rests with the governments of Britain, France and Italy which invited the Russian delegation to Lausanne for the full duration of the conference without ensuring its security."

On July 24, 1923, the conference adopted the British draft of the final document. It restricted Turkey's sovereignty and granted all nations the right freely to send into the Black Sea a force equal to the most powerful fleet of the littoral powers. The Soviet Government did not ratify the decisions of the Lausanne Conference.

## Disarmament: the Ideal of Socialism

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Disarmament, and thereby a guarantee of peace, is possible.

*Friedrich Engels*

The disarmament problem has a long history. It has been mankind's prime concern for decades, for a policy of disarmament is a policy of peace.

Lenin regarded disarmament as the apex of Soviet Russia's foreign policy programme. He closely linked the problem of peaceful coexistence with the problem of disarmament and the elimination of wars. "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism," Lenin always emphasised.

From the very first days of its existence the Soviet Government took a resolute stand in favour of peace and withdrawal from the imperialist war, and began a struggle for disarmament and peaceful cooperation. "The end of wars, peace among the peoples, termination of looting and violence—that is our ideal," wrote Lenin.

The connection between these two paramount

problems of world politics, disarmament and peaceful coexistence, became even more obvious after the end of the Civil War and foreign military intervention in Russia. On Lenin's instructions, the demand for peaceful coexistence and for disarmament was incorporated in the programme of the Soviet delegation at the 1922 Genoa Conference. It was expounded in Chicherin's statement on the opening day of that conference.

Lenin passionately hated war. He fought against it and looked forward to the time when war would become impossible. "War against war! Against all interference! For peace! Such are the slogans of the workers," Lenin used to repeat over and over again.

In our time the efforts of the peoples are focused on arriving at durable guarantees for the preservation of peace, and on depriving the aggressive forces of a chance to set their death-dealing weapons in motion.

As it was stressed at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, "*The main thing is to ward off a thermonuclear war, to prevent it from breaking out. This can be done by the present generation.*"

A radical way to attain lasting peace lies through general and complete disarmament under strict international control. That is the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union today.

## The Origin of Disarmament

Lenin's unflagging struggle for disarmament is graphically evidenced by numerous documents.

Even before World War I, and particularly after it had broken out, Lenin emphasised that "war is no chance happening, no 'sin' as is thought by Christian priests (who are no whit behind the

opportunists in preaching patriotism, humanity and peace), but an inevitable stage of capitalism, just as legitimate a form of the *capitalist* way of life as peace is." Before unleashing a war the general staffs of imperialist states would spend decades on preparations for it.

During the war Lenin's voice rang out courageously to tell the peoples the whole truth about its rapacious nature and about the way it could be ended.

The bold and resolute actions of the Russian proletariat resulted in Lenin's slogan for the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war becoming an accomplished fact in 1917. The news flashed across the whole world and evoked a wave of popular sympathy for the Soviet Republic everywhere.

It is characteristic of Lenin that he applied a concrete historical approach to the disarmament question. Decisions on the attitude to a war and to disarmament, he said, must be taken by Social Democrats not from the viewpoint of whether the war is a defensive or an offensive one, but from positions of defence of the class interests of the international proletariat. As a true champion of peace, Lenin called for a struggle against imperialist wars. He addressed his appeal to the peoples at a time when capitalism still reigned supreme in the international arena, while the social and political forces that are not interested in war were still weak, insufficiently organised, and powerless to curb the imperialists.

With Lenin's participation, the International Socialist Congresses at Stuttgart in 1907 and Copenhagen in 1910 debated and passed resolutions pledging that socialists of all countries would actively oppose militarism and demand of their governments the reduction of armaments and the peaceful settlement of all conflicts arising bet-

ween states. Before the outbreak of the First World War the slogan of disarmament was fully justified. But later, when the world imperialist war had begun, Lenin changed his attitude to the disarmament slogan. In his view, the new conditions called for agitation in favour of arming the proletariat and turning the imperialist war into a civil war. He therefore sharply criticised those who approached the disarmament problem without taking into account the obtaining situation. The mistake of the Left Socialists at that time was that they opposed the need to arm the people. "This", wrote Lenin, "is a glaring error. It is precisely for a socialist revolution against imperialism that armaments are necessary."

In 1916, Lenin pointed out in *On the Slogan of Disarmament*: "Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historic mission, to consign all armaments to the scrap-heap. And the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before."

At that time Lenin saw that a revolutionary situation was brewing. In those circumstances it was wrong to advance the slogan of disarmament as a slogan for action and to substitute disarmament for the arming of the people as one of the demands to be included in the minimum programme of the Social-Democratic movement, as suggested by some Swiss, Dutch and Scandinavian Left Social Democrats. To pose the question of disarmament would have meant demobilising the masses on the eve of revolution. That is why in his *On the Slogan of Disarmament* and several other works written in the autumn of 1916 Lenin severely criticised the Kautskyan position on the disarmament question. This position amounted to a denial of the possibility of socialist revolution, for those who preached disarmament during

the imperialist war slipped into the morass of bourgeois pacifism.

The demand for disarmament at the time of the war was typical of the opportunists who had renounced revolution. "Our slogan", Lenin said, "must be: arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie."

Lenin believed that only the advent of a new society—a socialist society of the kind that appeared in Russia in 1917—would turn the struggle for disarmament into a practical proposition, for in a socialist society there are no social strata, no classes interested economically or politically either in war or in an arms race.

Lenin relegated the decisive role in preventing war and in fighting for disarmament to the masses. He emphasised that since the struggle against the threat of war had become a life-or-death issue for tens of millions of people there must be "...the greatest possible number of the simplest and most obvious decisions and measures that would certainly lead to peace." Lenin advocated extending and deepening the struggle against a new imperialist war. He continuously pointed out that "it is worth devoting one's whole life to the struggle against this kind of war; it is a struggle in which one must be ruthless and chase to the furthest corners of the Earth all the sophistry that is uttered in its defence."

Nadezhda Krupskaya recalled that Lenin once said: "...modern technology is today increasingly promoting the destructive nature of war. But there will come a time when war will become so destructive as to become altogether impossible... Ilyich spoke of this with great enthusiasm. You could see how passionately he wanted war to become impossible." Of course, Lenin was by no means implying that the destructiveness of war would, of its own accord, make it impossible. He

always called on the masses to wage a most vigorous struggle against war.

The state brought into being by the October Revolution, where there is no social or national inequality and where the exploitation of man by man has been abolished forever, cannot aspire to enslave other countries and peoples. As in Lenin's time the army of the Soviet Republic was needed for defence, so in our time the armies of the socialist countries are essential for safeguarding the peaceful life of the working people and the gains of socialism.

It is out of the question for working people to want war or the arms race, as the terrible hardships they entail would be theirs to bear.

The Civil War was hardly over when Soviet Russia began to demobilise its army. From 5.3 million men under arms in Soviet Russia in December 1920 the army was cut by December 1921 to 1.5 million men and by mid-1922 to 800,000—just a little over one-seventh of its size some 18 months earlier. But even this force was thought to be too big. Soviet Russia would willingly have made further cuts in its armed forces—to the point of completely abolishing the army—had there been genuine guarantees of the country's inviolability and territorial integrity.

### The Struggle for Disarmament at the Genoa Conference

The Soviet Government's struggle for disarmament at Genoa holds a prominent place in the history of international relations.

The cited documents graphically illustrate how vigorously Lenin campaigned for disarmament and international cooperation throughout this



period of history. Of importance in this regard is Lenin's correspondence with Chicherin on the eve of the Genoa Conference, notably Lenin's March 14 letter of reply to Chicherin which has already been quoted above, and his comments on Chicherin's letter of March 10, 1922. In his letter Chicherin laid special emphasis on the disarmament problem. "Simultaneously," he wrote, "we shall propose a *general reduction of armaments*, proceeding from those theses that we have agreed upon with the Revolutionary War Council. Developing further the tradition of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, we shall propose complementing *the rules of war by various prohibitions: the abolition of submarines, chemical gases, flame throwers, and aerial warfare.*" Lenin felt that the socialist state must introduce something new into the conventional international forms, something that would meet the interests of the working people. And it came up with the demand for general and complete disarmament.

As soon as the conference opened on April 10, 1922, Chicherin submitted Russia's disarmament proposal. "The Russian delegation", he declared, "intends, in the course of the conference, to propose a general reduction of armaments and to support all proposals tending to lighten the burden of militarism, on condition that this reduction is applied to the armies of all countries, and the rules of war are complemented by the absolute prohibition of its most barbarous forms, such as poison gases, aerial warfare and, in particular, the use of weapons of destruction against civilian population. It goes without saying that Russia is equally prepared to carry out a reduction of armaments for itself too, provided there is complete and unreserved reciprocity and the establishment for it of the necessary guarantees to prevent any attacks or interference in its internal affairs."

