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THE ROOTS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

The events currently taking place in China are causing growing alarm and anxiety among Marxist-Leninists throughout the world. This is understandable, for the very existence of the Chinese Communist Party, one of the major forces in the international communist movement, is being imperilled. Already now the danger of a change in power in the country and, consequently, the threat to the socialist gains of the Chinese revolution are clearly seen. This is a tragedy for the whole Chinese people and for the Chinese Communists who had fought heroically for so many years for the freedom of their homeland and for the right to build socialism. The events in China, however, are not merely an internal affair. The policy of Mao Tse-tung's group is doing great harm to the entire cause of socialism and revolution in the world chiefly because it leads to the isolation of China from the socialist system and to the conversion of the country into a

force hostile to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This harm can also be seen in the fact that the activities of Mao Tse-tung's group on the international arena are increasingly playing into the hands of imperialism and reaction. The repudiation of united actions with socialist countries, a policy aimed at splitting the revolutionary forces and increasing international tension, encourages imperialism to pursue a policy of aggression and war.

The views and deeds of Mao Tse-tung and his adherents have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, with scientific communism. But as these people are acting in the name of socialism, they cause considerable confusion among some strata of the revolutionary, anti-imperialist movement, particularly in countries which must choose their ways of social development.

The events in China have given rise to increased activities on the part of anti-communists. Imperialist propaganda, and above all, the propaganda of the USA and West Germany, is more and more taken up with the spreading of Maoist views, particularly those of an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet nature. The result of this has been felt by Communist Parties working under various conditions. They are constantly obliged to divert a considerable amount of their energy to combating this new and very dangerous trend of imperialist propaganda.

One of the most negative and harmful results of the activities of Mao Tse-tung's group consists in the fact that Maoism has actually opened a new front against the international com-

unist movement and attempts to annul the whole historical experience of the international proletariat.

This is why the Marxist-Leninist parties are doing and will continue to do everything in their power to minimise the negative effect of the policy of Mao Tse-tung's group on world development. In particular, this task calls for a profound analysis of the events taking place in China. The situation in China remains extremely complicated, and it is impossible as yet to form an opinion on all the developments. But much is sufficiently clear; a considerable number of facts is now available, an analysis of which would enable us to work out a correct approach to the events in China and to appraise them from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism.

* * *

It would be impossible to understand the causes of today's events in China without taking into consideration the peculiarities of the historical development, the socio-economic position of the country, and the conditions under which the Chinese revolutionary movement and the Chinese Communist Party developed.

This is not to say that the harm which Mao Tse-tung's policy has done to China and the whole international communist movement can be justified by the difficulties and complicated turns experienced by the Chinese revolution or by referring to the specific character of the country.

Today not only theory but also practical experience show that the working class and its communist vanguard can successfully withstand the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element, persuade the non-proletarian strata to accept the ideas of scientific socialism, and lead the latter in building socialism. Such a development, however, does not automatically happen, but is the result of the implementation by the communist vanguard of a policy which is clearly and definitely proletarian, and of persistent and patient work in educating the revolutionary masses.

The whole responsibility for the deep socio-political crisis in China lies fully with Mao Tse-tung's group, which has deliberately abandoned Marxism-Leninism in order to satisfy its great-power adventurist aspirations.

Marxist-Leninists, however, must not ignore the specific conditions which nourished the rise and the spreading of Maoism.

Pre-revolutionary China was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal state which was extremely backward economically, socially and culturally. The structure of the Chinese society at the time of the victorious revolution reflected this backwardness. The working class numbered less than one per cent of the population. The peasantry was numerically predominant, while the other preponderant social strata included the urban petty bourgeoisie, petty traders and artisans.

The long period of feudalism, militarist rule and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, the cultural backwardness of the country, the ancient traditions of Confucian ideology with its cult of

the supreme ruler and its preaching of the superiority of everything Chinese had left their mark on the development of revolutionary and democratic trends in China.

Another peculiarity of China's historical development was the existence of objective pre-conditions for the growth of great-power chauvinist aspirations. In ancient times and in the Middle Ages the country occupied a leading position in Eastern Asia. Its large population, a comparatively high civilisation and its isolation from other countries had created the illusion of China being the centre of the world. Throughout the ages the ruling clique had cultivated this illusion in the minds of the Chinese people. The contradiction between it and the real position of the country, which in modern times had been reduced to a semi-colony, resulted in an intensification of nationalist sentiments and the desire to restore the past grandeur at any cost.

Lenin pointed out: "The more backward the country, the stronger is the hold of small-scale agricultural production, patriarchalism and isolation, which inevitably lend particular strength and tenacity to the deepest of petty-bourgeois prejudices, i.e., to national egoism and national narrow-mindedness." (Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 150).

Under these conditions the formation and development of the Communist Party of China were accompanied by great difficulties. In November, 1927 the Plenum of the CPC Central Committee stated: "The Communist Party of China began to emerge as a political force and as a party at a time when the Chinese prole-

tariat did not yet exist as a class and when the *class* movement of workers and peasants was still in a rudimentary state. *The rise of the national liberation* movement in which a great role was at first played by the bourgeoisie and particularly by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, occurred long before the growth of class self-consciousness and class struggle of the exploited masses in China. At that time the most radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined the ranks of our Party, which formed the extreme left wing of the national liberation movement. It was these elements that formed the original core of the Chinese Communist Party."

In the course of its long revolutionary struggle, the leadership of the Communist Party of China had failed to pay sufficient attention to working with the proletariat. Furthermore, the notion of "proletariat" was not correctly understood by some theorists of the Communist Party of China and above all by Mao Tse-tung himself, who applied the term to all poor people (including the lumpen-proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry). After the defeat of the revolutionaries in 1927 in the big cities (Shanghai, Wuhan and Canton) and after the unleashing of terrorist acts by the Kuomintang reactionaries against the revolutionary workers, the leaders of the Communist Party of China came to the firm belief that the proletariat was incapable of playing the predominant role in the Chinese revolution. Such a role was assigned to the peasantry instead. With the shift of the centre of gravity of the revolutionary movement to the village, an army formed of peasants became the main force of the move-

ment. In addition to fighting, this peasant army also carried out important political tasks and was made into an instrument of political education of the masses and even of administration and party work.

The Communist Party of China had had the beneficial influence of the ideas of the October Revolution and of the support of the collective organ of the international communist movement -- the Comintern. This influence formed the nucleus of communist-internationalists within the Communist Party of China who were guided by Marxism-Leninism and strove to apply it creatively under the specific conditions of their country.

From the very outset there were two opposing trends in the Communist Party of China: a Marxist-Leninist internationalist trend and a petty-bourgeois nationalistic trend which in turn was split into a number of trends.

An important fact in the early history of the Communist Party of China was the struggle waged by the communist-internationalists against the opportunist deviation of the former General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Chen Tu-hsiu, and his adherents whose mistakes were among the causes of the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927. In 1930 the leadership of the CPC fell into the hands of leftist elements led by Li Li-san,¹ who, ignoring the real conditions of the country and the advice of the Comintern, embarked on a course of organising

¹ Li Li-san is a representative of the left-opportunist trend in the CPC. In the 1930s he occupied leading posts in the Party. At present he is a member of the CPC Central Committee.

revolts throughout the country and seizing cities and towns by force of arms. Li and his followers thought that such attempts to carry out a putsch in China would draw the Soviet Union into an armed conflict with imperialism resulting in a world war, in the course of which the international proletariat would rise in a world revolution and thus ensure the victory of socialism in China. Such an outlook was also shared by Mao Tse-tung.

The communist-internationalists in the CPC (Li Ta-chao,¹ Chu Chiu-po² and others) supported by the Comintern, tried to weaken the pernicious influence of the right and "left" deviations, strove for the adoption of a policy which would take into account the experience of the world communist movement, and struggled against nationalistic tendencies. Li Ta-chao pointed out that it was necessary to constantly combat the narrow nationalistic attitude of mind engendered by the peasant masses and to help them understand that the revolutionary masses of workers and peasants of the world were friends of the Chinese working people (Li Ta-chao, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1965, p. 287).

¹ Li Ta-chao (1888-1927), a professor of Peking University, one of the first propagandists of Marxism-Leninism in China, and an organiser of the first Marxist circles there, played a prominent role in building the Communist Party in China. He was brutally murdered by reactionaries in Peking in 1927.

² Chu Chiu-po (1899-1935), an outstanding publicist and a prominent leader of the Communist Party of China, was elected General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. In 1935 he was assassinated by members of the Kuomintang.

In the early 1930s, after the white terror of the Kuomintang had resulted in the breaking up of Party organisations in the towns, the CPC concentrated its activity in the countryside and at some strongholds situated far away from industrial centres, reinforcing its ranks by people from the non-proletarian strata of the population.

In this situation Mao Tse-tung took advantage of the serious defeat of the Chinese Red Army and its retreat into the remote districts of the country as well as of the lack of communication with the Comintern. In January 1935, at the so-called "extended sitting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee" at Tsunyi,¹ from which the majority of the members of the Political Bureau were absent, Mao actually seized the leadership of the army and the Party. The stay in Yanan during the next decade was used by Mao Tse-tung and his followers for completing the struggle to establish full control over the Party. By means of terror and repressions, particularly in the course of the "campaign for improving the style of work" (1941-44), they forced the Party to accept "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" as its theoretical base. At the 7th Congress (1945) the premise was inserted in the Party Rules that "the Communist Party of China is guided in all its activities by Mao Tse-tung's ideas.

Thus Maoism became the ideological basis of the political course of the present CPC leaders. But what, exactly is Maoism? A few years ago Peking propaganda described Maoism as "a

¹ A district town in the Kweichow province.

combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution." Today Maoism is declared to be a universal doctrine valid for all peoples and showing the only correct way towards socialist reconstruction of the world, while Mao himself has been proclaimed a thinker "standing above Marx and Lenin."

Actually, Maoism is a trend characterised by the views formed arbitrarily by the petty-bourgeois strata on a great number of questions during certain periods of development of the Chinese Communist Party and notably in the current decade.

