




LENIN





WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

10



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VOLUME

10

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PREFACE

Volume Ten contains works by V. I. Lenin written between November 1905 and June 6 (19), 1906, during the period when he was active in St. Petersburg upon his return from exile abroad.

The articles "The Reorganisation of the Party", "The Armed Forces and the Revolution", "The Proletariat and the Peasantry", "The Dying Autocracy and New Organs of Popular Rule", etc., which were published in *Novaya Zhizn*, a legal Bolshevik newspaper, define the tasks of the Party during the first Russian revolution.

The pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party* and the articles written by Lenin after the defeat of the armed uprising in December 1905 sum up and generalise the experience of the first year of the revolution.

In his *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*, Lenin sets forth and substantiates the Bolshevik agrarian programme for confiscation of the landed estates and for nationalisation of all the land.

Considerable space is taken up in this volume by works dealing with the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party: "A Tactical Platform for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", speeches and statements made at the Congress, and the "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P."

This volume also contains "Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies", an article included in Lenin's *Collected Works* for the first time. In it Lenin appraises the Soviets as organs of insurrection and as the rudiments of a new, revolutionary power.

Other documents included in the present edition for the first time are various statements made by Lenin at the

Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.: Statement in Support of Muratov's (Morozov's) Amendment Concerning a Parliamentary Social-Democratic Group; Resolution on the Accountability of the Credentials Committee to the Congress; Statement on the Necessity of the Congress Approving the Minutes; Written Statement at the Seventeenth Session of the Congress; Written Statement at the Twenty-First Session of the Congress; Speeches and Statements at the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (February and March 1906). Published for the first time in the *Collected Works* are the articles "Resolution and Revolution" and "They Won't Even Bargain!", which appeared in *Volna*, a legal Bolshevik newspaper, in 1906. Both articles are directed against the Cadets.

В. И. Ленин
 Рабочий и Крестьянский
 Совет

1

Намеждение к Съезду Рабочих
 и Крестьянских
 Депутатов

(Начало к речи)

Товарищи! Совет и съезд
 «рабочих и крестьянских
 депутатов» — это органы
 власти и управления
 народа. И только в
 них может быть осуществлена
 программа партии, то есть
 программа революции. И
 только в них может быть
 осуществлена программа
 партии, то есть программа
 революции. И только в них
 может быть осуществлена
 программа партии, то есть
 программа революции.

First page of Lenin's manuscript
 "Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies",
 November 1905

Reduced

**OUR TASKS
AND THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES**
A LETTER TO THE EDITOR¹

Written on November 2-4 (15-17),
1905

First published on November 5, 1940,
in *Pravda*, No. 308

Published according to
the manuscript

Comrades, the question of the significance and role of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is now immediately facing the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats and the entire proletariat of the capital. I take up my pen to set out certain ideas on this burning issue; but before doing so, I consider it absolutely necessary to make a most important reservation. I am speaking as an *onlooker*. I still have to write from that accursed "afar", from the hateful "abroad" of an exile. And it is all but impossible for anyone to form a correct opinion of this concrete, practical matter if he has not been in St. Petersburg, if he has never seen the Soviet of Workers' Deputies or exchanged views with comrades on the spot. Therefore I leave it to the discretion of the editorial board to publish or not to publish this letter, written by an uninformed person. I reserve the right to revise my opinion when I have at last had an opportunity of acquainting myself with the matter from something more than "paper" information.

And now to get down to business. It seems to me that Comrade Radin is wrong in raising the question, in No. 5 of *Novaya Zhizn*² (I have seen only five issues of the virtual Central Organ of our R.S.D.L.P.): the Soviet of Workers' Deputies or the Party? I think that it is wrong to put the question in this way and that the decision must *certainly* be: *both* the Soviet of Workers' Deputies *and* the Party. The only question—and a highly important one—is how to divide, and how to combine, the tasks of the Soviet and those of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

I think it would be inadvisable for the Soviet to adhere wholly to any one party. As this opinion will probably surprise the reader, I shall proceed straightway to explain my views (stating again and most emphatically that it is the opinion of an onlooker).

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies came into being through the general strike, in connection with the strike, and for its aims. Who led the strike and brought it to a victorious close? The *whole* proletariat, which includes non-Social-Democrats—fortunately a minority. What were the aims of the strike? They were both economic and political. The economic aims concerned the *whole* proletariat, all workers, and partly even all working people, not the wage-workers alone. The political aims concerned all the people, or rather all the peoples, of Russia. These aims were to free all the peoples of Russia from the yoke of the autocracy, survivals of serfdom, a rightless status, and police tyranny.

Let us go further. Should the proletariat continue its economic struggle? By all means; there is no disagreement over this point among Social-Democrats, nor could there be any. Should this struggle be conducted only by the Social-Democrats or only under the Social-Democratic banner? I do not think so; I still hold the view I have expressed (in entirely different, now outdated conditions, it is true) in *What Is To Be Done?*, namely, that it is inadvisable to limit the composition of the trade unions, and hence of those taking part in the trade union, economic struggle, to members of the Social-Democratic Party.* It seems to me that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, as an organisation representing all occupations, should *strive* to include deputies from *all* industrial, professional and office workers, domestic servants, farm labourers, etc., from *all* who want and are able to fight in common for a better life for the whole working people, from *all* who have at least an elementary degree of political honesty, from all but the Black Hundreds. As for us Social-Democrats, we shall do our best, first, to have all our Party organisations represented on all trade unions as fully as possible and, secondly, to use the struggle we are waging jointly with our fellow-proletarians, irrespective of their views, for the tireless, steadfast advocacy of the *only* consistent, the only truly proletarian world outlook, *Marxism*. To propagate it, to carry on this propaganda and agitation work, we shall by all means preserve, strengthen and expand our com-

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 451-67.—*Ed.*

pletely independent, consistently principled class party of the class-conscious proletariat, i.e., the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Every step in the proletarian struggle, if inseparably linked with our Social-Democratic, methodical and organised, activities, will bring the *masses* of the working class in Russia and the Social-Democrats ever closer together.

This aspect of the problem, concerning the economic struggle, is comparatively simple and hardly gives rise to any particular disagreement. But the other aspect, concerning political leadership and the political struggle, is a different matter. And yet, at the risk of surprising the reader still more, I must say here and now that in this respect, too, I think it inadvisable to demand that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should accept the Social-Democratic programme and join the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. It seems to me that to lead the political struggle, *both* the Soviet (*reorganised* in a sense to be discussed forthwith) *and* the Party are, to an equal degree, absolutely necessary.

I may be wrong, but I believe (on the strength of the incomplete and only "paper" information at my disposal) that politically the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should be regarded as the embryo of a *provisional revolutionary government*. I think the Soviet should proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government of the whole of Russia as early as possible, or should *set up* a provisional revolutionary government (which would amount to the same thing, only in another form).

The political struggle has just reached a stage of development where the forces of revolution and counter-revolution are roughly equal and where the tsar's government is *already* powerless to suppress the revolution, while the revolution is not *yet* strong enough to sweep away the Black-Hundred government. The decay of the tsar's government is complete. But even as it rots alive, it is contaminating Russia with the poison of its putrefaction. It is absolutely necessary, in contrast to the decay of the tsarist, counter-revolutionary forces, to *organise* the revolutionary forces at once, immediately, without the slightest delay. This organisation has been making splendid progress, particular-

ly of late. This is evident from the formation of contingents of a revolutionary army (defence squads, etc.), the rapid development of Social-Democratic mass organisations of the proletariat, the establishment of peasants' committees by the revolutionary peasantry, and the first free meetings of our proletarian brothers in sailor's or soldier's uniform, who are paving for themselves a strenuous and difficult but true and bright way to freedom and to socialism.

What is lacking now is the unification of all the genuinely revolutionary forces, of all the forces that are already operating in revolutionary fashion. What is lacking is an all-Russian political centre, a fresh, living centre that is strong because it has struck deep roots in the people, a centre that enjoys the absolute confidence of the masses, that possesses tireless revolutionary energy and is closely linked with the organised revolutionary and socialist parties. Such a centre can be established only by the revolutionary proletariat, which has brilliantly carried through a political strike, which is now organising an armed uprising of the whole people, and which has won half freedom for Russia and will yet win full freedom for her.

The question may be asked: Why cannot the Soviet of Workers' Deputies become the embryo of such a centre? Is it because there are not only Social-Democrats in the Soviet? But this is an advantage, not a disadvantage. We have been speaking all the time of the need of a militant alliance of Social-Democrats and revolutionary bourgeois democrats. We have been speaking of it, and the workers have actually done it. It is splendid that they have done it. When I read in *Novaya Zhizn* a letter from *worker comrades* who belong to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party,³ and who protest against the Soviet being included in one of the parties, I could not help thinking that those worker-comrades were right in many practical respects. It goes without saying that our views differ from theirs, and that a merger of Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries is out of the question, but then there is no suggestion of it. We are deeply convinced that those workers who share Socialist-Revolutionary views and yet are fighting within the ranks of the proletariat are inconsistent, for they retain non-proletarian views while championing a truly proletarian cause. Their incon-

sistency we must combat, from the ideological point of view, with the greatest determination, but in so doing we must see to it that the revolutionary cause, a vital, burning, living cause that is recognised by all and has brought all honest people together, does not suffer. We still consider the views of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to be revolutionary-democratic and not socialist. But for the sake of our militant aims, we must march together while fully retaining Party independence, and the Soviet is, and must be, a militant organisation. To expel devoted and honest revolutionary democrats at a time when we are carrying out a democratic revolution would be absurd, it would be folly. We shall have no difficulty in overcoming their inconsistency, for our views are supported by history itself, are supported at every step by reality. If our pamphlet has not taught them Social-Democracy, our revolution will. To be sure, those workers who remain Christians, who believe in God, and those intellectuals who defend mysticism (fie upon them!), are inconsistent too; but we shall not expel them from the Soviet or even from the Party, for it is our firm conviction that the actual struggle, and work within the ranks, will convince all elements possessing vitality that Marxism is the truth, and will cast aside all those who lack vitality. And we do not for one moment doubt our strength, the overwhelming strength of Marxists, in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

To my mind, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, as a revolutionary centre providing political leadership, is not too broad an organisation but, on the contrary, a much too narrow one. The Soviet must proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government, or form such a government, and must by all means enlist to this end the participation of new deputies not only from the workers, but, first of all, from the sailors and soldiers, who are everywhere seeking freedom; secondly, from the revolutionary peasantry, and thirdly, from the revolutionary bourgeois intelligentsia. The Soviet must select a strong nucleus for the provisional revolutionary government and reinforce it with representatives of all revolutionary parties and all revolutionary (but, of course, only revolutionary and not liberal) democrats. We are not afraid of so broad and mixed a composi-

tion—indeed, we want it, for unless the proletariat and the peasantry unite and unless the Social-Democrats and revolutionary democrats form a fighting alliance, the great Russian revolution cannot be fully successful. It will be a temporary alliance that is to fulfil clearly defined immediate practical tasks, while the more important interests of the socialist proletariat, its fundamental interests and ultimate goals, will be steadfastly upheld by the independent and consistently principled Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

The objection may be raised that if the composition is broad and mixed, it will be hardly possible to establish a centre solid and united enough to exercise practical leadership. I shall answer that with a question: What are the lessons of the October revolution?⁴ Did not the strike committee prove *in fact* to be the generally recognised centre, the real government? And would not that committee readily admit into its ranks representatives of that section of the unions and of the “Union of Unions”⁵ which is really revolutionary and really supports the proletariat in its relentless struggle for freedom? The essential thing is that the main, purely proletarian body of the provisional revolutionary government should be strong and that for, say, hundreds of workers, sailors, soldiers and peasants there should be dozens of deputies from the unions of the revolutionary intelligentsia. I believe the proletarians will soon be able in practice to establish the proper ratio.

The objection may be raised that it is hardly possible to advance for such a government a programme complete enough to ensure victory for the revolution and broad enough to make possible a fighting alliance free from all reservations, vagueness, reticence or hypocrisy. I shall answer: such a programme has already been advanced in full by reality. It is already recognised in principle by all the politically-conscious elements of absolutely all the classes and sections of the population, including even Orthodox priests. The complete realisation of political freedom, which the tsar has promised so hypocritically, should come first in this programme. The repeal of all legislation restricting freedom of speech, conscience, assembly, the press, association and strikes, and the abolition of all institutions

limiting these liberties, should be immediate and real, they should be guaranteed and actually put into practice. The programme should provide for the convocation of a national constituent assembly that would enjoy the support of a free and armed people and have full authority and strength to establish a new order in Russia. It should provide for the arming of the people. The necessity of arming the people is realised by all. What remains to be done is to complete and unify the work already begun and being carried on everywhere. The programme of the provisional revolutionary government should also provide for the immediate granting of real and full freedom to the nationalities oppressed by the tsarist monster. A free Russia has been born. The proletariat is at its post. It will not allow heroic Poland to be crushed again. It will itself go into action; it will fight both for a free Russia and a free Poland, not only by peaceful strikes, but by force of arms as well. The programme should provide for the eight-hour working day, which the workers are already "seizing", and for other urgent measures to curb capitalist exploitation. Lastly, the programme must necessarily include transfer of all the land to the peasants, support for every revolutionary measure that the peasantry is carrying out to take away all the land (without, of course, supporting the illusion of "equalised" small land tenure), and the establishment everywhere of revolutionary peasants' committees, which have already begun to take shape spontaneously.

Who but the Black Hundreds and the Black-Hundred government will deny today the pressing character and practical indispensability of this programme? In fact, even bourgeois liberals are willing to accept it in theory! As for us, we must put it into practice with the help of the forces of the revolutionary people; to do this, we must unite those forces as speedily as possible through the proletariat proclaiming a provisional revolutionary government. True, only an armed uprising can really form the basis of such a government. But the projected government will in fact be the *organ* of this growing and already maturing uprising. The formation of a revolutionary government could not be initiated in practice until the insurrection had assumed proportions evident to all, proportions that were, so to

speaking, tangible to all. But now is the time to unify this uprising politically, to organise it, to give it a clear-cut programme, to turn all the contingents of the revolutionary army, which are already numerous and are growing fast in strength, into the mainstay and into instruments of this new, truly free and truly popular government. The struggle is imminent, the uprising inevitable, and the decisive battle close at hand. It is time to issue a direct challenge, to set the organised power of the proletariat against the decaying tsarist regime, to address to the whole people a manifesto on behalf of the provisional revolutionary government constituted by the foremost workers.

It is now obvious to us that among the revolutionary people there can be found persons capable of accomplishing this great task, persons thoroughly devoted to the revolution, and more important still, persons of tireless, inexhaustible energy. It is now obvious to us that there exist the elements of a revolutionary army, which will back this cause, and that all who are fair-minded and alert and politically-conscious in every class of the population will turn away completely from tsarism when the new government declares a decisive war on the dying semi-feudal, police state of Russia.

Citizens—it would be proper to say in that declaration of war, in that manifesto of the revolutionary government—citizens, make your choice! There we have the whole of old Russia, all the sinister forces of exploitation, oppression, and violence against man. And here we have a union of free citizens who have equal rights in all affairs of the state. There we have a union of exploiters, of the wealthy, of policemen. And here we have a union of all working people, of all the vital forces of the people, of all fair-minded intellectuals. There we have the Black Hundreds, here we have the organised workers fighting for freedom, for education, for socialism.

Make your choice, citizens! Here is our programme, which has long since been put forward by the whole people. These are our aims in the name of which we declare war on the Black-Hundred government. We are not trying to impose on the people any innovations thought up by us, we are merely taking the initiative in bringing about that without

which it is impossible to live in Russia any longer, as is acknowledged generally and unanimously. We do not shut ourselves off from the revolutionary people but submit to their judgement every step and every decision we take. We rely fully and solely on the free initiative of the working masses themselves. We unite absolutely all revolutionary parties, and we call into our ranks deputies from every group of the population that is willing to fight for freedom, for our programme, which guarantees the elementary rights and meets the elementary needs of the people. In particular, we hold out our hand to our worker comrades in soldier's uniform and to our peasant brothers, so that we may fight together to the end against the yoke of the landlords and the bureaucrats, for land and freedom.

Prepare for the decisive struggle, citizens! We will not allow the Black-Hundred government to use violence against Russia. We will not be deluded by the replacement of a few bureaucrats or by the resignation of a few police officers while the whole mass of Black-Hundred police retains the power to kill, plunder and commit outrages against the people. Let the liberal bourgeois stoop to pleading with that Black-Hundred government. The Black Hundreds laugh when anyone threatens them with trial in the very same old tsarist court by the very same old tsarist officials. We shall order our army units to arrest the Black-Hundred heroes who fuddle ignorant people with vodka and corrupt them; we shall commit all those monsters, such as the chief of police in Kronstadt, for public, revolutionary trial by the whole people.

Citizens, everyone but the Black Hundreds has turned away from the tsarist government. Rally, then, behind the revolutionary government, stop paying any duties or taxes, and bend all your energies to organise and arm a free people's militia force. Russia will have genuine freedom only insofar as the revolutionary people gain the upper hand over the forces of the Black-Hundred government. There are not, and cannot be, any neutrals in a civil war. The white-flag party is sheer cowardly hypocrisy. Whoever shies away from the struggle bolsters up Black-Hundred rule. Who is not for the revolution is against the revolution. Who is not a revolutionary is one of the Black Hundreds.

We undertake to rally and train forces for an uprising of the people. Let there not be a trace left of the institutions of tsarist power in Russia by the anniversary of that great day, the Ninth of January.⁶ May the spring holiday of the world proletariat find Russia already a free country, with a freely convened constituent assembly of the whole people!

That is how I visualise the development of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies into a provisional revolutionary government. And these first and foremost are the tasks that I would set all our Party organisations, all class-conscious workers, the Soviet itself, the workers' forthcoming congress in Moscow, and the congress of the Peasant Union.⁷

THE REORGANISATION OF THE PARTY⁸

I

The conditions in which our Party is functioning are changing radically. Freedom of assembly, of association and of the press has been captured. Of course, these rights are extremely precarious, and it would be folly, if not a crime, to pin our faith to the present liberties. The decisive struggle is yet to come, and preparations for this struggle must take first place. The secret apparatus of the Party must be maintained. But at the same time it is absolutely necessary to make the widest possible use of the present relatively wider scope for our activity. In addition to the secret apparatus, it is absolutely necessary to create many new legal and semi-legal Party organisations (and organisations associated with the Party). Unless we do this, it is unthinkable that we can adapt our activity to the new conditions or cope with the new problems.

In order to put the organisation on a new basis, a new Party congress is required. According to the Rules, the Party should meet in congress once a year, and the next congress should be held in May 1906; but now it is essential to bring it forward. If we do not seize this opportunity, we shall lose it—in the sense that the need for organisation which the workers are feeling so acutely will find its expression in distorted, dangerous forms, strengthen some “Independents”⁹ or other, etc. We must hasten to organise in a new way, we must submit new methods for general discussion, we must boldly and resolutely lay down a “new line”.

The appeal to the Party, published in this issue and signed by the Central Committee of our Party,¹⁰ lays down

that new line, I am profoundly convinced, quite correctly. We, the representatives of revolutionary Social-Democracy, the supporters of the "Majority", have repeatedly said that complete democratisation of the Party was impossible in conditions of secret work, and that in such conditions the "elective principle" was a mere phrase. And experience has confirmed our words. It has been repeatedly stated in print by former supporters of the Minority (see the pamphlet by "A Worker" with a preface by Axelrod, the letter signed "A Worker, One of Many", in *Iskra*¹¹ and in the pamphlet *Workers on the Party Split*) that in fact it has proved impossible to employ any real democratic methods and any real elective principle. But we Bolsheviki have always recognised that in new conditions, when political liberties were acquired, it would be essential to adopt the elective principle. The minutes of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. prove this most conclusively, if, indeed, any proof is required.

Thus the task is clear: to preserve the secret apparatus for the time being and to develop a new, legal apparatus. As applied to the Congress, this task (the concrete fulfilment of which demands, of course, practical ability and a knowledge of all the conditions of time and place) may be formulated as follows: to convene the Fourth Congress on the basis of the Party Rules and at the same time to begin immediately, at once, application of the elective principle. The Central Committee has solved this problem. Committee members, in form as representatives of fully authorised organisations, in fact as representatives of the Party's continuity, attend the Congress with the right to vote. Delegates elected by the *entire* Party membership, and consequently by the masses of the workers belonging to the Party, *are invited* by the Central Committee, in virtue of its right to do so, to attend the Congress with voice but no vote. The Central Committee has declared, furthermore, that it will at once propose to the Congress to change this consultative voice into the right to vote. Will the full delegates of the committees agree to this?

The Central Committee declares that in its opinion they will unquestionably agree to it. Personally, I am profoundly convinced of this. It is impossible not to agree to such a thing. It is inconceivable that the majority of the leaders

of the Social-Democratic proletariat will not agree to it. We are sure that the opinion of Party workers, most carefully registered by *Novaya Zhizn*, will very soon prove the correctness of our view; even if a struggle takes place over this step (to convert the consultative voice into the right to vote), the outcome is a foregone conclusion.

Look at this question from another angle—from the point of view of the substance of the matter, not of its form. Is Social-Democracy endangered by the realisation of the plan we propose?

Danger may be said to lie in a sudden influx of large numbers of non-Social-Democrats into the Party. If that occurred, the Party would be dissolved among the masses, it would cease to be the conscious vanguard of its class, its role would be reduced to that of a tail. That would mean a very deplorable period indeed. And this danger *could* undoubtedly become a *very serious* one *if* we showed any inclination towards demagogy, if we lacked party principles (programme, tactical rules, organisational experience) entirely, or if those principles were feeble and shaky. But the fact is that no such “ifs” exist. We Bolsheviks have never shown any inclination towards demagogy. On the contrary, we have always fought resolutely, openly and straightforwardly against the slightest attempts at demagogy; we have demanded class-consciousness from those joining the Party, we have insisted on the tremendous importance of continuity in the Party’s development, we have preached discipline and demanded that *every* Party member be trained in one or other of the Party organisations. We have a firmly established Party programme which is officially recognised by all Social-Democrats and the fundamental propositions of which have not given rise to any criticism (criticism of individual points and formulations is quite legitimate and necessary in any live party). We have resolutions on tactics which were consistently and systematically worked out at the Second and Third Congresses and in the course of many years’ work of the Social-Democratic press. We also have some organisational experience and an actual organisation, which has played an educational role and has undoubtedly borne fruit, a fact which may not be immediately apparent, but which can be denied only by the blind or by the blinded.

Let us not exaggerate this danger, comrades. Social-Democracy has established a name for itself, has created a trend and has built up cadres of Social-Democratic workers. And now that the heroic proletariat has proved by deeds its readiness to fight, and its ability to fight consistently and in a body for clearly-understood aims, to fight in a purely Social-Democratic spirit, it would be simply ridiculous to doubt that the workers who belong to our Party, or who will join it tomorrow at the invitation of the Central Committee, will be Social-Democrats in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. The working class is instinctively, spontaneously Social-Democratic, and more than ten years of work put in by Social-Democracy has done a great deal to transform this spontaneity into consciousness. Don't invent bugaboos, comrades! Don't forget that in every live and growing party there will always be elements of instability, vacillation, wavering. But these elements can be influenced, and they will submit to the influence of the steadfast and solid core of Social-Democrats.

Our Party has stagnated while working underground. As a delegate to the Third Congress rightly said, it has been suffocating underground during the last few years. The "underground" is breaking up. Forward, then, more boldly; take up the new weapon, distribute it among new people, extend your bases, rally all the worker Social-Democrats round yourselves, incorporate them in the ranks of the Party organisations by hundreds and thousands. Let their delegates put new life into the ranks of our central bodies, let the fresh spirit of young revolutionary Russia pour in through them. So far the revolution has justified all the basic theoretical propositions of Marxism, all the essential slogans of Social-Democracy. And the revolution has also justified the work done by us Social-Democrats, it has justified our hope and faith in the truly revolutionary spirit of the proletariat. Let us, then, abandon all pettiness in this imperative Party reform; let us strike out on the new path at once. This will not deprive us of our old secret apparatus (there is no doubt that the Social-Democratic workers have recognised and sanctioned it; practical experience and the course of the revolution have proved this a hundred times more convincingly than it could have been proved by

decisions and resolutions). It will give us fresh young forces rising from the very depths of the only genuinely and thoroughly revolutionary class, the class which has won half freedom for Russia and will win full freedom for her, the class which will lead her through freedom to socialism!

II

The decision of the Central Committee of our Party to convene the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 9, is a decisive step towards the full application of the democratic principle in Party organisation. The election of delegates to the Congress (who will come there first with the right to a voice but no vote and will then, undoubtedly receive the right to vote) must be carried through within a month. All Party organisations must, therefore, begin as soon as possible to discuss candidates and the tasks of the Congress. It is unquestionably necessary to reckon with the possibility of the dying autocracy making fresh attempts to withdraw the promised liberties and to attack the revolutionary workers, above all their leaders. Therefore it would hardly be advisable (except perhaps in special cases) to publish the real names of delegates. The assumed names to which the epoch of political slavery has accustomed us must not be discarded so long as the Black Hundreds are in power, nor would it be amiss to elect, as of old, alternates, in case of arrests. However, we shall not dwell on all these precautions of secrecy, since comrades acquainted with the local conditions of work will easily overcome all the difficulties that may arise in this respect. Comrades who have ample experience in revolutionary work under the autocracy must help by their counsel all those who are starting Social-Democratic work in the new and "free" conditions (free in inverted commas, for the time being). It goes without saying that in doing so our committee members must show great tact: previous formal prerogatives inevitably lose their significance at the present time, and it will be necessary in very many cases to start "from the beginning", to *prove* to large sections of new Party comrades the importance of a consistent Social-Democratic programme, Social-Democratic tactics and organisation. We must not

forget that so far we have had to deal too often only with revolutionaries coming from a particular social stratum, whereas now we shall have to deal with typical representatives of the masses. This change calls for a change not only in the methods of propaganda and agitation (a more popular style, ability to present a question, to explain the basic truths of socialism in the simplest, clearest and most convincing manner), but also in organisation.

In this article I should like to dwell on one aspect of the new tasks in organisation. The Central Committee decision invites *all* Party organisations to send delegates to the Congress and calls upon *all* worker Social-Democrats to join such organisations. If this excellent desire is to be really fulfilled, a mere "invitation" to the workers will not do, nor will it do merely to increase the number of organisations of the old type. For this purpose, it is necessary for all comrades to devise *new* forms of organisation by their independent, creative joint efforts. It is impossible to lay down any predetermined standards for this, for we are working in an entirely new field: a knowledge of local conditions, and above all the initiative of *all* Party members must be brought into play. The new form of organisation, or rather the new form of the basic organisational nucleus of the workers' party, must be definitely much broader than were the old circles. Apart from this, the new nucleus will most likely have to be a less rigid, more "free", more "loose" (*lose*) organisation. With complete freedom of association and civil liberties for the people, we should, of course, have to found Social-Democratic unions (not only trade unions, but political and Party unions) everywhere. In the present conditions we must strive to approach that goal by all ways and means at our disposal.

We must immediately arouse the initiative of all Party functionaries and of all workers who sympathise with Social-Democracy. We must arrange at once, everywhere, lectures, talks, meetings, open-air rallies at which the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. should be announced, the tasks of the Congress explained in the most popular and comprehensible way, the new form of organisation of the Congress pointed out, and an appeal made to all Social-Democrats to take part in building up a genuinely proletarian Social-Democratic

Party on new lines. Such work will supply us with a wealth of information based on experience; it will, in the course of two or three weeks (if we act energetically), produce new Social-Democratic forces from among the workers, and revive among far wider sections an interest in the Social-Democratic Party, which we have now decided to reconstruct on new lines jointly with all the worker comrades. At all meetings the question will immediately be raised about the founding of unions, organisations, Party groups. Each union, organisation or group will immediately elect its bureau, or board, or directing committee—in a word, a central standing body which will conduct the affairs of the organisation, maintaining relations with local Party institutions, receive and circulate Party literature, collect subscriptions for Party work, arrange meetings and lectures, and, finally, prepare the election of a delegate to the Party Congress. The Party committees will, of course, take care to help each such organisation, to supply it with material explaining what the R.S.D.L.P. stands for, its history and its present great tasks.

It is high time, furthermore, to take steps to establish local economic strong points, so to speak, for the workers' Social-Democratic organisations—in the form of restaurants, tea-rooms, beer-halls, libraries, reading-rooms, shooting galleries,* etc., etc., maintained by Party members. We must not forget that, apart from being persecuted by the "autocratic" police, the Social-Democratic workers will also be persecuted by their "autocratic" employers, who will dismiss agitators. Therefore it is highly important to organ-

* I do not know the Russian equivalent of *tir* [Lenin uses the French word.—*Tr.*], by which I mean a place for target practice, where there is a supply of all kinds of fire-arms and where anyone may for a small fee practise shooting at a target with a revolver or rifle. Freedom of assembly and association has been proclaimed in Russia. Citizens have the right to assemble and to learn how to shoot; this can present no danger to anyone. In any big European city you will find such shooting galleries open to all, situated in basements, sometimes outside the city, etc. And it is very far from useless for the workers to learn how to shoot and how to handle arms. Of course we shall be able to get down to this work seriously and on a large scale only when the freedom of association is guaranteed and we can bring to book the police scoundrels who dare to close such establishments.

ise bases which will be as independent as possible of the tyranny of the employers.

Generally speaking, we Social-Democrats must take every possible advantage of the present extension of freedom of action, and the more this freedom is guaranteed, the more energetically shall we advance the slogan: "Go among the people!" The initiative of the workers themselves will now display itself on a scale that we, the underground and circle workers of yesterday, did not even dare dream of. The influence of socialist ideas on the masses of the proletariat is now proceeding, and will continue to proceed along paths that we very often shall be altogether unable to trace. With due regard to these conditions, we shall have to distribute the Social-Democratic intelligentsia* in a more rational way to ensure that they do not hang about uselessly where the movement has already stood up on its own feet and can, so to speak, shift for itself, and that they go to the "lower strata" where the work is harder, where the conditions are more difficult, where the need for experienced and well-informed people is greater, where the sources of light are fewer, and where the heartbeat of political life is weaker. We must now "go among the people" both in anticipation of elections, in which the entire population, even of the remotest places, will take part, and (more important still) in anticipation of an open struggle—in order to paralyse the reactionary policies of a provincial Vendée,¹² to spread all over the country, among all the proletarian masses, the slogans issuing from the big centres.

To be sure, it is always bad to run to extremes: to organise the work on the most stable and "exemplary" lines possible, we shall even yet have often to concentrate our best forces in some important centre or other. Experience will show the proportion to be adhered to in this respect. Our task now is not so much to invent rules for organising

* At the Third Congress of the Party I suggested that there be about eight workers to every two intellectuals in the Party committees. (See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 408.—*Ed.*) How obsolete that suggestion seems today!

Now we must wish for the new Party organisations to have one Social-Democratic intellectual to several hundred Social-Democratic workers.

on new lines, as to develop the most far-reaching and courageous work which will enable us at the Fourth Congress to sum up and set down the data obtained from the experience of the Party.

III

In the first two sections we dealt with the general importance of the elective principle in the Party and the need for new organisational nuclei and forms of organisation. We shall now examine another extremely vital question, namely, the question of Party unity.

It is no secret to anyone that the vast majority of Social-Democratic workers are exceedingly dissatisfied with the split in the Party and are demanding unity. It is no secret to anyone that the split has caused a certain cooling-off among Social-Democratic workers (or workers ready to become Social-Democrats) towards the Social-Democratic Party.

The workers have lost almost all hope that the Party "chiefs" will unite of themselves. The need for unity was formally recognised both by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and by the Menshevik Conference held last May. Six months have passed since then, but the cause of unity has made hardly any progress. No wonder the workers are beginning to show signs of impatience. No wonder "A Worker, One of Many", who wrote on unity in *Iskra* and in a pamphlet published by the "Majority" (*Workers on the Party Split*, published by the Central Committee, Geneva, 1905), has at last threatened the Social-Democratic intelligentsia with a "fist from below". Some Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) did not like that threat at the time, others (Bolsheviks) thought it legitimate and, at bottom, fully justified.

It seems to me that the time has come when the *class-conscious* worker Social-Democrats can and must carry out their intention (I will not say "threat", because this word smacks of accusations, of demagogy, and we must do our utmost to avoid both). Indeed, the time has come, or, in any case, is coming, when the elective principle can be applied in the Party organisation not in words only, but in deeds, not as a fine-sounding but hollow phrase, but as a really new principle which really renovates, extends and strengthens Party ties. The "Majority" represented by the

Central Committee has directly appealed for the immediate application and introduction of the elective principle. The Minority is following in the same direction. And the Social-Democratic workers constitute the enormous, overwhelming majority in all the Social-Democratic organisations, committees, gatherings, meetings, etc.

Hence it is now possible not only to *urge* unity, not only to obtain *promises* to unite, but actually to *unite*—by a simple decision of the majority of organised workers in both factions. There will be no imposition, since, in principle, the need for unity has been recognised by all, and the workers have only to decide in practice a question that has already been decided in principle.

The relation between the functions of the intellectuals and of the proletariat (workers) in the Social-Democratic working-class movement can probably be expressed, with a fair degree of accuracy, by the following general formula: the intelligentsia is good at solving problems “in principle”, good at drawing up plans, good at reasoning about the need for action—while the workers act, and transform drab theory into living reality.

And I shall not in the slightest degree slip into demagogy, nor in the least belittle the great role played by consciousness in the working-class movement, nor shall I in any way detract from the tremendous importance of Marxist theory and Marxist principles, if I say now: both at the Congress and at the Conference we created the “drab theory” of Party unity. Comrade workers, help us to transform this drab theory into living reality! Join the Party organisations in huge numbers! Turn our Fourth Congress and the Second Menshevik Conference into a grand and imposing Congress of Social-Democratic workers. Join with us in settling this practical question of fusion; let this question be the exception (it is an exception that proves the opposite rule!) in which we shall have one-tenth theory and nine-tenths practice. Such a wish is surely legitimate, historically necessary, and psychologically comprehensible. We have “theorised” for so long (sometimes—why not admit it?—to no use) in the unhealthy atmosphere of political exile, that it will really not be amiss if we now “bend the bow” slightly, a little, just a little, “the other way” and put practice a

little more in the forefront. This would certainly be appropriate in regard to the question of unity, about which, owing to the causes of the split, we have used up such an awful lot of ink and no end of paper. We exiles in particular are longing for practical work. Besides, we have already written a very good and comprehensive programme of the whole democratic revolution. Let us, then, unite also to make this revolution!

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY¹³

The Congress of the Peasant Union now in session in Moscow once again raises the vital question of the attitude of Social-Democrats to the peasant movement. It has always been a vital question for Russian Marxists when determining their programme and tactics. In the very first draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democrats, printed abroad in 1884 by the Emancipation of Labour group,¹⁴ most serious attention was devoted to the peasant question.

Since then there has not been a single major Marxist work dealing with general questions, or a single Social-Democratic periodical, which has not repeated or developed Marxist views and slogans, or applied them to particular cases.

Today the question of the peasant movement has become vital not only in the theoretical but also in the most direct practical sense. We now have to transform our general slogans into direct appeals by the revolutionary proletariat to the revolutionary peasantry. The time has now come when the peasantry is coming forward as a conscious maker of a new way of life in Russia. And the course and outcome of the great Russian revolution depend in tremendous measure on the growth of the peasants' political consciousness.

What does the peasantry expect of the revolution? What can the revolution give the peasantry? Anyone active in the political sphere, and especially every class-conscious worker who goes in for politics, not in the sense vulgarised by bourgeois politicians, but in the best sense of the word, must answer these two questions.

The peasantry wants land and freedom. There can be no two opinions on this score. All class-conscious workers

support the revolutionary peasantry with all their might. All class-conscious workers want and are fighting for the peasantry to receive all the land and full freedom. "All the land" means not putting up with any partial concessions and hand-outs; it means reckoning, not on a compromise between the peasantry and the landlords, but on abolition of landed estates. And the party of the class-conscious proletariat, the Social-Democrats, have most vigorously proclaimed this view: at its Third Congress held last May, the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution directly declaring for support of the peasants' revolutionary demands, *including confiscation of all privately-owned estates*. This resolution clearly shows that the party of the class-conscious workers supports the peasants' demand for all the land. And in *this* respect the content of the resolution adopted at the conference of the other half of our Party fully coincides with that of the resolution passed by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

"Full freedom" means election of officials and other office-holders who administer public and state affairs. "Full freedom" means the complete abolition of a state administration that is not wholly and exclusively responsible to the people, that is not elected by, accountable to, and subject to recall by, the people. "Full freedom" means that it is not the people who should be subordinated to officials, but the officials who should be subordinated to the people.

Of course, not all peasants fighting for land and freedom are fully aware of what their struggle implies, and go so far as to demand a republic. But for all that, the democratic trend of the peasants' demands is beyond all doubt. Hence the peasantry can be certain that the proletariat will support these demands. The peasants must know that the red banner which has been raised in the towns is the banner of struggle for the immediate and vital demands, not only of the industrial and agricultural workers, but also of the millions and tens of millions of small tillers of the soil.

Survivals of serfdom in every possible shape and form are to this day a cruel burden on the whole mass of the peasantry, and the proletarians under their red banner have declared war on this burden.

But the red banner means more than proletarian support of the peasants' demands. It also means the independent demands of the proletariat. It means struggle, not only for land and freedom, but also against all exploitation of man by man, struggle against the poverty of the masses of the people, against the rule of capital. And it is here that we are faced with the second question: what can the revolution give the peasantry? Many sincere friends of the peasants (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, for instance, among them) ignore this question, do not realise its importance. They think it is sufficient to raise and settle the question of what the peasants want, to get the answer: land and freedom. This is a great mistake. Full freedom, election of all officials all the way to the head of the state, will not do away with the rule of capital, will not abolish the wealth of the few and the poverty of the masses. Complete abolition of private landownership, too, will not do away either with the rule of capital or with the poverty of the masses. Even on land belonging to the whole nation, only those with capital of their own, only those who have the implements, livestock, machines, stocks of seed, money in general, etc., will be able to farm independently. As for those who have nothing but their hands to work with, they will inevitably remain slaves of capital even in a democratic republic, even when the land belongs to the whole nation. The idea that "socialisation" of land can be effected without socialisation of capital, the idea that equalised land tenure is possible while capital and commodity economy exist, is a delusion. In nearly all countries of Europe, socialism has experienced periods when this or some similar delusions have been prevalent. The experience of working-class struggle in all countries has shown in practice how dangerous such an error is, and today the socialist proletarians of Europe and America have completely rid themselves of it.

Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might the peasants' struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism. The fight for socialism is a fight against the rule of capital. It is being carried on first and foremost by the

wage-workers, who are directly and wholly dependent on capital. As for the small farmers, some of them own capital themselves, and often themselves exploit workers. Hence not all small peasants join the ranks of fighters for socialism; only those do so who resolutely and consciously side with the workers against capital, with public property against private property.

That is why the Social-Democrats say they are fighting together with the entire peasantry against the landlords and officials, besides which they -- the town and village proletarians together -- are fighting against capital. The struggle for land and freedom is a democratic struggle. The struggle to abolish the rule of capital is a socialist struggle.

Let us, then, send our warm greetings to the Peasant Union, which has decided to stand together and fight staunchly, selflessly and unswervingly for full freedom and for all the land. These peasants are true democrats. We must explain to them patiently and steadily where their views on the tasks of democracy and socialism are wrong, regarding them as allies with whom we are united by the great common struggle. These peasants are truly revolutionary democrats with whom we must and shall carry on the fight for the complete victory of the present revolution. We are fully in sympathy with the plan to call a general strike and the decision to rise together the next time, with the town workers and all the peasant poor acting in unison. All class-conscious workers will make every effort to help carry out this plan. Yet no alliance, even with the most honest and determined revolutionary democrats, will ever make the proletarians forget their still greater and more important goal, the fight for socialism, for the complete abolition of the rule of capital, for the emancipation of all working people from every kind of exploitation. Forward, workers and peasants, in the common struggle for land and freedom! Forward, proletarians, united by international Social-Democracy, in the fight for socialism!

PARTY ORGANISATION AND PARTY LITERATURE

The new conditions for Social-Democratic work in Russia which have arisen since the October revolution have brought the question of party literature to the fore. The distinction between the illegal and the legal press, that melancholy heritage of the epoch of feudal autocratic Russia, is beginning to disappear. It is not yet dead, by a long way. The hypocritical government of our Prime Minister is still running amuck, so much so that *Izvestia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov*¹⁵ is printed "illegally"; but apart from bringing disgrace on the government, apart from striking further moral blows at it, nothing comes of the stupid attempts to "prohibit" that which the government is powerless to thwart.

So long as there was a distinction between the illegal and the legal press, the question of the party and non-party press was decided extremely simply and in an extremely false and abnormal way. The entire illegal press was a party press, being published by organisations and run by groups which in one way or another were linked with groups of practical party workers. The entire legal press was non-party—since parties were banned—but it "gravitated" towards one party or another. Unnatural alliances, strange "bed-fellows" and false cover-devices were inevitable. The forced reserve of those who wished to express party views merged with the immature thinking or mental cowardice of those who had not risen to these views and who were not, in effect, party people.

An accursed period of Aesopian language, literary bondage, slavish speech, and ideological serfdom! The proletariat has put an end to this foul atmosphere which stifled every-

thing living and fresh in Russia. But so far the proletariat has won only half freedom for Russia.

The revolution is not yet completed. While tsarism is *no longer* strong enough to defeat the revolution, the revolution is *not yet* strong enough to defeat tsarism. And we are living in times when everywhere and in everything there operates this unnatural combination of open, forthright, direct and consistent party spirit with an underground, covert, "diplomatic" and dodgy "legality". This unnatural combination makes itself felt even in our newspaper: for all Mr. Guchkov's¹⁶ witticisms about Social-Democratic tyranny forbidding the publication of moderate liberal-bourgeois newspapers, the fact remains that *Proletary*,¹⁷ the Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, still remains outside the locked doors of *autocratic*, police-ridden Russia.

Be that as it may, the half-way revolution compels all of us to set to work at once organising the whole thing on new lines. Today literature, even that published "legally", can be nine-tenths party literature. It must become party literature in contradistinction to bourgeois customs, to the profit-making, commercialised bourgeois press, to bourgeois literary careerism and individualism, "aristocratic anarchism" and drive for profit, the socialist proletariat must put forward the principle of *party literature*, must develop this principle and put it into practice as fully and completely as possible.

What is this principle of party literature? It is not simply that, for the socialist proletariat, literature cannot be a means of enriching individuals or groups: it cannot, in fact, be an individual undertaking, independent of the common cause of the proletariat. Down with non-partisan writers! Down with literary supermen! Literature must become *part* of the common cause of the proletariat, "a cog and a screw" of one single great Social-Democratic mechanism set in motion by the entire politically-conscious vanguard of the entire working class. Literature must become a component of organised, planned and integrated Social-Democratic Party work.

"All comparisons are lame," says a German proverb. So is my comparison of literature with a cog, of a living move-

ment with a mechanism. And I daresay there will even be hysterical intellectuals to raise a howl about such a comparison, which degrades, deadens, "bureaucratizes" the free battle of ideas, freedom of criticism, freedom of literary creation, etc., etc. Such outcries, in point of fact, would be nothing more than an expression of bourgeois-intellectual individualism. There is no question that literature is least of all subject to mechanical adjustment or levelling, to the rule of the majority over the minority. There is no question, either, that in this field greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed for personal initiative, individual inclination, thought and fantasy, form and content. All this is undeniable; but all this simply shows that the literary side of the proletarian party cause cannot be mechanically identified with its other sides. This, however, does not in the least refute the proposition, alien and strange to the bourgeoisie and bourgeois democracy, that literature must by all means and necessarily become an element of Social-Democratic Party work, inseparably bound up with the other elements. Newspapers must become the organs of the various party organisations, and their writers must by all means become members of these organisations. Publishing and distributing centres, bookshops and reading-rooms, libraries and similar establishments—must all be under party control. The organised socialist proletariat must keep an eye on all this work, supervise it in its entirety, and, from beginning to end, without any exception, infuse into it the life-stream of the living proletarian cause, thereby cutting the ground from under the old, semi-Oblomov,¹⁸ semi-shopkeeper Russian principle: the writer does the writing, the reader does the reading.

We are not suggesting, of course, that this transformation of literary work, which has been defiled by the Asiatic censorship and the European bourgeoisie, can be accomplished all at once. Far be it from us to advocate any kind of standardised system, or a solution by means of a few decrees. Cut-and-dried schemes are least of all applicable here. What is needed is that the whole of our Party, and the entire politically-conscious Social-Democratic proletariat throughout Russia, should become aware of this new problem, specify it clearly and everywhere set about solving it. Emerging

from the captivity of the feudal censorship, we have no desire to become, and shall not become, prisoners of bourgeois-shopkeeper literary relations. We want to establish, and we shall establish, a free press, free not simply from the police, but also from capital, from careerism, and what is more, free from bourgeois-anarchist individualism.

These last words may sound paradoxical, or an affront to the reader. What! some intellectual, an ardent champion of liberty, may shout. What, you want to impose collective control on such a delicate, individual matter as literary work! You want workmen to decide questions of science, philosophy, or aesthetics by a majority of votes! You deny the absolute freedom of absolutely individual ideological work!

Calm yourselves, gentlemen! First of all, we are discussing party literature and its subordination to party control. Everyone is free to write and say whatever he likes, without any restrictions. But every voluntary association (including the party) is also free to expel members who use the name of the party to advocate anti-party views. Freedom of speech and the press must be complete. But then freedom of association must be complete too. I am bound to accord you, in the name of free speech, the full right to shout, lie and write to your heart's content. But you are bound to grant me, in the name of freedom of association, the right to enter into, or withdraw from, association with people advocating this or that view. The party is a voluntary association, which would inevitably break up, first ideologically and then physically, if it did not cleanse itself of people advocating anti-party views. And to define the border-line between party and anti-party there is the party programme, the party's resolutions on tactics and its rules and, lastly, the entire experience of international Social-Democracy, the voluntary international associations of the proletariat, which has constantly brought into its parties individual elements and trends not fully consistent, not completely Marxist and not altogether correct and which, on the other hand, has constantly conducted periodical "cleansings" of its ranks. So it will be with us too, supporters of bourgeois "freedom of criticism", *within* the Party. We are now becoming a mass party all at once, changing abrupt-

ly to an open organisation, and it is inevitable that we shall be joined by many who are inconsistent (from the Marxist standpoint), perhaps we shall be joined even by some Christian elements, and even by some mystics. We have sound stomachs and we are rock-like Marxists. We shall digest those inconsistent elements. Freedom of thought and freedom of criticism within the Party will never make us forget about the freedom of organising people into those voluntary associations known as parties.

Secondly, we must say to you bourgeois individualists that your talk about absolute freedom is sheer hypocrisy. There can be no real and effective "freedom" in a society based on the power of money, in a society in which the masses of working people live in poverty and the handful of rich live like parasites. Are you free in relation to your bourgeois publisher, Mr. Writer, in relation to your bourgeois public, which demands that you provide it with pornography in frames* and paintings, and prostitution as a "supplement" to "sacred" scenic art? This absolute freedom is a bourgeois or an anarchist phrase (since, as a world outlook, anarchism is bourgeois philosophy turned inside out). One cannot live in society and be free from society. The freedom of the bourgeois writer, artist or actress is simply masked (or hypocritically masked) dependence on the money-bag, on corruption, on prostitution.

And we socialists expose this hypocrisy and rip off the false labels, not in order to arrive at a non-class literature and art (that will be possible only in a socialist extra-class society), but to contrast this hypocritically free literature, which is in reality linked to the bourgeoisie, with a really free one that will be *openly* linked to the proletariat.

It will be a free literature, because the idea of socialism and sympathy with the working people, and not greed or careerism, will bring ever new forces to its ranks. It will be a free literature, because it will serve, not some satiated heroine, not the bored "upper ten thousand" suffering from fatty degeneration, but the millions and tens of

* There must be a misprint in the source, which says *ramkakh* (frames), while the context suggests *romanakh* (novels).—Ed.

millions of working people—the flower of the country, its strength and its future. It will be a free literature, enriching the last word in the revolutionary thought of mankind with the experience and living work of the socialist proletariat, bringing about permanent interaction between the experience of the past (scientific socialism, the completion of the development of socialism from its primitive, utopian forms) and the experience of the present (the present struggle of the worker comrades).

To work, then, comrades! We are faced with a new and difficult task. But it is a noble and grateful one—to organise a broad, multiform and varied literature inseparably linked with the Social-Democratic working-class movement. All Social-Democratic literature must become Party literature. Every newspaper, journal, publishing house, etc., must immediately set about reorganising its work, leading up to a situation in which it will, in one form or another, be integrated into one Party organisation or another. Only then will “Social-Democratic” literature really become worthy of that name, only then will it be able to fulfil its duty and, even within the framework of bourgeois society, break out of bourgeois slavery and merge with the movement of the really advanced and thoroughly revolutionary class.

Novaya Zhizn, No. 12,
November 13, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

**RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG SOVIET OF WORKERS'
DEPUTIES ON MEASURES FOR COUNTERACTING
THE LOCK-OUT
ADOPTED ON NOVEMBER 14 (27), 1905¹⁹**

Citizens, over a hundred thousand workers have been thrown on to the streets in St. Petersburg and other cities.

The autocratic government has declared war on the revolutionary proletariat. The reactionary bourgeoisie is joining hands with the autocracy, intending to starve the workers into submission and disrupt the struggle for freedom.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies declares that this unparalleled mass dismissal of workers is an act of provocation on the part of the government. The government wants to provoke the proletariat of St. Petersburg to isolated outbreaks; the government wants to take advantage of the fact that the workers of other cities have not yet rallied closely enough to the St. Petersburg workers, and to defeat them all piecemeal.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies declares that the cause of liberty is in danger. But the workers will not fall into the trap laid by the government. The workers will not accept battle in the unfavourable conditions in which the government wants to impose battle on them. We must and shall exert every effort to unite the whole struggle—the struggle that is being waged both by the proletariat of all Russia and by the revolutionary peasantry, both by the Army and by the Navy, which are already heroically rising for freedom.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolves;

(1) All factories that have been shut down must immediately be reopened and all dismissed comrades reinstated. All sections of the people that cherish freedom in reality, and not in words only, are invited to support this demand.

(2) In support of this demand, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies considers it necessary to appeal to the solidarity of the entire Russian proletariat, and, if the demand is rejected, to call upon the latter to resort to a general political strike and other forms of resolute struggle.

(3) In preparation for this action, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies has instructed the Executive Committee to enter into immediate communication with the workers of other cities, with the railwaymen's, post and telegraph employees', peasant and other unions, as well as with the Army and Navy, by sending delegates and by other means.

(4) As soon as this preliminary work is completed, the Executive Committee is to call a special meeting of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies to take a final decision with regard to a strike.

(5) The St. Petersburg proletariat has asked all the workers and all sections of society and the people to support the dismissed workers with all the means at their disposal—material, moral and political.

THE PROVOCATION THAT FAILED

The resolution of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies* which we print in this issue marks an exceedingly important stage in the development of the revolution.

The alliance of the government and the bourgeoisie is making an attempt to defeat the proletariat, taking advantage of its exhaustion. In answer to the introduction of an eight-hour day in the St. Petersburg factories by revolutionary means, the bourgeoisie has announced a lock-out.

The plot has been hatched. They have decided to fight the strike by means of a mass dismissal of workers. Government-owned works are being shut down, together with many private works. Tens of thousands of workers have been thrown on to the streets. The intention is to provoke the St. Petersburg proletariat exhausted by the previous battles, to a new conflict in most unfavourable conditions.

Following the advice of the Social-Democratic representatives, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies has decided to expose the plot of the counter-revolution before the workers and to caution the proletariat of St. Petersburg against allowing itself to be drawn into a trap. The Soviet has answered the challenge to fight single-handed by appealing for a united struggle throughout Russia; it has answered by immediate steps to consolidate the alliance of the revolutionary workers with the revolutionary peasants and with those sections of the Army and Navy which are beginning to revolt in all parts of Russia.

At such a moment, more than at any other time, it is essential to direct all our efforts towards uniting the army of the revolution all over Russia, it is essential to preserve our forces, to use the liberties we have won for agitation

* See pp. 50-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and organisation increased a hundredfold, to prepare for new decisive battles. Let the autocracy unite with the reactionary bourgeoisie! Let the liberal bourgeoisie (as represented by the congress of Zemstvo²⁰ and municipal leaders in Moscow²¹) vote confidence in the government, which hypocritically talks about liberty and at the same time uses armed force to crush Poland for demanding the most elementary guarantees of liberty!

We must counteract the alliance between the autocracy and the bourgeoisie by an alliance between the Social-Democrats and all revolutionary bourgeois democrats. The socialist proletariat holds out its hand to the peasantry fighting for freedom, and calls on it to join in a concerted general onslaught all over the country.

It is in this that the enormous importance of the decision of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies lies. We Social-Democrats must see to it that the whole Party comes to the assistance of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. We are bent on more than just the democratic revolution. We are fighting for socialism, i.e., for the complete emancipation of the toilers from all oppression, economic as well as political. Our Party admits into its ranks only those who recognise this great aim and who never for a moment forget the necessity of preparing the forces for its attainment.

But just because we socialists want to reach our socialist goal, we are striving for the most thorough fulfilment of the democratic revolution, for the winning of complete liberty in the interests of a successful fight for socialism. That is why we must go hand in hand with those revolutionary democrats who do not want to bargain with the government, but to fight it, who do not want to curtail the revolution, but to carry it to completion—with these people we must go hand in hand, without, however, merging with them. Long live, then, the alliance of the socialist proletariat and the whole revolutionary people! All the forces of reaction, all the attacks of the counter-revolution will break down before their joint onslaught.

THE ARMED FORCES AND THE REVOLUTION

The insurrection at Sevastopol continues to spread. Things are coming to a head. The sailors and soldiers who are fighting for freedom are removing their officers. Complete order is being maintained. The government is unable to repeat the dirty trick it played at Kronstadt,²² it is unable to engineer riots. The squadron has refused to put to sea and threatens to shell the town if any attempt is made to suppress the insurgents. Command of the *Ochakov* has been taken over by Lieutenant Schmidt (retired), who was dismissed from the service for an "insolent" speech about defending, arms in hand, the liberties promised by the Manifesto of October 17.²³ According to a report in *Rus*,²⁴ the term fixed {or the sailors' surrender expires to-day, the 15th.

We are thus on the eve of the decisive moment. The next few days—perhaps hours—will show whether the insurgents will win a complete victory, whether they will be defeated, or whether a bargain will be struck. In any case, the Sevastopol events signify the complete collapse of the old slavish order in the armed forces, the system which transformed soldiers into armed machines and made them instruments for the suppression of the slightest striving after freedom.

Gone for ever are the days when Russian troops could be sent abroad to suppress a revolution—as happened in 1849.²⁵ Today the armed forces have irretrievably turned away from the autocracy. They have not yet become wholly revolutionary. The political consciousness of the soldiers and sailors is still at a very low level. But the important thing is that it has already awakened, that the soldiers have started a movement of their own, that the spirit of

liberty has penetrated into the barracks everywhere. Military barracks in Russia are as a rule worse than any prisons; nowhere is individuality so crushed and oppressed as in the barracks; nowhere are torture, beating and degradation of the human being so rife. And these barracks are becoming hotbeds of revolution.

The Sevastopol events are neither isolated nor accidental. Let us not speak of former attempts at open insurrection in the Navy and in the Army. Let us compare the sparks at St. Petersburg with the fire at Sevastopol. Let us recall the soldiers' demands which are now being formulated in various military units at St. Petersburg (they appeared in yesterday's issue of our paper). What a remarkable document this list of demands is! How clearly it shows that the slavish army is being transformed into a revolutionary army. And what power can now prevent the spread of similar demands throughout the Navy and throughout the Army?

The soldiers stationed in St. Petersburg want better rations, better clothing, better quarters, higher pay, a reduction in the term of service and shorter daily drill. But more prominent among their demands are those which could be presented only by the civic-minded soldier. They include the right to attend in uniform at all meetings, "on an equal footing with all other citizens", the right to read all newspapers and keep them in the barracks, freedom of conscience, equal rights for all nationalities, complete abolition of all deference to rank outside the barracks, the abolition of officers' batmen, the abolition of courts martial, jurisdiction for the civil courts over all military offences, the right to present complaints collectively, the right to defend oneself against any attempt on the part of a superior to strike a subordinate. Such are the principal demands of the soldiers in St. Petersburg.

These demands show that a great part of the Army is already at one with the men of Sevastopol who have risen for liberty.

These demands show that the hypocritical talk of the henchmen of the autocracy about the neutrality of the armed forces, about the need to keep the forces out of politics, etc. cannot count on the slightest sympathy among the soldiers.

The armed forces cannot and should not be neutral. Not to drag them into politics is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and of tsarism, who in fact have always dragged the forces into reactionary politics, and turned Russian soldiers into henchmen of the Black Hundreds, accomplices of the police. It is impossible to hold aloof from the struggle the whole people is waging for liberty. Whoever shows indifference to this struggle is supporting the outrages of the police government, which promised liberty only to mock at it.

The demands of the soldier-citizens are the demands of Social-Democracy, of all the revolutionary parties, of the class-conscious workers. By joining the ranks of the supporters of liberty and siding with the people, the soldiers will ensure victory for the cause of liberty and the satisfaction of their own demands.

But in order to secure the really complete and lasting satisfaction of these demands, it is necessary to take another little step forward. All the separate wishes of the soldiers, worn out by the accursed convict life of the barracks, should be brought together into a single whole. And put together, these demands will read: abolition of the standing army and introduction of the arming of the whole people in its stead.

Everywhere, in all countries, the standing army is used not so much against the external enemy as against the internal enemy. Everywhere the standing army has become the weapon of reaction, the servant of capital in its struggle against labour, the executioner of the people's liberty. Let us not, therefore, stop short at mere partial demands in our great liberating revolution. Let us tear the evil up by the roots. Let us do away with the standing army altogether. Let the army merge with the armed people, let the soldiers bring to the people their military knowledge, let the barracks disappear to be replaced by free military schools. No power on earth will dare to encroach upon free Russia, if the bulwark of her liberty is an armed people which has destroyed the military caste, which has made all soldiers citizens and all citizens capable of bearing arms, soldiers.

The experience of Western Europe has shown how utterly reactionary the standing army is. Military science has

proved that a people's militia is quite practicable, that it can rise to the military tasks presented by a war both of defence and of attack. Let the hypocritical or the sentimental bourgeoisie dream of disarmament. So long as there are oppressed and exploited people in the world, we must strive, not for disarmament, but for the arming of the whole people. It alone will fully safeguard liberty. It alone will completely overthrow reaction. Only when this change has been effected will the millions of toilers, and not a mere handful of exploiters, enjoy real liberty.

Written on November 15 (28), 1905

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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THE SCALES ARE WAVERING

Russia's present condition is often described as anarchy. In reality, this incorrect and lying designation expresses the fact that there is no established order in the country. The war of a new, free Russia against the old, feudal-autocratic Russia is raging all along the line. The autocracy is no longer strong enough to defeat the revolution, and the revolution is not yet strong enough to defeat tsarism. The old regime has been smashed but not yet destroyed, and the new, free order exists unrecognised, half-concealed, very often persecuted by the minions of the autocratic regime.

Such a state of affairs may last for quite a while yet, it will inevitably be attended by manifestations of instability and vacillation in all spheres of social and political life: people hostile to liberty, who now profess to be friends of liberty by way of a military stratagem, will inevitably try to fish in these troubled waters. But the longer this state of transition lasts, the more surely will it lead to the complete and decisive victory of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry. For nothing opens the eyes of the most ignorant masses of town and country so effectively, nothing so greatly rouses even the most indifferent and most sleepy, as this long-drawn-out decay of the autocracy, which has been condemned by all and has acknowledged its condemnation.

What do the latest political events tell us—this new and great strike of the post and telegraph employees,²⁶ this growing ferment and growing revolutionary organisation in the armed forces and even in the police, this victory of politically-backward troops fettered by discipline over the army of freedom in Sevastopol, this unparalleled slump in

government securities? They tell us that the autocracy is firing its last shots and using up its last reserves. Even the stock exchange—loyal to the tsar in its bourgeois cowardice and its bourgeois longing for the end of the revolution—even the stock exchange has no faith in the “victors” of Sevastopol. These events tell us that the revolutionary people is steadily extending its conquests, rousing new fighters, exercising its forces, improving its organisation and marching forward to victory, advancing as irresistibly as an avalanche.

The weapon of the political strike is being perfected; new contingents of workers are now learning to wield this weapon, workers without whom a modern civilised community cannot exist even for a single day. The awareness of the need for freedom is growing in the armed forces and in the police, preparing new centres of insurrection, new Kronstadt and new Sevastopols.

The victors of Sevastopol have hardly any reason for rejoicing. The Crimean insurrection has been defeated. The insurrection of all Russia is invincible.

Let worker Social-Democrats therefore prepare for even greater events, which will impose on them an immense responsibility!

Let them not forget that only a solidly united Social-Democratic Party can lead the proletariat of Russia to victory, hand in hand with the Social-Democratic proletariat of the whole world!

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

LEARN FROM THE ENEMY

The bourgeois democrats of *Nasha Zhizn*²⁷ have launched a campaign against “the mixture of Marxism and barbarism”. We strongly recommend all class-conscious workers to look closely into the arguments of the radical democrats.

Nothing facilitates an understanding of the political essence of developments as greatly as their evaluation by one’s adversaries (that is, of course, unless the latter are hopelessly stupid).

Nasha Zhizn does not like “the struggle of one section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party against the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies”, or, to be exact, the struggle of the Social-Democrats against “non-partisan” class organisations, as the newspaper itself puts it. Our radicals say that the workers must unite. That means—that means that the leaders of the Soviet who “are endeavouring to unite the *entire* proletariat without distinction of political creed” are right. And the radicals triumphantly show us up as contradicting our own principle of the “*class struggle*”.

Learn from your enemies, comrade workers, who sympathise with the formation of a non-partisan workers’ organisation, or are at least indifferent to this desire! Call to mind the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels, which speaks of the *transformation* of the proletariat *into a class* in keeping with the growth not only of its unity, but also of its political *consciousness*.²⁸ Remember the example of such countries as England, where the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie has been going on everywhere and at all times, in spite of which the proletariat has remained disunited, its elected representatives have been

bought up by the bourgeoisie, its class-consciousness has been corrupted by the ideologists of capital, its strength has been dissipated through the desertion of the masses of the workers by the labour aristocracy. Think of all this, comrade workers, and you will come to the conclusion that only a Social-Democratic proletariat is a proletariat conscious of its class tasks. Down with non-partisanship! Non-partisanship has always and everywhere been a weapon and slogan of the bourgeoisie. Under certain conditions, we can and must march together with proletarians who are not class-conscious, with proletarians who accept non-proletarian doctrines (the programme of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries"). But under no circumstances and at no time must we relax our strict Party approach, under no circumstances and at no time must we forget, or allow others to forget, that hostility to Social-Democracy within the ranks of the proletariat is a relic of bourgeois views among the proletariat.

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REVOLUTIONARY OFFICE ROUTINE AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

It was only natural and inevitable in our revolutionary movement that the question of a constituent assembly should be brought forward. To sweep away the survivals of the old, semi-feudal institutions of autocratic Russia for good and all, to determine the institutions of new, free Russia, one cannot conceive of any consistent and logical path save that of calling a constituent assembly of the whole people. True, in actual life consistent and logical objectives are rarely realised in full; life always introduces many unforeseen features which complicate and confuse the issue, which mix up the old and the new. But whoever sincerely wishes to have done with the old and knows how to work for that end must define clearly what a constituent assembly stands for, and fight with all his might for its realisation in its full and unadulterated form.

The party of the class-conscious proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party, advanced the demand for a constituent assembly as far back as 1903, in its Programme adopted at the Second Congress. "The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party," reads the last section of our Programme, "is firmly convinced that the complete, consistent and lasting attainment of the above-mentioned political and economic reforms [the establishment of a democratic state system, labour protection, etc.]* can be achieved only by overthrowing the autocracy and convoking a constituent assembly, freely elected by the whole people."

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

These words clearly show that our Party is concerned not only with the purely formal, but also with the material conditions for the convocation of a constituent assembly, i.e., with the conditions which would make such an assembly truly national and truly constituent. It is not enough to call an assembly "constituent", it is not enough to convene representatives of the people, even though they be chosen by universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot, even though freedom of elections be really guaranteed. In addition to all these conditions, it is necessary that the constituent assembly have the authority and the force to constitute a new order. There have been cases in the history of revolutions when an assembly was nominally constituent, while in actual fact real force and power were not in its hands but in the hands of the old autocracy. This was the case in the German revolution of 1848, which explains why the "constituent" assembly of that period, the notorious Frankfurt Parliament, acquired the shameful reputation of a contemptible "talking shop". That assembly babbled about freedom, decreed freedom, but took no practical steps to remove the government institutions which were destroying freedom. It is quite natural, therefore, that that pitiable assembly of pitiable liberal-bourgeois prattlers withdrew from the scene in ignominy.

In present-day Russia the question of the convocation of a constituent assembly heads the list of the political questions of the day. And it is now that the practical side of this question is becoming a matter of the utmost urgency. What is important is not so much whether a constituent assembly will be convoked (it is probable that even Count Witte, that ministerial broker, will agree to it tomorrow), but whether it will be a truly national and truly constituent assembly.

As a matter of fact, the experience of our revolution, despite the fact that it is only just beginning, has already shown clearly what jugglery may be performed with words and promises in general, and with the constituent assembly slogan in particular. Just call to mind the recent congress of Zemstvo and municipal leaders—the "Cadets"²⁹—in Moscow. Recall their famous formula: a State Duma with constituent functions for drawing up a constitution to be approved by the Emperor.... Even the bourgeois-democratic

press noted the inherently contradictory nature and absurdity of this formula. To “constitute” a new political order “to be approved” by the head of the old government—what does this mean but legalising two governments, two equal (on paper) supreme authorities—the authority of the people risen in revolt and the authority of the old autocracy. It is obvious that equality between them is a sheer semblance, that in practice the terms of any “compromise” between them depend on which side has the preponderance of *force*. Thus, in their “ideal” plan of transition from the old Russia to the new, the liberal bourgeois were legitimising the coexistence of two equal, mutually hostile and contending forces, i.e., they were legitimising an eternal and hopeless struggle.

This contradiction cannot be explained by simple formal logic. But it is fully explained by the logic of the class interests of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is afraid of complete freedom, of full democracy, for it knows that the class-conscious, i.e., socialist, proletariat will use this freedom to fight against the domination of capital. Therefore what the bourgeoisie really wants is not complete freedom, not the full sovereignty of the people, but a deal with reaction, with the autocracy. The bourgeoisie wants parliamentarism in order to ensure the domination of capital rather than that of the bureaucracy, and at the same time it wants the monarchy, a standing army, the preservation of certain privileges for the bureaucracy, because it does not want to allow the revolution to reach its final goal, because it does not want to arm the proletariat—“arming” meaning both direct arming with weapons and arming with complete freedom. The contradictory class position of the bourgeoisie between the autocracy and the proletariat inevitably gives rise, irrespectively of the will or consciousness of this or that individual, to senseless and absurd formulas of “compromise”. The constituent assembly slogan is turned into an empty phrase the great demand of the proletariat which has risen to win freedom is reduced to a farce—this is the way the bourgeoisie profanes absolutely everything, substituting haggling for struggle.

The radical bourgeois of *Nasha Zhizn* do not see this inevitably false and spurious presentation of the question by the liberals, when they extol with serious mien the “draft”

for the convocation of a constituent assembly prepared by Messrs. Falbork and Charnolusky, and then also by the Central Bureau of the Union of Unions. It is ridiculous to make such "drafts", gentlemen! You are following in the footsteps of the "Cadets", who have betrayed the revolution. You forget that paper drafts, like all constitutional illusions, corrupt the revolutionary consciousness of the people and weaken their fighting spirit, for they obscure the main point and entirely distort the question itself. After all, you are not engaged in propaganda for a political ABC. You are putting the question *practically*, as is indicated by the very nature of the discussion of the draft "by representatives of the extreme and the moderate parties", which you have proposed. It is Manilovism³⁰ on your part, esteemed bourgeois democrats, to admit, on the one hand, that it is desirable for the constituent assembly to possess "full" power and attempt, on the other hand, to unite the extreme parties with the "moderate" parties, i.e., those who desire such full power with those who do not desire it.

Off with the frills and furbelows! We have had enough of lying liberal phrases! It is time to draw the line. To the right—the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, who have in effect been brought together by their opposition to the transfer of all power—sole, full and indivisible—to a constituent assembly. To the left—the socialist proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry or, more broadly, the whole of revolutionary bourgeois democracy. They want the constituent assembly to have full power. For this they can and must conclude a fighting alliance, without, of course, merging. It is not paper drafts they need, but fighting measures, not the organisation of office routine, but the organisation of a victorious struggle for liberty.

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THE DYING AUTOCRACY AND NEW ORGANS OF POPULAR RULE³¹

The insurrection is gaining ground. The impotence, confusion and disintegration of the autocratic Witte Government are increasing. The organisation of the most diverse groups, sections and classes of the people, the organisation of the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary forces, is growing in breadth and depth.

Such is the situation at present. It can be expressed in the words: organisation and mobilisation of the revolution. Land battles in Voronezh and Kiev follow on the heels of the naval battle in Sevastopol. In Kiev the armed uprising apparently goes a step further, a step in the direction of merging the revolutionary army with the revolutionary workers and students. That, at any rate, is the testimony of the report in *Rus* about a meeting of 16,000 people in the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, held under the protection of a sapper battalion of insurgent soldiers.

It is quite natural that in the circumstances even the liberal bourgeoisie, which longs from the bottom of its heart for a deal with the autocracy, is beginning to lose patience, to lose faith in the "great" acrobat Witte, and to cast its eyes towards the left, in search of a force capable of carrying out the revolution which has become an absolute necessity.

In this respect, the stand taken by *Rus* is highly instructive. This newspaper clearly sees that "events are beginning to pile up in just such an avalanche as preceded October 17". And so, on the one hand, it appeals to the very Zemstvo leaders who have manifested no less confusion, impotence and helplessness than the autocratic government.

It calls on them "not to delay" and to take "part in the impending events", in order "to give the outcome of these events mild forms, least prejudicial and most favourable to the country". On the other hand, this very same *Rus* disagrees with *Slovo*,³² declaring that "no one believes that the present government could convoke a State Duma under the present circumstances". "At present," states *Rus*, "it is necessary to think of forming a government that could convoke a Duma."

Thus, under the pressure of the revolutionary proletariat, the liberal bourgeoisie takes another step to the left. Yesterday it was expressing a desire to bargain with Witte and adopted a conditional vote of confidence in him (at the Zemstvo Congress). Today confidence in Witte is waning, and capital is demanding a new government. *Rus* proposes that all liberation parties set up a special national council of deputies, which would become a "powerful instrument of pressure on the government, if the latter shows itself still [!] capable of functioning, and an organ of power of the people ready for use, to take over the duties of the government provisionally in the event of the latter's utter incapacity and collapse".

In plain and simple Russian, an organ of power of the people which temporarily assumes the duties of a government that has collapsed is called a provisional revolutionary government. Such a government is bound to be provisional, for its authority expires with the convocation of a constituent assembly representing the whole people. Such a government is bound to be revolutionary, for it replaces a government that has collapsed, and it does so with the support of the revolution. The very replacement of one by the other cannot occur other than by revolutionary means. Such a government must become an "organ of power of the people", carrying out everywhere the demands put forward by the people and replacing at once, immediately and everywhere all the old, autocratic and Black-Hundred "organs of power" by organs of power of the people, i.e., either by representatives of the provisional revolutionary government or by elected persons in all cases where elections are possible—on the basis, of course, of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

We are very glad that the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie has arrived at the idea of a provisional revolutionary government. We are glad not because we believe that the liberals have sided with the revolution, not because we have suddenly begun to put faith in their sincerity, steadfastness and consistency. No, we are glad because it is an obvious and indubitable sign of the strength of the revolution. The revolution must have become a force since even the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie has come to realise the necessity for a provisional revolutionary government.

We are not forgetting, of course, that the liberals want to use such a government as a threat to the autocracy more than they desire its establishment, just as a customer threatens the shopkeeper that he will go to another shop. Lower your price, Mr. Witte, or we shall go into the provisional revolutionary government, "mildly" termed "general council of deputies" or "national council of deputies"! Only this desire to go on haggling can explain the seeming senselessness and absurdity of *Rus* declaring the Witte Government incapable of convening representatives of the people, and yet in the same breath granting that it is possible for this government to "show itself *still* capable of functioning".

Oh, no, gentlemen of the liberal camp, these are not times in which such wiles can succeed or in which duplicity can remain unexposed! The people are fighting against the autocracy, which (on October 17) promised liberty only to make a mock of liberty, to outrage it. A provisional revolutionary government is the organ of a people fighting for liberty. The struggle for liberty against a government which is trampling liberty underfoot is (at a certain stage in the development of this struggle) an armed uprising, and this is what is now taking place in Russia all along the line. A provisional revolutionary government is the organ of insurrection, uniting all who have risen in revolt and exercising political leadership of the insurrection. Therefore anyone who talks of the possibility and necessity of a provisional revolutionary government, and yet permits of a deal with the old government which is to be superseded, is either confusing matters or committing an act of treachery. Indeed, just think, gentlemen who write in *Rus*: can there really be such simpletons among the supporters of the revo-

lution who would voluntarily accept as members of a provisional revolutionary government individuals, or representatives of parties, who regard the old government as still "capable of functioning" and who continue to pay it visits by the back door, to bargain with it? Just consider: would the Russian Army have gained or lost by including the patriotic young men of Manchuria in its ranks? Most likely it would have lost, for the Manchurian patriots would have betrayed the Russians to the Japanese. The revolutionary people of Russia will likewise lose if the "patriots", the monarchist-minded patriots of the money-bag (i.e., the liberal bourgeois), betray them to the Witte autocracy.

Let the liberal bourgeoisie regard the provisional revolutionary government as a mere threat to the autocracy. For the socialist proletariat, for the revolutionary peasantry, and for all those who are resolutely and irrevocably taking a stand with them in the struggle for liberty, the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government is a great and extremely important task, which becomes more pressing with every day. The October revolution, together with the military risings which followed it, has so weakened the autocracy that the organs of a new power—that of the people—have begun to spring up spontaneously, on the ground ploughed up by the political strike and fertilised with the blood of the champions of liberty. These organs are the revolutionary parties and militant organisations of the workers, peasants and other sections of the people who are waging a genuine revolutionary struggle. These organs are bringing about in practice the alliance between the socialist proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. We must now extend and consolidate this fighting alliance, give it shape and cement it, so that the organs of the new power are prepared for the coming repetition of October 17, so that all the fighters for liberty throughout Russia may then come forward with a common programme of immediate political changes—organised, self-disciplined, well aware of their aim, keeping out all traitors, all waverers, all windbags. For us representatives of the socialist proletariat the forthcoming democratic revolution is only one of the steps to the great goal, the socialist revolution. Bearing this in mind, we shall never merge with the petty-bourgeois parties or groups,

however sincere, revolutionary or strong they may be; we know for certain that on the road to socialism, the ways of the worker and of the petty proprietor will very often inevitably diverge. But it is in the interests of socialism that we shall now do our utmost for the democratic revolution to be accomplished as speedily, as fully and as resolutely as possible. With this end in view, we shall conclude, and are concluding, a temporary fighting alliance with all the revolutionary-democratic forces to attain our common immediate political aim. It is to this end that, while strictly preserving our Party identity and independence, we enter the Soviets of Workers' Deputies and other revolutionary associations. Long live the new organs of power of the people! Welcome to the single, supreme and victorious organ of popular rule!

And to the radical bourgeois we shall say in parting: Gentlemen, you chatter about organs of power of the people. It is only strength that makes power. In present-day society, only the armed people headed by the armed proletariat can constitute this strength. If sympathy with liberty were proved by words, we should probably have to call even the authors of the Manifesto of October 17 supporters of liberty. But if it has to be proved by deeds, then the only such deed at the present time is assistance in arming the workers, assistance in forming and building up a genuinely revolutionary army. So make your choice, gentlemen: will you go to Mr. Witte's antechamber to beg for crumbs of liberty, to haggle over the curtailment of liberty, or to the "organs of power of the people", to the provisional revolutionary government, to fight selflessly for complete liberty? Choose!