The presentation of this Leninist disarmament programme at Genoa was an event of exceptional importance, for it reflected the sincere peace aspirations of the peoples exhausted by wars and the burden of military expenditure.

Soviet Russia's proposals had a bombshell effect. After Chicherin's speech the head of the French delegation asserted that in the commissions France would not only protest, it would "decisively" and "vigorously" oppose the discussion of any reduction in armaments. Seeking to tone down the impression made by the statement of his French colleague, Llyod George declared there had been "nothing explosive" in the Soviet proposals and called for a "reconciliation" between the two delegations.

The impression caused by the Soviet disarmament proposal was aptly described by Narimanov, a member of the Soviet delegation at Genoa. He subsequently wrote in *Izvestia*: "The first word about disarmament won for us world-wide popularity. Before the conference we had been looked at askance. . . . But as soon as we took the initiative in urging all states to disarm, this proposal swiftly sobered everyone, not only those present, but also, over their heads, all public circles in Europe."

However, at that time the Soviet proposal was not destined to be realised. The British and French delegates prevented its discussion at the conference. The vivifying idea of disarmament stifled in the emasculated diplomatic atmosphere. The bourgeois governments, their diplomats and their press did all they could to muffle the Soviet proposals. "We were impeded from bringing up at the conference the question of disarmament, as well as certain other questions," said Chicherin in his concluding remarks at the conference.

On April 22, 1922, *Pravda* wrote: "When the popular masses in all countries learn that only the Communists raised the disarmament question at the conference, while the bourgeois governments removed it from the agenda, this will not increase the masses' trust in the bourgeois rulers. But the prestige and popularity of Soviet Russia is growing immensely." Discussing the activities of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a decree on May 17, 1922. This document, which had been drafted by Lenin, stated: "The All-Russia Central Executive Committee emphasises the correctness and timeliness of the fact that the delegation introduced the proposal for general disarmament in its very first statement. In that statement of the RSFSR delegation were reflected not only the interests and wishes of the working masses of Russia but also the vital interests of the working people of the whole world and of all oppressed and enslaved peoples and nations. The working masses of the whole world cannot renounce their desire to secure peace for themselves at any cost, and they will have to seek guarantees of that peace.

Having advanced the idea of disarmament at the Genoa Conference as a practical proposition and a realistic way to ensure stable peace, the Soviet Government went on to prove the sincerity of its intentions.

One such example was provided by Lenin's proposal to place the question of reducing the size of the Red Army on the agenda of the third session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the 9th convocation. On May 20, 1922, Lenin dictated his "Letter to the Secretariat of the CC RCP(B) on the Reduction of the Red Army." "I believe," he wrote, "that a decree should be passed announcing a reduction by one-fourth,

motivating it by the fact that, though small and not particularly reliable, yet a certain real step towards an armistice was taken at Genoa." The plan to cut the size of the Red Army was elaborated by the Revolutionary Military Council and submitted for approval by the session on condition that the Genoa Conference found a positive solution to the disarmament question.

On May 24, the third session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee passed a decree stating: "Thanks to the line upheld by our delegation, the Genoa Conference provides grounds for hoping that a serious reduction of the army is possible. However, the Genoa Conference has failed to produce solutions for even the most urgent questions with regard to relationships between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois states, referring the solution of the basic questions to the Hague..." In view of this, the question of reducing the army was withdrawn from the session's agenda. The session authorised the Government and the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs to submit an appropriate proposal depending on the outcome of the Hague Conference.

On November 16, 1922, the Central Committee Politbureau again considered the question of reducing the army and took a decision to cut its strength from 800,000 to 600,000 men in January 1923. On December 18, 1922, a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee endorsed the Politbureau decision. The plenum recommended addressing an appeal on behalf of the 10th All-Russia Congress of Soviets to all the peoples of the world, reiterating Soviet Russia's desire for general disarmament and calling on them to overcome the opposition of other states to this proposal. The appeal was adopted.

After Genoa the Soviet Government initiated new steps with regard to disarmament in the in-

ternational arena. It decided to interest its Western neighbours in this problem. The Soviet Government believed that if general disarmament in Europe was proving to be a difficult problem, agreement on mutual arms reductions should be reached with the states bordering on Russia. On June 12, 1922, it sent notes to Finland, Poland, Latvia and Estonia inviting them to discuss the question of arms reductions at a special conference.

After protracted exchanges those states accepted the proposal. Matters relating to the conference were debated several times by the Central Committee Politbureau. On November 23, 1922, the Politbureau approved a programme providing for a limitation in the size of the armies over a period of 18 months to two years on condition there was reciprocal action by the other states concerned.

### The Moscow Disarmament Conference of 1922

The disarmament conference opened in Moscow on December 2, 1922. It was attended by representatives of the RSFSR, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The objective of the conference was to bring about a reduction to a minimum of the armed forces of all the participating states. Cuts in the sizes of the armies were to be mutual and objectively fair. It was hoped that the decisions of the conference could become the starting point for an All-European drive for general disarmament.

The Soviet proposals submitted to the conference by Litvinov, the chairman of the Soviet delegation, envisaged a 75 per cent reduction in the

strength of the armies within the next 18 to 24 months. They also outlined several other disarmament measures. However, the Soviet proposals came up against the refusal of several bourgeois governments to limit their armies. Their representatives countered the Soviet proposals with a Polish draft treaty on disarmament which sought to substitute "moral disarmament" for material disarmament. It demanded that a non-aggression and arbitration pact be signed first, while the decision on disarmament should be placed in the hands of a technical commission that was to meet later. Furthermore, the statements made by the representatives of the Baltic states indicated that they were thinking in terms of only token force reductions.

On December 7, 1922, Lenin attended a meeting of the Politbureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee which again reviewed the progress of the conference. The meeting instructed Litvinov to "struggle to ensure that both documents, that is the document on moral disarmament and the document on material disarmament, should represent a single whole and be signed jointly. But if the other side should present its demand for signing the moral disarmament document as an ultimatum, that proposal is not to be accepted and the document is not to be signed."

The delegations of Poland, Finland and Estonia refused to discuss the question of proportionate arms reduction, that is, to consider the question of material disarmament; so the Moscow Conference closed on December 12, 1922 without taking any decisions.

The story of Lenin as the architect of Soviet foreign policy who elaborated its basic principles and personally guided the diplomatic activities of the young Soviet state is nearing an end. In the last period of his life Lenin wrote several

works which were very important for the further development of Soviet Russia. In them he not only discussed major aspects of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, but also referred to several problems of the world-wide revolutionary movement. A brief look at this period in Lenin's life will be of interest to the reader.

On November 20, 1922, Lenin addressed a plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet. It was his last public speech. In discussing the international situation, Lenin said that in the foreign policy field the Soviet Republic was continuing the line that had been taken earlier, continuing it consistently and with great success. He noted the strengthening economic and diplomatic positions of the Soviet Republic: "We have won quite a definite diplomatic position, recognised by the whole world. All of you see it. You see its results, but how much time we needed to get it! We have now won the recognition of our rights by our enemies both in economic and in commercial policy. This is proved by the conclusion of trade agreements."

Soviet Russia was approaching a new phase in its international relations—a phase of recognition by most countries of the capitalist world. Lenin's personal efforts undoubtedly had a great deal to do with this new situation.

After December 16, 1922, Lenin's health began to deteriorate. Confined to bed, sensing that he might very shortly be rendered completely inactive, Lenin hastened to expound his views on the ways to build socialism in Russia, on the Party and on measures to strengthen it, and on prospects for the development of the world revolutionary movement. On Lenin's insistence his doctors permitted him to dictate his thoughts on all these matters to a stenographer—but for a very short time every day. On December 24, after a con-

ference between members of the Central Committee Politbureau and Lenin's doctors, it was decided: "1. Vladimir Ilyich shall be entitled to dictate every day for five-ten minutes, but this should not be in the nature of a correspondence and Vladimir Ilyich should not expect a reply to these notes. Personal visits are forbidden. 2. Neither his friends, nor members of his family should communicate to Vladimir Ilyich any information about political life, so as to give him no cause for worry or excitement." Later Lenin's health gradually improved and he was allowed to dictate for 20 to 40 minutes a day. In reality he worked much longer.

Uppermost in Lenin's mind at that time was the question of the destinies and prospects of the building of socialism in Soviet Russia. Thus, in his article entitled *On Co-operation* he emphasised that Russia had all that was necessary to build a socialist society: a proletarian state, large-scale production in the hands of the Soviet Government, a union of the working class and the peasantry, and the leadership of the working class in that union. "It is still not the building of socialist society," Lenin wrote, "but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for it."