The ideological and political platform of Mao Tse-tung's group was not formed all at once. It underwent several stages, each marked by the rise and strengthening of elements alien to Marxism-Leninism. The evolution of Maoism was characterised by an attempt to adapt it to the political aims pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his close adherents, by the growing discrepancy between these aims and the tasks of revolutionary struggle and socialist development both in China and on an international scale. This discrepancy inevitably exposed the real content of Maoism and showed it to be an instrument for disguising great-power, nationalistic designs.

Mao Tse-tung's ideas began to take shape at a time when the Chinese revolution was engaged in the battle against imperialism and feudalism. It was a period of the wide spreading of Marxism-Leninism following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The revolutionary democratic forces of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, including China,

saw in Marxism-Leninism a powerful theoretical weapon for the struggle for national liberation and social progress.

The peculiar nature of the Chinese revolution demanded a creative approach to the application of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. As is known, Lenin put forward the task "of translating the true communist doctrine . . . into the language of every people" (*Lenin. Coll. Works*, Vol. 30, p. 162), applying the doctrine "to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals and not against capitalism." (*Lenin. Coll. Works*, Vol. 30, p. 161). This task naturally also arose before the CPC—the vanguard of the Chinese revolution. The emergence of Maoism is due essentially to the distortion of this objective necessity of developing creatively revolutionary theory in concrete historical conditions. Mao Tse-tung and the tendency he represented treated Marxism in a utilitarian way, they merely adopted some of its ideas without getting to the core of the science of communism. Sinoisation of Marxism in fact turned out to be the nationalistic ideology of Mao Tse-tung.

Many statements made by Mao Tse-tung at that time and presented today as general truths of contemporary Marxism merely reflect the specific Chinese experience in connection with the revolutionary peasant war. Mao Tse-tung ignored the role of the proletariat in the revolution, reduced all forms of struggle to one form—armed guerilla struggle, and made many other mistakes. Recognising these errors, the Comintern had always helped the Communist

Party of China to correct its political line and warned it of the danger of petty-bourgeois ultra-revolutionary deviation and nationalism.

With the victory of the people's revolution, when the country was faced with the tasks related to the building of a new society, the negative aspects of Maoism, particularly under conditions of the cult of Mao's personality, became increasingly dangerous. The political directives issued during the period of the guerilla war were dogmatically applied to the task of socialist construction, bringing about disastrous results.

It should be borne in mind that Mao Tse-tung's views underwent a certain evolution. Though Mao wrote his main speeches and articles in the 1930s and 1940s, he worked out certain theoretical formulae at each stage of the country's development after 1949, which were later translated into a concrete policy. These formulae represented, on the one hand, a logical development of many erroneous ideas put forward by Mao in the past and, on the other hand, an attempt to justify the failures which resulted from his arbitrary decisions.

The early works of Mao Tse-tung as well as his latest "dicta" contain a number of outwardly correct Marxist principles, but almost always a new meaning is put into them. Thus when Mao speaks about the dictatorship of the proletariat, he means a regime of his absolute power; when he speaks about socialist democracy, he implies blind obedience and barrack-like discipline, the man turned into a screw in the bureaucratic machine; when he speaks about anti-imperialist struggle, he means the subordi-

nation of the whole liberation movement to his great-power aims.

An analysis of Mao Tse-tung's views shows that Mao actually never understood the essence of Marxism-Leninism, the world historical role of the proletariat, the importance of the Communist Party, and the Leninist strategy of world socialist revolution. An underestimation of objective conditions, an arbitrary way of thinking, and the exaggeration of the role of the subjective factor are characteristic of Mao Tse-tung.

Thus Maoism constitutes a body of views which are profoundly hostile to Marxist-Leninist theory, though clothed in "left" ultra-revolutionary phraseology.

What is then the distinctive feature of Maoism? It lies, first of all, in its eclecticism and pragmatism. A variant of petty-bourgeois ideology, Maoism lacks an inner wholeness. It is instead a conglomerate of views picked out from different sources and adapted to self-seeking political designs.

Side by side with elements of Marxism, one can find here echoes of different trends of Utopian socialism (from distinctly expressed egalitarian tendencies¹ to the eulogising of primitive universal equalisation), anarchism (vindication of violence and destruction, the absence of a creative, constructive principle), Trotskyist conceptions (reliance on artificial

¹ Egalitarianism—petty-bourgeois Utopian theories advocating the elimination of capitalist contradictions by means of redistribution of private property on an equalisation basis.

speeding-up of history, on leaps, permanent revolution), Narodism (exaggeration of the role of the peasantry in the transformation of the old society), etc.

Traditional conceptions in Chinese philosophy occupy a particularly important place in Mao's thinking ("Agriculture is the foundation of the state"; "The people are the grass, and the rulers are the wind"; "The state perishes if it does not wage war"; etc.). It is characteristic of Maoism that it has adopted not so much the ideas represented by the progressive humanistic trend in China as those represented by the conservative trend whose roots lie in the feudal-monarchical ideology.

An analysis of Mao Tse-tung's philosophical views reveals this very clearly. While constantly advocating the use of dialectics and employing some dialectical terms, Mao actually reduces them to a limited scheme characteristic of the philosophers of ancient China. Thus the law of the struggle of opposites is reduced to the mechanical contrasting of any arbitrarily chosen pair of phenomena ("war—peace," "beauty—ugliness," "split—unity," etc.), the interpenetration and interaction of contradictions being simply disregarded. This, of course, has nothing in common with Marxist philosophy, which reveals the world in all its complexity and diversity.

The fundamental question of philosophy is also treated by Mao Tse-tung in the same extremely simplified way. By attaching absolute importance to the subjective factor and thus underrating the importance of objective conditions, Mao stands far from a materialistic interpreta-

tion of the world and its objective laws. What he presents, as a rule, is an idealistic interpretation of social processes. His entire political outlook is based on the principle that it is sufficient to change consciousness in order to solve all problems.

Mao Tse-tung's statements on philosophical problems are purely utilitarian. In the final analysis, they serve one purpose, namely, to create the semblance of scientific substantiation of Mao's political course. This course proceeds not so much from an attempt to solve specific problems of social development of the country in accordance with objective laws and the interests of the working people, as from Mao's selfish, ambitious designs to hold power, "to be the first man in the Celestial Empire."

Consequently, Maoism does not constitute any systematically expounded, let alone new, theory of revolution, but represents a petty-bourgeois chauvinist platform used as an instrument of political struggle.

From the very beginning Mao and his adherents used undemocratic methods of work, ignoring the Party's Rules. Thus, for example, since the end of the 1920s only three Party Congresses were convened (the 6th Congress in 1928, the 7th Congress in 1945, and the 8th Congress in 1956). Sitzings of the Central Committee were held sporadically, and decisions on important questions were made at "enlarged sittings" of the Political Bureau or at closed conferences attended by certain leaders only. The Communist Party of China has never had a detailed Party programme.

The nationalistic character of Mao Tse-tung's

political line was clearly shown in the refusal by the CPC to fulfil its duty to the world communist movement during the years of the Second World War. At a time when all the revolutionary and progressive forces of the world, including the Chinese people, were waging a hard struggle against German fascism and Japanese militarism, Mao strove to impose upon the Party a passive wait-and-see policy. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung actually refused to comply with the direct request of the Comintern in the autumn of 1941 to intensify the struggle against Japan so as to prevent its attack on the Soviet Union from the rear.

The international communist movement recognised the negative tendencies in the development of the CPC and consistently pursued a policy of rendering it comprehensive help. The Comintern directly participated in the working out of a policy for a united front of the Chinese people in their struggle against the Japanese invaders (1937-45). The implementation of this policy permitted the CPC to become a massive and the most influential political party in the country.

In analysing the causes of the victory of the Chinese revolution, it is necessary to take fully into account the world conditions at the time. The Soviet Union's support for the revolution, the role it played in the defeat of the Japanese imperialists, the emergence of the socialist camp, and the growing influence of the socialist and democratic forces in the world—all these created favourable conditions for the successful development of the Chinese revolution.

Despite its complex and contradictory development, the Communist Party of China was able to fulfil the role of the leader of the people's revolution. This was the result of the activities of hundreds of thousands of Chinese Communists who worked selflessly for the independence of the country and its socialist future.

The defeat of Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism, the liberation by the Soviet Army of North-Western China, and the strengthening of the economic and military base of the Chinese revolutionary movement with the help of the USSR ensured the necessary conditions for the completion of the Chinese people's struggle for independence. The stormy upsurge of the liberation movement and the establishment of people's democracy in a number of countries facilitated the victory of the people's revolution in China.

The international factors of this victory, the most important being the support of the Soviet Union, made the Chinese masses and CPC members realize that China could not carry out successfully radical social transformations without relying on the help of the USSR and other socialist countries and learning from their experience. Mao Tse-tung, too, realised that without the economic, military and other assistance from the Soviet Union China would not be able to achieve the position of an independent state and strengthen its position on the international arena. These considerations determined Mao's stand at that time.

The existence of the world socialist system opened up exceedingly favourable prospects for

strengthening China's independence. The alliance with socialist states provided a guarantee against imperialist intervention and offset an economic blockade. The socialist countries rendered the Chinese People's Republic considerable assistance in the training of national cadres and in the solution of many tasks related to the building of a new, socialist China.

Ties of fraternal friendship and international unity were established between China, and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. On this foundation the reconstruction of the country and the building of the basis of socialism in China proceeded successfully. An official document, dated 1955, says: "The fact that our country was able to carry out so quickly the first five-year economic development plan is closely connected with the assistance rendered us by the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, particularly the Soviet Union. The 156 projects being built with Soviet assistance form the core of industrial construction for the period of the first five-year plan" (from a report by Lee Fu-chun, Deputy Premier of the State Council and Chairman of the State Planning Committee, on the first five-year plan delivered at the session of the National People's Congress in Peking on July 5th, 1955). During the first decade following the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, the share of Chinese output with the use of Soviet equipment amounted to: iron, steel and rolled stock—from 35 to 40 per cent; aluminium—100 per cent; trucks and tractors—85 per cent; electric power—40 per cent; electrical equipment—45 per cent; heavy engineering—35 per cent. The assistance of other

socialist countries, too, was essential for the economic development of China.