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SOCIALISM AND ANARCHISM

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies decided yesterday, November 23, to reject the application of the anarchists for representation on the Executive Committee and on the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The Executive Committee itself has given the following reasons for this decision: "(1) In the whole of international practice, congresses and socialist conferences have never included representatives of the anarchists, since they do not recognise the political struggle as a means for the achievement of their ideals; (2) only parties can be represented, and the anarchists are not a party."

We consider the decision of the Executive Committee to be in the highest degree correct, and of enormous importance from the point of view both of principle and of practical politics. If we were to regard the Soviet of Workers' Deputies as a workers' parliament or as an organ of proletarian self-government, then of course it would have been wrong to reject the application of the anarchists. However insignificant (fortunately) the influence of the anarchists among our workers may be, nevertheless, a certain number of workers undoubtedly support them. The question whether the anarchists constitute a party, an organisation, a group, or a voluntary association of like-minded people, is a formal question, and not of major importance in terms of principle. Lastly, if the anarchists, while rejecting the political struggle, apply for representation in an institution which is conducting such a struggle, this crying inconsistency merely goes to show once again how utterly unstable are the philosophy and tactics of the anarchists. But, of course, instability is no reason for excluding anyone from a "parliament", or an "organ of self-government".

We regard the decision of the Executive Committee as absolutely correct and in no way contradicting the functions, the character and the composition of this body. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is not a labour parliament and not an organ of proletarian self-government, nor an organ of self-government at all, but a fighting organisation for the achievement of definite aims.

This fighting organisation includes, on the basis of a temporary, unwritten fighting agreement, representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (the party of proletarian socialism), of the "Socialist-Revolutionary" Party (the representatives of petty-bourgeois socialism, or the extreme Left wing of revolutionary bourgeois democrats), and finally many "non-party" workers. The latter, however, are not non-party in general, but are non-party revolutionaries, their sympathies being entirely on the side of the revolution, for the victory of which they are fighting with boundless enthusiasm, energy and self-sacrifice. For that reason it will be quite natural to include representatives of the revolutionary peasantry in the Executive Committee.

For all practical purposes, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is an inchoate, broad fighting alliance of socialists and revolutionary democrats, the term "non-party revolutionary", of course, representing a series of transitional stages between the former and the latter. Such an alliance is obviously necessary for the purpose of conducting political strikes and other, more active forms of struggle, for the urgent democratic demands which have been accepted and approved by the overwhelming majority of the population. In an alliance of this sort, the anarchists will not be an asset, but a liability; they will merely bring disorganisation and thus weaken the force of the joint assault; to them it is still "debatable" whether political reform is urgent and important. The exclusion of anarchists from the fighting alliance which is carrying out, as it were, our democratic revolution, is quite necessary from the point of view of this revolution and is in its interests. There can be a place in a fighting alliance only for those who fight for the aim of that alliance. If, for example, the "Cadets" or the "Party of Law and Order"³³ had managed to recruit at least several hundred workers into their St. Petersburg branches, the Executive Committee of the

Soviet of Workers' Deputies would hardly have opened its doors to the representatives of such organisations.

In explaining its decision, the Executive Committee refers to the practice of international socialist congresses. We warmly welcome this statement, this recognition by the executive body of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies of the ideological leadership of the international Social-Democratic movement. The Russian revolution has already acquired international significance. The enemies of the revolution in Russia are already conspiring with Wilhelm II and with all sorts of reactionaries, tyrants, militarists and exploiters in Europe against free Russia. Neither shall we forget that the complete victory of our revolution demands an alliance of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia with the socialist workers of all countries.

It is not for nothing that international socialist congresses adopted the decision not to admit the anarchists. A wide gulf separates socialism from anarchism, and it is in vain that the *agents-provocateurs* of the secret police and the newspaper lackeys of reactionary governments pretend that this gulf does not exist. The philosophy of the anarchists is bourgeois philosophy turned inside out. Their individualistic theories and their individualistic ideal are the very opposite of socialism. Their views express, not the future of bourgeois society, which is striding with irresistible force towards the socialisation of labour, but the present and even the past of that society, the domination of blind chance over the scattered and isolated small producer. Their tactics, which amount to a repudiation of the political struggle, disunite the proletarians and convert them in fact into passive participants in one bourgeois policy or another, since it is impossible and unrealisable for the workers really to dissociate themselves from politics.

In the present Russian revolution, the task of rallying the forces of the proletariat, of organising it, of politically educating and training the working class, is more imperative than ever. The more outrageous the conduct of the Black-Hundred government, the more zealously its *agents-provocateurs* strive to fan base passions among the ignorant masses and the more desperately the defenders of the autocracy, which is rotting alive, clutch at every opportunity

to discredit the revolution by organising hold-ups, pogroms and assassinations, and by fuddling lumpen proletarians with drink, the more important is the task of organisation that falls primarily to the party of the socialist proletariat. And we shall therefore resort to every means of ideological struggle to keep the influence of the anarchists over the Russian workers just as negligible as it has been so far.

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THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND NON-PARTY REVOLUTIONISM

I

The revolutionary movement in Russia, which is rapidly spreading to ever new sections of the population, is giving rise to a number of non-party organisations. The longer the urge for association has been suppressed and persecuted, the more forcibly it asserts itself. All sorts of organisations, frequently loose in form, and most original in character, are constantly springing up. They have no hard and fast boundaries, as have organisations in Europe. Trade unions assume a political character. The political struggle blends with the economic struggle—as, for instance, in the form of strikes—and this gives rise to temporary, or more or less permanent, organisations of a blended type.

What is the significance of this phenomenon, and what should be the attitude of Social-Democrats towards it?

Strict adherence to the party principle is the corollary and the result of a highly developed class struggle. And, vice versa, the interests of the open and widespread class struggle demand the development of the strict party principle. That is why the party of the class-conscious proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party, has always quite rightly combated the non-party idea, and has worked steadily to establish a closely-knit, socialist workers' party consistent in its principles. The more thoroughly the development of capitalism splits up the entire people into classes, accentuating the contradictions among them, the greater is the success of this work among the masses.

It is quite natural that the present revolution in Russia should have given rise, and should continue to give rise, to so many non-party organisations. This is a democratic revo-

lution, i.e., one which is bourgeois as regards its social and economic content. This revolution is overthrowing the autocratic semi-feudal system, extricating the bourgeois system from it, and thereby putting into effect the demands of all the classes of bourgeois society—in this sense being a revolution of the whole people. This, of course, does not mean that our revolution is not a class revolution; certainly not. But it is directed against classes and castes which have become or are becoming obsolete from the point of view of bourgeois society, which are alien to that society and hinder its development. And since the entire economic life of the country has already become bourgeois in all its main features, since the overwhelming majority of the population is in fact already living in bourgeois conditions of existence, the anti-revolutionary elements are naturally extremely few in number, constituting truly a mere “handful” as compared with the “people”. Hence the class nature of the bourgeois revolution inevitably reveals itself in the “popular”, at first glance non-class, nature of the struggle of all classes of a bourgeois society against autocracy and feudalism.

The epoch of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, no less than in other countries, is distinguished by a relatively undeveloped state of the class contradictions peculiar to capitalist society. True, in Russia capitalism is more highly developed at the present time than it was in Germany in 1848, to say nothing of France in 1789; but there is no doubt about the fact that in Russia purely capitalist antagonisms are very very much overshadowed by the antagonisms between “culture” and Asiatic barbarism, Europeanism and Tartarism, capitalism and feudalism; in other words, the demands that are being put first today are those the satisfaction of which will develop capitalism, cleanse it of the slag of feudalism and improve the conditions of life and struggle both for the proletariat and for the bourgeoisie.

Indeed, if we examine the demands, instructions and *doléances*, which are now being drawn up in infinite numbers in every factory, office, regiment, police unit, parish, educational institution, etc., etc., all over Russia, we shall easily see that the overwhelming majority of them contain purely “cultural” demands, if we may call them so. What I mean is that actually they are not specifically class demands.

but demands for elementary rights, demands which will not destroy capitalism but, on the contrary, bring it within the framework of Europeanism, and free it of barbarism, savagery, corruption and other "Russian" survivals of serfdom. In essence, even the proletarian demands are limited, in most cases, to reforms of the sort that are fully realisable within the framework of capitalism. What the Russian proletariat is demanding now and immediately is not something that will undermine capitalism, but something that will cleanse it, something that will accelerate and intensify its development.

Naturally, as a result of the special position which the proletariat occupies in capitalist society, the striving of the workers towards socialism, and their alliance with the Socialist Party assert themselves with elemental force at the very earliest stages of the movement. But purely socialist demands are still a matter of the future: the immediate demands of the day are the democratic demands of the workers in the political sphere, and economic demands within the framework of capitalism in the economic sphere. Even the proletariat is making the revolution, as it were, within the limits of the minimum programme and not of the maximum programme. As for the peasantry, the vast and numerically overwhelming mass of the population, this goes without saying. Its "maximum programme", its ultimate aims, do not go beyond the bounds of capitalism, which would grow more extensively and luxuriantly if all the land were transferred to the whole of the peasantry and the whole of the people. Today the peasant revolution is a bourgeois revolution—however much these words may jar on the sentimental ears of the sentimental knights of our petty-bourgeois socialism.

The character of the revolution now in progress, as outlined above, quite naturally gives rise to non-party organisations. The whole movement, therefore, on the surface inevitably acquires a non-party stamp, a non-party appearance—but only on the surface, of course. The urge for a "human", civilised life, the urge to organise in defence of human dignity, for one's rights as man and citizen, takes hold of everyone, unites all classes, vastly outgrows all party bounds and shakes up people who as yet are very very far from being able to rise to party allegiance. The vital need of immediate,

elementary, essential rights and reforms puts off, as it were, all thought and consideration of anything further. Preoccupation with the struggle in progress, a preoccupation that is quite necessary and legitimate, for without it success in the struggle would be impossible, causes people to idealise these immediate, elementary aims, to depict them in rosy colours and sometimes even to clothe them in fantastic garb. Simple democracy, ordinary bourgeois democracy, is taken as socialism and "registered" as such. Everything seems to be "non-party"; everything seems to fuse into a single movement for "liberation" (actually, a movement liberating the whole of bourgeois society); everything acquires a faint, a very faint tint of "socialism", owing above all to the leading part played by the socialist proletariat in the democratic struggle.

In these circumstances, the idea of non-partisanship cannot but gain certain temporary successes. The slogan of non-partisanship cannot but become a fashionable slogan, for fashion drags helplessly at the tail of life, and it is the non-party organisation that appears to be the most "common" phenomenon on the surface of political life: non-party democracy, non-party strike-ism, non-party revolutionism.

The question now arises: what *should* be the attitude of the adherents and representatives of the various classes towards this fact of non-party organisation, towards this idea of non-partisanship? "Should", that is, not in the subjective sense, but objectively, i.e., not in the sense of what view to take of it, but in the sense of what attitude is inevitably taking shape under the influence of the respective interests and viewpoints of the various classes.

II

As we have already shown, the non-party principle is the product—or, if you will, the expression—of the bourgeois character of our revolution. The bourgeoisie cannot help inclining towards the non-party principle, for the absence of parties among those who are fighting for the liberation of bourgeois society implies that no fresh struggle will arise against this bourgeois society itself. Those who carry on a "non-party" struggle for liberty are not aware of the bourgeois nature of liberty, or they sanctify the bourgeois system, or

else they put off the struggle against it, its "perfecting", to the Greek calends. And, conversely, those who consciously or unconsciously stand for the bourgeois system cannot help feeling attracted by the idea of non-partisanship.

In a society based upon class divisions, the struggle between the hostile classes is bound, at a certain stage of its development, to become a political struggle. The most purposeful, most comprehensive and specific expression of the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. The non-party principle means indifference to the struggle of parties. But this indifference is not equivalent to neutrality, to abstention from the struggle, for in the class struggle there can be no neutrals; in capitalist society, it is impossible to "abstain" from taking part in the exchange of commodities or labour-power. And exchange inevitably gives rise to economic and then to political struggle. Hence, in practice, indifference to the struggle does not at all mean standing aloof from the struggle, abstaining from it, or being neutral. Indifference is tacit support of the strong, of those who rule. In Russia, those who were indifferent towards the autocracy prior to its fall during the October revolution tacitly supported the autocracy. In present-day Europe, those who are indifferent towards the rule of the bourgeoisie tacitly support the bourgeoisie. Those who are indifferent towards the idea that the struggle for liberty is of a bourgeois nature tacitly support the domination of the bourgeoisie in this struggle, in the free Russia now in the making. Political unconcern is political satiety. A well-fed man is "unconcerned with", "indifferent to", a crust of bread; a hungry man, however, will always take a "partisan" stand on the question of a crust of bread. A person's "unconcern and indifference" with regard to a crust of bread does not mean that he does not need bread, but that he is always sure of his bread, that he is never in want of bread and that he has firmly attached himself to the "party" of the well-fed. The non-party principle in bourgeois society is merely a hypocritical, disguised, passive expression of adherence to the party of the well-fed, of the rulers, of the exploiters.

The non-party idea is a bourgeois idea. The party idea is a socialist idea. This thesis, in general and as a whole is applicable to all bourgeois society. One must, of course,

be able to adapt this general truth to particular questions and particular cases; but to forget this truth at a time when the whole of bourgeois society is rising in revolt against feudalism and autocracy means in practice completely to renounce socialist criticism of bourgeois society.

The Russian revolution, despite the fact that it is still in the early stages of its development, has already provided no little material to confirm the general considerations here outlined. Only the Social-Democratic Party, the party of the class-conscious proletariat, has always insisted, and insists now, upon strict adherence to the party principle. Our liberals, who voice the views of the bourgeoisie, cannot bear the socialist party principle and will not hear of class struggle. One need but recall the recent speeches of Mr. Rodichev, who for the hundredth time repeated what has been said over and over again by *Osvobozhdeniye*³⁴ abroad, as well as by the innumerable vassal organs of Russian liberalism. Finally, the ideology of the intermediate class, the petty bourgeoisie, has found a clear expression in the views of the Russian "radicals" of various shades, from *Nasha Zhizn* and the "radical-democrats"³⁵ to the "Socialist-Revolutionaries". The latter have demonstrated their confusion of socialism with democracy most clearly over the agrarian question, particularly by their slogan of "socialisation" (of the land without socialising capital). It is likewise well known that being tolerant towards bourgeois radicalism, they are intolerant towards the Social-Democratic Party principle.

An analysis of just how the interests of the various classes are reflected in the programme and tactics of the Russian liberals and radicals of all shades is beyond our subject. We have touched upon this interesting question only in passing, and must now proceed to draw the practical political conclusions with regard to the attitude of our Party towards non-party organisations.

Is it permissible for socialists to participate in non-party organisations? If so, on what conditions? What tactics should be pursued in these organisations?

The answer to the first question cannot be an unconditional and categorical "no". It would be wrong to say that in no case and under no circumstances should Social-Democrats participate in non-party (i.e., more or less consciously or

unconsciously bourgeois) organisations. In the period of the democratic revolution, a refusal to participate in non-party organisations would in certain circumstances amount to a refusal to participate in the democratic revolution. But undoubtedly socialists should confine these "certain circumstances" to narrow limits, and should permit of such participation only on strictly defined, restrictive conditions. For while non-party organisations, as we have already said, arise as a result of the relatively undeveloped state of the class struggle, strict adherence to the party principle, on the other hand, is one of the factors that make the class struggle conscious, clear, definite, and principled.

To preserve the ideological and political independence of the party of the proletariat is the constant, immutable and absolute duty of socialists. Whoever fails to fulfil this duty ceases to be a socialist *in fact*, however sincere his "socialist" (in words) convictions may be. Socialists may participate in non-party organisations only by way of exception; and the very purpose, nature, conditions, etc., of this participation must be wholly subordinated to the fundamental task of preparing and organising the socialist proletariat for conscious leadership of the socialist revolution.

Circumstances may compel us to participate in non-party organisations, especially in the period of a democratic revolution, specifically a democratic revolution in which the proletariat plays an outstanding part. Such participation may prove essential, for example, for the purpose of preaching socialism to vaguely democratic audiences, or in the interests of a joint struggle of socialists and revolutionary democrats against the counter-revolution. In the first case, such participation will be a means of securing the acceptance of our ideas; in the second case, it will represent a fighting agreement for the achievement of definite revolutionary aims. In both cases, participation can only be temporary. In both cases, it is permissible only if the independence of the workers' party is fully safeguarded and if the party as a whole controls and guides its members and groups "delegated" to non-party unions or councils.

When the activities of our Party were conducted secretly, the exercise of such control and guidance presented extreme-

ly great, and sometimes almost insuperable difficulties. But now that the activities of our Party are becoming more and more open, this control and this guidance can and should be exercised on the largest scale, not only by the higher bodies of the Party, but also by the rank and file, by all the organised workers belonging to our Party. Reports on the activities of Social-Democrats in non-party unions and councils, lectures on the conditions and aims of such activities, resolutions of party organisations of all types about these activities, should become a regular practice in a workers' party. Only by such *real* participation of the Party as a whole, by participation in the *direction* of such activities, can we contrast in practice truly socialist work with general democratic work.

What tactics should we pursue in the non-party unions? First of all, we should use every opportunity to establish independent contacts and to propagate the whole of our socialist programme. Secondly, we should define the immediate political tasks of the day in terms of the fullest and most resolute accomplishment of the democratic revolution; we should put forward the political watchwords of the democratic revolution and advance a "programme" of those reforms which should be carried out by militant revolutionary democrats as distinct from haggling, liberal democrats.

Only if matters are arranged in this way will it be permissible and useful for members of our Party to participate in the non-party revolutionary organisations which are being set up one day by the workers, the next day by the peasants, the day after by the soldiers, etc. Only in that event shall we be in a position to fulfil the twofold task of a workers' party in a bourgeois revolution, namely, to carry the democratic revolution to completion and to extend and strengthen the forces of the socialist proletariat, which needs freedom in order to carry on a ruthless struggle for the overthrow of the rule of capital.

SOCIALISM AND RELIGION

Present-day society is wholly based on the exploitation of the vast masses of the working class by a tiny minority of the population, the class of the landowners and that of the capitalists. It is a slave society, since the "free" workers, who all their life work for the capitalists, are "entitled" only to such means of subsistence as are essential for the maintenance of slaves who produce profit, for the safeguarding and perpetuation of capitalist slavery.

The economic oppression of the workers inevitably calls forth and engenders every kind of political oppression and social humiliation, the coarsening and darkening of the spiritual and moral life of the masses. The workers may secure a greater or lesser degree of political liberty to fight for their economic emancipation, but no amount of liberty will rid them of poverty, unemployment, and oppression until the power of capital is overthrown. Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, overburdened by their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation. Impotence of the exploited classes in their struggle against the exploiters just as inevitably gives rise to the belief in a better life after death as impotence of the savage in his battle with nature gives rise to belief in gods, devils, miracles, and the like. Those who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labour of others are taught by religion to practise charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moderate price tickets to well-being in heaven. Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual booze,

in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man.

But a slave who has become conscious of his slavery and has risen to struggle for his emancipation has already half ceased to be a slave. The modern class-conscious worker, reared by large-scale factory industry and enlightened by urban life, contemptuously casts aside religious prejudices, leaves heaven to the priests and bourgeois bigots, and tries to win a better life for himself here on earth. The proletariat of today takes the side of socialism, which enlists science in the battle against the fog of religion, and frees the workers from their belief in life after death by welding them together to fight in the present for a better life on earth.

Religion must be declared a private affair. In these words socialists usually express their attitude towards religion. But the meaning of these words should be accurately defined to prevent any misunderstanding. We demand that religion be held a private affair so far as the state is concerned. But by no means can we consider religion a private affair so far as our Party is concerned. Religion must be of no concern to the state, and religious societies must have no connection with governmental authority. Everyone must be absolutely free to profess any religion he pleases, or no religion whatever, i.e., to be an atheist, which every socialist is, as a rule. Discrimination among citizens on account of their religious convictions is wholly intolerable. Even the bare mention of a citizen's religion in official documents should unquestionably be eliminated. No subsidies should be granted to the established church nor state allowances made to ecclesiastical and religious societies. These should become absolutely free associations of like-minded citizens, associations independent of the state. Only the complete fulfilment of these demands can put an end to the shameful and accursed past when the church lived in feudal dependence on the state, and Russian citizens lived in feudal dependence on the established church, when medieval, inquisitorial laws (to this day remaining in our criminal codes and on our statute-books) were in existence and were applied, persecuting men for their belief or disbelief, violating men's consciences, and linking cosy gov-

ernment jobs and government-derived incomes with the dispensation of this or that dope by the established church. Complete separation of Church and State is what the socialist proletariat demands of the modern state and the modern church.

The Russian revolution must put this demand into effect as a necessary component of political freedom. In this respect, the Russian revolution is in a particularly favourable position, since the revolting officialism of the police-ridden feudal autocracy has called forth discontent, unrest and indignation even among the clergy. However abject, however ignorant Russian Orthodox clergymen may have been, even they have now been awakened by the thunder of the downfall of the old, medieval order in Russia. Even they are joining in the demand for freedom, are protesting against bureaucratic practices and officialism, against the spying for the police imposed on the "servants of God". We socialists must lend this movement our support, carrying the demands of honest and sincere members of the clergy to their conclusion, making them stick to their words about freedom, demanding that they should resolutely break all ties between religion and the police. Either you are sincere, in which case you must stand for the complete separation of Church and State and of School and Church, for religion to be declared wholly and absolutely a private affair. Or you do not accept these consistent demands for freedom, in which case you evidently are still held captive by the traditions of the inquisition, in which case you evidently still cling to your cosy government jobs and government-derived incomes, in which case you evidently do not believe in the spiritual power of your weapon and continue to take bribes from the state. And in that case the class-conscious workers of all Russia declare merciless war on you.

So far as the party of the socialist proletariat is concerned, religion is not a private affair. Our Party is an association of class-conscious, advanced fighters for the emancipation of the working class. Such an association cannot and must not be indifferent to lack of class-consciousness, ignorance or obscurantism in the shape of religious beliefs. We demand complete disestablishment of the Church so as to be able to combat the religious fog with purely ideo-

logical and solely ideological weapons, by means of our press and by word of mouth. But we founded our association, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, precisely for such a struggle against every religious bamboozling of the workers. And to us the ideological struggle is not a private affair, but the affair of the whole Party, of the whole proletariat.

If that is so, why do we not declare in our Programme that we are atheists? Why do we not forbid Christians and other believers in God to join our Party?

The answer to this question will serve to explain the very important difference in the way the question of religion is presented by the bourgeois democrats and the Social-Democrats.

Our Programme is based entirely on the scientific, and moreover the materialist, world-outlook. An explanation of our Programme, therefore, necessarily includes an explanation of the true historical and economic roots of the religious fog. Our propaganda necessarily includes the propaganda of atheism; the publication of the appropriate scientific literature, which the autocratic feudal government has hitherto strictly forbidden and persecuted, must now form one of the fields of our Party work. We shall now probably have to follow the advice Engels once gave to the German Socialists: to translate and widely disseminate the literature of the eighteenth-century French Enlightenmenters and atheists.³⁶

But under no circumstances ought we to fall into the error of posing the religious question in an abstract, idealistic fashion, as an "intellectual" question unconnected with the class struggle, as is not infrequently done by the radical-democrats from among the bourgeoisie. It would be stupid to think that, in a society based on the endless oppression and coarsening of the worker masses, religious prejudices could be dispelled by purely propaganda methods. It would be bourgeois narrow-mindedness to forget that the yoke of religion that weighs upon mankind is merely a product and reflection of the economic yoke within society. No number of pamphlets and no amount of preaching can enlighten the proletariat, if it is not enlightened by its own struggle against the dark forces of capitalism.

Unity in this really revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class for the creation of a paradise on earth is more important to us than unity of proletarian opinion on paradise in heaven.

That is the reason why we do not and should not set forth our atheism in our Programme; that is why we do not and should not prohibit proletarians who still retain vestiges of their old prejudices from associating themselves with our Party. We shall always preach the scientific world-outlook, and it is essential for us to combat the inconsistency of various "Christians". But that does not mean in the least that the religious question ought to be advanced to first place, where it does not belong at all; nor does it mean that we should allow the forces of the really revolutionary economic and political struggle to be split up on account of third-rate opinions or senseless ideas, rapidly losing all political importance, rapidly being swept out as rubbish by the very course of economic development.

Everywhere the reactionary bourgeoisie has concerned itself, and is now beginning to concern itself in Russia, with the fomenting of religious strife—in order thereby to divert the attention of the masses from the really important and fundamental economic and political problems, now being solved in practice by the all-Russian proletariat uniting in revolutionary struggle. This reactionary policy of splitting up the proletarian forces, which today manifests itself mainly in Black-Hundred pogroms, may tomorrow conceive some more subtle forms. We, at any rate, shall oppose it by calmly, consistently and patiently preaching proletarian solidarity and the scientific world-outlook—a preaching alien to any stirring up of secondary differences.

The revolutionary proletariat will succeed in making religion a really private affair, so far as the state is concerned. And in this political system, cleansed of medieval mildew, the proletariat will wage a broad and open struggle for the elimination of economic slavery, the true source of the religious humbugging of mankind.

**RESOLUTION ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION
ADOPTED BY THE "MAJORITY" CONFERENCE
AT TAMMERFORS³⁷**

DECEMBER 12-17 (25-30), 1905

1. The Conference recognises that the development of the peasant movement fully confirms the fundamental views of revolutionary Marxism, with regard to both the revolutionary nature and the real social and economic essence of this movement, which is destroying the survivals of serfdom and creating free bourgeois relationships in the countryside. The Conference holds that it is desirable to amend the agrarian programme of our Party as follows: to delete the clause on cut-off lands³⁸; to declare, instead, that the Party supports the revolutionary measures of the peasantry, including the confiscation of all state, church, monastery, crown and privately-owned land, making it its principal and constant task to ensure the independent organisation of the rural proletariat, explain to it the irreconcilable conflict between its interests and those of the rural bourgeoisie, and point out the ultimate goal of socialism, which alone is capable of doing away with the division of society into classes and all exploitation of man by man.

2. The Conference expresses the desire that the demand for the refunding of land redemption payments³⁹ and the establishment of a special fund out of the sums thus collected be deleted from the agrarian programme. The demand for the confiscation of state, monastery, etc., lands should be transferred to another clause.

- 1) Раб. Стафаніе надрумаеў унітар
справы нод пуркоб. в. С. Р. П. М. в. Судбу
лукер дзія: 1895-1901/2
- 2) Раб. Дбуф. непер. в. справы ^{в. С. Р. П. М.}
оды в. гуманітарнае нодуруека
уноуруека, члов. луд. в. рад.
Дзія в. чл. дзія: 1901/2 - 1905.
- 3) Раб. Дбуф. паронаеція в. спр.
спр. ібаста, нурен луд.
Дзія спр. енлітлае в. к. д. наг.
спр. в. дзія (в. оуруека ібаста нурен)
в. спр. ібаста (в. оуруека)
в. спр. ібаста, ко радур.
Дзія в. чл. дзія в. С. Р. П. М.
в. спр. ібаста в. спр. ібаста
в. спр. ібаста в. спр. ібаста
1905 (в. С. Р. П. М.)

First page of Lenin's manuscript
"The Stages, the Trend, and the Prospects of the Revolution",
1905

Reduced

THE STAGES, THE TREND, AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION

1. The working-class movement rouses the proletariat from the beginning under the leadership of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and *awakens* the liberal bourgeoisie: 1895 to 1901-02.

2. The working-class movement passes to open political struggle and *enlists* the politically awakened strata of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie: 1901-02 to 1905.

3. The working-class movement flares up into a direct *revolution*, while the liberal bourgeoisie has already formed itself into the Constitutional-Democratic Party and thinks of stopping the revolution by compromising with tsarism; but the *radical* elements of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are inclined to enter into an alliance with the proletariat for the *continuation of the revolution*: 1905 (especially the end of that year).

4. The working-class movement achieves victory in the *democratic* revolution, the liberals passively waiting to see how things go and the *peasants* actively assisting. Plus the radical, republican intelligentsia and the corresponding strata of the petty bourgeoisie in the towns. The rising of the peasants is victorious, the power of the landlords is broken.

(“The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.”)

5. The liberal bourgeoisie, temporising in the third period, passive in the fourth, becomes downright counter-revolutionary, and organises itself in order to take away from the proletariat the gains of the revolution. Among the peasantry, the whole of the well-to-do section, and a fairly large part of the middle peasantry, also grow “wiser”,

quieten down and turn to the side of the counter-revolution in order to wrest power from the proletariat and the rural poor, who sympathise with the proletariat.

6. On the basis of the relations established during the fifth period, a new crisis and a new struggle develop and blaze forth, with the proletariat now fighting to preserve its democratic gains for the sake of a socialist revolution. This struggle would have been almost hopeless for the Russian proletariat alone and its defeat would have been as inevitable as the defeat of the German revolutionary party in 1849-50, or of the French proletariat in 1871, *had the European socialist proletariat* not come to the assistance of the Russian proletariat.

Thus, at this stage, the liberal bourgeoisie and the well-to-do peasantry (plus partly the middle peasantry) organise counter-revolution. The Russian proletariat *plus* the European proletariat organise revolution.

In such conditions the Russian proletariat can win a second victory. The cause is no longer hopeless. The second victory will be the *socialist revolution in Europe*.

The European workers will show us "how to do it", and then together with them we shall bring about the socialist revolution.

Written late in 1905
or early 1906

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according
to the manuscript

THE WORKERS' PARTY AND ITS TASKS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION⁴⁰

The general tasks of the students in the Russian liberation movement have been explained more than once in the Social-Democratic press, and we shall not dwell on them in this article. There is no need to explain to student Social-Democrats the leading role of the working-class movement, the immense importance of the peasant movement, or the importance of assistance to both by those intellectuals who have pondered the Marxist world-outlook, have taken the side of the proletariat, and are prepared to train themselves to become real members of the workers' party.

We propose to dwell, if only briefly, on another question which is now of paramount practical importance.

What is the special feature of the present state of the great Russian revolution?

It is that events have completely exposed the illusory nature of the Manifesto of October 17. Constitutional illusions have been dispersed. Reaction is rampant all along the line. The autocracy has been fully restored, and even "reinforced" by the dictatorial powers granted to the local satraps, from Dubasov⁴¹ down to the lowest ranks of the police.

Civil war is raging. The political strike, as such, is beginning to exhaust itself, and is becoming a thing of the past, an obsolete form of the movement. In St. Petersburg, for instance, the famished and exhausted workers were not able to carry out the December strike. On the other hand, the movement as a whole, though held down for the moment by the reaction, has undoubtedly risen to a much higher plane.

The heroic proletariat of Moscow has shown that an active struggle is possible, and has drawn into this struggle a large body of people from strata of the urban population hitherto considered politically indifferent, if not reactionary. And yet the Moscow events⁴² were merely one of the most striking expressions of a "trend" that has broken through all over Russia. The new form of action was confronted with gigantic problems which, of course, could not be solved all at once. But these problems are now confronting the whole people in a clear and definite way; the movement has been raised to a higher level, consolidated and tempered. No power on earth can wrest these gains from the revolution.

Dubasov's guns have revolutionised new masses of the people on an unprecedented scale. The refurbished caricature of a Duma has been greeted beforehand with far greater hostility by the advanced fighters, and with incomparably greater scepticism by the bourgeoisie, than the old Bulygin Duma.⁴³

What now?

Let us look realities squarely in the face. We are now confronted with the new task of studying and utilising the experience of the latest forms of struggle, the task of training and organising forces in the most important centres of the movement.

It would be very much to the advantage of the government to suppress the still isolated actions of the proletarians. The government would like to challenge the workers of St. Petersburg immediately, to go into battle under circumstances that would be most unfavourable for them. But the workers will not allow themselves to be provoked, and will know how to continue on their path of independent preparation for the next all-Russian action.

Forces for such an action exist: they are growing faster than ever. Only a small part of them was drawn into the vortex of the December events. The movement has not by any means developed to its full breadth and depth.

It is enough to glance at the moderate bourgeois and Black-Hundred press. No one, not even *Novoye Vremya*,⁴⁴ believes the government's boast that it is able immediately

to nip in the bud any new active manifestation of the movement. No one doubts that the gigantic mass of combustible material—the peasantry—will dare up properly only towards the spring. No one believes that the government sincerely wants to convene the Duma, or that it is able to do so under the old system of repressions, red tape, officialism, denial of civic rights, and ignorance.

It is not excessive optimism on the part of revolutionaries, extremely dangerous in a question like that of decisive action; it is obvious facts, acknowledged even by opponents of the revolution, which testify that the government gained a “victory” in Moscow that rendered its position even more desperate than it was prior to October.

The peasant uprising is growing. Financial collapse is drawing near. The gold currency is declining. The deficit of 500 million rubles cannot be made good in spite of the readiness of the reactionary bourgeoisie of Europe to come to the aid of the autocracy. All the troops fit to fight against the revolution have been brought into action, and still the “pacification” of the Caucasus and Siberia drags on. The ferment in the Army and Navy, which became so marked after October 17, will certainly not be allayed by recourse to violence against the champions of liberty all over Russia. The return of the war prisoners and of the Manchurian army means an intensification of that ferment. The mobilisation of new army units against the internal enemy creates new dangers for the autocracy. The crisis, far from being solved, has, on the contrary, been extended and aggravated by the Moscow “victory”.

Let the workers' party clearly realise its tasks. Away with constitutional illusions! We must rally the new forces which are siding with the proletariat. We must “garner the experience” of the two great months of the revolution (November and December). We must re-adapt ourselves to the restored autocracy, and be able wherever necessary to go underground once more. We must present the colossal tasks of a new active encounter in a more definite and practical way, must prepare ourselves for it in a more sustained, more systematic and more persevering fashion, husbanding as far as possible the strength of the proletariat which has become exhausted by the strike struggle.

Wave follows on wave. After the capital, the provinces. After the outlying regions, the very heart of Russia. After the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie. After the towns, the villages. The effort of the reactionary government to carry out its vast tasks is bound to fail. Much in the outcome of the first phase of the great Russian revolution will depend on our preparation for the spring of 1906.

Written at the end of December 1905

Published in *Molodaya Rossiya*,
No. 1, January 4, 1906
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the newspaper text

SHOULD WE BOYCOTT THE STATE DUMA?

THE PLATFORM OF THE "MAJORITY"

The party of the working class, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, is becoming united. Its two halves are merging and are preparing for a unity congress, the convocation of which has already been announced.

But there is still one point on which the two halves of the Party disagree—the State Duma. All Party members must be clear on this question, in order to be able to make a deliberate choice of delegates for the joint congress, in order to settle the dispute in accordance with the wishes of all members of the Party, and not only with those of its present central and local bodies.

Bolsheviks and Mensheviks are agreed that the present Duma is a miserable travesty of popular representation, that this fraud must be exposed, and that preparations must be made for an armed uprising to bring about the convocation of a constituent assembly freely elected by the whole people.

The dispute is only about the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma. The Mensheviks say that our Party should take part in the election of delegates and electors. The Bolsheviks advocate an active boycott of the Duma. In this leaflet we shall set forth the views of the Bolsheviks, who at a recent conference of representatives of twenty-six organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution against participation in the elections.*

What does an active boycott of the Duma mean? Boycott means refusing to take part in the elections. We have no wish to elect either Duma deputies, electors or delegates.

* See pp. 103-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Active boycott does not merely mean keeping out of the elections; it also means making extensive use of election meetings for Social-Democratic agitation and organisation. Making use of these meetings means gaining entry to them both legally (by registering in the voters' lists) and illegally, expounding at them the whole programme and all the views of the socialists, exposing the Duma as a fraud and humbug, and calling for a struggle for a constituent assembly.

Why do we refuse to take part in the elections?

Because by taking part in the elections we should involuntarily foster belief in the Duma among the people and thereby weaken the effectiveness of our struggle against this travesty of popular representation. The Duma is not a parliament, it is a ruse employed by the autocracy. We must expose this ruse by refusing to take any part in the elections.

Because if we recognised the permissibility of taking part in the elections, we should have to be logical and elect deputies to the Duma. Indeed, the bourgeois democrats, such as Khodsky in *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo*, actually advise us to enter into election agreements with the Cadets for that purpose. But all Social-Democrats, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, reject such agreements because they realise that the Duma is not a parliament, but a new police fraud.

Because we cannot at present derive any advantage for the Party from the elections. There is no freedom to carry on agitation. The party of the working class is outlawed; its representatives are imprisoned without trial; its newspapers have been closed and its meetings prohibited. The Party cannot legally unfurl its banner at the elections, it cannot publicly nominate its representatives without betraying them to the police. In this situation, our work of agitation and organisation is far better served by making revolutionary use of meetings without taking part in the elections than by taking part in meetings for legal elections.

The Mensheviks are opposed to electing deputies to the Duma, but wish to elect delegates and electors. What for? Is it in order that they may form a People's Duma, or a free, illegal, representative assembly, something like an All-Russian Soviet of Workers' (and also Peasants') Deputies?

To this we reply: if free representatives are needed, why bother with the Duma at all when electing them? Why supply the police with the lists of our delegates? And why set up new Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and in a new way, when the old Soviets of Workers' Deputies still exist (e.g., in St. Petersburg)? This would be useless and even harmful, for it would give rise to the false, utopian illusion that the decaying and disintegrating Soviets can be revived by new elections, instead of by making new preparations for insurrection and extending it. And it would simply be ridiculous to appoint legal elections on legally fixed dates for the purpose of an insurrection.

The Mensheviks argue that Social-Democrats in all countries take part in parliaments, even in bad parliaments. This argument is false. We, too, will take full part in a parliament. But the Mensheviks themselves realise that the Duma is not a parliament; they themselves refuse to go into it. They say that the masses of the workers are weary and wish to rest by participating in legal elections. But the Party cannot and must not base its tactics on the temporary weariness of certain centres. This would be fatal for the Party; for weary workers would choose non-party delegates, who would merely discredit the Party. We must perseveringly and patiently pursue our work, husbanding the strength of the proletariat, but not ceasing to believe that this depression is only temporary, that the workers will rise still more powerfully and more boldly than they did in Moscow, and that they will sweep away the tsar's Duma. Let the unenlightened and ignorant go into the Duma—the Party will not bind its fate with theirs. The Party will say to them: your own practical experience will confirm our political forecasts. Your own experience will reveal to you the utter fraud the Duma is; and you will then turn back to the Party, having realised the correctness of its counsel.

The tactics of the Mensheviks are contradictory and inconsistent (to take part in the elections, but not to elect deputies to the Duma). They are unsuitable for a mass party, for instead of a simple and clear solution they propose one that is involved and ambiguous. They are not practical, for if the lists of delegates fall into the hands of the police, the Party will suffer a heavy loss. Finally, these tac-

tics cannot be put into effect, because if the Mensheviks appear at the meetings with our programme, the inevitable result will be that instead of legal elections there will be the illegal use of meetings without elections. The police regime will transform the Mensheviks' participation in meetings from Menshevik participation in elections into Bolshevik revolutionary use of the meetings.

Down with the Duma! Down with the new police fraud! Citizens! Honour the memory of the fallen Moscow heroes by fresh preparations for an armed uprising! Long live a freely-elected national constituent assembly!

Such is our battle-cry; and only the tactics of an active boycott are compatible with it.

Written in January 1906

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as a leaflet both by the C.C.
and the Joint C.C.
of the R.S.D.L.P.

Published according to the
leaflet of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.

**THE STATE DUMA
AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC
TACTICS⁴⁵**

Written in January 1906

Published in February 1906
in the pamphlet *The State Duma
and Social-Democracy*
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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the pamphlet text

The Law of December 11⁴⁶ has brought up, once again, the question of our tactics in relation to the Duma. Shall we take part in the Duma elections, or not? This is the question that is being eagerly discussed in the columns of our bourgeois-democratic press. And it was on this question that the conference of organisations of the "Majority" in the R.S.D.L.P. recently expressed its opinion. This conference, which was attended by representatives of twenty-six organisations (fourteen of them composed of workers, elected by over four thousand organised members of the Party), took the place of the proposed Fourth Congress of the Party, the convocation of which had been announced by the Central Committee. The Congress could not be held because of the railway strike, the Moscow insurrection, and various other events in the most far-flung parts of Russia. But the delegates who had gathered organised a conference of the "Majority" which, among other things, also discussed the Duma elections. This question it decided in the negative, that is, in the sense that the Party should not take part in the elections. The following is the relevant part of the resolution adopted by the conference:

"Ever since October 17, the autocratic government has been trampling upon all the fundamental civil liberties won by the proletariat. The government has drenched the country in blood, shooting down with artillery and machine-guns the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors fighting for liberty. The government scoffs at the nation-wide demand for the convocation of a constituent assembly, and by its Law of December 11 is trying once again to deceive the proletariat and the peasantry, and to stave off its final destruction.

"The Law of December 11 practically bars the proletariat and the bulk of the peasantry from the State Duma; and its object is by all sorts of ruses and police restrictions to ensure in advance the predominance in the Duma of the Black-Hundred elements of the exploiting classes.

"This conference is convinced that the whole of the class-conscious proletariat of Russia will reply to this new tsarist law by resolutely

fighting against it, as well as against any other travesty of popular representation.

“This conference holds that the Social-Democrats must strive to prevent the convocation of this police Duma, and must refuse to take any part in it.”

The resolution then goes on to recommend all Party organisations to take full advantage of the election meetings, but not in order to carry out any sort of elections under police restrictions. They should do so in order to expand the revolutionary organisation of the proletariat and conduct agitation among all sections of the people in favour of a resolute struggle against the autocracy; for only after complete victory has been achieved over the latter will it be possible to convene representatives of the people elected in a truly free manner.

Is this decision correct? To answer this question, let us first of all examine the objections that may be raised against it. What may now be urged in favour of participating in the Duma is that the workers have obtained some rights in electing the Duma, and also that there is now somewhat greater freedom to carry on agitation than in the period of the “first”, Bulygin, Duma promised by the Law of August 6. These considerations—together with the suppression of the insurrection in Moscow and elsewhere, after which some period of lull is necessary to rally and train fresh forces—have naturally been inclining the “Minority” in the R.S.D.L.P. in favour of participation in the election of at least the delegates and electors. Such Social-Democrats believe that we ought not to try to get into the State Duma, that we ought not to go beyond the stage of electing electors; but that we ought to use the opportunities offered by the election in the workers’ curia to carry on agitation, and to organise and politically educate the proletariat.

In reply to these arguments, we will first of all observe that they follow quite naturally from the general principles of the Social-Democratic world-outlook and from Social-Democratic tactics. We representatives of the “Majority” must admit this, to avoid running to factional extremes that may prove an obstacle to Party unity, which is so absolutely essential now. We must by all means carefully reconsider the question of tactics. Although events

have confirmed the correctness of our tactics towards the 6th of August Duma, which was really frustrated, boycotted, swept away by the proletariat, it does not automatically follow that the new Duma can be frustrated in the same way. The situation has changed, and we must carefully weigh up the arguments for and against participation.

We have briefly outlined what we believe to be the main arguments in favour of participation. Let us now pass to the arguments against it.

The new Duma is undoubtedly a caricature of popular representation. Our participation in the elections will give the masses of the people a distorted idea of our appraisal of the Duma.

There is no freedom to carry on agitation. Meetings are dispersed. Delegates are arrested.

If we swallow the bait of Dubasov's "constitutionalism", we shall be unable to unfurl our Party banner before the masses, and shall weaken our Party forces with little benefit to the cause; for if our candidates come forward "legally" we shall merely provide the police with ready-made lists of people to be arrested.

In most parts of Russia civil war is raging. The lull can only be a temporary one. Continuous preparation is essential. It is both inadvisable and impracticable for our Party to combine this with elections held under the Law of December 11. We shall be unable to take part in the elections "legally", even if we wanted to; the conditions of the struggle will not permit it. There may be exceptions, of course; but it would be irrational for their sake to cause confusion, disorganisation and disunity in our nation-wide proletarian tactics.

Duma elections held under the Law of December 11 and under the rule of the Dubasovs and Durnovs⁴⁷ are mere playing at parliamentarism. It is beneath the dignity of the proletariat to be a party to such a game.

The tactics of the mass party of the proletariat must be simple, clear and straightforward. The proposal to elect delegates and electors, without electing deputies to the Duma, however, is a confused and ambiguous solution of the problem. On the one hand, it accepts the legal form

of elections under the law. On the other hand, it "frustrates" the law, for the proposed elections will not be conducted for the purpose of carrying out the law, of electing deputies to the Duma. On the one hand, an election campaign begins; on the other, it breaks off at the most important stage (in the elections as a whole), just when the actual composition of the Duma is to be decided. On the one hand, the workers are to restrict their elections (of delegates and electors) within the absurd and reactionary limits of the Law of December 11. On the other hand, these workers' elections, which avowedly give an incomplete and distorted picture of the progressive aims of the proletariat, are expected to achieve these aims outside the Duma (in the shape of some sort of illegal representation or illegal Duma, or popular Duma, etc.). The result is an absurdity: elections on the basis of a non-existent franchise to a non-existent parliament. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg and Moscow were elected by the workers themselves, not in accordance with "legal forms" prescribed by the police. And the arrest of the members of these Soviets taught the workers a very important lesson. These arrests showed how dangerous it is to trust pseudo-constitutionalism, how insecure "revolutionary local self-government" without the victory of the revolutionary forces, how inadequate a temporary non-party organisation, which can sometimes supplement, but cannot in any sense replace a solid, lasting militant party organisation. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the two capitals fell because they lacked firm support in the shape of militant proletarian organisation. If we replace these Soviets by meetings of electors or of delegates, we shall be substituting verbal support for militant support, would-be parliamentary support for revolutionary support. This will be the same as trying to replace a missing gun by one drawn on cardboard.

Furthermore, if we participate in the elections, we put the proletariat in a false relation to the bourgeois democrats. The latter are splitting up again. The moderate liberals (Cadets) are staunchly in favour of participating in the elections. The radicals are prone to boycott them. The class background of this split is clear: the Right wing of the bourgeoisie is prone to come to terms with reaction through

the Duma. The Left wing of the bourgeoisie is prone to form an alliance with the revolution, or at any rate to back it (recall how the Union of Unions associated itself with the manifesto on the financial bankruptcy of the government issued by the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies⁴⁸). The boycott tactics provide a clear and correct expression of the proletariat's attitude towards the revolutionary and the opportunist bourgeoisie. The tactics of participation would cause utter chaos, and prevent the proletariat from distinguishing between its immediate allies and its enemies.

Lastly, the practical objects of participation can be attained to an equal, if not greater, degree by the boycott. An assessment of the strength of the proletariat, agitation and organisation, and the predominance of the Social-Democrats in the workers' curia can all be achieved by the revolutionary use of election meetings instead of formal participation in them; for this there is no need whatever to elect "delegates" and "electors". There is less chance of achieving all this if forces are diverted to these ridiculous legal elections; for we ourselves reject the objects of these elections, and it is not in the least to our advantage to inform the police about them. In practice, what will happen probably in nearly every case will be the revolutionary use of the election meetings, and not participation in them; for the workers will not submit to the police restrictions, will not eject "unauthorised persons" (i.e., the Social-Democrats), and will not abide by the election regulations. By the force of circumstances, of the revolutionary situation, there will be no elections at the "election" meetings; they will be transformed into meetings for party agitation outside of and despite the elections; in other words, the result will be what is called "active boycott". Whatever view we take of things, however we interpret our views, and whatever reservations we make, our participation in the elections will inevitably tend to foster the idea of substituting the Duma for a constituent assembly, the idea of convening a constituent assembly through the Duma, etc. The tactics of exposing the fraudulent and fictitious character of representation in the Duma, of demanding the convocation of a constituent assembly by revolutionary

means and yet participating in the Duma, can only confuse the proletariat at a revolutionary moment: they can only strengthen the position of the least class-conscious elements of the mass of the workers, and of those working-class leaders who are least scrupulous and least principled. We may declare that our Social-Democratic candidates are completely and absolutely independent, and that we are participating in the elections on the strictest possible Party lines: but the political situation is more potent than any number of declarations. Things will not, and cannot, turn out in keeping with these declarations. Whether we like it or not, if we participate now in the present Duma elections, the result will inevitably be neither Social-Democratic nor workers' party policy.

The tactics recommended by the conference of the "Majority" are the only correct tactics.

The position taken up by the "Cadets" provides interesting confirmation (indirect) of this conclusion. In its "death-bed" issue (of December 20) *Narodnaya Svoboda* argues as follows on a question which has arisen once more—whether to go into the Duma.⁴⁹ The immediate task is to convene a national constituent assembly. The newspaper takes this proposition for granted. Who is to convene this constituent assembly, and how? In *Narodnaya Svoboda*'s opinion, three answers may be given to this question: (1) The lawful (or *de facto*, the autocratic) government; (2) a provisional revolutionary government; (3) the State Duma, as an "authority competing with authority". It goes without saying that the "Cadets" are in favour of the third "solution" and urge the necessity of participating in the Duma precisely in order to achieve it. They reject the first solution, as they have given up all hopes of the government. Concerning the second solution they give us the following highly characteristic specimen of argument:

"Can we count on the *practical* achievement of that provisional government of which even today—amidst the bloody fumes of a suppressed insurrection—the revolutionary parties still dream? We say quite plainly: no, we cannot—and not because armed uprising is impossible: Moscow has proved the reverse, and not because such an insurrection must, as sure as fate, be suppressed by armed force: who can foretell the future?"

“We cannot count on a provisional government because it will not *in any circumstances*—not even in the event of a successful insurrection—be strong and authoritative enough to ‘restore the shattered temple’ of the land of Russia. It will be swept away by the waves of counter-revolution surging up from the depths of society.

“The Russian revolution has been going on, not for months, but for years; during this period it has managed to take a sharp and definite course; and we must say quite candidly that this course is neither towards armed uprising nor towards a provisional government. Let us not shut our eyes to facts. The liberal intelligentsia, the peasantry and the proletariat are all revolutionary; but the revolutionary co-operation of these three elements under the banner of armed uprising is *impossible*. We will not go into the question of who is right and who is to blame: the fact remains a fact. That being so, from what elements can the vaunted provisional government of the revolutionary parties arise? What can it be? The dictatorship of the proletariat? But it is useless talking about the dictatorship of the proletariat in present-day Russia....”

We have deliberately reproduced this argument in full, because it splendidly, and with a lucidity rare for the “Cadets”, conveys the substance of the liberal-bourgeois point of view. The flaws in this argument are so obvious that we need dwell on them only briefly. If the possibility of armed uprising has now been proved, and if the hopelessness of its victory cannot be proved in advance, then of what value is the argument that “it will be swept away by counter-revolution”? It is a ridiculously weak excuse. There has never been a revolution without counter-revolution, nor can there be. Today, for instance, October 17 itself has been swept away by the wave of counter-revolution; but does that prove that constitutional demands have lost their vitality? The question is not whether there will be counter-revolution, but who, in the last analysis, after the inevitably long battles, with their many vicissitudes, will be the victor.

Narodnaya Svoboda realises that this question can be answered only by an analysis of the social forces. It makes this analysis, and admits that the proletariat, the peasantry and the liberal intelligentsia are all revolutionary. But then it “decrees”: their “co-operation under the banner of armed uprising is impossible”. Why? This is the pivot of the question, and it cannot be settled by bare state-

ments. The fact that remains a fact is that the proletariat and the peasantry are rising, with the co-operation of at least some part of the bourgeois intelligentsia. By admitting the fact (which now no longer needs anyone's admission) that armed insurrection is possible, admitting that it is impossible to predict that all later outbreaks will fail, the newspaper has cut the ground from under its own arguments. It saves itself only by a quibble: it repudiates the possibility of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., of a socialist dictatorship, whereas it should have talked about the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. These classes are assured of the sympathy and co-operation of a certain section of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and of the bourgeois intelligentsia in particular; the only question is the degree of organisation and fighting capacity. This is a very important and serious question, of course; but only those who obviously want to evade an answer would attempt to answer it offhand in the negative.

The position of the liberal landlords is clear. They want to take part in the Duma precisely because they do not want to take part in the revolutionary struggle. They want the Duma convened precisely because they do not want the revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly. They want the Duma precisely because they want a deal. Thus the difference between the attitude of the liberals and that of the Social-Democrats towards the Duma quite distinctly reflects the difference between the class attitude of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat. And how hopeless is this sighing for a deal and for a Duma, in a period of acute civil war, is shown, among other things, by the suppression of the "Cadet" newspapers and the miserable existence of the whole liberal press in general. Every day all this press publishes heaps of facts which show that the representation in the Duma is an utter fraud, and that anything like free agitation and proper elections are utterly impossible. The realities of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary situation prove, more convincingly than any number of arguments, that dreams about participating in the Duma for the purpose of fighting are futile, and that the tactics of active boycott are correct.

A few words in conclusion about how our agitation for an active boycott of the Duma should be conducted within the Party in view of the amalgamation of the factions and the complete unification of the R.S.D.L.P. now taking place.

Amalgamation is essential. It must be supported. In the interests of amalgamation, we must contend with the Mensheviks on tactics in a comradely way; we must strive to convince all the members of the Party, and convert our polemics into a practical setting forth of the pros and cons, an explanation of the position of the proletariat and its class aims. But amalgamation does not in the least oblige us to gloss over disagreements on tactics or to refrain from explaining our tactics fully and sincerely. Nothing of the kind. The ideological struggle for the tactics that we regard as correct should be carried on openly, straightforwardly and resolutely to the end, that is to say, until the unity congress of the Party meets. Tactics determine the immediate activities of a party, and therefore a united party can have only one set of tactics. These tactics must be those agreed to by the majority of the members of the Party: when the majority has taken a definite stand, the minority must submit to it in its political conduct, while retaining the right to criticise and to advocate a settlement of the question at the next congress.

In the present situation in our Party, both factions have agreed to the convocation of a unity congress, and both have agreed to submit to its decisions. The unity congress will decide what are to be the united tactics of the Party. Our duty is to do everything to hasten the convocation of this congress, and to strive with the utmost vigour to bring home to every Party member as clearly as possible the tactical differences on the question of taking part in the Duma, so that, in voting for delegates to the joint congress that will unite our Party and our tactics, all Party members may make their choice not haphazardly, but with deliberation, with a complete knowledge of the case, and after fully weighing up the arguments of both sides.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN RUSSIA AND THE TACTICS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY⁵⁰

The Russian Social-Democratic Party is passing through a very difficult time. Martial law, shootings and floggings, overcrowded prisons, a proletariat worn out by starvation, chaos in organisation, aggravated by the destruction of many of the underground centres and by the absence of legal centres, and lastly the controversy over tactics, coinciding with the difficult task of restoring Party unity, are all inevitably causing a certain disarray of Party forces.

The formal way out of this disarray is the convening of the unity congress of the Party; and it is our profound conviction that all Party workers should do their utmost to hasten this event. But while the work of convening the congress is proceeding, we must bring to everybody's notice, and very seriously discuss, the extremely important question of the more profound causes of this disarray. Strictly speaking, the question of boycotting the State Duma is only a minor part of the big question of revising the whole tactics of the Party. And this question, in its turn, is only a minor part of the big question of the present situation in Russia and of the significance of the present moment in the history of the Russian revolution.

We can see two lines of tactics, which are due to two different appraisals of the present moment. Some (see, for example, Lenin's article in *Molodaya Rossiya**) regard the suppression of the insurrection in Moscow and elsewhere merely as preparing the ground and the conditions for another, more decisive, armed struggle. They see the real significance of the present moment in the dispelling of con-

* See pp. 93-96 of this volume.—*Ed.*

stitutional illusions. They regard the two great months of the revolution (November and December) as the period in which the peaceful general strike grew into an armed uprising of the whole people. The possibility of such an uprising has been proved; the movement has been raised to a higher plane; the broad masses have acquired the practical experience needed for the success of the future uprising; peaceful strikes have spent themselves. This experience must be very carefully collected; the proletariat must be given an opportunity to recuperate; all constitutional illusions and all idea of participating in the Duma must be emphatically discarded. We must more perseveringly and patiently prepare for a new insurrection and establish closer links with the organisations of the peasantry, which in all probability will rise in greater strength towards the spring.

Others appraise the situation differently. Comrade Plekhanov, in No. 3, and particularly in No. 4 of his *Dnevnik*,^{50a} has formulated this other appraisal more consistently than anybody, although, unfortunately, he has not everywhere fully set forth his ideas.

"The political strike, inopportunately begun," says Comrade Plekhanov, "resulted in armed uprising in Moscow, Rostov, and elsewhere. The strength of the proletariat proved inadequate for victory. It was not difficult to foresee this. And therefore it was wrong to take up arms." The practical task of the class-conscious elements in the working-class movement "is to point out to the proletariat its mistake, and to explain to it how risky is the game called armed uprising". Plekhanov does not deny that he wants to put a brake on the movement. He recalls that, six months before the Commune, Marx warned the proletariat of Paris against untimely outbreaks.⁵¹ "The facts of life have shown," says Plekhanov, "that the tactics our Party has pursued during the past months are unsound. On pain of further defeats, we must learn to adopt new tactics." ... "The main thing is immediately to pay much more attention to the workers' trade union movement." "A very large number of our comrades have become too engrossed with the idea of armed uprising to devote any serious attention to the task of helping the trade union movement."... "We must value

the support of the non-proletarian opposition parties, and not repel them by tactless actions." Quite naturally, Plekhanov also declares against boycotting the Duma (without saying definitely whether he is in favour of taking part in the Duma, or of the electors forming "organs of revolutionary local self-government", the pet idea of the "Mensheviks"). "Election agitation in the rural districts would sharply bring up the question of the land." Confiscation of the land has been approved by both sections of our Party and "it is now high time to put their resolutions into effect".

Such are Plekhanov's views, which we have outlined almost entirely as the author himself formulated them in his *Dnevnik*.

We hope that this outline has convinced the reader that the question of the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma is only part of the general question of tactics, which, in its turn, is subordinate to the question of how the present revolutionary moment as a whole should be appraised. The roots of the disagreement on tactics may be summed up as follows. Some say it was wrong to take up arms, and urge that the risks involved in insurrection be explained and that the emphasis be shifted to the trade union movement. Both the second and third strikes and the insurrection were blunders. Others say it was necessary to take up arms, for otherwise the movement would not have risen to a higher plane, it would not have obtained the necessary practical experience of insurrection nor freed itself from the narrow limits of the peaceful strike alone, which had spent itself as a weapon in the struggle. Thus for some the question of insurrection is shelved, at all events until a new situation arises that will compel us to revise our tactics once again. The logical conclusion that inevitably follows from this is that we must adjust ourselves to the "constitution" (participate in the Duma and work vigorously in the legal trade union movement). For others, on the contrary, it is now that the question of insurrection comes to the forefront, on the basis of the practical experience which has been acquired, which has proved that it is quite possible to fight against regular troops, and which has suggested the immediate task of a more persevering and more patient preparation for the next outbreak. Hence the slogan "Away

with constitutional illusions!" and the assignment to the legal trade union movement of a modest, at any rate not the "principal", place.

It goes without saying that we must examine this point of dispute in the light of the present objective conditions and of an assessment of social forces, not from the point of view of whether any particular line of action is desirable. We think that Plekhanov's views are wrong. His appraisal of the Moscow insurrection, summed up in the words, "it was wrong to take up arms", is extremely one-sided. Shelving the question of insurrection virtually means admitting that the revolutionary period has drawn to a close, and that a "constitutional" period of the democratic revolution has set in, i.e., it means placing the suppression of the December uprisings in Russia on a par, for example, with the suppression of the insurrections in Germany in 1849. Of course, it is by no means impossible for our revolution to end like that; and in the light of the present moment, when reaction is becoming rampant, it is quite easy to draw the conclusion that such a finale has already set in. Nor can there be any doubt that it is more advisable fully to abandon the idea of insurrection, if objective conditions have made it impossible, than to waste our forces on new and fruitless attempts.

But that would mean making too hasty a generalisation about the state of affairs at the present moment, and elevating it to a law for a whole period. Have we not seen reaction raging in all its fury after nearly every important advance of our revolution? And has not the movement risen again after a time with mightier force despite the reaction? The autocracy has not yielded to the inexorable demands of all social development; on the contrary, it is retrogressing, and is now evoking protests even among the bourgeoisie, which welcomed the suppression of the insurrection. The strength of the revolutionary classes, the proletariat and the peasantry, is far from exhausted. The economic crisis and financial dislocation are growing and becoming more acute, rather than diminishing. The probability of a fresh outbreak even now, when the first insurrection has not yet been completely crushed, is admitted even by the "law-abiding" bourgeois press, which is certainly hostile to in-

surrection.* The farcical character of the Duma is becoming clearer and clearer, and the hopelessness of the Party attempting to participate in the elections more and more unquestionable.

It would be short-sightedness, slavish acquiescence in the present situation, if we shelved the question of insurrection in these circumstances. See how Plekhanov contradicts himself when, on the one hand, he strongly advises us to put into effect the resolutions on agitation among the peasantry in favour of confiscating the land, and, on the other hand, warns us against repelling the opposition parties by tactless actions, and dreams about the question of the land coming up "sharply" in the course of election agitation in the countryside. It is safe to say that the liberal landlords will forgive you a million "tactless" actions, but they will never forgive you for advocating the confiscation of the land. No wonder even the Cadets say that they, too, are in favour of suppressing peasant revolts with the aid of troops, provided they, and not the bureaucracy, are in command of the troops (see Prince Dolgorukov's article in *Pravo*⁵²). We can be quite sure that the question of land will never come up as "sharply" in election agitation as it did come, is coming, and will come up outside the Duma and outside elections conducted with the aid of the police.

We have whole-heartedly accepted the slogan of confiscating the land. But this slogan is merely a hollow sound if it does not imply the victory of armed uprising; for the peasants are now confronted not only by regular troops, but also by volunteers hired by the landlords. When we preach the confiscation of the land, we are actually calling upon peasants to revolt. And unless we want to indulge in revolutionary phrase-mongering, have we a right to do this if we do not count on a workers' insurrection in the towns, on the workers supporting the peasants? It would be cruel

* This, for example is what the conservative bourgeois Slovo (No. 364 of January 25) writes: "Among the most convinced adherents of the Centre, one more and more often hears the opinion, hesitant and timid though it still is, that unless there is another outbreak, prepared by the revolutionary parties, reform will not be brought about with the necessary fulness and completeness.... There is now hardly any hope that reforms will be brought about peacefully from above."

mockery if, when the peasants rise in a body and begin to confiscate the land, the workers were to offer them the co-operation of trade unions that were under the tutelage of the police, instead of the co-operation of fighting organisations.

We really have no grounds for shelving the question of insurrection. We must not revise our Party tactics to suit the conditions of the present moment of reaction. We cannot, and must not, give up hope of at last merging the three separate streams of insurrection—workers', peasants' and military—into a single victorious insurrection. We must prepare for this, without, of course, renouncing any "legal" means of extending propaganda, agitation and organisation: but harbouring no illusions about the durability and importance of these means. We must collect the experience of the Moscow, Donets, Rostov and other uprisings and spread knowledge of them far and wide; we must perseveringly and patiently prepare new fighting forces, train and steel them in a series of fighting guerrilla operations. The new outbreak may not take place in the spring; but it is approaching, and in all probability is not very far off. We must meet it armed, organised in military fashion, and prepared for determined offensive operations.

We will make a slight digression here about the guerrilla operations by the fighting squads. We think it is wrong to put these operations on a par with the old type of terrorism. Terrorism consisted in acts of vengeance against individuals. Terrorism was a conspiracy by groups of intellectuals. Terrorism in no way reflected the temper of the masses. Terrorism never served to train fighting leaders of the masses. Terrorism was the result—and also the symptom and concomitant—of lack of faith in insurrection, of the absence of conditions for insurrection.

Guerrilla operations are not acts of vengeance, but military operations. They no more resemble adventurous acts than the harassing of the enemy's rear by raiding parties of huntsmen during a lull on the main battlefield resembles the killing of an individual in a duel or by assassination. Guerrilla operations conducted by fighting squads—formed long ago by Social-Democrats of both factions in all the important centres of the movement and consisting mainly of

workers—undoubtedly reflect, clearly and directly, the temper of the masses. Guerrilla operations by fighting squads directly train fighting leaders of the masses. The guerrilla operations of the fighting squads today do not spring from lack of faith in insurrection, and are not conducted because insurrection is impossible; on the contrary, they are an essential component of the insurrection now in progress. Of course, mistakes may be made in all things and always: premature and unnecessary attempts at insurrection are possible; so also are over-zealousness and excesses, which are always and definitely harmful, and may injure even the best of tactics. But the fact is that in most of the purely Russian centres we have so far been suffering from the other extreme, namely, insufficient initiative among our fighting squads, lack of fighting experience, and insufficient determination in their activities. In this respect we have been outstripped by the Caucasus, Poland and the Baltic Provinces, i.e., the centres where the movement has left the old terrorism farthest of all behind, where preparations for insurrection have been made best, and where the proletarian struggle most clearly and vividly bears a mass character.

We must catch up with these centres. We must not restrain but encourage the guerrilla operations of the fighting squads if we want to prepare for insurrection not merely in words, and if we recognise that the proletariat is seriously ready for insurrection.

The Russian revolution started with petitions to the tsar to grant freedom. Shootings, reaction and Trepovism⁵³ did not stamp out, but fanned the names of the movement. The revolution took a second step forward. It forcibly compelled the tsar to recognise freedom. It defended this freedom arms in hand. It did not succeed at the first attempt. Shootings, reaction and Dubasovism will not stamp out the movement, they will fan its flames. Taking shape before our eyes is the third step, which will decide the outcome of the revolution: the struggle of the revolutionary people for an authority that will really introduce freedom. In this struggle, we must count on the support of the revolutionary-democratic parties, and not of the opposition parties. Shoulder to shoulder with the socialist proletariat will march the democratic and revolutionary peasantry. It will be a great

and arduous struggle, a struggle for the completion, for the complete victory, of the democratic revolution. But all the signs now are that such a struggle is being brought near by the course of events. Let us see to it that the new wave finds the proletariat of Russia at a new stage of fighting preparedness.

Partiiniye Izvestia, No. 1,
February 7, 1906
Signed: A Bolshevik

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the text in *Partiiniye Izvestia*

**THE ST. PETERSBURG CITY CONFERENCE
OF THE R.S.D.L.P.⁵⁴**

FEBRUARY 11(24), 1906

**STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE
CREDENTIALS OF THE DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE
FROM THE OKRUZHNOI AND VYBORG DISTRICT
ORGANISATIONS**

1

The decision taken on the Okruzhnoi organisation has annulled the original Conference decision on the general verification of credentials from the formal point of view. There were 56 doubtful votes in the Okruzhnoi organisation, and it could be a question of them alone. The Committee and the district conference have verified the election; if we are not to trust the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee on the Okruzhnoi organisation, then we must be consistent and undertake to verify all districts.

2

The question posed by Martov bears on the formal aspect; if you have decided to examine here one district in view of the protests voiced, you should take a similar decision on the other districts about which protests are being made. Comrade Akim⁵⁵ sees an irregularity in Vyborg District, and the Conference, which has passed a decision on the Okruzhnoi organisation, should extend its decision to Vyborg District.

3

On a point of order. If the St. Petersburg Committee has recognised the competence of the Okruzhnoi organisation, then I am surprised at Comrade Martov's proposal to bar the organisation from this Conference.

4

Comrade Martov's proposal cannot be put to the vote—only the St. Petersburg Committee can decide the question he has raised.

5

Think, comrades, of the monstrosity proposed to you. An important question has been under discussion in the decision of which the whole St. Petersburg organisation should take part, and it is suddenly proposed that you should cut off a huge section—Okruzhnoi District. Think of it. I consider voting on a thing like that impermissible in principle. I move that this meeting vote to decide whether it wants Comrade Martov's proposal to be put to the vote.

6

We must consider the matter coolly. The question is whether we may deprive the Okruzhnoi organisation of the right to vote at this Conference. Since its delegation is validly accredited, it would be the height of unlawfulness to debar it from voting here. You have recognised its credentials to be valid; it did not vote when the issue of their validity was under discussion, but it must take part in the voting on all subsequent questions.

RESOLUTION

AGAINST MARTOV'S PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW THE REPORT
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE

This meeting considers that the question raised by Comrade Martov is not open to discussion and does not require voting.

ARGUMENTATION OF RESOLUTION

Comrade Martov is wrong; he says that remarks like “there he is again” are not allowed, but they are. All sorts of remarks are allowed at meetings. As regards the report, we must hear it. It will take a mere fifteen or twenty minutes; if we do not hear it, it may be said that juridical in addition to moral irregularities were committed at the Conference (that there were juridical as well as moral omissions). We must certainly hear the report. If you see fit to approve it, do so; and if you do not see fit, do not approve it.

PROPOSAL ON THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE REPORT

I wish to table a motion. The question brought up by Comrade Akim—that the report be approved—may be shelved. I move the following decision: “Having heard the report of the St. Petersburg Committee, this meeting recognises the Conference delegations to be validly accredited, the Conference duly established, and its decision binding on the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation.”

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSAL

I agree that we must vote in logical order, but I hold my proposal to be the most radical, while the others are conciliatory. If you reject the radical proposal, you will then vote on the conciliatory proposals.

COMMENT ON THE RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE TACTICS OF BOYCOTT

I am sorry if I have wearied this meeting by a long resolution, but if we want to discuss its substance, we must have a clear idea of what we are criticising. My draft sums up all that has been said in the course of previous discussions and what there has been no time to speak of here. We must not drag out this meeting any longer. If there is no time to discuss the resolution, we can elect a committee.

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THE ST. PETERSBURG CITY CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (II)

LATE FEBRUARY (EARLY MARCH) 1906

STATEMENTS IN DEFENCE OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE TACTICS OF BOYCOTT

1

The resolution is lengthy—"long-winded", as Comrade Dan put it. That is true; but it has a merit compensating for this defect—the resolution examines all the arguments, without which the explanation of the tactics would be superficial, and would be wrong. The masses want brevity, but this resolution is for the organisations and not for the masses. Not all the points have been debated, but all of them have been touched upon. It is necessary to expound the whole set of views advocated in political agitation. There can be no question of the majority suppressing the minority in any way, although the position of the defeated section is not a happy one. As a way out, I can propose a division of labour: you will criticise the Duma, and we shall elaborate the tactics. No one wants to impose on Comrade Dan the defence of points he does not agree with. The accusation of engaging in factionalism and polemics is groundless.

2

There is also a polemic in the short resolution (Martov's), but why do you want to make us ridiculous by proposing that we should adopt it? The long draft resolution seems

to contain propositions that have not been discussed by the proletariat. But the dummy made by the Rasterayev workers mocked at the very idea of representation,⁵⁶ and they must have been thinking of the peasantry as well.

OBJECTIONS TO THE AMENDMENTS TO POINTS 3 AND 6 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION

1

You are weakening the resolution; the government is not only obstructing the elections, it is also planting rural superintendents⁵⁷ as delegates.

2

Comrade Dan's amendment is inexact. The Union of October Seventeenth⁵⁸ is an opposition group, but it is not persecuted. We must stand up for the Cadets if they are persecuted, even if they are persecuted for no particular reason.

3

"Zubatovism"⁵⁹ is not merely a police form of netting suspects, for it takes account of the working-class movement; it is an organisation of the working class. "Zubatovism" is a truly Russian invention. And it is being used now too. The Duma is a police game, but there is no hint of a constitution in it. Speaking generally, the term "Zubatovism" has been used here for comparison and is therefore incomplete as a definition. Besides, we do say that it is a "new" form of *all-Russian, state* "Zubatovism". Our tactics here are the same as they have always been in relation to "Zubatovism". We have attended even Zubatovist meetings, but we have never been members.

STATEMENTS DURING THE DEBATE ON POINTS 7 AND 8
OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION

1

Comrade Dan's statement about a factual inaccuracy is something quite new to me. So far no formal statement has been made anywhere of the permissibility of "participating in the Duma".⁶⁰ Neither Parvus, nor even Plekhanov has said that so far. Furthermore, it would be narrow-minded of us to ignore the fact that the class-conscious section of the proletariat has this opinion of the issue and no other, and we take that fact into consideration, it is not accidental. I am willing to amend "everyone" to "the overwhelming majority".

2

Comrade Dan's formal statement is particularly valuable to me, it is the first time I have heard such a statement. One can only wish to see it in the press, for the press has so far published no such thing. Indeed, the Mensheviks have protested whenever such an opinion was attributed to them. The leaflet of the Joint Central Committee affirms that both sections of the Party are agreed that we must not go into the Duma. It is a document, and nothing contradicts it in the relevant point of our resolution. Dan's remark about Plekhanov is wrong. He merely said: "I am against boycott", and came to a stop at the most interesting point. We are sufficiently well informed, and the allusion to Poltava has not shaken our opinion of the view taken by the majority of the proletariat on the question of participating in the Duma. Solidarity must be stressed.

3

Dan believes that the very convocation of the Duma will bring back the year 1849. He is wrong. The Duma is the United Landtag of 1847,⁶¹ and that Landtag we will not enter. I think we must take Lunacharsky's remarks into consideration. I believe we should answer three questions: (1) Is it a fact that the majority is right? Yes, it is; no one has refuted us, all that has been said is groundless and cannot serve as a sufficient reason for crossing out the reference to

the fact. (2) Should we take this fact into account? We must. (3) What is the attitude of the editorial board of the Central Organ to the question touched on in this point of the preamble? I maintain that the editorial board regarded participation in the Duma as *impossible*. I had no idea this would offend the Menshevik comrades so much; so far no one has ever said anything like what Comrade Dan said. Comrade Dan is wavering, and I feel very unhappy about it.

4

It is said that the rest is full of polemics. That is not true, we would never pursue any such aims. Why must we not go into the Duma? Because the people may imagine that it is worth going to the polls irrespective of what the Menshevik comrades think of the people. We are not bickering, we are examining an argument. We hold that we must send nothing but dummies.

WRITTEN STATEMENT TO THE CONFERENCE BUREAU

Statement of fact. I declare that Comrade Dan's assertions are wrong and that he has not refuted any of my statements about the absence in the press of assertions similar to the statement made by Comrade Dan.

RESOLUTION
ON THE MOTIVATION OF THE BOYCOTT TACTICS

This Conference deems it necessary to give a detailed motivation of the decision of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation on the inadvisability of participating in the elections, not at all in order to engage in polemics with the comrades who were formerly Mensheviks or to cast aspersions on them as Social-Democrats, but with the aim of giving an accurate and official statement of the opinion of the majority of the organisation as to the character and significance of a complete boycott.

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**TO ALL WORKING MEN AND WOMEN
OF THE CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG AND VICINITY⁶²**

Comrade workers, the organised Social-Democratic workers of the whole St. Petersburg and Okruzhnoi organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. have adopted a final decision on the State Duma elections that is binding on the Party Committee and all the local Party organisations. Despite all police obstacles and traps, the workers have succeeded in holding *120 circle meetings*, which have discussed the question in detail, with the participation of spokesmen for the two tactics which have emerged in our Party. *Over 2,000 workers* and intellectuals belonging to our Party have voted on the question, and by a majority of 1,168 votes to 926 (the number of voters totalling 2,094) they have declared *for a complete boycott*, not only of the Duma, but of *all elections* to it. The conference of delegates elected in all districts (one delegate for every 30 Party members who voted) discussed the question once more, and by 36 votes to 29 (the total number of delegates with the right to vote being 65) it adopted a *final* decision in favour of the tactics of an *active boycott*.

And so, the Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg has spoken. All the forces of the Party organisation, and all the efforts of the foremost workers who sympathise with the Social-Democratic Party and desire to take its decision into account, should now be directed towards acquainting the broadest sections of the working class and the population as a whole with the Social-Democrats' decision, towards spreading among the masses a correct understanding of the aims which the class-conscious proletariat sets itself, and of the ways and means it chooses for achieving its aims.

Why have the Social-Democrats of St. Petersburg declared a complete boycott of the Duma and refused completely to participate in any elections to it?

Because the State Duma is a sham Duma. It is a travesty of a popular representative assembly. It is not a people's Duma but a police and landlord Duma. The elections are not to be equal for all; they have been so devised as to give the landlords and the big capitalists complete superiority over the workers and peasants. Three-quarters of the whole working class have been totally deprived of the right to elect, and as for the remaining quarter, it is invited to elect on the basis of the deputies being sifted through three sieves, so that first the workers will elect delegates, then the delegates will elect electors, and then the electors (24 in all) will, jointly with the landlords and capitalists (over 100 in number), elect members of the Duma.