Lenin pointed out that the path to socialism would not be an easy one. The armed intervention and the blockade had thrown the country back economically. The Civil War had also been used by the foes of socialism to ravage the economy of Soviet Russia. However, Lenin said, the enemies "failed to overthrow the new system created by the revolution, but they did prevent it from at once taking the step forward that would have justified the forecasts of the socialists, that would have enabled the latter to develop the productive forces with enormous speed, to develop all the potentialities which, taken together, would have



produced socialism; socialists would thus have proved to all and sundry that socialism contains within itself gigantic forces and that mankind had now entered into a new stage of development of extraordinary brilliant prospects."

Observing the decline of the revolutionary upsurge in the West, Lenin stressed that the Soviet people would for a long time to come have to build socialism in conditions of capitalist encirclement.

In his last written works Lenin showed that the development of the world liberation movement had been more complex and slower than could have been expected. The revolutions in Germany and Hungary, and the revolutionary actions of the proletariat in several other countries had been defeated. At the same time he emphasised that the slowing down of the development of revolutions in West European countries did not at all mean that the Bolsheviks had erred in affirming the inevitability of the victory of socialism on a world-wide scale. "The revolutionary movement has made progress," Lenin noted. "The development of the international revolution... has not proceeded along as straight a line as we had expected."

Lenin was convinced that the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, the successes of socialist and communist construction in that country and the involvement of the vast majority of the people of the world in the struggle against imperialism immensely accelerated world development.

Victories of Socialism  
on an International Scale.  
History Corroborates  
Lenin's Prediction

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The Struggle of the USSR for General and  
Complete Disarmament

Although the Moscow Conference of 1922 failed to yield concrete results, it did show the entire world the sincerity of Soviet Russia's desire for peace.

After Lenin's death the Soviet Government continued to implement Lenin's ideas in the sphere of foreign policy, including disarmament.

In 1925, under the pressure of the anti-war sentiments of the masses, the sixth session of the League of Nations passed a decision calling for the preparation of an international conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments. To this end the Council of the League formed a Preparatory Commission on December 12.

The Soviet Union did not participate in the first three sessions of the Preparatory Commission which were held in Geneva in 1926 and 1927, since it had no diplomatic relations with Switzerland following the assassination of V. V. Vorovsky, the Soviet plenipotentiary representative. On April 14, 1927, the Soviet-Swiss conflict was settled and the Soviet delegation began actively to struggle for general and complete disarmament in the Commission. Thus, at the fourth session of the Commission it submitted a proposal which envisaged the disbandment of the entire personnel of land, naval and air forces; the destruction of all types of weapons, munitions and other means of annihilation; the elimination of all warships and combat aircraft; the termination of all military training; the promulgation of laws to abolish compulsory and voluntary military service; the dismantling of all fortresses and naval and air bases; the dismantling of munitions factories; the termination of appropriations for military purposes; the abolition of war ministries and the dissolution of general staffs; the prohibition of war propaganda; the prohibition by law of the issue of patents for military inventions, and so forth.

The Soviet Government proposed that these measures be implemented within one year or carried out in stages over a period of four years.

The Soviet proposals met with broad response among public circles in foreign countries. Even the American bourgeois newspaper, the *Baltimore Sun*, was compelled to admit that the Soviet proposals were acclaimed by ordinary people everywhere.

This was confirmed by the British Labour leader George Lansbury, who said: "I am sure that if you put the Russian proposal before any gathering of ordinary men and women they would

unanimously vote in favour of it. . . I look upon this statement of Russia as the biggest thing that has been brought into the peace movement."

At the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission (March 15-24, 1928) the Soviet Government submitted a draft convention on immediate general and complete disarmament. In view of its rejection by the representatives of Britain, France, the United States and Japan, the Soviet delegation came out with a new proposal—a draft convention on progressive-proportionate disarmament.

According to this proposal the bigger powers were to reduce their armaments by one half and the smaller countries by one-third or one-fourth. The convention provided for complete disarmament with respect to tanks, large warships, long-range artillery, heavy bombers, all stockpiles of aerial bombs, all means of chemical and bacteriological warfare, etc. It was proposed that all these measures be carried out within a two-year period, with a standing international inspection commission, formed of representatives of all the states participating in the convention, to supervise their effective implementation.

However, all these persistent efforts by the Soviet Union to secure disarmament encountered fierce opposition on the part of the imperialist states.

On the eve of the International Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1932 the Soviet Government took a new initiative in the disarmament question by proposing the mutual exchange of information on the state of armaments between Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Finland, Lithuania and Latvia. In this way it tried to improve the atmosphere at the Conference. However, those countries attempted to use the information about the Soviet Union's armaments for espiona-

ge purposes. Reports appeared in the press that some of the Western great powers had provided false information about their air force and navy. Bad examples can be contagious. Some of the smaller countries decided to take a leaf out of the great powers' book. Thus, in early May 1931, a conference of Polish and Finnish military men and diplomats passed a resolution saying: "As for the figures to be included in the tables, they need not necessarily reflect the true situation in the field of armaments." Some states were loath to provide any information about their armaments. By mid-September, when the time allotted for the presentation of information had run out, only 21 out of the 60 countries invited to the conference had provided the relevant data on their armaments.

At the Disarmament Conference which opened in Geneva on February 2, 1932, the Soviet Government tabled a programme of general and complete disarmament which called for the "speediest general and complete disbandment of all armed forces on the basis of the equality of all states." At the same time it submitted a draft convention on the progressive-proportionate reduction of armaments.

Most of the participants in the conference rejected those proposals. In this connection the Soviet Government declared that the disarmament problem should be practically resolved without further procrastination. "Disarmament," the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs emphasised, "must cease to play the role of a tennis ball thrown from one commission or sub-commission to another, from one conference to another, from one session to another."

The Soviet disarmament programme was highly appreciated by international public opinion. Its presentation and discussion at a representative

international forum promoted a rising tide of public activity in favour of disarmament, created moral barriers in the path of the forces of militarism and helped diminish the war threat.

Of great importance in the defence of peace was the Soviet proposal as to the definition of an aggressor, which was submitted on February 6, 1933 to the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference. The draft declaration on this question proclaimed the principles of independence of all states, big and small, and the complete inviolability of frontiers. It refuted the right of one state to interfere in the internal affairs of another. This declaration has gone down in history as the Charter of the Freedom of Nations. It made good a substantial deficiency of the League of Nations Charter which envisaged the application of sanctions against an aggressor but failed to provide a definition of the aggressor. The adoption of the definition would have prevented arbitrary interpretations of the Charter.

The Soviet proposal on the definition of an aggressor greatly impressed world public opinion. Thus, the French political leader E. Daladier, addressing the Chamber of Deputies in April 1933, stated that the Soviet declaration was "a clear-cut and precise definition of an aggressor, which Russia, to its credit, submitted for discussion and which we fully endorse." The British delegate to the Conference, Anthony Eden, reported to the Foreign Office that the discussion in the General Commission had revealed a strong current in favour of the Soviet draft.

However, the imperialist quarters of the Western powers blocked the adoption of the Soviet proposal.

In spite of this the Soviet Union continued its efforts to secure the implementation of the principles of its declaration on the definition of an

aggressor. At the International Economic Conference in London in June 1933, on a Soviet proposal, the Convention on the Definition of an Aggressor was signed by the USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. This step promoted the consolidation of peace in Europe.

The Soviet Union's struggle for the implementation of the Leninist foreign policy ideas—the ideas of peace and security for all the peoples—raised its prestige in the international arena. This was admitted not only by its friends but also by its foes. For instance, in late July 1934, Lloyd George said that in his view the foreign policy of the USSR was aimed at peace, that USSR was one of the most powerful forces for peace and that its influence in this respect was growing.

During the Second World War the peoples insistently demanded that the sacrifices borne in the struggle against fascism should not be in vain. They urged the creation of a reliable system of international security and the establishment of enduring and lasting peace which would save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

With the unprecedented development of science and technology disarmament has become one of the most vital problems of international relations.

After the war, reflecting the aspirations of the masses and following Lenin's behests, the Soviet Union has continued its efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament.

At various international conferences and in the United Nations the Soviet Government has submitted proposals on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the reduction of armed forces and armaments, the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territories and the prohibition of war propaganda. In 1955, 1956 and 1958

the Soviet Government unilaterally carried out sizable reductions in the strength of its armed forces.

Agreement on concrete questions of restraining the arms race, including the restriction of the nuclear armaments race, is, the Soviet Government believes, quite feasible, though perhaps not easy. This is borne out by such international agreements as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; and, finally, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which has already been signed by over 80 states. The Soviet Union was the initiator of all these treaties. There has been widespread international response to the new Soviet proposals outlined in the Memorandum on Certain Urgent Measures for the Cessation of the Arms Race and for Disarmament submitted to the 23rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1968.

These concrete Soviet proposals affect key questions of disarmament and constitute a broad programme of action to ensure international peace and security.