As a result of the great efforts of the Chinese working people and the assistance of the fraternal countries, the volume of industrial production in China increased more than 5 times during 1949-57.

During the first years following the formation of the Chinese People's Republic Mao and his group utilized the experience of world socialism. But while the majority of the Party members and the working people regarded it as a key to the socialist transformation of Chinese society, Mao and his adherents, as it has now become clear, were guided chiefly by nationalistic considerations. The latter intended to use the gigantic progress achieved with the help of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries in developing the country along socialist lines to realise their great-power hegemonic designs.

These designs, however, had been frustrated by the country's objective development. The official proclamation of the policy of building socialism had promoted the growth of internationalist tendencies within the Party and among the people. The successful development of the country's economy and culture, the improvement of the living standard and the rise of the country's prestige on the international arena were convincing proof that China was advancing along the correct road. Using the experience of fraternal parties, the CPC contributed to the solution of the problem of transition to socialism in underdeveloped countries.

The revolutionary gains of the Chinese peo-

ple were reflected in the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic (1954). The 8th CPC Congress, held in 1956, confirmed the general line of the Party for building socialism in close alliance with the world socialist system.

The 8th CPC Congress holds a special place in the history of the Party. The distinguishing feature of this Congress lies in its emphasis on the importance of strengthening and developing sound Marxist-Leninist forces among the ranks of the Party.

The Congress made it incumbent upon all Communists to give close consideration to the objective possibilities of developing the economy and not to set unrealistically high rates of construction. It came to the conclusion that in the struggle between socialism and capitalism in China the question "who will win?" had been settled. It put forward the task of raising the material and cultural standard of the people on the basis of the development of the economy. It demanded the further extension of democracy in the country and within the Party.

The 8th Congress confirmed the general line of the Party: "To gradually accomplish, within a fairly long period of time, the socialist industrialisation of the country and to gradually carry out the socialist transformation of agriculture, the handicraft industry, the capitalist industry and trade."

The Congress inserted in the Rules that the CPC stood for the preservation of peace in the world and for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and that it was working towards stronger international proletarian solidarity and educating its members and

the people in the spirit of internationalism. The Congress stated as the primary object of the foreign policy of the Chinese People's Republic the further strengthening of friendship with the Soviet Union and all the other countries of the world socialist system.

Three factors account chiefly for the important results achieved at the 8th Congress.

First, at the time of the Congress important progress had been made in the socialist construction in China. The first five-year plan was being successfully fulfilled, and socialist relations in the town and countryside were being strengthened. The Chinese Communists were learning from their own experience that in following the road of scientific socialism China would be able to do away with her century-old economic and cultural backwardness, and radically improve the living conditions of the working people.

Secondly, the successful socialist construction in China was closely connected with the tremendous help rendered China by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Thus internationalism in action showed the Chinese working people that "without the great international solidarity of the proletariat of all countries and without the support of the world revolutionary forces the victory of socialism in China is impossible" (from the Political Report of the CPC Central Committee to the 8th Party Congress).

Thirdly, the work of the Congress was favourably influenced by the 20th CPSU Congress, a fact acknowledged by the Chinese leaders themselves. The 8th Congress drew attention to the

vital importance of the strict observance of the principle of collective leadership and of the struggle against the personality cult; it changed the formulation of the fundamental ideological and theoretical principles of the Party by excluding the mention of Mao Tse-tung's "ideas" and emphasising in the new Rules that "the Communist Party of China is guided in its activity by Marxism-Leninism".

But this development and the implementation of the 8th Congress decisions contradicted the political conceptions of Mao Tse-tung and created a real threat to his autocratic rule. In their attempt to prevent any further development in this direction and again to take the initiative, Mao and his adherents decided to exploit the atmosphere of national enthusiasm prevailing in the country and the natural desire of the Chinese people to turn the country as soon as possible into a developed socialist state. They proceeded from the fact that they already had at their disposal the primary base for the development of a modern industry in China, which had been built up with the help of the socialist countries.

In 1958 Mao and his adherents brought forward the adventurist policy of the "three red banners" ("the new general line," "the great leap," "the people's communes"), which won the support of the overwhelming majority of Party members who had not at first foreseen the disastrous consequences of this policy. But the policy meant a complete break with the line adopted in 1953 and confirmed by the 8th Congress in 1956; it was furthermore counter to the Declaration of the 1957 Moscow Conferen-

ce in which the fraternal parties jointly formulated the main objective laws of socialist construction. The CPC leadership disregarded the friendly advice of the Marxist-Leninist parties which became uneasy about the Chinese experiment and warned of its grave consequences.

The "three red banners" policy was an attempt to artificially speed up the rate of economic development through the extreme exertion on the part of the working people, to outstrip the other states, and to "leap" into communism bypassing the necessary stages of building a socialist society.

The policy was advertised by the CPC leadership as a model for the development of other countries.

The theory and practice of "the leap into communism" ran counter to the objective reality in China and the whole world as well as to science and the experience of the socialist countries and the international communist movement. The failure of "the great leap" and "the people's communes" showed that voluntaristic objectives were unattainable, that it was impossible to skip definite stages of socialist construction, that slogans could not substitute for technology, and that subjective factors were not omnipotent either in the sphere of material production or in the sphere of social relations.

The "leap" policy and economic difficulties led to an acute intensification of struggle within the CPC. At the 8th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee (August 1959), a group of pro-

minent leaders including Peng Te-huai¹ and Chang Wen-tien² openly criticised Mao Tse-tung's policy. Though Mao Tse-tung and his adherents managed to suppress and discredit their adversaries, the CPC leadership was far from being united on the question of the direction the country should take for its further development; this lack of unity laid the ground for the further aggravation of differences. The dispute was about the ways and methods of transforming China into a mighty world power and the rate of building a socialist society. One trend of thought, supported at various stages by different people, stood for rational methods of developing the national economy with due regard for the experience of other socialist countries. The other trend, headed by Mao Tse-tung, flatly rejected the international experience of socialist construction and insisted on voluntaristic methods of speeding up the rate of economic construction. As a result of the failure of "the great leap" policy and subsequent developments, supporters of Mao Tse-tung's nationalistic policy who had earlier opposed Peng

¹ Peng Te-huai (born in 1898)—member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and one of the organisers and distinguished leaders of the People's Liberation Army of China. Before 1959 he was a Marshal and the Minister of Defence. According to the hungweiping press, he was arrested in 1966.

² Chang Wen-tien (born in 1900)—candidate-member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. He was Ambassador to the USSR in 1951-55. Before 1959 he was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; since 1934 he was a member of the Central Committee; he was the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee in 1935-40. His fate is unknown at present.

Te huai gradually moved away from Mao on the question of the ways and means of achieving great-power aims.

The country's economy was thrown back to the level of a few years before. At the 9th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee (January 1961) the leaders of the CPC were forced to retreat and show a more realistic approach. They proclaimed a policy of "adjustment," which enabled them to eliminate some of the negative results of the "great leap" and "people's communes" policy and to check a further decline in production. One of the consequences of the policy of "adjustment" was a certain revival of the forces in favour of the democratisation of the life of the country. Some open criticisms of subjectivist methods of solving economic and other questions began to appear in the press. The prestige of Mao Tse-tung and belief in his infallibility began to decline both within the Party and among the people. The answer to this were further curtailment of Party and state democracy, militarisation of the life of society, elevation of the role of the army, and still greater boosting of the cult of Mao.

At the same time Mao Tse-tung's group shifted the centre of gravity of their adventurist policy to the international arena: an open slanderous campaign was launched against the socialist countries and Communist Parties; military provocations were staged with a view to aggravating the international situation; and ultra-revolutionary slogans were put forward, designed to create the impression that the Chinese leaders were the most steadfast and consistent revolutionaries.

All these moves were dictated by definite aims. One consisted in diverting the attention of the Party and the people from internal difficulties, causing the wave of discontent to turn outward, and creating an atmosphere of nationalistic psychosis and war hysteria. The other was to realise the hegemonic designs by any means.

By early 1966 it was clear that these moves, in the final analysis, had failed to achieve their aim. The loss of prestige on the international arena and the growing isolation of the country brought about a further intensification of the internal political struggle.

The CPC leaders found themselves faced with the alternative of resuming the road which the country had taken during the first years of its existence, the tested road of socialist construction and close cooperation with the socialist countries as endorsed by the 8th Congress, or continuing to pursue a voluntaristic and nationalistic policy. The first alternative proved unacceptable to Mao and his associates, since it ran counter to their petty-bourgeois, nationalistic nature. Thus they continued to pursue the second road, deviating still further from Marxism and internationalism.

In the meantime the adventurist great-power policy, which had already led to grave internal and external consequences, clashed violently with the social and state system of the CPR and with the line of world socialism, so that its implementation became impossible without changing the very character of the Communist Party of China as a Marxist-Leninist party, without making radical political changes, without break-

ing with the communist movement and the socialist community.

The petty-bourgeois nationalistic wing in the CPC, which has temporarily gained the upper hand, has launched a "cultural revolution" and has definitely taken the road of splitting the international communist movement.

ON THE NATURE
OF THE
"CULTURAL
REVOLUTION"
IN CHINA

The political campaign launched by the Mao Tse-tung group under the slogan of "cultural revolution" having passed through a number of phases has now taken the form of acute conflict between different political forces.

By 1966 the grave economic situation in the country and failures in foreign policy had enormously aggravated discontent among party members and the people. The more conscious sections of the people—primarily party and state executives responsible for the country's economy, culture, defence and foreign relations—could not help feeling growing anxiety at the state of affairs. They realised that the further implementation of Mao Tse-tung's adventurist line could only lead China into a blind alley.