The government mocks at the peasants even more outrageously. Peasant deputies are sifted through four sieves: first, representatives per ten households are elected in the volosts (even so, the peasant poor who have neither house nor land are excluded from this election); then the ten-household representatives elect delegates, the delegates elect electors, and the electors elect members of the Duma, with the result, however, that among the electors in the gubernias the peasants mostly find themselves in the minority.

Why has this sifting through three or four sieves been devised? It has been done to prevent the workers and peasants from getting their real representatives elected to the Duma, to bar from the Duma people who are for the workers and peasants, to enable a handful of Black-Hundred landlords and capitalists, who are plundering the whole working people with the help of the police, to call themselves people's representatives.

Workers and peasants, do not trust the police and landlord Duma! It is not people's representatives but enemies of the people that are being convoked there, so that they may the more effectively plot against the workers and against the peasants. Look around you: How can the workers and peasants freely elect their real representatives, their deputies, to the Duma? Does not the police government jail the finest workers and finest peasants without trial? Shootings and

punitive measures carried out against peasants who fought for the people's cause are taking place throughout Russia. The whole of Russia has been delivered into the hands of a gang of ruined petty aristocrats in military uniform to be plundered and outraged. All the promises of freedom that we have heard from the government have been trampled underfoot by the tyrants. All the prisons are packed with the champions of freedom for the people.

The government wants to deceive the people by convening a sham Duma. It wants, with the help of a landlord Duma, to borrow more money to oppress the people, to wage war against its own people, against the peasants and workers. The government wants to decoy us into a police trap, wants us to agree to participate in this fraud called the Duma elections.

The class-conscious workers refuse to walk into this police trap. Without resorting to any elections, we must tell the government and the whole people outright that we shall not take part in a farce. We shall not allow a fraud. We shall expose this police falsehood for all to see. We warn those workers and those peasants who have not yet seen through the fraud and expect the Duma to benefit the people: If they try nevertheless to take part in the elections, they will see that it will not be workers' or peasants' deputies who get into the Duma, but capitalists and landlords who suit the police. We call on all workers and all peasants, on all honest people, to fight against the police fraud.

We are continuing our struggle for a genuine assembly of real representatives of the people. That assembly must be elected freely, and by all alike, without any privileges for the landlords and the wealthy, and without any hindrance on the part of the authorities and the police. Only a freely elected constituent assembly of the whole people can be a genuine Duma and not a sham one. Only such an assembly can establish a better order in Russia, make life easier for the workers, give land to the peasants, and bring freedom to the whole people.

On October 17 the workers by their struggle wrested from the government the promise of freedom. The government has broken all its promises. The workers will now fight still more concertedly and stubbornly to win freedom for the

people. The workers do not lose heart from temporary reverses. They know that the struggle for freedom is difficult and severe, but that the cause of freedom is the cause of the whole people. The cause of freedom will triumph; the struggle will grow in breadth. The workers will recover from the reverses inflicted upon them. They will rally in still closer unity against the government. They will gather fresh strength. They will explain to still wider sections of the peasantry all the frauds of the government and the need to counteract it. The workers will rise together with the peasants and overthrow the government of police tyrants, who are using violence against the people.

Down with the sham, police and landlord, Duma!

Long live a freely elected constituent assembly of the whole people!

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**RESOLUTION
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION
OF THE R.S.D.L.P.
ON THE TACTICS OF BOYCOTT⁶³**

Whereas:

(1) the State Duma to be convened under the Law of August 6-December 11 is the grossest travesty of a popular representative assembly, since the vast majority of the proletariat and the peasantry has virtually been debarred from participation in the Duma owing to the fact that the suffrage is not universal and the electors from the workers and peasants are sifted through three or four sieves;

(2) by artificially controlling the composition of the body of electors and by establishing a number of privileges in favour of the rich landlords and big capitalists, the government seeks to ensure complete preponderance in the Duma of representatives, not merely of the exploiting classes, but of the Black-Hundred elements of those classes;

(3) the government most brazenly rigs even these elections—which are restricted within the narrow limits of the social-estates—by ruling out all freedom of agitation, establishing martial law and unbounded police tyranny everywhere, and persecuting, in defiance of all legislation and without trial, not only members of the revolutionary and socialist parties, but even members of the parties of the monarchist-liberal bourgeoisie (Constitutionalist-Democrats, etc.);

(4) the government is now repealing its own law on simultaneous elections in order artificially to appoint, in the various localities, the dates that suit it best, and to force the elections through at such speed that it will be impossible

for those elected to establish any contact with the population;

(5) the autocratic government expects by convening the Duma to influence Russian, and especially foreign, public opinion and thereby to put off its inevitable downfall and obtain further millions of rubles in loans to crush the revolution and continue oppressing the people;

(6) the Law of February 20,⁶⁴ which transforms the Council of State into an Upper Chamber, makes still worse the statute governing the Duma, by seeking to reduce the latter completely to the role of an impotent advisory appendage of the autocratic bureaucracy;

(7) under these political conditions, participation in such a Duma is considered impossible by the overwhelming majority of the Social-Democratic parties and organisations of all nations in the country;

(8) participation of the Social-Democrats in the State Duma elections at any stage is likely to encourage among the people the incorrect idea that there is a possibility of reasonably fair elections for the parties that uphold the interests of the broad masses;

(9) participation in the elections is likely to divert the attention of the proletariat from the revolutionary movements of the workers, peasants, soldiers, etc., that are taking place apart from the Duma to the tiny matter of a pseudo-legal, sham constitutional election campaign and to lower still more the temporarily depressed mood of the working class by creating the impression that the revolutionary period of the struggle is over, the question of an uprising has been shelved, and the Party is taking the constitutional path;

(10) elections to the State Duma imply a situation in which the Party must keep within legal and peaceful bounds; for this reason our participation in the elections would have a harmful effect on the pressing revolutionary task—that of more vigorous actions against the government during the Duma elections and at the time of its convocation;

(11) the Party of the Social-Democrats cannot go to the polls with the less developed masses if it wants to educate them from the practical point of view, for these insufficiently developed masses want to go as far as the Duma and, more-

over, want to do so in the legal way, while the Party would, by refusing to submit to the laws, merely incur natural distrust on the part of those masses and prevent them from learning the lessons of the Duma campaign sincerely and consistently;

(12) the workers' delegates and electors cannot contribute anything towards a truly revolutionary organisation of the broad sections of the working class because of the artificial composition of the voters, who have been picked by police methods, because of the short term and limited nature of their powers, and because of the circumstances of the elections mentioned above;

(13) the Duma cannot be frustrated through the withdrawal from the gubernia election meetings of that part of the electors whom at best the Social-Democrats could draw away with them;

(14) class-conscious spokesmen for the proletariat of the most oppressed nationalities of Russia (the Polish, Jewish Lettish, and Lithuanian Social-Democrats) flatly reject all participation in the election farce and are fighting with might and main against those who have enacted it;

(15) public opinion of all the militant elements of bourgeois democracy and of the peasantry (Peasant Union, Teachers' Union,⁶⁵ Union of Unions, Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Polish Socialist Party,⁶⁶ Polish Progressive Party, etc.) rejects both the Duma and the elections to it;—

Therefore, this meeting of representatives of St. Petersburg workers, members of the R.S.D.L.P., deems it necessary:

(1) to reject absolutely all participation in the State Duma;

(2) to reject absolutely any elections to the State Duma at any stage whatever;

(3) to develop agitational work among the people on as large a scale as possible in order to expose the true nature of the Duma, put an end to the deception of public opinion in Russia and Europe, and show the inevitable disappointment of that section of the peasantry which expects benefits from the Duma;

(4) to utilise in every way, legal and illegal, all meetings connected with the elections for stating the Social-

Democrats' views in general and criticising the Duma in particular, and above all for issuing a call to fight for the revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly of the whole people;

(5) in counterposing revolutionary methods of struggle for freedom to the struggle through the Duma, to devote especial attention during this agitation to familiarising the workers and the people as a whole with the experience of the December uprising, which marks the beginning of a higher stage of the revolutionary struggle for genuine freedom for the people;

(6) to lay stress, during this agitation in respect of the Duma, on the deep economic and financial crisis, the extreme intensification of exploitation of the workers by the reactionary capitalists, the aggravation of unemployment in the towns and of hunger in the countryside, the peasant movement that is bound to begin in the spring, and the instances of unrest among the troops, as circumstances which make a new popular outbreak highly probable before long, an outbreak that will sweep away the State Duma either before its convocation or after it, when the population is thoroughly disillusioned with it;

(7) to use this agitation, among other things, for branding those cowardly representatives of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (such as the Cadets) who pervert the civic consciousness of the population by fostering constitutional illusions at a time of bitter civil war, by recommending the Duma and participation in it, by rejecting the use of force in defence of freedom and of the rights of the vast majority of the people at a time when the armed gangs that call themselves the government are holding their ground only by dint of savage tyranny.

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THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

I

What is the state of the democratic revolution in Russia? Is it defeated, or are we merely passing through a temporary lull? Was the December uprising the climax of the revolution, and are we now rushing headlong towards a "Shipov Constitution" regime⁶⁷? Or is the revolutionary movement, on the whole, not subsiding, but rising, in preparation for a new outbreak, using the lull to muster new forces, and promising, after the first unsuccessful insurrection, a second, with much greater chances of success?

These are the fundamental questions that now confront the Social-Democrats in Russia. If we are to remain true to Marxism, we cannot and should not try, by resorting to generalities, to shirk the task of analysing the objective conditions; for, in the last analysis, the appraisal of these conditions provides the final answer to these questions. On this answer wholly depend the tactics of the Social-Democrats; and our disputes about boycotting the Duma, for example (which, incidentally, are drawing to a close, as the majority of the organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. have declared in favour of the boycott), are only a tiny particle of these big questions.

We have just said that it would be unbecoming for a Marxist to try to evade these questions by resorting to generalities. A sample of these generalities is the argument that we have never regarded the revolution merely as being one of "pikes and pitchforks"; that we were revolutionaries even when we did not call for immediate insurrection; that we will remain revolutionaries also in the parliamentary period

when it sets in, etc. Such arguments would be miserable evasions, replacing the concrete historical question by abstract considerations which explain absolutely nothing, and merely serve to cover up paucity of ideas, or political confusion. To support our statement with an example, we will refer to Marx's attitude to the German revolution in 1848. This may be all the more useful since in our country we see a number of symptoms of the same, and perhaps even more sharp, division among the bourgeoisie into a reactionary and a revolutionary section—a division that was absent in the Great French Revolution, for example. Strictly speaking, the fundamental questions about the state of the Russian revolution that we posed above can also be put in a form adapted to the analogy with Germany (in the relative and limited sense, of course, in which any historical analogies may be drawn). We can put it as follows: 1847 or 1849? Are we going through (like Germany in 1847, when the German State Duma, the so-called United Landtag, was being convened) the closing period of the climax of the revolution, or are we experiencing (as Germany did in 1849) the closing period of final exhaustion of the revolution, and the beginning of a humdrum life under a dock-tailed constitution?

Marx was putting this question all through 1850, was studying it and answered it at last, not by an evasion, but with a direct reply deduced from his analysis of the objective conditions. In 1849 the revolution was crushed, a number of insurrections ended unsuccessfully; the liberty actually won by the people was taken away from them, and reaction was raging against the "revolutionaries". Open political action by the Communist League (the Social-Democratic organisation of the time, virtually led by Marx) became impossible. "Everywhere the need arose," we read in the Address of the Central Committee to the members of the League in June 1850, "for a strong, *secret* (our italics) organisation of the revolutionary party throughout Germany." The Central Committee, which has its headquarters abroad, sends an emissary to Germany, who concentrates "all the available forces in the hands of the League". Marx writes (in the Address of March 1850) that a revival, a new revolution, is probable; he advises the workers to organise independently, and particularly urges the necessity of arming

the whole proletariat, of forming a proletarian guard, and of "frustrating by force any attempt at disarming". Marx calls for the formation of "revolutionary workers' governments", and discusses what the proletariat should do "during and after the coming insurrection". Marx points to Jacobin France of 1793 as the model for the German democrats (see *The Revelations About the Cologne Communist Trial*, Russ. transl., p. 115 and foll.).⁶⁸

Six months pass. The expected revival does not come about. The efforts of the League fail. "In the course of the year 1850," wrote Engels in 1885, "the prospects of a new upswing of the revolution became more and more improbable, indeed impossible."⁶⁹ The industrial crisis of 1847 had been overcome. A period of industrial prosperity was setting in. And so Marx, reckoning with the objective conditions, raises the question sharply and definitely. In the autumn of 1850 he categorically declares that now, with the productive forces of bourgeois society developing so profusely, "*there can be no talk of a real revolution*".⁷⁰

As the reader will see, Marx makes no attempt to dodge a difficult question. He does not play with the word revolution; he does not substitute empty abstractions for a burning political issue. He does not forget that the revolution, in general, is making progress in any case, because bourgeois society is developing; but he says straightforwardly that a democratic revolution in the direct and narrow sense of the term is impossible. He solves a difficult problem without reference to the "mood" of dejection and weariness prevailing among a particular section of the proletariat (as some Social-Democrats who have slipped into tail-ism often do). No, so long as he had no other facts to go by except that the mood was subsiding (in March 1850), he continued to call to arms and insurrection, to prepare for it, and not to depress the mood of the workers by personal scepticism and dismay. Not until he was absolutely convinced that the "exhaustion" of the "real revolution" was inevitable did he change his views. And having changed them, he openly and straightforwardly demanded a fundamental change of tactics and the complete cessation of preparations for insurrection: for such preparations could then only be playing at insurrection. The slogan of insurrection was definitely shelved. It was

openly and definitely admitted that "the form of the movement has changed".

We must always keep this example of Marx before us in the present difficult times. We must treat the possibility of a "real revolution" in the immediate future, the question of the main "form of the movement", the question of insurrection and of preparing for it, as seriously as possible; but a fighting political party must solve this problem straightforwardly and definitely, without equivocation, without evasion, and without any reservation. The party that failed to find a clear answer to this question would not deserve to be called a party.

II

And so, what objective facts have we to go by in solving this problem? There are a number of superficial and conspicuous facts that would seem to support the opinion that the directly revolutionary "form of the movement" is completely exhausted, that a new insurrection is impossible, and that Russia has entered the era of paltry bourgeois quasi-constitutionalism. That a turn has taken place among the bourgeoisie is beyond doubt. The landlords have deserted the Cadets and have joined the Union of October Seventeenth. The government has already granted a two-chamber "Constitution". Martial law, arrests and other punitive measures make possible the convening of a sham Duma. Insurrection in the towns has been suppressed, and the peasant movement in the spring may prove to be isolated and impotent. The landlords are selling out their estates, and that means that the bourgeois, "orderly" section of the peasantry is growing. That a mood of dejection prevails after the suppression of the insurrection is a fact. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that it is easier and cheaper, so to speak, to predict the defeat of revolution in general than to predict its revival; for at present power is on the side of reaction, and in "most cases", up to now, revolutions have finished unfinished.

What evidence is there that supports an opposite opinion? We will allow this question to be answered by K. Kautsky, whose sober views and ability calmly, practically and thoroughly to discuss topical and acute political problems are

known to all Marxists. Kautsky expressed his opinion soon after the suppression of the Moscow insurrection, in an article entitled "The Chances of the Russian Revolution". This article has appeared in Russian—of course, mutilated by the censor (in much the same way as was the Russian translation of another splendid essay by Kautsky, *The Agrarian Question in Russia*).

Kautsky does not attempt to dodge the difficult problem. He does not try to get rid of it by uttering empty phrases about the revolution in general being invincible, about the proletarian class being always and constantly revolutionary, etc. No, he bluntly puts the concrete historical question of the chances of the present democratic revolution in Russia, here and now. Without beating about the bush, he starts his article by stating that since the beginning of 1906 hardly any news other than sad has been received from Russia, which "*might give rise to the opinion that the revolution has been utterly suppressed and is at its last gasp*". It is not only the reactionaries that are exultant over this, but also the Russian liberals, writes Kautsky, showering on these heroes of the "coupon"⁷¹ a string of contemptuous epithets that they fully deserve (evidently Kautsky has not yet been converted to Plekhanov's theory that Russian Social-Democrats should "value the support of the non-proletarian *opposition parties*").

And so Kautsky analyses in detail this naturally plausible opinion. That there is an outward resemblance between the defeat of the Moscow workers in December and the defeat of the Paris workers in June (1848) is beyond doubt. In both cases the armed uprising of the workers was "provoked" by the government at a time when the working class was not yet sufficiently organised. In both cases reaction triumphed despite the heroic resistance of the workers. What conclusion does Kautsky draw from this? Does he repeat Plekhanov's pedantic admonition that it was wrong to take up arms? No. He does not hasten to indulge in cheap and short-sighted moralising after the event. He *studies* the objective facts that can reply to the question whether the Russian revolution is completely crushed or not.

Kautsky sees four radical points of difference between the defeat of the proletariat in Paris in 1848 and the defeat of the

proletariat in Moscow in 1905. First, the defeat of Paris was the defeat of the whole of France. Nothing like this can be said about Moscow. The workers of St. Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa, Warsaw and Lodz are not defeated. They have been exhausted by the frightfully hard, twelve months' struggle; but their spirit has not been broken. They are gathering their strength to renew the struggle for freedom.

Secondly, an even more essential difference is that in France, in 1848, the peasants were on the side of reaction, whereas in Russia, in 1905, the peasants are on the side of the revolution. Peasant revolts are in progress. Whole armies are engaged in crushing these revolts. These armies are devastating the country as only Germany was devastated during the Thirty Years' War.⁷² Military reprisals cow the peasants for a time; but they only aggravate their poverty and make their conditions more desperate. They, like the devastation caused during the Thirty Years' War, will inevitably rouse larger and larger masses who will be compelled to declare war on the existing system, who will prevent the restoration of peace in the country, and will join every insurrection.

The third and extremely important difference is the following. The way for the revolution of 1848 was paved by the crisis and famine of 1847. The reaction was strengthened by the termination of the crisis and a period of industrial prosperity. "The present reign of terror in Russia, however, must inevitably lead to an aggravation of the economic depression which has been weighing on the country for years." The full effects of the famine of 1905 will yet be felt within the next few months. The suppression of a revolution represents civil war on the very greatest scale, war against the whole people. This war is costing no less than a foreign war, and besides is devastating the home country, not some foreign land. Financial collapse is imminent. Moreover, the new trade agreements threaten particularly severe consequences for Russia, and may even give rise to a world economic crisis. Thus the longer the reign of reactionary terror lasts, the more desperate will become the economic position of the country and the more will anger against the hated regime grow. "Such a situation," says Kautsky, "will make any powerful movement against tsarism invin-

cible. And there will be no lack of such a movement. The Russian proletariat, which has already given so many great proofs of its heroism and devotion, will see to that.”

The fourth difference that Kautsky points out is of particular interest for Russian Marxists. Nowadays, unfortunately, we hear a lot of inane, virtually and purely Cadet, snickering over “Brownings” and “fighting squads”. No one has the courage and straightforwardness, of which Marx gave such an example, to say that insurrection is impossible, and that it is no use making further preparations for it. But people here are very fond of snickering over military operations by revolutionaries. They call themselves Marxists, but prefer to shirk the task of analysing the *military* aspect of insurrection (to which Marx and Engels always attached great importance⁷³) by declaring with the inimitable majesty of a doctrinaire: “It was wrong to take up arms....” Kautsky behaves differently. Few as the facts about the insurrection at his disposal have been, he nevertheless tries to analyse the military aspect of the question as well. He tries to appraise the movement as a new form of struggle devised by the masses, unlike our revolutionary Kuropatkins,⁷⁴ who appraise a battle according to the rule: if they’re giving something away, take it; if there’s a fight on, run; if you’re beaten, well, you shouldn’t have taken up arms!

“Both the June fighting in Paris,” says Kautsky, “and the December fighting in Moscow were barricade fighting. But the former was a disaster, it marked the end of the old barricade tactics. The latter marked the beginning of new barricade tactics. And consequently we must revise the opinion which Engels expressed in his “Introduction” to Marx’s *Class Struggles*, that the period of barricade fighting is over for good.⁷⁵ Actually, only the period of the *old* barricade tactics is over. This is what the Moscow fighting showed, when a handful of insurgents managed to hold out for two weeks against superior forces armed with all the resources of modern artillery.”

That is how Kautsky speaks. He does not sing a requiem for the insurrection because the first attempt failed. He does not grumble over the failure, but *studies* the birth and growth of a new and higher form of struggle, examines the significance of the disorder and discontent among the troops, the assistance the workers received from the townspeople, the combination of the mass strike with insurrection. He

studies the way in which the proletariat is *learning* the art of insurrection. He revises obsolete military theories, and thereby calls upon the whole Party to analyse and assimilate the experience of Moscow. He regards the whole movement as a transition from strike to insurrection, and tries to grasp how the workers should combine the two for the purpose of achieving success.

Kautsky concludes his article as follows: "Such are the lessons of Moscow. How far they will influence the forms of the struggle in future, it is impossible, as yet, to foresee from here [i.e., from Germany]. Indeed, in all preceding manifestations of the Russian revolution so far we have seen spontaneous outbreaks of the unorganised masses; none of these were planned or prepared beforehand. Probably this will continue to be the case for some time.

"But while it is impossible, as yet, definitely to predict the forms that the struggle will assume in the future, all the signs are that we must expect further battles, that the present ominous [*unheimliche*] stillness is merely the calm before the storm. The October movement made the masses in town and country conscious of their power. Then the reaction in January hurled them into an abyss of torment. Here everything inflames them, arouses their anger, and they are ready to pay any price, however high, to escape. Soon the masses will rise again and attack with mightier force than ever! Let the counter-revolution celebrate its triumph over the bodies of the heroes who fell in freedom's cause. The end of this triumph is approaching: the red dawn is rising, the *proletarian revolution* is at hand."

III

The question we have outlined is the fundamental question of Social-Democratic tactics as a whole. This is the first question that the coming Party congress will have to settle in the clearest and most unambiguous manner; and all members of the Party, all class-conscious workers should immediately do their utmost to collect the comprehensive material that will help to settle it, discuss it and send delegates to the congress who will be fully prepared for their important and responsible task.

The elections of delegates for the congress should take place on the basis of a clear distinction between tactical platforms. Strictly speaking, the consistent and complete reply that is given to this question, one way or the other, will settle all the minor details of Social-Democratic tactics.

Either—or.

Either we admit that at the present time “there can be no talk of a real revolution”, in which case we must say so openly and emphatically, in the hearing of all, so as not to mislead either ourselves, or the proletariat, or the people. In that case, we must absolutely reject the task of completing the democratic revolution as the *immediate* task of the proletariat. In that case, we must completely shelve the question of insurrection and cease all work of arming and organising fighting squads; for it is unbecoming for the workers’ party to play at insurrection. In that case, we must admit that the strength of revolutionary democrats is exhausted and make it our immediate business to support one or other section of the liberal democrats, as the real oppositional force under a constitutional regime. In that case, we must regard the State Duma as a parliament, even if a bad one, and not only participate in the elections, but also go into the Duma. In that case we must put the legalisation of the Party first, change the Party programme accordingly, and adjust all our work to the “legal” limits, or at any rate relegate underground work to a minor and subordinate place. In that case, we can regard the organisation of trade unions just as primary a Party task as armed uprising was in the preceding historical period. In that case, we should also shelve the revolutionary slogans of the peasant movement (such as confiscation of the landed estates), because these slogans are in practice slogans of insurrection, and to call for insurrection without previously preparing for it in military fashion, without believing in it, would be unworthy playing at insurrection. In that case, we must stop talking not only about a provisional revolutionary government, but also about so-called “revolutionary local self-government”; for experience has shown that bodies that are rightly or wrongly called by that name are actually transformed by the force of circumstances into organs of insurrection, into rudiments of a revolutionary government.

Or we admit that we can and must talk of a real revolution at the present time; we admit that new and higher forms of the open revolutionary struggle are inevitable, or at all events, most probable. In that case, the principal political task of the proletariat, the nerve centre of all its work, the soul of all its organised class activities, must be the task of *completing the democratic revolution*. In that case, all evasion of this task would merely mean degrading the concept of class struggle to Brentano's interpretation⁷⁶ of it: it would mean converting the proletariat into a hanger-on of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. In that case, the Party's urgent and central political task is to prepare the forces of the proletariat, and to organise it, for armed uprising as the highest form of struggle achieved by the movement. In that case, it is our bounden duty critically to study the whole experience of the December uprising for the most direct practical purposes. In that case, we should increase tenfold our efforts to organise and arm fighting squads. In that case, we should prepare for insurrection also by means of fighting guerrilla operations, for it would be ridiculous to "prepare" only by enrolling and registering new recruits. In that case, we should regard civil war as having been declared and in progress, and the *whole* of the Party's activities should be guided by the rule: "In war as in war!". In that case, it is absolutely essential to train the cadres of the proletariat for *offensive* military operations. In that case, it is logical and consistent to issue revolutionary watchwords for the masses of the peasantry. The task of concluding fighting agreements with the revolutionary, and only the revolutionary, democrats comes into the foreground: the criterion for distinguishing between the various sections of the bourgeois democrats is the question of insurrection. With those who are in favour of insurrection the proletariat "strikes together", although it "marches separately"; those who are opposed to insurrection we ruthlessly fight, or spurn them as contemptible hypocrites and Jesuits (the Cadets). In that case, we put into the foreground of all our agitation the criticism and exposure of constitutional illusions from the standpoint of open civil war, and concentrate on circumstances and conditions that will steadily pave the way for spontaneous revolutionary outbreaks. In that case, we regard the Duma,

not as a parliament, but as a police headquarters, and reject all participation in the farcical elections because it can only corrupt and disorganise the proletariat. In that case, we take as the basis of organisation of the party of the working class (as Marx did in 1849) a "strong, secret organisation", which must have a separate apparatus for "public activities", and send its special feelers into all legal societies and institutions, from the workers' trade unions to the legal press.

To put it in a nutshell: either we must admit that the democratic revolution is at an end, shelve the question of insurrection and take the "constitutional" path. Or we recognise that the democratic revolution is still in progress, make it our primary task to complete it, develop and apply in practice the slogan of insurrection, proclaim civil war and ruthlessly denounce all constitutional illusions.

It is scarcely necessary to tell the reader that we are emphatically in favour of the *latter* solution of the problem that now confronts the Party. The purpose of the tactical platform published in this issue is to sum up and expound in systematic form the views that we shall uphold at the congress and in the course of our work in preparing for it. This platform should be regarded not as something complete, but as an outline explanation of tactical problems, and as a preliminary draft of the resolutions and decisions we shall advocate at the Party congress. This platform has been discussed at private gatherings of like-minded ex-"Bolsheviks" (including the editors of, and contributors to, *Proletary*) and is a product of collective effort.

Partiiniye Izvestia, No. 2,
March 20, 1906
Signed: *A Bolshevik*

Published according to
the text in *Partiiniye Izvestia*

**A TACTICAL PLATFORM
FOR THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.**

**DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
FOR THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.⁷⁷**

Published in *Partiiniye Izvestia*,
No. 2, March 26, 1906

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to the newspaper text

The eleven resolutions herewith submitted to the reader have been drawn up by a group consisting of the former editors of, and contributors to, *Proletary*, and of several Party members engaged in practical work, who all share the same views. These are not finished resolutions, but rough drafts, the object of which is to give as complete an idea as possible of the sum-total of views on tactics held by a certain section of the Party, and to facilitate the systematic discussion that is now being started in all our Party circles and organisations on the invitation of the Joint Central Committee.

The resolutions on tactics fit in with the Congress agenda⁷⁸ that was proposed in the leaflet of the Joint Central Committee. But members of the Party are by no means obliged to confine themselves to this agenda. With a view to making a complete exposition of all opinions on tactics, we felt bound to add two questions that do not appear in the agenda proposed by the Joint Central Committee, namely, "The present stage of the democratic revolution" and "The class tasks of the proletariat in the present stage of the democratic revolution". Unless these questions are cleared up, the more specific questions of tactics cannot be discussed. We therefore propose that the Congress should include in its agenda the following general question: "The present stage of the democratic revolution and the class tasks of the proletariat".

As for the agrarian programme, and the attitude to be adopted towards the peasant movement, a special-pamphlet is needed.* Moreover, the Joint Central Committee has appointed a special committee to draw up a report on this question⁷⁹ for the Congress.

* See pp. 165-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In publishing these rough drafts, we invite all Party members to discuss, amend and supplement them. Written reports and drafts may be sent through our Party organisations to the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to be delivered to the group which drew up the resolutions.

THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Whereas:

(1) with the wholesale destruction of productive forces and the unprecedented impoverishment of the people, the economic and financial crisis that Russia is experiencing, far from subsiding, is spreading and becoming more acute, causing frightful unemployment in the towns and famine in the countryside;

(2) although the big capitalist and landlord class, frightened by the independent revolutionary activity of the people who are menacing its privileges and predatory interests, is turning sharply away from opposition towards a deal with the autocracy, with the object of suppressing the revolution, the demands for real political liberty and social and economic reforms are gaining ground and becoming stronger among new strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry;

(3) the present reactionary government, striving in effect to preserve the old autocracy, trampling upon all the liberties it has proclaimed, granting only a consultative voice to the upper strata of the propertied classes, offering a gross travesty of popular representation, subjecting the whole country to a regime of military repression, savage brutalities and mass executions, and intensifying police and administrative tyranny to an unprecedented degree, is thereby causing unrest and discontent among broad sections of the bourgeoisie, arousing the resentment and indignation of the masses of the proletariat and peasantry, and paving the way for a new, wider and more acute political crisis;

(4) the course of events at the end of 1905—mass strikes in the towns, unrest in the countryside and the armed uprising in December, produced by the desire to defend the liberties obtained by the people and taken away from them by the government, and the subsequent ruthless military suppression of the emancipation movement—has revealed the futility of

constitutional illusions, and has opened the eyes of the broad masses of the people to the harmfulness of such illusions in a period when the struggle for freedom has reached the intensity of open civil war;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the democratic revolution in Russia, far from subsiding, is on the eve of a new upswing, and that the present period of comparative lull must be regarded, not as the defeat of the forces of revolution, but as a period of accumulation of revolutionary energy, assimilation of the political experience of preceding stages, enlistment of new strata of the people in the movement and, consequently, of preparation for a new and mightier revolutionary onslaught;

(2) that the main form of the emancipation movement at the present time is not legal struggle on a quasi-constitutional basis, but the direct revolutionary movement of broad masses of the people, breaking the police and semi-feudal laws, making revolutionary law, and destroying by force the instruments for the oppression of the people;

(3) that the interests of the proletariat, as the foremost class in modern society, demand that a relentless struggle be waged against the constitutional illusions which the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (including the Constitutional-Democratic Party) is spreading in order to cover up its narrow class interests and which, in a period of civil war, produce the most corrupting effect upon the political consciousness of the people.

ARMED UPRISING

Whereas:

(1) the whole history of the present democratic revolution in Russia shows us that, on the whole, the movement is steadily rising towards ever more determined, offensive forms of struggle against the autocracy, forms that are assuming an increasingly mass character and are embracing the whole country;

(2) the political strike in October, which swept away the Bulygin Duma, compelled the autocratic government to proclaim the principles of political liberty and revealed the

gigantic strength of the proletariat and its ability to take unanimous action on a country-wide scale, in spite of all the deficiencies of its class organisations;

(3) with the further growth of the movement, the peaceful general strike proved inadequate, while partial recourse to it failed its aim and disorganised the forces of the proletariat;

(4) the entire revolutionary movement led with elemental force to the armed uprising in December, when not only the proletariat but new forces of the urban poor and the peasantry took up arms to defend the liberties gained by the people from the encroachments of the reactionary government;

(5) the December uprising gave rise to new barricade tactics, and proved generally that the open armed struggle of the people is possible even against modern troops;

(6) owing to the introduction of a military and police dictatorship, despite constitutional promises, the masses of the people are becoming increasingly conscious of the necessity of fighting for real power, which the revolutionary people can capture only in open battle against the forces of the autocracy;

(7) the autocracy is weakening and demoralising its military forces by employing them to suppress by force of arms the very people of whom they are a part, by not carrying out the now urgent military reforms that all honest elements in the army are demanding, by not taking steps to relieve the desperate conditions of the reservists, and by responding to the demands of the soldiers and sailors only by tightening police and barrack-room severities;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that at the present time armed uprising is not only the necessary means of fighting for freedom, but a stage actually reached by the movement, a step which, in view of the growth and intensification of a new political crisis, begins the transition from defensive to offensive forms of armed struggle;

(2) that in the present stage of the movement, the general political strike must be regarded not so much as an independent means of struggle as an auxiliary means in relation to insurrection; that therefore the timing of such a strike, and the choice of its place and of the industries it is to involve should

preferably depend upon the time and circumstances of the main form of struggle, namely, armed uprising;

(3) that in its work of propaganda and agitation the Party must take special care to study the practical experience of the December uprising, examine it critically from the military point of view, and draw practical lessons from it for the future;

(4) that still greater efforts must be made to form more fighting squads, improve their organisation, and supply them with weapons of every type; and, as experience suggests, it is necessary to form not only Party fighting squads, but also squads associated with the Party, and entirely non-Party squads;

(5) that there should be increased work among the armed forces, bearing in mind that discontent alone in the forces is not enough to achieve success for the movement, that there is also a need for direct agreement with the organised revolutionary-democratic elements in the armed forces, for the purpose of launching determined offensive operations against the government;

(6) that in view of the growing peasant movement, which may flare up into a regular insurrection in the very near future, it is desirable to work for combining actions by the workers and the peasants, in order to organise, as far as possible, joint and simultaneous fighting operations.

FIGHTING GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Whereas:

(1) scarcely anywhere in Russia since the December uprising has there been a complete cessation of hostilities, which the revolutionary people are now conducting in the form of sporadic guerrilla attacks upon the enemy;

(2) these guerrilla operations, which are inevitable when two hostile armed forces face each other, and when repression by the temporarily triumphant military is rampant, serve to disorganise the enemy's forces and pave the way for future open and mass armed operations;

(3) such operations are also necessary to enable our fighting squads to acquire fighting experience and military

training, for in many places during the December uprising they proved to be unprepared for their new tasks;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the Party must regard the fighting guerrilla operations of the squads affiliated to or associated with it as being, in principle, permissible and advisable in the present period;

(2) that the character of these fighting guerrilla operations must be adjusted to the task of training leaders of the masses of workers at a time of insurrection, and of acquiring experience in conducting offensive and surprise military operations;

(3) that the paramount immediate object of these operations is to destroy the government, police and military machinery, and to wage a relentless struggle against the active Black-Hundred organisations which are using violence against the population and intimidating it;

(4) that fighting operations are also permissible for the purpose of seizing funds belonging to the enemy, i.e., the autocratic government, to meet the needs of insurrection, particular care being taken that the interests of the people are infringed as little as possible;

(5) that fighting guerrilla operations must be conducted under the control of the Party and, furthermore, in such a way as to prevent the forces of the proletariat from being frittered away and to ensure that the state of the working-class movement and the mood of the broad masses of the given locality are taken into account.

THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL ORGANS OF REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITY

Whereas:

(1) in developing into armed struggle, the revolutionary movement against the autocratic government has so far taken the form of sporadic local insurrections;

(2) in this open struggle, the elements of the local population that are capable of fighting resolutely against the old regime (almost exclusively the proletariat and the advanced

sections of the petty bourgeoisie) have been compelled to set up organisations that in practice have been embryonic forms of a new revolutionary authority—the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities, the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies at Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk and elsewhere, the railwaymen's committees in Siberia and in the South, the peasant committees in Saratov Gubernia, the town revolutionary committees in Novorossiisk and other towns, and lastly, the elected village bodies in the Caucasus and in the Baltic Provinces;

(3) in keeping with the initial, rudimentary form of the insurrection, these bodies were just as sporadic, haphazard, irresolute in their activities, and lacked the support of an organised armed force of the revolution, and were therefore doomed to fall at the very first offensive operations of the counter-revolutionary armies;

(4) only a provisional revolutionary government, as the organ of a victorious insurrection, can completely crush all resistance by reaction, ensure complete freedom for election agitation, convene on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot a constituent assembly capable of really establishing the sovereignty of the people and putting into effect the minimum social and economic demands of the proletariat;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that in order to complete the revolution, the urgent task now confronting the proletariat is, jointly with the revolutionary democrats, to help to unite the insurrection, and to set up an organ that will unite it, in the shape of a provisional revolutionary government;

(2) that one of the conditions for the successful fulfilment of the functions of the revolutionary government is the establishment, in all the towns and village communities that have joined the insurrection, of organs of revolutionary local self-government, elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot;

(3) that the participation of delegates of our Party in the provisional revolutionary government jointly with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats is permissible depending on the alignment of forces, and must formally be made con-

ditional on control of these delegates by the Party and, in substance, on their upholding the independent interests of the working class and staunchly maintaining the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete socialist revolution and is therefore relentlessly hostile to all bourgeois parties;

(4) that, irrespective of whether it will be possible for Social-Democrats to participate in the provisional revolutionary government or not, propaganda must be carried on among the broadest possible sections of the proletariat to explain that the armed proletariat, guided by the Social-Democratic Party, should bring constant pressure to bear upon the provisional government, with a view to protecting, consolidating and enlarging the gains of the revolution.

SOVIETS OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES

Whereas:

(1) Soviets of Workers' Deputies spring up spontaneously in the course of mass political strikes as non-party organisations of the broad masses of the workers;

(2) in the course of the struggle, these Soviets inevitably undergo a change both as regards their composition, by absorbing the more revolutionary elements of the petty bourgeoisie, and as regards the nature of their activities, by growing from purely strike organisations into organs of the general revolutionary struggle;

(3) insofar as these Soviets are rudiments of revolutionary authority, their strength and importance depend entirely on the strength and success of the insurrection;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party should participate in non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies, unfailingly form the strongest possible groups of Party members in each Soviet, and direct the activities of these groups strictly in accordance with the general activities of the Party;

(2) that the formation of such organisations for the purpose of increasing Social-Democratic influence on the pro-

letariat, and the influence of the proletariat on the course and outcome of the democratic revolution, may, in certain conditions, be left to the local organisations of our Party;

(3) that the broadest possible sections of the working class, and also of representatives of the revolutionary democrats, particularly peasants, soldiers and sailors, should be induced to take part in the non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies;

(4) that as the activities and sphere of influence of Soviets of Workers' Deputies expand, it must be pointed out that these institutions are bound to collapse unless they are backed by a revolutionary army and unless the government authorities are overthrown (i.e., unless the Soviets are transformed into provisional revolutionary governments); and that therefore one of the main tasks of these institutions in every revolutionary situation must be to arm the people and to strengthen the military organisations of the proletariat.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BOURGEOIS PARTIES

Whereas:

(1) the Social-Democratic Party has always recognised the necessity of supporting every opposition and revolutionary movement against the existing social and political system in Russia;

(2) at the present time, when the revolution is bringing various classes into open action, thus stimulating the formation of political parties, it is the urgent duty of the Social-Democratic Party to ascertain the class character of these parties, to appraise the present relations between the classes, and to determine its own attitude to the various parties accordingly;

(3) the main task of the working class at the present stage of the democratic revolution is to carry it to its completion and therefore, in determining its attitude towards the other parties, the Social-Democratic Party must particularly take into account the extent to which each party is capable of actively promoting this object;

(4) from this point of view, all existing non-Social-Democratic parties in Russia (bar the reactionary parties) may be

divided into two main groups: liberal-monarchist parties and revolutionary-democratic parties;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the Right liberal-monarchist parties (the Union of October Seventeenth, the Party of Law and Order, the Commercial and Industrial Party,⁸⁰ etc.) represent the class organisations of the landlords and the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and are openly counter-revolutionary, but have not yet made a final deal with the autocratic bureaucracy on sharing power; that the party of the proletariat, while taking advantage of this conflict which is still in progress, must at the same time wage a relentless struggle against these parties;

(2) that the Left liberal-monarchist parties (the Party of Democratic Reforms,⁸¹ the Constitutional-Democratic Party, etc.), not being definitely class organisations, are constantly vacillating between the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary elements of the big bourgeoisie, between the desire to lean on the people and fear of its independent revolutionary activity, and aim at nothing that goes beyond the limits of a well-ordered bourgeois society protected from the encroachments of the proletariat by a monarchy and a two-chamber system; and that the Social-Democratic Party must utilise the activities of these parties for the political education of the people, counteract their hypocritical democratic phrase-mongering by the consistent democracy of the proletariat, and ruthlessly expose the constitutional illusions they spread;

(3) that the revolutionary-democratic parties and organisations (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Peasant Union, some of the semi-trade union and semi-political organisations, etc.) most closely express the interests and point of view of the broad masses of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie, strongly opposing landlordism and the semi-feudal state, consistently striving for democracy and clothing their virtually bourgeois-democratic aims in a more or less nebulous socialist ideology; and that the Social-Democratic Party deems it possible and necessary to enter into fighting agreements with these parties, while at the same time systematically exposing their pseudo-socialist character and

combating their attempts to obscure the class antithesis between the proletariat and the small proprietor;

(4) that the immediate political object of such temporary fighting agreements between the Social-Democratic Party and the revolutionary democrats is to secure the convocation by revolutionary means of a constituent assembly of the whole people with full powers, on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot;

(5) that temporary fighting agreements are possible and advisable at the present time only with those elements which recognise armed uprising as a means of struggle and are actually assisting to bring it about.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NATIONAL SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Whereas:

(1) in the course of the revolution the proletariat of all the nationalities in Russia is becoming more and more united by the common struggle;

(2) this common struggle is bringing the various national Social-Democratic parties in Russia closer together;

(3) in many towns amalgamated committees of all the national Social-Democratic organisations of the particular locality are being formed, in place of the former federal committees;

(4) most of the national Social-Democratic parties no longer insist on the principle of federation, which was rightly rejected by the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the most energetic measures must be taken to achieve the speedy amalgamation of all the national Social-Democratic parties in Russia into a united Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

(2) that the basis of this amalgamation must be the complete merging of all the Social-Democratic organisations in each locality;

(3) that the Party must really ensure the satisfaction of all the Party interests and requirements of the Social-Democratic proletariat of each nationality, giving due consideration also to the specific features of its culture and way of life; and that this may be ensured by holding special conferences of Social-Democrats of the particular nationality, giving representation to the national minorities on the local, regional and central bodies of the Party, forming special groups of authors, publishers, agitators, etc.

Note. The representation of a national minority on the Central Committee of the Party could, for example, be arranged in the following manner: the general Party congress may elect to the Central Committee a definite number of members from among candidates nominated by the regional congresses in those parts of Russia where at present separate Social-Democratic organisations exist.

THE TRADE UNIONS

Whereas:

(1) the Social-Democratic Party has always regarded the economic struggle as a component of the proletarian class struggle;

(2) the experience of all capitalist countries shows that the most advisable form of organisation of the working class for the economic struggle is that of broad trade unions;

(3) at the present time a general striving is observed among the masses of the workers in Russia to associate in trade unions;

(4) the economic struggle can bring about a lasting improvement in the conditions of the masses of the workers, and a strengthening of their truly class organisation, only if this struggle is properly combined with the political struggle of the proletariat;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that all Party organisations must promote the formation of non-party trade unions, and induce all Party members to join the trade unions in their respective trades;

(2) that the Party must exert every effort to educate the workers who belong to trade unions in the spirit of a broad

understanding of the class struggle and the socialist aims of the proletariat; by its activities to win a virtually leading position in these unions; and lastly to ensure that these unions, under certain conditions, come into direct association with the Party—however, without at all expelling non-party members from their ranks.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STATE DUMA

Whereas:

(1) the State Duma is a gross travesty of popular representation, since:

(a) the suffrage is not universal, not equal, and not direct, the bulk of the workers and peasants are practically debarred from participation in the State Duma, and the ratio of electors from the various groups of the population has been made to fit in with the views of the police;

(b) as regards its powers and its position in relation to the Council of State, the Duma is an impotent appendage of the autocratic bureaucracy;

(c) the conditions under which the elections are proceeding make it utterly impossible for the people really to express their will, owing to the absence of freedom to carry on agitation, to military repressions, mass executions, arrests, and police and administrative tyranny;

(d) the government's sole purpose in convening such a State Duma is to deceive the people, strengthen the autocracy, make further financial swindles easier for it, and strike a bargain with the reactionary elements of the exploiting classes, whose predominance in the State Duma is assured;

(2) participation in elections to the State Duma, while in no way helping to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat or to strengthen and enlarge its class organisation and fighting preparedness, is more likely to disorganise and corrupt the proletariat, since:

(a) if the Social-Democratic Party participated in the elections, it would inevitably foster among the people constitutional illusions, belief that the elections can to some extent truly express the will of the people, and the notion that the Party is taking the path of pseudo-constitutionalism;

(b) in view of their small number, the shortness of their period of office and their special functions, the groups of delegates elected by the workers, and of electors, can in no way help in building a really revolutionary organisation of the proletariat;

(c) participation in the elections focuses the attention of the proletariat on the farce being played by the government rather than on the revolutionary movement that is going on outside the Duma, and concentrates attention on agitation among small groups of electors rather than on extensive agitation among the masses;

(d) our participation in the elections cannot facilitate the Social-Democratic education of the more ignorant sections of the masses who want to take part in the Duma elections, exclusively in the legal way, a method which the R.S.D.L.P. cannot at present adopt;

(e) the withdrawal of a section of the electors from the gubernia election meetings could neither frustrate the convocation of the Duma nor give rise to a broad popular movement;

(3) participation in the elections in the present political situation will compel the Social-Democrats either to step aside, without any benefit to the movement, or to stoop to the position of silent abettors of the Constitutional-Democrats;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the R.S.D.L.P. must emphatically refuse to take part in the State Duma;

(2) that the R.S.D.L.P. must emphatically refuse to participate in the State Duma elections at any stage;

(3) that the R.S.D.L.P. must make most vigorous use of all meetings connected with the elections to expound Social-Democratic views in general, and ruthlessly to criticise the State Duma in particular, and especially to call for a struggle for the revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly of the whole people;

(4) that the R.S.D.L.P. must also use the agitation about the Duma to acquaint the broadest possible masses of the people with all the Party's views on tactics in the present revolutionary situation, and on the tasks arising from it.

PRINCIPLES OF PARTY ORGANISATION

Whereas:

(1) the principle of democratic centralism in the Party is now universally recognised;

(2) although made difficult, it can nevertheless be put into effect within certain limits in existing political conditions;

(3) mixing the secret with the legal apparatus of the Party organisation has proved most fatal for the Party, and plays into the hands of government provocation;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the elective principle in the Party organisations should be applied from top to bottom;

(2) that departures from this principle, for example: two-stage elections or co-optation to elected bodies, etc., may be permitted only when police obstacles are insurmountable, and in exceptional cases especially provided for;

(3) that it is imperative to preserve and strengthen the secret nucleus of the Party organisation;

(4) that for public activities of all kinds (in the press, at meetings, in the unions, particularly trade unions, etc.) special departments of the Party organisations should be formed, which could not in any way jeopardise the secret nuclei;

(5) that there must be one central body for the Party, i.e., the general congress of the Party must elect a single Central Committee, which shall appoint the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ, etc.

**REVISION OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME
OF THE WORKERS' PARTY⁸²**

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РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТИИ.

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Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
*Revision of the Agrarian Programme
of the Workers' Party, 1906*

Reduced

Everybody now admits that it is necessary to revise the agrarian programme of the workers' party. This urgent question was formally brought up at the last conference of the "Majority" (December 1905), and it has now been placed on the agenda of the Unity Congress.

We propose first of all to make a very brief survey of how the agrarian question has been posed in the history of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, then to review the various draft programmes now proposed by Social-Democrats, and lastly, to present a rough draft of our own.

I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC VIEWS ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

Ever since it came into being, the Russian Social-Democratic movement has recognised the vast importance of the agrarian question in Russia and of the peasant question in particular, and in all its policy documents has included an independent analysis of this question.

The contrary opinion, often spread by the Narodniks⁸³ and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, is based either on complete ignorance or on deliberate distortion of the facts.

The very first draft programme of the Russian Social-Democrats, published by the Emancipation of Labour group in 1884, contained the demand for the "radical revision of agrarian relations" and the abolition of all feudal relations in the countryside (not having at hand the old Social-Democratic literature that was published abroad at the time, we

are compelled to quote from memory, so that we can vouch for the general sense, but not for the actual wording of the quotations).

Later Plekhanov, both in the magazine *Sotsial-Demokrat*⁸⁴ (late 1880s), as well as in the pamphlets: *Russia's Ruin and The Tasks of the Socialists in Fighting the Famine in Russia* (1891-92), repeatedly, and in the most emphatic terms, stressed the vast importance of the peasant question in Russia. He even pointed out that in the impending democratic revolution a "general redistribution"⁸⁵ was possible, and that the Social-Democrats did not fear or shrink from such a prospect. He argued that while by no means a socialist measure, a "general redistribution" would give a powerful impetus to the development of capitalism, to the growth of the home market, to an improvement in the conditions of the peasantry, to the disintegration of the village commune, to the development of class contradictions in the countryside and to the eradication of all vestiges of the old, feudal bondage system in Russia.

Plekhanov's reference to a "general redistribution" is of special historical importance to us, for it clearly shows that the Social-Democrats adopted from the very outset the theoretical formulation of the agrarian question in Russia to which they have adhered up to the present day.

Ever since they founded their Party, the Russian Social-Democrats have maintained the following three propositions. *First*. The agrarian revolution will necessarily be a part of the democratic revolution in Russia. The content of this revolution will be the liberation of the countryside from the relations of semi-feudal bondage. *Second*. In its social and economic aspect, the impending agrarian revolution will be a bourgeois-democratic revolution; it will not weaken but stimulate the development of capitalism and capitalist class contradictions. *Third*. The Social-Democrats have every reason to support this revolution most resolutely, setting themselves immediate tasks, but not tying their hands by assuming commitments, and by no means refusing to support even a "general redistribution".

Those who are unaware of these three propositions, who have not noticed them in *all* the Social-Democratic literature on the agrarian question in Russia, are either ignorant

of the subject or evade its essence (as the Socialist-Revolutionaries always do).

Reverting to the history of the evolution of Social-Democratic views on the peasant question, we may also mention, among the literature of the late 1890s, "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats" (1897),* where the opinion that Social-Democrats are "indifferent" to the peasantry is emphatically denied, and the general views of the Social-Democrats on this subject are reiterated—and also the newspaper *Iskra*.⁸⁶ The third issue of that paper, published in the **spring** (March and April) of 1901, that is, *twelve months* before the first major peasant uprising in Russia, contained an editorial entitled "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry",** which re-emphasised the importance of the peasant question and, among a series of other demands, put forward the demand for restitution of the cut-off lands.

This article may be regarded as the first rough draft of the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. that was published in the name of the editors of *Iskra* and *Zarya*⁸⁷ in the summer of 1902, and which was adopted by the Second Congress of our Party (August 1903) as the official Party programme.

In this programme the *whole* struggle against the autocracy is regarded as a struggle waged by the bourgeois order against feudalism, and the imprint of Marxist principles is very distinctly seen in the main proposition of its agrarian section: "With a view to eliminating the survivals of serfdom which are a direct and heavy burden upon the peasantry, and for the purpose of facilitating the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the Party demands...."

The critics of the Social-Democratic programme nearly all *evade* this main proposition: they overlook the obvious.

In addition to demands that raised no controversy (abolition of the social-estate taxation of the peasantry, reduction of rents, freedom to use land at will), the agrarian programme adopted at the Second Congress also contained a number of clauses demanding the refunding of land re-

* See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*

demption payments, and the establishment of peasant committees for the restitution of cut-off lands and for the abolition of survivals of serfdom.

The last clause about cut-off lands gave rise to most criticism among Social-Democrats. It was criticised by the Social-Democratic *Borba* Group, which proposed (if I remember rightly) the expropriation of all the landed estates,⁸⁸ and also by Comrade X.⁸⁹ (whose criticism, together with my reply,* was published in pamphlet form in Geneva, in the summer of 1903, just before the Second Congress. The delegates to that Congress had copies of it). Comrade X. proposed substituting, for the clause about cut-off lands and the refunding of land redemption payments, (1) the confiscation of church, monastery and crown lands, to be “transferred to the democratic state”, (2) “the imposition of a progressive tax on ground-rent drawn by the big landowners, so that this form of revenue should go to the democratic state for the needs of the people”, and (3) “the transfer of part of the private land (big estates), and of all the land, if possible, to large self-governing public organisations (the *Zemstvos*)”.

I criticised this programme and said that it was an “inferior and contradictory formulation of the demand for nationalisation of the land”; I stressed that the demand for peasant committees was important as a fighting slogan to rouse the oppressed social-estate; that the Social-Democrats must not tie their hands by pledging themselves to oppose even the “sale” of the confiscated land; that the restitution of cut-off lands *does not in the least restrict the aims* of Social-Democracy, but merely restricts the possibility of the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie advancing common aims. I stressed that “if the demand for all the land is a demand for the nationalisation of the land or its transference to the land-holding peasants of today, we shall appraise this demand from the standpoint of the proletariat’s interests, *taking all factors into consideration* [our italics]; we cannot, for instance, say in advance whether, when the revolution awakens them to political life, our land-holding peasants will come out as a democratic revolu-

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 436-51.—*Ed.*

tionary party, or as a party of order" (pp. 35-36).*

The same idea—that the cut-off lands will restrict neither the magnitude of the peasant movement nor our support for it, if it develops further—I also expressed in my pamphlet *To the Rural Poor* (published in 1903, before the Second Congress), where I say that cut-off lands are not a "barrier" but a "door",** and where, far from rejecting the idea of *all the land* going to the peasantry, I even welcome it in certain political conditions.

As regards the "general redistribution", I wrote the following in August 1902 (*Zarya*, No. 4, p. 176) in defending the draft agrarian programme:

"The demand for general redistribution contains the reactionary utopian idea of generalising and perpetuating small-scale peasant production, but it also contains (in addition to the utopian idea that the 'peasantry' can serve as the vehicle of the *socialist* revolution) a revolutionary element, namely, the desire to sweep away by means of a peasant revolt all the remnants of the serf-owning system."***

Thus, reference to the literature of 1902-03 irrefutably proves that the authors of the demand about cut-off lands never regarded it as restricting the peasant movement, or our support of it. Nevertheless, the course of events proved that this part of the programme was unsatisfactory, because the peasant movement was growing in breadth and depth with tremendous speed, and our programme was giving rise to bewilderment among the broad masses. Yet the party of the working class must reckon with the broad masses and cannot keep on referring only to commentaries, which explain a programme that is obligatory for all by arguments that are not obligatory for the Party.

The necessity for revising the agrarian programme was growing. At the beginning of 1905, one of the issues of the "Bolshevik" Social-Democratic newspaper *Vperyod* (published weekly in Geneva from January to May 1905) contained proposals for amending the agrarian programme,

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 444-45.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, p. 418.—*Ed.*

*** *Ibid.*, p. 137.—*Ed.*

among which was the proposal for deleting the clause about cut-off lands and substituting for it "support for the peasant demands, up to and including confiscation of all the landed estates".*

However, at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (May 1905), and at the "conference" of the "Minority" held at the same time, the question of revising the programme as such was not raised. Matters did not go beyond the adoption of a resolution on *tactics*, both sections of the Party agreeing to support the peasant movement, *including confiscation of all the landed estates*.

Strictly speaking, those resolutions predetermined the question of revising the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. The last conference of the "Majority" (December 1905) accepted my proposal to suggest deleting clauses about cut-off lands and about the refunding of land redemption payments, and replacing them by the statement that we support the peasant movement to the point of confiscation of all the landed estates.**

With this we may conclude our brief historical outline of the evolution of the views of the R.S.D.L.P. on the agrarian question.

II. FOUR TRENDS AMONG SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ON THE QUESTION OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

At the present time, in addition to the resolution of the "Bolshevik" conference already referred to, we have on this question two finished drafts of an agrarian programme—those of Comrades Maslov and Rozhkov—and comments and views of Comrades Finn, Plekhanov and Kautsky, which are incomplete, i.e., offer no finished draft of a programme.

Let us briefly outline the views of these authors.

Comrade Maslov offers us Comrade X.'s draft, slightly modified. Specifically, he deletes the progressive tax on ground-rent, and amends the demand for transfer of the pri-

* See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 235.—*Ed.*

** The resolution was published in *Rus, Nasha Zhizn* and *Pravda*⁹⁰ (see p. 88 of this volume.—*Ed.*).

vate lands to the Zemstvos. Maslov's amendment consists, first, in that he deletes X.'s phrase: "and all the land, if possible" (i.e., to transfer all the land to the Zemstvos). Secondly, he deletes from X.'s draft all reference to the "Zemstvos"; and for the phrase "large self-governing public organisations (the Zemstvos)", he substitutes the phrase "large regional organisations". The whole clause as amended by Maslov reads as follows:

"The transfer of private lands (big estates) to large self-governing regional organisations. The minimum size of land holdings to be alienated shall be determined by the regional popular representative body. "Thus Maslov emphatically rejects complete nationalisation, tentatively proposed by X., and demands "municipalisation", or, to be precise, "provincialisation". Against nationalisation, Maslov advances three arguments: (1) nationalisation would be an encroachment on the self-determination of nationalities; (2) the peasants, and particularly, homestead peasants, will not agree to the nationalisation of their land; (3) nationalisation will strengthen the bureaucracy inevitable in a bourgeois-democratic class state.

Maslov criticises the division of the landed estates ("dividing up") merely as a pseudo-socialist utopia of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but does not give his opinion of this measure as compared with "nationalisation".

As for Rozhkov, he wants neither division nor nationalisation. All he wants is deletion of the clause about cut-off lands and the substitution of a clause like the following: "Transfer to the peasants without redemption of all lands that serve as instruments for their economic enslavement" (see Comrade N. Rozhkov's article in the symposium *The Present Situation*,⁹¹ p. 6). Comrade Rozhkov demands the confiscation of church and other lands, but says nothing about their "transfer to the democratic state" (which Comrade Maslov proposes).

The next is Comrade Finn, who in his unfinished article (in *Mir Bozhy*,⁹² 1906) rejects nationalisation and evidently is inclined to support the demand that the landed estates be divided up among the peasantry as their private property.

Nor does Comrade Plekhanov say anything at all in his *Dnevnik*, No. 5, about making definite changes in our agrarian

programme. In criticising Maslov, he merely advocates "flexible tactics" in general, rejects "nationalisation" (using the old arguments advanced in *Zarya*), and appears to be in favour of dividing the landed estates among the peasantry.

Lastly, K. Kautsky, in his splendid essay "The Agrarian Question in Russia", sets forth the general principles of the Social-Democratic views on the subject, expresses his complete sympathy with the idea of dividing up the landed estates and apparently admits the possibility of nationalisation too, in certain conditions; but he says absolutely nothing at all either about the old agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. or about the proposals to amend it.

Summing up the opinions which exist in our Party on the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P., we obtain the following *four* main types:

(1) The agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. should demand neither nationalisation nor confiscation of the landed estates (a view held by advocates of the present programme, or of slight amendments, like those proposed by Comrade N. Rozhkov);

(2) The agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. should demand confiscation of the landed estates, but not nationalisation of the land in any form (this view is evidently supported by Comrade Finn, and perhaps by Comrade Plekhanov, though his opinion is not clear);

(3) Alienation of the landed estates, together with a peculiar and restricted sort of nationalisation ("Zemstvoisation" and "provincialisation", as proposed by X., Maslov, Groman and others);

(4) Confiscation of the landed estates and, *in definite political conditions*, nationalisation of the land (the programme proposed by the majority of the committee appointed by the Joint Central Committee of our Party; this programme, which this writer advocates, is given at the end of the present pamphlet).*

Let us examine these opinions.

The supporters of the present programme, or of a programme like that proposed by Comrade Rozhkov, start out

* See pp. 194-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*

either with the idea that confiscation of the big estates, which will result in their division into small ones, is altogether indefensible from the Social-Democratic point of view, or with the idea that confiscation should not appear in the programme, that its place is in the resolution on tactics.

Let us begin by examining the first opinion. We are told that the big estates represent an advanced capitalist type. Their confiscation and division would be a reactionary measure, a step backward to small-scale production. Social-Democrats cannot support such a measure.

We think that this opinion is wrong.

We must take into account the general and ultimate result of the present peasant movement, and not lose sight of it over individual cases and particulars. Taken as a whole, the landed estate in Russia today rests on a system of feudal bondage rather than on the capitalist system. Those who deny this cannot explain the present breadth and depth of the revolutionary peasant movement in Russia. Our mistake in putting forward the demand for the restitution of cut-off lands was that we did not sufficiently appraise the breadth and depth of the democratic, that is, the bourgeois-democratic movement among the peasantry. It would be unwise to persist in this mistake now that the revolution has taught us so much. The advantages of the confiscation of all the landed estates for the development of capitalism would far outweigh the disadvantages that would ensue from dividing up the big capitalist farms. Division will not destroy capitalism, and will not throw back its development but will to a very great extent clear the ground for it and provide a more general, extensive and firm basis for its (capitalism's) further development. We have always said that it is not by any means the business of the Social-Democrats to restrict the scope of the peasant movement: and at the present time to reject the demand for confiscation of all the landed estates would obviously mean restricting the scope of a social movement which has taken definite shape.

Hence those comrades who are at present opposing the demand for confiscation of all the landed estates are committing the same mistake as those British miners who, working less than eight hours a day, are opposing the enactment of an eight-hour day for the whole country.

Other comrades make a concession to the "spirit of the times". They say: In the programme, let us have the cut-off lands, or alienation of the lands which serve as instruments of enslavement. In the resolution on tactics, let us have confiscation. The programme must not be mixed up with tactics.

Our reply to this is that the attempt to draw a hard and fast line between programme and tactics can only result in scholasticism and pedantry. The programme defines the general and basic relations between the working class and other classes. Tactics define particular and temporary relations. This is quite true, of course. But we must not forget that the entire struggle we are waging against the survivals of serfdom in the countryside is a particular and temporary task in comparison with the general socialist aims of the proletariat. If a "constitutional regime" *à la* Shipov lasts in Russia for ten or fifteen years, these survivals will disappear; they will cause the population untold suffering, but nevertheless they will disappear, die out of themselves. Anything like a powerful democratic peasant movement will then become impossible, and it will no longer be possible to advocate any sort of agrarian programme "with a view to abolishing the survivals of the serf-owning system". Thus the distinction between programme and tactics is only a relative one. But a mass party which is now operating more openly than before would be put to a very great disadvantage if the programme contained a particular, limited and restricted demand, while the resolution on tactics contained a general, broad and all-embracing demand. Whatever the case may be—whether the Dubasov-Shipov "Constitution" becomes firmly established or whether the peasants' and workers' insurrection is victorious—we shall have to revise our Party's agrarian programme again fairly soon just the same. So we need be in no particular hurry to build a house for all time.

Let us now examine the second type of opinion. We are told: confiscation and division of the landed estates—yes, but no nationalisation in any circumstances. Kautsky is quoted in support of division, and the arguments formerly advanced by all Social-Democrats (cf. *Zarya*, No. 4) against nationalisation are reiterated. We fully and absolutely

agree that, on the whole, division of the landed estates would, at the present time, be a decidedly progressive measure, both economically and politically. We also agree that in bourgeois society, the small proprietor class is, *in certain conditions*, "a stauncher pillar of democracy than the class of tenant farmers dependent on a police-controlled class state, even if it is a constitutional state" (*Lenin*, "Reply to X.", p. 27*).

But we think that if we confine ourselves to these considerations at the present stage of the democratic revolution in Russia, if we confine ourselves to advocating the old position we took up in 1902, it will certainly mean that we are discounting the material changes that have taken place in the social-class and political situation. In August 1902 *Zarya* pointed out (see Plekhanov's article in No. 4, p. 36) that *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*⁹³ was advocating nationalisation, and expressed the undoubtedly correct opinion that the demand for nationalisation of the land is far from everywhere, and certainly not always, a revolutionary demand. This is true, of course; but in the same article Plekhanov says (p. 37) that "*in a revolutionary period*" (Plekhanov's italics), the expropriation of the big landowners may be essential in Russia, and in certain circumstances this question will have to be raised.

Undoubtedly, the present situation is substantially different from what it was in 1902. The revolution rose to a high pitch in 1905, and is now gathering force for a new rise. That *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* should advocate nationalisation of the land (at all seriously) is out of the question. Quite the reverse: the keynote of the speeches delivered by Nicholas II and of the howling of Gringmut⁹⁴ & Co. has been defence of the inviolability of private landed property. The peasant uprising has already shaken up old serf-ridden *Rus*, and the dying autocracy is now placing its hopes entirely on the possibility of a deal with the landlord class, which has been scared to death by the peasant movement. Not only *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, but *Slovo* too, the organ of the Shipovites, is attacking Witte and Kutler's⁹⁵ "socialist" draft, which proposes not nationalisation of the land, but only

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 437.—*Ed.*

compulsory *redemption payments* for part of the land. The savage suppression of the Peasant Union by the government, and the savage “dragonnades” against the turbulent peasantry, show as clearly as anything can show that the peasant movement has definitely assumed a revolutionary-democratic character.

This movement, like every profoundly popular movement, has already roused the peasantry to tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm and revolutionary energy and is continuing to do so. In their struggle against the private ownership of large estates, against landlordism, the peasants necessarily arrive, and through their foremost representatives have already arrived, at the demand for the abolition of all private ownership of land in general.*

There cannot be the slightest doubt that the idea that the land should belong to the whole people is now very widespread among the peasantry. Nor can there be any doubt that, in spite of all the ignorance of the peasantry, in spite of all the reactionary-utopian elements in its aspirations, this idea on the whole is revolutionary-democratic in character.**

* See *Resolutions of the Congresses of the Peasant Union, August 1 and November 6, 1905*, St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 6, and *Minutes of the Inaugural Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union* (St. Petersburg, 1905), *passim*.

** In his *Dnevnik*, No. 5, Comrade Plekhanov warns Russia not to repeat the experiments of Wang Hang-che (a Chinese reformer of the eleventh century who unsuccessfully introduced nationalisation of the land), and tries to show that the peasants' idea of land nationalisation is of reactionary origin. The far-fetched nature of this argument is only too obvious. Truly, *qui prouve trop, ne prouve rien* (he who proves too much, proves nothing). If twentieth-century Russia could be compared with eleventh-century China probably Plekhanov and I would hardly be talking either about the revolutionary-democratic character of the peasant movement or about capitalism in Russia. As for the reactionary origin (or character) of the peasants' idea of land nationalisation, well, even the idea of a general redistribution of the land has undoubted features not only of a reactionary origin, but also of its reactionary character at the present time. There are reactionary elements in the whole peasant movement, and in the whole peasant ideology, but this by no means disproves the general revolutionary-democratic character of this movement as a whole. That being so, Comrade Plekhanov by his exceedingly far-fetched argument has not proved his thesis (that Social-Democrats cannot, in certain political conditions put forward the demand for nationalisation of the land) and has, indeed, weakened it very considerably.

Social-Democrats must cleanse this idea of its reactionary and petty-bourgeois socialist distortions—there is a question about that. But they would be committing a serious error if, failing to perceive its revolutionary democratic side, they were to throw this demand entirely on board. We must very frankly and emphatically tell the peasants that land nationalisation is a bourgeois reform; that it is *useful* in definite political circumstances; but it would be a short-sighted policy for us socialists to come before the masses of the peasants and *boldly* repudiate this measure. And it would not only be a short-sighted policy, but also a theoretical distortion of Marxism, which has very definitely established that nationalisation of the land is possible and conceivable even in bourgeois society; that it will not retard, but stimulate, the development of capitalism, and that it is the *maximum* bourgeois-democratic reform in the sphere of agrarian relations.

And how can anyone deny that it is our duty *at the present time* to come before the peasantry, advocating the maximum bourgeois-democratic reforms? How can anyone still fail to see the connection between the radicalism of the peasants' agrarian demands (abolition of private ownership of land) and the radicalism of their political demands (a republic, etc.)?

The only stand Social-Democrats can take on the agrarian question at the present time, when the issue is one of carrying the democratic revolution to its conclusion, is the following: against landlord ownership and for peasant ownership, if private ownership of land is to exist at all. Against private ownership of land and for nationalisation of the land in definite political circumstances.

This brings us to the third type of opinion: the "Zemstvoisation" or "provincialisation" proposed by X., Maslov and others. In answering Maslov, I must to some extent repeat what I said in 1903 in answering X., namely, that his was "an inferior and contradictory formulation of the demand for the nationalisation of the land" (*Lenin*, "Reply to X.," p. 42*). And I went on to say: "The land should (generally speaking) preferably be transferred to a democratic state,

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 450.—Ed.

and not to *small* public organisations (like the present or future Zemstvos).”

What does Maslov propose? He proposes a hodge-podge of nationalisation *plus* Zemstvo-isation, *plus* private ownership of land, but he *does not indicate at all* the different political circumstances in which this or that agrarian system would benefit (relatively) the proletariat. Indeed, in Point 3 of his draft Maslov demands the “confiscation” of church and other lands and their “transfer to the democratic state”. This is nationalisation pure and simple. Why, one may ask, did he make no reservation about the political circumstances that would make nationalisation innocuous in bourgeois society? Why did he not propose *here* Zemstvo-isation instead of nationalisation? Why did he choose a formulation that *precludes* the sale of the confiscated land?* Maslov has replied to none of these questions.

In proposing the nationalisation of church, monastery and crown lands, and yet arguing against nationalisation in general, Maslov defeats his own purpose. His arguments against nationalisation are partly incomplete and inexact, and partly very feeble. First argument: nationalisation encroaches on the self-determination of nationalities. The authorities in St. Petersburg should not control the land in Transcaucasia. This is not an argument, but a sheer misunderstanding. In the first place, our programme recognises the right of nationalities to self-determination, and therefore, Transcaucasia, too, “has a right” to self-determination by secession from St. Petersburg. Maslov does not object to the four points⁹⁶ on the ground that “Transcaucasia” may not agree, does he? In the second place, our programme recognises *extensive* local and regional self-government as a *general principle*, and so it is positively ridiculous to talk about “the St. Petersburg bureaucracy controlling the land of the mountaineers” (Maslov, p. 22). Thirdly, it is in any case the *St. Petersburg* constituent assembly that will have

* Cf. *Lenin*, “Reply to X.”, p. 27: “It would be wrong to say that, under all circumstances and at all times, the Social-Democrats will be opposed to the sale of the land.” (See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 437.—*Ed.*) It is both illogical and unwise to assume that private ownership of land has not been abolished, yet commit oneself against the sale of the land.

to pass a law for the "Zemstvo-isation" of the land in *Transcaucasia*, for surely Maslov does not agree to any of the border territories having the right to preserve the landed estates. Consequently, Maslov's whole argument falls to the ground.

Second argument: "Nationalisation of the land presupposes the transfer of all the land to the state. But will the peasants, and particularly the homestead peasants, voluntarily agree to transfer their land to anybody?" (Maslov, p. 20).

First, Maslov is juggling with words, or else is confusing terms. Nationalisation means transferring to the state the right of ownership of the land, the right to draw rent, but not the land itself. Nationalisation does not by any means imply that all the peasants will be forced to transfer their land to anyone at all. We will explain this to Maslov by the following example. The socialist revolution implies the transfer to the whole of society, not only of property in the land, but of the land itself as an object of economic activity; but does that mean that the socialists want to deprive the small peasants of their land against their will? No, not a single sensible socialist has ever proposed anything so stupid.

Does anybody think it is necessary to make a special reservation about this in the section of the socialist programme which deals with the substitution of public ownership for private ownership of land.? No, not a single Social-Democratic Party makes such a reservation. We have all the less reason to invent imaginary horrors about nationalisation. Nationalisation means transferring rent to the state. The majority of the peasants receive no rent from land. Consequently they will not have to pay anything when the land is nationalised; and the democratic peasant state (tacitly implied in Maslov's vaguely formulated proposal for Zemstvo-isation) will in addition introduce a progressive income tax and reduce payments by the small proprietors. Nationalisation will facilitate the mobilisation of the land, but it does not in the least imply that the small peasants will be forcibly deprived of their land.

Secondly, if the argument against nationalisation hinges on the homestead peasants' "voluntary consent", then we ask Maslov: will the peasant proprietors "voluntarily con-

sent” to the “democratic state”—in which the peasants will be a force—*only renting* the best land, that is, the landlord, church and crown land, to them? Why, that would be just like saying to them: “You may own the bad, allotment land; as for the good, landed estates, you can only rent them. Black bread you may get free; for white bread, pay up in hard cash.” The peasants will never agree to this. One of two things, Comrade Maslov: either economic relations necessitate private ownership of land, and the latter is advantageous—in that case we must speak of dividing up, or confiscating altogether, the landed estates. Or nationalisation of all the land is possible and advantageous—in that case there is no need whatever to make any exception for the peasants. To combine nationalisation with provincialisation, and provincialisation with private ownership, is evidence of utter confusion. We can be quite sure that such a measure would be impracticable *even if the democratic revolution achieved the most complete victory.*

III. COMRADE MASLOV’S PRINCIPAL MISTAKE

Here we must deal with another argument, which follows from the preceding one but requires more detailed examination. We have just said that we can be quite sure Maslov’s programme will be impracticable even if the democratic revolution achieves the most complete victory. Speaking generally, the argument that certain demands in the programme are “impracticable”, by which we mean that they are not likely to be carried out in present conditions or in the immediate future, cannot serve as an argument against those demands. K. Kautsky brought this out very clearly in his article in reply to Rosa Luxemburg on the question of the independence of Poland.* R. Luxemburg had said that the independence of Poland was “impracticable”, to which K. Kautsky rejoined that it was not a question of “practicability” in the sense mentioned above, but whether a certain demand corresponds to the general trend of development

* An excerpt from it is quoted in my article on the draft agrarian programme in *Zarya*, No. 4. (See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 121—*Ed.*)

of society, or to the general economic and political situation throughout the civilised world. Take, for example, the demand in the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party for the election of all government officials by the people, said Kautsky. Of course, this demand is "impracticable" in present conditions in Germany. Nevertheless, it is quite a correct and necessary demand, for it is an inseparable part of the consistent democratic revolution towards which all social development is tending and which the Social-Democrats are demanding as a condition for socialism and as an essential element in the political superstructure of socialism.

That is just why, in saying that Maslov's programme is impracticable, we emphasise the words: even if the democratic revolution were to achieve the most complete victory. We do not merely say that Maslov's programme is impracticable in the light of present political relations and conditions. No, we assert that it would be impracticable even after a complete and fully consistent democratic revolution, i.e., in political conditions that would be most remote from the present, and most favourable for fundamental agrarian reforms. Precisely in these conditions Maslov's programme would be impracticable, not because it would be too big, so to speak, but because it would be too small for these conditions. In other words: if the democratic revolution is not completely victorious, then the abolition of landlordism, confiscation of the crown and other lands, municipalisation, and so forth, will be entirely out of the question. On the other hand, if the democratic revolution is completely victorious, it *cannot* confine itself to municipalising part of the land. A revolution that will sweep away all landlordism (and it is such a revolution that Maslov and all those who stand for division or confiscation of the landed estates assume) demands revolutionary energy and revolutionary action on a scale unprecedented in history. To assume that such a revolution is possible without confiscation of the landed estates (in his draft programme Maslov only speaks of "alienation", not of confiscation), without the idea of nationalising all the land becoming widespread among the "people", and without the most politically advanced forms of democracy being created, is to assume an

absurdity. All sides of social life are closely interconnected and, in the last analysis, are entirely subordinate to relations of production. A radical measure like the abolition of landlordism is unthinkable without a radical change in the forms of the state (a change which, given this economic reform, is possible only in the direction of democracy); it is unthinkable unless the "people" and the peasantry who demand the abolition of the most large-scale form of private property in land, are opposed to private ownership of land in general. In other words: a far-reaching revolution like the abolition of landlordism must, in itself, inevitably give a mighty impetus to the whole of social, economic and political development. A socialist who raises the question of such a revolution must also of necessity carefully consider the new problems that arise from it: he must examine this revolution in terms of the future as well as of the past.