As an objective of first-rate importance the Memorandum puts forward the question of banning the use of nuclear weapons. This measure would be a serious deterrent for any one wishing to employ such weapons. In this connection it is worth recalling that as far back as 1961 the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the initiative of several Asian and African states, condemned the use of nuclear weapons. It would now be quite logical to embody the provisions of the declaration adopted at that time in an international convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons.



To remove the danger of nuclear war it is necessary to resolve a variety of complicated questions involving rocket-nuclear armaments. The Soviet Government has proposed that all the nuclear powers should promptly begin talks about ending the production of nuclear weapons, reducing their stockpiles and subsequently completely banning and eliminating such weapons. It has also proposed an agreement on the mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

The other measures proposed in the Memorandum also meet the interests of strengthening peace. Tensions in the world would abate considerably if such proposals were implemented as the prohibition of underground nuclear tests with the establishment of control through national means of detection; the banning of flights of bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond the limits of national boundaries and limitation of the operating range of missile-carrying submarines; the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons; the dismantling of foreign military bases on alien territories; the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world; the formalisation of rules for the use of the sea bed and ocean floor solely for peaceful purposes.

Lenin's prediction that the question of war and peace would become a life-or-death issue for tens and hundreds of millions of people is borne out with particular force today. Lenin called for action against all sophistry in defence of war, whatever its source, for exposure of preparations for an imperialist war and for effective measures against the war danger. Following Lenin's behests, the Soviet Union is doing all in its power to abolish war, to give effect to general and complete disarmament and to establish peace on Earth for all time.

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## Conclusion

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Soviet foreign policy forms an integral part of the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its bedrock foundation is the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Herein lies the strength of Soviet foreign policy.

The foreign policy of the Soviet state is an outcome of the October Revolution. It has always been, and remains to this day, an active factor in the international class struggle and an effective instrument for peace. By its very nature Soviet foreign policy is internationalist, since the interests of the Soviet people, which it reflects, coincide with the interests of the working people of the world. It is permeated with the spirit of solidarity with the progressive social forces of foreign countries. The major features of that policy are its genuine democracy, the recognition of all nations, big and small, the equality of races and nationalities. It is a consistent policy of peace, security and friendship of the peoples.

Today Soviet foreign policy is keynoted by the main features that were formulated at the time when Lenin led the Soviet Government.

Lenin's activities in the foreign policy field

were an example of dedication to principles, of an ability to evaluate social, economic and political events in all their complexity and contradictory relationships and promptly to respond to changes in the international situation which required a change in tactics.

Following Lenin's behests, the Soviet Government thoroughly analyses the events taking place in the world, displays boldness and flexibility, dedication to principles and readiness, where necessary, to accept reasonable compromises.

Soviet foreign policy today pursues the following objectives:

- to create the most favourable international situation for the continuation and completion of communist construction, to chart a course aimed at establishing sound international relations;

- to ensure the security and inviolability of the countries of the socialist community;

- to strengthen the fraternal alliance with the national-liberation movement, to render all-out assistance to the countries that have freed themselves from colonial domination in strengthening their political and achieving economic independence;

- to be the mainstay for all progressive, democratic, revolutionary forces of the world by rendering all-out assistance in the struggle of the working class, the toiling masses and the oppressed nations of all countries;

- to remove the danger of a new world war, to bring about conditions for society to rid itself of wars altogether; to achieve the disbandment of all opposing military blocs;

- to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict international control;

- to strengthen relations of fraternal friendship and close-knit cooperation with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America fighting

for the achievement and consolidation of national independence and with all peoples and states in favour of preserving peace;

— to pursue an active and consistent policy of improving and developing relations with all capitalist countries in the interests of safeguarding peace;

— to pursue a line aimed at developing international cooperation in the field of trade, cultural ties, science and technology;

— to maintain a high degree of vigilance against the aggressive circles seeking to violate the peace, to take timely steps to expose the initiators of military adventures, and to take all the necessary measures to ensure the security of the Soviet Union.

Lenin pointed out that “. . . politics is a science and an art that does not fall from the skies or come gratis.”

Since politics is a *science*, it requires a scientific approach, a definition of its content and its trends on a scientific basis.

Since politics is an *art*, it must be pursued skilfully, knowledgeably and with due regard for the experience and practices of living reality.

Marxism-Leninism has charted the road leading to the one and only correct assessment of history as an integrated, consistent and law-governed process—its contradictions notwithstanding. Through this Marxism-Leninism has merged science with politics, and theory with practice. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine teaches how to separate the important from the second-rate. It lends foreign policy a creative nature, guarding it against the danger of falling into error.

A paramount feature of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy is indissoluble connection between word and deed. The Soviet Union treasures the confidence of the peoples and there-

fore it does not engage in empty rhetoric; it does not promise the unattainable. "...Let us face the truth squarely," Lenin said, "In politics that is always the best and the only correct attitude."

It is necessary to strive for sincerity in politics, as it deals not with isolated people but with millions, Lenin emphasised.

The Soviet Government is consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-economic systems which was first advanced by Lenin. The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence has been further developed in the resolutions of plenary meetings of the Central Committee and of CPSU Congresses, and in the Programme of the Party. These documents point out that peaceful coexistence implies the renunciation of war as an instrument for the settlement of disputes between states and their settlement through negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and confidence between states; non-interference in internal affairs, absolute respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all countries; the development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit.

Guided by Lenin's precepts, the Soviet Union stands firmly in favour of one social system proving its superiority over the other by competing in the production of material benefits and in creating cultural values, in achieving the greatest possible satisfaction of man's requirements.

"Peace to the peoples"—this slogan born of the Great October Revolution has become a paramount principle of Soviet foreign policy.

The causes for war and aggressive policies under capitalism have been for ever abolished in the Soviet Union. In contrast to the capitalist countries there are no exploiting classes or social groups in the Soviet Union that are interested in

war. The USSR has no need to seize alien territories. It has a vast amount of land containing untold mineral resources. In the Soviet Union there are no social groups that could profit by the arms race. The Soviet Union does not and cannot pursue any political line other than a struggle against the arms race.

An object of the Soviet Government's constant concern is the peace and security of the peoples, the prevention of a thermonuclear war.

*"The main thing is to ward off a thermonuclear war, to prevent it from breaking out. . . It is possible to avert a world war by the combined efforts of the mighty socialist camp, the peace-loving non-socialist countries, the international working class and all the forces championing peace. . . To abolish war and establish everlasting peace on earth is a historic mission of communism,"* declares the Programme of the CPSU.

As in Lenin's time the struggle for peace is a task infused with profound class content. To fight for peace today means to isolate the more bellicose and aggressive quarters of the imperialist powers. The history of Soviet foreign policy is a history of persistent and incessant struggle to save the peoples from the scourge of war.

Great attention is devoted in that struggle to defending the gains of socialism. A revolution, Lenin said, is only worth anything if it can defend itself politically, economically, ideologically and militarily. Lenin regarded the defence of the socialist gains as the supreme internationalist duty not only of the working class and all working people in a country building socialism but also of the entire international proletariat. Life has shown that departure from Lenin's ideas and principles can imperil the revolutionary gains of the peoples.

Lenin pointed out that under imperialism wars are inevitable. Lenin's proposition that grounds for aggressive wars will exist as long as imperialism exists remains valid to this day. The antagonistic socio-economic nature of capitalism has not changed. Its existence implies the constant threat of wars. But we are living at a time when there exist forces capable of curbing the aggressive circles of the imperialist states.

The community of socialist countries is a decisive factor in preventing wars and preserving peace. Before the Second World War there were only two socialist states in existence—the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. They accounted for 17 per cent of the world's territory, roughly 9 per cent of the population and 10 per cent of the industrial output. After the Second World War, with the formation of the world socialist system, the situation changed. The socialist system now accounts for 26 per cent of the world's territory and over 35 per cent of its population. In 1965, the socialist community produced 38 per cent of the world's industrial output.

Proceeding from the changes that have occurred in the world in favour of socialism and developing further Lenin's doctrine as to war, the Communists arrived at the important conclusion that today war is not a fatal inevitability and that war can be prevented.

The Soviet Union will go on following Lenin's behests, and it will pursue a policy for excluding war from the life of society, strengthening peace and safeguarding the security of the peoples.

By implementing the Leninist nationalities policy, the peoples of the Soviet Union have set an example of fraternal friendship and cooperation without precedent in human history. They have forever repudiated the capitalist policy of build-

ding the well-being of the economically and militarily powerful states on the oppression of the weaker countries and the curtailment of the national independence of other peoples.

Having resolved the national question inside the country on the basis of self-determination and fraternal friendship among all peoples, the Soviet Union, naturally enough, cannot conduct any policy in the international arena other than a policy of friendship and cooperation between all peoples, recognition of the right of each nation to independent statehood and non-interference in its internal affairs.