Mao discerned in this a direct threat both to his autocracy and to his political doctrine designed to perpetuate his name, and become a lodestar for the Chinese people and the rest of

mankind for "scores of thousands of years" to come. This was what decided the Mao group to start the "cultural revolution" and determined what its tasks should be. The objects were as follows: first, to suppress resentment and consolidate the absolute dictatorship in order to follow the preset political course unhampered; second, to wipe out the correct understanding of Marxism-Leninism from the minds of the people, and to educate the younger generation in the spirit of fanatical loyalty to "Mao's thought," thereby ensuring continuity of the great-power line.

It is to these ends that the Mao Tse-tung group, hoping to make capital on the people's ignorance (over 300 million of them are completely illiterate), is openly trying to rally the people, the younger generation above all, on a nationalistic platform, to heighten the reactionary sentiments that the Chinese are superior to other peoples and nationalities, to turn the multimillion Chinese people into an obedient tool for implementing Maoist schemes. Also serving these ends are the Mao Tse-tung personality cult raised to idolatry, the mechanical study of his scholastic sayings, the fanning of war hysteria in the country, threats, blackmail, and the staging of border incidents with neighbouring countries.

The ruling group could not count on the entire party membership and the main sections of the working people upholding its adventurist line. Therefore, Mao Tse-tung and his following resorted to violence—to downright reprisals against all discontented, or simply doubting, people. Storm detachments made up of

youths, brainwashed in the spirit of fanaticism, and the army became the chief instruments of this violence.

Mao Tse-tung needed an organisation of muscle men, and by way of preparation he started a campaign of hounding cultural workers, picking first on the party members. This was no chance choice. Mao could not strike at once at party and state executives who enjoyed great prestige and influence among the people. For this reason the current political campaign in China was at first disguised as a "cultural revolution" and passed for "a popular movement against bourgeois culture." But as soon as the ruling group had gathered strength, prepared storm detachments and created a charged atmosphere in the country, they began to shift their attacks to party and state executives. The green light for this was given at the 11th full-scale meeting of the CC CPC at which decisions were steamrollered through. Mao advanced the thesis that persons "who were going along the capitalist road" should be deprived of authority which provided a loophole for him to shirk responsibility for the failures in domestic and foreign policies and to direct popular discontent against the party and state executives whom Mao and his following considered their rivals. And yet, despite their perfidious tactics, the Mao group did not manage to carry out their plans to the end—they failed to stage a coup. The group ran into growing resistance from a considerable part of the party and state cadres. More important still, the opposition was joined by workers and peasants whose interests were affected because

of the economic and political confusion caused by the "cultural revolution."

There are more indications today of the growing political division of the Chinese nation into two camps—supporters and opponents of the Mao Tse-tung line. If the Mao group is still in the lead, it is only because the opposition has no centralised organisation or political stand. Besides, the opposition consists of various forces including true Marxists and people who oppose the methods used by the Mao group in carrying out the "cultural revolution" but who favour its great-power and hegemonistic aspirations.

From time to time armed clashes occur in the course of the "cultural revolution." In the autumn of 1957 there was danger of local armed conflicts developing into a civil war. Lack of unity among the Mao supporters aggravated the situation. The army, hungweiping and tsaofan detachments were split, and one group was fighting another (this is still the case). The Centre found increasing difficulty in controlling the situation.

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters were forced to try another political trick. They launched a campaign for what they called "great revolutionary unification" of army men, hungweipings and some of the party veterans. Its aim was to weaken resistance to the Mao Tse-tung group, unite all their supporters grappling with each other for power, and hoodwink party members and the people so as to gain time to eliminate physically or to neutralise the forces opposing Mao.

So far the new gimmick has not yielded any

tangible results. "Great unification" is running into snags. Armed struggle between Mao's supporters and opponents continues, as it does within the Maoist camp. The Mao Tse-tung group has been forced to take measures to tighten control over the hungweipings and tsao-fans. In this connection great hopes are pinned on the army whose influence on life in China grows continually.

Conceived as a conspiracy, the "cultural revolution" has led to an acute political crisis in the course of which the fate of the present social system and the direction of the country's future development are being decided.

This crisis manifests itself, first and foremost, in that the "cultural revolution" is leading towards the destruction of the present political system—the Chinese People's Republic. The Communist Party of China is paralysed. Its Central Committee is in no position to exercise authority. More than two-thirds of the Central Committee membership elected at the 8th Congress in 1956 have been denounced, proclaimed "blackguards," "scum," and "enemies of Mao Tse-tung," and barred from political activity. Three out of five of the deputy-chairmen of the CC CPC have been classed as "proponents of a reactionary line." Liu Shao-chi, CPR Chairman; Chu Te, Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives; and Teng Hsiao-ping, CC CPC General Secretary have been styled "leaders of blackguards." Most of the Politbureau members and alternate members have been declared "opponents of the thought of Chairman Mao."

Following Mao Tse-tung's appeal "to open

fire on headquarters," nearly all provincial, town and district party committees, party committees at ministries and departments, and party locals have either been disbanded or their work disrupted. Trade union, young communist and other mass organisations have been abolished.

Although Mao Tse-tung and his group dealt the Party a heavy blow, they have not been able to eliminate it. There are still sound forces in the Party who, under favourable conditions, can set China back on the road towards socialism. However, it is obvious that with its executive bodies actually destroyed the CPC cannot, for the time being, be the leading force in the society.

Striking at the Communist Party, the Mao group will probably preserve its outward features but will try to change radically its nature, its class content. The group is banking on replacing the bulk of the old party cadres with people who are personally loyal to Mao Tse-tung, who accept Maoism as the only ideological basis of the Party's activity. "We want to be members of Mao Tse-tung's Communist Party of China," wrote the hungweiping newspaper.

Recently the Mao group took practical steps to create such a party. Official statements have been made since the autumn 1967 on the need to "overhaul and reorganise" the CPC. Implementation of this measure will be guided by a "group for the cultural revolution affairs." In the words of the Minister of Public Security, Hsieh Fu-chin, this group is "more important than the Secretariat plus the Politbureau." It is envisaged that the core of the party will be made up of army

men, hungweipings and tsaofans who have personally proved their loyalty to Mao Tse-tung. Party cadres who, in the course of the "cultural revolution," showed themselves to be Mao's "faithful soldiers" will be allowed to remain in the Party. Maoism is to be the theoretical and ideological basis of the new organisation.

When the delegates have been carefully selected the Mao group plans to convene a party congress. Before the congress it is planned to inject "new blood" into the Party—to replenish its ranks with new members (over 10 million, according to some sources) chosen from among hungweipings and tsaofans whom Chinese propaganda has begun to call "the forefront of the proletariat." In late 1967, a directive was issued on behalf of the CC CPC assigning to "revolutionary committees" and military control committees the task of "effecting the reorganisation and straightening out of the Party under the control of the hungweipings and tsaofans." That doctrine also recommended "to see to it that the more active hungweipings and tsaofans are recruited into the Party."

Realisation of the plans for a Maoist party would change the situation both as regards China's domestic policy and her position in the world communist movement. Inside China, this would place the Party as the leading political organisation of society, and its time-honoured authority at the service of Maoism. On the international scene, the Marxist-Leninist parties would have to deal not with a Mao Tse-tung group but with a mass organisation which, though calling itself communist, would have nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist ideo-

logy. Such an organisation would not be a party dedicated to proletarian internationalism, but an instrument to carry out the Mao Tse tung group's great-power policy.

Along with their line of doing away with the Party as a Marxist-Leninist organisation, the Mao group have adopted the course of subverting institutes of state power. The All-China Assembly of People's Representatives has not met for almost three years, most of the deputies having been discredited and subjected to persecution. The Permanent Committee of the Assembly is inactive. Elective bodies of local government have been disbanded. They are being replaced by "revolutionary committees" set up by the Mao group on the basis of a "triple alliance"—army men, pro-Mao party cadres, and the "revolutionary masses" (the hungweipings and tsaofans).

However, the setting up of "revolutionary committees" meets with considerable difficulty, since there are substantial differences between the groups that make up the "triple alliance." The process is still far from completion although the deadline date has been put off several times. Struggles continue even in places where "revolutionary committees" have been set up, while the position of these committees remains unstable.

Mao Tse-tung is rushing through the setting up of "revolutionary committees" because the destruction of the old system of local party and administrative bodies has led to the break-up of the normal rhythm of the life of the country and of the economy, the spread of anarchy and internecine strife and an increase in separatist tendencies in outlying national regions.

The army, which on Mao's order took control of the nation, has proved incapable of administering the country effectively without the help of experienced personnel. At the same time the army's attempts to establish even a semblance of order in the country have resulted in acute conflict with the "revolutionary masses." So now Mao Tse-tung is pinning his hopes on the "revolutionary committees" which exercise party, administrative, economic and financial authority. Having, replaced the truly popular, elective bodies of government, the "revolutionary committees," however, have been unable to put an end to the internecine strife and clashes. Moreover, they are themselves becoming objects of attack. China's Minister of Public Security, for one, admits that some of the "revolutionary committees" have been split. This has happened in Peking, for instance, the Minister stated. Neither the "broad unification," nor the "combination of the three forces" was put into effect there. "Therefore, repetition of certain events is likely to happen" he declared. The threat of a split hangs over the "revolutionary committees" of Shanghai, Kangsu, Shansi and Heilungkiang provinces, and the newly formed committees of Kwangtung Province and the city of Kwangchow. The Chinese press had good reason to clamour about "anarchism trying to destroy or weaken the fighting strength of the revolutionary committees."

Chinese propaganda is trying to create the impression that the aim of the "cultural revolution" is to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. The demagogic nature of such a claim is obvious. Leadership of society by the

working class and its Marxist-Leninist party is a key principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In today's China the working class, the peasants and the intelligentsia are actually debarred from government, while the Party has been shattered.

The "cultural revolution" discredits the very idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Enforcement agencies are used against the progressive forces of socialism, against the people—but not to defend socialist gains or against the bourgeoisie. Scientific principles for organising the economy are ignored. Orientation work has been replaced by forcible inculcation of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The function of the socialist state, as regards foreign policy, has also been greatly distorted.

Chinese propaganda claims that now, thanks to the "cultural revolution," anybody can criticise anybody, and this releases the initiative of the masses. In actual fact, broad democracy Mao Tse-tung style is nothing but persecution, sponsored from above, of anyone whom "the group for the affairs of the cultural revolution" and its local representatives wish to brand "revisionists," or people "going along the capitalist road."