It is from this aspect that Comrade Maslov's draft is particularly unsatisfactory. First, it wrongly formulates the slogans that should now, at once, immediately, kindle, fan, spread and "organise" the agrarian revolution. The only slogans that can serve this purpose are *confiscation* of all the landed estates and the establishment, for this purpose, of none other than *peasant committees*, as the only advisable form of local revolutionary authority that is close to the people and powerful. Secondly, the draft is defective in that it does not specify the political conditions without which "municipalisation" is a measure that is not necessarily useful, and is, indeed, positively harmful for the proletariat and the peasantry; that is to say, it does not give a precise and unambiguous definition of the term "democratic state". Thirdly, and this is one of the most serious and least frequently noticed defects in the draft, it does not examine the present agrarian revolution from the standpoint of its future, does not indicate the tasks that directly follow from this revolution, and suffers from a discrepancy between the economic and political postulates upon which it is based.

Examine carefully the strongest argument (the third) which might support Maslov's draft. This argument reads: nationalisation will strengthen the bourgeois state, whereas the municipal bodies, and local bodies generally, in such a state are usually more democratic, are not burdened with expendi-

ture for the maintenance of the armed forces, do not directly fulfil the police functions of oppressing the proletariat, and so on, and so forth. This argument clearly assumes that the state *will not be fully democratic*; it assumes that the most important part of the state, the central authority, will retain most of the features of the old military and bureaucratic regime, and that the local bodies, being of second-rate importance and subordinate, will be better, more democratic, than the central bodies. In other words, this argument assumes that the *democratic revolution will not be a complete one*. This argument *tacitly* assumes something between Russia in the reign of Alexander III, when the Zemstvos were better than the central bodies, and France at the time of the "republic without republicans", when the *reactionary* bourgeoisie, frightened by the growing strength of the proletariat, set up an anti-democratic "monarchist republic" with central bodies that were far worse than the local ones, less democratic and more permeated with the militarist, bureaucratic and police spirit. In essence, Maslov's draft tacitly assumes a situation in which the demands of our political minimum programme have not been carried out in full, the sovereignty of the people has not been ensured, the standing army has not been abolished, officials are not elected, and so forth. In other words, it assumes that our democratic revolution, like most of the democratic revolutions in Europe, has not reached its complete fulfilment and that it has been curtailed, distorted, "rolled back", like all the others. Maslov's draft is especially intended for a half-way, inconsistent, incomplete, or curtailed democratic revolution, "made innocuous" by reaction.*

This is what makes Maslov's draft absolutely artificial, mechanical, impracticable in the above-mentioned sense of the word, inherently contradictory and rickety, and lastly, lop-sided (for it only conceives of the transition from the democratic revolution to anti-democratic bourgeois reaction, and not to the intensified struggle of the proletariat for socialism).

* In his *Agrarfrage* Kautsky, to whom Maslov refers, points out particularly that nationalisation, which would be absurd in the conditions prevailing in Mecklenburg, would have a different significance in democratic England or Australia.

It is absolutely impermissible *tacitly* to assume that the democratic revolution will not be carried through to the end, and that the fundamental demands of our political minimum programme will not be carried out. Such things must not be passed over in silence, but stated in very precise terms. If Maslov wanted to do justice to himself, if he wanted to eliminate any element of reticence and inherent falsity in his draft, he should have said: as the state that will emerge from the present revolution will “probably” not be very democratic, it will be better not to increase its power by nationalisation, but to keep to Zemstvo-isation, for “*we must assume*” that the Zemstvos will be better and more democratic than the central bodies of the state. This, and this alone, is the tacit assumption in Maslov’s draft. Therefore, when he uses the term “democratic state” in his draft (Point 3), and without any reservation at that, he is uttering a glaring untruth and misleading himself, the proletariat and the whole people. For in reality he is “adjusting” his draft precisely to a *non*-democratic state, a reactionary state arising out of a democracy that has been left incomplete, or has been “taken over” by reaction.

That being the case, it is clear why Maslov’s draft is so artificial and “synthetic”. Indeed, if we assume a state with a central authority that is more reactionary than the local authorities, a state like the third French republic without republicans, then it is positively ridiculous to imagine that landlordism can be abolished in such a state, or that it will at least be possible to prevent the restoration of landlordism abolished by the revolutionary onslaught. In that part of the world that is called Europe, and in the century that is called the Twentieth, every state of *that* kind would be compelled by the objective logic of the class struggle to *start by protecting* landlordism, or by *restoring* it if it had been partly abolished. The whole purpose, the objective purpose, of such a semi-democratic, but actually reactionary, state is to preserve the *foundations* of bourgeois, landlord and bureaucratic rule, and to sacrifice only the least important of its prerogatives. The existence in such states of a reactionary central authority side by side with comparatively “democratic” local bodies, Zemstvos, municipal councils, and so forth, is due solely and exclusively to the

fact that these local bodies are engaged in matters that are *harmless for the bourgeois state*: they are engaged in "tinkering with wash-basins", water supply, electric trams, and similar matters that do not endanger the *foundations* of what is called "the existing social system". It would be childishly naïve to imagine that because the Zemstvos engage in activities such as supplying water and light, they can engage in the "activity" of abolishing landlordism. This is the same as if a municipal council with a 100 per cent Social-Democratic majority somewhere in the French Poshekhonye⁹⁷ were to set about "municipalising" all the privately-owned land in France that had privately-owned buildings erected on it. The whole point is that the measure which abolishes landlordism differs just a little from measures to improve water supply, lighting, sewage, and so forth. The whole point is that the first "*measure*" very daringly "encroaches" upon the foundations of the *whole* "existing social system", it violently shakes and undermines these foundations, and facilitates the proletariat's onslaught upon the bourgeois system as a whole, on a scale unprecedented in history. Yes, in such circumstances the first and most important thing any bourgeois state will have to concern itself with will be to preserve the foundations of bourgeois domination. As soon as the fundamental interests of the bourgeois and landlord state are encroached upon, all rights and privileges as regards autonomous "tinkering with wash-basins" will be abolished in the twinkling of an eye; all municipalisation will at once be scrapped, and every vestige of democracy in local government bodies will be extirpated by "punitive expeditions". The innocent assumption that democratic municipal autonomy is possible under a reactionary central authority, and that this "autonomy" can be used to abolish landlordism, is a matchless specimen of visual incongruities, or of infinite political naïveté.

IV. THE OBJECTS OF OUR AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

The question of the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. would be very much clearer if we attempted to set it forth in the form of clear and plain advice that the Social-Democratic

Party should offer the proletariat and the peasantry in the period of the democratic revolution.

The first advice would necessarily be the following: make every effort to achieve the complete victory of the peasant uprising. Without such a victory, it will be impossible even to talk seriously either about "taking the land" from the landlords, or about setting up a truly democratic state. And the only slogan that can rouse the peasantry to revolt is: confiscation of all the landed estates (and not alienation in general, or expropriation in general, which would leave the question of compensation in the shade), and definitely confiscation by peasant committees pending the convocation of a constituent assembly.

Any other advice (including Maslov's slogan of "alienation", and all his municipalisation) is a call to the peasantry to settle the question, not by means of insurrection, but by a deal with the landlords, with the reactionary central authority. It is a call for a settlement of the question, not in a revolutionary but in a bureaucratic way, for even the most democratic regional and Zemstvo organisations are bound to be bureaucratic compared with revolutionary peasant committees, which should settle accounts with the landlords there and then, and take over powers later to be sanctioned by a national constituent assembly.

The second advice would necessarily be: unless the political system is made thoroughly democratic, unless a republic is established and the sovereignty of the people really assured, it will be useless to think either of retaining the gains won by the peasant revolt, or of making further progress. We should formulate this advice to the workers and peasants in the clearest and most precise terms to preclude all doubts, ambiguities, misinterpretations, or the tacit assumption of absurdities such as the possibility of abolishing landlordism under a reactionary central authority. And therefore, in pressing our political advice, we must say to the peasants: after taking the land, you should go further, otherwise you will be beaten and hurled back by the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. You cannot take the land and retain it without achieving new political gains, without striking another and even stronger blow at private ownership of land in general. In politics, as in all the life

of society, if you do not push forward, you will be hurled back. Either the bourgeoisie, strengthened after the democratic revolution (which naturally strengthens the bourgeoisie), will rob both the workers and the peasant masses of all their gains, or the proletariat and the peasant masses will fight their way further forward. And that means a republic and the complete sovereignty of the people. It means—if a republic is established—the nationalisation of all the land as the most that a bourgeois-democratic revolution can attain, as the natural and necessary step from the victory of bourgeois democracy to the beginning of the real struggle for socialism.

The third and last advice is: proletarians and semi-proletarians of town and country, organise separately. Don't trust any petty proprietors—not even small, or “working”, proprietors. Don't be tempted with small-scale ownership, so long as commodity production continues. The nearer the peasant uprising is to victory, the more likely is the peasant proprietor to turn against the proletariat, the more necessary is it for the proletariat to have its independent organisation, and the more vigorously, perseveringly, resolutely and loudly should we call for the complete socialist revolution. We stand by the peasant movement to the end; but we have to remember that it is the movement of another class, not the one which can and will bring about the socialist revolution. That is why we leave aside the question of what is to be done about distributing the land as an object of economic activity: in bourgeois society, that question can and will be settled only by the proprietors, big and small. What we are mostly (and after the victory of the peasant uprising exclusively) interested in is: what should the rural proletariat do? We have been and will be concerned mainly with this question, leaving it to the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie to invent such things as equalised land tenure and the like. Our reply to this question, the fundamental question of the new, bourgeois-democratic Russia is: the rural proletariat must organise independently together with the town proletariat to fight for the complete socialist revolution.

Hence our agrarian programme should consist of three main parts. First, the formulation of the most emphatic call for a revolutionary peasant onslaught upon landlordism;

secondly, a precise definition of the next step the movement can and should take to consolidate the peasants' gains and to pass from the victory of democracy to the direct proletarian struggle for socialism; third, an indication of the Party's proletarian class aims, which, as the victory of the peasant uprising draws nearer, more urgently confront us and more persistently demand a clear formulation.

Maslov's programme does not solve a single one of the fundamental problems that now confront the R.S.D.L.P.; it does not give the slogan that could now, immediately, under the present most anti-democratic state, indicate the path of victory for the peasant movement. This programme does not define exactly the political reforms that are necessary to complete and consolidate the agrarian reforms; it does not indicate the agrarian reforms that will be necessary in a complete and consistent democracy; it does not describe the proletarian attitude of our Party towards all bourgeois-democratic reforms. It defines neither the conditions of the "first step" nor the objects of the "second step", but lumps everything together: beginning with the transfer of the crown lands to a non-existent "democratic state", and going on to the transfer of the landed estates to democratic municipalities out of fear of the undemocratic nature of the central authority! Non-revolutionary as regards its present practical significance, based on the assumption of an absolutely artificial and entirely improbable deal with a semi-reactionary central authority, this programme can give no guidance to the workers' party in any of the possible and conceivable lines of development of the democratic revolution in Russia.

To sum up. The only correct programme, provided there is a democratic revolution, is the following: confiscation of the landed estates and establishment of peasant committees*; this we must demand immediately, without hedging

* Like X., Maslov "sees a contradiction in the fact that we demand abolition of the social-estates and the establishment of peasant, i.e., social-estate, committees. In fact, the contradiction is only a seeming one: the abolition of the social-estates requires a 'dictatorship' of the lowest, oppressed social-estate, just as the abolition of classes in general, including the class of proletarians, requires the dictatorship of the proletariat. The object of our entire agrarian programme is

it round with restricting reservations. Such a demand is revolutionary and advantageous both to the proletariat and to the peasantry in all circumstances, even the worst. Such a demand inevitably involves the collapse of the police state and the strengthening of democracy.

But we cannot limit ourselves to confiscation. In the period of democratic revolution and peasant uprising, we cannot under any circumstances flatly reject nationalisation of the land; but we must specify the particular political conditions without which nationalisation might be detrimental to the proletariat and the peasantry.

Such a programme will be complete and integral. It will unquestionably offer the maximum of what is conceivable in any bourgeois-democratic revolution. It will not tie the hands of the Social-Democrats, for it will allow for division of the land or nationalisation, according to political circumstances. It will under no circumstances cause any friction between the peasants and the proletariat as fighters for democracy.* It will here and now, under the present political regime of police-ridden autocracy, advance absolutely revolutionary slogans that will revolutionise this regime; and it will also contain further demands, provided the democratic revolution is completely victorious, i.e., provided a situation arises in which the completion of the democratic revolution opens new prospects and brings forward new tasks.

It is absolutely essential that the programme should precisely indicate the special proletarian position we occupy throughout the democratic agrarian revolution. We need not be embarrassed by the fact that the place for this is a

the eradication of feudal and social-estate traditions in the sphere of agrarian relations, and to bring that about the only possible appeal can be to the lowest social-estate, to those who are oppressed by these remnants of the serf-owning system." *Lenin*, "Reply to X.", p. 29. (See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 438.—*Ed.*)

*To remove any idea that the workers' party wants to impose upon the peasantry any scheme of reforms against their will and independently of any movement among the peasantry, we have attached to the draft programme *Variant A*, in which, instead of the direct demand for nationalisation, we say first that the Party supports the striving of the revolutionary peasantry to abolish private ownership of land.

resolution on tactics, or that it repeats the general part of our programme.

It is worth sacrificing the symmetrical division of subjects into programmatic and tactical, if by doing so we make our position clear and intelligible to the masses.

Herewith we submit the draft agrarian programme drawn up by the majority of the "Agrarian Committee" (appointed by the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to draft a new agrarian programme).

V. DRAFT AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

With a view to eradicating the survivals of the serf-owning system, which are a direct and heavy burden upon the peasants, and for the purpose of facilitating the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the Party demands:

(1) the confiscation of all church, monastery, crown, state, and landlord estates;

(2) the establishment of peasant committees for the purpose of immediately abolishing all traces of landlord power and privilege, and of actual disposal of the confiscated lands, pending the establishment of a new agrarian system by a constituent assembly of the whole people;

(3) the abolition of all taxes and services at present exacted from the peasantry, as the tax-paying social-estate;

(4) the repeal of all laws that restrict the peasants in disposing of their land;

(5) the authorisation of the courts elected by the people to reduce exorbitant rents and to annul all contracts that entail an element of bondage.

If, however, the decisive victory of the present revolution in Russia brings about the complete sovereignty of the people, i.e., establishes a republic and a fully democratic state system, the Party will* seek the abolition of private

* Variant A.

... the Party will support the striving of the revolutionary peasantry to abolish private ownership of land and seek the transfer of all the land to the state.

ownership of land and the transfer of all the land to the whole people as common property.

Furthermore, the object of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in all circumstances, and whatever the situation of democratic agrarian reform, is steadily to strive for the independent class organisation of the rural proletariat; to explain that its interests are irreconcilably opposed to those of the peasant bourgeoisie; to warn it against being tempted by small-scale ownership, which cannot, so long as commodity production exists, abolish poverty among the masses; and lastly, to urge the necessity for a complete socialist revolution as the only means of abolishing all poverty and all exploitation.

**PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION
OF K. KAUTSKY'S PAMPHLET
*SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY WIPED OUT!***

This is the Russian translation of a pamphlet written by one of the most outstanding representatives of German Social-Democracy. The author has succeeded in covering a far wider ground than the subject he has chosen would lead one to expect. Instead of merely refuting the lying assertions of Herr Burger, an unscrupulous henchman of the manufacturers, he has provided a wonderfully lucid and popular outline of the fundamental problems of the working-class movement, not only in Germany but all over the world. The decay of small-scale production and the impoverishment of the people are taking place everywhere. Like Herr Burger, the bourgeois politicians and economists in all countries are trying hard to obscure this fact. A methodical examination of the arguments usually advanced by these gentlemen is therefore of great value.

The author deals almost exclusively with facts concerning Germany. On some questions it would be useful to supplement these with facts concerning Russia. The publishers will probably make an effort to do so if this pamphlet achieves the circulation it fully deserves. It must be observed, however, that Russian industrial and agricultural statistics are in a most pitiable condition compared with German. In the case of Germany, it is possible to compare the returns of two national industrial and agricultural censuses, taken at different times. In Russia, not a single census of this kind has ever been taken, and apart from the Zemstvo statistics which have analysed in a European way

only small, isolated sections of our national economy, we have nothing more than the lying, slipshod, bureaucratically muddled statistics of various "departments", which would better deserve the title of police whitewash.

The Russian bureaucracy is preventing the Russian people from learning the whole truth about their conditions. But every educated Russian reader will easily recall hundreds and thousands of examples from our literature, illustrating the conditions of peasant farming, the handicraft trades and factory life, which fully bear out the conclusions arrived at by the author of this pamphlet. Every Russian worker and peasant will easily see that the impoverishment of the people described in this pamphlet is going on in Russia on a still larger scale, and in still more intense and cruder forms.

March 1906

N. Lenin

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Social-Democracy Wiped Out!

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THE VICTORY OF THE CADETS AND THE TASKS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY

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I

WHAT WAS THE OBJECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE
OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE DUMA ELECTIONS?

The Cadets' victories have turned the head of our liberal press. In the course of the election campaign the Cadets succeeded in rallying all, or nearly all, the liberals. Newspapers which hitherto had not been associated with the Cadet Party have in effect become the organs of that party. The liberal press is overjoyed. On all sides we hear cries of exultation and threats addressed to the government. And a very characteristic circumstance is that these cries are constantly intermingled with sometimes malicious and sometimes condescending digs at the Social-Democrats.

Look what a mistake you made by keeping out of the elections! Now you see it, don't you? You will admit that you were mistaken, won't you? Now you appreciate the advice of the wise and far-sighted Plekhanov, don't you?—These and similar utterances may be read in the columns of the liberal press, bubbling over with elation. Comrade Stepanov (in his article "From Afar", in the symposium *The Present Situation*) has very aptly remarked that Plekhanov's present experience is something like what happened to Bernstein. Just as Bernstein was once carried shoulder-high by the German liberals, and lauded to the skies by all the "progressive" bourgeois newspapers, so today there is not a liberal newspaper in Russia, or even a liberal newspaper article (even *Slovo*, yes, even the Octobrist *Slovo*!) that does not embrace and kiss and fondle the wise and far-sighted, reasonable and sober-minded Plekhanov, who had the courage to rise in arms against the boycott.

Let us, then, see what the victories of the Cadets have proved. Whose mistake have they revealed? Whose tactics have they proved to be barren?

Plekhanov, Struve and Co. keep on telling us that the boycott was a mistake. Why the Cadets should think so is quite clear. Their proposal to secure the election to the Duma of one working man from Moscow (see *Nasha Zhizn*, March 23) shows that the Cadets appreciate the assistance of the workers, that they desire to strike a bargain with the Social-Democrats in order to round off and consolidate their victory, and that they are just as ready to strike such a bargain with the non-party workers as with the Social-Democratic Party. That the Cadets should abhor the boycott is quite natural, for it implies refusal to support them, the Cadets, refusal of the "Left" to strike a bargain with them, the Cadets.

But what does Plekhanov want—and the Mensheviks, or our Russian anti-boycott Social-Democrats, who gravitate towards him (some unwittingly and others wittingly)? Alas, alas! Plekhanov, the boldest of them all, the one who most consistently, most freely and most clearly expounds his views, shows again and again, in the fifth issue of his *Dnevnik*,* that *he does not know what he wants*. We must take part in the elections, he shouts. What for? To organise revolutionary local self-government, as advocated by the Mensheviks? Or in order to go into the Duma?

Plekhanov twists and turns and wriggles, and resorts to sophistry to avoid answering these plain, blunt and clear questions. After remaining silent for months and months when the Mensheviks, in the columns of *Iskra*, were already advocating revolutionary local self-government (*and when he was unequivocally signifying his sympathy with the Mensheviks' tactics*), Plekhanov now suddenly hurls a most contemptuous phrase at this "celebrated revolutionary local self-government" of the Mensheviks. Why and how celebrated, Comrade Plekhanov? Was it not the very Bolsheviks whom Plekhanov now wants to fight, and who long ago proved that this slogan was inadequate, indefinite and half-hearted, that helped to make it "celebrated"?

* *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 5.

No reply. Plekhanov explains nothing. He pronounces his dictum like an oracle and passes on. But the difference between an oracle and Plekhanov is that an oracle predicts events, whereas Plekhanov pronounces his dictum after the event; he brings in the mustard when the meal is over. When, before the October revolution, before the December uprising, before the revolutionary upsurge, the Mensheviks were talking about "revolutionary local self-government", Plekhanov was silent, although he approved of the Mensheviks' tactics in general; he was silent, as if waiting in bewilderment, not daring to make up his mind. Now, when the revolutionary tide has ebbed, when the "days of freedom" and the days of insurrection are past, when all the various Soviets of workers', soldiers', railwaymen's and other deputies have left the scene (Soviets which the Mensheviks thought were organs of revolutionary local self-government, and which the Bolsheviks regarded as rudimentary, disconnected, spontaneous and therefore impotent organs of revolutionary state power)—in short, when the question has lost its acuteness, when the meal has been consumed, Plekhanov comes along with the mustard; he displays that wisdom and far-sightedness concerning yesterday that Messrs. Struve and Co. admire so much.

Why Comrade Plekhanov is displeased with revolutionary local self-government remains a secret. Plekhanov now agrees with the Bolsheviks that revolutionary local self-government "confuses" a lot of people (*Dnevnik*, No. 5); but by all appearances, Plekhanov thinks that this slogan is too radical, whereas the Bolsheviks think it too moderate. Plekhanov thinks that this slogan goes too far, whereas we think that it does not go far enough. What Plekhanov wants is to draw the Mensheviks away from this idea of "revolutionary local self-government" to sober, practical work in the Duma. We, however, want—and not only want, but consciously and distinctly call for—a step forward from the idea of revolutionary local self-government to recognition of the necessity for systematically setting up integral, methodical and dynamic organs of insurrection, organs of revolutionary power. For all practical purposes, Plekhanov shelves the slogan of insurrection (although he dares not say so openly and definitely); it is therefore quite natural that he should

also reject the slogan of revolutionary self-government, which without an insurrection, and unconnected with an insurrectionary situation, would be ridiculous and harmful make-believe. Plekhanov is slightly more consistent than his fellow-thinkers, the Mensheviks.

And so, why should we after all take part in the elections, Comrade Plekhanov, and how? Not for the sake of revolutionary local self-government, which only "confuses" people. To participate in the Duma, then? But here Plekhanov is overcome with timidity. He does not want to reply. But as $n+1$ comrades in Russia desire to do something definite among the masses of the workers, and not merely "do the reading" of the diaries of an author who "does the writing", and as these $n+1$ pestering correspondents demand a specific reply, Plekhanov loses his temper. It is difficult to imagine anything more helpless and more curious than his angry statement that it would be pedantic, formalistic, etc., to expect the voters to know what they are voting for, and why. But dear Comrade Plekhanov! Your friends the Cadets, and our workers as well, will simply laugh you out of court if you come before the masses and seriously begin to advocate this magnificent programme: take part in the elections; vote; but don't ask what you are voting for, or why. Vote on the basis of the Duma election law; but don't dare think (that would be pedantic and formalistic) that you are voting for candidates for the Duma.

Why has Comrade Plekhanov, who was once able to write clearly and give specific answers, become so obviously muddled? Because, having wrongly appraised the December uprising, he has formed a totally wrong notion of the present political situation. He finds himself in a position where he does not dare to think out his ideas to their logical conclusion; he is afraid to face realities squarely.

But the unvarnished realities of the "Duma campaign" are now clear to everyone. Facts have now answered the question what was the objective significance of the elections and of participating in them, irrespective of the will, consciousness, speeches and promises of those participating in them. The very reason why Comrade Plekhanov, the most determined of Mensheviks, dare not declare straightforwardly for participating in the Duma elections is that it

is now perfectly clear what this participation means. *Participation in the elections means either supporting the Cadets and striking a bargain with them, or playing at elections.* The very facts of life have proved this. In No. 5 of his *Dnevnik* Plekhanov was compelled to admit the correctness of the second half of this argument; he was compelled to admit that the slogan of "revolutionary local self-government" is absurd. In No. 6 of his *Dnevnik*, Plekhanov will be compelled, unless he refuses to consider the issue on its merits, to admit that the first half is also correct.

Political realities have utterly shattered the Mensheviks' tactics, the tactics they advocated in their "platform" (the hectographed leaflet mentioning the names of Martov and Dan, issued in St. Petersburg at the end of 1905 or beginning of 1906) and in their printed statements (the Bulletin of the Joint Central Committee outlining the tactics of both sides, and Dan's article in a certain pamphlet). These tactics were to participate in the elections, but not to elect members of the Duma. We repeat, not a single more or less prominent Menshevik dared even hint in the press that we should go into the Duma. And it is these "pure" Menshevik tactics that the facts of life have completely shattered. It is hardly possible now to so much as talk seriously about participating in the elections for the sake of "revolutionary local self-government", of withdrawing from the gubernia election meetings, etc. Events have shown very clearly that such playing at elections, at parliamentarism, can only compromise Social-Democracy, can only result in disgrace and scandal, and nothing else.

If any further confirmation of this is required, it is provided most strikingly by the Moscow Regional Committee of our Party. This is an amalgamated organisation, consisting of the Majority and Minority factions. The tactics it adopted were also "amalgamated", i.e., they were at least half Menshevik tactics, namely, to take part in the election of delegates for the purpose of consolidating Social-Democratic influence in the workers' curia, and then to wreck the elections by refusing to elect the electors. This was an attempt to repeat the tactics adopted towards the Shidlovsky Commission.⁹⁸ It was the "first step" on the lines recommended by Comrade Plekhanov:

we will take part in the elections, and go into the matter more thoroughly afterwards.

As was to be expected, the Menshevik-Plekhanov tactics of the Moscow Regional Committee ended in a complete fiasco. The delegates were elected, among them Social-Democrats and even members of the organisation. Then came the anti-boycott law.⁹⁹ The delegates found themselves on the horns of a dilemma: either to go to prison for agitating in favour of the boycott, or elect the electors. The Regional Committee, like all our Party organisations, conducts its agitation underground, and so it proved unable to cope with the forces it had set in motion. *The delegates broke their promise*, they tore up their imperative mandates and—*elected the electors*. Among those elected were also Social-Democrats, and even members of the organisation.

This writer witnessed a very painful scene during the meeting of the Moscow Regional Committee, when that leading Social-Democratic organisation discussed what was to be done after the failure of the (Plekhanov) tactics. The failure of the tactics was so obvious that *not a single* Menshevik member of the Committee spoke in favour of the electors participating in the gubernia election meeting, or of revolutionary local self-government, or anything of the sort. On the other hand, it was difficult to decide to impose any penalty on the worker delegates who had acted contrary to their mandates. The Committee could do nothing but wash its hands of the situation, and tacitly confess that it had blundered.

Such was the result of the Plekhanov tactics of voting without carefully considering (without even desiring to think carefully, without desiring to think at all: see *Dnevnik*, No. 5) what we were to vote for, and why. At the first impact with reality the Menshevik “tactics” were shattered; and this is not surprising, for these “tactics” (participation in the elections, but not in order to elect) consisted entirely of good words and good intentions. The intentions remained intentions and the words, words; but what actually occurred was dictated by the inexorable logic of the objective political situation: either elect in order to support the Cadets, or play at elections. Thus events have fully borne out what I wrote in my article, “The State Duma and Social-

Democratic Tactics": "We may declare that our Social-Democratic candidates are completely and absolutely independent, and that we are participating in the elections on the strictest possible Party lines: but *the political situation is more potent than any number of declarations*. Things will not, and cannot, turn out in keeping with these declarations. Whether we like it or not, if we participate now in the present Duma elections, the result will inevitably be neither Social-Democratic nor workers' party policy" (p. 5).*

Let the Mensheviks or the Plekhanovites try to refute this conclusion—not by words but by deeds, by facts. After all, every local organisation of our Party is now autonomous as far as tactics are concerned. How is it that nothing good and practical has come of Menshevik tactics anywhere in Russia? Why has not the Moscow group of the R.S.D.L.P., which is a Menshevik group and not amalgamated with the Bolshevik Committee, drawn up a "Plekhanov" plan of campaign, or one of its own, for the elections that are to take place in Moscow the day after tomorrow, on Sunday, March 26? Not because it did not want to, of course. And, I am sure, not because it did not know how. It was because the objective political situation dictated either boycott, or support for the Cadets. Now among the electors elected for Moscow Gubernia there are Social-Democrats. The results of the elections are quite definite. The gubernia election meeting will not be held yet awhile. There is still time, Comrade Plekhanov. There is still time, Menshevik comrades! Why don't you advise these electors what to do?*** Show

* See p. 108 of this volume.—*Ed.*

*** These lines had been written when I read in *Rech*,¹⁰⁰ No. 30, of March 24, the following correspondence from Moscow: "So far as one can judge at present, the chances of the Cadets and Right parties at the coming gubernia elections are about equal: the Octobrists (11), the Commercial and Industrial Party (26) and the representatives of the extreme Right parties (13) have a fairly definite total of 50 votes; the Cadets (22), if to them we add the non-party progressives (11) and the workers (17), also have 50. Success in the contest will be determined by 9 electors whose sympathies are unknown."

Let us assume that these 9 are liberals and that the 17 workers are delegates of the Social-Democratic Party (as Plekhanov and the Mensheviks would like them to be). The totals will then be: Cadets 42, Rights 50, Social-Democrats 17. What else can the Social-Democrats do except enter into an electoral agreement with the Cadets about the distribution of the seats in the Duma?

them, at least for once, that you have tactics for an event and not after it. Should these electors simply walk out of the gubernia election meeting? Or should they walk out and form a revolutionary local self-government? Or should they hand in blank ballot papers? Or, lastly, should they vote for candidates for the Duma, and if so, for whom? For their own Social-Democratic candidates, for the sake of a futile and hopeless hole-and-corner demonstration? And lastly, the main question that you, Menshevik comrades and Comrade Plekhanov, must answer is: What are these electors to do if their votes are to decide whether the Cadets or Octobrists are to be elected? If, for example, the Cadets have A minus 1 electors, the Octobrists have A, and there are two Social-Democratic electors? To abstain* would mean helping the Octobrists to defeat the Cadets! Thus, the only course open is to vote for the Cadets and *to beg the latter to leave you a seat in the Duma as a reward for that service.*

This is by no means an imaginary conclusion. Nor is it a polemical dig at the Mensheviks. It is a conclusion drawn from reality. The participation of the workers and of the Social-Democrats in the elections leads to this *in practice*, and only to this. The Cadets rightly took into account what happened in St. Petersburg, where the non-party worker tenants voted for them to prevent the Octobrists from winning. Taking this into account, they made a forthright offer to

* There is hardly need to add that by voting for their own Social-Democratic candidate, these two would *actually be helping the Black Hundreds*. Voting for the Social-Democratic candidate would be tantamount to abstaining, that is to say, to passively retiring from the fight in which the Black Hundreds were beating the Cadets.

P.S. In the text above it was erroneously stated that the gubernia election meeting would not meet yet awhile. It has already met. The Black Hundreds have won, because the peasants could not come to terms with the Cadets. Incidentally, the same issue of *Nasha Zhizn* from which we obtained this information (No. 405, March 28) says: "The newspaper *Put* reports from a reliable source that many Menshevik Social-Democrats took an active part in the elections (in Moscow) yesterday, and voted for the people's 'freedom ticket'." Is this true?

the Moscow workers: support us and we will get one of your electors into the Duma. The Cadets appreciated the real significance of Plekhanov's tactics better than Plekhanov himself. By their proposal they anticipated the inevitable political result of the elections. If Social-Democratic worker electors had been in the place of the non-party worker electors, they would have been confronted with the same dilemma: either retire from the elections, and thus help the Black Hundreds; or enter into a direct or indirect agreement or deal, tacit or written, with the Cadets.

O yes, it is *not for nothing* that the Cadets are now smothering Plekhanov in their embraces! And the price of these embraces is obvious. *Do ut des*, as the Latin saying has it: give and take. I embrace you because you, by your advice, are getting *me* extra votes. True, that may not have been your intention; you have even been ashamed to confess publicly that we have embraced you. You tried by fair means and foul (particularly by foul!) to get away from answering the questions that too importunately, too closely probed into the details of our love match. But it is not what you want, not what you think, not your good (from the Social-Democratic standpoint) intentions that count. What counts are the *results*—and those are in our favour.

The Cadets' interpretation of Plekhanov's tactics is correct. That is why they obtain the results they desire: the workers' votes, a deal with the workers, and *involvement of the workers in joint responsibility* with the Cadets for a *Cadet Duma*, for the Cadet policy.

Plekhanov's interpretation of the tactics he proposes is wrong. That is why his good intentions merely pave the way to hell. Social-Democratic election agitation among the *masses*, organisation of the *masses*, mobilisation of the *masses* around the Social-Democrats, and so on, and so forth (see the rhetoric of Dan, Plekhanov's fellow-thinker, in his pamphlet), all remain a dead letter. Much as some of us may desire these things, objective conditions are against them.

We do not succeed in unfurling the banner of Social-Democracy before the masses (remember the case of the Moscow Regional Committee); it is impossible to transform an underground organisation into a legal one; the helm is wrenched

from the powerless steersman who has been flung into the quasi-parliamentary torrent without proper equipment. *What we actually get is not a Social-Democratic, not a workers' party policy, but a Cadet labour policy.*

But your boycott has proved absolutely useless and impotent, the Cadets shout at us from all sides. The workers who wanted to make a laughing-stock of the Duma and of us Cadets, by their example of a boycott, the workers who elected a dummy to the Duma, were very clearly mistaken! The Duma will not be a dummy, but a Cadet Duma!

Have a heart, gentlemen! You are naïve, or pretending to be naïve. If the Duma turns out to be a Cadet Duma, the situation will be different; but the Duma will be a dummy all the same. The workers were guided by a wonderfully sensitive class instinct when, by their matchless demonstration of voting for a dummy, they symbolised the future Duma, warned credulous people, and disclaimed all responsibility for playing at dummies.

You don't understand that? Let us explain it to you.

II

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIRST ELECTIONS

The first political elections in Russia have very important political and social significance. But the Cadets, intoxicated by their victory, and totally submerged in constitutional illusions, are absolutely incapable of understanding the real significance of these elections.

First of all, let us see what class elements are grouped around the Cadets. On this question the elections provide highly instructive and valuable evidence, which is still far, very far, from being complete, however. Nevertheless, it already reveals some things that are worthy of special attention. The following are the returns of the election of electors up to March 18, i.e., before the elections in St. Petersburg. We have taken the figures from *Russkiye Vedomosti*.¹⁰¹

Political trend*	Number of electors elected by meetings of:		
	City Voters	Landowners	Total
Lefts	268	128	396
Rights	118	172	290
Non-party	101	178	279
<i>Total</i>	487	478	965

Scanty as these figures are, they nevertheless show (and the St. Petersburg elections merely serve to confirm it) that the Russian liberation movement in general, and the Cadet Party in particular, is undergoing a social evolution. The centre of this movement is steadily shifting to the cities. The movement is becoming democratized. The "small fry" among the townspeople are coming to the forefront.

Among the landowners, the Rights predominate (if we assume that the non-party electors are evenly divided between the Lefts and the Rights, an assumption which, if anything, errs on the side of pessimism rather than of optimism). Among the city voters, the Lefts predominate to a far greater extent.

The landlords have deserted the Cadets for the Union of October Seventeenth and other similar parties. On the other hand, the petty bourgeoisie, or at any rate, the urban petty bourgeoisie (no figures are yet available for the rural petty bourgeoisie, and it will be more difficult to obtain them before the Duma elections), is clearly coming into the political arena, and is clearly turning towards democracy. In the bourgeois liberation (and *Osvobozhdeniye*) movement of Zemstvo congresses, the landlords predominated; but the peasant revolts and the October revolution have now thrown back a large section of them definitely to the side of the counter-revolution. The Cadet Party remains a dual party—in it we see both urban petty bourgeoisie and liberal landlords: but the latter, apparently, are already a minority in the party. The petty-bourgeois democrats predominate.

* Among the Lefts we include the Social-Democrats (2), Cadets (304), Party of Democratic Reforms (4) the progressive trend (59), the moderate liberals (17), the Jewish Equality League (3) and the Polish nationalists (7). Among the Right we include the Octobrists (124), Commercial and Industrial Party (51) Constitutional Monarchist (7), Party of Law and Order (5), the Right (49) and monarchists (54).

Thus, with a large margin of probability, almost with certainty, we can draw the following two conclusions: first, that the petty bourgeoisie is taking shape politically, and is definitely opposing the government; second, that the Cadet Party is becoming the "parliamentary" party of the petty-bourgeois democrats.

These two conclusions are not identical, as might appear at first sight. The second is much narrower than the first, for the Cadet Party does not comprise all the petty-bourgeois democratic elements, and moreover, it is only a "parliamentary" (i.e., *of course, a quasi-parliamentary, mock-parliamentary*) party. As for the significance of the St. Petersburg elections, there is an astonishing agreement among all witnesses; beginning with the pert *Rus*, which is flirting with radicalism, continuing with Mr. Nabokov, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party and candidate for the Duma, and ending with *Novoye Vremya*. All agree that the election returns are not so much a vote *for* the Cadets as a vote *against the government*. The Cadets achieved their victory largely *because they were* (thanks to Durnovo and Co.) *the most extreme Left party in the field*. The genuinely Left parties were kept out of the field by violence, arrests, massacres, the election law, and so forth. By the very force of circumstances, by the logic of the election struggle, all the discontented, irritated, angry and vaguely revolutionary elements were compelled to rally around the Cadets.* The combination of all the progressive electors with the Cadets that we made in the table given above is a reflection of what actually took place. Virtually there were two big forces contending: one for the government (the counter-revolutionary landlords, the capitalists, and the dehumanised officials), and the other against the government (the liberal landlords, the petty bourgeoisie, and all the vaguely revolutionary-democratic elements). That elements to the left of the Cadets voted for the latter is a fact that stands out

* *Molva* of March 22 wrote: "It is no secret that nobody expects any constructive work from this Duma, and many of those who are voting for the Cadets disagree with their programme; they are merely imposing upon them the sacred and arduous duty of cleaning out the accumulated filth of years from our Augean stables, or in other words, from the government."

beyond doubt from the general picture of the St. Petersburg elections*; it is confirmed by the direct evidence of numerous witnesses (the fact that the "common people" voted for "freedom", and so on, and so forth); and it is borne out indirectly by the swing to the Cadet camp of the whole of the democratic press that stands slightly to the left of the Cadet press. Thus, while the core of the present Cadet Party consists of people who are certainly good for nothing better than toy-parliament oratory, this cannot be said about the bulk of the petty-bourgeois voters who voted for the Cadets. "Virtually, our experience is the same as that of the Social-Democrats during elections in Germany," said a Cadet to the reporter of the Cadet (or semi-Cadet) *Nasha Zhizn* (No. 401, March 23). "Many people vote for them because they are the party most strongly opposed to the government."

This is very true, but a tiny little thing must be added: the German Social-Democratic Party, being a militant and advanced socialist party in the fullest sense of the word, groups around itself many relatively backward elements. But the Russian Cadets, who in the fullest sense of the word are a backward and not a militant, democratic party, have carried with them many advanced and potentially militant democratic elements because the genuinely democratic parties have been forcibly removed from the battlefield. In other words, the German Social-Democratic Party carries with it those who trail behind it; whereas the Russian Cadets themselves trail behind the democratic revolution and can carry with them many advanced people only when most of those who march in front of them are inmates of prisons or are lying in their graves.** We say this

* The St. Petersburg elections, in which all the 160 electors returned were Cadets only serve to bring out more distinctly what has been noted in the elections in many other parts of the country. This is the real significance of the St. Petersburg elections.

** It is interesting to note the admission of *Rus* that one of the reasons for the Cadets' victory was that they allowed the "Left" to attend their meetings. Mr. S. A-ch, in *Molva*, No. 18 (March 22) writes as follows: "This party [the Cadets] gained quite a deal in the eyes of the voters also from the fact that it allowed representatives of the extreme Left parties to attend its meetings and victoriously entered into debate with them." Mr. A-ch may have his opinion about the Cadets' victories in debate with us. We are quite satisfied with the results of the

in passing lest our Cadets get above themselves on account of this comparison with the German Social-Democrats.

Owing to the elimination of the advanced democratic elements from the scene of this toy-parliament struggle, and so long as they are kept out of it, the Cadets, naturally, have a chance of gaining control of the toy parliament that goes by the name of the Russian State Duma. If we take the above-quoted figures, bear in mind the St. Petersburg and later victories of the Cadets, roughly estimate the enormous predominance of rural electors over urban, and add the peasant electors to the landowner electors, we shall have to admit that, on the whole, it is quite possible, and even probable, that the Duma will be a Cadet Duma.

III

WHAT IS THE PARTY OF PEOPLE'S FREEDOM?

What role, then, can and must a Cadet Duma play? To answer this question, we must first of all examine in greater detail the character of the Cadet Party itself.

We have already noted the main feature of the class structure of this party. Unconnected with any one particular class in bourgeois society, but absolutely bourgeois in composition, character and ideals, this party is wavering between the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary elements of the big bourgeoisie. The social basis of this party consists, first, of the masses of the townspeople, the very townspeople who eagerly built barricades in Moscow in the famous December days; secondly, it consists of the liberal landlords who want to come to a deal with the autocracy, through the good offices of pro-liberal officials, for an "inoffensive" division of power between the people and those who by the grace of God oppress the people. This extremely broad, indefinite and inherently contradictory class basis (which, as has been noted above,

contests between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets at the meetings in St. Petersburg in March 1906. Some day impartial people who attended those meetings will say who were the victors.

is clearly discernible in the figures regarding the Cadet electors) is reflected with remarkable vividness in the Cadets' programme and tactics. Their programme is entirely bourgeois; the Cadets simply cannot conceive of a social system other than capitalism, beyond which even their boldest suggestions do not go. In politics, their programme combines democracy, "people's freedom", with counter-revolution, with the freedom of the autocracy to oppress the people; and it combines them with particularly petty-bourgeois and professorial-pedantic scrupulousness. The Cadet's ideal is that power in the state should be divided into approximately three parts. One part goes to the autocracy. The monarchy remains. The monarch retains equal power with the popular representative body, which is to "agree" with him on the laws to be passed, and submit its *bills* to him for *approval*. The second part goes to the landlords and the big capitalists. They get the Upper Chamber, from which the "common people" are to be barred by a two-stage electoral system and a residential qualification. Lastly, the third part goes to the people, who get a Lower Chamber elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Why fight, why this internecine strife? wails Judas Cadet,¹⁰² lifting up his eyes and reproachfully glancing, now towards the revolutionary people, now towards the counter-revolutionary government. Brothers! Love one another! Let the wolves have their fill without any harm to the sheep, let the monarchy with its Upper Chamber be inviolate and "people's freedom" assured.

The hypocrisy underlying these Cadet principles is most glaring, and the fallacies of the "scientific" (professorially-scientific) arguments with which they are defended are amazing. It would be a great mistake, of course, to attribute this hypocrisy and these fallacies to the personal qualities of the Cadet leaders, or of individual Cadets. Such a vulgar explanation, which our opponents often attribute to us, is repugnant to Marxism. Undoubtedly, there are many most sincere Cadets who really believe that their party stands for "people's freedom". But the dual and vacillating class basis of their party inevitably engenders their double-faced policy, their fallacies, and their hypocrisy.

These amiable features stand out even more clearly, perhaps, in the Cadets' tactics than in their programme. *Polyarnaya Zvezda*,¹⁰³ in which Mr. Struve has so sedulously and successfully merged Cadetism with *Novoye Vremya*-ism, has given us an excellent, magnificent and inimitable example of Cadet tactics, at the moment when the firing in Moscow was subsiding, and when the military and police dictatorship was indulging in its savage orgies, when repressions and mass torture were raging all over Russia, *Polyarnaya Zvezda* protested against the use of force by the Lefts, and against the strike committees organised by the revolutionary parties. The Cadet professors who are trading in their science for the benefit of the Dubasovs went to the length (like Mr. Kiesewetter, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party and candidate for the Duma) of translating the word "dictatorship" by the words "reinforced security"! These "men of science" even distorted their high-school Latin in order to discredit the revolutionary struggle. Please note once and for all, Messrs. Kiesewetter, Struve, Izgoyev and Co., that dictatorship means unlimited power based on force, and not on law. In civil war, any victorious power can only be a dictatorship. The point is, however, that there is the dictatorship of a minority over the majority, the dictatorship of a handful of police officials over the people; and there is the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority of the people over a handful of tyrants, robbers and usurpers of people's power. By their vulgar distortion of the scientific concept "dictatorship", by their outcries against the violence of the Left at a time when the Right are resorting to the most lawless and outrageous violence, the Cadet gentlemen have given striking evidence of the position the "compromisers" take in the intense revolutionary struggle. When the struggle flares up, the "compromiser" cravenly runs for cover. When the revolutionary people are victorious (October 17), the "compromiser" creeps out of his hiding-place, boastfully preens himself, shouting and raving until he is hoarse: "That was a 'glorious' political strike!" But when victory goes to the counter-revolution, the compromiser begins to heap hypocritical admonitions and edifying counsel on the vanquished. The successful strike was "glorious". The defeated strikes were

criminal, mad, senseless, and anarchistic. The defeated insurrection was folly, a riot of surging elements, barbarity and stupidity. In short, his political conscience and political wisdom prompt the "compromiser" to cringe before the side that for the moment is strongest, to get in the way of the combatants, hindering first one side and then the other, to tone-down the struggle and to blunt the revolutionary consciousness of the people who are waging a desperate struggle for freedom.

The peasants are fighting against landlordism, and this struggle is now reaching its climax. It has become so acute that the issue is put squarely: the landlords are demanding machine-guns in reply to the slightest attempt of the peasants to seize the land that the nobles have been grabbing for centuries. The peasants want to take all the land. If they attempt it, *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, with an unctuous excuse, will send the Kaufmans into the field to prove that the landlords haven't very much land: that, strictly speaking, it is not the land that is the cause of the trouble, and that everything can be settled peacefully.

The resolution on tactics adopted by the last Cadet congress¹⁰⁴ very well sums up the Cadets' political chicanery. After the December uprising, when it had become perfectly obvious to everybody that the peaceful strike was obsolete, that it had spent itself and become useless as an independent weapon in the struggle, the Cadet congress came along with a resolution (proposed, I think, by Mr. Vinaver) which recognised the *peaceful* political strike as a weapon in the struggle!

This is magnificent, matchless, Cadet gentlemen. You have assimilated the spirit and meaning of bourgeois political chicanery with inimitable facility. The bourgeoisie must seek the support of the people; without it, it will never achieve power, and has never done so. But at the same time it must restrain the revolutionary onslaught of the people to prevent the workers and peasants from winning—God forbid—complete and consistent democracy, genuine, and not monarchist and "two-Chamber", freedom for the people. That is why it must throw a spoke in the wheel of the revolution every time it is winning. And for this purpose every means, every device, must be brought into play—from

the “scientific” distortion of Latin by “professors” to discredit the very idea of the people achieving a decisive victory, to, say, recognising only such weapons in the revolutionary struggle as are *already* obsolete at the time when you recognise them! This is both harmless and advantageous. Harmless, because blunted weapons obviously cannot bring the people victory, will not put the proletariat and the peasantry in power; at best, they will shake the autocracy a little and help the Cadets to bargain for an extra bit of “rights” for the bourgeoisie. It is advantageous because on the surface it creates the impression that the Cadets are “revolutionary”, that they sympathise with the people’s struggle, and this wins them the support of large numbers who sincerely and earnestly want the revolution to win.

The very essence of the economic condition of the petty bourgeoisie, wavering between capital and labour, inevitably engenders the political instability and duplicity of the Cadet Party, leads to the latter’s notorious “arrangement” theory (“the people have rights, but it is the prerogative of the monarch to sanction these rights”) and converts it into a party of constitutional illusions. The ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie cannot grasp the “essence of the constitution”. The petty bourgeois is always inclined to take a scrap of paper for the essence of the thing. He is ill-fitted for independent organisation—that is, independent of the militant class—for the direct revolutionary struggle. Being the most far-removed from the most acute economic struggle of our epoch, he prefers, in politics as well, to yield first place to other classes when it comes to really winning a constitution, to actually achieving a genuine constitution. Let the proletariat fight for the constitutional ground, and on this constitutional ground, so long as it holds, even on the corpses of workers killed during the insurrection, let the toy-business mannikins¹⁰⁵ play at parliamentarism—such is the immanent tendency of the bourgeoisie. And the Cadet Party, this refined, ennobled, sublimated, perfumed, idealised, and sweetened incarnation of general bourgeois aspirations, is working on these lines with wonderful consistency.

You call yourselves the party of people’s freedom? Don’t give us that! You are a party of philistine betrayers of

people's freedom, a party of philistine illusions about people's freedom. You are a party of freedom—in that you want to subject freedom to a monarch and a landlord Upper Chamber. You are a party of the people—in that you dread the victory of the people, that is, the complete victory of a peasant revolt, of the workers' struggle for the cause of labour. You are a party of the struggle—in that every time a real, direct, immediate revolutionary struggle against the autocracy flares up, you take refuge behind unctuous, professorial excuses. You are a party of words, not of deeds; a party of promises, not of fulfilment; a party of constitutional illusions, not a party for an earnest struggle for a real (not merely a paper) constitution.

When a lull sets in after a desperate battle; when up above "the sated beast, the victor, lies a-weary",* and down below the people are "sharpening their swords" and gathering fresh strength; when slowly the ferment is beginning to bubble and seethe among the masses again, when a new political crisis and a new great battle are only in the making—then the party of philistine illusions about people's freedom reaches the culminating point of its development and exults over its victories. The sated beast feels too languid to pounce once more upon the liberal talkers (there's no hurry; it can wait!), for the champions of the working class and the peasantry, the time has not yet come for another upheaval. This is just the golden opportunity; this is the time to gather the votes of all the discontented (and who is contented nowadays?); this is the time for our Cadets to sing full-throated, like any nightingale.

The Cadets are the worms in the grave of the revolution. The revolution lies buried. It is being eaten by worms. But revolution has the power of speedy resurrection and of blossoming forth again on well-prepared soil. The soil has been

* Skitalets, "Silence Reigns". "The strings are broken; song, be silent now! All we had to say we said before the fray. The dragon, dying monster, has come to life again; the clash of swords has drowned the thrum of strings.... Silence reigns; the familiar sounds of life are stilled in this gruesome night. The vanquished, down below, are sharpening their swords; above, the victor lies a-weary. The sated beast is old and feeble. There, down below, he sees something new a-foot; the old door is trembling and shaking; the giant is breaking his chains."

wonderfully, magnificently prepared by the October days of freedom and by the December uprising; but we would not for a moment deny that the worms, too, are doing useful work while the revolution lies buried. Why, these fat worms manure the soil so well....

Mr. Struve once exclaimed in *Polyarnaya Zvezda*: "The peasant in the Duma will be a Cadet!" Very likely. The bulk of the peasants are, of course, in favour of freedom for the people. They will hear these fine, lofty words, they will see the police officials, face-smashing policemen, and feudal-minded landlords dressed up in all sorts of "Octobrist" costumes: and, of course, they will be on the side of freedom for the people, they will be attracted by the beautifully coloured labels, they will not see through this philistine deception all at once. They will become Cadets—and remain Cadets until the course of events shows them that the people's freedom has *still* to be won, that the real fight for freedom for the people has still to be fought *outside* the Duma. And then—then the peasants as well as the bulk of the town petty bourgeoisie will split: a small but economically powerful kulak minority may this time definitely side with the counter-revolution, another section will go over to the side of "compromise", of "reconciliation", of an amicable deal with the monarchy and the landlords; and a third section will side with the revolution.

In December, during the great struggle, the townspeople built barricades. In March, when the insurrection is suppressed, they protest against the government by voting for the Cadets. When their present constitutional illusions are dispelled, they will leave the Cadets and go over to the revolution again. How many of the townspeople abandon Cadet word-spinning for revolutionary struggle, how many of the peasantry join them, how vigorously, how well-organised, how successfully the proletariat goes forward in the next onslaught, will determine the outcome of the revolution.

The Cadet Party is an ephemeral, lifeless party. This may sound paradoxical at a time when the Cadets are achieving brilliant election victories, and will probably achieve still more brilliant "parliamentary" victories in the Duma. But Marxism teaches us to examine all phenomena in their

process of development, and not to be content merely with superficial descriptions; not to believe in pretty labels, but to investigate the economic, class basis of parties; to study the objective political situations which will determine the significance and outcome of their political activities. Apply this method to the Cadets, and you will see that our assertion is correct. The Cadets are not a party, but a symptom. They are not a political force, but foam resulting from the collision of more or less equally balanced contending forces. They do in very truth combine in themselves the swan, crab and pile of the fable—the garrulous, boastful, smug, narrow-minded, craven bourgeois intellectual, the counter-revolutionary landlord who wants to ransom himself from revolution at a reasonable price, and lastly the hard, shrewd, cheese-paring and tight-fisted petty bourgeois. This party neither desires, nor is it able, to rule at all firmly in bourgeois society; it neither desires, nor is it able, to lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution along anything like a definite path. The Cadets have no desire to rule; they prefer to “belong” under a monarchy and an Upper Chamber. They cannot rule, because the real masters of bourgeois society, the Shipovs and Guchkovs, the representatives of big capital and big property, hold aloof from this party. The Cadets are a party of dreamers about a nice white, clean, orderly, “ideal” bourgeois society. The Guchkovs and Shipovs are the party of real, genuine, grimy capital in modern bourgeois society. The Cadets cannot lead the revolution forward, because they lack the backing of a united and really revolutionary class. They dread the revolution. They rally everybody, the whole “people”, only on the basis of constitutional illusions and unite them only with a negative bond: hatred for the sated beast, for the autocratic government, in opposition to which, on the present “legal” basis, the Cadets are *more to the left than anybody else*.

The historical role of the Cadets is a transient, fleeting one. They will fall together with the inevitable and speedy fall of constitutional illusions; they will fall like the French Social-Democrats of the late 1840s, who very much resembled our Cadets, and were also petty-bourgeois. The Cadets will fall, after preparing the soil—either for a prolonged triumph

of the Shipovs and Guchkovs, for a prolonged burial of the revolution, for "serious" bourgeois constitutionalism, or for the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

IV

THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF A CADET DUMA

And so the State Duma will be a Cadet Duma, say the liberal newspapers. We have already said that this is quite probable. We can only add that even if, despite their present victories, the Cadets prove to be a minority in the Duma, it is not likely to affect very materially the course of the political crisis that is again maturing in Russia. The elements of this revolutionary crisis are too deep-rooted to be seriously affected by the composition of the Duma. The attitude of the broad masses of the people towards the government is quite clear. The attitude of the government towards the pressing needs of the whole of social development is more than clear. Naturally, in these circumstances, the revolution will advance. The predominance of the Black Hundreds in the First Duma can have only one probable delaying effect upon certain aspects of the political development of Russia: the collapse of the Cadet Party and of its prestige among the people will be delayed if the Cadets are now in the minority. At the present time it would be very convenient for them to be in a minority and to remain in opposition. The public would attribute the predominance of the Black Hundreds to the government's repressive measures during the elections. The opposition speeches of the Cadets, who realise how "harmless" their opposition is, would be particularly fervid. Their prestige among the broad masses of the politically uneducated population might rise, in circumstances when their "words" sounded even louder than at present, while their "deeds" remained even more vague because of their being outvoted by the Octobrists. Even then, the growth of discontent with the government and preparations for a new revolutionary upsurge would continue; but the exposure of Cadet futility might be somewhat delayed.

Let us now make another assumption, a more probable one, if we are to believe the present assertions of the Cadet newspapers. Let us assume that the Cadets will have a majority in the Duma, consisting, of course, of the same combination of Cadets and various non-party, "petty-party" and other liberals that we now see in the elections. What will the role and significance of a Cadet Duma be then?

The Cadets themselves give a very specific answer to this question. Their statements, promises and high-sounding phrases breathe firmness and determination. And it is extremely important that we members of the workers' party should carefully collect all these statements, keep them well in mind, spread them among the people and ensure by all means that these lessons in politics (which the Cadets are giving the people) are not wasted, that the workers and peasants know exactly *what the Cadets are promising and how they carry out their promises.*

In this pamphlet—which contains no more than the cursory comments of a wandering Social-Democratic publicist who by the grace of Durnovo and Co. has had to retire from journalistic work—in this pamphlet, we cannot hope to collect all, or even all the most important, statements and promises of the Cadets who are going into the Duma. We can only note one or two things in the literature that we happen to have at our disposal.

Here is the newspaper *Narodnaya Svoboda*, which started publication in December and was soon suppressed by the government. This was the avowed, official organ of the Cadet Party. It was edited by such pillars of this party as Messrs. Milyukov and Hessen. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the whole Cadet Party is responsible for its contents.

In its issue of December 20, *Narodnaya Svoboda* sets about convincing its readers that it is necessary to go into the Duma. What arguments does the Cadet organ advance in support of this? *Narodnaya Svoboda* does not attempt to deny that the political task that immediately confronts Russia is to convene a constituent assembly. The Cadet organ takes this for granted. The only question is, you see, who is to convene the constituent assembly? This question may be answered in three ways: (1) the present, i.e., in practice the autocratic, government; (2) a provisional

revolutionary government; and (3) the State Duma as “*an authority competing with authority*”. The Cadets reject the first two outcomes—they place no hopes in the autocratic government, and have no faith in the success of an insurrection. They accept the third outcome. They urge that it is necessary to go into the Duma because this is the best, surest, and so on and so forth, method of convening a national constituent assembly.

Mark this conclusion well, gentlemen! The Cadet Party, the party of “people’s freedom”, *has promised the people* to use the “authority competing with authority”, to use its predominance in the State Duma (if the people help it to achieve this predominance), to *convene a national constituent assembly*.

This is a historical fact. It is an important pledge. It will be the first test of how the party of “people’s freedom” (in inverted commas) will serve people’s freedom (without inverted commas).

In the current issues of the Cadet Party newspapers (and we repeat, nearly all the liberal newspapers, including *Rus*, *Nasha Zhizn*, etc., have *virtually* gone over to that party), you will no longer find this promise. You may find references to the “constituting functions” of the Duma; but nothing is said now about the Duma convening a national constituent assembly. As the time to back promises with deeds draws nearer, *they already take a step backwards*, they prepare a *loophole*.

Perhaps the whole trouble is that the present ferocious laws are preventing you from speaking openly about a constituent assembly? Is that so, gentlemen? But in the Duma, where your deputies will *by law* enjoy freedom of speech, you will again give full voice to your demand for the convocation—what am I saying?—you will *convene* the national constituent assembly, will you not?

Let us wait and see. And we shall not forget the Cadets’ promise to convene a national constituent assembly through the medium of the Duma. The Cadet newspapers now bristle with statements to the effect that they, the Cadets, will be “the government”, that they will be “in power”, and so on, and so forth. Good luck, gentlemen! The sooner you have a majority in the Duma, the sooner will your promissory notes

be presented to you for payment. The Cadet newspaper *Rus*, welcoming the victory of the party of "people's freedom" in St. Petersburg, publishes in its issue of March 22 an impassioned article entitled "With the People or Against It?" It says nothing specifically about the Duma convening a national constituent assembly. But despite this step back from the Cadets' promises, it paints a fairly rosy picture of the Cadets' prospects:

"The principal mission of the Duma that is about to assemble and of the Party of People's Freedom in it, is to be the whips and scorpions of the people's anger.

"After expelling and impeaching the criminal members of the government, it will have to deal only with urgent measures and then convene a real Duma—on a broader basis, the representative of the whole people [i.e., the constituent assembly?].

"This is the indubitable function of the Duma, i.e., the function that the people itself now imposes on it."

So. Expel the government. Impeach the government. Convene a real Duma.

Rus writes well. The Cadets speak well; they speak wonderfully well. It is only a pity that their newspapers are suppressed for these fine words....

Gentlemen, let us remember this new promise you have made on the day following the St. Petersburg elections; let us remember it very well. The Cadets are going into the Duma to expel the government, to impeach the government, to convene a real Duma.

Let us now pass from the Cadets' promises regarding the Duma to the government's "views" about the Cadet Duma. Of course, nobody is allowed to know exactly what these "views" are; but those same optimistic Cadet newspapers provide us with some material from which to appraise them. For example, the reports published about the proposed loan in France¹⁰⁶ appear to be more and more confident that this matter is settled, and that the loan will be floated before the Duma is convened. Thus, the government will, of course, be still less dependent on the Duma.

Then, as regards the prospects of the Witte-Durnovo Ministry, the same *Rus* (or *Molva*), in the article quoted above, calls upon the government to "go with the people, i.e., with the Duma". As you see, "expelling the criminal

members of the government" merely means making certain changes in its composition. The nature of these changes can be seen from the following statement in this newspaper:

"Today, a Ministry formed by a man of repute like D. N. Shipov would be most advantageous even for the reaction. It alone could avert a final collision between the government and society in the Duma." But we are assuming that "the worst happens", observes the newspaper, anticipating the formation of a purely bureaucratic Ministry. "Here no proof is required," says *Molva*. "It is obvious to everybody that if the government does not intend to rob the Duma of all significance, it must, it is in duty bound to, dismiss Durnovo, Witte and Akimov forthwith. And it is equally clear that if this does not happen, if this is not done, it will show that the gendarme policy of 'curbing and preventing' is to be applied both to the representatives of the people and to the State Duma. And for this purpose, of course, the most suitable men are those whose arms are already steeped to the elbows in the blood of the people. It is quite obvious that if Mr. Durnovo remains in office with the Duma in opposition, it can only be for the purpose of dispersing the Duma. It has no other purpose, nor can it have. Everybody understands this. It is understood on the stock exchange, and it is understood abroad." "To resist" the Duma means "sending the ship of state out into such a raging storm", etc., etc.

Lastly, to complete the picture, we will quote the following report published in the Cadet *Nasha Zhizn* of March 21 about the "bureaucratic spheres", concerning which this newspaper tries to give its readers as much information as possible.

"The increasing successes of the Cadet Party have attracted the attention of the higher spheres. At first they were somewhat alarmed by these successes, but now they are treating them quite calmly. Last Sunday a private conference of the highest representatives of the government was held to discuss this question, where this attitude became apparent, and, moreover, tactics, so to speak, were decided on. Incidentally, some very characteristic observations were made. Some held that a Cadet victory is positively to the government's advantage, for, if the Right elements were to win in the Duma elections, it would only play into the hands of the extreme groups who would use the composition of the Duma as a pretext for conducting propaganda against it, and would argue that it was deliberately picked to ensure a reactionary majority. The more representatives of the Cadet Party there are

in the Duma, the more the bulk of the nation will respect it as regards the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma, the majority held that there are no grounds for apprehending and 'surprises' in view of 'the restrictions that are imposed on the Duma', as one of those present candidly remarked. In view of this, the majority believed that the future members of the Duma should not be hindered, 'even if they do criticise individual members of the government'. A great many expect this, and the general opinion of the bureaucrats on this point can be summed up as follows: 'Let them talk'; 'there will be demands for proceedings to be taken; perhaps proceedings will be started, and so forth, and then they will get tired of it. What becomes of these cases, we shall see; meanwhile the members will have to concern themselves with questions affecting the country—and then everything will slip into its normal course. Even if the members take it into their heads to express no confidence in the government, that will not be serious either; after all, the Ministers are not appointed by the Duma'. It is reported that these arguments had a soothing effect even upon Durnovo and Witte, who were at first alarmed by the successes of the Cadet Party."

Thus you have the opinions, views and intentions of the persons directly interested and participating in these "affairs". On the one hand, there are prospects of a struggle. The Cadets promise to expel the government and convene a new Duma. If the government attempts to dissolve the Duma, there will be "a raging storm". The question therefore is: who will expel, or who will dissolve? On the other hand, there is the prospect of a deal. The Cadets think that a Shipov Ministry could avert a collision between the government and society. The government thinks: let them talk; let them even take one or two to court; after all, the Ministers are not appointed by the Duma. We have deliberately quoted only the opinions of those who are involved in the deal, and have quoted them entirely in their own words. We have added nothing. To have added anything would have weakened the impression created by the evidence of the witnesses. And their evidence gives us a vivid picture of what a Cadet Duma will be like.

Either a struggle, and in that case it will not be the Duma that will fight, but the revolutionary people. The Duma hopes to reap the fruits of victory. Or a deal, and then in any case it will be the people, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, who will be deceived. As regards the terms of the deal, men who are really business-like say nothing until the time is ripe. Only hot-headed "radicals" sometimes blurt it

out. Let us say, for example, the Ministry of bureaucrats is replaced by a Ministry formed by that "honest bourgeois", Shipov; it will then be possible to strike a bargain that will be fair to both sides.... Then we shall come very, very near to achieving the Cadet ideal: first place for the monarchy; second place for a landlord and factory-owner Upper Chamber, with a Shipov Ministry that will harmonise with it, and third place for a "popular" Duma.

It goes without saying that this alternative, like every assumption concerning the social and political future, indicates only the main and fundamental lines of development. In real life, we often see mixed solutions; lines intercross—struggles alternate with deals, and struggles supplement the deals. This is exactly how Mr. Milyukov, in *Rech* of Friday, March 24, argues about the prospects that are already arising out of the Cadet victory, which is now evident. It is quite wrong, he says, to regard us as, and to declare that we are, revolutionaries. It all depends upon circumstances, gentlemen, says our "charming dialectician" for the edification of the powers that be; even Shipov was a "revolutionary" up to October 17. If you agree to a deal with us in a peaceful and friendly way, we shall agree to reforms and not revolution. If you do not agree, we shall probably have to exert some pressure from below upon you, release a little bit of revolution to frighten you, to weaken you by a blow struck by the revolutionary people, and then you will be more accommodating, and before you know where you are, we shall have got a better bargain.

Thus, the elements of the problem are as follows. A government is in power which the majority of the bourgeoisie avowedly do not trust, and which the workers and class-conscious peasants hate. The government has a tremendous force at its command. Its one weak spot is finance; and even that is not certain. It may still be able to raise a loan before the Duma assembles. Against the government, according to our assumption, stands the Cadet Duma. What does it want? Its bargaining price we know: the Cadet programme, i.e., a monarchy and an Upper Chamber, with a democratic Lower Chamber. What is its rock-bottom price? No one knows. Well, something in the nature of a Shipov Ministry, perhaps. True, Shipov is opposed to direct suffrage; but after

all, he is an honest man—we could probably come to terms with him, somehow. What are the Cadet Duma's methods of fighting? To refuse to vote money. An unreliable method, first, because the government may probably get the money without the Duma; and secondly, because according to the law, the Duma's right of control over finance is very, very slight. The other method is: "They will shoot." You remember how Katkov depicted the attitude of the liberals towards the government: yield, or "they" will shoot.¹⁰⁷ But in Katkov's time "they" were a handful of heroes who were unable to do anything except assassinate individuals. Today, "they" are the whole mass of the proletariat, which in October showed that it was capable of amazingly concerted country-wide action, and in December showed that it was capable of waging a stubborn armed struggle. And now "they also include the peasant masses, who have shown that they are capable of waging a revolutionary struggle, if in an unco-ordinated, unconscious and disunited fashion; but among them there are increasing numbers of those who, given appropriate conditions, given the slightest breath of free air (it is so difficult to escape the draught nowadays!), will be capable of leading millions. "They" are not only capable of assassinating Cabinet Ministers; "they" can completely sweep away the monarchy, and all traces of an Upper Chamber, and landlordism, and even the standing army. "They" are not only capable of doing this, "they" will inevitably do it, if the severity of the military dictatorship—the last refuge of the old order, last not in the light of theoretical calculations, but of acquired practical experience—is relaxed.

Such are the elements of the problem. How it will be solved cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. There can be no doubt about how we Social-Democrats *want* to solve it, and how all class-conscious workers and class-conscious peasants *will* solve it: by striving for the complete victory of the peasant uprising and for the winning of a really democratic republic. What *will* Cadet tactics be in these circumstances; what *should* they be, not according to what individuals want and think, but in virtue of the objective conditions of existence of a petty bourgeoisie in capitalist society fighting for its emancipation?

The Cadets' tactics will certainly and inevitably reduce themselves to manoeuvring between the autocracy and the victory of the revolutionary people, and to preventing either of the opponents from finally and completely crushing the other. If the autocracy succeeds in finally and completely crushing the revolution, the Cadets will become powerless, for their strength is derived from the strength of the revolution. If the revolutionary people, i.e., the proletariat, and the peasantry rising in revolt against the whole system of landlordism, crush the autocracy finally and completely, and hence, sweep away the monarchy with all its frills and trimmings, the Cadets will also be powerless, for all the virile elements will desert them either for the revolution or for the counter-revolution; and the party will be left with a couple of Kiesewetters sighing about the "dictatorship", and digging Latin dictionaries for the appropriate Latin terms. Briefly, the Cadets' tactics may be formulated as follows: *to ensure the support of the revolutionary people for the Cadet Party*. By "support" they evidently mean such action by the revolutionary people as will, first, be entirely subordinated to the interests of the Cadet Party and carried out according to its instructions, etc.; and secondly, not be too resolute and aggressive, and above all, not be too drastic. The revolutionary people must not be independent, that is the first point; and it must not achieve final victory, that is point two. These are the tactics that, on the whole, will inevitably be pursued by the entire Cadet Party and by any Cadet Duma. And, of course, these tactics will be backed, defended and justified with the aid of the rich ideological stock-in-trade of "scientific" investigations,* "philosophical" obscurities, political (or politicians') banalities, "literary-critical" squealing (*à la* Berdayev), etc., etc.

On the other hand, the revolutionary Social-Democrats cannot at the present time define their tactics by the proposition: support of the Cadet Party and a Cadet Duma. Such tactics would be wrong and utterly useless.

The retort to us will be, of course: What? Do you repudiate what is recognised in your programme and by all internation-

* Like those of Mr. Kiesewetter, who has discovered that "dictatorship" in Latin means reinforced security.

al Social-Democracy? Do you deny that the Social-Democratic proletariat must support the revolutionary and oppositionist bourgeois democrats? Why, that is anarchism, utopianism, rebelliousness, senseless revolutionism.

But wait a minute, gentlemen. Permit us first of all to remind you that this is not a general, or abstract, question of whether to support bourgeois democrats in general, but a concrete question of whether to support precisely the Cadet Party and precisely a Cadet Duma. We are not repudiating a general proposition; we are demanding a special analysis of the conditions for applying these general principles in a concrete case. Truth is never abstract, it is always concrete. This is forgotten by Plekhanov, for example, who, not for the first time, is proposing, and laying special emphasis on the tactics: "Reaction is trying to isolate us. We must try to isolate reaction." This proposition is correct, but it is ridiculously general: it applies equally to Russia of 1870, to Russia of 1906, to Russia generally, and to Africa, America, China and India. It tells us nothing and helps us in no way; for the whole problem is to define what reaction is, whom we must unite with, and how (or if not unite, then co-ordinate our activities with), in order to isolate reaction. Plekhanov is afraid to specify; but actually, in practice, his tactics, as we have already shown, amount to election agreements between the Social-Democrats and the Constitutional-Democrats, to Social-Democrats supporting the Cadets.

The Cadets are opposed to reaction? I turn again to *Molva*, No. 18 of March 22, which I have already quoted. The Cadets want to expel the government. That is splendid; that is opposition to reaction. The Cadets want to make peace with the autocratic government on the basis of a Shipov Ministry.* That's bad. That's one of the worst

* I may be told that this is a lie, that it was simply nonsense blurted out by the loquacious *Molva*. But excuse me, I think it is true. The loquacious *Molva* blurted out the truth—of course, the approximate, not literal, absolute truth. How can this dispute be settled? By reference to Cadet statements? But in politics I don't believe in words. Cadet deeds? Yes, I would accept that criterion. And whoever inquires into the political conduct of the Cadets as a whole, will have to admit that, what *Molva* has said is, in the main, true.

forms of reaction. You see, gentlemen: abstract propositions, bald phrases about reaction, do not carry you a single step forward.

The Cadets are bourgeois democrats? That is true. But then the peasant masses, who are out for the confiscation of all the landed estates—which the Cadets don't want—are also bourgeois democrats. Both the forms and the content of the political activities of these two sections of bourgeois democrats are different. Which of them is it more important for us to support at the present time? Can we, *generally speaking*, in the period of democratic revolution, support the former? Will it not mean betraying the latter? Or perhaps you will deny that Cadets who in politics are ready to resign themselves to a Shipov, in the agrarian question are capable of resigning themselves to a Kaufman? You see, gentlemen: abstract propositions, bald phrases about bourgeois democracy, do not carry you a single step forward.

But the Cadets are a united, strong and virile parliamentary party!

That is not true. The Cadets are neither a united, nor a strong, nor a virile, nor a parliamentary party. They are not united, for many of the people who voted for them are capable of fighting to the very end and not merely of striking a bargain. They are not united, for their social basis is inherently contradictory: it ranges from the democratic petty bourgeoisie to the counter-revolutionary landlords. They are not strong, for as a party they refuse to, and cannot, take part in the intense and open civil war that flared up in Russia at the end of 1905, and very likely will flare up again with added force in the near future. They are not a virile party, for even if their ideal is achieved, not they but the "solid" bourgeois, the Shipovs and Guchkovs, will be the power in the society formed in conformity with this ideal. They are not a parliamentary party, for we have no parliament. We have no Constitution; we have only a constitutional autocracy, only constitutional illusions, which are particularly harmful in a period of intense civil war, and which the Cadets are spreading with particular zeal.

This brings us to the pivot of the question. The specific feature of the present state of the Russian revolution is

that objective conditions are pushing into the forefront a resolute, extra-parliamentary struggle for parliamentarism; and for that reason there can be nothing more harmful and dangerous at such a time than constitutional illusions and playing at parliamentarism. At such a time the parties of "parliamentary" opposition may be more dangerous and harmful than completely and avowedly reactionary parties: this proposition may sound paradoxical only to those who are totally incapable of thinking dialectically. Indeed, if the demand for parliamentarism has fully matured among the widest masses of the people, if it is based on the whole of the age-long social and economic evolution of the country, and if political evolution has brought us to the point of achieving it, what can be more dangerous and harmful than a fictitious realisation of this demand? Avowed anti-parliamentarism is harmless. Its doom is sealed. It is dead. The attempts to resurrect it are only having the very good effect of revolutionising the more backward strata of the population. A "constitutional autocracy", the creation and spreading of constitutional illusions, are becoming the only possible means of saving the autocracy. This is the only correct and wise policy the autocracy can pursue.

And I assert that at the present time the Cadets are doing more to help the autocracy to pursue this wise policy than *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. Take, for example, the controversy between the latter and the liberal press as to whether Russia is a constitutional monarchy. It is not, says *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. It is, say the Cadet newspapers in unison. In this controversy, *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* is progressive and the Cadet newspapers are reactionary; for *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* is telling the truth, exposing illusions, *adussprehen was ist*,* whereas the Cadets are telling a lie—a well-meaning benevolent, sincerely-conscientious, beautiful, graceful scientifically-smooth, Kiesewetter-varnished, drawing-room polite lie: but a lie nevertheless. And there is nothing more dangerous, nothing more harmful, in the present period of the struggle—considering the present objective conditions—than such a lie.

* Speaks out what exists.—*Ed.*

A slight digression. Recently I delivered a lecture on political topics at the house of a very enlightened and extremely amiable Cadet. We had a discussion. Our host said: Imagine there is a wild beast before us, a lion; and we two are slaves who have been thrown to this lion. Would it be appropriate if we started an argument? Is it not our duty to unite to fight this common enemy, to "isolate reaction", as that most wise and most far-sighted of Social-Democrats, G. V. Plekhanov, so excellently puts it? The analogy is a good one, and I accept it, I replied. But what if one of the slaves advises securing weapons and attacking the lion, while the other, in the very midst of the struggle, notices a tab reading "Constitution" suspended from the lion's neck, and starts shouting: "I am opposed to violence, both from the Right and from the Left"; "I am a member of a parliamentary party and stand for constitutional methods." Under those circumstances would not the lion's cub who blurted out the lion's real intentions, be doing more to educate the masses and to develop their political and class consciousness, than the slave being mauled by the lion who was preaching faith in tabs?

The whole point is that, in using the stock argument that Social-Democrats must support the bourgeois democrats, people too often allow general abstract propositions to obscure the concrete situation, in which a resolute struggle for parliamentarism is maturing and in which the autocratic government is playing at parliamentarism as one of the means of combating parliamentarism. In such circumstances, when the final battle outside parliament still lies ahead, to advocate that the workers' party should support the party of parliamentary compromisers, the party of constitutional illusions, would be a really fatal mistake, if not a crime against the proletariat.