An important feature of the Leninist Soviet foreign policy is its internationalism. Underlying it is the identity of the fundamental interests of the Soviet people with the interests of the working masses in all countries. In the past 50 years Soviet foreign policy, developing its Leninist traditions, has inscribed into its history many splendid examples of international brotherhood. Well known is the solidarity displayed by the newly emergent Soviet Republic with the insurgent proletarians in Germany and Hungary, the support rendered by the Soviet Union to the struggle of the Chinese people against the forces of imperialism. Equally well known are the Soviet Union's aid to Spain and the liberation struggle of the Soviet people in the Second World War. The victory won at the cost of millions of Soviet lives saved many countries from fascist enslavement.

Another and no less important feature of Soviet foreign policy is its genuine democracy. The unshakable democratic basis on which the Soviet Union develops its relations with all countries is true recognition of Lenin's precepts on the equality of all peoples and nations, all races and nationalities. The Soviet Union is a champion of the democratic rights, the freedom and the inde-



pendence of all peoples. The Soviet Union is a staunch ally of all those who favour the genuine equality of nations.

The vital objectives of Soviet foreign policy include concern for the consolidation of the world socialist system.

The socialist countries have a similar economic foundation—the public ownership of the means of production; a similar system of government—people's power with the working class at the head; a similar ideology—Marxism-Leninism; common interests in defending the revolutionary gains and objectives in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

The Soviet Union is bound with the socialist countries by treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Their content reflects the new, higher stage in its relations with those countries. The Soviet Government takes great care to ensure further development of the economic cooperation of socialist states and to strengthen their common defences. Of prime importance in this respect is the strengthening of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

The friendship of the socialist countries is strengthening and developing from year to year. It is becoming ever more profound and many-faceted, turning into an organic requirement of the peoples of those countries. Each socialist nation makes its contribution to the building up of the world socialist system, to the consolidation of its might. The cooperation of the socialist states affords each of them an opportunity to utilise its productive forces in the fullest and most rational way. A new type of international division of labour is coming into being in the process of the economic, scientific and technological coope-

ration of the socialist countries, the coordination of their national economic plans, and the specialisation and cooperation of production.

History has proved that the emergence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics followed by the world system of socialism is the beginning of the historic process of comprehensive rapprochement of the peoples. The practical experience of the peoples of the socialist community has confirmed that their fraternal unity and cooperation are in the best interests of each country.

The socialist system has to overcome certain difficulties stemming chiefly from the fact that most of the countries belonging to it had, in the past, medium or even low levels of economic development along with the fact that world reaction is doing its best to impede the building of socialism. The main political and ideological weapon to which international reaction and the remnants of the internal reactionary forces are resorting in their struggle against the unity of the socialist countries is nationalism. It is a well known fact that manifestations of nationalism and national narrow-mindedness do not disappear automatically with the establishment of a socialist system. Nationalistic prejudices and vestiges of old national dissensions are a field where resistance to social progress can be the longest and the stubbornest, the bitterest and the craftiest.

Of importance in Soviet foreign policy is assistance to the national-liberation movement. Many newly emergent nations have cast off the colonial yoke and are struggling for the development and consolidation of their independence and for social progress. Today relations of confidence and mutual understanding are developing between the Soviet Union and the newly emergent

states. The scope and concrete forms of these relations depend on the general policy line of the nation concerned. The USSR has established the closest economic and political ties with those countries that have taken a path leading to socialism. These nations are gradually getting convinced that the Soviet Union is treating them with sincerity, that it claims nothing for itself but, on the contrary, helps them develop their economy, build plants, factories, power stations, institutes, hospitals and the like.

The time has long since passed when imperialism could freely exploit the human and material resources of those countries in its aggressive interests. Today the peoples of the developing countries can place their resources at the service of universal security, they can become a new bulwark of peace. This is required by their own interests and by the interests of all the peoples of the world.

Lenin urged that the utmost concern be displayed for strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet Union, for the might of the first socialist country is the main obstacle in the path of the warmongers. He emphasised that the creation of a socialist army inspired by the ideas of the struggle for the liberation of the working people would make the Soviet state invincible. Today, looking back at the path that has been traversed, the Soviet people can justly say that Lenin's behest has been fulfilled. The Soviet Union's military might will never be used for selfish purposes. It is essential for the struggle against aggression and oppression, the struggle for freedom, democracy and peace.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a consistently revolutionary policy in all its manifestations.

Time is the strictest and fairest of all judges. Firmly abiding by the Leninist foreign policy principles, the Soviet Union within half a century has won decisive positions in international relations. It has merited the esteem of the peoples of the world.

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## Important Dates in Lenin's Foreign Policy Activities

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### 1917

- 7-8 November      The Great October Socialist Revolution—start of a new era in human history.
- 8-9 November      Lenin drafts the Decrees on Peace, on Land and on the Formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia, the Council of People's Commissars; participates in the work of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, delivers reports on peace and on land. The Congress adopts the Decrees on Peace and on Land and the Decision on the Formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Government, and approves the composition of the Council of People's Commissars.
- 15 November      Lenin signs the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia.

- 22 November Lenin participates in a conference of delegates from the front which hears a report by N. V. Krylenko on the measures taken by the Council of People's Commissars to conclude an armistice with Germany.
- Middle of November, not later than 30 November Lenin signs an Appeal (in the German language) by the Council of People's Commissars to German soldiers urging them to support the struggle of the working people of Soviet Russia for peace and socialism.
- 3 December Lenin signs an Appeal by the Council of People's Commissars "To All the Working Moslems of Russia and the East."
- 10 December Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the composition of the peace delegation for armistice talks with Germany and the instructions for the conduct of the peace talks.
- 28 December Lenin receives Count Mirbach, the head of the German delegation in the mixed commission formed at Petrograd to decide on the exchange of civilian internees and invalids and on measures to restore cultural and economic relations between the countries-signatories of the armistice. He talks with Mirbach about transferring the venue of the peace conference from Brest-Litovsk to Stockholm or some other city in a neutral country.

30 December

Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the appeal of the Finnish Government to the Soviet Government for Russian recognition of Finland's independence and the report of the peace delegation at the Brest-Litovsk Conference.

31 December, 1917  
and the night of  
31 December to 1  
January, 1918

Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars. While the meeting is in progress members of the Finnish Government delegation, Prime Minister Svinhufvud, Senator Enkel and the Counsellor of the Finnish mission in Petrograd, K. Idman, ask to be received. Lenin leaves the meeting for several minutes, hands over to Svinhufvud the Council of People's Commissars Decree on recognition of Finland's state independence and talks with the members of the delegation.

December

Lenin has several conversations with Colonel Raymond Robins, the head of the American Red Cross, on the question of Russian-American relations in connection with the peace talks with Germany.

1918

Beginning of  
January

Lenin writes the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, the basis for the first Soviet Constitution.

- 14 January Lenin talks with diplomatic envoys Francis (United States), Noulens (France), Spolaitovic (Serbia), Destree (Belgium) and others.
- 16 January Lenin talks with a delegation of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee before its departure for Brest-Litovsk.
- 20 January Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses a report on the progress of the Brest-Litovsk peace talks. Lenin writes his *Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace*.
- 1 February Lenin addresses a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(B) on questions relating to the conclusion of peace with Germany.
- The night of 18 to 19 February On behalf of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin sends a radiogram to the German Government protesting against an offensive by the German troops and announcing willingness to sign the peace on the terms suggested by the German Government.
- 1 March Lenin receives the British diplomat Lockhart and discusses the progress of the peace talks with Germany.
- 4 March Lenin signs the Council of People's Commissars communique on the signing of the peace treaty



- with Germany by the Soviet delegation at 5 p. m. on March 3 and on its forthcoming ratification on March 17 under a Decree of the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
- 7 March Lenin delivers the political report of the Central Committee at the 7th Congress of the RCP(B).
- 7-8 March Lenin writes down his comments on the speeches on war and peace at the 7th Congress of the RCP(B).
- Not later than 8 March Lenin drafts the resolution of the 7th Congress of the RCP(B) on war and peace.
- 8 March At the fourth meeting of the 7th Party Congress Lenin winds up the debate on the report on war and peace.
- 14 March Lenin presents a report on the ratification of the peace treaty with Germany to the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
- 15 March Lenin winds up the debate on the report on ratification of the peace treaty at the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
- After 17 April Lenin corrects the text of a radiogram to be sent by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Rumania, protesting against the seizure of Bessarabia by Rumania.