Chinese propaganda claims that in the course of the "cultural revolution," revolutionary workers and peasants "seize power." Actually, power in China is being seized by the Mao Tse-tung group who rely on the army and security agencies. In late 1966 and early 1967 military control was introduced throughout the country. Besides police functions, the army assumed those of control over industry and agriculture.

As Lin Piao¹ and Hsieh Fu-chih admitted in August 1967, the army became practically the sole support of the regime, since party and administrative bodies had been destroyed.

Thus, the "cultural revolution" is actually destroying the political superstructure in China—a people's democracy—and replacing it with a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

The "cultural revolution" has had a pernicious effect both on the economy and the standard of living. The national economy, which had begun to revive after the "great leap," is once again in a sorry state. The system of production management has actually been disorganised; economic ties between town and country, the normal functioning of transport and material and technical supplies have been disrupted; overall output has fallen sharply. Another cause for the economic slump was the waning labour enthusiasm of the workers and peasants, strikes and armed action in defence of their rights and interests.

That industrial production shrank considerably in 1967 is shown by many direct and indirect indications. A number of industrial units were destroyed as a result of riots and clashes in several important industrial centres (Shang-

¹ Lin Piao is Deputy Chairman of the CC CPC, member of the CC Politbureau and its Permanent Committee, Deputy Chairman of the CC CPC Military Committee, Deputy Premier of the CPR State Council, Defence Minister and Deputy Chairman of the CPR State Defence Committee. He was appointed by Mao Tse-tung to leading party and government posts when the present Chinese leaders adopted the so-called special course. Lin Piao has been officially announced Mao Tse-tung's "close associate" and "successor".

hai, Wuhan, Kwangchow and others). Many acts of sabotage occurred (arson, deliberate destruction of equipment, etc.). The damage caused by the "cultural revolution" is estimated at thousands of millions of yuan.

A drop in coal output has resulted in the shortage of coal for the power industry and transport. Supply of foodstuffs is something of a problem in several provinces because of ruptured contacts between economic areas. Premier Chou En-Lai admitted publicly that "a certain price in terms of output had to be paid for the cultural revolution." Mao Tse-tung and his group are trying to shift responsibility for the economic slump to their opponents.

One of the more disastrous consequences of the implementation of "the thought of Mao Tse-tung" in the economy is the actual discontinuance of industrialisation—the main means of overcoming China's age-old backwardness. Scientific and technological progress has been retarded. The only thing being done in this field is the forced development of a few industries (the nuclear rocket industry for one) which the ruling group consider vital for carrying out their great-power aims.

An attempt is being made in the course of the "cultural revolution" to organise production along military lines and to introduce forced labour as well as rationing at a low level of consumption. The idea of raising living standards is repudiated as a "bourgeois" urge towards "satiety." Widely propagated are Mao's sayings, such as "Poverty is good," and "It is frightening to think of the time when all people become rich." Lenin's principle of material incen-

tives has been declared "a stab in the back of the proletarian revolution." All this is in glaring contradiction to scientific socialism which states that the expansion of social production and the raising of living standards are decisive conditions for the development of man's abilities, for freeing him from the burden of tiring physical labour, and for bringing one and all into creative activity.

The Mao Tse-tung group has no constructive programme of economic development. Therefore, the "cultural revolution" leads to regression in the national economy, to the perpetuation of China's economic backwardness and a serious deterioration of the working people's standard of living.

The "cultural revolution" has had a particularly unfortunate effect on the cultural life of Chinese society.

The campaign to wipe out illiteracy in China with 90 per cent of its population illiterate was a most important means of overcoming backwardness. In the early years of the Chinese People's Republic efforts were made to start a real cultural revolution. Today these efforts have been curtailed. Within the last two years studies at standard and higher schools have practically ceased; no engineers, doctors, teachers or specialists in other professions are being trained.

The "cultural revolution" denies the Chinese people access to treasures of the national and world cultures: humanistic works—products of social thought, literature, and arts in China—have been taken out of circulation; publication of socio-political, scientific, literary and art ma-

gazines has been stopped; art workers' unions, theatre companies and other groups have been disbanded; many books have been burnt. Practically everything that makes up the treasury of world civilisation has been declared "bourgeois" or "counter-revolutionary." Behind it all is the intention to prevent penetration of progressive ideas into the country. People's minds are regarded as "blank sheets of paper" to be filled in with "the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

One of the most vivid features of the "cultural revolution" is deification of Mao Tse-tung, which differs little from the cult of the Emperors in olden China. Attempts are being made to eradicate the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism from the minds of the communists and the working people in general, to establish Maoism as the only ideology, and to foist it upon the people as a sort of religion.

The sponsors of the "cultural revolution" are trying to limit the cultural world of every Chinese, young and old, down to memorising sayings by Mao Tse-tung, a collection of which is a must in every family. Every man is to be guided by these sayings in his private and social life. People are told every day that it is in this catechism of sorts that answers to all questions concerning their life and work must be sought.

Nearly all the country's printing-houses have been switched to reprinting works by Mao Tse-tung in scores of millions of copies, as well as printing his portraits. In Chinese propaganda he is likened to an almighty god. The whole history of the revolutionary movement has been cru-

dely re-carved and falsified for the purpose of glorifying Mao Tse-tung. Chinese communists, living or dead, who at one time differed from Mao in this or that question, are grouped together as "national traitors" and "agents of counter-revolution."

Besides the boosting of the Mao personality cult efforts to inflame great-power, nationalistic passions are another distinctive feature of the "cultural revolution." The notion of the unquestionable superiority of the Chinese nation over all other nations, and of its special mission in history is being persistently propagated. A hostile attitude towards the USSR and other socialist countries is also widely cultivated.

By condemning Chinese society to a protracted period of cultural stagnation the "cultural revolution" obstructs the country's progress towards socialism, the building of which is unthinkable in isolation from all the treasures of national and world cultures. The "cultural revolution" is nothing but brainwashing on a national scale in the spirit of chauvinism, militarism and war-mongering.

Foisted upon the Chinese people in disregard of their economic and cultural needs, the "cultural revolution" is being implemented by means of force and terrorism.

It has revealed the Mao Tse-tung group's stock-in-trade methods of political warfare: intrigues, setting one section of the people against another, promotion of people according to their loyalty, demagoguery, the shameful practice of public confessions, twisting the meaning of

slogans to prove Mao's "infallibility," resorting to religious rites such as burning the enemy in effigy for greater psychological effect on ignorant people. A quotation from Marx and Engels is in place here: "Ignorance is a diabolical force," they warned, "and, we are afraid, it will be the cause of many tragedy yet." (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Col. Works*, Vol. 1, p. 112, Rus. Ed.).

Sponsored by Mao Tse-tung, the students' movement was intended to create an impression that support for his policy came from below, an impression of mass revolutionary activity. Banking on the political immaturity of the young people of whom the hungweiping detachments are made up, was not fortuitous. They are the generation brought up under the Mao Tse-tung personality cult and educated in the spirit of blind submission to his will. Militant nationalism and anti-Sovietism, a disparaging attitude towards the culture, traditions and experience of other peoples, and a distorted conception of socialist ideals are some other features of their education. The Mao Tse-tung group also makes use of the young people's discontent with their position in society, telling them that the "cultural revolution" will open up board prospects for them to play an important part in the country's life.

The hungweipings are strengthened by tsao-fan detachments recruited from among young people who have just started work in industry and in the state machinery. These are people who have not had time to take a stand with the working class, to understand its interests, or to imbibe its traditions. They are easily in-

fluenced by social demagoguery and are ready to believe in any dogma, repudiate anything, take part in any kind of "rumpus." The political and moral corruption of the younger generation presents a grave threat to the cause of socialism in China.

The Mao Tse-tung group's mainstay is the army. It passed from the control of the Party and the people even before the "cultural revolution," and was indoctrinated in the spirit of unquestioning fulfilment of Mao's instructions. Between 1959 and 1965 the more politically conscious and active officers were discharged. In May 1965, a so-called revolutionisation of the armed forces was carried out: all grades and badges of rank were abolished under the pretext of a need for "further strengthening the ties between command and the masses." Simultaneously, promotion of the slogan on precedence of politics in any sphere of activity, including the military sphere, was stepped up. Criticism was levelled at people who stood for improvement of military training, for better equipment for the army, but neglected orientation work to make men and officers ever more loyal to Mao Tse-tung and his "thought." A major purge was carried out in the army behind the smoke-screen of "revolutionisation." This time the purge affected high-ranking officers, including Lo Jui-ching, Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Premier, and all those who doubted the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's views. The "revolutionisation" of the army was in fact preparation, under the same slogan, for militarisation of the entire social life in the country. Political departments staffed by army

cadres were instituted at factories and offices in 1964-65.

In other words, the army was given the opportunity to directly control the work of factories and offices, which facilitated transition towards a nation-wide "cultural revolution." As the "revolution" developed there was only one organised force of a national calibre left—the army. However, inside it there is difference of opinion concerning the Mao Tse-tung group, especially in units under provincial authorities. The army is far from unanimous in supporting the Mao group: some of the enlisted men and officers do not approve of the "cultural revolution" and do not want to be an instrument for suppressing the masses.

Clearly, the "cultural revolution" is being carried out by a narrow section of Chinese society; it is in fact an act of violence against the people. It stopped the natural formation of the Chinese people's socio-political and ideological unity, and sharply aggravated social contradictions.

The genuine aims of the current political campaign and the real meaning of the slogans advanced by the Mao Tse-tung group and their opponents are not yet completely clear to most of the working people of China.

The wrecking of the party, trade union, young communist and other public organisations, and the appearance of all kinds of new organisations (up to several score within one enterprise) are inevitably leading the working people towards a split and hampering their understanding of the situation. It should be noted that as a rule, opposing forces, for various reasons, take action under the slogan of "defence of Mao Tse-

tung." The situation is further complicated by anarchic elements on the rampage. Coming up to the surface are a great number of real class enemies of the Chinese working people, careerists and unscrupulous demagogues ready to use any slogans and watchwords to attain their selfish ends.