Let us imagine that we have in Russia a firmly established parliamentary system. This would mean that parliament had already become the main form of the domination of the ruling classes and forces, that it had become the principal arena of the conflict of social and political interests. There would be no revolutionary movement in the direct sense of the term; the economic and other conditions would not be engendering revolutionary outbreaks in the period we are

assuming. No declamations, however revolutionary, could of course "call forth" revolution in such circumstances. It would be utterly wrong for Social-Democrats in such conditions to renounce the parliamentary struggle. It would be the duty of the workers' party to take up parliamentarism most seriously; to take part in "Duma" elections and in the "Duma" itself; and to adjust all its tactics to the conditions favourable for the formation and successful functioning of a parliamentary Social-Democratic Party. In those circumstances, it would be our bounden duty to support the Cadet Party in parliament against all parties to the right of it. Then, too, it would be wrong categorically to object to election agreements with this party in joint elections, say, in gubernia election meetings (if the elections were indirect). More than that. It would be the duty of the Social-Democrats in parliament to support even the Shipovites against the real, brazen reactionaries. We would then say: reaction is trying to isolate us; we must try to isolate reaction.

Today, however, there is nothing like an established, universally-recognised and really parliamentary regime in Russia. The main form of domination of the ruling classes and social forces in Russia today is an avowedly non-parliamentary form; parliament is admittedly not the principal arena of the conflict of social and political interests. In these circumstances, it would be suicidal for the workers' party to support the party of parliamentary compromisers. On the other hand, support for the bourgeois democrats who are operating in a non-parliamentary manner, even if spontaneously, sporadically and unconsciously (like the peasant outbreaks) comes to the forefront, becomes a real, serious business, to which all else must be subordinated. In such social and political conditions, insurrection is a reality, while parliamentarism is a plaything, an unimportant field of struggle, a bait rather than a real concession. Hence the point is not that we repudiate or underrate the importance of parliamentarism; and general phrases about parliamentarism do not affect our position at all. The point is that in the particular conditions precisely of the present stage of the democratic revolution the bourgeois compromisers, the liberal monarchists, while not denying that Durnovo may simply send the Duma packing, or that the law may finally reduce

this Duma to a cipher, nevertheless declare that parliamentarism is a serious affair and that insurrection is utopia, anarchism, rebelliousness, impotent revolutionism, or whatever else the Kiesewetters, Milyukovs, Struves, Izgoyevs and other heroes of philistinism may call it.

Let us imagine that the Social-Democratic Party had taken part in the Duma elections, and that a number of Social-Democratic electors had been elected. Having plunged into this stupid election farce, we would have had to support the Cadets to prevent the Black Hundreds from winning. The Social-Democratic Party would have had to conclude an election agreement with the Cadets. With the aid of the latter, a certain number of Social-Democrats would have been elected to the Duma. We ask, would the game have been worth the candle? Would we have gained or lost by this? In the first place, we would not have been able to inform the masses about the terms and the character of our election agreements with the Cadets from the Social-Democratic point of view. The Cadet newspapers, in hundreds of thousands and millions of copies, would have spread bourgeois lies and bourgeois distortions of the class aims of the proletariat far and wide. Our leaflets and our little reservations in individual declarations would have been but a drop in the bucket. *In practice*, we would have turned out to be a dumb appendage of the Cadets. Secondly, by entering into an agreement we would undoubtedly, tacitly or openly and formally—it makes no difference—have undertaken before the proletariat a certain amount of responsibility for the Cadets; we would have vouched for them being better than all the others; we would have guaranteed that their Cadet Duma would help the people; we would have been responsible for the whole of their Cadet policy. Whether we would have been able to disclaim responsibility for any particular steps taken by the Cadets, by means of subsequent “*declarations*”, is an open question; and besides, the declarations would have remained mere declarations, whereas the election agreement would have remained a *fact*. But have we any grounds whatever for even indirectly vouching for the Cadets before the proletariat and the masses of the peasantry? Have not the Cadets given us thousands of proofs of their affinity with those German Cadet professors, with those “Frankfurt phrase-mongers”, who man-

aged to convert, not merely a Duma, but a National Constituent Assembly from an instrument for the development of the revolution into an instrument for toning down the revolution, for throttling (morally) the revolution? It would have been a mistake for the Social-Democrats to support the Cadet Party, and our Party has done the right thing in boycotting the Duma elections.

Even now it cannot be the task of the Social-Democrats to support the Cadet Party. We cannot support a Cadet Duma. In war, compromisers and deserters may be even more dangerous than the enemy. Shipov, at any rate, does not call himself a "democrat", and the "muzhik" who wants "people's freedom" will not follow his lead. But if the party of "people's freedom", after concluding a pact of mutual assistance with the Social-Democrats, were to strike a bargain with the autocracy to substitute a Ministry headed by this very Shipov for a constituent assembly, or were to confine its "activities" to making high-sounding speeches and proposing grandiloquent resolutions, we would find ourselves in a most false position.

To say that the task of the workers' party at the present time is to support the Cadets would be the same as saying that the function of steam is not to drive a ship's engine, but to keep up the possibility of sounding the ship's siren. If there is steam in the boiler, it will be possible to sound the siren. If the revolution is strong, the Cadets will also be able to sound their siren. It is quite easy to imitate the sound of a siren, and in the history of the struggle *for* parliamentarism bourgeois betrayers of people's freedom have many times imitated the sound of the siren and bamboozled simple-hearted folk who put their trust in various "first representative assemblies".

Our task is not to support the Cadet Duma, but to use the conflicts within this Duma, or connected with it, for choosing the right moment to attack the enemy, the right moment for an insurrection against the autocracy. What we have to do is to take account of how the political crisis in the Duma and around it is growing. As a means of testing public opinion and defining as correctly and precisely as possible the moment when "boiling point" is reached, this Duma campaign ought to be of enormous value to us,

but only as a symptom, not as the real field of struggle. It is not the Cadet Duma that we shall support; it is not with the Cadet Party that we must reckon, but with those elements of the urban petty bourgeoisie, and particularly of the peasantry, who have voted for the Cadets, and who will inevitably be disillusioned with them and get into a fighting mood. And the more decisive the victory of the Cadets in the Duma, the more rapidly will this take place. Our task is to use the respite that will be provided by an opposition Duma (and as the proletariat needs time to rally its forces properly, this respite will be very much to our advantage), to organise the workers, to expose constitutional illusions, and to prepare for a military offensive. Our task is to be at our post when the Duma farce develops into a new great political crisis; and our aim then will be, not support for the Cadets (at best they will be only a weak mouthpiece of the revolutionary people), but the overthrow of the autocratic government and the transfer of power to the revolutionary people. If the proletariat and the peasantry are victorious in their insurrection, the Cadet Duma will in a trice draw up a document declaring its association with the manifesto of the revolutionary government announcing the convocation of a national constituent assembly. If the insurrection is suppressed, the victor, exhausted by the struggle, may be compelled to yield a good half of his power to the Cadet Duma, which will sit down to the feast, as it were, and adopt a resolution deploring the "folly" of armed uprising at a time when a genuine constitutional system was supposed to be so possible and so near at hand.... Find the corpses, and you will always find the worms.

V

A SAMPLE OF CADET SMUGNESS

To appraise the victories of the Cadets and the present tasks of the workers' party, it is vastly important to analyse the preceding period of the Russian revolution and its relation to the present period. The draft resolutions on tactics, published by the Majority and the Minority respectively, lay down two lines, express two trends of thought, which arise

from two different appraisals of this period. We refer the reader to those resolutions. Here we propose to deal with an article published in the Cadet newspaper *Nasha Zhizn*. The article discusses the first Menshevik resolution, and provides ample material with which to test, supplement and explain what we have said above about the Cadet Duma. For this reason we quote the article in full (R. Blank, "Topical Questions in the Russian Social-Democratic Movement", *Nasha Zhizn*, No. 401, March 23, 1906):

"The resolution of the 'Menshevik' faction of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on party tactics, published the other day, is a very valuable document. It shows that the severe lessons of the first period of the Russian revolution have not been lost on that section of the Russian Social-Democrats which is *most sensitive* to the demands of real life, and is most thoroughly permeated with the principles of scientific socialism. The *object of the new tactics* formulated in this resolution is to direct the Russian Social-Democratic movement along the path that is being followed by the whole of the international Social-Democratic movement led by the great Social-Democratic Party of Germany. I say 'new tactics', but this is not quite correct, because in many respects they represent a reversion to the old principles that were laid down by the founders of the Russian Social-Democratic movement at its very inception, which since then have been repeatedly elaborated by its theoreticians and publicists, and which were accepted by nearly all Russian Social-Democrats right up to the outbreak of the Russian revolution. But these principles were forgotten. The revolutionary whirlwind caught up the whole of our Social-Democratic movement like a feather and swept it forward at a dizzying speed. All the Social-Democratic and Marxist principles and ideas, elaborated with such zeal and devotion in the course of a quarter of a century, disappeared from view in an instant, as though they were merely a light dust on the surface. The very pillars of the Social-Democratic world-outlook were shaken to their very foundations, and even seemed to have been uprooted.

"But the whirlwind raged for a time and then subsided on the spot where it began; the Social-Democrats returned to their starting-point. The force of the whirlwind can be judged from the fact that it even carried away Parvus, as he himself admits; and those who know what a heavy-weight Parvus is, will understand what this means.... 'The revolutionary torrent swept us forward with irresistible force,' writes Parvus in his well-known pamphlet. 'We were merely the strings of a harp on which the revolutionary hurricane was playing,' he observes elsewhere in that pamphlet. This too, is absolutely true and explains why Social-Democratic music at that time was so unlike the symphonies of Beethoven, Bach or—Marx. All theories and principles, and even intellect and simple reason, retreat into the background, almost vanish behind the scenes, when the mighty elements appear upon the stage in all their fury.

“But now the turn of intellect and reason has come again, and it is possible to resume deliberate, methodical and systematic activities. Obviously, the first thing to do is to take precautions to prevent a repetition of what occurred in the first period of the Russian revolution, in its Sturm- und Drang-Zeit, that is, measures against the destructive effects of revolutionary torrents and hurricanes. The only effective precaution against this is to enlarge and strengthen the organisation. It is quite natural, therefore, that the ‘Menshevik’ faction should push this task into the forefront and formulate it on broad lines, by including in its programme economic organisations as well, and by recognising the necessity of utilising all legal possibilities. The resolution is free from romantic contempt for ‘legality’ and from aristocratic disdain for ‘economics’.

“The resolution expresses an equally sober attitude towards the question of the relations between the workers and the bourgeois democrats, it fully recognises the need for mutual assistance and the danger of the proletariat entering single-handed into a decisive struggle against the armed reaction. Particularly noteworthy is the attitude the resolution adopts towards the question of armed uprising. It recognises the necessity of ‘avoiding such actions as will bring the proletariat into armed conflict with the government, in conditions that will doom it to remain isolated in this struggle’.

“Only in this way can we in this country avoid a repetition of the June days of 1848 in Paris and make it possible to co-ordinate, if not to coalesce, the struggle of the workers and the bourgeois democrats for unless this is done the movement cannot be successful. The bourgeois democrats who according to Karl Marx, ‘are of supreme importance in every advanced revolution’, are of no less importance in the Russian revolution. If the Russian Social-Democratic Party cannot, or has no desire to, make them its open allies, it must at all events take care not to push them into the opposite camp, into the camp of reaction and counter-revolution. This the revolutionary Social-Democrats must not do, have no right to do; they are *in duty bound* to prevent this by every means in their power, for the sake of the cause of freedom, and for the sake of Social-Democracy itself. If the bourgeois democrats are opposed to insurrection at the present time, then it is useless talking about insurrection. This fact must be reckoned with, even if the bourgeoisie is prompted only by its characteristic flabbiness, feebleness and cowardice. Such factors must also be reckoned with. Did not the leader of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats himself say:

“*In der Gewalt sind sie uns stets über!*”—‘As far as brute force is concerned, they, i.e., the reactionaries, will always be superior to us!’

“Perhaps it is wrong to say ‘always’, but as far as the ‘present’ is concerned, one can share the opinion of Liebknecht, and of German Social-Democracy which unanimously agrees with him, without being a coward or even merely ‘flabby’.... Evidently, the resolution of the ‘Mensheviks’ is based on this point of view, or at all events on something like it. And on a number of other points, too, it is permeated with the same spirit of political realism that distinguishes the German Social-Democrats, and to which their unexampled successes are due.

“Will the Russian Social-Democratic Party as a whole subscribe to the resolution of the ‘Mensheviks’? This is something on which much in our revolutionary movement, especially in our Social-Democratic movement—perhaps its very fate for many years to come—will depend. In Russia, as was also the case in other countries, Social-Democracy can take root and become strong only when it penetrates deeply into the democratic masses. Should it, however, limit itself to cultivating the upper, even if the most fruitful, layer of democrats, a new hurricane may easily uproot it from Russian soil in the same way as Social-Democracy was uprooted in France in 1848, or as the Social-Democratic movement known as the ‘Chartist movement’ was uprooted in England in the 1840s.”

Such is Mr. Blank’s article. The most typical “Cadet” arguments, the origins of which are familiar to everyone who has carefully read Mr. Struve’s *Osvobozhdeniye* and the later legal Cadet publications, are so arranged here that the appraisal of present-day political tactics is based on an appraisal of the past period of the Russian revolution. First of all, therefore, we will examine this *appraisal of the past*, to see whether it is right or wrong.

Mr. Blank compares two periods of the Russian revolution. The first period covers approximately October-December 1905. This is the period of the revolutionary whirlwind. The second is the present period, which, of course, we have a right to call the period of Cadet victories in the Duma elections, or, perhaps, if we take the risk of running ahead somewhat, the period of a Cadet Duma.

Regarding this period Mr. Blank says that the turn of intellect and reason has come again, and it is possible to resume deliberate, methodical and systematic activities. On the other hand, Mr. Blank describes the first period as a period in which theory diverged from practice. All Social-Democratic principles and ideas vanished; the tactics that had always been advocated by the founders of Russian Social-Democracy were forgotten, and even the very pillars of the Social-Democratic world-outlook were uprooted.

Mr. Blank’s main assertion is merely a statement of fact: the whole theory of Marxism diverged from “practice” in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind.

Is that true? What is the first and main “pillar” of Marxist theory? It is that the only thoroughly revolutionary class in modern society, and therefore, the advanced class in every revolution, is the proletariat. The question is then;

has the revolutionary whirlwind uprooted this "pillar" of the Social-Democratic world-outlook? On the contrary, the whirlwind has vindicated it in the most brilliant fashion. It was the proletariat that was the main and, at first, almost the only *fighter* in this period. For the first time in history, perhaps, a bourgeois revolution was marked by the employment of a purely proletarian weapon, i.e., the mass political strike, on a scale unprecedented even in the most developed capitalist countries. The proletariat marched into battle, which was definitely revolutionary, at a time when the Struves and Blanks were calling for participation in the Bulygin Duma, and when the Cadet professors were exhorting the students to keep to their studies. With its proletarian weapon, the proletariat won for Russia the whole of that so-called "constitution", which since then has only been mutilated, chopped about and curtailed. The proletariat in October 1905 employed those tactics of struggle that *six months before* had been laid down in the resolution of the *Bolshevik* Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which had strongly emphasised the necessity of combining the mass political strike with insurrection; and it is this combination that characterises the *whole* period of the "revolutionary whirlwind", the whole of the last quarter of 1905. Thus our ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie has distorted reality in the most brazen and glaring manner. He has not cited a single *fact* to prove that Marxist theory diverged from practical experience in the period of the "revolutionary whirlwind"; he has tried to obscure the main feature of this whirlwind, which most brilliantly confirmed the correctness of "all Social-Democratic principles and ideas", of "all the pillars of the Social-Democratic world-outlook".

DIGRESSION

A POPULAR TALK WITH CADET PUBLICISTS AND LEARNED PROFESSORS

But what was the real reason that induced Mr. Blank to come to the monstrously wrong conclusion that all Marxist principles and ideas vanished in the period of the "whirlwind"? It is very interesting to examine this circumstance;

it still further exposes the real nature of philistinism in politics.

What is it that mainly distinguished the period of the "revolutionary whirlwind" from the present "Cadet" period, as regards the various forms of political activity and the various methods by which the people make history? First and mainly, it is that during the period of the "whirlwind" certain special methods of making history were employed which are foreign to other periods of political life. The following were the most important of these methods: (1) *the "seizure" by the people of political liberty*—its exercise without any rights and laws, and without any limitations (freedom of assembly, even if only in the universities, freedom of the press, freedom of association, the holding of congresses, etc.); (2) the creation of new organs of *revolutionary authority*—Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Railwaymen's and Peasants' Deputies, new rural and urban authorities, and so on, and so forth. These bodies were set up exclusively by the *revolutionary* sections of the people; they were formed irrespective of all laws and regulations, entirely in a revolutionary way, as a product of the native genius of the people, as a manifestation of the independent activity of the people which had rid itself, or was ridding itself, of its old police fetters. Lastly, they were indeed organs of *authority*, for all their rudimentary, spontaneous, amorphous and diffuse character, in composition and in activity. They acted as a government when, for example, they seized printing plants (in St. Petersburg) and arrested police officials who were preventing the revolutionary people from exercising their rights (such cases also occurred in St. Petersburg, where the new organ of authority concerned was weakest, and where the old government was strongest). They acted as a government when they appealed to the whole people to withhold money from the old government. They confiscated the old government's funds (the railway strike committees in the South) and used them for the needs of the new, people's government. Yes, these were undoubtedly the embryos of a new, people's, or, if you will, revolutionary government. In their social and political character, they were the rudiments of the dictatorship of the revolutionary elements of the people. This surprises you, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter! You do not see here the "reinforced

security”, which for the bourgeois is tantamount to dictatorship? We have already told you that you have not the faintest notion of the scientific concept “dictatorship”. We will explain it to you in a moment; but first we will deal with the *third* “method” of activity in the period of the “revolutionary whirlwind”; *the use by the people of force against those who used force against the people.*

The organs of authority that we have described represented a dictatorship in embryo, for they recognised *no* other authority, *no* law and *no* standards, no matter by whom established. Authority—unlimited, outside the law, and based on force in the most direct sense of the word—is dictatorship. But the force on which this new authority was based, and sought to base itself was not the force of bayonets usurped by a handful of militarists, not the power of the “police force”, not the power of money nor the power of any previously established institutions. It was nothing of the kind. The new organs of authority possessed neither arms, nor money, nor old institutions. Their power—can you imagine it, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter?—had nothing in common with the old instruments of power, nothing in common with “reinforced security”, if we do not have in mind the reinforced security established to protect the people from the tyranny of the police and of the other organs of the old regime.

What was this power based on, then? It was based on the mass of the people. This is the *main* feature that distinguished this new authority from all the preceding organs of the old regime. The latter were the instruments of the rule of the minority over the people, over the masses of workers and peasants. The former was an instrument of the rule of the people, of the workers and peasants, over the minority, over a handful of police bullies, over a handful of privileged nobles and government officials. Such is the difference between dictatorship *over* the people and dictatorship *of* the revolutionary people: mark this well, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter! As the dictatorship of a minority, the old regime was able to maintain itself solely with the aid of police devices, solely by preventing the masses of the people from taking part in the government and from supervising the government. The old authority persistently distrusted the masses, feared the light, maintained itself by deception. As the dictatorship of the over-

whelming majority, the new authority maintained itself and could maintain itself solely because it enjoyed the confidence of the vast masses, solely because it, in the freest, widest and most resolute manner, enlisted all the masses in the task of government. It concealed nothing it had no secrets, no regulations, no formalities. It said, in effect: Are you a working man? Do you want to fight to rid Russia of the gang of police bullies? You are our comrade. Elect your deputy. Elect him at once, immediately, whichever way you think best. We will willingly and gladly accept him as a full member of our Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Peasant Committee, Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, and so forth. It was an authority open to all, it carried out all its functions before the eyes of the masses, was accessible to the masses, sprang directly from the masses, and was a direct and immediate instrument of the popular masses, of their will. Such was the new authority, or, to be exact, its embryo, for the victory of the old authority trampled down the shoots of this young plant very soon.

Perhaps, Mr. Blank or Mr. Kiesewetter, you will ask: Why "dictatorship", why "force"? Is it necessary for a vast mass to use force against a handful? Can tens and hundreds of millions be dictators over a thousand or ten thousand?

This question is usually put by people who for the first time hear the term dictatorship used in what to them is a new connotation. People are accustomed to see only a police authority and only a police dictatorship. The idea that there can be government without any police, or that dictatorship need not be a police dictatorship, seems strange to them. You say that millions need not resort to force against thousands? You are mistaken; and your mistake arises from the fact that you do not regard a phenomenon in its process of development. You forget that the new authority does not drop from the skies, but grows up, arises parallel with, and in opposition to, the old authority, in struggle against it. Unless force is used against tyrants armed with the weapons and instruments of power, the people cannot be liberated from tyrants.

Here is a very simple analogy, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter, which will help you to grasp this idea, which seems so remote and "fantastic" to the Cadet mind. Let us suppose that Avramov is injuring and torturing Spiridonova. On

Spiridonova's side, let us say, are tens and hundreds of unarmed people. On Avramov's side there is a handful of Cossacks. What would the people do if Spiridonova were being tortured, not in a dungeon, but in public? They would resort to force against Avramov and his body-guard. Perhaps they would sacrifice a few of their comrades, shot down by Avramov; but in the long run, they would forcibly disarm Avramov and his Cossacks, and in all probability would kill on the spot some of these brutes in human form; and they would clap the rest into some gaol to prevent them from committing any more outrages and to bring them to judgement before the people.

So you see, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter, when Avramov and his Cossacks torture Spiridonova, that is military and police dictatorship over the people. When a revolutionary people (that is to say, a people capable of fighting the tyrants, and not only of exhorting, admonishing, regretting, condemning, whining and whimpering; not a philistine narrow-minded, but a revolutionary people) resorts to force against Avramov and the Avramovs, that is a *dictatorship* of the revolutionary people. It is a dictatorship, because it is the authority of the people over Avramov, an authority unrestricted by any laws (the philistine, perhaps, would be opposed to rescuing Spiridonova from Avramov by force, thinking it to be against the "law". They would no doubt ask: Is there a "law" that permits the killing of Avramov? Have not some philistine ideologists built up a theory of non-resistance to evil?)*. The scientific term "dictatorship" means nothing more nor less than authority untrammelled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force. The term "dictatorship" *has no other meaning but this*—mark this well, Cadet gentlemen. Again, in the analogy we have drawn, we see the dictatorship of the people, because the people, the mass of the population, unorganised, "casually" assembled at the given spot, itself appears on the scene, exercises justice and metes out punishment, exercises power

* Mr. Berdayev! Messrs. editors of *Polyarnaya Zvezda* or *Svoboda i Kultura!*¹⁰⁸ Here is another subject for your lengthy lamentations—I mean, for lengthy articles against the "hooliganism" of revolutionaries. Fancy, they dare to call Tolstoi a philistine!! "Quelle horreur!"—as the lady with many good points¹⁰⁹ used to say.

and creates a new, revolutionary law. Lastly, it is the dictatorship of the *revolutionary* people. Why only of the revolutionary, and not of the whole people? Because among the whole people, constantly suffering, and most cruelly, from the brutalities of the Avramovs, there are some who are physically cowed and terrified; there are some who are morally degraded by the "resist not evil" theory, for example, or simply degraded not by theory, but by prejudice, habit, routine; and there are indifferent people, whom we call philistines, petty-bourgeois people who are more inclined to hold aloof from intense struggle, to pass by or even to hide themselves (for fear of getting mixed up in the fight and getting hurt). That is why the dictatorship is exercised, not by the whole people, but by the revolutionary people who, however, do not shun the whole people, who explain to all the people the motives of their actions in all their details, and who willingly enlist the *whole* people not only in "administering" the state, but in governing it too, and indeed in organising the state.

Thus our simple analogy contains *all the elements* of the scientific concept "dictatorship of the revolutionary people", and also of the concept "military and police dictatorship". We can now pass from this simple analogy, which even a learned Cadet professor can grasp, to the more complex developments of social life.

Revolution, in the strict and direct sense of the word, is a period in the life of a people when the anger accumulated during centuries of Avramov brutalities breaks forth into *actions*, not merely into words; and into the actions of *millions of the people*, not merely of individuals. The people awaken and rise up to rid themselves of the Avramovs. The people rescue the countless numbers of Spiridonovas in Russian life from the Avramovs, use force against the Avramovs, and establish their authority over the Avramovs. Of course, this does not take place so easily, and not "all at once", as it did in our analogy, simplified for the benefit of Professor Kiesewetter. This struggle of the people against the Avramovs, a struggle in the strict and direct sense of the word, this act of the people in throwing the Avramovs off their backs, stretches over months and years of "revolutionary whirlwind". This act of the people in throwing the Avramovs off their backs is the real content of what is called the great

Russian revolution. This act, regarded from the standpoint of the methods of making history, takes place in the forms we have just described in discussing the revolutionary whirlwind, namely: the people seize political freedom, that is, the freedom which the Avramovs had prevented them from exercising; the people create a new, revolutionary authority, authority over the Avramovs, over the tyrants of the old police regime; the people use force against the Avramovs in order to remove, disarm and make harmless these wild dogs, all the Avramovs, Durnovos, Dubasovs, Mins, etc., etc.

Is it good that the people should apply such unlawful, irregular, unmethodical and unsystematic methods of struggle as seizing their liberty and creating a new, formally unrecognised and revolutionary authority, that it should use force against the oppressors of the people? Yes, it is very good. It is the supreme manifestation of the people's struggle for liberty. It marks that great period when the dreams of liberty cherished by the best men and women of Russia *come true*, when liberty becomes the cause of the vast masses of the people, and not merely of individual heroes. It is as good as the rescue by the crowd (in our analogy) of Spiridonova from Avramov, and the forcible disarming of Avramov and making him harmless.

But this brings us to the very pivot of the Cadets' hidden thoughts and apprehensions. A Cadet is the ideologist of the philistines precisely because he looks at politics, at the liberation of the whole people, at revolution, through the spectacles of that same philistine who, in our analogy of the torture of Spiridonova by Avramov, would try to restrain the crowd, advise it not to break the law, not to hasten to rescue the victim from the hands of the torturer, since he is acting in the name of the law. In our analogy, of course, that philistine would be morally a monster; but in social life as a whole, we repeat, the philistine monster is not an individual, but a social phenomenon, conditioned, perhaps, by the deep-rooted prejudices of the bourgeois-philistine theory of law.

Why does Mr. Blank hold it as self-evident that all Marxist principles were forgotten during the period of "whirlwind"? Because he distorts Marxism into Brentanoism, and thinks that such "principles" as the seizure of liberty, the establishment of revolutionary authority and the use of

force by the people are not Marxist. This idea runs through the whole of Mr. Blank's article; and not only Mr. Blank's, but the articles of all the Cadets, and of all the writers in the liberal and radical camp who, today, are praising Plekhanov for his love of the Cadets; all of them, right up to the Bernsteinians of *Bez Zaglavia*,¹¹⁰ the Prokopoviches, Kuskovas and *tutti quanti*.

Let us see how this opinion arose and why it was bound to arise.

It arose directly out of the Bernsteinian or, to put it more broadly, the opportunist concepts of the West-European Social-Democrats. The fallacies of these concepts, which the "orthodox" Marxists in Western Europe have been systematically exposing all along the line, are now being smuggled into Russia "on the sly", in a different dressing and on a different occasion. The Bernsteinians accepted and accept Marxism *minus* its directly revolutionary aspect. They do not regard the parliamentary struggle as one of the weapons particularly suitable for definite historical periods, but as the main and almost the sole form of struggle making "force", "seizure", "dictatorship", unnecessary. It is this vulgar philistine distortion of Marxism that the Blanks and other liberal eulogisers of Plekhanov are now smuggling into Russia. They have become so accustomed to this distortion that they do not even think it necessary to prove that Marxist principles and ideas were forgotten in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind.

Why was such an opinion bound to arise? Because it accords very well with the class standing and interests of the petty bourgeoisie. The ideologists of "purified" bourgeois society agree with *all* the methods used by the Social-Democrats in their struggle *except those to which the revolutionary people resort in the period of a "whirlwind"*, and which revolutionary Social-Democrats approve of and help in using. The interests of the bourgeoisie demand that the proletariat should take part in the struggle against the autocracy, but only in a way that does not lead to the supremacy of the proletariat and the peasantry, and does not completely eliminate the old, feudal-autocratic and police organs of state power. The bourgeoisie wants to preserve these organs, only establishing its direct control over them. It needs them *against the*

proletariat, whose struggle would be too greatly facilitated if they were completely abolished. That is why the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class require both a monarchy and an Upper Chamber, and the prevention of the dictatorship of the revolutionary people. Fight the autocracy, the bourgeoisie says to the proletariat, but do not touch the old organs of state power, for I need them. Fight in a "parliamentary" way, that is, within the limits that we will prescribe by agreement with the monarchy. Fight with the aid of organisations, only not organisations like general strike committees, Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' Deputies, etc., but organisations that are recognised, restricted and made safe for capital by a law that we shall pass by agreement with the monarchy. It is clear, therefore, why the bourgeoisie speaks with disdain, contempt, anger and hatred about the period of the "whirlwind",* and with rapture, ecstasy and boundless philistine infatuation for reaction, about the period of constitutionalism as protected by Dubasov. It is once again that constant, invariable quality of the Cadets: seeking to lean on the people and at the same time dreading their revolutionary initiative.

It is also clear why the bourgeoisie is in such mortal fear of a repetition of the whirlwind, why it ignores and obscures the elements of the new revolutionary crisis, why it fosters constitutional illusions and spreads them among the people.

Now we have fully explained why Mr. Blank and his like declare that in the period of the "whirlwind" all Marxist principles and ideas were forgotten. Like all philistines, Mr. Blank accepts Marxism *minus* its revolutionary aspect;

* Compare, for example, the views of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, No. 1, 1906, on the activities of the Peasant Union—which is nothing less than a denunciation to Dubasov of the revolutionary democrats, of their Pugachev aspirations,¹¹¹ of their approval of the idea of seizing the land and of establishing a new government, and so forth. Even the Left Cadets of *Bez Zaglavii* (No. 10) admonished *Russkiye Vedomosti*, and rightly put it on a par with *Moskovskiy Vedomosti*, for publishing such views. Unfortunately, the Left Cadets admonish *Russkiye Vedomosti* in a tone that sounds like an apology. *Bez Zaglavii* defends the Peasant Union, but does not accuse the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Whether this not altogether decent method of controversy with *Russkiye Vedomosti* is due to its "fear of the Jews", or to the fact that Mr. Blank writes for that paper, I cannot say. The Left Cadets are, after all, Cadets.

he accepts Social-Democratic methods of struggle *minus* the most revolutionary and directly revolutionary methods.

Mr. Blank's attitude towards the period of "whirlwind" is extremely characteristic as an illustration of bourgeois failure to understand proletarian movements, bourgeois horror of acute and resolute struggles, bourgeois hatred for every manifestation of a radical and directly revolutionary method of solving social historical problems, a method that breaks up old institutions. Mr. Blank has betrayed himself and all his bourgeois narrow-mindedness. Somewhere he heard and read that during the period of whirlwind the Social-Democrats made "mistakes"—and he has hastened to conclude, and to declare with self-assurance, in tones that brook no contradiction and require no proof, that all the "principles" of Marxism (of which he has not the least notion!) were forgotten. As for these "mistakes", we will remark: Has there been a period in the development of the working-class movement, in the development of Social-Democracy, when no mistakes were made, when there was no deviation to the right or the left? Is not the history of the parliamentary period of the struggle waged by the German Social-Democratic Party—the period which all narrow-minded bourgeois all over the world regard as the utmost limit—filled with such mistakes? If Mr. Blank were not an utter ignoramus on problems of socialism, he would easily call to mind Mülberger, Dühring, the *Dampfersubvention*¹¹² question, the "Youth",¹¹³ the Bernsteiniad¹¹⁴ and many, many more. But Mr. Blank is not interested in studying the actual course of development of the Social-Democratic movement; all he wants is to minimise the scope of the proletarian struggle in order to exalt the bourgeois paltriness of his Cadet Party.

Indeed, if we examine the question in the light of the deviations that the Social-Democratic movement has made from its ordinary, "normal" course, we shall see that even in this respect there was *more* and not less solidarity and ideological integrity among the Social-Democrats in the period of "revolutionary whirlwind" than there was before it. The tactics adopted in the period of "whirlwind" did not further estrange the two wings of the Social-Democratic Party, but brought them closer together. Former disagreements gave way to unity of opinion on the question of armed uprising.

Social-Democrats of both factions were active in the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, these peculiar instruments of embryonic revolutionary authority; they drew the soldiers and peasants into these Soviets, they issued revolutionary manifestos jointly with the petty-bourgeois revolutionary parties. Old controversies of the pre-revolutionary period gave way to unanimity on practical questions. The upsurge of the revolutionary tide pushed aside disagreements, compelling Social-Democrats to adopt militant tactics; it swept the question of the Duma into the background and put the question of insurrection on the order of the day; and it brought closer together the Social-Democrats and revolutionary bourgeois democrats in carrying out immediate tasks. In *Severny Golos*¹¹⁵ the Mensheviks, jointly with the Bolsheviks, called for a general strike and insurrection; and they called upon the workers to continue this struggle until they had captured power. The revolutionary situation itself suggested practical slogans. There were arguments only over matters of detail in the appraisal of events: for example, *Nachalo*¹¹⁶ regarded the Soviets of Workers' Deputies as organs of revolutionary local self-government, while *Novaya Zhizn* regarded them as embryonic organs of revolutionary state power that united the proletariat with the revolutionary democrats.

Nachalo inclined towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. *Novaya Zhizn* advocated the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But have not disagreements of this kind been observed at every stage of development of every socialist party in Europe?

Mr. Blank's misrepresentation of the facts and his gross distortion of recent history are nothing more nor less than a sample of the smug bourgeois banality, for which periods of revolutionary whirlwind seem folly ("all principles are forgotten", "even intellect and reason almost vanish"), while periods of suppression of revolution and philistine "progress" (protected by the Dubasovs) seem to be periods of reasonable, deliberate and methodical activity. This comparative appraisal of two periods (the period of "whirlwind" and the Cadet period) runs through the whole of Mr. Blank's article. When human history rushes forward with the speed of a locomotive, he calls it a "whirlwind", a "torrent", the "vanishing" of all "principles and ideas". When history plods along at

dray-horse pace, the very symbol of it becomes reason and method. When the masses of the people themselves, with all their virgin primitiveness and simple, rough determination begin to make history, begin to put "principles and theories" immediately and directly into practice, the bourgeois is terrified and howls that "intellect is retreating into the background" (is not the contrary the case, heroes of philistinism? Is it not the intellect of the masses, and not of individuals, that invades the sphere of history at such moments? Does not mass intellect at such a time become a virile, effective, and not an armchair force?). When the direct movement of the masses has been crushed by shootings, repressive measures, floggings, unemployment and starvation, when all the bugs of professorial science financed by Dubasov come creeping out of their crevices and begin to administer affairs *on behalf of* the people, *in the name of the masses*, selling and betraying their interests to a privileged few—then the knights of philistinism think that an era of calm and peaceful progress has set in and that "the turn of intellect and reason has come". The bourgeois always and everywhere remains true to himself: whether you take *Polyarnaya Zvezda* or *Nasha Zhizn*, whether you read Struve or Blank, you will always find this same narrow-minded, professorially pedantic and bureaucratically lifeless appraisal of periods of revolution and periods of reform. The former are periods of madness, *tolle Jahre*, the disappearance of intellect and reason. The latter are periods of "deliberate and systematic" activities.

Do not misinterpret what I am saying. I am not arguing that the Blanks prefer some periods to others. It is not a matter of preference; our subjective preferences do not determine the changes in historical periods. The thing is that *in analysing the characteristics* of this or that period (quite apart from our preferences or sympathies), the Blanks shamelessly *distort the truth*. The thing is that it is just the revolutionary periods which are distinguished by wider, richer, more deliberate, more methodical, more systematic, more courageous and more vivid making of history than periods of philistine, Cadet, reformist progress. But the Blanks turn the truth inside out! They palm off paltriness as magnificent making of history. They regard the inactivity of the oppressed or downtrodden masses as the triumph of "system" in the work of

bureaucrats and bourgeois. They shout about the disappearance of intellect and reason when, instead of the picking of draft laws to pieces by petty bureaucrats and liberal *penny-a-liner** journalists, there begins a period of direct political activity of the "common people", who simply set to work without more ado to smash all the instruments for oppressing the people, seize power and take what was regarded as belonging to all kinds of robbers of the people—in short, when the intellect and reason of millions of downtrodden people awaken not only to read books, but for action, vital human action, to make history.

Look how majestically this Cadet knight argues: "The whirlwind raged for a time and then subsided *on the spot where it began*." Why, the fact that the liberal philistines are still alive, that they have not been gobbled up by the Dubasovs, *is due entirely to this whirlwind*. "On the spot where it began," you say? You say that Russia in the spring of 1906 is on the same spot as she was in September 1905?

Yes, throughout the "Cadet" period the Dubasovs and Durnovos have been dragging, and *will drag Russia* "deliberately, methodically and systematically" back, in order to return her to September 1905; *but they haven't the strength to do so*, because during the whirlwind the proletarians, the railwaymen, the peasants, the mutinous soldiers, have driven all Russia forward with the speed of a locomotive.

Had this unreasoning whirlwind really subsided, the Cadet Duma would have been doomed to engage only in tinkering with wash-basins.

But Mr. Blank has no inkling that the question whether the whirlwind has subsided is a separate and purely scientific question, the answer to which will settle a number of problems of tactics, and an answer to which is essential if we want to understand at all clearly the problems of present-day tactics. Mr. Blank has not based his conclusion that the conditions for a movement in the form of a whirlwind are lacking at present on the examination of facts and arguments (if it were well-founded, such a conclusion would really be of fundamental importance in determining tactics, for, we repeat, these tactics cannot be determined simply by

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

one's "preference" for one course or another). No, he is simply and frankly expressing his profound (and profoundly short-sighted) conviction that it cannot be otherwise. Strictly speaking, Mr. Blank regards the "whirlwind" just as it is regarded by the Wittes, Durnovos, Bülow and other German bureaucrats, who long ago pronounced the year 1848 to have been a "mad year". Mr. Blank's phrase "the whirlwind subsided" expresses, not a scientific conviction, but philistine stupidity, which regards every whirlwind, and whirlwinds in general, as the "disappearing of intellect and reason".

"The Social-Democrats have returned to their starting-point," Mr. Blank assures us. The Mensheviks' new tactics direct the Russian Social-Democratic movement along the path that is being followed by the entire international Social-Democratic movement.

You see that for some reason Mr. Blank declares the parliamentary path to be the "starting-point" (although it could not have been the starting-point for Social-Democracy in Russia). Mr. Blank regards the parliamentary path as what may be called the normal, the main and even the sole, all-embracing and exclusive path for international Social-Democracy. He has no inkling that, in this respect, he is repeating in its entirety the bourgeois distortion of Social-Democracy that predominates in the German liberal press, and which at one time was borrowed by the followers of Bernstein. The liberal bourgeois imagines that one of the methods of fighting is the sole method. This fully expresses the Brentano conception of the working-class movement and the class struggle. Mr. Blank has no inkling that the Social-Democrats in Europe took the parliamentary path, and were able to do so, only when objective conditions had removed the question of carrying the bourgeois revolution to its complete fulfilment from the agenda of history, only when the parliamentary system had really become the principal form of bourgeois rule and the principal arena of the social struggle. He does not even stop to think whether there is a parliament and a parliamentary system in Russia, but declares in a peremptory manner: the Social-Democrats have returned to their starting-point. The bourgeois mind can conceive only of incomplete democratic revolutions (for at bottom

the *interests* of the bourgeoisie require incomplete revolutions). The bourgeois mind shuns all non-parliamentary methods of struggle, all open mass actions, any revolution in the direct sense of the term. The bourgeois instinctively hastens to declare, proclaim and accept all sham parliamentarism as real parliamentarism in order to put a stop to the "dizzying whirlwind" (which may be dangerous not only for the heads of many weak-headed bourgeois, but also for their pockets). That is why the Cadet gentlemen are totally incapable even of understanding the scientific and really important question whether the parliamentary method of struggle can be recognised as having any real meaning for Russia, and whether the movement in the form of a "whirlwind" has spent itself. And the material, class background of this incomprehension is quite clear: let the workers support a Cadet Duma by a peaceful strike or some other action, but they must not think of waging an earnest and resolute war of extermination, they must not think of rising in revolt against the autocracy and the monarchy.

"Now the turn of intellect and reason has come again," says Mr. Blank, going into raptures over the period of Dubasov's victories. Do you know what, Mr. Blank? There has been no period in the history of Russia to which the expression "the turn of intellect and reason has come again" could be better applied than the period of Alexander III! That is really a fact. It was in that period that the old Russian Narodism ceased to be merely the dreamy contemplation of the future and made its rich contribution to Russian social thought by its researches into the economic life of Russia. It was in that period that Russian revolutionary thought worked hardest, and laid the groundwork for the Social-Democratic world-outlook. Yes, we revolutionaries are far from denying the revolutionary role of reactionary periods. We know that the form of the social movement changes, that periods of direct, constructive political activity by the masses of the people give way in history to periods of outward calm, when the masses, downtrodden and crushed by back-breaking toil and want, are silent or dormant (appear to be dormant), when modes of production become revolutionised with particular rapidity, when the intellect of the foremost representatives of human thought is summing up the past and devising

new systems and new methods of research. After all, in Europe, too, the period after the suppression of the revolution of 1848 was distinguished by unprecedented economic progress and by the labours of the intellect that created, say, Marx's *Capital*. In short, "the turn of intellect and reason" comes sometimes in periods of human history just as a period of imprisonment in the life of a political leader gives him an opportunity to engage in scientific study and work.

But the trouble with our bourgeois philistine is that he does not realise that his remarks have, so to speak, a prison or Dubasov ring. He does not notice the fundamental question: Is the Russian revolution crushed, or is it on the eve of a revival? Has the form of the social movement changed from a revolutionary form to one adjusted to the Dubasov regime? Have the forces making for a "whirlwind" spent themselves, or not? The bourgeois intellect does not trouble itself with these questions because, in general, it regards revolution as an unreasoning whirlwind, and reform as the return of intellect and reason.

Examine his most edifying argument about organisation. "The first thing" intellect and reason must do, he informs us, "is to take precautions to prevent a repetition of what occurred in the first period of the Russian revolution, in its *Sturm- und Drang-Zeit*, that is, measures against the destructive effects of revolutionary torrents and hurricanes. The only effective precaution against this is to enlarge and strengthen the organisation."

You see that, as the Cadet conceives it, the period of hurricane destroyed organisations and organisation itself (see *Novoye Vremya*, I mean *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, containing Struve's articles against anarchy, spontaneity, lack of firm authority during revolutions, etc., etc.); whereas the period of intellect and reason protected by Dubasov is a period for building up organisations. Revolution is evil; it destroys, it is a hurricane, a dizzying whirlwind. Reaction is good; it creates, it is a favourable wind and a time for deliberate, methodical, and systematic activity.

So once again the philosopher of the Cadet Party slanders the revolution and betrays all his infatuation with bourgeois-restricted forms and conditions of the movement. The hurricane destroyed organisations! What a glaring untruth!

Mention a period in Russian or world history, find any six months or six years, when as much was done for the free and independent organisation of the masses of the people as was done during the six weeks of the revolutionary whirlwind in Russia when, according to the slanderers of the revolution, all principles and ideas were forgotten and reason and intellect disappeared! What was the all-Russian general strike? Was it not organisation? True, it was not registered by the police, it was not a permanent organisation, and therefore you refuse to take it into account. Take the political organisations. Do you know that the working people, the raw masses, never joined political organisations so eagerly, never increased the membership of the political associations so enormously, never created such original, semi-political organisations as the Soviets of Workers' Deputies? But you are a bit afraid of the political organisations of the proletariat. Like a true disciple of Brentano, you think that trade unions are safer for the bourgeoisie (and therefore more sound and respectable). If we take the trade unions, we shall find that, in spite of all the philistine tittle-tattle about their being ignored in time of revolution, Russia never saw such a multitude of trade union organisations formed by the workers as in those days. The columns of the socialist, and precisely the socialist, newspapers, both *Novaya Zhizn* and *Nachalo*, were packed with reports of the formation of more and more trade unions. Even backward sections of the proletariat, like domestic servants, who could barely be roused in decades of "methodical and systematic" philistine progress, displayed the greatest eagerness and ability to organise. Take the Peasant Union. One often meets Cadets today who speak about this Union with magnificent disdain. Why, it was a semi-fictitious organisation, they say. It has disappeared without leaving a trace. I wonder, gentlemen, how much of your Cadet organisations would be left had you been obliged to contend with punitive expeditions, with innumerable rural Luzhenovskys, Rimans, Filonovs, Avramovs and Zhdanovs. The Peasant Union grew with fabulous speed in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind. It was a genuinely popular, mass organisation, sharing, of course, in a number of peasant prejudices, and susceptible to the petty-bourgeois illusions of the peasants (just

like our Socialist-Revolutionaries); but it was undoubtedly a real organisation of the masses, of "men of the soil", unquestionably revolutionary at bottom, capable of employing genuinely revolutionary methods of struggle. It did not restrict but extended the scope of the political initiative of the peasantry, and brought them, with their hatred of the government officials and the landlords, into the arena—not the semi-intellectuals who are so often inclined to hatch all sorts of proposals for a deal between the revolutionary peasantry and the liberal landlords. The current disdain for the Peasant Union most of all expresses the philistine bourgeois narrow-mindedness of the Cadet, who has no faith in the independent revolutionary activity of the masses and is afraid of it. In the days of liberty, the Peasant Union was one of the mightiest realities, and we can confidently predict that, if the Luzhenovskys and Rimans do not butcher more tens of thousands of young, progressive peasants, if the slightest breeze of liberty blows again, this Union will grow with lightning speed, and will become an organisation against which the present Cadet committees will look like specks of dust.*

To sum up: the organising abilities of the people, particularly of the proletariat, but also of the peasantry, are revealed a million times more strongly, fully and productively in periods of revolutionary whirlwind than in periods of so-called calm (dray-horse) historical progress. The Blanks'

* Of course, not being a class organisation, the Peasant Union also contains elements of disintegration. The more imminent the victory of the peasant uprising and the fuller that victory, the more imminent will be the disintegration of this Union. But up to the victory of the peasant uprising, and for such a victory, the Peasant Union is a mighty and viable organisation. Its function will cease with the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, whereas the function of the proletarian organisations at that moment will be particularly important and vital in the struggle for socialism. But the function of the Cadet organisations is to hamper the complete victory of the bourgeois revolution, to excel in the preparatory periods of that revolution, in the periods of depression, stagnation and Dubasov rule. In other words, the peasantry will be victorious in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then cease to be revolutionary as a peasantry. The proletariat will be victorious in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and only thereby will fully develop its true, genuine, socialist revolutionary nature. But the Cadet petty bourgeoisie will cease to be an opposition on the very next day after constitutional illusions are dispelled.

opinion to the contrary is a bourgeois-bureaucratic distortion of history. The good bourgeois and honest bureaucrat regard as "genuine" only such organisations as have been properly registered by the police and scrupulously conform to all sorts of "provisional regulations". They cannot conceive of methods and system without provisional regulations. We must therefore have no illusions about the true significance of high-sounding words from a Cadet about romantic contempt for legality and aristocratic disdain for economics. These words have only one real meaning—a bourgeois opportunist dread of the independent revolutionary activity of the people.

Finally, let us examine the last point in Mr. Blank's Cadet "theory": the relation between worker democrats and bourgeois democrats. Mr. Blank's arguments on this subject deserve the closest attention of Social-Democrats, for they provide an example of how Marx is misrepresented by quotations from Marx. Just as Brentano, Sombart, Bernstein and Co. substituted Brentanoism for Marxism by employing Marxian terminology, by quoting some of Marx's statements and by assuming a Marxist disguise, so our Cadets indulge in the "subtle art" of faking Marxism on the question of the relation between worker democrats and bourgeois democrats.

Unless the activities of the worker democrats and bourgeois democrats are co-ordinated, the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be successful. This is gospel truth. Absolute truth. It seems to you, Messrs. Blank, Izgoyev and Co., that the revolutionary Social-Democrats forgot this particularly during the days of the "whirlwind"? You are mistaken, or are deliberately substituting for the concept *revolutionary bourgeois* democrats the concept bourgeois democrats in general, which includes the monarchist-liberal democrats and the opportunist democrats, but above all the monarchist-liberal democrats. Take *Novaya Zhizn*, and you will find that it deals with the question of joint action, of a fighting agreement between the worker democrats and the revolutionary bourgeois democrats *in nearly every issue*. It speaks of the importance of the Peasant Union and of the peasant movement in the most emphatic terms. Despite the Cadet fables about the Marxists' intolerance and narrow-minded dogmatism, you will find that that paper fully recognises the importance of

non-party associations and organisations*: but of course only non-party *revolutionary* organisations. The pivot of the question that is so artfully concealed by our Brentanoists in politics is: *Which* elements of bourgeois democracy are capable of pushing the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its complete fulfilment when that revolution is, so to speak, half-way towards its goal? Is it the elements that accept the monarchist-liberal programme, that are completely submerged in constitutional illusions and bespatter revolutionary periods and revolutionary methods of making history with the slime of their philistine anger, condemnation and regret? Or is it those who accept the programme of a complete victory of the peasant uprising (instead of a deal between the peasants and the landlords), of complete victory for democracy (instead of a deal between the democratic Lower Chamber, on the one hand, and the Upper Chamber and the monarchy, on the other)? Have these gentlemen, the Blanks and the Izgoyevs, ever given a thought to this question? Must we at the present time "strike together" with the bourgeois-democratic *compromisers* or with the bourgeois-democratic *revolutionaries*?

Have you, esteemed gentlemen, who are so fond of quoting and misrepresenting Marx, ever heard how mercilessly Marx lashed the bourgeois-democratic compromisers in Germany in 1848?¹¹⁷ And yet these compromisers were members of a National Assembly and not of a paltry State Duma: as democrats, they were far more "resolute" (in words) than our Cadets.

And fifteen years later, during the "constitutional conflict" in Prussia, the same Marx and Engels advised the workers' party to support the bourgeois-democratic Progressists, who were not a whit better than the Frankfurt democrats.¹¹⁸ You think that this shows that Marx and Engels were inconsistent and contradicted themselves? You think this proves that they, too, in the period of the "revolutionary whirlwind" almost lost their "intellect and reason" (this view is held by the majority of the Bernsteinians and most of the Cadets)? As a matter of fact, there is no con-

* See my article in *Novaya Zhizn*: "The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism". (See pp. 75-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

tradition here at all. In the period of revolutionary struggle, Marx concentrated his attack on constitutional illusions and constitutional compromisers. When the force of the revolutionary "whirlwind" was spent, and there could no longer be any doubt that the German Cadets had utterly betrayed the revolution, when the insurrections had been finally and completely suppressed, and economic prosperity was making any repetition of them hopeless, then and *only then* (Marx and Engels were not craven-hearted, and their faith in insurrection did not dwindle after the very first defeat!), did they recognise the parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle. In parliament, once you have gone into it, it is not only permissible but obligatory, in certain circumstances, to support the turncoat Izgoyev against Shipov, and Shipov against Durnovo. In the fight for real parliamentarism there is sometimes nothing more dangerous than Cadet "compromisers".

If you want to quote Marx, gentlemen, try to prove that our Duma is already an instrument of the rule of the bourgeoisie in a free Russia, and not a fig-leaf for the autocracy. You will say that the latter may evolve into the former through a few slight changes, and that the election of the Cadets is already not a slight, but an important testimony of this "evolution".

Very well. But in that way you are only putting the question off, you are not answering it. Has the present Duma, right now, already outgrown its limits to such an extent that it can become an organ of state power? Those of you who think so, and are trying to make the people think so, are deliberately spreading the most harmful constitutional illusions: you are downright counter-revolutionaries. Those of you, however, who think it probable that "Durnovo will remain in order to disperse the Duma",* or who realise that nothing is certain yet without an extra-"parliamentary", revolutionary onslaught,** are proving how shaky your position is. Their admissions clearly show that the Cadets' policy is a *policy of the moment*, and not a policy of earnestly

* *Rus and Molva*.

** P. Milyukov, "The Elements of the Conflict", in *Rech*, No. 30, March 24—the extremely interesting credo of a compromiser.

defending the *permanent* and fundamental interests of the revolution. These admissions show that during the solution of the *new revolutionary crisis* that is now maturing, a large number of revolutionary bourgeois democrats will break away from the Cadets, and will be impelled by the Durnovos' outrages against the Duma to go to the barricades. Thus the whole difference is that you want to *restrict* this inevitable new battle, to fetter it, to *narrow it down* to the task of supporting the Cadet Duma; whereas we want to concentrate all our plans, all our energies, all our work of agitation, propaganda and organisation on extending the scope of this battle beyond the limits of Cadet programmes, to extend it to the complete overthrow of the autocracy, to the complete victory of the peasant uprising, to the convocation of a national constituent assembly by revolutionary means.

It seems to you that there are no revolutionary bourgeois democrats in Russia, that the Cadets are the only, or at all events, the main force of bourgeois democracy in Russia. But it seems so to you only because you are short-sighted, because you are content to observe only the surface of political events; you do not see or understand the "essence of the constitution". Being hand-to-mouth politicians, you are most typical opportunists, for the momentary interests of democracy shut out from your view its more profound and fundamental interests: because, engrossed in the tasks of the moment, you forget the more serious tasks of the future: the label prevents you from seeing the contents. There are revolutionary bourgeois democrats in Russia, and there must be, so long as there is a revolutionary peasantry, which by thousands of millions of threads is also bound up with the poorer classes in the towns. These democrats are lying low *only* because of the activities of the Rimans and Luzhenovskys.¹⁴⁹ The events of the very near future will dispel Cadet illusions. Either the regime of repression continues, the Rimans and Luzhenovskys "do things" while the Cadet Duma talks—and in that case the paltriness of this Duma and of the party that predominates in it will immediately become evident to the vast masses of the people. There will be a strong outbreak, in which it will not be the Cadets as a party that will participate, of course, but those elements among the people that constitute the revolutionary democracy. Or the regime of repression

will be relaxed, the government will make a few concessions, and the Cadet Duma, of course, will begin to melt as a result of the very first concessions, and will settle for Shipov, or even perhaps for something worse. The counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets (which stood out in striking relief during the days of the "whirlwind", and is constantly evident in their literature) will display itself in full. But the very *first* fresh breeze of liberty, the slightest relaxation of repression, will again *inevitably* call into being hundreds and thousands of organisations, unions, groups, circles and undertakings of a revolutionary-democratic nature. And this will as inevitably result in another "whirlwind", in a repetition of the October-December struggle, but on an immeasurably greater scale. The Cadets, who are shining so brightly today, will be dimmed once again. Why? Because maggots are found near corpses, not near living people.

In other words, the Cadets may finally make the people "acquire a taste", as Durnovo would say, for "people's freedom", but they can never under any circumstances wage a genuine struggle for real freedom of the people, freedom without inverted commas, without a compromise with the autocracy. This struggle has still inevitably to be waged; but it will be waged, not by the Cadets, but by other parties, other social elements. It is clear, therefore, why the revolutionary Social-Democrats do not in the least envy the successes of the Cadets, and continue to concentrate on this forthcoming real, and not sham, fight.

Mr. Blank quotes what Marx said about the supreme significance of bourgeois democracy. To express Marx's real opinion, he should have added: and *supremely treacherous significance*. Marx said this a thousand times in different passages in his various writings. Comrade Plekhanov, who is inclining towards Brentanoism in present-day politics, has forgotten what Marx said on this score. Indeed, Comrade Plekhanov has no inkling of *what* the liberal democrats may betray. The answer to this is very simple, Comrade Plekhanov. The party of "people's freedom" has betrayed the freedom of the people, and will continue to do so.

Mr. Blank admonishes us not to push the bourgeois democrats "into the camp of reaction and counter-revolution". We ask this sagacious Cadet: do you want to take the

world of ideas, theories, programmes and lines of tactics, or the world of material class interests? Let us take both. Who pushed your friend Mr. Struve into the camp of counter-revolution, and when? Mr. Struve was a counter-revolutionary in 1894, when, in his *Critical Remarks*, he made Brentanoist reservations concerning Marxism. And despite the efforts some of us made to "push" him from Brentanoism to Marxism, Mr. Struve went over entirely to Brentanoism. And *the counter-revolutionary tone never left the pages of Osvobozhdeniye, the illegal "Osvobozhdeniye"*. Was this mere chance? Was it by chance that Mr. Struve was prompted to start that model organ of reactionary spleen, *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, precisely in the period of the "whirlwind", of the independent revolutionary activity of the people?

What, in general, pushes the small producer in a commodity economy over to the side of reaction and counter-revolution? The position he occupies in capitalist society between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The petty bourgeois inevitably, in all countries and in every combination of political circumstances, vacillates between revolution and counter-revolution. He wants to free himself from the yoke of capital and to strengthen his position as a small proprietor. This is virtually impossible; and the vacillations of the petty bourgeois are inevitable and ineradicable owing to the very system of modern society. That is why no one but the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie can imagine that it is *thinkable* for the workers, or for the peasants rising in revolt against landlordism, to display independent revolutionary activity that *will not push* a certain section of the bourgeois democrats into the camp of reaction. Only knights of philistinism can regret this.

Do the Blanks and the Izgoyevs (or Comrade Plekhanov) really imagine that it is possible, for example, to have a complete victory of the peasant uprising, that it is possible completely to "*take the land*" (Plekhanov's slogan) from the landlords without compensation, without three-fifths of the Cadet "bourgeois democrats" being pushed into the camp of counter-revolution? Should we, therefore, begin bargaining with the Cadets about a "reasonable" peasant programme? What do you think, Comrade Plekhanov? What is your opinion, Messrs. Blank and Izgoyev?

And now for the finale of the political arguments advanced by our Cadet: *if the bourgeois democrats are opposed to armed uprising at the present time*, it is useless talking about it.

These words express the whole sum and substance of Cadet policy: to subordinate the proletariat to the Cadets, to take it in tow on the fundamental question of its political conduct and its political struggle. It is no use shutting our eyes to that. Mr. Blank rather dexterously tries to distract our attention from the main point. He speaks not about the Cadets, but about bourgeois democrats in general. He talks about the "present juncture", but not about insurrection in general. But only a child could be taken in by this trick, and fail to realise that the true meaning of Blank's conclusion is the one we have indicated. We have already cited a number of examples to show that Mr. Blank (like all the Cadets) systematically ignores the bourgeois democrats who are more to the left than the Cadets; and that, in keeping with his whole position as an advocate of constitutional illusions, he identifies the Cadets with the bourgeois democrats, and ignores the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. It only remains for us to prove that the Cadets are opposed to armed uprising in general, and not only to choosing the wrong "moment" (it is curious how often these two things are confused, and it is particularly to the advantage of the Cadets to confuse them, and to cover up their repudiation of insurrection by arguments about the moment chosen for it). This is quite easy to prove. It is sufficient to refer to the *illegal "Osvobozhdeniye"*, where Mr. Struve, in the spring and summer of 1905, after January 9 and before October 9, strongly opposed armed uprising, and argued that to preach it was "*folly and a crime*". Events have sufficiently refuted this counter-revolutionary. Events have proved that it was the *combination of general strike and armed uprising*—which the Marxists foresaw and put forward as a watchword—that alone won the recognition of liberty and the rudiments of constitutionalism in Russia. Only a very few Social-Democrats, with no supporters in Russia (like Plekhanov), cravenly said about the December insurrection: "It was wrong to take up arms." On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of Social-Democrats agree that insurrection was a necessary act of resistance to the withdrawal of liberties; that it raised

the entire movement to a higher plane and demonstrated the possibility of fighting against regular troops. The latter circumstance has been admitted by such an impartial, sober-minded and cautious witness as Kautsky.

Now let us see what the moral that the Blanks draw amounts to: the proletariat must not think of insurrection if the Cadet Party (which was never revolutionary) is not in sympathy with it (although at present, and at *all other times*, it is opposed to insurrection). No, Mr. Blank! The proletariat will certainly reckon with the bourgeois democrats on the question of insurrection in general, and on the question of the moment to be chosen for it in particular—only, it will reckon *not* with the Cadet bourgeois democrats, *but* with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats; not with the liberal-monarchist, but with the revolutionary-republican trends and parties; not with windbags who are satisfied with a toy parliament, but with the masses of the peasantry (who are also bourgeois democrats), whose attitude towards insurrection differs from that of the Cadets.

“The Cadets are opposed to insurrection.” Why, they have never been in favour, nor can they ever be in favour of it. They dread it. They naïvely imagine that it *depends* on their wishes—the wishes of the intermediary elements who stand aloof from the most acute and direct struggle—whether there is to be an insurrection or not. What a delusion! The autocracy is preparing for civil war, and is just now preparing for it very methodically. A new, much wider and more profound political crisis is maturing because of the Duma. Both the peasant masses and the proletariat still have in their midst vast numbers of militants who are emphatically demanding freedom for the people, not deals that will curtail the freedom of the people. Can the wishes of this or that party determine in these circumstances whether an insurrection will break out or not?

Just as the West-European philistine on the eve of socialist revolution yearns for an abatement of the class antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, pleads with the latter not to push the representatives of the bourgeoisie into the camp of reaction, declares in favour of social peace, and with profound moral indignation rejects the unscientific, narrow-minded, conspiratorial, anarchist, and

so forth, idea of a cataclysm, so the Russian philistine, half-way on the road towards our bourgeois-democratic revolution, yearns for an abatement of the antagonism between the autocracy and people's freedom, pleads with the revolutionaries, that is, with all resolute and consistent supporters of the people's freedom, not to push the liberal bourgeoisie into the camp of reaction, advocates the constitutional path, and with sincere indignation, reinforced with philosophical idealism, rejects the unscientific, narrow-minded, conspiratorial, anarchist, and so forth, idea of insurrection. The class-conscious worker says to the West-European philistine: "The question of a cataclysm will be decided by the intensification of extremes and not by the intermediary elements." To the Russian philistine (and the Cadet is the ideal philistine in politics) the class-conscious worker says: "The question of insurrection depends, not on the will of the liberals, but on the actions of the autocracy and the growth of the class-consciousness and the indignation of the revolutionary peasantry and the proletariat. The West-European philistines say to the proletariat: "Don't repel the small peasants and the enlightened, social-liberal, reforming petty bourgeoisie generally; don't isolate yourselves; it is the reactionaries who want to isolate you." To this the proletarian replies: "I must, in the interests of the whole of toiling humanity, isolate myself from those who advocate compromise between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, for these compromisers are advising me to disarm; they are exercising the most harmful, immediately and practically harmful influence on the minds of the oppressed class by preaching compromise, abatement of antagonisms, etc. But I do not isolate myself from that vast mass of the petty bourgeoisie, the working masses, who are capable of adopting the point of view of the proletariat, of not yearning for compromise, of not being carried away by the consolidation of petty economy in capitalist society, and of not renouncing the struggle against the capitalist system itself."

Much the same is taking place in Russia, but in different conditions, in a different historical period, on the eve (and not even on the eve, but in the midst) of a bourgeois-democratic and not a socialist revolution. The philistine says to the proletarian: "The reactionaries want to isolate you; you must

isolate the reactionaries; don't repel the enlightened, politically-liberal Cadets who want reforms." To this the proletarian replies: "In the interests of the genuine struggle for real freedom, I must isolate myself from the advocates of a compromise between the autocracy and the representatives of the people, for these compromisers are advising us to disarm, they are befogging the civic consciousness of the people by their advocacy of 'political peace' and constitutional illusions. But these compromisers, all these Cadets, are not the people at all, they are not the masses at all, they are not a force at all, as seems to those who give way to the moods and impressions of the moment, and are now shouting about the danger of the proletariat being isolated. The real masses are the revolutionary peasantry and the poorer sections of the town population. From *these* masses I do not isolate myself; I call upon them to cast off their constitutional illusions, I call upon them to take up the real struggle, I call them to insurrection. In deciding on the moment for the insurrection, I will pay very serious attention to the mood and to the process of political development of these masses (not of the Cadet compromisers); but I will not for a moment forget the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy that is maturing very fast, and will probably break out in the near future, for the sake of momentary successes, for the sake of the tawdry brilliance of Cadet parliamentarism (or rather Dubasov parliamentarism, to put it more correctly)."

In Europe, not so long ago, the flashy and loud-mouthed social-liberal, the petty-bourgeois compromiser, importunately pressed his offers of alliances and agreements upon the proletariat. The intellectual wing of the Social-Democratic parties took the bait, succumbed to the policy of the moment, founded the notorious Bernsteinianism, etc. A year or two passed, the fog of "social peace" was completely dispelled, and the correctness of the position taken up by the revolutionary wing of the Social-Democratic parties, which consistently adhered to the proletarian point of view, became perfectly evident.

In Russia today everybody is intoxicated with the Cadet victories and with the prospect of a Cadet Duma. There is a danger that the intellectual wing of our Party will be fascinated by these brilliant successes and will be taken in by the

idea of an election bloc with the Cadets, by the idea of supporting them, by a policy of "dealing tactfully" with the Cadets. There is a danger that they will be reluctant clearly and distinctly to define from the proletarian point of view the petty-bourgeois class nature of this party, the harmfulness of its constitutional illusions and the constant danger created by its tactics of "compromise". But in a few years, or perhaps even months, the fog will be dispelled; the views of the revolutionary Social-Democrats will be borne out by reality, and the columns of the Cadet newspapers and magazines will cease to ring with eulogies of certain Social-Democrats, which are offensive to the proletariat and are symptomatic of some disease within the Social-Democratic Party.

VI

CONCLUSION

In discussing the views of Mr. Blank, this highly typical exponent of Cadet policy, we said hardly anything about the views of our Menshevik comrades. But the conclusion to be drawn about their position logically follows from what we have said. The very fact that the Cadets are so effusive in their praise of the Mensheviks shows that the latter must be making some mistake. The Cadet press constitutes nearly nine-tenths of the whole of the political press in Russia at the present time; and if the whole of this bourgeois press is systematically and continuously praising Plekhanov one day, Potresov another day (*Nasha Zhizn*), and the resolution adopted by all the Mensheviks yet another day, it is a true, if of course indirect, sign that our Menshevik comrades are making, or are about to make, some mistake. It is hardly possible for the public opinion of the whole bourgeois press to diverge very sharply from the class instinct of the bourgeoisie, which is very sensitive to the way the wind is blowing.

But, we repeat, this is only an indirect sign. What we have said above also leads us to a direct formulation of the mistakes that are evident in the draft Menshevik resolutions. This is not the place to examine these resolutions in detail;

we can only briefly deal with the most important points, relevant to the question of "the victories of the Cadets and the tasks of the workers' party".

The mistake the Mensheviks make is that they do not at all formulate, and evidently have even quite forgotten, such an important political task that now confronts the class-conscious, Social-Democratic proletariat as combating constitutional illusions. The socialist proletariat, strictly adhering to the class point of view, unswervingly applying the materialist conception of history in appraising present conditions, and hostile to all petty-bourgeois sophistries and deceptions, cannot ignore this task in the period Russia is passing through. If it were to ignore this task, it would cease to be the vanguard fighter for complete freedom for the people; it would cease to be the fighter who stands above bourgeois-democratic narrow-mindedness. If it were to ignore this task it would trail helplessly behind events, which are converting these very constitutional illusions into an instrument for the bourgeois corruption of the proletariat, just as the theory of "social peace" lately served in Europe as the principal instrument of the bourgeoisie for diverting the workers from socialism.

Constitutional illusions represent an entire period in the Russian revolution which naturally set in after the suppression of the *first* armed uprising (which will yet be followed by a second one), and after the Cadets' election victories. Constitutional illusions are a politically opportunist and bourgeois poison, which the Cadet press, taking advantage of the enforced silence of the socialist newspapers, is pouring into the brains of the people through its millions of copies. We have before us the newspaper *Tovarishch*,¹²⁰ an organ of those Cadets who go among "the people", and especially among the working class. In its first issue it sings dithyrambs to the Cadets: "In its programme it [the Cadet Party] promises [humph, humph, prom-is-es!] to defend the interests of the peasants [*à la* Kaufman?] and the workers [why, of course!] and the political rights of all Russian citizens without exception. If it obtains a majority in the State Duma, the present government, which has done so much harm to the people, will have to go, and the state will be administered by new men [the Muravyovs in place of Witte?] *who will*

heed the voice of the people." Yes, yes—heed the voice of the people!... How beautifully those Cadets write!

We are sure that there is not a single socialist who will not feel outraged by this shameless bourgeois lie, who will deny that it is absolutely necessary to combat this bourgeois corruption of the working class with the utmost vigour, a corruption which is all the more dangerous because the Cadets have heaps of newspapers, whereas we have not a single one, in spite of our innumerable attempts to start a most moderate, most restrained and most modest socialist newspaper.

Moreover, there is no denying that this bourgeois lie, this befogging of the revolutionary consciousness of the people, is not an isolated sortie, but a regular campaign. More than that. A Cadet Duma (if the Duma will be Cadet) will be, so to speak, the incarnation of constitutional illusions, their hot-bed, the focus of all the most ostentatious aspects of political life (which to the superficial and idealistic mind of the petty bourgeois seem the essence of, or at least the main factor in, contemporary political life). We are faced not merely with a systematic campaign by the whole of the bourgeois press and by all the bourgeois ideologists who are striving to take the proletariat in tow, but with an all-Russian representative institution that is surrounded with the halo of the first "parliament"—if we may call it that—and must perpetuate this transformation of the working class into an appendage of the Cadets. Recall the opinion of the "spheres" that we mentioned above. They said in effect: how good it would be if the Cadets could win public confidence for the Duma, and make it the centre of all public hopes. The Duma is to serve as a plaster to draw the heat out of the revolution. On this our Cadets are virtually agreed with the Durnovos and Dubasovs. This is a fact. *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, especially, has proved this very clearly. Methodical and systematic reforms are better than a revolutionary whirlwind in which intellect and reason disappear—say the Blanks. It is better to haggle with the Cadets in the Duma than to fight with unreliable troops against the workers and peasants—say the Durnovos and Dubasovs. *Les beaux esprits se rencontrent*. Birds of a feather flock together.

Everybody says that we are slandering the liberals. We were called slanderers when, long ago, in *Zarya* and in the

old *Iskra*, we gave the first issues of *Osvobozhdeniye* a hostile reception.¹²¹ The slanders turned out to be a Marxist analysis of bourgeois ideology which was wholly confirmed by reality. It will therefore not surprise or grieve us if we are now accused of slandering the party of "people's freedom".

Every political period confronts the Social-Democratic Party, as the representative of the only thoroughly revolutionary class, with a particular and specific task which becomes the urgent task of the day, but which is always obscured or pushed into the background in one way or another by the opportunist sections of the bourgeois democrats. The specific political task at the present time—which only the revolutionary Social-Democrats can fulfil, and which they must fulfil if they do not want to betray the lasting, fundamental and vital interests of the proletariat—is to combat constitutional illusions. Petty-bourgeois opportunists are always content with the achievements of the moment, with the gleam of the latest novelty, with momentary "progress". We, however, must look further and deeper into things, and must point at once and immediately to those aspects of this progress that are the basis and guarantee of *retrogression*, that express the one-sidedness, narrowness and flimsiness of what has been achieved and make it necessary to *continue the fight in other forms and under other conditions*.

The more decisive the victory of the Cadets and of the opposition generally in the elections, and the more probable and imminent a Cadet Duma, the more dangerous constitutional illusions become and the more acutely perceptible is the contradiction between the complete maintenance and even intensification of the reactionary policy of the autocracy—which still exercises all power—and "popular" representation. This contradiction is very rapidly creating a new revolutionary crisis, immeasurably wider and deeper, more conscious and acute than all its predecessors. In 1906 we are verily experiencing the *reproduction* of the revolution, as some Social-Democrat aptly expressed it. It is as if the history of 1905 were being repeated, starting from the beginning, from the autocracy in full power, going through the stage of public excitement and of a country-wide opposition movement of unprecedented power, and ending with—who knows

what? Perhaps with a "reproduction" of the liberal deputation that waited on the tsar last summer, but this time in the form of an address or a resolution of the Cadet Duma; or perhaps a "reproduction" of the autumn upsurge of 1905. It would be ridiculous to attempt to forecast the exact forms and dates of the future steps of the revolution. The important thing is to bear in mind the immeasurably wider sweep of the movement, and the greater political experience of the whole people. The important thing is to remember that what is impending is a *revolutionary* and not a parliamentary crisis. The "parliamentary" struggle in the Duma is a small stage; indeed, it is a tiny railway station—"Cadet Halt"—on the road from Constitution to Revolution. Owing to the fundamental peculiarities of the present social and political situation, the struggle in the Duma *cannot* decide the fate of people's freedom. It cannot be the *main* form of the struggle, because this "parliament" is admittedly not recognised by *either* of the combatants—either the Durnovos, Dubasovs and Co. or the proletariat and the peasantry.

And the Social-Democrats, taking all the concrete, specific features of the present historical situation into account, must therefore resolutely recognise and systematically instil into the minds of the workers and politically-conscious peasants that the main form of social movement in present-day Russia continues to be the directly revolutionary movement of the broad masses of the people, breaking the old laws, destroying the instruments for oppressing the people, winning political power, making new laws. The Duma convened by the Dubasovs and Durnovos, and protected by these worthy gentlemen, will play a very important part in the movement, but will not in any circumstances change its main form. The opposite opinion, already expressed and being spread by the Cadets, is a deception of the people, a petty-bourgeois philistine utopia.

And bound up with this is the question of the bourgeois democrats, and of whether the proletariat should support them or not. On this point, too, the Mensheviks' resolutions are partly inadequate and partly mistaken. The Cadets are doing their utmost to identify their party with the bourgeois democrats in general, and are claiming that their party is the principal representative of bourgeois democracy. This is

a monstrous lie; and all vagueness on the part of Social-Democrats in defining the term "bourgeois democracy" merely serves to foster this lie. We must find a solution for the concrete political problem of supporting the bourgeois democrats that will be based on an absolutely definite appraisal of specific trends, tendencies and parties among the bourgeois democrats. And the main task of the day in this respect is to separate the revolutionary bourgeois democrats—who, even if they are not quite politically conscious and cling to a number of prejudices and so forth, are capable of waging a resolute and unrelenting struggle against all the remnants of serfdom in Russia—from the liberal monarchists and opportunist bourgeois democrats who are capable of entering into all sorts of deals with the reaction, and who at every critical moment advance their counter-revolutionary aspirations. That there are extremely large numbers of revolutionary democrats in Russia is beyond doubt; their lack of organisation, their non-party character, and the fact that they are crushed by the present reign of terror can mislead only the most superficial and thoughtless observers. It is with these democrats, and only with these, that we must "march separately, but strike together", with the object of fulfilling the democratic revolution to the very end, and ruthlessly exposing the unreliability of the now "dominant" Cadet Party.

And setting itself the object of carrying through to the end the democratic revolution, the party of the socialist proletariat must be able not only to expose at any time all constitutional illusions, not only to separate the elements capable of struggle from the mass of bourgeois democrats, but also precisely and frankly to define and put clearly before the masses the conditions in which this decisive victory of the revolution can be achieved. It must show the masses, and bring out in all its propaganda and agitation, what precisely this decisive victory of the revolution must mean. Unless we do this (and this our Menshevik comrades have failed to do in their resolutions), all our talk about "carrying through the revolution to the end" will be nothing more than bare and empty phrases.

In his article Mr. Blank refers to the French "Social-Democrats" of 1848-49. Our worthy Cadet does not realise that he is

drawing a caricature of himself. It is, after all, the Cadets who today are repeating the mistakes of the French "Social-Democrats", who in fact were not Social-Democrats, i.e., Marxists, at all. They were not a class party of the workers, but a regular petty-bourgeois party; they were thoroughly permeated with constitutional illusions and with belief in "parliamentary" methods of struggle in all, even revolutionary, circumstances. And that is precisely why in spite of their stupendous, purely "Cadet", parliamentary successes, they suffered that shameful fiasco which Marx so derided.¹²²

And our Party, too—if it were imprudently to enter into all sorts of election blocs, agreements and deals with the Cadets, if it were to leave the task of combating constitutional illusions in the shade, if, in seeking a *rapprochement* with the bourgeois democrats, it were to identify the latter with their opportunist wing, i.e., the Cadets, and if it were to forget the necessity of seriously preparing for extra-parliamentary methods of struggle in a period like the one we are now passing through—our Party, too, would run the serious risk of meeting with the same deplorable fate as that met with by the French petty-bourgeois, quasi-Social-Democrats in 1848-49.