- 7 May Lenin receives the British diplomat Lockhart.
- 11 May Lenin receives Raymond Robins, leader of the US Red Cross mission, before his departure for the United States.
- 14 May Lenin delivers a report on foreign policy at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet.
- 27 June Lenin delivers a report on the current situation at the 4th conference of trade unions and factory and plant committees of Moscow. In the report Lenin discusses questions of foreign policy.
- 29 June Lenin writes a note to Chicherin about convening a conference to discuss several matters, including the question of defining the competence of ambassadors.
- 6 July Lenin and Sverdlov call on the German Embassy in connection with the assassination by Left Socialist Revolutionaries of the German Ambassador Mirbach.
- 19 September Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars discussing the question of implementing the financial agreement with Germany of August 27, 1918.
- 3 October Lenin writes a letter to the joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet with repre-

representatives of trade unions and factory and plant committees in connection with the political crisis in Germany.

13 November

Lenin signs the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Second half of  
December

Lenin meets and talks with the American journalist R. Miner, the British journalist F. Price and others.

### 1919

21 January

Lenin writes his *Letter to the Workers of Europe and America*.

5 February

Lenin is interviewed by L. Nadeou, a correspondent of the French bourgeois newspaper *Le Temps*.

14 February

Lenin talks with the British journalist Arthur Ransome about the international significance of the Soviets and about other matters.

Beginning of  
March

Lenin takes part in talks with William Bullitt, who has delivered to Moscow proposals outlining the terms for ending the fighting in Russia, formulated by the US President, Woodrow Wilson, with the approval of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George.

Between 8 and  
12 March

Lenin receives Bullitt and discusses the proposals of the governments of the United States and the Entente countries.

- 18 March Lenin delivers the political report of the Central Committee to the 8th Congress of the RCP(B).
- 22 March On behalf of the 8th Congress of the RCP(B) Lenin sends a telegram of greetings to the Hungarian Soviet Republic formed on 21st March, 1919.
- 3 April Lenin delivers the report on the foreign and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic at the extraordinary session of the plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies.
- 27 May Lenin and Kalinin send a message to Amanullah Khan, the King of Afghanistan, in reply to his letter about friendly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Afghan people.
- May Lenin writes his article, *Greetings to the Hungarian Workers*.
- May Lenin submits to the Central Committee draft directives on the military unity and alliance of the Soviet Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Byelorussia.
- 18 June In a telegram to Bela Kun Lenin reminds him of the need for special caution in talks with the Entente about a provisional armistice or peace.
- 12 July Lenin presents a report on the domestic and foreign situation of

- the Republic at the Moscow City Conference of the RCP(B).
- 20 July Lenin writes his *Answers to an American Journalist's Questions*.
- 23 September Lenin writes his *Letter to the American Workers*
- 5 October Lenin writes out replies to questions put by N. Levin, a correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*.
- After 13 October Lenin reads a recommendation given to the American journalist Lincoln Eyre, who has come to study Russia.
- 14 October At 7 p. m. Lenin receives in his office an Afghan special mission headed by Ambassador Mohammed Wali Khan. During the 30-minute talk the Ambassador hands over a letter from the Afghan Emir.
- 27 November Lenin sends a letter to the Afghan Emir in reply to the letter handed over by Ambassador Mohammed Wali Khan about friendly relations between the two states.
- 5 December Lenin presents a report on the activities of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars at the 7th All-Russia Congress of Soviets on questions of domestic and foreign policy.

## 1920

- 10 January Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Po-

- litbureau which, besides other matters, discusses the question of an armistice with the Latvian bourgeois republic.
- 13 January Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau discussing the questions of an armistice with Latvia and a peace treaty with Estonia.
- 18 February Lenin writes replies to questions put by correspondents of the *New York Evening Journal* and the *London Daily Express*.
- 21 February Lenin talks with Lincoln Eyre, a correspondent of the American newspaper *The World*.
- Before Lenin is interviewed by a correspondent of the *New York Herald*.
- 23 February
- 1 March Lenin delivers a report at the 1st All-Russia Congress of Working Cossacks in which he gives his assessment of the military victories of the Red Army and discusses the international and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic.
- 29 March On the authorisation of the RCP(B) Central Committee Lenin opens the 9th Congress of the RCP(B) with an introductory speech and then presents the report on the political activities of the Central Committee and questions of foreign and domestic policy.
- 31 May Lenin talks with Kirov, who has been appointed plenipotentiary

- representative of the RSFSR in Menshevik Georgia, and gives him instructions.
- 1 June Lenin writes a plan of his theses on the national and the colonial questions for the Second Comintern Congress.
- 4 June Lenin receives Fuse, a correspondent of the Japanese newspapers *Osaka Mainichi* and *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi*.
- 5 June Lenin writes his *Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions* for the Second Congress of the Communist International.
- Before 24 June Lenin is interviewed by a special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*.
- 16 July Lenin participates in a plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which, besides other matters, discusses the question of sending a delegation to Britain and the reply to the Curzon Note.  
Lenin drafts a Decree on the Curzon Note submitted for consideration by the plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee on July 16, 1920.
- 26 July Lenin delivers the report of the commission on the national and the colonial questions at the Second Congress of the Comintern.
- 5 August Lenin attends a plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses foreign policy questions: on Britain and

- Poland, on the talks with Germany, on the negotiations with Latvia and Finland, on the emigration of foreign workers to Soviet Russia.
- 10 August Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which, besides other questions, discusses the relationships between diplomatic representatives and representatives of the Foreign Trade Commissariat abroad.
- 13 August Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau discussing questions relating to the Far Eastern Republic, the peace talks with Poland and several others.
- 22 September Lenin delivers the political report of the Central Committee at the 9th All-Russia Conference of the RCP(B).
- 23 September Lenin participates in a plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which, among other things, discusses peace talks with Poland. Lenin writes a note to the Foreign Commissar Chicherin about the Polish frontiers.
- Not later than  
23 September Lenin introduces amendments and additions to the original draft of a statement by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the peace proposals to be offered to Poland.
- First half of  
October Lenin meets and talks with the British author H. G. Wells.



- 26 October Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the question of treaties concluded with Germany and Sweden.
- 6 November Lenin addresses a meeting of the plenum of the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, the Moscow Committee of the RCP(B) and the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions marking the 3rd anniversary of the October Revolution. He assesses the foreign policy activities of the Soviet Government.
- 6 December Lenin addresses a meeting of the Moscow organisation of the RCP(B) on the subject of concessions.
- 7 December Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses foreign policy questions: the treaty with Turkey and the fundamentals of a treaty with Persia.
- 22 December Lenin delivers a report on the activities of the Council of People's Commissars at a plenary meeting of the 8th All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Lenin delivers a speech on the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Government at a meeting of the RCP(B) fraction of the 8th All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

1921

12 January

Lenin participates in a plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee. The plenum approves the conclusions of a special commission on the Far Eastern Republic established by a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee plenum on January 4, 1921.

Lenin talks with the American journalist Louise Bryant, the widow of John Reed, and writes out a certificate for her visit to Central Asia.

26 January

Lenin directs the work of a plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which, besides other matters, discusses the conclusion of a trade agreement with Britain. The plenary meeting decides to sign the agreement.

27 January

Lenin talks with G. Hardy, the Secretary of the American organisation "Industrial Workers of the World," V. L. Kopp, the representative of the Soviet Government on prisoner-of-war affairs in Germany, and L. B. Krasin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

5 February

Lenin attends a meeting of the Politbureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses questions relating to the oil concessions, the People's Commissariat for Nationalities and other subjects.

- 6 February Lenin speaks to the 4th All-Russia Congress of Garment Workers on the international situation and the tasks of the trade union movement.
- 9 February Lenin talks with the Indian Communist M. Roy, who describes the situation in the Middle East and conditions of labour in Central Asia and India.
- 11 February Lenin talks with L. B. Krasin about oil concessions and the talks with Britain.
- 25 February Lenin participates in the plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses Soviet-Afghan relations, the demobilisation of the army, etc.
- 26 February Lenin receives a Turkish delegation and discusses the conclusion of a treaty with Turkey.
- 28 February Lenin addresses a plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies and describes the international and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic.
- 16 March Lenin attends a plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses the question of sending a mission for the exchange of prisoners of war to Poland and the signing of a peace treaty with Poland.
- 28 March and the night of 28 to 29 March Lenin participates in a conference of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses his draft of concession treaties.

- 8 April  
Lenin attends a meeting of the Politbureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses questions relating to the establishment of a Franco-Russian trade agency, the demobilisation of the army and other topics.
- 11 April  
Lenin signs a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On Measures Relating to the Signing of a Trade Agreement between the RSFSR and Great Britain."
- 4 May  
Lenin participates in a meeting of the Politbureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses foreign policy questions. They include the draft of a document describing the relationships of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with diplomatic couriers.
- 10 May  
Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the purchase abroad of food and manufactured goods.
- 7 June  
Lenin writes a letter to Chicherin on the conclusion of concession and trade treaties with German firms. In it he also requests that talks be initiated with the Latvian bourgeois government on the exchange of Latvian workers, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia, brought before a military court.