The political struggle in China has become a protracted one. Even in areas controlled by the army or by "revolutionary committees" the situation is still far from normal.

Mao Tse-tung never got mass support from any of the working classes or sections of the Chinese people, including the backward peasantry on whom he staked his all. This is, above all, because the Mao line brought about a sharp deterioration in the standard of living. Propaganda of ascetic socialism, the falling standard of living, outrages by irresponsible youths, and disorganised production—all serve to aggravate the popular discontent. The pernicious effect of the "cultural revolution" on all spheres of social life has resulted in the working people beginning more actively to come out in defence of the revolutionary social gains.

The present disposition of class forces in China is exceedingly complex and contradictory.

The working class now presents no single political force. Its core, having witnessed the consequences of "the great leap," does not favour Mao Tse-tung's policy. In order to neutralise resistance from this part of the working class and to separate it from the broad masses of workers, the Mao group contraposes it to unskilled labourers who have recently come from the countryside and are politically immature. Such

a line prevents consolidation of the working class and prevents workers from reaching an understanding as to where their common interests lie.

The Mao Tse-tung group infringes upon the workers' economic and political rights: the payment-according-to-work principle is being violated under the pretext of fighting vestiges of the "bourgeois law;" the workers' rights as regards social insurance and fixed working hours won by the Revolution are being abolished; organisations for upholding the workers' interests have been disbanded or are immobilised. While infringing, in the main, upon the interests of the skilled personnel, these measures promote "wage-levelling" favoured by unskilled workers temporarily drawn from the countryside. All this is being done under "revolutionary" slogans, which mislead the masses. While attacks on the workers' economic interests and social rights are in progress under the slogan of fighting "bourgeois ways" and "economism," the working class increasingly opposes the "cultural revolution." Strikes and demonstrations of protest are taking place at many enterprises, while in Shanghai and several other industrial centres the workers have repeatedly taken up arms against "Mao Tse-tung's storm detachments."

The peasants on the whole have not yet clearly determined their attitude towards the "cultural revolution." This is largely due to the fact that the sponsors of the present political campaign are doing their best to keep the peasants from taking part in the current developments. They are afraid, on the one hand, that agricul-

ture would fall apart, and on the other, that the pent-up discontent in the countryside would grow into an uprising.

It is common knowledge that the "people's communes" hit hard at the well-being of the working peasantry. The "cultural revolution" has again called for the abolition of private plots, closing the agricultural market, and curtailing domestic crafts permitted only a few years ago. This means worsened living conditions for all sections of the peasantry, even though the present standards of living is exceedingly low. There is opposition to the measures of the "cultural revolution" in the countryside. Quite often, armed peasant detachments leave for town to fight the hungweipings and tsaofans, to uphold their class interests. Chinese propaganda now has to persuade the peasants that Mao's thesis on "country surrounding town" is not to be applied to China. There were also cases when ignorant peasants were sicked on to workers who opposed the Mao line.

The intelligentsia is against the "cultural revolution" en masse. This stratum of Chinese society became its first victim—intellectuals were subjected to wholesale hounding and persecution. The main blow was struck against the forefront of the intelligentsia—party members who matured in the course of struggles for the revolutionary cause, for socialism. The Mao group set out to destroy that part of the intelligentsia, who possessed revolutionary traditions and who could see better than any other stratum of the people the harm coming from the Mao Tse-tung line.

Only a small group of experts, primarily

those engaged on the nuclear rocket programme, have not been affected by the "cultural revolution," although the interests of that section of the intelligentsia are also being infringed upon.

The national bourgeoisie has assumed the tactic of passive waiting. They have never been attacked or hounded, and nothing is being done to them even today when blows are said to be dealt at all those who "are going, or striving to go, along the capitalist road." They have kept their former privileges and continue to receive interest on capital. The latest events have not affected any of the bourgeois-democratic parties in China. Not one of the bourgeois leaders who hold important posts in the Government (such as ministers and members of the Permanent Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives) has come under attack.

Obviously, bourgeois elements can use the political confusion in the country to consolidate their positions. The present situation favours subversive activity by counter-revolutionary elements, as well as US and Chiang Kai-shek agents.

It should also be noted that the "cultural revolution" has bared acute antagonisms on the national question. Unlike as it was in the Soviet Union and other multi-national socialist states, this question is being tackled in China from chauvinistic positions. Consider the following facts: there are fifty-odd non-Han nationalities and national groups in the country which total some 43 million people. Many of the larger nationalities (between two and three million

people) have very little autonomy—mostly in the form of autonomous districts and areas. The Manchurians, for instance, totalling 2.4 million, received no autonomy at all when the Chinese People's Republic was formed. Some autonomous districts actually lost their autonomy as a result of mass resettlement, administrative re-carving of territory and implementation of the policy of assimilation.

Complete disregard by Mao Tse-tung and his following of Lenin's principles of national policy and the right of nations to self-determination, retarded economic and cultural development in national regions, cultivation of Great-China chauvinism, persecution and destruction of national cadres under the pretext of fighting "local nationalism," broad assimilation of various national groups by the Chinese, and the disparaging attitude towards the local language, customs and traditions—all these have bred profound discontent with the Mao Tse-tung line among the national minorities. This discontent has come to the surface in the course of the "cultural revolution." Logically enough, such regions as Sinkiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia have become areas of constant tension and major action against the Maoists.

The policy pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his group has brought the country to an acute crisis.

Regardless of future developments, it is already obvious that the "proletarian cultural revolution" has nothing to do either with revolution or the proletariat or culture.

To sum up:

The so-called cultural revolution is nothing

but an attempt to erase the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism from the minds of communists and the working people in general; to establish Maoism as the only ideology and foist it on the Chinese people as a sort of religion; to turn the entire population into an instrument of the Mao Tse-tung group.

It is nothing but an attempt to eliminate the Communist Party as the vanguard of the Chinese working class, destroy the system of people's democracy, abolish civil rights, and establish a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

It is nothing but an attempt to perpetuate the present low standard of living and China's semi-natural economy, and to concentrate the main national resources on the building-up of a nuclear rocket potential.

It is nothing but an attempt to inflame chauvinism and hatred for other peoples, and to prepare the nation for the implementation of great-power plans to establish China's hegemony in the world.

Kommunist, No. 7, 1968

*ON THE POLITICAL
COURSE PURSUED
BY MAO TSE-TUNG
IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ARENA*

The political course which Mao Tse-tung pursues in the international arena and which he has imposed on the Communist Party of China is a product of long evolution.

The first clear signs of the hegemonic aspirations of the Chinese leaders appeared in the early 1950's, when they started to lay claim to the role of supreme judges called upon to direct the activities of other Parties and countries.

At the end of the 1950s the CPC leadership issued a public statement of its views which were at variance with the general line of the international communist movement. At the time many people thought that the CPC leadership was temporarily misled. Further development of events showed, however, that what had to be dealt with was not simply blunders but a conscious desire on the part of the CPC leadership to revise the general line of the communist movement and to impose on the movement a course of its own.

Already at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1957, Mao Tse-tung advocated the anti-Marxist idea that world imperialism could be defeated only through a nuclear war and that the sacrifices, hardships and calamities that would result from such a war were of no consequence. The Chinese leadership openly outlined its erroneous line in the brochure "Long Live Leninism" (April, 1960) and later at the session of the World Federation of Trade Unions held in Peking (June, 1960), the Bucharest Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in the summer of 1960 and at the Conference of Representatives of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in November, 1960.

The participants in the Conference rejected, in the course of the discussion, the attempts of the Chinese leadership to impose its own line on the other Parties. The CPC leadership then signed the Declaration and Appeal to the Nations of the World. But it soon became clear that this was nothing more than a manoeuvre: Mao Tse-tung and his group had begun preparations for a frontal attack on the general line of the communist movement.

After the Chinese press had published in June, 1963 a series of polemic articles ("Answers" to Comrades Togliatti and Thorez, and attacks on the Communist Parties of the USA and India), the CPC leadership came forward with the so-called Proposal on the General Line of International Communist Movement ("25 Points"). Later at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC held in August 1966, this document was said to have been

“evolved under the personal supervision” of Mao Tse-tung. Calling the document a “programme,” Mao’s group officially counterposed its “25 Points” to the general line of the world communist movement.

The more the CPC leaders intensified their polemics with the fraternal parties, the clearer it became that their aim was to dominate all the revolutionary forces of our time and to impose on the communist movement their own platform.

In trying to appear as the most consistent and staunch revolutionaries and to justify their thesis on the transfer of the centre of world revolution to the CPR, the CPC leaders wanted to establish their dominant role in the revolutionary movement and to turn it into a tool for implementing their own great-power line in the international arena.

The attempt of Mao and his group to substantiate the “universal” character of Maoism and to prove its ability to serve as a theoretical basis for settling problems of social development throughout the world is also connected with their chauvinistic aims. References to the experience of the Chinese revolution, especially of guerrilla warfare, and the desire to make this experience absolute, to derive from it “general laws” that are presumably applicable to all countries and nations, also serve this aim. The founders of scientific communism had repeatedly pointed out the great harm that could be done to the cause of revolutionary movement by the desire to overestimate the significance of national experience and the attempts to establish it as the universal recipe for the

various detachments of the revolution without taking into account the concrete conditions of time and place. All the successes achieved by the communist movement were due precisely to the fact that the Marxist-Leninist Parties, basing their activities on collective experience, had been able to master and apply creatively the common principles of revolutionary theory, taking into consideration the specific features of their countries.

The Mao Tse-tung group is doing all it can to aggravate international tension whenever it thinks it is in its interests to do so, and pours oil on the flames of conflicts. At the same time it is trying to create an atmosphere of war psychosis inside the country, instilling in the Chinese people a fear of the danger of an attack which allegedly threatens China from all sides.