We have no reason to be envious of the Cadets' successes. Petty-bourgeois illusions and faith in the Duma are still fairly strong among the people. They must be dispelled. The more complete the Cadets' triumph in the Duma, the sooner will this be done. We welcome the successes of the Girondists¹²³ of the great Russian revolution! They will be followed by the rise of broader masses of the people; more energetic and revolutionary sections will come to the fore; they will rally around the proletariat; they will carry our great bourgeois revolution to complete victory, and will usher in the era of socialist revolution in the West.

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1

SPEECH IN REPLY TO THE DEBATE
ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION¹²⁵

I advance two main theses: (1) the peasants will never agree to municipalisation; (2) without a democratic republic, without the fully guaranteed sovereignty of the people and without the election of government officials, municipalisation would be harmful. In developing these theses, I will first deal with the more serious objections raised against nationalisation. Undoubtedly, the most important objection is the one raised by Comrade Plekhanov. Comrade Plekhanov said literally the following, I took down his words: "We cannot under any circumstances be in favour of nationalisation." This is a mistake. I venture to assert that if a peasant revolution is really brought about in Russia, and if the political revolution that will accompany it reaches the point of creating a really democratic republic, Comrade Plekhanov will consider it possible to support nationalisation; and if a democratic republic is really brought about in Russia in the forthcoming revolution, then not only the Russian but the entire international situation of the movement will push things towards nationalisation. But if this condition does not arise, municipalisation will still prove to be a fiction; in those circumstances it can be carried out only as possibly a new form of compensation. Comrade John¹²⁶ uses the term alienation instead of confiscation, and, as was evident from his speech, he did not choose this term by chance. Yet it is a purely Cadet term: it can be taken to mean anything you please, and the compensation scheme proposed by the Cadets fits in with it completely. To go on. "What guarantee is there against restoration?" asked Comrade Plekhanov. I don't think.

this question has any close and inseparable bearing on the programme we are discussing; but since it has been raised, a definite and unambiguous answer must be given to it. If we mean a real, fully effective, economic guarantee against restoration, that is, a guarantee that would create the economic conditions precluding restoration, then we shall have to say: the only guarantee against restoration is a socialist revolution in the West. There can be no other guarantee in the real and full sense of the term. Without this condition, in whichever other way the problem is solved (municipalisation, division of the land, etc.), restoration will be not only possible, but positively inevitable. I would formulate this proposition as follows: the Russian revolution can achieve victory by its own efforts, but it cannot possibly hold and consolidate its gains by its own strength. It cannot do this unless there is a socialist revolution in the West. Without this condition restoration is inevitable, whether we have municipalisation, or nationalisation, or division of the land: for under each and every form of possession and property the small proprietor will always be a bulwark of restoration. After the complete victory of the democratic revolution the small proprietor will inevitably turn against the proletariat; and the sooner the common enemies of the proletariat and of the small proprietors, such as the capitalists, the landlords, the financial bourgeoisie, and so forth are overthrown, the sooner will this happen. Our democratic republic has no other reserve than the socialist proletariat in the West. And in this connection we must not lose sight of the fact that the classical bourgeois revolution in Europe, namely, the Great French Revolution of the eighteenth century, took place in an international situation that was entirely different from the one in which the Russian revolution is taking place. France at the end of the eighteenth century was surrounded by feudal and semi-feudal states. Russia in the twentieth century, accomplishing her bourgeois revolution, is surrounded by countries in which the socialist proletariat stands fully prepared on the eve of the final battle with the bourgeoisie. If such relatively insignificant events as the tsar's promise of freedom in Russia on October 17 gave the powerful impetus it did to the proletarian movement in Western Europe, if a telegram from St. Petersburg announcing the issue of the

notorious Constitutional Manifesto was sufficient to make the Austrian workers pour into the streets, to lead to a number of demonstrations and collisions with the troops in the largest industrial towns of Austria, you can imagine what the international socialist proletariat will do when it receives news from Russia, not of promises of freedom, but of its actual achievement, and the complete victory of the revolutionary peasantry. If, however, the question of a guarantee against restoration is put on a different basis, that is, if we mean a conditional and relative guarantee against restoration, then we shall have to say: the only conditional and relative guarantee against restoration is that the revolution should be effected in the most drastic manner possible, effected by the revolutionary class directly with the least possible participation of go-betweens, compromisers and all sorts of conciliators; that this revolution should really be carried to the end. In this respect, my draft provides the maximum as regards guarantees against restoration.

My draft proposes the formation of peasant committees as the direct levers of the revolutionary peasant movement, and as the most desirable form of that movement. Translated into simple language, peasant committees mean calling upon the peasants to set to work immediately and directly to settle accounts with the government officials and the landlords in the most drastic manner. Peasant committees mean calling upon the people who are being oppressed by the survivals of serfdom and the police regime to eradicate these survivals "in a plebeian manner",¹²⁷ as Marx put it. Comrade Plekhanov thinks that this premise of a revolution carried to the end, of a revolution which introduces the election of government officials by the people, is reminiscent of anarchism, which is abhorrent to him, just as to all of us, of course. But it is extremely strange that the question of the people electing the government officials should remind anyone of anarchism, or should, at a time like the present, bring a smile to the lips of any Social-Democrat, except Bernstein, perhaps. It is at the present time that this slogan—the election of government officials by the people—assumes direct and immense practical significance. All our activity, our propaganda and agitation among the masses of the peasantry should consist largely in propagating, spreading and

explaining this slogan. To advocate a peasant revolution, to speak of an agrarian revolution at all seriously, and at the same time to say nothing about the need for real democracy, which, among other things, includes the election of government officials by the people, is a crying contradiction. This reproach about anarchism in this connection only reminds me of the German Bernsteinians who not long ago, in controversy with Kautsky, accused him of advocating anarchism.

We must plainly and definitely say to the peasants: if you want to carry the agrarian revolution to the end, you must also carry the political revolution to the end; for unless the political revolution is carried to the end there will be no durable agrarian revolution, and perhaps none at all. Without a complete democratic revolution, without the election of government officials by the people, we shall have either peasant disturbances, or Cadet agrarian reforms. We shall not have what would deserve the lofty title used by Plekhanov—a peasant revolution. To go on. Municipalisation provides a wide arena for the class struggle, said Plekhanov. I have tried to use his own words as nearly as possible, and I must say emphatically that what he says is definitely *wrong*. It is wrong both in the political and in the economic sense. Other things being equal, a municipality and municipal landownership undoubtedly allow a narrower arena for the class struggle than the whole nation, and the nationalisation of the land. In a democratic republic, nationalisation of the land would undoubtedly provide the widest field for the class struggle—the widest field possible and thinkable under capitalism. Nationalisation means the abolition of absolute rent, a reduction in the price of grain, the maximum freedom for competition and the free penetration of capital into agriculture. Municipalisation, on the contrary, narrows the field of the nation-wide class struggle, for it does not free all production relations in agriculture from absolute rent, and it cuts up our general demands into particular demands. At all events, municipalisation obscures the class struggle. From this point of view, only one answer can be given to Comrade Plekhanov's question. From this point of view municipalisation does not hold water. Municipalisation means narrowing and obscuring the class struggle.

Plekhanov's next objection concerns the question of seizing power. He perceives in my draft of the agrarian programme the idea of seizing power. I must admit that my draft does, indeed, contain the idea of the seizure of power by the revolutionary peasantry; but it is a great mistake to put this on a par with the Narodnaya Volya¹²⁸ idea of seizing power. In the 1870s and 1880s, when the idea of seizing power was fostered by the Narodnaya Volya, the latter consisted of a group of intellectuals, and there was no really mass revolutionary movement of any extent to speak of. Seizure of power was the desire, or the phrase of a handful of intellectuals, but not the inevitable next step of an already developing mass movement. Now, after October, November and December 1905, after the broad masses of the working class, the semi-proletarian elements and the peasantry have shown the world forms of the revolutionary movement such as have not been witnessed for a long time; after we have had the struggle of the revolutionary people for power flaring up in Moscow, in the South and in the Baltic Provinces, to put the idea of the revolutionary people winning political power on a par with the ideas of the Narodnaya Volya means being fully twenty-five years behind the times, means striking out a whole vast period of Russian history. Plekhanov said we must not be afraid of an agrarian revolution. But this fear that the revolutionary peasantry will win power is fear of an agrarian revolution. Agrarian revolution is an empty phrase if its victory does not presuppose the winning of power by the revolutionary people. Without this latter condition, it will not be an agrarian revolution but a peasant revolt, or a Cadet agrarian reform. In concluding the examination of this point, I should like to remind you that even the resolution of the comrades of the Minority, published in the second issue of *Partiiniye Izvestia*, says that we are already being confronted with the task of wresting power from the government.

Comrade Plekhanov thinks that the expression "the creative activity of the people", which I don't think you will find in our resolutions, but which, if we are to trust Comrade Plekhanov's memory, I used in my speech, is reminiscent of old acquaintances—the Narodnaya Volya and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. I think that this recollection of

Comrade Plekhanov's is also twenty-five years behind the times. Recall what happened in Russia in the last quarter of 1905—strikes, Soviets of Workers' Deputies, insurrections, peasant committees, railwaymen's committees, and so forth. All this shows that the popular movement was passing into the form of insurrection, and these bodies were undoubtedly rudimentary organs of revolutionary authority. And what I said about the creative activity of the people had a very definite and concrete meaning: it referred precisely to these historic days of the Russian revolution, and it characterised this method of fighting not only against the old regime, but by means of a revolutionary authority, a method employed for the first time by the broad masses of the Russian workers and peasants in the famous October and December days. If our revolution has been buried, then so have these rudimentary forms of the revolutionary authority of the peasants and workers. But if your reference to a peasant revolution is not a mere phrase, if we have a real agrarian revolution in the true sense of the word, then we shall undoubtedly see a repetition of the October and December events on a much greater scale. A revolutionary authority, not of intellectuals, not of a group of conspirators, but of the workers and peasants, has already existed in Russia, has already been put into effect in the course of our revolution. It was crushed by the triumph of reaction; but if there are real grounds for our conviction that the revolution will revive, then we must also anticipate the inevitable revival, development and success of new organs of revolutionary authority that will be even more resolute and more closely connected with the peasantry and the proletariat than the preceding ones. Hence, by raising this battered and ridiculous bogey of the Narodnaya Volya, Plekhanov has merely dodged the task of analysing the October and December forms of the movement.

Lastly, let us examine the question whether my programme is flexible and "well shod on all four hoofs". I think that in this respect, too, my agrarian programme is more satisfactory than all the others. What if things go badly with the revolution? What if it turns out to be impossible to carry through to the end our democratic revolution unless all the "ifs" I have put in my draft are met? In that case, we shall certainly have to reckon with the conditions of

peasant farming and of peasant land tenure that already exist. In this connection I will mention the extremely important factor of rented land. If we can conceive of things going badly with the revolution, of it not being carried through to the end, we must undoubtedly reckon with the existence and persistence of this factor. And in my draft, the Party's tasks in the event of this worst contingency arising, in the event of all the allegedly utopian "ifs" being absent, are formulated more fully, more precisely and much more soberly I than in Comrade Maslov's draft. Thus my programme provides practical slogans both for the present conditions of peasant farming and peasant land tenure, and for the contingency that capitalism will have the best possible prospects of development. Comrade John tried to be witty and said that my programme contains too many programmes, that it provides for both confiscation and the renting of land, and that the one precludes the other. But his joke fell flat, because confiscation of the landed estates does not preclude the renting of land: this takes place on the peasants' land as well. Hence Comrade Plekhanov was particularly wrong when he advanced his particularly slashing argument against me. He implied that it was easy to draw up a programme for the contingency that everything will go off splendidly. Anybody can draw up a programme like that; but try to draw up a programme for the contingency that the best conditions don't exist. In answer to this argument, I assert that it is precisely having in view the contingency of the worst possible course or outcome of our revolution that my programme is particularly realistic and particularly "well shod", for it speaks of the confiscation of the landed estates and makes provision for questions such as that of renting land. But Comrade John's draft, which says nothing about these worst conditions, that is, about the absence of complete political democracy, merely provides for municipalisation; and municipalisation without the election of government officials by the people, without the abolition of the standing army, and so forth, is as dangerous as nationalisation, and even more so. That is why I insist on retaining all the "ifs" that Plekhanov has so unjustly condemned.

And so, the peasants will not accept municipalisation. Comrade Kartvelov¹²⁹ said that in the Caucasus the peasants

are fully in agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but they ask whether they will have the right to sell the land they obtain as a result of division, or of socialisation. Quite right, Comrade Kartvelov! Your observations fully coincide with the peasants' interests in general, and with the peasants' conception of their interests. But it is precisely because the peasants regard every agrarian reform from the point of view of whether they will have the right to sell the extra land they obtain that they will undoubtedly be opposed to municipalisation, or Zemstvo-isation. The peasants still confuse the Zemstvo with the rural superintendent, and they have much more reason to do so than is assumed by the haughty Cadet professors of law who scoff at the ignorance of the peasants. That is why, before speaking about municipalisation, it is necessary, absolutely necessary, to speak about the election of government officials by the people. At present, however, until this democratic demand is carried out, it is appropriate to speak only of confiscation in general, or of division of the land. That is why, to simplify matters for the Congress on this fundamental question, I propose the following: as Comrade Borisov's¹³⁰ programme has a number of features in common with mine and is based on the principle of division and not of nationalisation, I withdraw my programme and leave it to the Congress to express its opinion on the question of division or municipalisation. If you reject division—or perhaps it would be more correct to say “when” you reject division—I, of course, shall have to withdraw my draft for good, as hopeless. If, however, you accept division, I will submit my programme in its entirety as an amendment to Comrade Borisov's draft. I would also remind you, in reply to the reproach that I want to foist nationalisation on the peasants, that my programme contains “*Variant A*”, which expressly speaks of removing any idea of foisting anything upon the peasants against their will. Hence the substitution of Borisov's draft for mine in the preliminary voting will not affect the substance of the matter in the least, and will only make it easier and simpler for us to ascertain what the Congress really wants. In my opinion, municipalisation is wrong and harmful; division is wrong, but not harmful.

I will refer briefly to the difference between the two.

The "divisionists" rightly interpret the facts, but they have forgotten what Marx said about the old materialism: "The materialists interpreted the world; the point, however, is not only to interpret the world, but to change it."¹³¹ The peasant says: "The land is God's, the land is the people's, the land is nobody's." The "divisionists" tell us that the peasant says this without realising what he is saying; that he says one thing and means another. All that the peasants are really striving for, they tell us, is additional land; they want to enlarge their small farms, and no more. All this is quite true. But our disagreement with the "divisionists" does not end here, it only begins. We must use what the peasants say, even if it is economically unsound or meaningless, as a hook for our propaganda. We must say to them: You say that everybody ought to have the right to use the land? You want to transfer the land to the people? Excellent! But what does transferring the land to the people mean? Who controls the people's wealth and the people's property? The government officials, the Trepovs. Do you want to transfer the land to Trepov and to the government officials? No. Every peasant will say that it is not to them that he wants to transfer the land. Do you want to transfer the land to the Petrunkevich and Rodichevs,¹³² who, perhaps, will sit on the municipal councils? No. The peasant will certainly not want to transfer the land to these gentlemen. Hence—we will explain to the peasants—if the land is to be transferred to the whole people in a way that will benefit the peasants, it is necessary to ensure that all government officials without exception are elected by the people. Hence my proposal for nationalisation, with the proviso that a democratic republic is fully guaranteed, suggests the right line of conduct to our propagandists and agitators; for it clearly and vividly shows them that discussion of the agrarian demands of the peasantry should serve as a basis for political propaganda in general, and for propaganda in favour of a republic in particular. For example, the peasant Mishin, who was elected to the Duma by the Stavropol peasants, brought with him an instruction from his electors which has been published in full in *Russkoye Gosudarstvo*.¹³³ In this instruction, the peasants demand the abolition of Zemstvo officials, the erection of elevators, and the transfer of all the

land to the state. This last demand is undoubtedly a reactionary prejudice, for in constitutional Russia today and tomorrow the state is and will be a police and military despotism. But we must not simply reject this demand as a harmful prejudice; we must "hook on" to it in order to explain to Mishin and his like how things really stand. We must tell Mishin and his like that the demand for the transfer of the land to the state expresses, although very badly, an idea that is extremely important and useful for the peasants. The transfer of the land to the state can and will be very useful for the peasants only when the state becomes a fully democratic republic, when all government officials are elected by the people, when the standing army is abolished, and so forth. For all these reasons I think that if you reject nationalisation, you will cause our practical workers, our propagandists and agitators, to make the same mistakes as we brought about by our mistaken demand for restitution of the cut-off lands in our programme of 1903. Just as our demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands was interpreted in a narrower sense than it was meant by its authors, so now rejection of nationalisation and its replacement by the demand for division, to say nothing of the utterly confused demand for municipalisation, will inevitably lead to so many mistakes by our practical workers, our propagandists and agitators, that very soon we shall regret having adopted the "division" or the municipalisation programme.

I will conclude by repeating my two main theses: first, the peasants will never agree to municipalisation; secondly, without a democratic republic, without the election of government officials by the people, municipalisation would be harmful.

2

SPEECH IN REPLY TO THE DEBATE
ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE CLASS TASKS
OF THE PROLETARIAT

I shall try to keep to the most important points. Comrade Ptitsyn¹³⁴ reminded me of the saying: the ball comes to the player. He asked: "What makes the Bolsheviki think that the main form of the struggle now is breaking the laws, etc.?" Do take your Cadet spectacles off, Comrade Ptitsyn! It seems to you that parliamentarism is the main form of the struggle. Look at the unemployed movement, the movement among the armed forces, the peasant movement. The main form of the movement is not in the Duma; it can only play an indirect role. Comrade Plekhanov said that Hegel would have turned in his grave twice over had he heard my reference to him. But Comrade Plekhanov spoke before Comrade Ptitsyn, and it is to him that this remark applies. Comrade Ptitsyn worships the present; he sees only things that lie on the surface; he does not notice what is going on deep below the surface. He does not study things in their process of development. He thinks that talk about the head and the tail, about whether the proletariat should play the part of vanguard or rearguard, is mere phrase-mongering. This brought out all the more vividly the fundamental mistake of the Mensheviki. They do not see that the bourgeoisie is counter-revolutionary, that it is deliberately striving for a deal. They refer to the Jacobins, and say that they were naïve monarchists and yet became republicans. The Cadets, however, are not naïve, but deliberate monarchists. This is what the Mensheviki forget.

Our formidable Comrade Leonov¹³⁵ said: "Look, the 'Bolsheviks' talk about the revolutionary people; but so do the 'Mensheviks', in their resolution." Comrade Leonov mentioned Marx, who in his *Class Struggles in France* said that a republic is the supreme political form of the rule of the bourgeoisie. Comrade Leonov should have read on. He would have found that the republic was imposed on the bourgeoisie by a temporary situation and that, having broken up into two factions—Legitimists and Orleanists¹³⁶—it endured the republic against its will.¹³⁷

Dan said: "The 'Bolsheviks' ignore the importance of political organisation." That is not true; but it would be merely a truism to talk about the importance of organisation in general. The point is, what particular forms of political organisation are necessary today? We must say on what ground we are building a political organisation. The "Mensheviks" take as their premise an upsurge of the revolution, and yet recommend tactics that would be suitable for a decline, and not for an upsurge, of the revolution. In this way they play into the hands of the Cadets, who are doing everything to discredit the period of October-December. The "Mensheviks" talk about an explosion. Put that word into the resolution. If you do, the present form of the movement—the elections to the State Duma, and so forth—will appear only as a transitory form.

Comrade Dan said: "The slogans of the 'Minority' have been confirmed"; and he referred to revolutionary local self-government bodies, to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. But take Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*, No. 5. There Plekhanov says that revolutionary local self-government "misleads people". But whom has this slogan misled, and when? We have never repudiated this slogan; but we regarded it as inadequate. It is half-hearted; it is not a slogan of victorious revolution. The reference to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies is beside the point. We have not yet discussed them.

Plekhanov's mistake is that he does not at all analyse the forms of the movement in October. He said: "Soviets of Workers' Deputies are desirable and necessary." But he has not taken the trouble to investigate what Soviets of Workers' Deputies are. What are they? Organs of revolutionary local self-government, or rudimentary organs of authority? I

assert, and this thesis cannot be refuted, that they represent a struggle by means of revolutionary authority. This, and this alone, is the characteristic that distinguishes the struggle in October-December from the present struggle; we cannot impose any particular form of struggle on the movement.

Plekhanov said: "Bernstein was praised for his theory, for having abandoned theoretical Marxism, whereas I was praised for my tactics." The situation is different now," said Comrade Plekhanov. To this Comrade Varshavsky rightly answered that Bernstein was praised for his tactics, for trying to blunt antagonisms, as the Cadets are doing. Bernstein tried to blunt social contradictions on the eve of the socialist revolution. Plekhanov is trying to blunt political contradictions at the height of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. That is why the Cadets are praising Plekhanov and the Mensheviks.

Comrade Plekhanov said: "We do not reject the seizure of power, but we want it to be seized in the way it was done in the period of the Convention,¹³⁸ and not by conspirators." Well, put that into your resolution, "Menshevik" comrades. Reject Leninism, denounce the Socialist-Revolutionary conspirators, and so on, and so forth; that doesn't frighten me in the least. But put in a clause about seizing power on the lines of the Convention, and we will sign that resolution with both hands. But remember, Comrade Plekhanov: as soon as you do that, the Cadets will stop praising you—they really will.

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE STATE DUMA
SUBMITTED TO THE UNITY CONGRESS¹³⁹

Whereas:

(1) the election Law of December 11 and the conditions in which the elections were actually conducted prevented the proletariat and the Social-Democratic Party from participating in the elections by putting up and independently securing the election of real Party candidates;

(2) in view of this, the real significance of participation by the workers in the elections was bound to, and as experience has shown, actually did, lead to the obscuring of the strictly class position of the proletariat as a consequence of agreements with the Cadets or other bourgeois groups;

(3) only complete and consistent boycott enabled the Social-Democrats to maintain the slogan of convening a constituent assembly by revolutionary means, to place all responsibility for the State Duma on the Cadet Party and to warn the proletariat and the peasant or revolutionary democrats against constitutional illusions;

(4) the State Duma, with its now evident (predominantly) Cadet composition, cannot possibly fulfil the function of a real representative of the people, and can only indirectly help to develop a new, wider and deeper revolutionary crisis;

We are of the opinion and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that by boycotting the State Duma and the Duma elections, the Party organisations acted correctly;

(2) that the attempt to form a Social-Democratic parliamentary group in present political conditions, and in view

of the absence in the Duma of really party Social-Democrats capable of representing the Social-Democratic Party, holds out no promise of reasonable success, but rather threatens to compromise the R.S.D.L.P. and place upon it responsibility for a particularly harmful type of parliamentarians, midway between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats;

(3) that in view of the foregoing, conditions do not yet exist to enable our Party to take the parliamentary path;

(4) that the Social-Democrats must utilise the State Duma and its conflicts with the government, or the conflicts within the Duma itself, fighting its reactionary elements, ruthlessly exposing the inconsistency and vacillation of the Cadets, paying particular attention to the peasant revolutionary democrats, uniting them, contrasting them with the Cadets, supporting such of their actions as are in the interests of the proletariat, and preparing to call upon the proletariat to launch a determined attack on the autocracy at the moment when, perhaps, in connection with a crisis in the Duma, the general revolutionary crisis becomes most acute;

(5) in view of the possibility that the government will dissolve the State Duma and convene a new Duma, this Congress resolves that in the subsequent election campaign no blocs or agreements shall be permitted with the Cadet Party or any similar non-revolutionary elements; as for the question whether our Party should take part in a new election campaign, it will be decided by the Russian Social-Democrats in accordance with the concrete circumstances prevailing at the time.

4

CO-REPORT ON THE QUESTION
OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STATE DUMA

Comrades, I will not read you the Bolshevik resolution, as in all probability you are all familiar with it. (*Nevertheless, in response to requests from delegates, the speaker reads the Bolshevik resolution again.*) If you compare this resolution with that of the Mensheviks, you will find the following four main points of difference, or four main defects in the latter:

(1) The Menshevik resolution contains no appraisal of the elections, no assessment of the objective results of our political experience in this field.

(2) This resolution is permeated with an imprudent, to put it mildly, or optimistic attitude towards the State Duma.

(3) The resolution does not clearly distinguish the various trends or parties among the bourgeois democrats, from the point of view of our tactics towards them.

(4) Your resolution proposes that a parliamentary group be formed under conditions and at a time when the value of such a step for the proletarian party cannot in any way be proved.

Such are the real disagreements between us, if we examine our disagreements seriously, and not seize upon words or trivialities.

Let us examine these four points.

It is highly important to sum up our experience of the elections if we want to base our conclusions on the actual alignment of political forces, and not on general phrases about parliamentarism in general, and so forth. We have advanced, and advance today, the very definite proposition

that participation in the elections really means supporting the Cadets; that participation is impossible without blocs with the Cadets. Do you analyse the substance of this proposition? Do you examine the situation in the light of the actual facts on this question? Nothing of the kind. Axelrod completely evaded the first two points, and on the next two he made two contradictory statements. At first he referred to blocs with the Cadets in general in the most disparaging terms. Then he said that he would have no objection to such blocs, provided, of course, they were not arranged by the old hole-and-corner methods and backstairs agreements, but by public and direct methods visible to the whole proletariat. This last "proposition" of Axelrod's is a magnificent specimen of "Cadet" dreaming, of real "pious wishes" engendered by constitutional illusions. In reality we have no constitution and no basis for open activities; what we have is Dubasov "constitutionalism". Axelrod's dreams will remain empty dreams, while the Cadets will obtain real benefit from the agreements, tacit or signed, formal or informal.

And when people talk about our "self-elimination" from the elections, they always forget that it was the political conditions and not our desire that kept our Party out; kept it out of newspapers and meetings; prevented us from putting up prominent members of the Party as candidates. In these circumstances, parliamentarism is a futile and pitiful game rather than a means of educating the proletariat. It is naïve to take parliamentarism "in its pure form", as an "idea", isolated from the real situation.

When people talk about the elections they usually forget that actually the contest took place, on the basis of Dubasov constitutionalism, between two strong "parties"—the Cadets and the Black Hundreds. The Cadets were right when they told the voters that any split in the vote, any nomination of "third" candidates, could lead only to the victory of the Black Hundreds. Take the case of Moscow, for example. Guchkov receives, say, 900 votes and the Cadet, 1,300. It would have been enough for the Social-Democrats to obtain 401 votes for the Black-Hundred candidate to win. Thus the Cadets rightly understood the significance of Social-Democratic participation in the elections (they gave the Moscow workers a seat in the State Duma as a reward for

participating in the elections), while you Mensheviks misunderstand its significance and thus indulge in an empty and idle dream. Either don't take up parliamentarism and don't talk commonplaces about it, or take it up seriously. Your present position is no use at all.

The second point. Axelrod in his speech even more glaringly revealed the defects in the resolution that I have pointed to. The resolution speaks of transforming the Duma into an instrument of the revolution. You regard the Duma exclusively in the light of the pressure the government exercises on us, of the government's efforts to crush the revolution. We regard the State Duma as a body that represents a definite class, as an institution that has a definite party composition. Your argument is absolutely wrong, incomplete and non-Marxist in its approach. You fail to take into account the Duma's internal structure, which is conditioned by the class composition of the Cadet Party. You say that the government is strangling the revolution, but you forget to add that the Cadets have already fully displayed their desire to extinguish it. A Cadet Duma cannot but display the characteristics of the Cadet Party. You completely overlook the example of the Frankfurt Parliament which, although a representative institution in a revolutionary period, betrayed an obvious desire to extinguish the revolution (owing to the petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness and cowardice of the Frankfurt windbags).

The reference to "authority recognised by the tsar and established by law", is most unfortunate in a Social-Democratic resolution. The Duma is not really an authority. The reference to the law does not strengthen, but weakens your whole argument and all your agitational slogans that follow from this resolution. Witte will most readily of all appeal to the "law" and to the "will of the tsar", in thwarting the slightest attempt of the Duma to go beyond the ridiculously narrow limits of its powers. Not the Social-Democrats, but *Russkoye Gosudarstvo* stands to gain by these references to the tsar and the law.

I come now to the third point. A fundamental mistake in the resolution, and one closely connected with all the preceding ones, is the absence of a clear characterisation of the Cadets, the refusal to expose all their tactics, the failure

to draw a distinction between the Cadets and the peasant and revolutionary democrats. Yet it is the Cadets who are masters of the situation in the present Duma. And these Cadets have already revealed more than once their betrayal of the "people's freedom". When, after the elections, the amiable windbag Vodovozov, wanting to be more Left than the Cadets, reminded the latter of the promises they had made about a constituent assembly, and so forth, Rech, adopting a "Great Power" tone, rudely and coarsely told him that it did not need gratuitous advice.

And your resolution is equally mistaken as regards the striving to weaken the revolution. As I have already said, this striving exists not only in the government, but also in those petty-bourgeois compromisers who are now making the most noise on the surface of our political life.

Your resolution says that the Duma is trying to lean on the people. This is only half true, and therefore not true at all. What is the State Duma? Is it tolerable that we should confine ourselves to general references to this institution, instead of analysing the classes and parties that actually determine its content and significance? Which Duma is striving to lean on the people? Not the Octobrist Duma, because such a striving is totally alien to the Octobrists. And not the peasant Duma, for the peasant deputies are an inseparable part of the people, and there is no need for them to "strive to lean on the people". The *striving* to lean on the people is characteristic precisely of the *Cadet* Duma. But characteristic of the Cadets is both their striving to lean on the people and their *fear* of independent revolutionary activity by the people. By pointing to one aspect of the question and saying nothing at all about the second, your resolution presents not only a wrong, but a positively harmful picture. Objectively, silence on this second aspect—which is emphasised in our resolution on the attitude to be adopted towards other parties—is the utterance of a lie.

In defining our tactics towards the bourgeois democrats we cannot possibly remain silent about the Cadets, or refrain from criticising them sharply. We can, and must, seek the support only of the peasant and revolutionary democrats, and not of those who try to blunt the political contradictions of the present time.

Lastly, let us glance at the proposal to form a parliamentary group. Even the Mensheviks dare not deny that Social-Democrats must handle this new weapon, "parliamentarism", very cautiously. They are quite ready to admit this "in principle". But the point now is not admitting things in principle; the point is to make a correct appraisal of concrete conditions. Recognition of caution "in principle" is worthless if actual conditions transform this recognition into innocent and idle dreams. The comrades from the Caucasus, for example, talk very finely about independent elections, about purely Party candidates and about repudiating blocs with the Cadets. But what are these fine phrases worth when—as one of the comrades from the Caucasus informed me in conversation—in Tiflis, that Menshevik stronghold in the Caucasus, the Left Cadet Argutinsky will probably be elected and, probably, not without the aid of the Social-Democrats? What good are our wishes for public and open statements before the masses if we only have—as we have now—the *Partiiniye Izvestia* of the Central Committee against a host of Cadet newspapers?

Note also that even the most optimistic Social-Democrats hope to get their candidates elected only through the peasant curia. Thus they want to "start parliamentarism" in the practice of the workers' party with the petty-bourgeois, semi-Socialist-Revolutionary curia and not with the workers' curia. Just think, which has most chance of emerging out of this situation—a Social-Democratic or a non-Social-Democratic workers' policy?

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF ARMED UPRISING

A comrade stated recently that we were collecting material for agitation against the decisions of the Congress. I at once answered that this was a very strange thing to say about voting by roll-call. Anyone who is dissatisfied with the Congress decisions will always agitate against them.¹⁴⁰ Comrade Vorobyov¹⁴¹ said that the “Mensheviks” could not work in one party with us “Bolsheviks”. I am glad that Comrade Vorobyov was the first to raise this subject. I have not the slightest doubt that his statement will serve as “material for agitation”. But material for agitation on questions of principle is more important, of course. And better material for agitation against the present Congress than your resolution against armed uprising could not be imagined.¹⁴²

Plekhanov said that this important question ought to be discussed calmly. He is a thousand times right. Calm discussion, however, is indicated, not by the absence of debate before and at the Congress, but by the really calm and practical content of the resolutions to be discussed. And precisely from this standpoint, a comparison of the two resolutions is particularly edifying. It is not the polemics in the “Menshevik” resolution that we object to—Plekhanov entirely misunderstood what Comrade Winter¹⁴³ said on that score—it is not the polemics we object to, but the petty, paltry polemics running through the “Menshevik” resolution. Take the question of appraising the experience of the past, the question of the criticism of the proletarian movement by the conscious exponent of that movement, the Social-Democratic Party. Here criticism and “polemics” are absolutely essential; but it must be open, straightforward, obvious and clear criticism

and not petty attacks, pinpricks or intellectual insinuations. And so our resolution, scientifically summing up the experience of the past year, straightforwardly criticises and says: the peaceful strike has proved to be "dissipation of forces", it is becoming obsolete. Insurrection is becoming the main form of struggle, and strikes the auxiliary form. Take the "Menshevik" resolution. Instead of calm discussion, instead of a consideration of experience, instead of a study of the relationship between strikes and insurrection, we get a covert, sneakingly covert renunciation of the December uprising. Your resolution is thoroughly saturated with Plekhanov's view: "It was wrong to take up arms" (although the majority of the "Mensheviks" in Russia have declared that they do not agree with Plekhanov). Comrade Cherevanin completely gave himself away in his speech when, in order to defend the "Menshevik" resolution, he had to depict the December uprising as a hopeless manifestation of "despair", as an insurrection which did not prove in the least that armed struggle is possible.

Kautsky, as you know, has expressed a different opinion. He has admitted that the December uprising in Russia makes it necessary to "reconsider" Engels's view that barricade fighting was no longer possible, and that the December uprising marks the *beginning* of new tactics. K. Kautsky's view may be wrong, of course, and the "Mensheviks" may be nearer to the truth. If you attach any value to "calm" and serious discussion, and not to petty criticism, you should openly and straightforwardly express your opinion in your resolution and say: "It was wrong to take up arms." But it is impermissible to express this view in a resolution covertly, without definitely formulating it. It is this sneaking, covert disavowal of the December insurrection, unsupported by the slightest criticism of past experience, that is the main and vast defect in your resolution. And it is this defect that provides an enormous amount of material for agitation against a resolution which virtually inclines towards Comrade Akimov's views, only hiding its rough edges.¹⁴⁴

The first clause in your resolution suffers from the same defect. It starts with a *platitudo*, for "stupid stubbornness" is typical of all reactionary governments; but this in itself does not prove that insurrection is necessary and inevitable.¹⁴⁵

“Wrest power” is the same as “seize power”, and it is amusing to note that those who opposed the latter term accepted the former. Thereby they revealed the hollowness of all their declamations against Narodnaya Volya-ism, etc. Comrade Plekhanov’s proposal to substitute the term “wrest their rights” for “wrest power” is particularly unfortunate, because *this* is a purely Cadet formula. The main thing, I repeat, is that your resolution approaches the question of “wresting power” and of armed uprising on the basis of unproved and unprovable platitudes, and not of a study and consideration of past experience and of the facts about the growth of the movement.

6

STATEMENT
IN SUPPORT OF MURATOV'S (MOROZOV'S) AMENDMENT
CONCERNING A PARLIAMENTARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC
GROUP¹⁴⁶

Comrade Muratov has relinquished to me the right to reply to the debate. It is quite untrue that he is forcing an open door. On the contrary, it is he who is opening it. His amendment puts the question squarely. This Congress has approved tactics different from those used by the workers in many places; in forming a Party group in the Duma, it is necessary to prevent sharp conflicts, and to ask the workers whether they wish to be represented in the Duma by those they did not participate in electing.

7

DISSENTING OPINION ON THE COMPOSITION
OF THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

I

Regarding the rejection of Stodolin's¹⁴⁷ amendment as a departure even from the principles of parliamentarism, I declare that I am submitting a dissenting opinion on this question.

II

In accordance with the declaration I have already submitted, I enclose herewith my dissenting opinion on the question of Stodolin's amendment.

In his amendment, Comrade Stodolin proposed that the official parliamentary group of the R.S.D.L.P. should consist exclusively of Party members who not only work in one of the Party organisations, and not only submit to the Party as a whole, and to their Party organisations in particular, but who, in addition, have been put up as candidates by the latter (i.e., the respective Party organisations).

Consequently Comrade Stodolin wanted our first Social-Democratic steps on the path of parliamentarism to be taken exclusively on the direct instructions of the respective organisations, and in their name. It is not enough that members of the parliamentary group should belong to one of the Party organisations. In view of the conditions prevailing in Russia, this does not preclude the most undesirable incidents, for our Party organisations cannot exercise open and

public control over their members. It is highly important therefore that our first steps on the path of parliamentarism should be accompanied by every precaution devised by the experience of the socialist parties in Europe. The West-European parties, and particularly their Left wings, even insist on parliamentary candidates being nominated by the local party organisations by agreement with the Central Committees. The revolutionary Social-Democrats in Europe have very serious grounds for demanding this *triple* control over their members of parliament: first, the general control that the party exercises over all its members; secondly, the special control of the local organisations who nominate the parliamentary candidates in their own name; and thirdly, the special control of the Central Committee, which, standing above local influences and local conditions, must see to it that only such parliamentary candidates are nominated as satisfy general party and general political requirements.

By rejecting Comrade Stodolin's amendment, by rejecting the demand that the parliamentary group should consist exclusively of those whom the Party organisations had directly nominated as parliamentary candidates, by rejecting this demand, the Congress has revealed far less prudence in parliamentary tactics than the West-European revolutionary Social-Democrats. And yet there can hardly be any doubt that, in view of the especially difficult conditions prevailing in Russia for the public activities of the Social-Democrats, we unquestionably require far greater prudence than that prompted by the experience of the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Western Europe.

8

RESOLUTION
ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE TO THE CONGRESS

This Congress makes it the duty of the Credentials Committee to present reports that will show the considerations which guided the organisation in electing delegates to the Congress, and the criterion applied in determining Party membership.

9

STATEMENT ON THE NECESSITY
OF THE CONGRESS APPROVING THE MINUTES

All minutes should be approved by the Congress. Hence the official minutes will be those kept by the secretaries. Stenographers should record only individual speeches.

10

WRITTEN STATEMENT
AT THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE CONGRESS

I did not say that the Tiflis comrades had decided to secure the election of Argutinsky. I said that Argutinsky's victory was considered probable, and moreover, probably not without help from the Social-Democrats.

11

WRITTEN STATEMENT
AT THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE CONGRESS

We declare that to describe voting on important questions by roll-call as “material for agitation against the authoritative character of Congress decisions” means to misunderstand the role of the Congress or to display narrow factionalism.

12

WRITTEN STATEMENTS
AT THE TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE CONGRESS

I

It is not true that I “supported” Comrade Vorobyov’s statement that the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks cannot work together in one party. I did not in any way “support” such an assertion, and *do not share that opinion at all*. The sense of my statement: “I am glad Comrade Vorobyov was the *first* to say that,” was purely ironical; for the victors, having a majority at the Congress, only revealed their weakness by being the *first* to speak of a split.

II

I propose that the following note be added to the rules on amalgamation with the Bund:

The Congress instructs the Central Committee to give effect to these rules immediately after they are confirmed by the Bund.

**AN APPEAL TO THE PARTY
BY DELEGATES TO THE UNITY CONGRESS
WHO BELONGED
TO THE FORMER "BOLSHEVIK" GROUP¹⁴⁸**

Comrades,

The Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. has been held. The split no longer exists. Not only have the former "Bolshevik" and "Menshevik" factions completely amalgamated organisationally, but unity has also been achieved between the R.S.D.L.P. and the Polish Social-Democrats,¹⁴⁹ a unity agreement has been signed with the Lettish Social-Democrats,¹⁵⁰ and unity has been assured with the Jewish Social-Democrats, i.e., the Bund.¹⁵¹ The political significance of these events would have been very great in any circumstances, but it is truly enormous in the historic period through which we are now passing.

The fate of the great Russian revolution is apparently to be determined in the near future. The proletariat leading the broad masses of the town and rural poor has been marching at the head of the revolution from the very beginning of the movement up to this day. In view of the coming formidable, decisive events in the people's struggle, it is all the more essential to attain the practical unity of the class-conscious proletariat of the whole of Russia, and of all her nationalities. In a revolutionary epoch like the present, all theoretical errors and tactical deviations of the Party are most ruthlessly criticised by experience itself, which enlightens and educates the working class with unprecedented rapidity. At such a time, the duty of every Social-Democrat is to strive to ensure that the ideological struggle within the Party on questions

of theory and tactics is conducted as openly, widely and freely as possible, but that on no account does it disturb or hamper the unity of revolutionary action of the Social-Democratic proletariat

The great Russian revolution is now on the eve of its turning-point. The struggle waged by all classes of bourgeois Russia against the autocracy brought into being a paper constitution. A section of the bourgeoisie is completely satisfied with this and has turned away from the revolution. Another section, wishing to go further, deludes itself with hopes of a "constitutional" path of struggle, and is ready to regard the election victory of the wavering and hypocritical bourgeois Cadet Party as an important victory for people's freedom.

The broad masses of the peasants, fighting courageously against old, semi-feudal Russia, against the omnipotence of officials and the yoke of the landlords, remain on the side of the revolution, but they are far from being fully class-conscious. The revolutionary-democratic section of the town petty bourgeoisie also shows but little political awareness. Only the proletariat, which fought heroically for freedom in October, and took up arms in defence of it in December, remains, as before, a consistently revolutionary class, which is gathering fresh forces and is now consciously preparing for a new and still greater battle.

The tsarist government is now with cynical frankness playing at a constitution. It retains its former power, it continues and intensifies the persecution of the fighters for liberty, its obvious intention is to make the Duma a futile talking shop, a screen for the autocracy, an instrument for deceiving the people. Whether these tactics will be crowned with success or not will be decided in the very near future, by the outcome of the new revolutionary explosion now coming to a head.

If the proletariat of the whole of Russia closes its ranks, if it succeeds in rousing all the genuinely revolutionary sections of the people, all those who want to fight and not to strike a bargain, if it trains itself well for the struggle and selects the proper moment for the final battle for freedom, it will be victorious. Then the tsar's cynical playing at a constitution will fail; then the bourgeoisie will not succeed in striking

a bargain with the autocracy; then the Russian revolution will not turn out to be as incomplete, half-hearted, and three-fourths fruitless for the interests of the working class and the peasants, as were the revolutions of the nineteenth century in Western Europe. Then it will really be a great revolution, a complete victory of the people's uprising will free bourgeois Russia of all the old fetters, and will perhaps open the epoch of socialist revolution in the West.

While striving for a complete democratic revolution, Social-Democrats must in all their work reckon with the inevitability of a new revolutionary explosion. We must ruthlessly expose the constitutional illusions fostered both by the government and by the bourgeoisie as represented by its liberal party—the Cadets; we must call upon the revolutionary peasantry to close its ranks for the sake of a complete victory of a peasant uprising; we must explain to the masses of the people the great importance of the first December uprising and the inevitability of a new revolt, which alone will be able really to wrest power from the tsarist autocracy and really transfer it to the people. Such must be the basic aims of our tactics at the present moment in history.

We cannot and must not conceal the fact that we are profoundly convinced that the Unity Congress did not quite appreciate these tasks. The three most important resolutions of the Congress clearly bear the stamp of the erroneous views of the former “Menshevik” faction, which numerically was predominant at the Congress.

The Congress accepted the principle of “municipalisation” in its agrarian programme. Municipalisation means peasant ownership of allotment land and the renting by the peasants of the landed estates transferred to the Zemstvos. This, in effect, is something midway between real agrarian revolution and Cadet agrarian reform. The peasants will not accept such a plan. They will either demand the simple division of the land, or its complete transfer to the people as their property. Municipalisation would be a serious democratic reform only in the event of a complete democratic revolution, if a republican regime were established and if government officials were elected by the people. We proposed to the Congress that it should at least link municipalisation with these conditions, but the Congress rejected our proposal. And without

these conditions municipalisation, as a liberal bureaucratic reform, will give the peasants something very different from what they require, and at the same time it will give new strength, new influence to the bourgeois anti-proletarian elements which dominate the Zemstvos. For it virtually puts the distribution of the land into their hands. We must explain this point to the broad masses of the workers and peasants.

In its resolution on the Duma, the Congress declared it desirable that a Social-Democratic parliamentary group in this Duma should be formed. The Congress refused to reckon with the fact that nine-tenths of the class-conscious workers of Russia, including all the Polish, Lettish and Jewish Social-Democratic proletarians, boycotted the Duma. The Congress rejected a proposal to make participation in the elections conditional on whether it would be possible to conduct really wide agitation among the masses. It rejected a proposal that only those whom workers' organisations had nominated for election to the Duma could be members of the Social-Democratic parliamentary group. The Congress, therefore, embarked on parliamentarism without even providing the safeguards for the Party which in this connection have been produced by the experience of revolutionary Social-Democrats in Europe.

As Social-Democrats we, of course, have recognised the obligation in principle of using parliamentarism as a weapon of the proletarian struggle. But the point is whether it is admissible for Social-Democrats to take part, in present conditions, in a "parliament" like our Duma. Is it admissible to form a parliamentary group without Social-Democratic members of parliament elected by workers' organisations? Our opinion is that it is not.

The Congress rejected the proposal to make it one of the tasks of the Party to combat playing at constitutionalism, to combat constitutional illusions. The Congress stated no opinion on the dual nature of the Cadet Party, which is predominant in the Duma and which inclines so strongly towards making a deal with the autocracy, towards blunting and putting an end to the revolution. The Congress allowed itself to be too greatly impressed by the fleeting and tinsel success of the party of bourgeois compromisers between the autocracy and people's freedom.

Nor, in its resolutions on the armed uprising, did the Congress provide what was necessary, namely, direct criticism of the mistakes of the proletariat, a clear assessment of the experience of October-December 1905—it did not even attempt in them to study the relationship between strike and insurrection. Instead of all this, a sort of timid evasion of the armed uprising predominates in the resolutions. The Congress did not openly and clearly tell the working class that the December uprising was a mistake; but at the same time, in a covert way, it condemned that uprising. We think that this is more likely to befog the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat than to promote it.

We must and shall fight ideologically against those decisions of the Congress which we regard as erroneous. But at the same time we declare to the whole Party that we are opposed to a split of any kind. We stand for submission to the decisions of the Congress. Rejecting boycott of the Central Committee and valuing joint work, we agreed to those who share our views going on the Central Committee, although they will comprise a negligible minority in it. We are profoundly convinced that the workers' Social-Democratic organisations must be united, but in these united organisations there must be wide and free discussion of Party questions, free comradesly criticism and assessment of events in Party life.

On the question of organisation, we differed only as regards the rights of the editorial board of the Central Organ. We insisted on the right of the Central Committee to appoint and dismiss the editors of the Central Organ.¹⁵² We were all agreed on the principle of democratic centralism, on guarantees for the rights of all minorities and for all loyal opposition, on the autonomy of every Party organisation, on recognising that all Party functionaries must be elected, accountable to the Party and subject to recall. We see the observance in practice of these principles of organisation, their sincere and consistent application, as a guarantee against splits, a guarantee that the ideological struggle in the Party can and must prove fully consistent with strict organisational unity, with the submission of all to the decisions of the Unity Congress.

We call upon all our fellow-thinkers to accept such submission and such ideological struggle: we invite all the members

of the Party carefully to assess the resolutions of the Congress. Revolution teaches: and we believe that practical unity in struggle of the Social-Democratic proletariat throughout Russia will safeguard our Party against fatal errors during the climax of the impending political crisis. In the course of the fight, events themselves will suggest to the working masses the right tactics to adopt. Let us do all in our power to ensure that our estimate of these tactics contributes to the fulfilment of the tasks of revolutionary Social-Democracy, to prevent the workers' party from deviating from the consistent proletarian path to hunt after some cheap fleeting success, so that the socialist proletariat may perform to the end its great role of vanguard fighter for liberty!

Written on April 25-26
(May 8-9), 1906

Published in leaflet form

Published according
to the leaflet text

REPORT
ON THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.
A LETTER TO THE ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS¹⁵³

Written early in May 1906

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Published according
to the pamphlet text

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ.

ДОКЛАДЪ

ОБЪ ОБЪЕДИНИТЕЛЬНОМЪ СЪѢЗДѢ
— РОССІЙСКОЙ —
— СОЦІАЛЬ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ —
— РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ —

(Листьмо къ петербургскимъ рабочимъ).

Цѣна 25 коп.

МОСКВА.
1906.

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
Report on the Unity Congress
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, 1906
Reduced

Comrades, you elected me your delegate to the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. As I am unable to come to St. Petersburg at present, permit me to send my report in writing and, in passing, to express a few ideas on the Congress.

Before proceeding with the subject, I must make an important reservation. It is quite impossible for me to remember in detail everything that happened at the Congress, at which there were one hundred and twenty or more delegates, and which held about thirty sessions. Being a member of the Bureau of the Congress, and one of the chairmen, and a member of several committees in addition, I was unable to take notes during the sessions. One cannot entirely trust one's memory without notes. Besides, being absent from the hall while engaged in work in committees, or for casual or personal reasons, I did not witness a number of episodes at the Congress, nor did I hear all the speeches. The experience of previous congresses (the Second and the Third), which were attended by fewer delegates, has convinced me that, even if one pays the closest attention to the proceedings, one cannot draw an exact picture of the congress from memory. When the minutes of the Second and Third Congresses appeared, I read them as if they were new books, although I myself was present at those congresses; for these books really provided me with much new material and compelled me to revise a number of inexact or incomplete personal impressions. Therefore I earnestly request you to bear in mind that this letter is only a rough outline of a report, subject, at all events, to correction on the basis of the minutes of the Congress.

I

THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESS

I will start with the general composition of the Congress. As you know, delegates with the right to vote were elected on the basis of one per 300 Party members. There were in all about 110 such delegates—at the beginning of the Congress, I think, slightly less (not all had arrived); at the close there were as many as 113. Delegates with a consultative voice were the 5 editors of the Central Organ (3 from the “Minority” and 2 from the “Majority”, for you had given me a full mandate) and five, if I am not mistaken, members of the Joint Central Committee. Then also, there were delegates with consultative voice from organisations who had not been granted full mandates, and several persons who had been especially invited to the Congress (two members of the “Agricultural Committee”, Plekhanov and Axelrod, Comrade Akimov, and several others). There were also several consultative delegates from large organisations having over 900 members (from St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Southern regional organisation, and others). Lastly, there were consultative delegates representing the national Social-Democratic parties: three each from the Polish Social-Democratic Party, the Lettish Social-Democratic and the Jewish organisation (the Bund), and one from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (it appears that this is the name that the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party¹⁵⁴ adopted at its last conference). Thus there were 30 delegates, or a little more, with a consultative voice. The total number present was therefore not 120, but over 140.

Taken according to their “trend” in relation to the tactical platforms, or their factional position, if you will, the delegates with the right to vote were divided approximately as follows: 62 Mensheviks and 46 Bolsheviks. At all events, these are the figures that impressed themselves most on my mind during the numerous “factional” votes that took place at the Congress. Some of the delegates, of course, were indefinite, or wavered on certain questions; these were what in parliamentary language are called the “Centre”, or the “Marsh”. This “Centre” was very feeble at the Congress, although a number of comrades whom I have

grouped with the Mensheviks according to the voting, claimed to be "conciliators", or the "Centre". Of all the more or less important votes that were taken at the Congress, I remember only one (that on the question of the Bund's affiliation to the Party) in which these "Menshevik conciliators" did not vote on factional lines. With this vote, in which, as far as I remember, the definitely factional Mensheviks were beaten by a majority of 59, I will deal in detail later on.

Thus, 62 and 46. The Congress was a Menshevik congress. The Mensheviks had a solid and safe majority, which enabled them to come to terms with one another beforehand and thus predetermine the decisions of the Congress. Strictly speaking, these private arrangements at factional meetings are quite natural when there is a definite and compact majority; and when several delegates, particularly those from the so-called Centre, complained about this, I said in conversation with the delegates that it was "the Centre complaining about its own weakness". Attempts were made at the Congress to raise the question of these factional meetings, but it was dropped, for it turned out that the factions had become closely welded just the same, and it became possible to allow outsiders to attend the factional meetings, to allow them to become "open" meetings. Towards the close of the Congress, for example, the question of the composition of the Central Committee was virtually decided, as will be seen later on, not by the voting in open Congress, but simply by an "agreement" between the factions. I will not pass any opinion on this; and I think it is useless bewailing it, because it is absolutely inevitable so long as the old factional divisions exist.

As regards divisions within the factions, I will note that they were marked only on the agrarian question (a section of the Mensheviks were opposed to municipalisation, while the Bolsheviks were divided into "Rozhkovists"—that is, those who advocated the division of the land—and the advocates of confiscation, with nationalisation in the event of a republic being established); and on the question of the affiliation of the Bund. Further, a striking thing was the complete absence among the Mensheviks of the trend that was so clearly revealed in *Nachalo*, and which in the Party we are accustomed to connect with the names of Comrades Parvus and Trotsky. True, it is quite possible that there were some

“Parvusites” and “Trotskyites” among the Mensheviks—I was told that there were about eight of them—but, owing to the removal from the agenda of the question of the provisional revolutionary government, they had no opportunity of making a show. It is probable, however, that in view of the general turn that the Mensheviks made at the Congress towards Plekhanov, with whose *Dnevnik* they had disagreed before the Congress, the “Parvusites” also took a step to the right. I remember only one episode in which, perhaps, the “Parvusites” among the Mensheviks made them all slightly change their attitude. It was an incident over the question of armed uprising. Plekhanov, the chairman of the committee, had altered the original Menshevik resolution, and instead of “wrest power” (this part of the resolution concerned the aims of the movement) inserted “wrest rights by force” (or “capture rights”—I don’t quite remember which). The opportunism of this alteration was so glaring that the most heated protests were raised against it in open Congress. We attacked the alteration with redoubled vigour. The ranks of the Mensheviks wavered. I do not know exactly whether any factional meetings had been held, or what took place at them if they were; nor can I vouch for the truth of the statement made to me that ten Mensheviks who were inclined towards “Parvusism” had emphatically declared their disagreement with the alteration. The fact is that, after the debates in open Congress, Plekhanov himself withdrew the alteration and did not allow it to be put to a vote; did this on the pretext (a skilful piece of diplomacy, perhaps, but it raised a smile) that it was not worth arguing about questions of “style”.

Lastly, to finish with the composition of the Congress, I will say something about the Credentials Committee (the committee which scrutinised the credentials of the delegates). There were two such committees, for the first one elected by the Congress resigned in a body.¹⁵⁵ This was a most extraordinary affair, and had never occurred at previous congresses. At all events, it was evidence of something extremely abnormal in the work of scrutinising the credentials. I remember that the chairman of the first committee was a conciliator, who at first had the confidence of our faction, too. But since he proved unable to weld his committee together, and since he and the whole committee

were compelled to resign, it shows that this conciliator was unable to conciliate. The details of the fight at the Congress over the reports of the Credentials Committee have escaped my attention most of all. The fight was often a very heated one, Bolshevik credentials were annulled, passions rose, and things reached their climax with the resignation of the first committee; but I was not in the hall at that time. I remember yet another, evidently fairly big, incident over this work of determining the composition of the Congress. It was a protest sent by a number of workers in Tiflis (about 200, I think) against the mandate of the Tiflis delegation, which consisted almost entirely of Mensheviks and was extraordinarily large, with as many as eleven members, I think. The protest was read at the Congress and should therefore appear in the minutes.¹⁵⁶

The record of the proceedings of the Credentials Committees should also appear in the minutes, that is, if the committees have performed their functions at all carefully, and have drawn up proper reports on the scrutiny of the credentials and of all the elections for the Congress. Whether they have done this, and whether the reports will appear in the minutes, I cannot say. If not, it will prove beyond doubt that the committees have not performed their functions with the necessary care and attention. If the reports do appear in the minutes, then I may have to correct a great deal of what I have said above, for on a question like this, which is not one of principle, but a purely concrete and practical question, it is particularly easy to make mistakes in forming general impressions, and it is particularly important carefully to study the records.

Incidentally, to finish with all the formalities and to proceed with the more interesting questions of principle, I will say something about the minutes. I am afraid that in this respect, too, the Congress will prove to be less satisfactory than the Second and Third Congresses. At both the previous congresses the minutes were adopted in their entirety by the Congress. At the Unity Congress the secretaries, for the first time, proved to be so inefficient, there was such a hurry to finish the Congress (in spite of the fact that a number of extremely important questions had been withdrawn from the agenda), that *not all* the minutes were

passed by the Congress. The Minutes Committee (consisting of two Mensheviks and two Bolsheviks) was given unprecedentedly wide and indefinite powers: to adopt the unfinished minutes. In the event of disagreement, it is to appeal to the Congress delegates who are in St. Petersburg. All this is very deplorable. I am afraid that we shall not get as good minutes as we have of the Second and Third Congresses. True, we had two stenographers, and some of the speeches are reported almost verbatim, and not in the form of condensed reports, as was the case in the past; but a complete verbatim report of the debates at the Congress cannot be expected, for this was more than the two stenographers could cope with, as they informed the Congress more than once. As chairman, I strongly insisted that the secretaries should at least make good condensed reports of the speeches, even if very brief. Let the verbatim reports of some of the speeches, I said, be a sort of supplement de luxe to the minutes; but it was essential to have the basis—not some of the speeches, but all the speeches without exception, at least in the form of condensed reports.¹⁵⁷

II

ELECTION OF THE BUREAU. THE CONGRESS AGENDA

I will now proceed with my narrative of the deliberations of the Congress in the order of its sessions. The election of the Bureau was the first vote that was taken, and virtually predetermined (strange as this may seem to an outsider) all the most important votes at the Congress. About 60 votes (not less than 58, if my memory is not at fault) were cast for Plekhanov and Dan, many leaving blank the space on their ballot papers for the third candidate. Forty-odd, or about forty votes, were cast for me. Then the "Centre" made a show, adding 10 or 15 votes to one or the other candidate. Those elected were: Plekhanov, with 69 votes, I think (or 71?), Dan 67 votes, and I obtained 60 votes.

On the question of the agenda, the debate on two occasions was very interesting and threw a great deal of light on the composition and character of the Congress. First there was the debate on whether the question of amalgamation

with the national Social-Democratic parties should be taken as the first item. The national parties wanted this, of course. We, too, were in favour of it. The Mensheviks, however, voted it down. Their argument was: let the R.S.D.L.P. define its own position first and then amalgamate with others; let "us" first determine *what* "we" are ourselves, and after that we can amalgamate with "them". To this argument (psychologically quite intelligible, and from the factional Menshevik point of view quite correct), we answered: is it not strange to deny the national parties the right to define their position *together* with us? If "they" are to amalgamate with "us", "we" will, and ought to, determine *what* "we" are together. It must also be added that before the Congress the Joint Central Committee had already concluded an agreement with the Polish Social-Democratic Party for its complete merging with us. Nevertheless, the proposal to take this as the first item on the agenda was defeated. Comrade Warszawski, a member of the Polish delegation, protested against this so outspokenly that he turned to the Mensheviks and exclaimed, amidst general laughter: "First of all you want to 'gobble up' or 'slaughter' the Bolsheviki and then amalgamate with us!" This was said in jest, of course, and I am least of all inclined to cavil at "frightful words" like "gobble up"; but this jest was a very striking and apt appraisal of a peculiar political situation.

The second interesting debate was on whether the question of the present state of our revolution and the class tasks of the proletariat should be put on the agenda. We Bolsheviki were, of course, in favour of this, in keeping with our declaration in *Partiinyye Izvestia*, No. 2.* From the standpoint of principle there could be no question of shirking the fundamental issue as to whether the revolution is really on the eve of an upswing, what forms of the revolutionary movement are the most important today in view of the objective conditions, and, consequently, what tasks confront the proletariat. In opposing the inclusion of this question in the agenda, the Mensheviks put themselves in a very unenviable position. Their arguments to the effect that this was a theoretical question, that the Party could not be bound by resolutions on

* See p. 149 of this volume.—*Ed.*

such questions, and so forth, were quite amazingly artificial and far-fetched. There was a burst of laughter when, in reply to a speech by no less a person than Dan, who had vehemently opposed the inclusion of this question in the agenda, a speaker took out a copy of *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, and calmly read the "fatal words" in the Menshevik tactical platform: "We"—yes, we Mensheviks—"are of the opinion and *propose that the Congress should agree.*" How is that, comrades? asked the speaker. Yesterday you said: "We propose that the Congress should agree," but today you say: "We propose that the Congress" should not discuss this question? The question was put on the agenda, but subsequently, as we shall see later on, the Mensheviks had their own way after all.

III

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

The agrarian question, or rather, the question of the agrarian programme, was taken by the Congress as the first item on the agenda. There was a big debate on this, and a large number of most interesting points of principle were raised. There were five reporters. I spoke in favour of the draft of the Agrarian Committee (published in the pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*, and attacked Maslov's proposal for municipalisation. Comrade John spoke in favour of the latter. The third reporter, Plekhanov, defended Maslov, and tried to persuade the Congress that Lenin's proposal for nationalisation smacked of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Narodnaya Volya. The fourth reporter, Schmidt,¹⁵⁸ supported the Agrarian Committee's draft with amendments on the lines of "Variant A" (for which see the pamphlet mentioned above*). The fifth reporter, Borisov, advocated division of the land. His programme was rather original in construction, but in substance it approximated most to our programme, except that for nationalisation—made conditional on the establishment of a republic—he substituted division of the land among the peasants as their property.

* See p. 194 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Of course, it is quite impossible for me to give in this report a full account of that lengthy debate in all its details. I shall try to deal with the more important points, i.e., the nature of "municipalisation", and the arguments advanced against nationalisation made conditional on the establishment of a republic, and so forth. I will remark that the pivot of the debate was Plekhanov's formulation of the question: this was due to its polemical acerbity, which is always good and desirable for the purpose of clearly distinguishing between the fundamental tendencies of the various trends of thought.

What is the essence of "municipalisation"? It is the transfer of the landed estates (or to be precise, of all large private estates) to the Zemstvos, or to local self-government bodies in general. The peasants' allotments, and the land of the smallholders, are to remain their property. The large estates are to be "alienated" and transferred to democratically organised local self-government bodies. This can be more simply expressed as follows: the peasants' land can remain the peasants' property; as for the landed estates, let the peasants rent them from the Zemstvos, only they must be democratic Zemstvos.

As the first reporter, I emphatically opposed this proposal. It is not revolutionary. The peasants will not agree to it. It would be harmful without a fully consistent democratic state system, including a republic, the election of government officials by the people, abolition of the standing army, etc. Such were my three main arguments.

I think that this draft is not revolutionary, first, because instead of confiscation (alienation without compensation) it speaks of alienation in general; secondly, and this is most important, it does not call for a *revolutionary method* of changing the agrarian system. Phrases about democracy mean nothing whatever at a time when the Cadets, those hypocritical advocates of compromise between the autocracy and the people, call themselves democrats. All methods of changing the agrarian system will be reduced to a liberal-bureaucratic *reform*, a Cadet reform, and not to a peasant revolution, if there is no slogan of the *immediate* seizure of the land by the peasants themselves, on the spot, that is, by revolutionary peasant committees, and of the peasants themselves *dispos-*

ing of the land thus seized,* pending the convocation of a national constituent assembly. Without this slogan we shall have a programme for a Cadet, or semi-Cadet, agrarian reform, and not for a peasant revolution.

Furthermore, the peasants will not agree to municipalisation. Municipalisation means you can have the allotment land gratis, but for the landed estates you must pay rent to the Zemstvo. The revolutionary peasants will not agree to this. They will say either let us divide all the land among ourselves or let us make all the land the property of the whole people. Municipalisation will never become the slogan of a revolutionary peasantry. If the revolution is victorious it cannot *in any circumstances* stop at municipalisation. If the revolution is not victorious, "municipalisation" will only be another swindle for the peasants, like the Reform of 1861.¹⁵⁹

My third main argument. Municipalisation will be harmful if made conditional on "democracy" in general, and not specifically on a republic and the election of government officials by the people. Municipalisation means transferring the land to the local authorities, to the self-government bodies. If the central government is not *fully* democratic (a republic, and so forth), the local authorities may be "autonomous" only in minor matters, may be independent only in "tinkering with wash-basins": they may be no more "democratic" than, say, the Zemstvos were under Alexander III. In important matters, however, particularly in such a fundamentally important matter as the landed estates, the democracy of local authorities in face of an undemocratic central authority would be merely a plaything. Without a republic and the election of government officials by the people, municipalisation would mean transferring the landed estates to elected local authorities even though the central government

* My draft said "confiscated". Comrade Borisov quite rightly remarked that this was a wrong formula. We should say "seized". Confiscation is the legal recognition of seizure, its legalisation. We should advance the slogan of confiscation. To put it into effect, we should call upon the peasants to *seize* the land. This seizure by the peasantry must be recognised, legalised, by the national constituent assembly, which, as the supreme organ of a sovereign people, will transform seizure into *confiscation* by passing a law to that effect.

remained in the hands of the Trepovs and Dubasovs. Such a reform would be a plaything, and a harmful one, because the Trepovs and Dubasovs would allow the elected local authorities to provide water, electric trams, and so forth, but *never could* leave them in control of land taken from the landlords. The Trepovs and Dubasovs would *transfer* these lands from the "jurisdiction" of the Zemstvos to the "jurisdiction" of the Ministry of the Interior, and the peasants would be trebly swindled. We must call for the overthrow of the Trepovs and Dubasovs, for the election of all government officials by the people, and not design—instead of that and before that—toy models of liberal local reform.

What were Plekhanov's arguments in favour of municipalisation? In both his speeches he laid most stress on the question of *guarantees against restoration*. This curious argument runs as follows. Nationalised land was the economic basis of Muscovy before the reign of Peter I. Our present revolution, like every other revolution, contains no guarantees against restoration. Therefore, in order to prevent the possibility of restoration (i.e., the restoration of the old, pre-revolutionary regime), we must particularly shun nationalisation.

To the Mensheviks this argument seemed particularly convincing, and they enthusiastically applauded Plekhanov, especially for the "strong language" he used about nationalisation ("Socialist-Revolutionary talk", etc.). And yet, if one ponders over the matter a little, one will easily see that the argument is sheer sophistry.

First of all, look at this "nationalisation in Muscovy before the reign of Peter I". We will not dwell on the fact that Plekhanov's views on history are an exaggerated version of the liberal-Narodnik view of Muscovy. It is absurd to talk about the land being nationalised in Russia in the period before Peter I; we have only to refer to Klyuchevsky, Yefimenko¹⁶⁰ and other historians. But let us leave these excursions into history. Let us assume for a moment that the land was really nationalised in Muscovy before the reign of Peter I, in the seventeenth century. What follows from it? According to Plekhanov's logic, it follows that nationalisation would facilitate the restoration of Muscovy. But such logic is sophistry and not logic, it is juggling with words without analysing the economic basis of developments, or the eco-

conomic content of concepts. Insofar as (or if) the land was nationalised in Muscovy, the economic basis of this nationalisation was the *Asiatic mode of production*. But it is the *capitalist mode of production* that became established in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, and is absolutely predominant in the twentieth century. What, then, remains of Plekhanov's argument? He confused nationalisation based on the Asiatic mode of production with nationalisation based on the capitalist mode of production. Because the words are identical he failed to see the fundamental difference in economic, that is, production relations. Although he built up his argument on the restoration of Muscovy (i.e., the alleged restoration of Asiatic modes of production), he actually spoke about political restoration, such as the restoration of the Bourbons (which he mentioned), that is, the restoration of the anti-republican form of government on the basis of capitalist production relations.

Was Plekhanov told at the Congress that he had got himself muddled up? Yes, a comrade who at the Congress called himself Demyan¹⁶¹ said in his speech that Plekhanov's "restoration" bogy was an out-and-out fizzle. The logical deduction from his premises is the restoration of Muscovy, i.e., the restoration of the Asiatic mode of production—which is a sheer absurdity in the epoch of capitalism. What actually followed from his conclusions and examples is the restoration of the Empire by Napoleon, or the restoration of the Bourbons after the great French bourgeois revolution. But first, this sort of restoration had nothing in common with pre-capitalist modes of production. And secondly, *this* sort of restoration followed, not on the nationalisation of the land, but on the sale of the landed estates, that is, a measure that was arch-bourgeois, purely bourgeois and certainly one that strengthened bourgeois, i.e., capitalist production relations. Thus *neither* form of restoration that Plekhanov dragged in—neither the restoration of the Asiatic mode of production (the restoration of Muscovy), nor restoration in France in the nineteenth century, had anything at all to do with the question of nationalisation.

What was Comrade Plekhanov's reply to Comrade Demyan's absolutely irrefutable arguments? He replied with uncommon adroitness. He exclaimed: "Lenin is a Socialist-

Revolutionary. And Comrade Demyan is feeding me a new brand of Demyan hash."¹⁶²

The Mensheviks were delighted. They laughed till their sides ached at Plekhanov's sparkling wit. The hall rocked with applause. The question whether there was any logic in Plekhanov's argument about restoration was completely shelved at this Menshevik Congress.

I am far from denying, of course, that Plekhanov's reply was not only a superb piece of wit, but, if you will, also of Marxist profundity. Nevertheless, I take the liberty of thinking that Comrade Plekhanov got himself hopelessly muddled up over the restoration of Muscovy and restoration in France in the nineteenth century. I take the liberty of thinking that "Demyan hash" will become a "historic term" that will be applied to *Comrade Plekhanov* and not to Comrade Demyan (as the Mensheviks, fascinated by the brilliance of Plekhanov's wit, think). At all events, when Comrade Plekhanov, in speaking about the seizure of power in the present Russian revolution, was tickling his Mensheviks with a story about a Communard in some provincial town in France who munched sausage after the unsuccessful "seizure of power", several delegates at the Unity Congress remarked that Plekhanov's speeches were like a "Moscow stew", and that they sparkled with "sausage wit".

As I have already said, I was the first reporter on the agrarian question. And in winding up the debate, I was not the last to be given the floor but the first, preceding the other four reporters. Consequently I spoke *after* Comrade Demyan and *before* Comrade Plekhanov. Hence I was unable to foresee Plekhanov's brilliant defence against Demyan's arguments. I briefly reiterated these arguments and concentrated on the question of restoration as such, rather than on revealing the utter futility of the talk about restoration as an argument in favour of municipalisation. What guarantees against restoration have you in mind?—I asked Comrade Plekhanov. Is it absolute guarantees in the sense of eliminating the economic foundation which engenders restoration? Or a relative and temporary guarantee, i.e., creating political conditions that would not rule out the possibility of restoration, but would merely make it less probable, would hamper restoration? If the former, then my answer is: the *only*

complete guarantee against restoration in Russia (after a victorious revolution in Russia) is a socialist revolution in the West. There is and can be no other guarantee. Thus, from this aspect, the question is: how can the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia facilitate, or accelerate, the socialist revolution in the West? The only conceivable answer to this is: if the miserable Manifesto of October 17 gave a powerful impetus to the working-class movement in Europe, then the *complete* victory of the bourgeois revolution in Russia will almost inevitably (or at all events, in all probability) arouse a number of such political upheavals in Europe as will give a very powerful impetus to the socialist revolution.

Now let us examine the "second", i.e., relative guarantee against restoration. What is the economic foundation of restoration on the basis of the capitalist mode of production, i.e., not the comical "restoration of Muscovy" but restoration of the type that occurred in France at the beginning of the nineteenth century? The condition of the small commodity producer in any capitalist society. The small commodity producer wavers between labour and capital. Together with the working class he fights against the survivals of serfdom and the police-ridden autocracy. But at the same time he longs to strengthen his position as a property-owner in bourgeois society, and therefore, if the conditions of development of *this* society are at all favourable (for example, industrial prosperity, expansion of the home market as a result of the agrarian revolution, etc.), the small commodity producer *inevitably* turns against the proletariat who is fighting for socialism. Consequently, I said, restoration on the basis of small commodity production, of small peasant property in capitalist society, is not only possible in Russia, but even *inevitable*, for Russia is mainly a petty-bourgeois country. I went on to say that from the point of view of restoration, the position of the Russian revolution may be expressed in the following thesis: the Russian revolution is strong enough to achieve victory by its own efforts; but it is not strong enough to retain the fruits of victory. It can achieve victory because the proletariat jointly with the revolutionary peasantry can constitute an invincible force. But it cannot retain its victory, because in a country where small

production is vastly developed, the small commodity producers (including the peasants) will inevitably turn against the proletarians when they pass *from* freedom to socialism. To be able to retain its victory, to be able to prevent restoration, the Russian revolution will need non-Russian *reserves*, will need outside assistance. Are there such reserves? Yes, there are: the socialist proletariat in the West.

Whoever overlooks this in discussing the question of restoration reveals that his views on the Russian revolution are extremely narrow. He forgets that France at the end of the eighteenth century, in the period of her bourgeois-democratic revolution, was surrounded by far more backward, semi-feudal countries, which served as the reserves of restoration; whereas Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the period of her bourgeois-democratic revolution, is surrounded by far more advanced countries, where there is a social force capable of becoming the reserve of the revolution.

To sum up. In raising the question of guarantees against restoration, Plekhanov touched upon a number of most interesting subjects but he explained nothing at all on the point at issue and led away (led his Menshevik audience away) from the question of municipalisation. Indeed, if the small commodity producers, as a class, are the bulwark of capitalist restoration (this is what we shall for short call restoration on the basis, not of the Asiatic, but of the capitalist mode of production), where does municipalisation come in? Municipalisation is a form of *landownership*; but is it not clear that the forms of landownership do not alter the main and fundamental features of a *class*? The petty bourgeois will certainly and inevitably serve as the bulwark of restoration against the proletariat, no matter whether the land is nationalised, municipalised or divided. If any sharp distinctions between the forms of landownership can be drawn in this respect, it can, perhaps, only be in favour of division, since that creates closer ties between the small proprietor and the land—closer and, therefore, more difficult to break.* But to

* We say “perhaps”, because it is still an open question whether these closest ties between the small proprietor and his “plot” are not the most reliable bulwark of Bonapartism. But this is not the place to go into the details of this concrete question.

urge municipalisation as an argument against restoration is simply ridiculous.

Comrades John and Plekhanov, who spoke after me in winding up the debate, tried once again to jump imperceptibly from this flimsy argument about restoration to another, which seemed to resemble it, but was really of an entirely different nature. They began to defend municipalisation, not as a guarantee against restoration of the monarchy after the establishment of a republic, that is, not as a measure that would safeguard the republic, not as a permanent institution, but as a basis in the *process of the struggle* against the monarchy for a republic, i.e., a measure that would facilitate further gains, a temporary and transitional institution. Plekhanov even went to the length of calling the large local self-government bodies that would municipalise the land local "republics" that would serve as strongholds in the war against the monarchy.

On this argument, we would make the following observations:

First, *neither* Maslov's original programme *nor* the John-Plekhanov-Kostrov¹⁶³ programme that was adopted at the Congress indicated *by a single word* that they regarded municipalisation as a temporary, transitional measure *in the course* of the revolution, i.e., as *a weapon in the struggle for further gains*. Thus such an interpretation is "a free invention", which is not confirmed but refuted by the text of the programme. For example, in advocating in my programme the establishment of revolutionary peasant committees as an instrument of the revolution, as a basis in the struggle for further gains, I say in so many words: the Party advises the peasant committees to 'seize the land and dispose of it *pending the convocation of a constituent assembly*. The Maslov-John-Plekhanov-Kostrov programme, not only does not say this,* but on the

* It was because Plekhanov's programme does not say this that we, at the Congress, had every right to put this new interpretation of municipalisation on a par with the "revolutionary local self-government" advocated by the Mensheviks. But it was none other than Plekhanov who, after the Bolsheviks had explained the point at great length was compelled to admit that the slogan of "revolutionary local self-government" explained nothing and, indeed, misled many people (see *Dnevnik*, No. 5). Even in *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, the Bolsheviks had already said that the slogan of "revolutionary local self-government

contrary, outlines beyond question a plan for a permanent system of land tenure.