- Lenin writes a note to N. P. Gorbunov on the need to contact Chicherin and speed up a decision on the issue of a visa to US Senator Joseph France to travel to Russia.
- 16 June Lenin speaks on the New Economic Policy at the 3rd All-Russia Food Conference.
- 19 June Lenin writes a note to his secretary for communication to the members of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade about a draft trade treaty with American co-operatives.
- Between 20 June and 2 July Lenin drafts a telegram to the Soviet trade delegation in London in connection with the talks proceeding since mid-June between L. B. Krasin and the British industrialist and financier Leslie Urquhart.
- 22 June Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence which discusses the question of American industrial emigration and adopts a decree.
- 2 July Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses the question of leasing concessions to Leslie Urquhart's company.
- 6 July Lenin attends a meeting of the Commission of the 3rd Congress

- of the Communist International editing the theses on the tactics of the Comintern, and delivers a speech on the Czechoslovak question.
- 15 July Lenin receives the American Senator Joseph France.
- 16 July Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses the appointment of a plenipotentiary representative in Berlin.
- 25 July Lenin writes a note to V. A. Smolyaninov requesting prompt action on food parcels from Britain to Russia.
- 8 August Lenin participates in a morning session of the plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee discussing the question of relations with Rumania.
- 11 August Lenin sends a telegram to the American "Society for Technical Aid to Russia."
- 27 August Lenin signs a convention of the Council of People's Commissars on the establishment of postal communications between Soviet Russia and Finland.
- 21 September Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which, besides other matters, discusses the Polish question.
- 22 September Lenin writes the draft of a contract to be signed by American workers seeking jobs in Russia and a letter to V. V. Kuibyshev. Lenin also writes a letter to the

members of the provisional Berlin commission responsible for issuing foreign orders for Gidrotorf urging that his instructions be carried out "most meticulously so that by 1. II. 1922 everything should be ready in Berlin and that by 1. III. 1922 everything should *definitely* be in Moscow."

17 October

Lenin participates in a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses and adopts his draft of a Politbureau decision on the establishment of a Central Concessions Commission.

19 October

Lenin writes a note to V. M. Mikhailov appending his draft of a Central Committee decision relating to an agreement with the Rutgers Group.

20 October

Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau and submits a proposal on the agreement with the Rutgers Group.

22 October

Lenin writes a telegram to B. S. Stomonyakov in Berlin on the need to meet the time-limits for shipments of materials for the Kashira power station.

Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses the appointment of a representative of the RSFSR in Canada.

Lenin receives a representative of the American United Drugs

- and Chemical Company Armand Hammer and others.
- 24 October Lenin signs a treaty between the Council of Labour and Defence and an organised group of American workers.
- 27 October Lenin is interviewed by Michael Farbman, a correspondent of the London *Observer*.
- 3 November Lenin writes a letter in English to Armand Hammer thanking him for the delivery of bread for the workers of Soviet Russia and expressing regret at being unable to see him before his departure.
- 5 November Lenin receives a delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic.
- 24 November Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau, announces the composition of the Concessions Commission and takes part in the debate on foreign missions.
- 26 November Lenin signs the treaty (in the Russian and English languages) between the Council of Labour and Defence and the organised group of American workers on the exploitation of the Nadezhdin Plant and several enterprises in the Kuznetsk Basin.
- 27 November Lenin talks with the representative of the bourgeois Workers' and Farmers' Party of the USA, P. P. Christensen.
- 28 November Lenin has a second meeting with Christensen.



- 3 December Lenin receives the American journalist Betsy Beety at her request.
- Between 17 and 23 December Lenin writes the plan of his report to the 9th All-Russia Congress of Soviets "The Home and Foreign Policy of the Republic."
- 23 December Lenin addresses the 9th All-Russia Congress of Soviets with the report of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "The Home and Foreign Policy of the Republic."
- 28 December Lenin attends a plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee which, among other issues, discusses the question of policy towards Prussia.

## 1922

- 9 January Lenin dictates a telephone message to M. M. Litvinov recommending a conference on a Norwegian loan to Soviet Russia.
- Between 9 and 12 January Lenin writes the "Draft Directive of the Politbureau on the New Economic Policy."
- 12 January Lenin sends a telegram to L. B. Krasin in London in which, in view of the critical food situation, he requests information within two days' time on the following: "1. How much grain has been purchased; 2. How much has been shipped, on what ships and to what ports; 3. How much is to be shipped in the immediate fu-

- ture and when; 4. The plan for the implementation of the undertaking on the purchase of 15 million poods."
- 14 January Lenin sends a coded telegram to the trade representatives of the RSFSR in London, Berlin, Stockholm, Prague, Warsaw, Helsingfors and Rome in which he urges precise fulfilment of the instructions sent by A. M. Lezhava on December 24 relating to the safety of imported goods.
- 19 January In a letter to J. V. Stalin Lenin suggests sending a telegram to L. B. Krasin on the purchase of 15 million poods of grain abroad.
- 23 January Lenin sends a letter to V. M. Molotov for the members of the Politbureau (copies to A. D. Tsyurupa and A. M. Lezhava) containing the draft of a Politbureau decision on the concession to Steinberg.
- Lenin dictates over the telephone a letter to A. M. Lezhava, P. A. Bogdanov and V. M. Molotov for members of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau on the request of the Friedrich Krupp-in-Essen Company for a concession for 50,000 desyatins of land.
- 26 January In a letter to Chicherin Lenin requests the Foreign Commissar to send him the published official text of the message from Bonomi, the Chairman of the

- Council of Ministers of Italy, dated January 13, 1922.
- 27 January Lenin writes a letter to Chicherin requesting the text of a letter from Sun Yat-sen of August 28, 1921 delivered to Chicherin.
- 1 February An extraordinary session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the 9th Convocation officially appoints Lenin Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference. Lenin writes the "Draft Directives to the Deputy Chairman and All Members of the Genoa Delegation."
- 2 February Lenin writes a note to M. M. Litvinov (or G. V. Chicherin) with the draft of a reply to Colonel F. R. MacDonald, who, as a co-director of a big British bank, came to Soviet Russia and sent a letter to Lenin. He inquired about forestry and agricultural concessions, the exploitation of railways and repairs to locomotives.
- After 3 February Lenin reads a note from Litvinov on the Genoa Conference, headed "On the Tactics of the Delegation and the Limits of Concession."
- 4 February Lenin writes out a draft Politbureau decision on the Genoa Conference.
- 6 February Lenin draws up the "Draft RCP(B) Central Committee directive for the Soviet Delegation to the Genoa Conference."

- 7 February Lenin writes a letter to Chicherin on the need for a principled and flexible policy at the Genoa Conference.
- 9 February Lenin sends a telegram of greetings to Charles Hillman, the chairman of the Russian-American Industrial Corporation.
- 21 February Lenin writes a letter to N. P. Gorbunov about the unsatisfactory conclusions made by the I. K. Mikhailov commission presented by the Supreme Council of National Economy and the State Planning Commission relating to an inspection of the regions singled out for concessions to be granted to Leslie Urquhart.
- 24 February Lenin drafts a Central Committee decision on the objectives and tactics of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference.
- 27 February Lenin reads a brief on treaties with foreign capitalists sent to him at his request on February 13, 1922. The brief stated that negotiations had been conducted with 96 businessmen and representatives of capitalist groups.
- 28 February Lenin reads a letter from B. S. Stomonyakov, trade representative in Germany who, at Lenin's request, submitted a list of concession and lease contracts negotiated through the RSFSR trade mission in Germany. Lenin writes a note to N. P. Gorbunov requesting finalisation

of the basic provisions of a treaty with the British Company Rusangloles Ltd. and the basic provisions of the treaty between Severoles and the Dutch firm Altsius & Co. on the establishment jointly with Severoles of the shareholding companies Rusangloles and Ruscgollandes to develop the timber industry in the Archangel region and neighbouring areas.

5 March

Lenin writes a note to members of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau criticising G. Y. Sokolnikov's proposals on foreign trade.

6 March

Lenin addresses a meeting of the Communist fraction of All-Russia Congress of Metalworkers with a speech "On the International and Domestic Situation of the Soviet Republic."

10 March

In a letter to L. B. Krasin Lenin requests him to draw up a brief on the development of foreign trade in recent months for inclusion in the political report of the RCP(B) Central Committee to the 11th Party Congress.

11 March

Lenin sends a directive to G. Y. Sokolnikov, the Chairman of the Mixed Societies Commission, requesting him "to collect and file detailed information about negotiations conducted both in Russia and abroad (other than concessions talks) and about all

matters relating to mixed societies, credit agencies, and shareholding societies."