The ruling group in China is trying to engineer a nuclear clash between the USSR and the USA in the hope that this will lead to the establishment of its own supremacy, while it would "sit on a hilltop and watch the fight between two tigers" as the Chinese saying goes. The Maoist "world revolution strategy" really boils down to this and nothing more. Only in this light can one understand the provocative mudslinging and slanderous attacks aimed at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which are charged with cowardice, collusion with imperialism and treason toward the revolutionary cause.

Intensive propaganda of the views of Mao Tse-tung on problems of war and peace constitutes an important part of the activities of the present CPC leadership. Mao Tse-tung considers

the 700-million-strong population of China to be the main factor in his policies, a factor which would enable him to emerge as the winner in the case of a head-on military collision. What is striking here is the readiness to sacrifice hundreds of millions of people and to condemn entire nations to extermination, especially the smaller ones, which, according to Chinese leaders, "must sacrifice themselves if a nuclear war flares up."

On the question of anti-imperialist struggle, the position of the Mao Tse-tung group is inconsistent. On the one hand, the group propagates the doctrine of the so-called people's war and the motto that "a rifle breeds power." These concepts were expressed in a condensed form in Lin Piao's article *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*, published in September, 1965. It is based entirely on Mao Tse-tung's views on war, on an attempt to turn the Chinese experience in the national-liberation struggle into an absolute law with the view to imposing it on other countries irrespective of their concrete, specific conditions or of the international situation of our time. On the other hand, while indulging in ultra-revolutionary demagoguery, the Mao Tse-tung group is far from being inclined to act as "one spearhead against another" in the struggle against imperialism "in the name of world revolution." Its struggle against imperialism is becoming more and more mere words.

Concentrating the country's resources on the creation of nuclear missiles when China is still economically backward and has not yet solved its basic economic problems, thus subjecting the Chinese people to tremendous sacrifice and de-

privation, Mao Tse-tung and his group are least of all concerned with the future of their own country or of world revolution. Peking considers nuclear missiles as one of the chief means of establishing China's hegemony in the world.

Camouflaging their course with pseudo-revolutionary slogans, the Maoists are actually working against the line agreed upon among the fraternal parties in the struggle against West German imperialism. In reality, the Maoist positions coincide with those of the FRG on such matters as anti-Sovietism, aspirations toward the possession of nuclear weapons, the desire to aggravate tensions in Europe and to revise state borders.

In the light of this general strategy one can also begin to understand the tactics of Peking concerning the Vietnamese question, which are designed to hamper a political settlement of existing problems. The ruling group in China is doing everything it can to prolong the war in Vietnam. It looks upon this war as a factor in its own great-power political game, paying no heed whatsoever to the interests of the Vietnamese people, the whole socialist camp and the international working class movement, and betraying the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism.

Peking is hoping to utilise the war in Vietnam to achieve the same aim—that of bringing about a military conflict between the USSR and the USA in which China would take no part. More and more new facts are coming to light which show that there exists a kind of tacit agreement on mutual non-aggression between the Chinese Government and the US ruling cir-

cles. The Chinese leaders have more than once declared to Washington that "if the CPR were not subjected to a direct military attack, China would not enter the fight against the USA in Vietnam" (conversation between Mao Tse-tung and E. Snow,¹ reported in the French magazine *Le Nouveau Candide*, February 11-18, 1965). Johnson and Rusk, on their part, have more than once let it be known publicly that the USA has no intention of invading the CPR or of spreading the Vietnam war into China.

The fraternal parties of the socialist countries have made many efforts to achieve unity of action with the CPC in the struggle against US imperialist aggression in Vietnam. However, the Mao Tse-tung group has rejected these efforts. Thus, it is this group that must bear the responsibility for frustrating plans to build a united front of all the forces of socialism on the most important question of today.

One must also pay attention to the fact that a certain section of the US ruling circles is persistently striving to "build bridges" across to Peking on an anti-Soviet foundation. It is significant that lately a number of prominent persons in the USA—E. Rostow, N. Katzenbach, under-secretaries of state, and some others—have started to stress officially and systematically that the USA is prepared to improve its relations with the CPR and that "the USA would be happy to respond" to proposals made by Peking in this direction.

¹ E. Snow—a US bourgeois journalist. He met Mao Tse-tung for the first time in 1936, and has since then been a frequent visitor to China where he is received by Mao and other Chinese leaders.

While developing relations with the imperialist states, the Chinese ruling group at the same time conducts a fierce demagogical campaign against the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems declaring that this principle is in contradiction to the cause of revolution and national and social liberation.

The Mao group's crusade against the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems—which is one of the forms of class struggle in the international arena—and its attempts to discredit this principle in the eyes of nations constitute one more proof of its departure from Marxist-Leninist class positions.

The present-day foreign policy of Mao's group is the logical outcome of its great-power chauvinistic concept, a departure from all the basic principles of socialist foreign policy, and a revision of the foreign-policy course, adopted by the 8th Congress of the CPC in 1956. It is directed against the cause of revolution and peace, and helps imperialism.

The entire policy of Mao's group in relation to the socialist countries is determined by the great-power course for achieving the world hegemony of China.

The world socialist system characterised by relations of fraternal cooperation, equality and internationalism turned out to be the main obstacle to the realisation of the hegemonic aspirations of the Mao group. This explains China's opposition to the socialist community, its attempts to split and weaken it and to draw other countries away from it. The logical outcome

of this policy is that the socialist countries, not imperialism, become the main target of attacks by Mao and his group.

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung and his group, aiming at splitting the socialist community, treat each socialist state according to the latter's attitude to Peking's course. They try to sow dissension among the socialist countries (in particular, between the Asian socialist states and the European ones), to isolate them from the USSR, and to turn them into a sphere of Chinese influence.

The socialist countries, while struggling against imperialism, are compelled at the same time to repel the attacks of the Mao Tse-tung group.

The present CPC leadership has launched an open ideological and political attack against the entire communist movement, with which the Mao group has practically cut off all ideological and organisational ties. Those Communist and Workers' Parties which do not agree with Peking's line are labelled "cliques" with which "the battle will be fought to the end." The CPC did not take part in the latest congresses of fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, the USSR, France, and a few others. Mao and his group are opposing all efforts aimed at strengthening the unity of the communist movement and are conducting a fierce campaign against the preparation and the convening of a new international conference of Communist Parties.

The Mao group is using its entire propagan-da and foreign-policy machinery to discredit Marxist-Leninist Parties in the eyes of the mas-

ses, having no scruples whatever about the methods it employs. Thus Peking's emissaries make contacts with hostile political parties and groups, in particular with Trotskyites, and openly utilise the persecution of Communist Parties in a number of capitalist countries for their own ends.

Peking is also attempting to unite, under its aegis, all the anti-Leninist forces in the revolutionary movement. Having placed under their influence the Communist Parties of Albania, Burma and New Zealand and the pro-Chinese "Communists" from Malaya and Thailand, who are living in Peking, the Mao group has built up in a number of capitalist countries Maoist groups, which exist on money from Peking and which resort to slander, provocations, falsifications and blackmail in their fight against Marxist-Leninist Parties. At present these groups are also being used to deceive the Chinese people who are being told that Mao Tse-tung enjoys international support.

The present leaders of the CPC are intensifying their splitting activities in international democratic organisations. Meeting with opposition, the Mao group in this case, too, resorts to the tactics of setting up puppet pro-Chinese centres. Organisations which are intended to supplant the World Federation of Research Workers, the International Organisation of Journalists and Writers of Asia and Africa and a number of others have already been set up.

The subversive activities of the ruling group of China and its agents hinder the progress of the communist movement and hamper the work of international democratic organisations.

The Mao group is trying to use the national-liberation movement as the basic means of realising its anti-Leninist programme.

One of the concepts embodied in Mao Tse-tung's "general line" amounts to the revision of the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the role and interaction of the main revolutionary forces of our time. In opposition to the published programme of the world communist movement, Mao has produced a thesis, according to which it is the national-liberation struggle in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which is in the centre of events in our time, and not the international working class and the world system of socialism. In keeping with this thesis it is declared that the main contradiction is between the "world city" and the "world village," between the "rich nations," among which the developed socialist countries are included together with the imperialist states, and the "poor countries", among which all underdeveloped countries are included, regardless of their regimes.

This concept is clearly anti-scientific and anti-Marxist. It substitutes a nationalistic and even racial approach to problems of modern social progress for the class approach, opposes the national-liberation movement to its natural ally—the international working class, discredits the idea of a non-capitalist mode of development, and, in reality, deprives the movement for national liberation of a socialist perspective. This opposing of the "world city" to the "world village," if it should be carried into practice, would lead to the isolation of the struggle waged by the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America and split up the three main currents of

the revolutionary stream of our time. The nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America would be left alone, face to face with a still powerful imperialism.

By putting forward the concept of "world city" and "world village," Mao and his group were far from being concerned with the development of the revolutionary process. This anti-Marxist concept is intended to serve Peking's plans of hegemony, to sabotage and destroy the militant alliance of the international proletariat with the national-liberation movement, to place this movement under its own control, and to turn the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America into a zone of Chinese influence.

All forms of relations of the present Chinese Government with the young national states (economic and military aid, propaganda, diplomatic ties and agreements, contacts with ruling parties and public organisations) are designed specifically to arouse in them mistrust of, and hostility towards, the USSR, the other socialist states, and the working class of Western Europe and the US. All this is being done in order to put into power in these countries such men who would obediently follow Peking's policies. Those states which rebuff the interference of Peking in their internal affairs and stop the activities of its agents and the dissemination of its propaganda material are subjected to malicious attacks.

The course of Mao's group is being used by imperialism and the reactionaries in their struggle against the progressive forces and for setting up reactionary political regimes. Peking is

openly encouraging the activities of extremist groups in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and takes upon itself the right to determine whether the regimes existing there are "progressive" or "reactionary." In doing this Peking uses a very "simple" criterion—the attitude towards the personality of Mao Tse-tung and his "ideas."

The Peking leaders ignore the practical socio-political problems facing the liberated countries, and are trying to push these states onto the adventurist road of military conflicts. This, in practice, draws these countries away from the main task in the anti-colonial struggle of our time, the winning of economic independence, thus weakening their positions in the struggle against imperialism. And when Chinese leaders consider it necessary to render economic aid, this aid is aimed at putting the countries of Africa and Asia under the CPR's influence.