Secondly, the main and fundamental answer to the argument we are examining is that in the guise of a guarantee against restoration or against reaction, Plekhanov's programme actually advocates *a deal with reaction*. Just think. Do we not write our programme, and particularly the agrarian (peasant) programme, for the broad masses whom we want to lead? But what do we get? Some members of the Party, be they even leaders, will say that Zemstvos which have municipalised the land will be republics, fighting against the monarchy at the centre. In the programme, the agrarian revolution is directly and definitely linked with democratic local administration; but *not by one word* is it linked with *complete* democracy in the central government and state system! I ask you: What is to guide our rank-and-file Party workers in their everyday agitation and propaganda? Plekhanov's talk about local "republics" fighting against the central monarchy, or the text of our new Party programme, in which the demand for land for the peasants is definitely linked only with democratic local administration, not with democratic central government and state system? Plekhanov's statements, muddled in themselves, will inevitably play the same role of a "*misleading*" slogan as the "*celebrated*" ("*celebrated*" in Plekhanov's opinion) slogan of "revolutionary local self-government". *In practice*, our Party programme remains the programme of a *deal with reaction*. If we take *its real political* significance in the present situation in Russia, and not the motives advanced by some of our speakers, it is not a Social-Democratic programme, but a Cadet programme. Some of our speakers' motives are of the very best, their intentions are most Social-Democratic; but the programme has turned out in practice to be a Cadet programme, filled with the spirit of a "deal" and not of a "peasant revolution" (incidentally, Plekhanov

was inadequate and incomplete, that it did not express the conditions of the complete victory of the revolution. It is not revolutionary local self-government that is needed for such a victory, but revolutionary authority; and not only local revolutionary authorities, but also a central revolutionary authority. (See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 179-87, 212-23, 356-73.—*Ed.*)

said that formerly we were afraid of the peasant revolution but now we must get rid of this fear).

Above, I examined the *scientific* significance of the argument about "guarantees against restoration". I now come to its *political* significance, in the period of Dubasov constitutionalism and of the Cadet State Duma. The scientific significance of this argument is zero, or minus one. Its political significance is that it is a weapon borrowed from the Cadet arsenal and brings grist to the mill of the Cadets. Look around! Which *trend in politics* has made almost a monopoly of pointing to the danger of restoration? The Cadet trend. What answer have the Cadets given millions of times to our Party comrades who have pointed to the contradiction between the "democratic principles" of the Cadets and their monarchist, etc., programme? That to touch the monarchy means creating the danger of restoration. The Cadets have been shouting to the Social-Democrats in a thousand different sharps and flats: "Don't touch the monarchy, for you have no guarantee against restoration. Why create the danger of restoration, the danger of reaction? Far better to strike a bargain with reaction!" This is the sum and substance of the Cadets' political wisdom, all their programme, all their tactics. And these are the logical outcome of the class position of the petty bourgeois, of the danger that democratic revolution carried through to the end represents for the bourgeoisie.

I will give only two examples in confirmation of the foregoing. In December 1905, *Narodnaya Svoboda*, the organ of Milyukov and Hessen, wrote that Moscow had proved that insurrection was possible; nevertheless, insurrection was fatal, not because it was hopeless, but because reaction would sweep away the gains of the insurrection (quoted in my pamphlet *Social-Democracy and the State Duma**). The other example. In *Proletary*, in 1905, I quoted an extract from an article by Vinogradov in *Russkiye Vedomosti*** Vinogradov had expressed a desire that the Russian revolution should follow the lines of 1848-49 and not 1789-93; that is to say, that we should not have any *victorious* insurrections, that our revolution should not be carried to its

* See p. 109 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 240-45.

complete fulfilment, that it should be cut short as early as possible by the treachery of the liberal bourgeoisie, by the latter's deal with the monarchy. He raised the bogey of restoration in the guise of the Prussian drill sergeant—without saying a word, of course, about such a “guarantee of revolution” as the German proletariat.

This argument about the absence of guarantees against restoration is a purely Cadet idea: it is the bourgeoisie's political weapon against the proletariat. The interests of the bourgeoisie force it into struggling to prevent the proletariat from completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution jointly with the revolutionary peasantry. In this struggle, the bourgeois philosophers and politicians inevitably clutch at historical arguments and examples from the past. In the past it always happened that the workers were bamboozled, that even the victory of the revolution was followed by restoration. Consequently, the same thing must happen here, says the bourgeoisie, naturally striving to undermine the faith of the Russian proletariat in its own strength and in the strength of European socialism. The sharpening of political contradictions and of the political struggle results in reaction, says the bourgeois for the edification of the workers: therefore these contradictions must be *blunted*. Rather than run the risk of reaction coming after victory, it would be better not to fight for victory, but to strike a bargain with reaction.

Is it an accident that Plekhanov began to snatch at the ideological weapon that the bourgeoisie uses against the proletariat? No, this was inevitable after he had wrongly appraised the December uprising (“it was wrong to take up arms”) and, without calling a spade a spade, had begun, in his *Dnevnik*, to advocate that the workers' party should support the Cadets. At the Congress this question was touched upon during the debate on another item of the agenda, when the question was raised as to why the bourgeoisie was praising Plekhanov. I shall deal with this point in its proper place; but here I will note that I did not elaborate the foregoing arguments at length, but presented them in the most general outline. I said that our “guarantee against restoration” was the complete fulfilment of the revolution, and not a deal with reaction. And it is this, and this alone, that is emphasised in my agrarian programme which is entirely a pro-

gramme of peasant uprising and of the complete fulfilment of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. For example, "peasant revolutionary committees" are the only line along which peasant uprising can advance (moreover, I do not counterpose peasant committees to revolutionary power, in the way the Mensheviks draw a contrast between the latter and revolutionary self-government; I regard these committees as one of the instruments of such authority, an instrument that must be supplemented by other, central instruments, by a provisional revolutionary government and a national constituent assembly). This is the *only* formulation of the agrarian programme that can preclude a bourgeois-bureaucratic settlement of the agrarian question, a settlement by the Petrunkeviches, Rodichevs, Kaufmans and Kutlers.

Plekhanov could not but see this fundamental feature of my programme. He saw it, and admitted it at the Congress. But (true to his nature) his admission was just another Demyan hash, or Plekhanov trash: oh, Lenin's programme contains the idea of seizing power. Lenin himself admits it. But that's just what is bad. It's Narodnaya Volya-ism. Lenin is reviving Narodnaya Volya-ism. Comrades, fight against the revival of Narodnaya Volya-ism! Lenin even talks about "the creative activity of the people". Isn't that Narodnaya Volya-ism? And so on, and so forth.

We Bolsheviks, both Voyinov¹⁶⁴ and I, heartily thanked Plekhanov for these arguments. Arguments like these can only benefit us, and we welcome them. Ponder over this argument, comrades: "Since Lenin's programme contains the idea of seizing power, Lenin is a Narodnaya Volya-ist." Which programme are we discussing? The agrarian programme. Who is to seize power, according to this programme? The revolutionary peasantry. Does Lenin confuse the proletariat with the peasantry? Far from doing that, he singles it out in the third part of his programme, which (the third part) the Menshevik Congress copied in full in its resolution on tactics!

Good, isn't it? Plekhanov himself said that it is unbecoming for Marxists *to be afraid of a peasant revolution*. But at the same time he fancies he can see Narodnaya Volya-ism in the *seizure of power by the revolutionary peasants!!* But how can a peasant revolution win if the revolutionary peasantry

does not seize power?? Plekhanov has reduced his own arguments to absurdity. Having stepped on to a slope, he irresistibly rolls down. First he denied that it was possible for the proletariat to seize power in the present revolution. Now he denies that it is possible for the revolutionary peasantry to seize power in the present revolution. But if *neither* the proletariat *nor* the revolutionary peasantry can seize power, then, logically, that power *must remain in the hands of the tsar and of Dubasov*. Or should the Cadets take power? But the Cadets do not want to seize power themselves, for they are in favour of retaining the monarchy, the standing army, the Upper Chamber and all the other delights.

Was I not right when I said at the Congress that Plekhanov's *fear of seizing power is fear of the peasant revolution*? Was not Voyinov right when he said that in his youth Plekhanov had been so scared by the Narodnaya Volya that he fancies he can see it even when he himself admits that a peasant revolution is inevitable, and when not a single Social-Democrat has any illusions as to peasant socialism? Was not Voyinov right when, in connection with the Menshevik resolution on armed uprising (Clause 1 of which starts with the admission that the task is "to wrest power from the autocratic government"), he ironically remarked at the Congress that to "seize power" means reviving the Narodnaya Volya, but to "wrest power" is true and profound Marxism? But really, it has turned out that in order to combat a Narodnaya Volya trend among the Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks have bestowed on our Party a programme which advocates the "*wresting of power*"—*by the Cadets*.

Of course, these outcries about Narodnaya Volya-ism did not surprise me in the least. I remember only too well that the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement have always (ever since 1898-1900) raised this bogey against the revolutionary Social-Democrats. And Comrade Akimov, who at the Unity Congress made a brilliant speech in defence of Axelrod and the Cadets, quite appropriately recalled this. I hope to return to this subject on another occasion in the literature.

A word about "the creative activity of the people". In what sense did I speak about this at the Congress? In the same sense as I speak about it in my pamphlet *The Victory of the*

*Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party** (this pamphlet was distributed among the delegates at the Congress). I contrast October-December 1905 to the present Cadet period, and say that in the revolutionary period the creative activity of the people (the revolutionary peasants plus the proletarians) is richer and more productive than in the Cadet period. Plekhanov thinks that this is Narodnaya Volya-ism. I think that from the scientific point of view, Plekhanov's opinion is an evasion of the highly important question of appraising the period of October-December 1905 (it never occurred to him to analyse the forms of the movement of this period in his *Dnevnik*; he confined himself to moralising!). From the political point of view, it is merely additional proof of how close Plekhanov's tactics are to those of Mr. Blank, and of the Cadets in general.

To finish with the agrarian question, I will deal with the last of the important arguments. Plekhanov said: "Lenin is a dreamer; he has fantastic ideas about the election of government officials by the people, and so forth. It is not difficult to draw up a programme for such a favourable contingency. Try to draw one up for an unfavourable contingency. Draw up your programme so as to have it 'well shod on all four hoofs'."

Undoubtedly, this argument contains an idea to which every Marxist should pay the strictest attention. Indeed, it would be a very poor programme that allowed for *only* a favourable contingency. But it is from this standpoint, I said in reply to Plekhanov, that my programme is obviously superior to Maslov's. To satisfy oneself of this, one has only to remember that there is such a thing as the *renting of land*. What distinguishes the capitalist (and semi-capitalist) mode of production in agriculture? Everywhere it is the renting of land. Does this apply to-Russia? Yes, on a very large scale. And Comrade John was wrong when, in replying to me, he said that my programme contained an absurdity, namely, that the renting of land remains after the landed estates are confiscated. On this point, Comrade John was thrice wrong: first, the *whole* of the first part of my programme speaks of the first steps of the peasant revolution (seizure of the land *pending* the convocation of a national constituent

* See pp. 242-70 of this volume.—*Ed.*

assembly); hence, in my programme, the renting of land does not "remain after" confiscation, but is taken for granted, because it is a fact. Secondly, confiscation means transferring the ownership of land to other hands, and in itself, the transference of ownership does not in the least affect the renting of land. Thirdly, as everybody knows, peasant land and allotment land are also being rented.

See how things stand as regards being "well shod on all four hoofs", as regards taking the worst as well as the best possible conditions into account. Maslov, with a majestic gesture, completely strikes out the renting of land. He assumes straightway a revolution that will abolish the renting of land. As I pointed out, this assumption is absolutely absurd from the point of view of "unpleasant reality" and of having to take it into account. Indeed, the whole of the first part of my programme is *entirely* based on the assumption of "unpleasant reality", against which the revolutionary peasants are rebelling. Therefore in my programme the renting of land does not vanish into the realm of shades (the abolition of the renting of land in capitalist society is a reform no less, if not more, "fantastic", from the point of view of Plekhanov's "common sense", than the abolition of the standing army, etc.). Hence I take "*unpleasant* reality" into account much more seriously than Maslov, while I preach *pleasant* reality to the peasants, not in terms of a Cadet deal (local republics versus the central monarchy), but in terms of the complete victory of the revolution and the winning of a really democratic republic.

I especially emphasised at the Congress that it was particularly important to have this element of political propaganda in the agrarian programme; and in all probability I shall have to deal with this point again more than once in the literature. At the Congress we Bolsheviks were told: we have a political programme, and that is where we ought to talk about a republic. This argument shows that those who made it have not thought out the question at all. True, we have a general programme, in which we formulate our principles (the first section of the Party programme) and we have special programmes: political, workers', and peasants' programmes. *Nobody* proposes that a reservation should also be made in the workers' section of the programme (eight-hour day,

etc.) regarding the special political conditions required for the various reforms proposed in it. Why? Because the eight-hour day and similar reforms must *inevitably* become instruments of progress under *all* political conditions. But is it necessary to *make special reservations* as regards political conditions in the peasant programme? Yes, because the very best redistribution of the land *may* become an instrument of retrogression under the regime of the Trepovs and Dubasovs. Take even Maslov's programme. It advocates the transfer of the land to the *democratic* state and to *democratic* local self-government bodies. Thus, although the Party has a political programme, Maslov's programme makes special reservations as regards the political conditions for present-day agrarian reforms. Hence there can be no argument about the necessity of making reservations as regards special political conditions for agrarian demands. The point at issue is: is it permissible, either from the standpoint of science or of consistent proletarian democracy, to link a radical agrarian revolution, not with the election of government officials by the people, not with a republic, but with "democracy" in general, i.e., with Cadet democracy as well, which today, whether we like it or not, is the principal and most widespread form of pseudo-democracy, and the most influential in the press and in "society". I think that this is not permissible. I predict that the mistake in our agrarian programme will have to be, and will be, put right by practical experience, that is to say, the political situation will *compel* our propagandists and agitators in their fight against the Cadets to emphasise, not Cadet democracy, but the election of government officials by the people, and a republic.

As for the programme which advocates the division of the land, I expressed my attitude towards it at the Congress in the following terms: municipalisation is wrong and harmful; division, as a programme, is mistaken, but not harmful. Therefore I, of course, am closer to those who are for division, and I am prepared to vote for Borisov as against Maslov. In the first place, division cannot be harmful, because the peasants will agree to it; and in the second place, it does not have to be made conditional on the consistent reorganisation of the state. Why is it mistaken? Because it one-sidedly regards the peasant movement only in the light of the past

and present, and gives no consideration to the future. In arguing against nationalisation, the "divisionists" say: when you hear the peasants talking about nationalisation, you must understand that it is not what they want. Don't pay attention to words, but to the substance. The peasants want private ownership, the right to sell land; and their talk about "God's land", and so forth, is merely an ideological cloak for their desire to take the land away from the landlords.

In my answer to the "divisionists" I said: all that is true; but our disagreements only begin where you think the question is settled. You repeat the mistake made by the old materialists, concerning whom Marx said: the old materialists have interpreted the world, but we must change it.¹⁶⁵ Similarly, the advocates of division *rightly* understand what the peasants say about nationalisation, they *rightly interpret what they say*; but the point is that they do not know how to convert this correct interpretation into *an instrument for changing the world*, into an instrument of progress. We are not suggesting that we should impose nationalisation on the peasants instead of division (Variant A in my programme removes all ground for such absurd ideas if they do occur to anyone). What we are suggesting is that a socialist, in ruthlessly exposing the peasants' petty-bourgeois illusions about "God's land", should be able to show them the road of progress. I told Plekhanov at the Congress, and I will repeat it a thousand times, that the practical workers will vulgarise the present programme just as they vulgarised the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands; they will convert a minor mistake into a major one. They will try to convince the crowds of peasants—who are shouting that the land is nobody's, the land is God's, the land is the state's—of the advantages of division, and by that will discredit and vulgarise Marxism. This is not what we must tell the peasants. We must say: there is a great deal of truth in what you say about the land being God's, nobody's or the state's; but we must look at the truth very closely. If the land is the state's and Trepov is at the head of the state, then the land will be Trepov's. Is that what you want? Do you want the land to pass into the hands of the Rodichevs and Petrunkeviches if they should succeed in capturing power, and consequently, the state, as

they would like to do? Of course, the peasants will answer: no, we don't want that. We will not surrender the land taken from the landlords either to the Trepovs or to the Rodichevs. If that is so, we must say, all government officials must be elected by the people, the standing army must be abolished, we must have a republic. *Only* then will the transfer of the land to the "state", to "the people", be a useful and not a harmful measure. And from the strictly scientific point of view, from the point of view of the conditions of development of capitalism in general, we must undoubtedly say if we do not want to differ with Volume III of *Capital*—that the nationalisation of land is possible in bourgeois society, that it promotes economic development, facilitates competition and the influx of capital into agriculture, reduces the price of grain, etc. Hence, in a period of real peasant revolution, given fairly well-developed capitalism, we *cannot* in any circumstances adopt a crude and sweepingly negative attitude towards nationalisation. That would be narrow, one-sided, crude and short-sighted. We should only explain to the peasants what political conditions are necessary for nationalisation to make it a useful measure, and then proceed to show its bourgeois character (as is done in Section 3 of my programme, now incorporated in the resolution of the Unity Congress*).

In concluding my narrative of the arguments about the agrarian question at the Congress, I will mention the amendments that were proposed to Maslov's draft programme. When the question of which draft to take as a basis was voted on, Maslov's draft at first obtained only 52 votes, *that is, less than half*. About 40 voted in favour of division (I voted with the "divisionists" to avoid splitting the vote against municipalisation). Only when a second vote was taken did Maslov's draft obtain 60-odd votes, as all the waverers voted for it, to save the Party from being left without any agrarian programme at all.

One of the amendments that the Mensheviks voted down was aimed at a more precise definition of the term: democratic state. We proposed the formulation: "a democratic republic fully guaranteeing the sovereignty of the people". This

* See pp. 194-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*

amendment was based on the idea, outlined above, that without *complete* democratisation of the central state authority, municipalisation would be positively harmful, and might degenerate into a Cadet agrarian reform. The amendment caused a storm. I was not in the hall at the time. I remember that as I was passing through an adjoining room on my way back to the hall, I was struck by the extraordinary noise in the "lobbies" and heard people jesting, saying: "Comrade John has proclaimed a republic!" "He could find no guarantees against restoration!" "Comrade Plekhanov has restored the monarchy."

As I was told afterwards, what happened was this. The Mensheviks, thin-skinned as usual, took offence at this amendment, which they regarded as an attempt to prove that they were opportunists, that they were opposed to a republic. There were angry speeches and shouts. The Bolsheviks also got heated, of course. They demanded a vote by roll-call. This stirred passion to fever heat. Comrade John was embarrassed, and being loath to create discord—he was not at all "against a republic", of course—he got up and announced that he would withdraw his formulation and support the amendment. The Bolsheviks applauded the "proclamation of a republic". But Comrade Plekhanov, or some other Menshevik, intervened, the argument started afresh, a demand was made for another vote, and the "monarchy was restored" by—according to what I was told—a matter of 38 votes to 34 (evidently many of the delegates were absent from the hall, or abstained from voting).

Of the amendments that were accepted, I must mention the substitution of the term "confiscation" for the term "alienation". Then the "municipalisers" had, after all, to make a concession to the "divisionists", and Comrade Kostrov proposed an amendment which in certain conditions permitted of division as well. Thus, instead of Maslov's original programme, the result was, as someone wittily put it at the Congress, a "castrated" programme. It is, in effect, a blend of nationalisation (certain lands are to become *national* property), municipalisation (part of the land is to be transferred to large local self-government bodies), and lastly, division. To this must be added that neither the programme nor the resolution on tactics specifies when

we are to support municipalisation and when division. The upshot was a programme, not well shod on all four hoofs, but with all four shoes loose.*

IV

APPRAISAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION AND OF THE CLASS TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

The question mentioned in the above heading was the second item on the agenda of the Congress. The reporters were Martynov and I. Strictly speaking, Comrade Martynov in his report did not defend the Menshevik draft resolution, printed in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2. He preferred to give a "general outline" of his views and a general criticism of what the Mensheviks call Bolshevik views.

He spoke of the Duma as a political centre, of the harmfulness of the idea of seizing power, and of the importance of the country's constitutional development in a revolutionary period. He criticised the December uprising, called upon us openly to admit our defeat, and condemned our resolution for its "technical" presentation of the question of strike and insurrection. He said that "the Cadets, although they are anti-revolutionary, are erecting the scaffolding for the further development of the revolution". (Then why do you not say so in your resolutions, we asked.) He said that "we are on the eve of a revolutionary explosion".** (Why isn't that in your resolution, we asked again.) Incidentally, he said: "Objectively, the Cadets will play a more important role than the Socialist-Revolutionaries." The idea of seizing power is akin to the ideas of Tkachov; the Duma must be put into the foreground as the first step in the country's "constitutional

* The sharpest criticism of Maslov's "castrated" programme was uttered at the Congress by a Menshevik comrade (Strumilin), an advocate of partial division. He read a written statement in which he very aptly and ruthlessly exposed—perhaps it would be more correct to say flayed—the inherent contradictions in the programme as it finally emerged. Unfortunately, I did not take any notes of his speech.

** I have put in inverted commas the words that I have found in my notes.

development", as the corner-stone of the edifice of "representative institutions"—such was the gist of Comrade Martynov's report. Like all Mensheviks, he passively adjusted our tactics to the slightest turn in the course of events, subordinated them to fleeting interests, to momentary (or apparent) needs, and involuntarily belittled the main and fundamental tasks of the proletariat as the vanguard fighter in the bourgeois democratic revolution.

I based my report on a precise comparison of the two resolutions before the Congress. I said that both resolutions admit that the revolution is on the rise again, that our task is to strive to carry the revolution to the end, and lastly, that only the proletariat together with the revolutionary peasantry can accomplish this. One would think that these three propositions should lead to complete unanimity on the tactical course to be adopted. But which of the two resolutions more consistently upholds this main point of view, more correctly motivates it, and more accurately indicates the conclusions to be drawn from it?

And I went on to show that the argument of the Menshevik resolution was utterly untenable, that it was a mere collection of phrases and not an argument ("the struggle has left the government no choice". This is a splendid specimen of sheer phrase-mongering! It is the very thing that has to be proved, but not in this form. The Mensheviks, however, start out from unproved and unprovable premises). I said that whoever *really* admits that an upswing of the revolution is inevitable must draw the proper conclusion as to the *main* form of the movement. For this is the fundamental scientific and political problem that we have to solve, and which the Mensheviks are dodging. They argue as follows. When there is a Duma, we will support the Duma; when there is a strike and insurrection, we will support the strike and insurrection. But they are unwilling, or unable, to determine whether the one or the other form of the movement is inevitable. They do not dare tell the proletariat, and the whole people, which is the *main* form of the movement. That being the case, all those phrases about the upswing of the revolution and about its completion (the Mensheviks very ineptly said: its *logical* completion) are so many platitudes. They imply that the proletariat—whose conception of the

revolution is the deepest and broadest, and whose tactics are prompted by the general and fundamental interests of democracy—must not be elevated to the position of foremost leader of the revolution, but must be degraded to the position of a passive participant and humble “labourer” in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The Mensheviks, I said, accept only the first half of Hegel’s celebrated proposition: “All that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real.” The Duma is real; therefore the Duma is reasonable, they say, and rest content with that. We say: the fight outside the Duma is “reasonable”. It is the objectively inevitable result of the whole of the present situation. Therefore it is “real”, although it is held down for the moment. We must not slavishly follow the fleeting moment; that would be opportunism. We must ponder over the more profound causes of events and over the more far-reaching implications of our tactics.

The Mensheviks in their resolution admit that the revolution is on the rise and that the proletariat jointly with the peasantry must carry it to completion. But whoever seriously takes that view must also be able to draw the necessary conclusions. If you say: jointly with the peasantry, it shows that you think that the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (Cadets, etc.) is unreliable. Why, then, don’t you say so, as we do in our resolution? How is it that you do not say a single word about the necessity of combating constitutional illusions, that is, belief in the promises and laws of the old autocratic government? It is habitual for the Cadets to forget about this; they themselves spread constitutional illusions. But a Social-Democrat who at a moment of revolution forgets the task of combating constitutional illusions, *politically* puts himself on a footing with the Cadets. What is the use of phrases like “upswing of the revolution”, “carrying it to completion”, or “a new revolutionary explosion”, if the Social-Democrats do nothing to dispel the constitutional illusions that are widespread among the people?

At the present time the question of constitutional illusions is the best and surest criterion by which to distinguish the opportunist from those who want the revolution to develop further. The opportunist shirks the task of dispelling these illusions. The advocate of revolution ruthlessly exposes

their deceptive character. And yet the Menshevik Social-Democrats are silent on a question like this!

Not daring to say openly and frankly that the October-December forms of struggle are unfit and undesirable, the Mensheviks say it in the worst, covert, indirect and evasive way. This is quite unbecoming for Social-Democrats.

Such were the main points of my report.

As regards the debate on these reports, the following characteristic incidents are worth mentioning. A comrade who at the Congress was known as Boris Nikolayevich¹⁶⁶ gave me occasion to exclaim in my reply to the debate: "The ball comes to the player!" It would be difficult to express the "sum and substance" of Menshevism more vividly than he did. He said that it was "curious" that the Bolsheviks should regard the revolutionary movements of the broad masses of the people, and not the legal or constitutional form, as the "*main* form of the movement". He said this was "ridiculous", for there were no such movements, whereas there was a Duma. All this talk about the proletariat being the "head", or "leader", about the possibility of it becoming the "tail", and so forth, was "metaphysics" and "phrase-mongering".

Take off your Cadet spectacles, I said in reply to this consistent Menshevik. You will then see a peasant movement in Russia, and unrest among the armed forces, and the movement of the unemployed: you will see forms of struggle that at the moment are "lying low", but the existence of which even bourgeois moderates do not dare to deny. They openly say that these forms are harmful and needless; but the Menshevik Social-Democrats *scoff* at them. This is the difference between the bourgeoisie and the Menshevik Social-Democrats. This was exactly the case with Bernstein, the German Menshevik, the German Right Social-Democrat. The bourgeoisie in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century held, and openly declared, that revolutionary forms of struggle were harmful. Bernstein *scoffed* at them.

Being raised at the Congress, the question of Bernstein naturally led to the question, why was the bourgeoisie praising Plekhanov? The fact that all the numerous liberal-bourgeois newspapers and other publications in Russia, including even the Octobrist *Slovo*, were most zealously praising Plekhanov could not pass unnoticed at the Congress.

Plekhanov picked up the gauntlet. He said that the bourgeoisie was not praising him for what it had praised Bernstein for. Bernstein was praised for surrendering to the bourgeoisie our theoretical weapon, Marxism. He (Plekhanov) was being praised for his tactics. The situation was different.

Plekhanov was answered by the representative of the Polish Social-Democratic Party and by myself. We both pointed out that Plekhanov was *wrong*. The bourgeoisie praised Bernstein not only for theory, and, in fact, not for theory at all. The bourgeoisie doesn't care a pin for any theory. The bourgeoisie praised the German Right Social-Democrats because they advocated different *tactics*. They were praised for their tactics, for their reformist tactics as distinct from revolutionary tactics; for regarding the legal, parliamentary, reformist struggle as the main, or almost the sole, form of struggle; for striving to convert the Social-Democratic Party into one of democratic social reforms. That is why Bernstein was praised. The bourgeoisie praised him for trying to *blunt* the antagonisms between labour and capital in the period preceding socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie is praising Plekhanov for trying to *blunt* the antagonisms between the revolutionary people and the autocracy in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Plekhanov is being praised for regarding the "parliamentary" struggle as the main form of struggle; for condemning the October-December struggle, and particularly the armed uprising. Plekhanov is being praised because on the question of present-day tactics he has become the leader of the Right Social-Democrats.

I have forgotten to add what stand the Mensheviks took in the debate on constitutional illusions. Theirs was not a firm stand. Some of them said that it was always the task of the Social-Democrats to combat constitutional illusions, and that this was not the special task of the present moment. Others (Plekhanov) declared that to combat constitutional illusions was anarchism. These two extreme and opposite opinions on constitutional illusions glaringly revealed the utter helplessness of the Mensheviks' position. When a constitutional system has become firmly established, when, for a certain period, the constitutional struggle becomes the main form of the class struggle and of the political struggle generally,

the task of dispelling constitutional illusions is not the special task of the Social-Democrats, not the task of the moment. Why? Because at such times affairs in constitutional states are administered *in the very way* that parliament decides. By constitutional illusions we mean deceptive faith in a constitution. Constitutional illusions prevail when a constitution seems to exist, but actually does not: in other words, when affairs of state are *not* administered *in the way* parliament decides. When actual political life *diverges* from its reflection in the parliamentary struggle, then, and *only then*, does the task of combating constitutional illusions become the immediate task of the advanced revolutionary class, the proletariat. The liberal bourgeois, dreading the extra-parliamentary struggle, spreads constitutional illusions even when parliaments are impotent. The anarchists flatly reject participation in parliament under all circumstances. Social-Democrats stand for utilising the parliamentary struggle, for participating in parliament; but they ruthlessly expose "parliamentary cretinism", that is, the belief that the parliamentary struggle is the *sole or under all circumstances the main* form of the political struggle.

Are the political realities of Russia at variance with the decisions of, and speeches made in, the Duma? Are affairs of state in our country administered in the way the Duma decides? Do the "Duma" parties reflect with any degree of accuracy the *real* political forces in the present state of the revolution? One has only to put these questions to understand the Mensheviks' helpless confusion on the question of constitutional illusions.

This confusion was revealed with uncommon vividness at the Congress when, although in the majority, the Mensheviks dared not put their resolution appraising the present situation to the vote. They withdrew their resolution! The Bolsheviks had a good laugh over this at the Congress. The victors are withdrawing their victorious resolution—that is what was said about the extraordinary behaviour of the Mensheviks, unprecedented in the history of congresses. A vote by roll-call was demanded and secured on this question, although, curiously enough, the Mensheviks were angry over this and submitted to the Bureau a written statement which said that "Lenin is collecting material for agitation against

the decisions of the Congress". As if the right to collect material were not the right and duty of every opposition! And as if our victors were not, by their chagrin, accentuating the impossibly awkward predicament into which they had put themselves by withdrawing their own resolution! The vanquished insist on the victors accepting their own victorious resolution! We could not wish for a more outspoken confirmation of the moral victory we had achieved.

The Mensheviks said, of course, that they did not wish to impose upon us something we did not agree with, that they did not want to resort to coercion, and so forth. Naturally, these excuses only raised a smile, and led to more demands for a vote by roll-call. For on those questions, on which the Mensheviks were convinced they were right, they did not hesitate to "impose" their opinion upon us, and to resort to "coercion" (why this terrible word, I wonder?), and so forth. The resolution appraising the present situation did not commit the Party to any particular action. But without it, the Party could not *understand* the principles and *motives* underlying all the tactics adopted by the Congress.

In this respect, the withdrawal of the resolution was a supreme manifestation of practical opportunism. Our business is to be in the Duma when there is a Duma, and we don't want to hear anything like general arguments, general appraisals or well-considered tactics—this, in effect, is what the Mensheviks said to the proletariat by withdrawing their resolution.

Undoubtedly the Mensheviks had convinced themselves that their resolution was wrong and worthless. It is quite out of the question that people who are convinced that their views are correct should refuse to express them openly and definitely. But the crux of the matter was that the Mensheviks could not even propose any amendments to their resolution. This suggests that they could not agree among themselves on a single important point concerning the appraisal of the situation and of the class tasks of the proletariat in general. They could agree only on a negative decision: to withdraw the resolution altogether. They had a vague presentiment that if their resolution defining *principles* were adopted, it would undermine their *practical* resolutions. But they did not gain anything thereby. The resolutions of

the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks on the appraisal of the present situation can and must be discussed and compared by the *whole* Party, by *all* Party organisations. The question was left open. But it must be settled. And a comparison of these two resolutions with the experience of political life, with the lessons taught by, say, the Cadet Duma, will splendidly confirm the correctness of the Bolshevik views on the present state of the Russian revolution and on the class tasks of the proletariat.

V

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STATE DUMA

On the question of the Duma, the reporter from the faction that predominated at the Congress was Comrade Axelrod. He too, in a long speech, refrained from discussing the comparative merits of the two resolutions (the committee submitted two resolutions, because the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks could not reach agreement), from stating in precise terms the views of the Minority on this question, but gave a "general outline" of the meaning of parliamentarism. He went far afield, took a long excursion into history, and drew a picture of parliamentarism, of its significance, its role in the development of proletarian organisation, in agitation, in the awakening of the class-consciousness of the proletariat, and so forth. Casting innuendoes all the time at "anarchistic-conspiratorial" views, he soared entirely in the realm of abstractions, in the lofty sphere of platitudes and magnificent reflections on history which were applicable to all times, to all nations and to all periods in history in general: but which, owing to their abstract character, were useless for dealing with the concrete features of the concrete matter in hand. I remember the following particularly glaring example of the incredibly abstract, vapid and general way in which Axelrod presented his case. Twice in his speech (I made a note of this) he touched on the question of bargains, or agreements, between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. Once he touched on it in passing, spoke of it in disparaging terms, and in a word or two expressed his opposition to all agreement. The second time he dealt with it at greater length and said that, speaking generally, agreements were permissible, ex-

cept that they must not be hole-and-corner doings by committees, but public agreements visible and clear to all the workers, and must represent important political steps, or actions. Such agreements, he said, would enhance the significance of the proletariat as a political force, would more clearly and distinctly reveal to it the machinery of politics and the different positions and different interests of the various classes. They would draw the proletariat into definite political relationships, teach it to see its enemies and ill-wishers, and so on and so forth. It was arguments of this kind that Comrade Axelrod's very long "report" consisted of. One cannot relate them—one can only give an idea of them by giving an example or two.

In my report in reply I said, first of all, that Axelrod had painted a very pretty, in fact, a charming picture. He had painted it lovingly and skilfully, applying vivid colours and fine strokes. The only pity was that the picture was not drawn from life. It was a fine picture—there could be no doubt about that—but its subject was purely imaginary. It was a splendid study on the theme of the significance of parliamentarism in general, a fine popular lecture on the functions of representative institutions. The only pity was that he said and explained absolutely nothing about the concrete historical conditions of the existing Russian "parliament", if one may call it that. Axelrod, I said, had given himself entirely away by his remarks on agreements with the Cadets. He had admitted that the importance of such agreements—sometimes inevitable when genuine parliamentarism exists—depended on the possibility of coming out openly before the masses, on the possibility of banishing the old "hole-and-corner" method and substituting for it agitation among the masses, the independence of the masses, and public utterances before the masses.

Magnificent things, sure enough. But are they possible under the Russian "parliamentary" system? Or rather, is this the form that real mass actions take in Russia under the present real (and not pictorial) objective conditions? Is it not the case, Comrade Axelrod, that Social-Democrats are obliged to make the appeals to the masses that you desire by means of illegal leaflets, while the Cadets have newspapers printed in millions of copies at their disposal? Would it not

have been better if, instead of uselessly depicting the charms of parliamentarism (which nobody denies), you had told us how matters really stand as regards Social-Democratic newspapers, meetings, clubs, and unions? Surely there is no need for me to prove to you, a European, that your general remarks about parliamentarism tacitly presuppose newspapers, meetings, clubs and unions, and that all these are part and parcel of the parliamentary system?

Why did Axelrod in his report confine himself to platitudes and abstract propositions? In order to leave in the background the concrete political realities of Russia in the period February-April 1906. These realities reveal much too *sharp* antagonisms between the *autocracy* and the downtrodden but indignant *proletariat and peasantry*. To charm his audience with the picture of parliamentarism in general, he had to tone down these antagonisms, to *blunt* them, to draw an "ideal" plan of an ideal, open agreement with the Cadets; and above all he had to make an *abstraction* of these sharp antagonisms, forget them, say nothing about them.

In order to assess our actual disagreements and not to soar in the skies, I, in my report, compared the two resolutions and analysed them in detail. It appeared that there were four main points of difference between the Menshevik and Bolshevik resolutions on the Duma.

First, the Mensheviks made no appraisal of the elections. At the time of the Congress the elections had been held in nine-tenths of Russia. These elections had undoubtedly provided ample political material for a realistic, and not fanciful, picture of the situation. We weighed up this material very frankly and carefully, and said: it shows that in the vast majority of places in Russia participation in the elections meant supporting the Cadets, and that it was not really a Social-Democratic policy. The Mensheviks say not a word about this. They are *afraid* to put the question on a concrete basis. They are afraid to face the facts and to draw the necessary conclusions from this position between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds. They do not appraise the *actual* elections, their results *as a whole*, because such an appraisal would *prove them wrong*.

Secondly, throughout their resolution the Mensheviks take, or regard, the Duma as a legal institution, and not as

an instrument that expresses the will (or lack of will) of certain elements of the bourgeoisie, not as an instrument that serves the interests of certain bourgeois parties. In their resolution, they speak of the Duma in general, of the Duma as an "institution", as an instrument of popular representation in its "pure" form. This is not a Marxist method of argument but a purely Cadet method; not a materialist but an idealist method, in the worst sense of the word; not a proletarian class method, but one of philistine vagueness.

Take, for example, the following extremely characteristic expression in the Menshevik resolution, I said at the Congress: "(4) that these conflicts [with reaction], compelling the State Duma to seek support among the broad masses..." (I am quoting from the draft which the Mensheviks submitted to the Congress). Is it true to say that the Duma can and will seek support among the broad masses? *Which* Duma? An Octobrist Duma? Certainly not. A Duma of peasants' and workers' deputies? It has no need to *seek* support, for it has, has had, and will have support. A Cadet Duma? Yes, this is true as regards such a Duma, and only such a Duma. A Cadet Duma certainly has to *seek support* among the broad masses. But as soon as you give the Mensheviks' abstract, idealistic and general formulation a definitely class content, you at once see that its wording is incomplete, and therefore wrong. The Cadets *strive* to lean on the people. That is true. That is word for word what our (Bolshevik) resolution on the attitude towards the bourgeois parties says about them. But our resolution goes on to say that the Cadets *waver* between the desire to lean on the people and *fear of its revolutionary independence*. No socialist will dare deny the justice of the words I have underlined. Why, then, did the Mensheviks, in a resolution on the Duma, when it was already known that the Duma would be Cadet in character, tell only *half the truth*? Why did they only note the *bright side* of the Cadets, and say nothing about the reverse side of the medal?

Our Duma is not the incarnation of the "pure idea" of popular representation. Only bourgeois philistines among our Cadet professors can think so. Our Duma is what the representatives in it of definite *classes* and definite parties make of it. Our Duma is a Cadet Duma. If we say that it is striving to lean on the people and do not add that it is afraid of

independent revolutionary activity by the people, we will be telling a downright lie, we will be misleading the proletariat and the whole people. We will be yielding in the most unpardonable way to the mood of the moment, and show that we are under the spell of the victories of a party that wavers between liberty and the monarchy, that we are incapable of appraising the true nature of that party. The Cadets, of course, will praise us for this reticence, but will the class-conscious workers do as much?

Another example. "The tsarist government is striving to check the revolutionary upsurge," say the Mensheviks in their resolution. That is true. But is it only the tsarist government that is striving to do that? Have not the Cadets shown a thousand times already that they, too, are striving *both* to lean on the people *and* to check its revolutionary upsurge? Is it proper for Social-Democrats to put the Cadets in a better light than they deserve?

And I drew the following conclusion. Our resolution says that the Duma will *indirectly* help to develop the revolution. This is the *only* correct formula, for the Cadets waver between revolution and reaction. Speaking *about the Duma*, our resolution plainly and bluntly says that the instability of the Cadets must be exposed. To say nothing about this in a resolution on the Duma means indulging in a bourgeois idealisation of "popular representation in its pure form".

And practical experience has already begun to refute the Mensheviks' illusions. In *Nevskaya Gazeta*,¹⁶⁷ you will even now find statements (not systematically consistent, unfortunately) to the effect that the Cadets in the Duma have not been behaving in a revolutionary way and that the proletariat will not permit "deals between the Milyukovs and the old regime". In saying this, the Mensheviks fully bear out the correctness of my criticism of their resolution at the Congress. In saying this, they are following in the wake of the revolutionary tide, which, although relatively weak, has already begun to reveal the true nature of the Cadets, and is already proving that the Bolshevik presentation of the question is correct.

Thirdly, I said, the Menshevik resolution does not draw a clear distinction between the various types of bourgeois democrats from the point of view of proletarian tactics.

The proletariat must, to a certain extent, march with the bourgeois democrats, or “march separately, but strike together”. But with which section of the bourgeois democrats must the proletariat “strike together”, in the present Duma period? You yourselves, Menshevik comrades, realise that the very existence of the Duma is bringing up this question—yet you dodge it. We, however, have said plainly and bluntly: with the peasant or revolutionary democrats, neutralising, by our agreement with them, the instability and inconsistency of the Cadets.

In reply to this criticism, the Mensheviks (especially Plekhanov, who, I repeat, was the actual ideological leader of the Mensheviks at the Congress) tried to make their position “more profound”. Yes, they exclaimed, you want to expose the Cadets! But we are exposing *all* the bourgeois parties. Look at the last part of our resolution: “to reveal to the masses the inconsistency of *all* the bourgeois parties”, etc. And Plekhanov proudly added that only bourgeois radicals attack solely the Cadets; we socialists expose all the bourgeois parties.

The sophistry hidden in this seeming “deepening” of the question was resorted to so often at the Congress, and is so often resorted to now, that it is worth saying a few words about it.

What is this resolution about? Is it the socialist exposure of all bourgeois parties, or defining which section of the bourgeois democrats can help the proletariat *now* to carry the bourgeois revolution still further forward?

Clearly, it deals with the latter and not with the former question.

If that is clear, there is no point in substituting the first question for the second. As regards the attitude to be adopted towards the bourgeois parties, the Bolshevik resolution clearly speaks of the socialist exposure of all bourgeois democracy, including that of revolutionary and peasant democrats. But as far as present-day proletarian tactics are concerned, the question is not one of socialist criticism, but of mutual political support.

The further the bourgeois revolution advances, the farther left the proletariat seeks for allies among the bourgeois democrats, and the deeper it goes from their upper ranks to their lower ranks. There was a time when help could come

from Marshals of the Nobility and from Mr. Struve, who (in 1901) put forward the Shipov slogan: "Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo".¹⁶⁸ The revolution has gone far beyond that. The upper ranks of the bourgeois democrats have begun to desert the revolution. The lower ranks have begun to awaken. The proletariat has begun to seek allies (for a bourgeois revolution) in the lower ranks of the bourgeois democrats. And today, the only correct definition of the tactics of the proletariat in this respect will be: with the peasantry (who are also bourgeois democrats: don't forget this, Menshevik comrades) and with the revolutionary democrats, paralysing the instability of the Cadets.

And again. Whose line have the first steps of the Cadet Duma proved correct? Reality has already outstripped our debates. Reality has compelled even *Nevskaya Gazeta* to single out the Peasant ("Trudovik") Group¹⁶⁹ in preference to the Cadets, to seek a *rapprochement* with it and to expose the Cadets. Reality has proved that we were right in our watchword: the proletariat's allies until the victory of the bourgeois revolution is achieved are the peasant and revolutionary democrats.

Fourthly, I criticised the last clause of the Menshevik resolution concerning a Social-Democratic group in the Duma. I pointed out that the great bulk of the class-conscious proletariat had not voted. Would it be advisable under these conditions to impose official representatives of the Party on this mass of workers? Can the Party guarantee that the candidates had really been chosen by Party organisations?—

Will not the fact that the first Social-Democratic members of the Duma are expected to come from the *peasant* and town petty-bourgeois curias create a certain danger and an abnormal situation? The first candidates of the Social-Democratic Labour Party to the Duma, not chosen by the workers' organisations, and not under their control.... Comrade Nazar's¹⁷⁰ amendment, which demanded that Social-Democratic candidates to the Duma be *nominated* by local workers' organisations, was rejected by the Mensheviks. We demanded a vote by roll-call, and recorded our dissenting opinion in the minutes.*

* See pp. 303-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

We voted for the amendment moved by the comrades from the Caucasus (to participate in the elections where they have not yet taken place, but not to enter into any blocs with other parties), because the prohibition of blocs, of agreements with other parties, was undoubtedly of great political significance for the Party.

I will add that the Congress rejected the amendment of Comrade Yermansky (a Menshevik who regarded himself as a conciliator), who wanted participation in the elections to be permitted only in those cases where it was possible to carry on agitation among the masses and to organise them on a large scale.

The representatives of the national Social-Democratic parties—the Poles, Bundists and, I think, also the Letts—took part in the debate on this question, and emphatically declared for the boycott. They stressed the necessity of taking specific local conditions into account, and protested against the settlement of a question like this on the basis of abstract arguments.

On the question of the formation of a Social-Democratic group in the Duma, the Congress also passed an instruction to the Central Committee, which, unfortunately, was not included in the decisions of the Congress published by the Central Committee. The Congress instructed the Central Committee to inform *all* Party organisations specifically: (1) whom, (2) when, and (3) on what conditions it has appointed as Party representatives in the parliamentary group, and also to submit periodical reports of the activities of these Party representatives.¹⁷¹ This resolution instructs the local workers' organisations to which the Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma belong to keep control over their "delegates" in the Duma. I will mention, in parenthesis, that this important resolution, which shows that the views of Social-Democrats on parliamentarism differ from those of bourgeois politicians, was unanimously condemned, or ridiculed, both in Mr. Struve's newspaper *Duma*¹⁷² and in *Novoye Vremya*.

Lastly, in concluding my narrative of the debate on the State Duma, I will mention two more episodes. The first was the speech of Comrade Akimov, who had been invited to attend the Congress as a consultative delegate. For the information of those comrades who are not familiar with the his-

tory of our Party, I will say that since the late 1890s Comrade Akimov has been the most consistent, or one of the most consistent, opportunists in the Party. Even the new *Iskra* has had to admit this. Akimov was an "Economist"¹⁷³ in 1899 and subsequent years, and has remained true to type. Mr. Struve, in *Osvobozhdeniye*, has extolled him more than once for his "realism" and for the scholarly quality of his Marxism. There is hardly any difference between Comrade Akimov and the Bernsteinians of *Bez Zaglavii* (Mr. Prokopovich and others). Naturally, the presence at the Congress of such a comrade could not but be valuable in the struggle between the Right and Left wings of Social-Democracy.

Comrade Akimov was the first to speak after the reporters on the question of the State Duma. He said that he did not agree with the Mensheviks on many points, but he fully agreed with Comrade Axelrod. He was in favour not only of going into the Duma, but also of supporting the Cadets. Comrade Akimov was the only consistent Menshevik at the Congress in openly standing up for the Cadets (and not in a covert way, not by saying, for example, that the Cadets were more important than the Socialist-Revolutionaries). He openly rose in arms against the appraisal of the Cadets that I made in my pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*. The Cadets, he said, "are really a party of people's freedom, but a more moderate one". The Cadets are "orphan democrats", said our orphan Social-Democrat. "The Mensheviks have to put up artificial barriers to prevent themselves from becoming accomplices of the Cadets."

The reader will see that Comrade Akimov's speech merely served as additional and convincing evidence of the direction our Menshevik comrades are taking.

The second episode showed this from another angle. This is what happened. In the original draft of the Menshevik resolution on the State Duma proposed by the committee, Clause 5 (on the armed forces) contained the following sentence: ... "Seeing for the first time on Russian soil a new authority, sprung from the depths of the nation, *called into being by the tsar himself and recognised by the law*", etc. In criticising the Menshevik resolution for what may mildly be called its imprudent and optimistic attitude towards the State Duma, I also criticised the words I have underlined,

and said jestingly: should we not add "and sent by God's grace" (meaning authority)? Comrade Plekhanov, a member of the committee, was frightfully angry with me for cracking this joke. What, he exclaimed in his speech, must I listen to these "suspicions of being an opportunist"? (His exact words, as I wrote them down.) I have served in the army myself, and I know the military man's attitude towards authority; I know of the importance he attaches to authority recognised by the tsar, etc., etc. Comrade Plekhanov's resentment exposed his vulnerable spot, and showed still more clearly that he had "overdone it". In my speech in reply to the debate, I said that it was not a matter of "suspicions", and it was ridiculous to use such pitiful expressions. Nobody was accusing Plekhanov of believing in the tsar. But resolutions are not written for Plekhanov; they are written for the people. And it was indecent to disseminate among the people such ambiguous arguments, fit only for Messrs. Witte and Co. These arguments would turn against us, for if we stressed that the State Duma was an "authority" (?? this word alone reveals the excessive optimism of our Mensheviks), and an authority called into being by the tsar, then it would be inferred that this lawful authority must act according to the law, and obey the one who "called it into being".

The Mensheviks themselves realised that Plekhanov had overdone it. On a motion that came from their ranks, the words underlined above were deleted from the resolution.

VI

ARMED UPRISING

The two main questions, the agrarian question and that of the State Duma, together with the debate on the appraisal of the situation, took up most of the attention of the Congress. I do not remember how many days we spent on these questions, but the fact remains that many of those present were beginning to show signs of fatigue, and probably not only of fatigue, but of a desire to shelve some of the items on the agenda. A motion was adopted to accelerate the proceedings of the Congress, and the time allotted for the reports on the question of armed uprising was *cut down* to fifteen minutes

(the reporters on the preceding questions had their time repeatedly extended beyond the allotted half-hour). The questions now began to be rushed through.

The reporter on armed uprising from the "Minority", which predominated at the Congress, was Comrade Cherevanin, and as was to be expected—and as the Bolsheviks more than once foretold—he "slipped down towards Plekhanov", that is to say, he virtually took the view of the *Dnevnik*, with which, before the Congress, many Mensheviks had expressed disagreement. The notes I have on his speech contain sentences like the following: "The December uprising was only a product of despair", or: "The defeat of the December uprising was a foregone conclusion in the very first days." Plekhanov's dictum: "It was wrong to take up arms" ran through his whole speech, which, as usual, was replete with thrusts at the "conspirators" and at those who "exaggerated the importance of technique".

Our reporter, Comrade Winter, vainly tried in his short speech to induce the Congress to appraise the exact texts of the two resolutions. He was even obliged once to refuse to continue with his report. This was when he was about half-way through, and was reading the first clause of the Menshevik resolution: "The struggle is bringing to the forefront the direct task of wresting power from the autocratic government." It transpired that our reporter, a member of the committee entrusted with drawing up a resolution on armed uprising, *did not know* that *at the last moment* this committee had submitted to the Congress a hectographed draft of the resolution in a *new* version, namely, the Menshevik section of the committee, headed by Plekhanov, proposed that the words "*wresting rights by force*" be substituted for the words "*wresting power*".

This alteration of the text of the resolution submitted to the Congress, without the knowledge of the reporter, a member of the committee, was so flagrant a violation of all rules and customs of Congress procedure that in his indignation our spokesman refused to continue with his report. Only after lengthy "explanations" had been made by the Mensheviks did he agree to say a few words in conclusion.

The alteration was truly flabbergasting. A resolution on insurrection speaks, not of the struggle for power, but of the

struggle for rights! Just imagine what incredible confusion this opportunist formula would have caused in the minds of the masses, and how absurd would have been the glaring discrepancy between the majesty of the means (insurrection) and the modesty of the aim (to wrest rights, i.e., to wrest rights from the old regime, to obtain concessions from the old regime, and not to overthrow it).

It goes without saying that the Bolsheviki attacked this amendment with the utmost vigour. The ranks of the Mensheviki wavered. Evidently they had convinced themselves that Plekhanov had again overdone it, and that in practice they would have a hard time of it trying to explain away this moderate and trim appraisal of the aims of insurrection. Plekhanov had to back out. He withdrew his amendment, saying that he did not attach any importance to what was, strictly speaking, merely a matter of "style". This was only gilding the pill, of course. Everybody realised that it was not a matter of style at all.

Plekhanov's amendment clearly revealed what the Mensheviki were aiming at on the question of insurrection: to invent dissuading arguments against insurrection, to repudiate the December uprising, to advise against launching another uprising, to nullify the aims of the insurrection, or define them in such a way as to rule out insurrection as a means of achieving them. But the Mensheviki could not bring themselves to say this straightforwardly and emphatically, plainly and openly. Their position was utterly false: to express their most cherished idea by veiled hints. The representatives of the proletariat can and should openly criticise its mistakes, but to do so in a veiled, ambiguous and vague form is quite unworthy of Social-Democrats. And the Menshevik resolution involuntarily expressed this ambiguous position: dissuading arguments against insurrection, along with a sham recognition of it by the "people".

The talk about technique and conspiratorial methods was too obviously an attempt to distract attention, too crude an attempt to muffle up disagreements on the *political* appraisal of insurrection. To avoid making this appraisal, to avoid saying bluntly whether the December uprising was a step forward and had raised the movement to a higher plane, it was necessary to divert the discussion from politics to

technique, from concrete appraisal of the events of December 1905 to generalities about conspiratorial methods. What a stain on Social-Democracy will be left by this talk about conspiracy in connection with such a *people's* movement as the December struggle in Moscow!

You want to indulge in polemics, we said to the Menshevik comrades; you want to have a "dig" at the Bolsheviks; your resolution on insurrection is full of thrusts at those who disagree with you. Indulge in polemics as much as you like. It is your right and your duty. But don't reduce the great question of appraising historic days to petty and pettifogging polemics. Don't humiliate the Party by making it appear as if, in speaking of the December struggle of the workers, peasants and town petty bourgeoisie, it could do no better than snarl and dig at another Party group. Rise a little higher: write a special polemical resolution against the Bolsheviks, if you want to, but do give the proletariat and the whole people a plain, straightforward and unambiguous answer concerning insurrection.

You shout about the overrating of technique and about conspiratorial methods. But compare the two draft resolutions. In our resolution, you will not find technique, but *historical and political* material. You will find that it is based, not on bare and unprovable platitudes ("the object of the struggle is to wrest power"), but on facts taken from the *history of the movement*, from the political experience of the last quarter of 1905. You lay the blame at the door of another, for it is your resolution that is utterly lacking in historical and political material. It speaks of insurrection, but says not a word about the relation between strike and insurrection, not a word about how the struggle after October necessarily and inevitably led to insurrection; there is not a single plain and straightforward statement in it about December. It is in our resolution that insurrection appears, not as a call from conspirators, not as a question of technique, but as the *political result* of a very specific historical situation created by the October strike, by the promise of liberties, by the attempt to withdraw these liberties and by the struggle to protect them.

Your phrases about technique and conspiracy are only a screen to cover up your *retreat* on the question of insurrection.

At the Congress, the Mensheviks' resolution on insurrection was actually called "a resolution *against* armed uprising". And anyone who at all carefully reads the texts of the two resolutions submitted to the Congress will hardly venture to challenge this statement.*

Our arguments influenced the Mensheviks only in part. Whoever compares the *draft* of their resolution with the resolution they finally adopted will see that they deleted a number of really petty attacks and expressions. But the general spirit of the resolution remained unaltered, of course. It is a historical fact that a Menshevik-dominated Congress, held after the first armed uprising in Russia, betrayed bewilderment, evaded a straight answer, did not have the courage to tell the proletariat in plain language whether this insurrection had been a mistake or a step forward, whether a second insurrection was necessary, and what historical connection it would have with the first.

The evasiveness of the Mensheviks, who wanted to shelve the question of insurrection, who longed to do so but could not bring themselves to admit it, resulted in the question virtually remaining open. The *Party still* has to draw up its appraisal of the December uprising; and all Party organisations must devote the most serious attention to this matter.

The practical aspect of the question of insurrection is also still an open one. In the name of the Congress, it was admitted that the *immediate* (note this!) task of the movement is to "*wrest power*". Why, this formulation is, if you will, ultra-Bolshevik: it reduces the whole matter to a phrase, the very thing that we were accused of doing. But since the Congress has said this, we must be guided by it. We must *on these grounds* very strongly criticise those local and central bodies and organisations of the Party that might forget this *immediate* task. On the basis of the Congress decision we can, and must, put this *immediate* task *first* in certain political situations. Nobody will have the right to object to this,

* In order to help the reader to study the debates at the Congress intelligently and critically, I print in the appendix the texts of the first drafts of the resolutions of the Majority and of the Minority, and the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Congress. Only by carefully studying and comparing these texts can one arrive at an independent opinion on the question of Social-Democratic tactics.

for since the words "wrest rights" have been deleted, and we have secured recognition of "*wresting power as the immediate task*", this will be wholly and entirely in accordance with the line laid down by the Congress.

We advise the Party organisations not to forget this, particularly at a time when our far-famed Duma is being so grossly snubbed by the autocratic government.

During the debate on armed uprising, Comrade Voyinov very aptly hit off the tight spot in which the Mensheviks had landed. To say "wrest rights" means expressing an utterly opportunist formula. To say "wrest power" means throwing away all weapons in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Now we know what orthodox Marxism and conspiratorial heresy are, said Voyinov ironically. "To wrest power" is orthodox: "to conquer power" is conspiracy....

The same speaker depicted the characteristics that are common to all Mensheviks in this connection. The Mensheviks, he said, are impressionists, people who yield to the mood of the moment. When the revolutionary tide rose and October-November 1905 arrived, *Nachalo* galloped off at breakneck speed, and went even more Bolshevik than the Bolsheviks. It galloped from democratic dictatorship to socialist dictatorship. But when the revolutionary tide turned, when enthusiasm ebbed and the Cadets rose to the top, the Mensheviks hastened to adjust themselves to this subdued mood. They now trot behind the Cadets, and disdainfully brush aside the October-December forms of struggle.

Highly interesting confirmation of the foregoing was provided at the Congress by a written statement from the Menshevik Larin. He submitted his statement to the Bureau, and it should therefore be fully recorded in the minutes. Larin's statement said that the Mensheviks had made a mistake in October-December by behaving like Bolsheviks. I heard verbal and informal protests against this "valuable admission" from individual Mensheviks at the Congress, but I will not vouch that these protests were expressed in speeches or statements.

Plekhanov's speech was also edifying. He was talking (if I am not mistaken) about the seizure of power, but in doing so he made a very curious slip. I am opposed to the conspiratorial seizure of power, he exclaimed: but I am wholly

in favour of the seizure of power on the lines of, say, the Convention during the great French Revolution.

We took Plekhanov at his word. Excellent, Comrade Plekhanov, I replied. Put what you have said in the resolution! Condemn conspiracy as sharply as you like—we Bolsheviks will whole-heartedly and unanimously vote for a resolution that recognises and recommends to the proletariat the seizure of power on the lines of the Convention. Condemn conspiracy, but recognise in your resolution a dictatorship like the Convention, and we will agree with you entirely and unreservedly. More than that. I guarantee that the moment you sign such a resolution the *Cadets will stop praising you!*

Comrade Voyinov also pointed to the glaring contradiction in which Comrade Plekhanov had landed as a result of his “slip of the tongue” about the Convention. The Convention was precisely a dictatorship of the lower classes, that is, of the lowest and poorest sections of the town and village population. In the bourgeois revolution this was a body with full powers, wholly and entirely dominated, not by the upper or middle bourgeoisie, but by the common people, the poor, that is, precisely those whom we call “the proletariat and the peasantry”. To recognise the Convention and to oppose the seizure of power means juggling with words. To recognise the Convention and be violently opposed to “the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry” means defeating one’s own purpose. But the Bolsheviks have at all times and invariably spoken about the capture of power by the masses of the people, by the proletariat and the peasantry and not by any “politically-conscious minority” All the talk about conspiracy and Blanquism was just pious declamation, which evaporated at the mere mention of the Convention.

VII

THE END OF THE CONGRESS

Armed uprising was the last question to be discussed more or less thoroughly and on principle at the Congress. The other questions were rushed through or decided without discussion.

The resolution on fighting guerrilla operations was adopted as an addendum to the resolution on armed uprising. I was not in the hall when it was taken; nor did I hear from any of the comrades that the debate on this question was at all interesting. Besides, this is not a question of principle, of course.

The resolution on trade unions and that on the attitude to be adopted towards the peasant movement were passed unanimously. In the committees which drafted these resolutions, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks reached agreement. I will note that the resolution on the peasant movement contains an absolutely correct appraisal of the Cadet Party, and recognises insurrection as "the only means" of winning freedom. Both these points should be kept in mind more often in our day-to-day work of agitation.

The question of amalgamating with the national Social-Democratic parties took up a little more time. Amalgamation with the Poles was accepted unanimously. So was amalgamation with the Letts, I remember: at all events it was accepted without much discussion. There was a big battle, however, over the question of amalgamating with the Bund. As far as I remember, this was carried by 54 votes, or thereabouts. Those voting *in favour* were the Bolsheviks (nearly all), the Centre, and the least factional-minded of the Mensheviks. It was agreed that the local guiding committees of the R.S.D.L.P. should be joint committees, and that all delegates to congresses should be elected according to the general procedure. A resolution was adopted which recognises the necessity of striving for centralist principles of organisation (we proposed a resolution, worded differently, but to the same effect, in which we stressed the practical significance of the concession we had made to the Bund, and urged the necessity of a steady effort to unite the forces of the proletariat more closely and in more up-to-date fashion).

Some of the Mensheviks got quite heated over the amalgamation with the Bund, and accused us of departing from the principles laid down by the Second Congress. The best reply to this accusation is a reference to *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2. In that issue, *long before the Congress*, the Bolsheviks published a draft resolution proposing a number of *further* concessions to *all* the national Social-Democratic parties,

even to the extent of "proportional representation in the local, regional and central bodies of the Party".* In that same issue, No. 2 of *Partiiniye Izvestia*, the Mensheviks in reply to our resolution published a counter-resolution, in which there was *not a single word* to suggest that they disagreed with our proposal to make further concessions to the Bund and to the other national Social-Democratic parties.

I think that this is the best answer to the controversial question whether it was the Bolsheviks who voted *for* the Bund for factional reasons, or the Mensheviks who for factional reasons voted *against* the Bund.

The Party Rules were adopted very quickly. I was a member of the committee that drafted them. The Mensheviks wanted to raise the proportion of the Party membership necessary to authorise the convocation of an extraordinary congress to two-thirds of the membership. Together with my Bolshevik colleagues, I then emphatically declared that the slightest attempt to curtail that minimum of autonomy and of rights of the opposition which had been recognised in the Rules adopted by the factional Third Congress would inevitably lead to a split. It is up to you, Menshevik comrades, I said. If you choose to remain loyal to the agreement and respect all the rights of the minority, all the rights of the opposition,** then we will submit, we will elect our fellow-thinkers to the Central Committee and condemn a split. If you do not, then a split is inevitable.

The Mensheviks agreed to come down from two-thirds to one-half. The Rules were adopted unanimously, including Clause 1, and the principle of democratic centralism. Only two points gave rise to disagreement.

First, we proposed that a note be added to Clause 1, to the effect that members of the Party, on changing their place of residence, should have the right to belong to the local Party organisation.

* See pp. 159-60 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** I will remind the reader that in my pamphlet, *Social-Democracy and the State Duma* (published together with an article by Dan). I pointed out before the Congress that the trend that remained in the minority must be ensured *freedom to criticise the decisions of the Congress and freedom to agitate for another Congress* (p. 8). (See p. 111 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

The purpose of this note was to preclude petty squabbling, the ejection of dissidents from the organisation, and the refusal of Mensheviks to accept Bolsheviks and vice versa. The Party is growing. It is becoming a mass party. Fighting for posts must stop. All the leading bodies in the Party are elected bodies. The local organisation of the Party, however, should be open to all members of the Party. Only this will prevent the ideological struggle from being besmirched by organisational squabbles.

In spite of our insistence, the Mensheviks rejected our note. But to prove that their intentions were loyal, they agreed to adopt the following resolution: "The Congress rejects this note solely because it considers it to be superfluous and *self-evident*" (I am quoting from memory, as I have not found the text of this resolution in my notes). It is very important to bear this resolution in mind in the event of any controversy and organisational friction arising.

The second point on which there was disagreement was the relation between the Central Committee and the Central Organ. The Mensheviks carried the point that the editorial board of the Central Organ is to be elected by the Congress and that the members of the editorial board are to act as members of the Central Committee when questions of policy are discussed (a vague point which will probably give rise to misunderstanding). The Bolsheviks, referring to the melancholy conflicts between writers in the Russian and German* party press, advocated the appointment of the editorial board of the Central Organ by the Central Committee, the latter to have the right to dismiss the editors. In my opinion, the decision of the Mensheviks undoubtedly shows that there is something abnormal in the relations between the writers and the practical-political leaders in the Right wing of our Party.

As a curiosity, I must mention that at the Congress the Mensheviks endorsed the resolution of the Amsterdam International Socialist Congress on the attitude to be adopted towards bourgeois parties.¹⁷⁵ This decision will go down in

* The recent "affair" of the six editors of *Vorwärts* who made quite a fuss because they had been dismissed by the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party.¹⁷⁴

the history of our Social-Democratic congresses precisely as a curiosity. Are not *all* the decisions of international socialist congresses binding on the Social-Democratic parties of *all* countries? What point is there in singling out and endorsing one of these decisions? Who has ever heard that a Social-Democratic party in any particular country has, instead of deciding its attitude towards a particular bourgeois party in its *own* country, taken its stand on the common attitude in all countries towards all bourgeois parties? Before the Congress, both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks drafted resolutions on the attitude to be adopted towards the bourgeois parties in Russia, in the Year of Our Lord 1906. If there was no time to examine this question at the Congress, then it ought to have been simply put off. But to choose this "middle" course of not examining the question of Russian parties, but of endorsing the international decision on the general question, was merely betraying one's confusion to the world. It was like saying: as we haven't the brains to decide what attitude to adopt towards the Russian parties, let us at least repeat the international decision. This was the most inept and ridiculous way of leaving the question open.

Yet the question is an extremely important one. The reader will find the draft resolutions of the Majority and the Minority in the appendix. We recommend those who are interested in this question (and which practical worker, agitator or propagandist is not?) to compare these drafts from time to time with the "lessons of the revolution", that is, with the political facts about the life of various parties that experience in Russia today provides so amply. Whoever makes this comparison will see that the revolution is increasingly corroborating our appraisal of the two main trends among the bourgeois democrats: the liberal-monarchist (mainly, the Cadets) and the revolutionary-democratic trend.

The Menshevik resolution, however, bears obvious traces of the helplessness and confusion which led at the Congress to the curious device of endorsing the international decision. The Menshevik resolution consists entirely of generalities, and makes no attempt to solve (or indicate a solution of) the concrete problems of political life in Russia. We must criticise all parties, says this bewildered resolution: we must expose them, we must state that there are no really consistent

democratic parties. But *how* the *different* bourgeois parties in Russia, or the different types of these parties, should be “criticised and exposed”, the resolution *does not know*. It says we must “criticise”, but it does not know how to criticise; for the Marxist criticism of bourgeois parties consists in a *concrete* analysis of the *class* basis of the different bourgeois parties, whatever it is. The resolution helplessly says there are no really consistent democratic parties. But it does not know how to define the *different degrees* of consistency of the *Russian* bourgeois-democratic parties that have already appeared and are appearing in the course of our revolution. The empty phrases and platitudes in the Menshevik resolution have even obscured the dividing lines of the three main types of bourgeois party in Russia: the Octobrist type, the Cadet type and the revolutionary-democratic type. And these our Right Social-Democrats, so ludicrously helpless when it comes to appraising the class foundations and trends of the various parties in bourgeois Russia, have the effrontery to accuse the Left Social-Democrats of “true socialism”, that is, of ignoring the historically concrete role of the bourgeois democrats! Now this is once again, indeed, laying the blame at someone else’s door.

I have digressed somewhat from my main subject; but I warned the reader at the very outset that I intended to combine my report on the Congress with a few ideas about the Congress. And I think that in order to be able to appraise the Congress intelligently, the members of the Party must ponder, not only over what the Congress did, but also over what the Congress left undone though it should not have. And every thinking Social-Democrat is beginning to realise more clearly every day the importance of a Marxist analysis of the different bourgeois-democratic parties in Russia.

The elections at the Congress took only a few minutes. Virtually, everything had been arranged before the general sessions. The Mensheviks took all five seats on the editorial board of the Central Organ. As for the Central Committee, we agreed to elect three persons to it, the other seven being Mensheviks. What the position of these three will be, as a kind of supervisors and guardians of the rights of the opposition, is something that only the future can tell,

VIII

THE CONGRESS SUMMED UP

Summing up the work of the Congress and the effect it has had upon our Party, we must draw the following main conclusions.

An important practical result of the Congress is the proposed (partly already achieved) amalgamation with the national Social-Democratic parties. This amalgamation will strengthen the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. It will help to efface the last traces of the old circle habits. It will infuse a new spirit into the work of the Party. It will greatly enhance the might of the proletariat of all the peoples of Russia.

Another important practical result was the amalgamation of the Minority and Majority groups. The split has been stopped. The Social-Democratic proletariat and its Party must be united. Disagreements on organisation have been almost entirely eliminated. There remains an important, serious and extremely responsible task: really to apply the principles of democratic centralism in Party organisation, to work tirelessly to make the local organisations the principal organisational units of the Party in fact, and not merely in name, and to see to it that all the higher-standing bodies are elected, accountable, and subject to recall. We must work hard to build up an organisation that will include all the class-conscious Social-Democratic workers, and will live its own independent political life. The autonomy of every Party organisation, which hitherto has been largely a dead letter, must become a reality. The fight for posts, fear of the other "faction", must be eliminated. Let us have really united Party organisations, in which there will only be a purely ideological struggle between different trends of Social-Democratic thought. It will not be easy to achieve this; nor shall we achieve it at one stroke. But the road has been mapped out, the principles have been proclaimed, and we must now work for the complete and consistent putting into effect of this organisational ideal.

We think that an important ideological result of the Congress is that there is now a clearer and more definite line of demarcation between the Right wing and the Left wing in

Social-Democracy. There is a Right and a Left wing in all the Social-Democratic parties in Europe; and their existence in our Party has been evident for a long time. A more distinct line of demarcation between the two, a clearer definition of the points of disagreement, is essential for the healthy development of the Party, for the political education of the proletariat, and for the checking of every inclination of the Social-Democratic Party to stray too far from the right path.

The Unity Congress has provided a wealth of practical, documentary material that will enable us to determine precisely and indisputably what we agree on, what we disagree on, and how much we disagree. This documentary material must be *studied*; we must know the *facts* which reveal the true nature and dimensions of the disagreement. We must wean ourselves of the old circle habits—vehemence, abuse and portentous accusations instead of earnest discussion of particular disagreements that have arisen on particular questions. And we have thought it essential to append to this pamphlet as much *documentary* material as possible on the Unity Congress, to enable the members of the Party to *study* the disagreements really independently instead of taking battered catchwords on faith. This documentary material is dry, of course. Not everybody will have the patience and perseverance to read the draft resolutions and compare them with the resolutions that were adopted, to ponder over the significance of the different formulations of each point and of each sentence. But whoever takes a really intelligent interest in the decisions of the Congress cannot shirk such serious work.

And so, summing up what I have said above about the disputes at the Congress and the different trends of the draft resolutions that the Congress did not discuss (or postponed), I come to the conclusion that the Congress has helped us a great deal to draw a more distinct line of demarcation between the Right wing and the Left wing in Social-Democracy.

The Right wing of our Party does not believe in the complete victory of the present, i.e., bourgeois-democratic, revolution in Russia; it dreads such a victory; it does not emphatically and definitely put the slogan of such a victory before the people. It is constantly being misled by the essentially erroneous idea, which is really a vulgarisation of Marx-

ism, that only the bourgeoisie can independently “make” the bourgeois revolution, or that only the bourgeoisie should lead the bourgeois revolution. The role of the proletariat as the vanguard in the struggle for the complete and decisive victory of the bourgeois revolution is not clear to the Right Social-Democrats.

For example, they—or at all events some of their speakers at the Congress—advance the slogan of a *peasant revolution*, but they do not uphold this slogan consistently. They do not formulate in the programme a clear revolutionary line of propaganda and agitation among the people (*seizure* of the land by revolutionary peasant committees *pending* the national constituent assembly). They are afraid of expressing in the programme of the peasant revolution the idea that the revolutionary peasantry should seize power. In spite of their promises, they do not carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution in agriculture to its “logical” conclusion, for the only “logical” (*and economic*) conclusion under capitalism is the nationalisation of land, which abolishes absolute rent. They invent an incredibly artificial middle course, with nationalisation cut up into local areas and with democratic Zemstvos under an undemocratic central government. They try to scare the proletariat with the bogey of restoration, not suspecting that they are clutching at the political weapon that the bourgeoisie uses against the proletariat, that they are bringing grist to the mill of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

And in their entire tactical line our Right Social-Democrats overrate the importance and role of the unstable, wavering, monarchist-liberal bourgeoisie (the Cadets, etc.) and underrate the importance of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats (the Peasant Union, the Trudovik Group in the Duma, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the numerous semi-political and semi-trade-union organisations, etc.). Their overrating of the Cadets and underrating of the revolutionary-democratic rank and file is very intimately linked with their mistaken views on the bourgeois revolution, referred to above. Our Right Social-Democrats are dazzled by the tawdry successes of the Cadets, by their glittering “parliamentary” victories and by their bombastic “constitutional” speeches. Beguiled by the politics of the moment, they forget the more fundamental and more important interests of democracy;

they forget those forces which make less "noise" on the surface of the "constitutionalism" permitted by the Trepovs and Dubasovs, but which are doing much more profound, if less ostentatious, work among the revolutionary-democratic rank and file, preparing for conflicts of a not quite parliamentary character.

Hence the sceptical (to put it mildly) attitude of our Right Social-Democrats towards insurrection; hence their effort to brush aside the experience of October and December, and the forms of struggle that then arose. Hence their irresolution and passivity in the struggle against constitutional illusions, a struggle which comes into the forefront at every truly revolutionary juncture. Hence their failure to understand the historical role of the boycott of the Duma, and their efforts to dodge the task of taking stock of the concrete conditions of the movement at any particular moment*

* I have just received a copy of Karl Kautsky's new pamphlet entitled *The State Duma*. His formulation of the question of the boycott and that of the Mensheviks are as wide apart as heaven and earth. Our would-be Social-Democrats, like Negorev in *Nevskaya Gazeta*, clumsily blurt out: the boycott is anarchism! But Kautsky, after analysing the concrete conditions, writes: "Under these conditions it is not surprising that the majority of our Russian comrades regarded the Duma convened in this way as nothing more than a most outrageous travesty of popular representation, and decided to boycott it...." "It is not surprising that the majority of our Russian comrades thought it more expedient to fight in order to wreck this Duma and secure the convocation of a constituent assembly, than to take part in the election campaign for the purpose of getting into this Duma."

Oh, how we should like to have Axelrod's platitudes about the benefits of parliamentarism and the harmfulness of anarchism published soon, as a parallel to Kautsky's historically concrete appraisal!

By the way. This is what Kautsky says about the victory of the revolution in the same pamphlet: "The peasants and the proletariat will more and more vigorously and unceremoniously push the members of the Duma to the left [this is what *Nevskaya Gazeta* would contemptuously call "the crude exposure of the Cadets"], will weaken and paralyse their opponents more and more *until they have utterly defeated them*." Thus the *peasantry and the proletariat* will defeat "them", that is, both the government and the liberal bourgeoisie. Poor Kautsky! He does not realise that only the bourgeoisie can make a bourgeois revolution. He is uttering a "Blanquist" heresy: the victory ("dictatorship") of the proletariat and the peasantry.

by use of the "biting" word "anarchism". Hence their extraordinary eagerness to go into a pseudo-constitutional institution and hence their overrating of the positive role of this institution.

Against this tendency of our Right Social-Democrats we must wage a most determined, open and ruthless ideological struggle. We should seek the widest possible discussion of the decisions of the Congress. We must call upon every member of the Party to take a conscious and critical stand on these resolutions. We must see to it that every workers' organisation, after making itself thoroughly familiar with the subject, declares whether it approves or disapproves of any particular decision. If we have really and seriously decided to introduce democratic centralism in our Party, and if we have resolved to draw the masses of the workers into intelligent decision of Party questions, we must have these questions discussed in the press, at meetings, in circles and at group meetings.

But in the united Party this ideological struggle must not split the organisations, must not hinder the unity of action of the proletariat. This is a new principle as yet in our Party life, and considerable effort will be needed to implement it properly.