Lenin sends a letter to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, the Chairman of the Concessions Commission of Gosplan, stating: "The Concessions Commission of Gosplan shall be responsible for collecting and filing detailed material about all concessions negotiations and concessions dealings of the RSFSR with foreign capitalists conducted both in Russia and abroad."

20 March

Lenin talks with L. B. Krasin about the work of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and about implementing the directives of the Politbureau on the foreign trade monopoly.

21 March

Lenin writes a letter to M. I. Frumkin on the need for strict implementation of the Politbureau directives on the foreign trade monopoly.

23 March

Lenin writes a letter for the plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee in which he outlines the plan for the political report of the RCP(B) Central Committee to the 11th Party Congress.

25 March

Lenin writes a statement on the transfer to Chicherin of the powers of Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference.

- 27 March Lenin delivers a speech at the opening of the 11th Congress of the RCP(B) in which he discusses international questions relating to the Genoa Conference.
- 13 April Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses matters bearing on the Genoa Conference and cuts in the size of the Red Army.
- Before 14 April Lenin is interviewed on the Genoa Conference by a correspondent of the *New York Herald*.
- 20 April Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses the Genoa Conference and other matters.
- 24 April Lenin amends the draft of a telegraphic directive of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau to the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference.
- 27 April Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses matters relating to the Genoa Conference.
- 4 May Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses matters relating to the Genoa Conference.
- 9 May Lenin submits to the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau the draft of a telegraphic directive to Chicherin at Genoa in connection with the signing and

- forthcoming ratification of the Rapallo Treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany.
- 11 May Lenin writes a letter to the American businessman Armand Hammer wishing success to his asbestos mining concession in the Urals. In a canvass of all members of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau Lenin favours prolongation of the contract with ARA (American Relief Administration) until January 1, 1923.
- 15 and 16 May Lenin drafts a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the report of the delegation to the Genoa Conference.
- 18 May Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses matters relating to the Genoa Conference.
- Before Lenin reads a note by A. M. 20 May Lezhava on the purchase of locomotives abroad.
- 11 July Lenin talks with J. V. Stalin about the work of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Hague Conference.
- 21 August Lenin talks with L. B. Krasin before his departure for Berlin to sign a concession contract with the British industrialist Leslie Urquhart.
- 30 August Lenin talks with J. V. Stalin about the international situation of the Soviet Republics.



- 14 September The RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau discusses Lenin's proposals for a study of possibilities for establishing economic ties with American business circles and other matters.
- 19 September Lenin writes a note to V. A. Smolyaninov requesting selected minutes of Politbureau meetings and plenary meetings of the RCP(B) Central Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, and to inform him on a regular basis about the negotiations with American industrialists on oil concessions.
- 5 October Lenin attends a session of the plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee and opposes the approval of the preliminary concession contract with Urquhart.
- 6 October Lenin signs a Council of People's Commissars decree rejecting the preliminary contract with Leslie Urquhart signed by L. B. Krasin, in Berlin on September 9, 1922.
- 13 October Lenin makes several additions to the letter to the RCP(B) Central Committee on the foreign trade monopoly and sends it to J. V. Stalin.
- 16 October Lenin talks with M. I. Frumkin and instructs the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to submit to the Council of People's Commissars monthly tables

- showing the turnovers and incomes of the Foreign Trade Commissariat.
- 17 October Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses matters relating to an agreement with a consortium of German firms headed by the Otto Wolff concern.
- 18 October Lenin writes a letter to J. V. Stalin for members of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau about the agreement with the Otto Wolff concern.
- 19 October Lenin talks with B. S. Stomonyakov, trade representative of the RSFSR in Germany, about the foreign trade monopoly and instructs him to draft a brief in consultation with other officials who oppose any slackening of the state monopoly.
- 20 October Lenin writes a letter to the US Society of Friends of Soviet Russia.  
Lenin writes a letter to the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia.
- 24 October Lenin talks with M. I. Frumkin about the work of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and with B. S. Stomonyakov about his "Theses on the Foreign Trade Monopoly." Lenin exchanges letters with Chicherin on questions of the Soviet Government's concessions policy.
- 27 October Lenin writes out replies to questions put to him by Michael

- Farbman, a correspondent of the London *Observer* and *Manchester Guardian*.
- Between 27  
October and  
5 November Lenin writes a first draft of replies to questions put to him by the British journalist Arthur Ransome.
- 31 October Lenin delivers a speech at the 4th session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the 9th convocation in which he salutes the Red Army on the recapture of Vladivostok and the expulsion of foreign invaders from the territory of the last of the Republics associated with Soviet Russia.
- Lenin writes a letter to Chicherin and all the members of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau about the draft of a note by the RSFSR Government to the Entente powers in connection with the Lausanne Conference.
- 2 November Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses the draft of the Soviet delegation's platform at the Lausanne Conference and the draft of a note to the governments of Britain, France and Italy, the question of the Far Eastern Republic and other matters.
- 3 November Lenin receives Arthur Ransome, the British journalist.
- 8 November or shortly thereafter Lenin reads a telegram from V. V. Vorovsky in Rome dated

- November 6, 1922 about the tactics of the Soviet mission in Italy in connection with the attack by Italian fascists on the RSFSR Trade Mission.
- 9 November Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses questions relating to the Japanese occupation of Sakhalin.
- 13 November Lenin delivers a report (in the German language) "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects for World Revolution" at the morning session of the 4th Congress of the Comintern.  
 Lenin writes the draft of a decree of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau on cuts in the strength of the Red Army.
- 16 November Lenin attends a meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau which discusses cuts in the Red Army numbers.
- 21 November Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars and votes for Chicherin's proposal to include V. V. Vorovsky, Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Italy, in the Soviet delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
- 22 November Lenin receives Colonel Broderick Haskell, ARA representative in Russia, before his return to the United States and conveys his thanks to the American peo-

- 23 November      ple for aiding the famine-stricken regions of Russia. Lenin attends a meeting of the Politbureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee which discusses the Moscow Disarmament Conference participated in by the RSFSR, Poland, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania.
- 24 November      Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence which discusses matters relating to a contract between the Supreme National Economic Council and the Russian-American Industrial Company and other subjects.
- 29 November      Lenin talks with V. A. Avanesov about the work of the Council of People's Commissars Commission to inspect Russian trade missions abroad, about the foreign trade monopoly and the forthcoming plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee.
- 2 December      Lenin sends a letter to V. Munzenberg, Secretary of the International Workers' Aid, about the organisation's aid to the starving in Soviet Russia.
- 5 December      Lenin talks with Czechoslovak delegates to the 2nd Congress of the Trade Union International (Hans, Chamosta, Franek, Richter, Chapera) about the trade union movement in Czechoslovakia.
- 8 December      Lenin informs L. A. Fotieva over the telephone of his ag-

reement with the draft decisions of the RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau on a telegram to the Soviet delegation to the Lausanne Conference concerning a statement on the convocation of a conference of the Black Sea states to ensure safety of navigation in the Black Sea.

13 December

Lenin dictates a letter for J. V. Stalin to be presented at the plenary meeting of the RCP(B) Central Committee about the foreign trade monopoly.

14 December

Lenin talks with Y. M. Yaroslavsky, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Commission to inspect Russian trade missions abroad.

### 1923

1-2 January

Lenin dictates the article *Pages from a Diary*.

4 January

Lenin dictates an addition to his *Letter to the Congress* (for insertion in the instalment dictated on December 24, 1922) and the first part of his article *On Co-operation*.

Not later than  
9 January

Lenin dictates a plan for the article *What Should We Do with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection?*

9 January

Lenin dictates the article, *What Should We Do with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection?* (the first version of the article, *How We Should Reorganise the*

*Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.)*

- 11 January The RCP(B) Central Committee Politbureau approves the nomination of Lenin to deliver the Political Report of the Central Committee to the 12th Party Congress.
- 16-17 January Lenin dictates his article, *Our Revolution (Apropos of N. Sukhanov's Notes)*.
- 2 February Lenin dictates the first part of the article, *Better Fewer, but Better*.  
Lenin requests N. K. Krupskaya to get him the books *World Imperialism and China (An Experiment in Political-Economic Research)* by A. Khodorov and *Soviet Russia and Imperialist Japan* by M. Pavlovich.
- 2 March Lenin completes his work on the article, *Better Fewer, but Better*.
- 17 April The 12th Congress of the RCP(B) opens; the Congress adopts a message of greetings to Lenin.
- 6 July The Central Executive Committee of the USSR forms the Government of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars, with Lenin as Chairman.
- August-December Lenin requests that lists of new books be periodically made and sent to him.
- 21 January 1924 A sudden drastic deterioration of Lenin's health.

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*М. ТРУШ*

**У истоков внешней политики СССР**

*на английском языке*

Цена 75 коп.