The fallacy and bankruptcy of the political course of Mao's group in the countries of the "third world" are especially evident in the "hot spots" of our globe during periods of sharp international crises. Thus, during the events in the Middle East, the CPC leadership did all it could to drive a wedge between the Arab nations and the socialist countries. By calling for a "war to victory," it had practically expressed its complete indifference to the fate of the progressive regimes in the Arab countries and to the preservation of the socio-political gains of Arab nations.

Mao's thinking and his policy in respect to the national-liberation movement can only weaken the position of this movement.

Recent events show convincingly the fallacy of Mao Tse-tung's course in the international arena.

The fact that the Maoists were compelled in most cases to give up their attempts to place under their influence major detachments of the liberation and working class movement and to go over to open struggle against them is evidence of the collapse of Peking's plans for achieving hegemony.

The Maoists have failed to demoralise the socialist community. The Chinese leadership has failed to foist its fallacious principles on any socialist country except Albania.

The plans of Mao's group with respect to the communist movement have also come to naught. An absolute majority of Marxist-Leninist Parties has firmly condemned the great-power, anti-Soviet course of Mao's group and is rebuffing its provocative activities. The decision to hold a conference of Communist and Workers' Parties at the end of 1968 was a definite expression of the firm will of the Communist Parties to further consolidate their ranks and to work out plans for united action on the basis of their collective experience and an analysis of the complex process going on in the world today. The puppet groups and "parties" created with Peking's support proved to be completely incapable of winning influence over the masses of working people. They are being corroded more and more by factional strife and in many cases are vanishing from the political scene.

The Mao group has failed to make the national-liberation movement a trump-card in its political game in the international arena. Its cru-

de interference in the internal affairs of countries which have won political independence. its unbridled propaganda against progressive regimes which do not wish to follow Chinese policies, its desire to impose everywhere the ideas and methods of the "cultural revolution" and the cult of Mao Tse-tung as the "leader of all the nations" are in fact producing the opposite effect—many of the developing countries are now reconsidering their attitude towards Peking.

In 1966-67 India, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal and Cambodia were swept by a new wave of demonstrations against the subversive activities of the Mao group in those countries and against the attempts made to put the Chinese emigres—money-lenders and tradesmen—who were ruthlessly exploiting the local population, into a special, privileged position. The Mao group is using the top stratum of the numerous Chinese emigres to pump capital out of those countries to meet the needs of its own chauvinistic policy. China's relations with a number of other countries in Asia and with many African countries have also deteriorated.

The Communist Parties and the revolutionary-democratic forces of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are attentively following the evolution of Chinese policy in respect to these continents. They are learning important lessons from the defeats suffered by some detachments of the revolutionary liberation movement (in Indonesia, Malaya and Thailand) which followed the ideological theses and political course of the Mao Tse-tung group.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to

underestimate the danger of the hostile activities of the Mao Tse-tung group against the forces of revolution. This danger lies, above all, in the fact that these activities are being backed up by the resources of one of the biggest states in the world and that the ruling group is utilising the economic, military and manpower potential of a country with a large population.

We need to evaluate carefully the events in China and to draw the right conclusions. This is important for the communist movement, particularly for its detachments operating in the developing countries.

In our time, when the ideas of socialism are spreading triumphantly throughout the world, the many-million-strong non-proletarian strata of the population are being drawn into the revolutionary process. Though natural and positive, this phenomenon, nevertheless, tends to complicate the revolutionary process, since the non-proletarian strata of the population bring with them their own concepts of what a just society should be like and of the ways of achieving it. Since the petty-bourgeois masses possess gigantic numerical superiority, these concepts can, under certain conditions, deform proletarian ideology, introduce elements alien to it, and distort the scientific ideal of socialism. Petty-bourgeois ideological trends such as Maoism also tend to penetrate the Communist Parties.

The events in China show how petty-bourgeois prejudices could lead to erroneous and dangerous trends, unless a firm struggle is waged for the purity of proletarian ideology. Mao's concepts of the aims of socialism and the me-

ans of achieving them are anti-scientific and inimical to Marxism-Leninism. His articles and speeches contain no clear exposition or analysis of these problems. However, the slogans and policies of Mao adequately express his social "ideals."

Society, built along the lines of Mao's recipe, would look something like this. In the field of *economics*: labour organised along army models (labour battalions, regiments, etc.), in fact, slave labour; consumption limited to the very basic needs; concentration of all means for building up the military might of the state in the interests of a great-power foreign policy. In the field of *social relations*: administrative-compulsory levelling out of classes and reducing the human personality to a mere cog in the state machine. In the field of *ideological life*: rejection of all the wealth of national and world culture, making "Mao's ideas" the only spiritual food of the nation; idealisation of self-denial and rejection of natural human needs and emotions. In the *political* field: complete liquidation of democratic institutions, dictatorial regime of personal power, and complete disregard for legality of any form or constitutional rights.

Mao's group regards as the basic principles of scientific socialism "revisionism," "economism" and "bourgeois liberalism." It calls all who strive towards raising the living standard of the working people "counter-revolutionaries" and accuses them of attempting to restore capitalism.

Mao Tse-tung distorts in equal measure both the ideal of socialism and the ways and means

of achieving it. Contrary to the Marxist-Leninist concept of the variety of forms and methods of revolutionary struggle, Mao has advanced the thesis that the sole effective means is armed struggle ("a rifle breeds power"). Contrary to the Marxist-Leninist concept of socialist construction being the outcome of the conscious creative endeavour of the masses, led by the Party of Communists, Mao stakes on military and administrative methods. In words—"a big democracy," but in deed—arbitrariness and terrorism; in words—"the line of the masses," but in deed—arbitrary rule and despotism of a narrow group of rulers.

Maoist ideas on the advancement of the world revolutionary process, which Peking is trying to foist on the liberation movement, are likewise permeated with the same cult of violence. These include export of revolution, complete ignoring of the objective conditions, and the banking on world war as a means of achieving progress, even if this means the death of half of mankind.

The failures of Maoist policies both inside the country and in the international arena show that they are completely inadequate as an ideological basis for the revolutionary struggle for socialism.

In present-day conditions nationalism constitutes a grave danger for the communist and the entire revolutionary movement. The danger of nationalism is especially great for those countries, which are moving towards socialism, bypassing the stage of a developed capitalist society and lacking a steeled proletariat in their revolutionary ranks. Lenin stressed that the task

of a Communist Party in an economically backward and previously oppressed country, is not only to promote most effectively the formation and development of a working class, but also to link the working class and all the working people of the country with the world working class, "to join in the common struggle waged by proletarians of other countries." Strict observance of the principles of proletarian internationalism and close, constant ties with the world working class movement, tend to compensate the relative weakness of small numbers of the country's own proletariat.

Today, when a world socialist system exists, this link with the world working class is maintained chiefly through economic, political, and ideological cooperation with the socialist states. The successful building of socialism, especially in countries where the relevant material preconditions have not yet taken shape, is made possible precisely by the support of the world system of socialism, the utilisation of its experience, and because of the ideological influence of the world communist and working class movement.

The events in China show that the departure from the principles of proletarian internationalism and the abandonment of all-round cooperation with the socialist community and the world working class movement can cause tremendous damage to the national interests of a country and lead inevitably to the deformation of the people's system.

The events in China have once again shown that progress along the socialist road is possible only on the basis of the systematic realisa-

tion of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the theory of scientific communism.

The fraternal parties of the socialist countries are consistently implementing the principles of Marxism-Leninism. They are working towards the all-round development of the productive forces; towards raising the living standard of the people, and towards the development of socialist democracy, thereby increasing the magnetic power of socialism. They base their efforts on the thesis contained in the "Communist Manifesto," namely, that communism is a society wherein the all-round free development of each individual is the condition for the development of all.

Only the return of China to the road indicated by the Marxist-Leninist theory and tested by the experience of world socialism and the experience of the first years of the Chinese People's Republic itself, recorded in the documents of the 8th Congress of CPC, will open up the prospect of building a socialist society in China.

The "cultural revolution," and the crushing of Party organisations and the organs of people's power were possible only because for many years the cult of Mao Tse-tung's personality has been instituted in China, the principles of collective leadership were trampled upon, and the tasks of developing socialist democracy and strengthening legality, law and order were ignored. Mao, after shaking off the control of the Party and the collective leading bodies, has virtually placed himself above them and has been able to resolve any questions arbitrarily and to impose his own political line on the country.

The activities of Mao Tse-tung and his group show that the personality cult and the rejection of inner-Party democracy undermine the leading role of the Party and threaten its very existence.

From being a deviation within the communist movement, Maoism has developed into a nationalistic trend, openly hostile to scientific socialism and the world communist movement. The chief danger of this trend lies in the fact that the Maoists covering up their activities with "leftist" phraseology and picturing their ideology as the "acme of Marxism-Leninism of our time," are attempting to destroy the communist movement from within.

The firm Marxist-Leninist position of the overwhelming majority of fraternal parties, their strict observance of the principles of proletarian internationalism and their consistent struggle for the consolidation of the revolutionary, progressive forces, help to unmask the ideology and policies of the Mao Tse-tung group and to isolate it from the ranks of the world communist movement.

* * *

Abiding by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will maintain its policy of friendship and international solidarity with the Communist Party of China and with the Chinese People's Republic.

While resolutely rebuffing the anti-Leninist course pursued by the Mao Tse-tung group and taking the necessary measures to frustrate provocations on its part, our Party at the same time stands for normalisation of state relations with the CPR, development of economic and other cooperation and for the implementation of joint action in defence of the heroic people of Vietnam and in the struggle against imperialism.

The struggle against the Mao Tse-tung group is a struggle for restoring friendship and cooperation with CPC based on Marxist-Leninist

principles, for the return of the Chinese Communist Party to the position of scientific socialism. It constitutes a realistic internationalist aid to those forces within China which remain loyal to Marxism-Leninism and oppose Maoism.

Корни нынешних событий в Китае

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