Freedom of discussion, unity of action—this is what we must strive to achieve. The decisions of the Unity Congress allow sufficient scope for all Social-Democrats in this respect. Practical measures on the lines of "municipalisation" are still a long way off; but in the matter of supporting the revolutionary activities of the peasantry, and of criticising petty-bourgeois utopias, all Social-Democrats are agreed among themselves. Hence we must discuss municipalisation, and condemn it, without being afraid of hindering the unity of action of the proletariat.

As regards the Duma, the situation is somewhat different. During elections there *must* be complete unity of action. The Congress has decided: we will *all* take part in elections, wherever they take place. During elections there must be no criticism of participation in elections. *Action* by the proletariat must be united. We shall all and always regard the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, whenever it is formed, as *our* Party group.

But beyond the bounds of unity of action there must be the broadest and freest discussion and condemnation of all steps, decisions and tendencies that we regard as harmful. Only through such discussions, resolutions and protests can the real public opinion of our Party be formed. Only on this condition shall we be a real Party, *always* able to express its *opinion*, and finding the right way to convert a definitely formed opinion into the *decisions* of its next congress.

Take the third resolution that caused disagreement, the one on insurrection. Here unity of action in the midst of the struggle is absolutely essential. In the heat of battle, when the proletarian army is straining every nerve, no criticism *whatever* can be permitted in its ranks. But before the call for action is issued, there should be the broadest and freest discussion and appraisal of the resolution, of its arguments and its various propositions.

Thus we have a very wide field. The resolutions of the Congress provide plenty of scope. Any infatuation with quasi-constitutionalism, any exaggeration of the "positive" role of the Duma by anybody, any appeals of the extreme Right Social-Democrats for moderation and sobriety—we have in our possession a most powerful weapon against them. This weapon is Clause 1 of the Congress resolution on insurrection.

The Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has recognised that the immediate task of the movement is to *wrest power* from the autocratic government. Whoever forgets about this *immediate* task, whoever attempts to push it into the background, will *infringe* the will of the Congress; and we shall fight all who are guilty of this in the sternest fashion.

I repeat: there is plenty of scope from the parliamentary group to the immediate task of wresting power. Within these wide limits, the ideological struggle can and must proceed without causing a split, without affecting the unity of action of the proletariat.

And we call upon all Social-Democrats who do not want our Party to stray too far to the right to join in this ideological struggle.

MATERIAL FOR APPRAISING THE WORK
OF THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To enable the reader, pending the publication of the minutes of the Congress, to study the questions that were discussed at the Congress with the aid of the records concerned, we append herewith the draft resolutions submitted to the Congress by the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks respectively, together with the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Congress. As we have already stated in the pamphlet, only by studying this material can one gain a clear and precise idea of the true significance of the ideological struggle at the Congress. We also append the more important resolutions that appeared in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, and which were not discussed at the Congress, or not brought up there; for all the delegates had these in mind during the debates and sometimes quoted them, but unless one reads them, one cannot fully understand the nature of the disagreements.

THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM AND THE FIGHT FOR POWER

Novoye Vremya exposes. That newspaper, serving the government which has in practice remained an autocracy, hurls a number of frightful charges against our paper,¹⁷⁶ and warns the Cadets of the dangers the proletarian class struggle holds in store for the bourgeoisie. Besides its usual denunciations to the authorities, the arguments in *Novoye Vremya* contain a number of points that are of vital, public interest.

“Are not the Cadets ashamed,” asks *Novoye Vremya*, “to represent social-revolutionaries [referring to *Volna*] as ‘the vanguard in the struggle for political freedom’? They are nothing of the kind. They are not fighting for freedom, but for power, and as against the old autocracy they are advancing their own sovereignty—the sovereignty of the proletariat.”

Novoye Vremya is a faithful servant of the autocratic government. The servant, in his master’s interests, is at pains to scare the bourgeoisie with the spectre of socialist revolution. That is its first object. Its second object is to depict the revolution now in progress as socialist: to confuse “sovereignty of the people” with “sovereignty of the proletariat”.

It is no accident that the servants of the autocracy resort to trickery and fraud to achieve these two objects. The servants of old autocracies have everywhere and always resorted to such fraud, and not only in newspaper articles, but in all their policy.

That is why it is most important to examine the deception perpetrated by *Novoye Vremya*. First of all, we shall deal with the “horrible” discovery that “they” are fighting, *not* for freedom, *but* for power. Let us see what this means. People’s freedom can be ensured only when the people can really,

without let or hindrance, form their associations, hold meetings, publish newspapers, make their own laws and elect and replace all officials in the state who are entrusted with carrying out the laws and administering the country on the basis of the laws. Thus people's freedom can be really and fully ensured only when all power in the state really and fully belongs to the people. This is absolutely obvious; and it is only the deliberate desire to confuse the minds of the people that prompts such servants of the government as *Novoye Vremya*. It is this obvious truth that is established in the programme of the workers' party. In this programme, the *political* demands that are feasible in bourgeois society, i.e., a society in which the private ownership of the means of production and production for the market prevails, are headed by the demand for the *sovereignty of the people*. Whoever fights for freedom for the people, but does not fight for the sovereignty of the people in the state, is either inconsistent or insincere.

This is how matters stand as regards the struggle for freedom and the struggle for power, arguing in purely logical terms. In the history of the struggle for freedom, the position has always been that the people, in fighting for freedom, at the beginning of their struggle received *promises* from the old regime to the effect that it would ensure their freedom. Prompted by fear of revolution, the old state power, which is independent of the people and is a power over the people, *promises the people* that it will ensure their freedom. But its promises remain unfulfilled; they cannot be fulfilled in their entirety so long as there exists a government which cannot be recalled by the people. And so, at a certain stage in the history of all revolutions, a moment arrives when the obvious logic of the foregoing argument penetrates the minds of the broad masses of the people, under the influence of the lessons taught by experience.

Such a moment is also approaching in Russia. In its historical aspect, the struggle in October 1905 was a struggle for a promise by the old regime to ensure freedom. And a promise is all that the people have succeeded in getting so far. But the numerous unsuccessful efforts to fight for something more have not been in vain. They prepared the people for a more serious struggle. The contradiction between the

promise of freedom and the absence of freedom, between the omnipotence of the old regime, which conducts all affairs, and the impotence of the "people's representatives" in the Duma, who do nothing but talk, is now, precisely as a result of the experience of the Duma, penetrating the minds of the masses more and more clearly, deeply and sharply. The struggle for full power for the people with the aim of ensuring full freedom for the people is approaching with amazing rapidity, not only because of the subjective logic of our arguments, but also because of the objective logic of political events. That is why a few days' sessions of the Duma were sufficient to cause a fresh breeze to blow. The Duma is a splendid instrument of exposure, and it particularly well exposes deceptive ideas about the power of such a Duma, about the value of promises, about the usefulness of constitutions bestowed from above, or of agreements between the old regime and the new freedom. And that is why signs of a new and real step forward by the movement for freedom are revealing themselves so early. The Cadet election victories at first turned everybody's head. The Cadets' behaviour in the Duma is already causing their halo to fade. And advocates of a compromise between the old regime and the new freedom are losing, and inevitably will lose, their glamour in the eyes of the people as the struggle for full power for the people, for full freedom for the people, draws nearer.

Volna, No. 9, May 5, 1906
Signed: N. L—n

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A NEW UPSWING

The opening of the Duma sessions has coincided with the outbreak of Black-Hundred riots. The first steps on the path of "peaceful parliamentarism", a path which caused the Cadets and all philistines in politics to go into raptures and tears of joy, have coincided with the most brutal, most direct and immediate manifestations of civil war. The introduction of the "constitutional" method of deciding affairs of state, the method of ballot-papers and the counting of votes, has coincided with outbreaks of the most primitive violence, with the settlement of affairs of state by exterminating dissidents, by annihilating political opponents (literally annihilating by fire and sword).*

Is this a chance coincidence? Of course not. And it would be inadequate as an explanation to say that the police is organising riots for provocative purposes, for the purpose of discrediting the Duma. Of course, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that the police is directly involved. Of course, the police is organising, inciting and provoking. All this is true. In a war which the bureaucracy is waging, virtually for its very existence, its servants and supporters literally stick at nothing. But why do they have to resort to such methods of struggle, and on such a large scale, precisely at the present time? This question is worth considering in order to avoid ascribing whole periods of revolutionary development to the exceptional viciousness, exceptional blood-thirstiness and exceptional bestiality of the combatants.

* The burning down of the People's House at Vologda by a mob instigated by the police, and the beating up of demonstrators at Simbirsk are the outstanding cases of riots during the past few days.

We are witnessing the beginning of a social revival. The unemployed movement, the May Day demonstrations, the growing unrest among the peasantry and in the armed forces, the meetings, the press, the unions, are all unambiguous indications of this revival. In a matter of days the revival of the broad popular movement has already outstripped the revival that was expressed in the victory of the Cadets and of the "Left" in general at the elections. The Cadets have already fallen behind. The Cadet Duma is already fading—it is withering before it has had time to blossom. This withering of our barren petty-bourgeois flowers, this consternation of the Cadets, is most characteristically expressed, among other things, in an article by Mr. D. Protopopov (a Cadet member of the State Duma) in yesterday's issue of *Duma*. Mr. Protopopov says, complaining and wailing: "The country expects from the State Duma the radical and immediate solution of a number of extremely intricate problems and, above all, the equally immediate practical introduction of the expected reforms." But have a heart, my dear fellow-citizens—wails this Cadet. We have neither a "magician's wand", nor "complete power" (the Cadet forgets to add that neither does the programme, i.e., the political ideal, of the Cadets, include complete power for the people). The State Duma is not the Convention. And from the lips of this Cadet comes the matchless, almost touching admission of a terrified philistine: "Only such a Duma-Convention could satisfy the demands of the bulk of the nation." What is true is true. "The bulk", perhaps the whole mass of the workers and peasants, are demanding a Convention, and all they get is—a Cadet Duma. Poor, poor Cadets! Could they have anticipated that they would be so quickly and so hopelessly overtaken by the rising tide?

And now this great tide is the material basis of the fact that the struggle is becoming extraordinarily acute, that "peaceful parliamentarism" is fading and slipping into the background, and that playing at a constitution is giving way to the settlement of affairs of state by force. The result is the resumption of the October uprising, but on a much wider basis, on a much greater scale, with the masses of the peasantry and the working class more politically conscious and (thanks to what they passed through in the period of

October-December) with incomparably more political experience. In October the combatant forces were equally balanced. The old autocracy proved to be no longer strong enough to govern the country. The people were not yet strong enough to secure complete power that would ensure complete freedom. The Manifesto of October 17 was the juridical expression of this equilibrium of forces. But this equilibrium, which compelled the old regime to make a concession, forced it into recognising freedom on paper, merely signified a temporary halt, but not the cessation of the struggle. In October and November it was said that our government had "gone on strike", that it had been "standing rigid" like a setter over the revolution, that it had paused as it waited for the opportune moment, and had plunged into a desperate battle which ended in its victory. Political philistines, narrow-minded as usual, with the timidity and flabby, Pharisaical "idealism" that is characteristic of them, expostulated, wept, and voiced their indignation at the "immorality" of the government's "strike", of its standing rigid like a setter over the revolution. Their indignation was totally out of place. "In war as in war." In every war, when the belligerents' forces are equally balanced, they pause, gather strength, recuperate, assimilate the experience they have obtained, make preparations, and then plunge into the next battle. This is what happened in the case of the armies of Kuropatkin and Oyama. So it has been, and always will be, in any great civil war. "In war as in war."

But civil war differs from ordinary war by its immeasurably greater complexity, by the fact that the belligerents are unknown and unknowable—because of desertions from one camp to another (Octobrists go over to the side of the government, a section of the armed forces go over to the side of the people), and because it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between "combatants" and "non-combatants". When the government "goes on strike", when the police pauses waiting and "stands rigid", the war goes on just the same, precisely because it is a civil war, because among the population itself there are those who are interested in defending the old regime and those who are fighting for freedom. That is why the present upswing, which has equalised the belligerent forces, is also with inexorable necessity weakening the government,

compelling it to "go on strike", to "stand rigid over the revolution" again to a certain extent, and on the other hand, is leading to a resumption of the October, November and December forms of struggle. Whoever wants to take a conscious stand on the great events unfolding before us, whoever wants to learn from the revolution, must realise that these forms of struggle are inevitable, and must think out the tasks that these forms of struggle impose upon us.

The Cadets, intoxicated with their election victories, have written reams of paper about Russia having taken the path of parliamentarism. The Social-Democrats in the Right wing of our Party have allowed themselves to be carried away by the general stream. At the Unity Congress of the Party, although they were the victors, and in spite of the protests of the Left Social-Democrats, they withdrew their resolution on the upswing of the revolution, on the main forms of the movement at the present time, and on the tasks of the proletariat. They behaved in this respect like Mr. Milyukov who, at the last congress of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, touched on the question whether the people were not more revolutionary than the Duma, whether a revolutionary struggle in the narrow sense of the word was not inevitable, but at once timidly withdrew the question from discussion. It was natural for a Cadet to evade such an issue; but it is unseemly for Social-Democrats to do so, and they are already paying the penalty for this. Forms of struggle are already arising, with elemental force, that are pushing the Duma into the background and are bringing nearer another October and another December, whether we like it or not.

At the Party Congress, a Right Social-Democrat scoffed at the resolution of the Left Social-Democrats which openly and straightforwardly recognised as the "*main* form of the movement", not the toy-constitutional, but the October-December form, i.e., the action of the broad masses, who directly sweep away the old laws and the old instruments of authority, and make use of a new authority, created in the very course of the struggle, as a weapon for winning freedom. There is no evidence of these forms of struggle, exclaimed this Right Social-Democratic speaker. They do not exist, they are the figment of the imagination of our Lefts, those visionaries, those rebels, those anarchists. "Take off your

Cadet spectacles!”—we retorted to this comrade at the Congress. You will then see something more than what is taking place on the surface. You will see that it is not the Duma struggle that is the *main* struggle, you will realise that objective conditions are making the *extra-Duma* forms of the movement inevitable, are making them the main, vital, fundamental and decisive forms.

A week or two has passed since these debates took place at the Congress. And already the revolution is knocking the Cadet spectacles off the noses not only of the Right Social-Democrats, but also of the broad masses of the people. The Duma is already fading, constitutional illusions are being dispelled. The October-December forms of struggle, which only yesterday short-sighted people, and those who yield to the moods of the moment, refused to see, are already approaching. And the Social-Democrats will be failing in their duty to the proletariat if they do not realise that these forms of struggle must inevitably grow and develop, if they do not fully explain to the masses the tasks which the situation is calling forth, and which will soon confront them. The Social-Democrats will prove unworthy of the class they represent if they attempt to evade the study and appraisal of these forms by uttering disparaging catchwords like “rebelliousness” and “Narodnaya Volya-ism” that are so often heard from the Right wing of our Party. The tide is rising spontaneously, and we must do all in our power to bring more consciousness and organisation into this upsurge than we were able to do in October and December.

We must not force the pace of events. It is not in our interest to hasten an explosion at present. There can be no doubt about that. This is the lesson we must learn from the experience of the end of 1905. But this is only a small part of our task: it is a purely negative definition of our tactics. Whoever confines himself to this aspect of the matter, whoever exalts this negative task to something positive, is bound to slide into the role of a bourgeois advocate of compromise between people’s freedom and the autocracy.

The party of the working class has an extremely serious, urgent and fundamental task to fulfil. We must concentrate all our plans, all our efforts, all our propaganda, agitation, organisation and immediate practical work on ensuring that

the proletariat and the peasantry are better prepared for the new, decisive struggle. We cannot will the choice of the forms of this struggle: they are being determined with iron necessity by the historical development of the Russian revolution. We already know from experience what the government's "standing rigid" means, and what the growing agitation among the masses over the rapidly maturing general political crisis means. We know with what dizzying rapidity the October struggle grew, and how inevitably it developed into the December struggle. Therefore let everybody be at his post. Nobody can forecast the moment when things will reach their climax; nobody knows in what order and in what combination the December and October forms of the movement will finally develop. But they are already beginning to develop. The organs of this movement are already springing up. On the solidarity, class-consciousness, self-control and resolution of the advanced class depends in large measure, if not entirely, the outcome of the great revolution.

Volna, No. 10, May 6, 1906
Signed: *N. L—n*

Published according
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THE CONGRESS SUMMED UP

“There are signs,” writes *Rech* today, “that the brilliant success of the opposition has revived old illusions that seemed to have been buried, and threatens to turn the revolutionary movement back to the path of Blanquism, from which the reasonable ‘Minority’ of the Russian Social-Democratic Party made such strenuous efforts to divert it after the unsuccessful ‘armed uprising’ last December.”

This is a valuable admission which the Russian workers would do well to ponder over. Why does the bourgeoisie insult certain Social-Democrats by slapping them on the back and calling them reasonable? Because they have made strenuous efforts to divert the movement from the path of Blanquism, from the “December” path. Is it true that the December struggle was a manifestation of Blanquism? No, it is not. Blanquism is a theory which repudiates the class struggle. Blanquism expects that mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals. Was there such a conspiracy, or anything like one, in December? No, there was not. It was the class movement of vast masses of the proletariat who resorted to the purely proletarian weapon of struggle, the strike, and won over to its side the masses of semi-proletarians (railwaymen, post-office employees, etc.), peasants (in the South, the Caucasus, the Baltic Provinces) and town petty bourgeoisie (Moscow), who had never before been seen on the Russian political scene. The bourgeoisie wants, by using the bogey of “Blanquism”, to belittle, discredit and slander the people’s struggle for power. The bourgeoisie stands to gain if the proletarians and peasants fight only for concessions from the old regime.

The Right Social-Democrats use the word "Blanquism" merely as a rhetorical device in their polemics. The bourgeoisie converts this word into a weapon against the proletariat: "Workers, be reasonable! Fight for the extension of the powers of the Cadet Duma! Pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the bourgeoisie, but don't dare to think of such madness, anarchism, Blanquism, as fighting for complete power for the people!"

Are the bourgeois liberals telling the truth when they say that the Right Social-Democrats have made strenuous efforts to divert the movement from the path and the methods of October and December? Unfortunately, they are. Not all the Right Social-Democrats realised that this is what their tactics meant, but actually this is what they did mean. Insisting on participation in the Duma elections virtually meant supporting the Cadets, who had been burying the revolution and had described the revolutionary struggle as an "old illusion". All of the Unity Congress's three resolutions of major importance in principle, adopted by the Right Social-Democrats against the bitter opposition of the Left Social-Democrats, i.e., the agrarian programme, the resolution on the State Duma and the resolution on armed uprising bear obvious marks of the efforts of the "reasonable section of the Social-Democratic Party" to divert the revolutionary movement from the path of October-December. Take the vaunted "municipalisation". True, as a result of our pressure, Maslov's original proposal for municipalisation was undoubtedly pushed leftward. "Confiscation" was substituted for "alienation"; his proposal now allows for the division of the land; a clause was inserted pledging support for the "revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including confiscation", etc. But for all that, municipalisation, even if a castrated municipalisation, is there. Municipalisation means transferring the landed estates to democratic Zemstvos. The revolutionary peasants will not agree to this. They quite rightly do not, and will not, trust the Zemstvos, even if they are democratic, so long as this local democracy exists side by side with an undemocratic central authority. They will quite rightly reject the proposal to transfer the land to the local and central authorities before the whole, absolutely the whole, administration is elected by, accountable to, and sub-

ject to recall by, the people. But this condition, in spite of the struggle of the Left Social-Democrats, was rejected by the Congress. Instead of voting for transferring the land to the people when all state authorities are elected by the people, the Congress voted in favour of transferring the land to elected local bodies. On what grounds? On the grounds that the idea of seizing power should not be in the programme: that it was necessary to have guarantees against restoration. But the fear lest the revolutionary peasants seize power is a purely Cadet fear of peasant revolution.

As for a guarantee against restoration in the real sense of the word, there can only be one: a socialist revolution in the West. Without this, nothing in the world can guarantee us against restoration of the undemocratic central authority, so long as capitalism, and the always unstable, always wavering, small commodity producer, exist. Consequently, instead of idly dreaming about relative guarantees against restoration, we should be thinking about carrying our revolution through to the end. At the Congress, however, the Right Social-Democrats thought that they had found a guarantee against restoration by adopting a programme that looks very much like a compromise with restoration: we shall guarantee ourselves against restoration of the undemocratic central authority if we say nothing in our agrarian programme about the necessity of completely democratising *this* authority.

Take the resolution on the Duma. The Congress adopted it when the Cadets had already achieved their election victories. And in spite of our protests, the Congress in its resolution speaks of a Duma of people's representatives in general and not of the present Cadet Duma. The Right Social-Democrats did not wish to indicate the two-faced nature of *this* Duma; it did not warn the workers about the counter-revolutionary role which the Cadet Duma is trying to play; it refused to say plainly and definitely that the socialist workers should march with the peasant and revolutionary democrats against the Cadets. It expressed the desire to have a Social-Democratic parliamentary group, without troubling to think whether we have a parliament, or whether we have any Social-Democratic members of parliament.

Take the third of the above-mentioned resolutions. It starts with an ultra-revolutionary phrase, but nevertheless

it is permeated with scepticism, if not hostility, towards the October-December struggle. It says nothing at all about the necessity of taking into account the historic experience that the Russian proletariat and the Russian people acquired at the end of 1905. Nor does it admit that very definite forms of struggle arose out of historical necessity in the past, and are arising again now. We have indicated, only in very brief and general outline, the main defects of the resolutions over which the struggle was waged at the Congress. We shall yet return to these subjects again more than once. The party of the proletariat must carefully discuss and review these resolutions in the light of the new facts that are provided by the Cadet Duma and the rapidly unfolding panorama of the new revolutionary upswing. The party of the proletariat must learn to examine very critically the resolutions of its representatives. And the unanimous chorus of praise coming from the bourgeois press for the reasonable, well-behaved Russian Social-Democrats clearly indicates to the proletariat that the Party must be suffering from some malady.

We must, and will, cure this malady.

Written on May 6 (19), 1906

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Signed: *N. L—n*

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THE DUMA AND THE PEOPLE

The question of the Duma's attitude towards the people is the topic of the day. Everybody is discussing it, and it is being discussed with particular zeal by the Cadets who predominate in the Duma. Here is a very interesting opinion expressed by the Left-Cadet *Nasha Zhizn*, which often reflects the views of the best of the Cadets.

“The question naturally arises, where is the border-line of unity between the Duma and the people? Where is the limit beyond which the Duma will either become the plaything of popular passions or on the contrary, will be dissociated from the people and the parties? The attitudes of the people to the Duma will become dangerous if they are allowed to be spontaneous. Some important event will occur, and an outbreak of spontaneous discontent will at once affect the Duma, which will not find it easy to maintain the position of an independent instrument of the popular will, acting in an organised way. The history of, say, the French Revolution, provides numerous examples of the people's representatives becoming playthings of the mob. But the opposite may happen: complete indifference. Can we say with certainty that if the Duma is dispersed the people will really support it? Will not even those who are demanding immediate and extremely radical decisions from the Duma pass by with a sceptical smile and say: we told you that the Duma was impotent? But what will they do; and when will they do it?”

And the author calls for the organisation of all sorts of clubs and meetings for the purpose of establishing living contacts between the Duma and the people. “Friendly criticism of the Duma and active support for it—this is the noble task of the present day.”

How strikingly these well-meaning utterances of a high-minded Cadet reflect the impotence of his party, and of the Duma in which that party reigns! Clubs, meetings, living

contacts with the people! Why talk so pompously about obvious things? Does it need proof that clubs and meetings are useful? The very first breath of free air that came with the present upswing led to the holding of meetings, the organisation of clubs, the expansion of the press. This will continue, so long as outside obstacles do not put an end to it. But this is all a matter of technique, so to speak. Clubs, meetings, newspapers, the press, petitions (very strongly advocated by our Right Social-Democrats) all help the Duma to know the opinion of the people, and the people to know the Duma. All these things are a thousand times necessary, of course. They all undoubtedly organise and inform. They all serve to establish "contact". But think, what kind of contact? Purely technical contact. The Social-Democratic workers' organisations must carefully watch the Cadet Duma. There can be no argument about that. But however well they are informed and however well they may be organised, their "contact" will not be contact of interests, of identical tasks, or of identical political behaviour. And that is the whole point. Our high-minded radical sees only *how* contacts are established, he has not noticed the *content* of the contacts; he has overlooked the difference in class interests, the difference in political tasks.

Why has he overlooked this? Because, being a Cadet, he is unable to see, or is afraid to admit, that the Cadet Duma is *behind* the broad masses of the people. The Duma is not leading the masses of the politically conscious peasants in the struggle for land and freedom. It is lagging behind the peasants, *restricting* the range of their struggle. Needless to say how far the Duma is lagging behind the proletariat. The Cadet Duma is not the leader of the peasant masses and of the working class, but a "high-minded" mediator, dreaming of an alliance on the right and of sympathy from the left. The Cadet Duma is what the Cadets have made of the Duma. And the party of "people's freedom" is a bourgeois party, wavering between the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary big bourgeoisie, between the desire to lean on the people and fear of the latter's independent revolutionary activity. The more acute the struggle between the people and the old regime becomes, the more intolerable is the position of the mediator, the more impotent will be those who waver.

Hence the dejected tone which marks the above-quoted passage and all the speeches of the Cadets. Hence their bitter complaints about their own impotence. Hence their eternal attempts to throw the blame for their own weakness, irresoluteness and instability on the people.

Ponder deeply over the significance of this fear of a "high-minded" bourgeois radical lest the Duma become the plaything of popular passions, the plaything of the crowd! These wretched people realise that they cannot be the vehicle of popular passion, the leader of the people, and so they blame the people for their own impotence and backwardness, contemptuously refer to it as the crowd, and disdainfully refuse to serve as a "plaything". And yet all the freedom that still exists in Russia was won only by the "crowd", only by the people, who heroically came out into the street, who made countless sacrifices in the fight, and who with their deeds supported the great watchword: freedom or death. All these actions of the people were the actions of the crowd. The whole new era in Russia was won, and is being maintained, only by popular passion.

But you, the party of words about "people's freedom", you dread popular passion, you are afraid of the crowd. And yet you have the effrontery to accuse the "crowd" of being indifferent! You, sceptics by nature, sceptics in your entire programme, sceptics in all your half-hearted tactics, describe the people's disbelief in your phrases as "scepticism"! Your political horizon does not stretch further than the question: will the people support the Duma?

We put the question the other way round. Are the Cadets in the Duma supporting the people? Or are they trailing in the wake of the people? Will these sceptics support the people when it "does" again what it has already done for the cause of freedom? Or will they put spokes in its wheel, damp down its energy, accuse it of anarchism and Blanquism, the spontaneity of folly and the folly of spontaneity?

But the masses of the peasantry and the working class will do as they see fit, contemptuously throwing aside the miserable fears and doubts of the flabby bourgeois intelligentsia. They will not support the Duma. They will support their own demands, which the Cadet Duma has so incompletely and inadequately expressed.

The Cadets think that they are the hub of the universe. They dream about peaceful parliamentarism. They have taken dreams for reality. They, if you please, are fighting, and so they must be supported. But is not the opposite the case, gentlemen? Is it not you who are constantly uttering a phrase that nobody in really parliamentary countries ever thinks of uttering, the phrase: "They will disperse the Duma?" Whoever takes the trouble to ponder seriously over the meaning of this phrase, over the state of affairs in which it has to be uttered, will realise that the future holds out for us either an abomination of desolation painted up with spurious phrases, or new deeds accomplished by the crowd, new deeds accomplished by the great passion of the people.

We cannot expect any help for this cause from the Cadets. Let us hope that the minority in the Duma, the "Trudovik Group" and the "Workers' Group", will take a stand different from that of the Cadets. It is not support for themselves that they will solicit from the people, nor will they proclaim themselves a force in our toy parliament: they will concentrate all their efforts and all their activities on helping in some way to promote the great work ahead.

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Signed: *N. L—n*

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AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS¹⁷⁷

In an article entitled "Liberal Praises", in *Nevskaya Gazeta*, No. 6, Comrade L. M. tries to prove that the bourgeoisie is praising the Right Social-Democrats for being genuine Social-Democrats, and is abusing the Left Social-Democrats for being anarchists. He suggests that the bourgeoisie is particularly afraid of anarchism, because of its crude methods of fighting, bomb-throwing, etc.

This opinion is a downright mockery of the truth.

Does not Comrade L. M. know that the bourgeoisie praised the Bernsteinians in Germany and Millerandists¹⁷⁸ in France precisely for their opportunism, for their attempts to blunt antagonisms in the midst of an intense struggle? Has L. M. become so much "wiser" that he is prone to regard the Bernsteinians and Millerandists as genuine Social-Democrats?

Or let Comrade L. M. think at least about the attitude the Russian liberal bourgeoisie adopted until recently towards the terrorism of the Narodnaya Volya and of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and about their present attitude towards the December forms of struggle. The liberal bourgeoisie after all praised the Socialist-Revolutionaries more than the Social-Democrats, when the terrorism of the former was directed against the hated autocracy. Isn't that so, Comrade L. M.? But what do you think, Comrade L. M., would the liberal bourgeoisie praise the Right Social-Democrats if they were to abandon their *present* position and adopt that of pure parliamentarism? In that case, Comrade L. M., would you say that the liberal bourgeoisie simply did not realise that the pure parliamentarism of the Social-Democrats would *at the present time* be far more harmful for it, and much more useful for the proletariat, than the present position of the Right Social-Democrats?

THE BOLSHEVIK RESOLUTION ON THE STATE DUMA¹⁷⁹

In publishing this draft resolution, we invite the impartial reader to say whether this draft provides any excuse for playing with words like “anarchism”, “Blanquism”, etc. Furthermore, which resolution has been justified by experience: the one adopted by the Congress, or this one? Is it not clear now that none but indirect use can be made of the Duma? Is it not clear now which of these two resolutions more directly meets genuine revolutionary democracy, and more correctly appraises “Cadetism” as it has manifested itself in practice, in the Duma?

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THE WORKERS' GROUP IN THE STATE DUMA

In the State Duma there is a Workers' Group of fifteen. How did these deputies get into the Duma? They were not nominated by workers' organisations. The Party did not authorise them to represent its interests in the Duma. Not a single local organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution (although it might have done) to nominate its members for the State Duma.

The worker deputies got into the Duma through non-party channels. Nearly all, or even all, got in by direct or indirect, tacit or avowed, agreements with the Cadets. Many of them got into the Duma in such a way that it is difficult to tell whether they were elected as Constitutional-Democrats or as Social-Democrats. This is a fact, and a fact of enormous political importance. To hush it up, as many Social-Democrats are doing today, is unpardonable and useless. Unpardonable, because it means keeping in the dark the electorate generally, and the workers' party in particular. Useless, because the fact is bound to come out in the course of events.

In declaring that the formation of a Social-Democratic parliamentary group was desirable, the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. made a mistake by not taking this fact into account. As is evident from the resolution of the Left Social-Democrats* that we published yesterday, this fact was pointed out at the Congress. But it must be stated in fairness that on the insistence of the Left wing, the Congress adopted a very important instruction to the Central Committee of the Party. The failure to print this resolution has left a very serious gap in the Central Committee's publi-

* See pp. 292-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

cation, from which we reproduced the Congress resolutions. The resolution on the parliamentary group instructs the Central Committee to inform *all* Party organisations (1) whom, (2) when and (3) on what conditions the Central Committee recognises as the Party's representative in the State Duma. Further, it instructs the Central Committee to give the Party periodical reports of the activities of the parliamentary group, and lastly, it imposes on those workers' organisations to which the Social-Democratic members of the State Duma belong the duty of exercising special control over these members.

Having mentioned this extremely important resolution, let us proceed to examine the question of the Workers' Group in the Duma. On entering the Duma, Mikhailichenko, the leader of this group, proclaimed himself a Social-Democrat. Through him the Workers' Group clearly expressed its desire to dissociate itself from the Cadets and become a genuine Social-Democratic group.

Such a desire is worthy of all sympathy. At the Congress we were opposed to the formation of an official parliamentary group. Our motives are set out precisely and in detail in our resolution published yesterday. But it goes without saying that the fact that we did not think it opportune to form an official parliamentary group does not in the least prevent us from encouraging *any* desire of *any* workers' representative to *shift* from the Constitutional-Democrat towards the Social-Democrats.

But there is some distance between desire and fulfilment. It is not enough to proclaim oneself a Social-Democrat. To be a Social-Democrat, one must pursue a genuinely Social-Democratic workers' policy. Of course, we fully understand the difficulties of the position of parliamentary novices. We are well aware of the need to be indulgent towards the mistakes that may be made by those who are beginning to pass from the Constitutional-Democrats to the Social-Democrats. But if they are destined ever to complete this passage, it will only be through open and straightforward criticism of these mistakes. To look at these mistakes through one's fingers would be an unpardonable transgression against the Social-Democratic Party and against the whole proletariat.

We must mention at once one mistake that the Workers' Group in the Duma has made. A few days after the vote on the reply to the address from the throne the members of the Workers' Group declared in the press that "they had abstained from voting, but had not made a demonstration of their refusal to vote, because they did not want to be confused with Count Heyden's¹⁸⁰ group". The Cadets are a party that wavers between revolution and reaction. The Heydens on the right and the Social-Democrats on the left must, and always will, demonstrate against this party. The Workers' Group made a mistake by not making a demonstration. Over the heads of the Cadets, it should have openly and plainly stated for all to hear: "You, gentlemen of the Cadet Party, are taking the wrong tone. Your address smacks of a deal. Drop that diplomacy. Speak out loudly and say that the peasants are demanding all the land, that the peasants must obtain all the land without compensation. Say that the people are demanding complete freedom, and that the people will take full power in order to ensure real freedom, and not merely freedom on paper. Do not trust written 'constitutions', trust only the strength of the fighting people! We vote against your address."

Had the Workers' Group said this, it would have performed an act of genuine Social-Democratic workers' policy. By doing so, it would have expressed the interests not only of the workers, but of the whole revolutionary people, which is fighting for freedom. And concerning the rejection of the request for an audience, it would have been able to say: "See, Cadet gentlemen, you have received a good lesson! You are properly punished for the wrong tone of your address. If you continue in the same key, the day will not be far distant when the people will speak of you with the withering scorn of the disillusioned son for his garrulous father'."¹⁸¹

We say again, in order to avoid malicious misinterpretation, that we are criticising the conduct of the Workers' Group, not to reproach its members, but to assist the political development of the Russian proletariat and peasantry.

And with the same object in view, we must point to a serious mistake made by *Nevskaya Gazeta*. "We cannot regard the incident over the address," writes that paper,

“as an excuse for stopping the activities of the Duma”.... “We see no ground for putting the question bluntly just now” (No. 6). This is the wrong tone. It is unseemly for Social-Democrats to pose as people who can in any way be responsible for the Duma. If the Social-Democrats had a majority in the Duma, the Duma would not be a Duma, or else the Social-Democrats would not be Social-Democrats. Let the Cadets bear all the responsibility for the Duma. Let the people learn to cast off constitutional illusions at their expense, and not ours.

You yourselves say, comrades: “The proletariat will not agree to the Milyukovs being left free to strike a bargain with the old regime.” Well spoken. But what, in substance, are the bargains struck by the Cadets? Not personal acts of treachery, of course. Such a crude opinion is utterly alien to Marxism. The substance of the bargains is (and is only) that the Cadets don't abandon, and don't want to abandon, their stand for preserving the old regime and for obeying the commands of this regime. The Cadets, so long as they remain Cadets, are quite right when they say: to abandon this position means putting the question bluntly, providing an excuse for stopping the activities of the Duma.

It is unseemly for Social-Democrats to argue in a way that might give the people cause for seeing in their arguments a justification of the Cadets. It is not our business to justify their hypocritical statements that it was all a question of the Duma's “politeness” and Trepov's “rudeness” (Struve in *Duma*). We must expose that hypocrisy, and show that the “first lesson” which the Cadets have received is a result of the intrinsic duplicity of their whole position, of their entire address. We must not appraise the revolutionary situation in the country from the standpoint of what goes on in the Duma. On the contrary, we must appraise questions and incidents that arise in the Duma from the standpoint of the revolutionary situation in the country.

THE QUESTION OF ORGANISATION¹⁸²

The Bolsheviks plainly stated, in the committee appointed by the Congress to draft the Party Rules, that any attempt to curtail the autonomy of the local organisations and the rights of the opposition as formulated by the factional Third Congress will inevitably lead to a split. That is why the Bolsheviks insisted that the right to call for another Congress should not be restricted, etc. The Bolsheviks proposed that a clause be inserted in the Rules to the effect that members of the Party, on changing their place of residence, should have the right to belong to the local Party organisation. The Congress rejected this proposal, *but adopted a resolution stating that it rejected the clause solely because it was superfluous and self-evident.*

Thus the Mensheviks promised to remain loyal to the agreement, and not to resort to the mean trick of “chucking out” dissidents. Let the Party watchfully see to it that they keep their promise. The Party’s control is the only guarantee that a split will be precluded.

**SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING
HELD IN COUNTESS PANINA'S PALACE,
MAY 9 (22), 1906¹⁸³**

I. BRIEF REPORT IN *NEVSKAYA GAZETA*

Comrade Karpov expressed the opinion that the Duma will not be dissolved, because the Cadets will do everything possible to prevent it. This is already obvious from their activities in the Duma. The Cadets are trying to combine the people's freedom with the old regime. The speaker then went on to deal with the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. The Congress, in his opinion, adopted a resolution on the Duma that was "far from complete and far from correct. We must carry out the decisions of the united R.S.D.L.P., but we shall supplement them in our activities".

In the speaker's opinion, the boycott was not a mistake. The proletariat had told them that it must sweep away this Duma. It failed to do this, but what of that? Of course, the people will only derive benefit from the Duma. The peasants' and workers' deputies will do a lot of good if they act consistently. But pressure on the Duma will be fruitless. When the government stands opposed to the people, we must remember that only the combatant sides can settle the conflict.

We will say to the peasants: learn, comrades, so that you, too, may be ready to support the revolutionary movement when the time comes.

II. BRIEF REPORT IN *VOLNA*

Comrade Karpov replied to him and to citizen Myakotin. He explained to citizen Myakotin that a deal is the practical outcome of negotiations, and negotiations are preparations for a deal. Therefore, citizen Myakotin was quite wrong in what he said about the Cadet Party. Fully recognising that the decisions of the Unity Congress were binding on the whole Party, the speaker, however, stated that some of these resolutions were mistaken, and that this was the cause of the wrong tone taken by Comrade Bartenyev with regard to the Cadet Party. Exposing the Cadet Party, said the speaker, was not merely a matter of abusing it, but the necessary and most advisable means of drawing the broad masses of the people away from the liberal bourgeoisie—which was half-hearted and timid, and was striving to make a deal with the old regime—to the revolutionary democratic bourgeoisie, which was preparing for a decisive struggle for power. To discredit a party like the Cadet Party meant giving a powerful impetus to the political development of the masses of the people. Of course, the time when the conflict will set in does not depend on our will but on the behaviour of the government, and on the degree of the political consciousness and the temper of the masses of the people. Our task is to do all in our power to enable the organised proletariat to be the leader of the victorious revolutionary army both in the present upsurge and in the inevitable decisive struggle ahead.

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE PUBLIC MEETING
IN COUNTESS PANINA'S PALACE,
MAY 9 (22), 1906**

This meeting calls the attention of all citizens to the fact that the autocratic government, by organising riots and constantly intensifying police and military tyranny, is obviously making a mockery of popular representation, and is preparing to resort to force in reply to the universal demand for freedom and to the peasants' demand for land.

This meeting declares that the party of "people's freedom" (Cadets) only timidly and inadequately expresses the people's demands, and is not keeping its promise to proclaim the convocation of a national constituent assembly. We warn the people against this party, which is wavering between people's freedom and the old autocratic regime, which is oppressing the people.

This meeting calls upon the Peasant ("Trudovik") and Workers' Groups in the State Duma resolutely to state their respective demands, and the full demands of the people, absolutely independently of the Cadets.

This meeting calls the attention of all those who value the cause of freedom to the fact that the behaviour of the autocratic government and its utter failure to satisfy the needs of the peasants, and of the people as a whole, is making inevitable a decisive fight outside the Duma, a fight for complete power for the people, which alone can ensure freedom for the people and meet their needs.

This meeting expresses confidence that the proletariat will continue to be at the head of all the revolutionary elements of the People.

THE PEASANT, OR "TRUDOVIK", GROUP AND THE R.S.D.L.P.

Yesterday we examined the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the Workers' Group in the Duma.* Let us now look at the question of the Trudovik Group.

This is the name of the group of 130 to 140 peasant deputies in the Duma who are beginning to dissociate themselves from the Cadets and to form an independent party. This process of dissociation is far from being completed, but it has become quite marked. Goremykin magnificently expressed this by his winged words: one-third of the members of the Duma (the Trudovik and Workers' Groups together roughly make up one-third) are asking for the gallops.

These winged words have clearly defined the difference between the revolutionary and the non-revolutionary (Cadet) bourgeois democrats. In what way is the Peasant Group revolutionary? Not so much in its political demands—which are far from being stated in full—as in its agrarian demands. The peasants are demanding land, and all the land at that. The peasants are demanding land on terms that will really improve their conditions, i.e., without compensation, or with a very moderate compensation. In other words, the peasants are virtually demanding an agrarian revolution, and not agrarian reform. They are demanding a revolution that will not in the least affect the power of money: it will not affect the foundations of bourgeois society, but will very drastically undermine the *economic* foundations of the old serf-owning system, the whole, of semi-feudal Russia—

* See pp. 402-05, of this volume.—*Ed.*

Russia of the landlords and bureaucrats. That is why the socialist proletariat will with all its heart and all its energy help the peasants to achieve their demands in full. Unless the peasants are completely victorious over all their oppressors left over from the old order, it will be impossible to achieve the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But the whole people need such a victory, and the proletariat needs it in the interests of its great struggle for socialism.

But while supporting the revolutionary peasantry, the proletariat must not for a moment forget about its own class independence and its own special class aims. The peasant movement is the movement of another class. It is not a proletarian struggle, but a struggle waged by small proprietors. It is not a struggle against the foundations of capitalism, but a struggle to cleanse them of all the survivals of serfdom. The masses of the peasantry are engrossed in their great struggle. It naturally appears to them that by taking all the land they will solve the agrarian problem. They long for an equalised distribution of the land and for its transfer to all the toilers; but they forget about the power of capital, about the power of money, about commodity economy, which even under the "fairest" division will inevitably again give rise to inequality and exploitation. Engrossed in their struggle against survivals of serfdom, they do not see the subsequent, still greater and more arduous struggle against capitalist society as a whole for the complete achievement of socialism. The working class will always wage this struggle, and for this purpose will organise itself in an independent political party. And the harsh lessons of capitalism will inevitably enlighten the small proprietors more and more rapidly, convincing them that the Social-Democrats are right, and will induce them to side with the proletarian Social-Democratic Party.

The proletariat often hears the bourgeoisie say nowadays: you must march together with the bourgeois democrats. Without their aid the proletariat will be unable to carry out a revolution. That is true. But the question is: with which democrats can and should the proletariat march now? With the Cadet democrats, or the peasant revolutionary democrats? There can be only one answer to this question:

not with the Cadet democrats, but with the revolutionary democrats; not with the liberals, but with the masses of the peasantry.

Bearing this reply in mind, we must not lose sight of the fact that the more rapidly the peasants become enlightened and the more openly they act in politics, the more markedly do all revolutionary elements among the bourgeois democrats gravitate towards the peasantry and, of course, also towards the petty-bourgeois townfolk. Minor distinctions become unimportant. What comes to the forefront is the primary question: are the various parties, groups and organisations going all the way with the revolutionary peasantry? More and more clearly we see the Socialist-Revolutionaries, certain independent socialists, the most Left of the radicals and a number of peasant organisations merging *politically* into one *revolutionary democracy*.

That is why the Right Social-Democrats at the Congress (Martynov and Plekhanov) were greatly mistaken when they exclaimed: "The Cadets are more important as a party than the Socialist-Revolutionaries." Taken by themselves, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a cipher. But as exponents of the spontaneous aspirations of the peasantry, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a part of the broad, mighty revolutionary-democratic masses without whose support the proletariat cannot even think of achieving the complete victory of our revolution. The *rapprochement* between the Peasant, or "Trudovik", Group in the Duma and the Socialist-Revolutionaries is not an accident. A section of the peasantry will, of course, understand the consistent point of view of the Social-Democratic proletariat; but the other section will undoubtedly regard "equalised" land tenure as the solution of the agrarian problem.

The Trudovik Group will no doubt play an important role both inside and, what is more important, outside the Duma. The class-conscious workers must do all in their power to increase their agitation among the peasants, to induce the Trudovik Group to separate from the Cadets, and to get this group to advance full and explicit political demands. Let the Trudovik Group organise itself more compactly and independently, let it enlarge the scope of its contacts outside the Duma, let it remember that the great land

question will not be settled in the Duma. That question will be settled by the people's struggle against the old regime, and not by voting in the Duma.

Today there is nothing more important for the success of the revolution than this organisation, education and political training of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. The socialist proletariat, while ruthlessly exposing the instability of the Cadets, will do everything it can to promote this great work. And in doing so it will shun all petty-bourgeois illusions. It will abide by the strictly class and proletarian struggle for socialism,

Long live the complete victory of the peasants over all their oppressors, the proletariat will say. That victory will be the surest earnest of success in our proletarian struggle for socialism.

Volna, No. 14, May 11, 1906

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THE LAND QUESTION IN THE DUMA

The Cadets' first move in the Duma was to draw up an address in reply to the address from the throne. Instead of a demand, they drew up a timid request. Their second "move" was silently to pass to the order of the day when their request that a deputation be received to present the Address was rejected. This time they behaved still more timidly. Now comes the third move—the debate on the land question, which has been included in the business of the Duma.

All workers should pay particular attention to this question. The land question is the one that is most of all worrying the masses of the peasants; and the peasants have now become the principal and almost the sole allies of the workers in the revolution. The land question will show better than anything else whether the Cadets, who call themselves the party of people's freedom, are loyally serving the cause of people's freedom.

What do the people, i.e., primarily the peasantry, want? The peasants want the land. Everybody knows that. The peasants are demanding that all the land in the country should belong to them. They want to throw off the tyranny of the landlords and the bureaucrats. They want to take the land from the landlords so that the latter may no longer impose labour-service upon them, which is virtually the old *corvée*; and they want to take power away from the bureaucrats, to prevent them from lording it any longer over the common people. The workers must help the peasants in their fight for the land, and also must help them to formulate the land question in straightforward, clear and definite terms.

It is particularly easy to confuse and obscure the land question. It is easy to argue that, of course, land must be allotted to the peasants, and then to hedge this allotting of land around with such conditions as will make it quite useless for the peasants. If the government officials do the allotting again, if the liberal landlords are again appointed as "civil mediators", and if the old autocratic government determines the "modest dimensions" of the compensation to be paid, then the peasants, instead of deriving any benefit, will be swindled as they were in 1861, and there will only be another noose around their necks. Therefore the class-conscious workers must most vigorously explain to the peasants that on the question of the land they should be particularly cautious and distrustful. As matters stand today, the question of compensation, and the question of which authority is to "allot" the land, are of the greatest importance. The question of compensation will serve as an immediate and infallible test of who stands for the peasants and who for the landlords, and also who is trying to desert from one side to the other. The Russian peasant knows—ah, how well he knows!—what compensation means. On this question, the divergence of interests of the peasants and the landlords is splendidly revealed. And the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was therefore quite right in substituting the word "confiscation" (i.e., alienation without compensation) for the word "alienation" in the original draft of the agrarian programme.

On the question of which authority is to allot the land, the interests of the peasants and the government officials diverge as sharply as do those of the peasants and the landlords on the question of compensation. The socialist workers must therefore show especial perseverance in explaining to the peasants how important it is that the land question should not be handled by the old authorities. Let the peasants know that no agrarian reform whatever will be of any use if it is handled by the old authorities. Happily, on this question too, agreement was reached at the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. as regards the substance of the matter, for the Congress resolution unreservedly recognised the necessity of supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry. True, the Congress in our opinion made a mis-

take by not stating plainly that the land reform can be entrusted only to a *fully* democratic state, only to government officials who are elected by, accountable to, and subject to recall by, the people. But we intend to deal with this point in greater detail on another occasion.

In the Duma, two main agrarian programmes will be proposed. The Cadets, who predominate in the Duma, want the landlords to have their own way without harm to the peasants. They agree to the compulsory alienation of a large part of the landed estates, but first, they stipulate compensation, and secondly, they want a liberal-bureaucratic and not a revolutionary-peasant settlement of the question of the ways and means of carrying out the agrarian reform. In their agrarian programme the Cadets, as always, wriggle like eels between the landlords and the peasants, between the old authorities and people's freedom.

The Trudovik, or Peasant, Group has not yet definitely formulated its agrarian programme. It urges that all the land must belong to the working people, but for the time being it says nothing about compensation, or about the question of the old authorities. We shall have more than one occasion to discuss this programme when it is definitely formulated.

The bureaucratic government, of course, refuses to consider even a Cadet agrarian reform. The bureaucratic government, which is headed by some of the richest landlord-bureaucrats, many of them owning tens of thousands of dessiatines of land each, "would sooner accept the Mohamadan faith" (as a certain writer wittily expressed it) than agree to the compulsory alienation of the landed estates. Thus the "*settlement*" of the agrarian question by the Duma will not be a settlement in the true sense of the term, but only a proclamation, only a declaration of demands. In the case of the Cadets, we shall again hear timid requests instead of the proud and bold, honest and open demands befitting representatives of the people. Let us hope that at least on this occasion the Trudovik Group will come out quite independently of the Cadets.

As for the socialist workers, they now have a particularly important duty to fulfill. In all ways and with all their strength they should enlarge their organisation in general,

and their contacts with the peasantry in particular. They should explain to the peasants—as widely, clearly, minutely and circumstantially as possible—the significance of the question of compensation and of whether they can put up with leaving the agrarian reform in the hands of the old authorities. They must strain every nerve to strengthen and enlarge the alliance between the socialist proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry, in preparation for the inevitable climax of the present political crisis. This alliance is the only earnest that the question of “all the land” for the peasants, and of full freedom and complete power for the people, will be effectively settled.

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RESOLUTION AND REVOLUTION

The leading article in yesterday's *Nasha Zhizn*, and in today's *Rech*, *Duma*, *Nasha Zhizn*, *Strana* and *Slovo*—the whole bourgeois press without exception—is storming against the Left Social-Democrats. What has happened? Where is that “victor's” pride which until recently enabled the Cadets scornfully to brush aside the “boycotters”? The hey-day of Cadet hegemony—when those gentlemen taught the proletariat genuine statesmanship and expressed sympathy for its errors—is a thing of the past. What has happened?

Revolutionism is being reborn, answers Mr. Struve in the *Duma* leading article on May 11. He is right. Faith in the *Duma* is dwindling hourly. The notion of how freedom for the people is won becomes clearer as the true face is revealed of the party which, prattling in the name of that freedom, contrived during the elections to take into account both the fact that the people were somewhat tired and the Witte-Durnovo policy which shut the election arena to the true representatives of the true interests of the people. The inevitability of new forms of struggle is strikingly emphasised by the activity of an organisation whose counter-revolutionary nature has become obvious. Yes, the bourgeoisie imagined during the elections that the revolution was at an end and the sweet moment had come when the bourgeoisie could turn to its own benefit the fruits of the struggle of the workers and peasants. But it had misjudged. It had mistaken a temporary lull for the final exhaustion of the revolution, for its end. It had only just settled more comfortably into the *Duma* chairs and begun nicely and politely to discuss with the old regime the terms of an amicable deal at the expense of the workers and peasants. And then, all

of a sudden, it turned out that the workers and peasants were prepared to interfere in the game and upset the deal.

The popular meeting in the Panina Palace seemed particularly outrageous to the Cadet gentlemen. The Social-Democrats' speeches at the meeting stirred up that putrid swamp. "Have a heart," cry the Cadet gentlemen, "you are helping the government with your criticism of our party." It is a familiar argument. Whenever the Social-Democrats step forward to explain to the proletariat and the people as a whole the real meaning of the events that are taking place, to dispel the fog which the bourgeois politicians are spreading over the workers, to warn the workers against the bourgeois traders of people's freedom, and to show the workers their true place in the revolution, the liberal gentlemen cry that this weakens the revolution. Whenever the Social-Democrats say that it does not befit the workers to march under bourgeois banners and that they have a banner of their own, the banner of Social-Democracy, the liberals begin to yell that this renders a service to the government. That is not true. The strength of the revolution lies in the growing class-consciousness of the proletariat, in the growing political consciousness of the peasantry. A Social-Democrat who criticises Cadet policy promotes that consciousness and strengthens the revolution. A Cadet who fools the people by his preachings befogs that consciousness and robs the revolution of its strength. To tell the Cadets that we do not trust them because they do not state the demands of the people fully and emphatically enough, and because they prefer bargaining with the government to fighting against it, does not mean forgetting the government on account of the Cadets.

It means showing the people the road to the real struggle and real victory. When the proletarian and peasant masses gain a clear idea of this road, the Cadets will have no one to bargain with, for the old regime will be doomed to be scrapped.

"You are driving the proletariat to open action," cry the Cadets. Wait a moment, gentlemen! It is not for you to talk of action, not for you, who have built up your political career on the blood of workers and peasants, to mouth Judas' discourses about "useless sacrifice".

At the same meeting, perfectly correct words were spoken fully expressing the conviction of all Social-Democrats that there is no need to urge the proletariat on. In *Volna* anyone could have read that events should not be forced.* But it is one thing to force events and another to force the conditions in which the next act of the great drama is to be played. What we are calling on the proletariat and the peasantry to do is to prepare for that moment, which, after all, does not depend on us alone but, among other things, on the extent to which the Cadet gentlemen will betray the cause of freedom. Our task is to explain the conditions for the struggle, point to its possible forms, show the proletariat its place in the coming struggle, and work to organise its forces and to promote its class-consciousness. And at present this means, among other things, indefatigably unmasking the Cadets and warning against the Cadet Party. That is what we are doing and will continue to do. When the Cadets get agitated and fly into a passion over this, it is a sign that we are not doing our job badly. And when in this connection the Cadets whine pitifully about the revolution being weakened, it is a sign that they already have a clear foreboding that the real revolution, the revolution of the workers and peasants, is about to overwhelm the Cadet Duma. The Cadets fear that the revolution may go beyond the limit which the bourgeoisie has set for its own convenience. The working class and the peasantry must not forget that their interests go beyond these limits and that their task is to carry the revolution through to the end.

And that is what was said in the resolution of the popular meeting, a resolution which made the Cadet Protopopov sigh wistfully as he thought of local police inspectors. You must write more cautiously, gentlemen of the Cadet Party.

Volna, No. 16, May 13, 1906
Signed, —B

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* See p. 390 of this volume.—*Ed.*

NEITHER LAND NOR FREEDOM

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers has communicated to the Duma the government's "declaration" in reply to the Duma's Address.

Everybody has been waiting impatiently for this declaration. It was to set forth the government's programme.

And, indeed, it formulates the government's "programme" in the clearest possible manner. We shall quote its two main points in full.

"As regards the settlement of the peasant land question by the means indicated by the State Duma, namely, by using for this purpose the crown, monastery and church lands, and by the compulsory alienation of privately-owned land, in which must be included the land of peasant proprietors who have acquired it by purchase, the Council of Ministers considers itself in duty bound to declare that the settlement of this question on the lines proposed by the State Duma is absolutely impermissible. The State cannot recognise the right of some to own land and at the same time deprive others of this right. Nor can the State repudiate in general the right to private property in land, without at the same time repudiating the right to own all other property. The principle of the inalienability and inviolability of property is, throughout the world and at all stages in the development of civic life, a corner-stone of national prosperity and social development and the mainstay of the State, without which the very existence of the State is inconceivable. Nor is the proposed measure necessitated by the substance of the matter. With the extensive and far from exhausted resources available to the State, and by the wide application of all lawful methods for the purpose, the land question can undoubtedly be satisfactorily settled without disintegrating the very foundations of our statehood and without sapping the vital forces of our country.

"The other legislative measures proposed in the Address of the State Duma consist in the appointment of Ministers who shall be responsible to the popular representative body and enjoy the confidence of the majority in the Duma, consist in abolition of the Council of State, and in removal of the limits to the legislative functions of the State Duma laid down by special enactments. The Council of Minis-

ters does not consider itself empowered to discuss these proposals: they involve a radical change in the fundamental laws of the State, which by their very nature are not subject to revision on the initiative of the State Duma."

Thus, as regards the *land*: "absolutely impermissible". As regards *freedom*, that is to say, the real rights of the representatives of the people: "not subject to revision on the initiative of the State Duma".

As regards the land, the peasants must depend entirely on the good will of the landlords, entirely on the consent of the landlords. Compulsory alienation of the land is absolutely impermissible. The slightest appreciable improvement in the conditions of life of the peasantry is absolutely impermissible.

As regards freedom, the people must depend entirely on the bureaucrats. Without their consent the people's representatives dare not decide anything. The Council of Ministers even thinks that it is not entitled to discuss the wishes of the Duma as regards the extension of the rights of the people's representatives. The people's representatives must not even think of rights. Their function is to petition. The function of the bureaucrats is to examine these petitions—in the way the Duma's "petitions" were examined in the declaration we have quoted.

Neither land nor freedom.

We cannot here go into a more detailed examination of the declaration itself.

We shall see whether the deputies to the Duma learn anything from this declaration. The Cadets will certainly learn nothing from it. The Trudovik and Workers' Groups must now show whether they have become at all independent of the Cadets—whether they have realised that it is necessary to give up petitioning—whether they are able to talk straightforwardly and clearly to the people.

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ELECTION VICTORY IN TIFLIS

Telegrams from Tiflis report that the Social-Democrats in that city have achieved a complete victory in the elections. Of the 81 electors who were elected, 72 are Social-Democrats, and only 9 are Cadets.¹⁸⁴ In Kutais four deputies have been elected, Social-Democrats all.¹⁸⁵ The candidate for the Duma nominated for Tiflis is Noah Jordania, a very influential Social-Democrat in that city.

We welcome the successes of our comrades in the Caucasus. After the decision of the Unity Congress of our Party, participation in the elections became obligatory, on the condition, however, that the workers' party did not enter into any blocs, i.e., agreements, with other parties.¹⁸⁶ If our comrades in the Caucasus have secured the election of their candidates quite independently, as one may believe was the case in Tiflis, then they have avoided the mistakes made by our comrades in Armavir.¹⁸⁷ In that case the decision of the Congress will have been fully adhered to; we shall have in the Duma truly Party Social-Democrats, elected on strictly Party lines; and soon we shall hear of the appointment by the Central Committee of the official representatives of our Party in the Duma.

Our readers know that we were in favour of boycotting the Duma. At the Congress we voted against the formation of a Social-Democratic parliamentary group, for reasons that were given in detail in the resolution published in *Volna*, No. 12.* These reasons did not involve matters of principle; they were prompted by considerations of pru-

* See pp. 292-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

dence and the practical conditions prevailing. But it goes without saying that, if real party Social-Democrats have now been elected to the Duma on really party lines, all of us, as members of a united party, will do all we can to help them to fulfil their arduous duties.

Let us not exaggerate the importance of the Tiflis victory. We could rejoice whole-heartedly at the parliamentary victories of Social-Democrats if we were really living under conditions of anything like a "serious" and established parliamentary system. But this is not the case in Russia. The present conditions in Russia impose on the Social-Democrats tasks of a magnitude that no Social-Democratic Party in Western Europe has to face. We are incomparably more remote than our Western comrades from the socialist revolution; but we are faced with a bourgeois-democratic peasant revolution in which the proletariat will play the leading role. As an inevitable result of these specific features of the situation, it is not in the Duma that the rapidly maturing political crisis will be solved.

In times such as Russia is now passing through, the participation of Social-Democrats in the elections does not at all mean that the masses really become stronger in the course of the election campaign. Without unfettered newspapers, without public meetings and without wide agitation, the election of Social-Democrats often expresses, not a consolidation of the proletarian and fully Social-Democratic Party, but only a sharp protest of the people. In such circumstances, large sections of the petty-bourgeoisie sometimes vote for any anti-government candidate. Opinions on the value of the boycott tactics for the whole of Russia, if based on the returns of the Tiflis elections alone, would be much too rash and ill-considered.

Nobody can tell as yet what overall role the Cadet Duma will play in the long run. That the Cadets are masters in the Duma is a fact. All Social-Democrats are agreed that the Cadets in the Duma are behaving like bad democrats, like timid and inconsistent, unstable and wavering partisans of people's freedom. Being in command of the Duma, the Cadets are now more than ever spreading constitutional illusions among the people, and thereby befogging the political consciousness of the workers and peasants.

Let us wait and see what experience shows before judging of the extent to which it will be possible to counteract these reactionary strivings of the Cadets within the Duma as well. Let us wish our comrades from the Caucasus, deputies to the Duma, for the first time to speak from this new platform in full voice, to speak the whole, bitter truth, to expose ruthlessly belief in words, promises and scraps of paper, to fill the gaps in our newspapers, which continue to be restricted and persecuted for speaking frankly, and to call upon the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry to pose their problems clearly and distinctly and to settle the impending final contest for freedom outside the Duma.

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GOVERNMENT, DUMA AND PEOPLE

The Duma is at loggerheads with the government. It has passed a vote of no confidence in the Ministry and has demanded its resignation. The Ministry has ignored the Duma's declaration and is jeering at it even more openly than before, suggesting that it should concern itself with the question of providing a laundry for office care-takers in the town of Yuriev.

That is at the bottom of this quarrel, of this conflict between the Duma and the government? The broad masses of the peasantry, the ordinary townspeople, and also a number of bourgeois politicians (the Cadets) imagine, or are trying to convince themselves and others, that the conflict is due to the government not understanding its duties and its position. When this misunderstanding is cleared up, when people become accustomed to the novelty, i.e., to the constitutional regime, to the necessity of deciding affairs of state by the vote of the citizens and not by the orders of the old authority, things will settle down in their normal course. According to this opinion, we are in the presence of a "constitutional conflict", i.e., a conflict between different institutions in a constitutional state which recognises both the old authority and the authority of the representatives of the people. They will get used to each other—this is what the man in the street thinks, and how the bourgeois politician reasons. The man in the street thinks so because of his simplicity and political inexperience. The bourgeois politician thinks so because these thoughts answer to the interests of his class.

For example, Rech, the chief organ of the Cadets, says: "Our Ministers are even less experienced in the theory and

practice of constitutionalism than most of our deputies." The point, you see, is the inexperience of the Ministers who have not taken lessons in constitutional law from Professors Kovalevsky and Milyukov. That is just the point. Well, if they have not learned from books, they will learn from the speeches delivered in the Duma. They will get used to each other. To prove its case, the Cadet *Rech* refers to the German bourgeoisie. The German bourgeoisie, too, was—let us put it mildly—at loggerheads with the government in 1848. It, too, sought, or meant to seek, complete power and complete freedom for the people. After the German Government had suppressed the struggle of the people, the bourgeoisie was permitted to have its representatives in parliament. While the representatives talked, the old authority acted. The representatives talked and explained to the Ministers that they "did not understand"; they taught them "constitutionalism", and kept on teaching them for a matter of fifteen years, from the late 1840s to the early 1860s. In the 1860s Bismarck openly quarrelled with the bourgeois "representatives of the people", but this was the last outburst in the family quarrel. The bourgeoisie was swept off its feet by the victories of the German army, and fully contented itself with manhood suffrage, while the aristocratic and bureaucratic government retained all its powers.

Now it is this last serious quarrel between Bismarck and the representatives of the "people" that the Cadet *Rech* is particularly pleased with. The German bourgeoisie (fifteen years after the revolution had been finally crushed) yielded to Bismarck. But in Russia the bourgeoisie will at one stroke compel Goremykin to yield. And the Cadets are rejoicing in anticipation: Goremykin will have to concede more than Bismarck conceded in his day.

We readily agree that Goremykin is far from being a Bismarck. But we think that it is particularly important now for the working class to understand the *very substance* of the deals between the bourgeoisie and the Bismarcks, whereas the question of the measure of the future concessions is a matter for the future. The Bismarcks made up their quarrel with the bourgeoisie only after the revolution had been finally crushed, when the bourgeoisie had completely betrayed the "people's freedom", when it was living

in peace and harmony with the old aristocratic and bureaucratic authority which was protecting the landlord against the peasant and, above all, protecting the capitalist against the worker.

This was the real and actual basis of the reconciliation between Bismarck and the German Cadets, that is, with the Prussian Progressives. This was the vital background of the "constitutionalism" which the German Kovalevskys and Milyukovs taught the Bismarcks fifteen years after the suppression of the revolution. Perhaps our professors do not know this; professors know their books, but they do not know what goes on in real life. The workers, however, must know this.

The grim struggle that is going on in Russia today is not at all over the concessions on which the Goremykins and the liberal bourgeoisie could agree. The struggle is being waged between the masses of the people, who cannot any longer live in the old conditions, and the old feudal and bureaucratic regime, which cannot exist in truly constitutional conditions. It is not a fight over how the lessons of constitutionalism should be applied, but over whether constitutionalism is possible at all.

This is not a parliamentary conflict, and the Duma itself is far from being a parliament as yet, far from being an instrument of the bourgeois "order" under an established constitution. It is only an indicator and a very feeble reflector of the people's movement, which is growing outside or independently of the Duma.

The Duma's conflict with the government is only an *indirect* indication of the conflict between all the fundamental and mature aspirations of the masses of the peasantry and the working class and the whole intact power of the old regime. These mature aspirations are often briefly expressed by the words: land and freedom. These aspirations have not been met. The forces behind these demands have not developed to the full by a very long way. The conditions under which they can reveal themselves to the full are only just ripening.

It is not to the lessons in constitutionalism given to the Goremykins by the Kovalevskys that we must draw the attention of the people, nor need we keep on recalling

the petty quarrels between the Bismarcks and the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie. The working class and the peasantry will not allow the Cadets to convert the Duma into an arena for such quarrels and such agreements. Every step that expresses the Cadets' leanings in this direction must be exposed. The Trudovik and Workers' Groups in the Duma must know that only by dissociating themselves from the Cadets, only by rising above schoolroom lessons in constitutionalism, only by loudly proclaiming all the demands and needs of the people, only by speaking the whole bitter truth, can they make their greatest contribution to the struggle for real freedom.

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THE CADETS ARE PREVENTING THE DUMA FROM APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE

We have just heard that the following incident occurred in the Duma today. The Bill for the abolition of capital punishment was under discussion. Aladyin, a member of the Trudovik Group, put the question more emphatically than it has been put so far. "We must fight against the executive authority," he said (we are quoting from the stop-press news in the evening edition of *Birzheviye Vedomosti*). "We intend to wear down the Ministers with interpellations; but is it not obvious that they will ignore them? We must choose between two paths: either continue playing at interpellations, or *take the cause of the people into our own hands*." Aladyin proposed that the question be decided at once and not postponed for a month by sending the Bill to a committee. He concluded his speech by saying: "And woe to us *if we do not tell the people the whole truth*, if we do not tell them clearly that the guilt rests on those who control the guns and the machine-guns."

The priest Poyarkov spoke in the same strain. He said: "The government is *mocking* at the State Duma. We must not petition, we must demand: abolish capital punishment today, or at latest tomorrow. If not, then I propose that we all return home, because I think it is dishonest to deliberate here and receive salaries while capital punishment is still in force."

Thus a proposal was heard from the Trudovik Group of which the sense is perfectly clear: appeal to the people, make demands and not requests, ignore the bureaucratic regulations, don't drag out questions, and don't send them to committees.

The Cadets prevented the Duma from appealing to the people. The Cadet Nabokov, who spoke after Poyarkov, called on the members of the Duma "to keep to the legal path". He insisted on the Bill being sent to a committee.

At the close of the debate the Chairman of the Duma (the Cadet Dolgorukov) announced: "We have *four* proposals before us: two of these *I cannot put to the vote*, as they are *contrary to the rules of parliamentary procedure*. These two proposals are: to appeal to the people and to appeal to the monarch."

Of the two other proposals—(1) that the Bill be sent to a committee and (2) that it be discussed immediately—the former was carried *unanimously*, as the latter was withdrawn.

Evidently the Trudovik Group again yielded to the importunities and threats of the Cadets, and did not keep to the resolute position it at first took up.

The people, who realise the meaning of the struggle for freedom, must protest against the Cadets' behaviour in the Duma and call upon the Trudovik Group resolutely and emphatically to declare that it will appeal to the people and to *do so!*

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Signed: *N. L—n*

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THEY WON'T EVEN BARGAIN!

Struve's noblest feelings have been hurt. The government has proved to be more stupid than he thought, and he has found it to be downright unprofitable from a business point of view to deal with the government. Mr. Struve imagined politics to be a very simple thing; as he saw it, the Duma, i.e., the Cadet majority in the Duma, would bargain in courteous' language customary in the most highly cultured merchant quarters; the government would come down a bit, the Duma in its turn would reduce the price, and thus the reign of freedom for the people would come about in Russia. The things the Cadet gentlemen did to bring this about! And suddenly the government shows such an utter lack of understanding, such a complete absence of commercial gumption!

Mr. Struve is indignant:

Of the demands and propositions of the Duma, it (the government) could have evaded some and others it could have accepted and made its own. It could have made radical concessions in the political sphere and tried to reduce some prices in the economic sphere. Or it could have done the opposite. But to reject all the essential points in all the disputed spheres, and to challenge the people's need and the people's conception of their rights by refusing a land reform based on compulsory alienation of private holdings, could have been done only by people whose statesmanship stands at the lowest level.

And so, the demands of the Duma, stated in its Address, constitute a *disputed* field; they are not something *indispensable* that has to be won by all and every means and which must immediately be extended further; they are only a basis for bargaining.

Amnesty, universal suffrage, liberties, and the forcible alienation of land are all disputable; one can haggle over

all of them and—reduce the price, provided the government gives something in exchange.

This has to be remembered. In the heat of his indignation Mr. Struve has blurted out those Cadet tactics to which the Social-Democrats have always called the attention of the people.

The people's demands, even in the curtailed and Cadet-tishly-distorted form in which they have been included in the Address, are not an indispensable minimum for the Cadet Party, but merely the highest price, which it was planned beforehand to reduce. To Mr. Struve's regret, the deal has not come off—for lack of "statesmanship" on the part of the government. According to Mr. Struve's testimony, that statesmanship stands at the lowest level. Why? For the simple reason that the Trepovs and Goremykins and Stishinskys refuse to bargain with the Cadets over the people's rights, which they reject outright.

As for a high level of "statesmanship", it is clear that it consists in openly selling the people's freedom.

Mark that well, workers and peasants! On the eve of Goremykin's Duma speech the Cadet gentlemen believed "statesmanship" to consist in striking a bargain with Trepov over a curtailment of the people's demands expressed in the Address.

To the profound sorrow of the Cadet gentlemen, the deal just does not come off. The conflict between the real interests of the proletariat and the peasantry and the likewise real interests of the old regime, which is fighting to survive, cannot be forced into the framework of diplomatic deals. And it is not because of any particular "level of statesmanship" on the part of Mr. Struve or Mr. Trepov that the Russian revolution cannot adopt a Cadet course. The very nature of the conflicting interests is pushing the Russian revolution on to the path of an open struggle between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces.

That is precisely why the gentlemen who are trading in the people's freedom, and who serve as brokers during the revolution and as diplomats in a time of war, are doomed to be disappointed again and again.

THE MANIFESTO OF THE WORKERS' DEPUTIES IN THE STATE DUMA¹⁸⁸

We warmly welcome the manifesto of the Workers' Group of Duma deputies, who stand closer to us in their convictions than any other group. This is the first appeal that Duma deputies have made, not to the government, but directly to the people. The example of the workers' deputies should, in our opinion, have been followed by the Trudovik, or Peasant, Group in the Duma.

The appeal of the workers' deputies contains much that is true, but in our opinion it also contains certain flaws.

Our worker comrades want "to strive to make the Duma prepare for the convocation of a constituent assembly". They can hardly count on the whole Duma, or even on the majority of the deputies, for this. The liberals, who predominate in the Duma, have repeatedly promised the people that they would convene a constituent assembly; but far from keeping their promise, they have not even openly and firmly voiced this demand in the Duma. In this matter, the workers' deputies can count with any certainty only on the Trudovik Group, on the representatives of the peasants. And that is why the working class cannot set out to support the *whole* Duma: the Russian liberals are too unreliable. The workers would, therefore, do better to concentrate on supporting the *peasant deputies*, in order to stimulate them to speak out independently, and to act like real representatives of the revolutionary peasantry.

The proletariat has proved its ability to fight. It is now mustering its forces to launch another determined struggle, but to launch it only together with the peasantry. The workers' deputies are therefore right in calling upon the

proletariat not to allow itself to be provoked by anyone, and not to enter, unless really necessary, into isolated collisions with the enemy. Proletarian blood is too precious to be shed needlessly and without certain hope of victory.

Only the peasant masses, when they have realised how powerless and inadequate the present Duma is, can serve as a reliable bulwark for the workers that will ensure victory. Although the resolutions and decisions adopted at workers' meetings are very useful in promoting the organisation of the working class for the struggle, they cannot provide a real bulwark against an enemy who has already prepared to reply to the demands of the people with the most brutal violence. On the contrary, the working class must explain to the peasant masses as well that they are mistaken when in their simple-mindedness they place their hopes in requests, resolutions, petitions and complaints.

Affairs in Russia are not moving in the direction where the great argument about the destiny of the people—the question of *land* and *freedom*—can be settled by speeches and voting.

Volna, No. 21, May 19, 1906

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THE LAND QUESTION AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

The Duma is discussing the land question. Two main proposals are offered for the solution of this problem: one advocated by the Cadets, and the other advocated by the "Trudoviks", i.e., the peasant deputies.

Concerning these solutions the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. quite rightly said in its resolution on the attitude to be taken towards the peasant movement: "The bourgeois parties are trying to utilise the peasant movement and to bring it under their control—one (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) in pursuit of their object of utopian petty-bourgeois socialism, and the other (the Cadets) with an eye to preserving, in some measure, large-scale private land-ownership and at the same time, to weakening the revolutionary movement by satisfying the property instincts of the peasantry with partial concessions."

Let us see what this resolution of the Social-Democratic Congress means. The Cadet Party is a semi-landlord party. Many liberal landlords belong to it. It strives to protect the interests of the landlords and agrees only to such *concessions* to the peasantry as are inevitable. The Cadets are striving as far as possible to protect large-scale private landownership and are opposed to complete alienation of all the landed estates for the benefit of the peasantry. The object of their proposal that the peasants should pay compensation for the land, i.e., should *buy* the land from the landlords through the state, is to transform the upper sections of the peasantry into a "party of order". In fact, no matter how this compensation is arranged, no matter how "fair" a price may be fixed for the land, compensation will be an easier matter for the well-to-do peasants and will

fall as a heavy burden upon the poorer peasantry. No matter what regulations may be drawn up on paper providing for purchase by the village community, etc., the land will in practice remain inevitably in the hands of those who are able to pay for it. Hence the compensation scheme will strengthen the rich peasants at the expense of the poor; it will disunite the peasantry and thereby weaken its struggle for complete freedom and for all the land. The compensation scheme is a *bait* held out to the more prosperous section of the peasantry to induce it to *desert* the cause of freedom and to go over to the side of the *old authorities*. Paying compensation for the land means paying ransom to be freed from the struggle for freedom; it means bribing a section of the fighters for freedom to desert to the enemies of freedom. The well-to-do peasant who pays compensation money for his land will become a small landlord, and it will be very easy for him to desert to the side of the old landlord and bureaucratic authorities and remain there.

Hence the resolution of the Social-Democratic Congress is quite right when it says that the Cadet Party (this semi-landlord party) advocates measures that will *weaken* the revolutionary movement, i.e., the struggle for freedom.

Now let us examine the solution of the land problem proposed by the "Trudovik", or peasant, deputies in the Duma. They have not quite cleared up their views as yet. They stand midway: between the Cadets and the "rustics" (Popular Socialist Party), between compensation for part of the land (the Cadets' proposal) and confiscation of all the land (proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries); but they are steadily moving away from the Cadets and drawing nearer to the "rustics".

Is the resolution of the Social-Democratic Congress right in describing the "rustics" as a bourgeois party, whose objects are those of utopian petty-bourgeois socialism?

Let us take the very latest Land Reform Bill proposed by the "rustics" and published in yesterday's issue of their *Narodny Vestnik* (No. 9).¹⁸⁹ This Bill provides for the complete abolition of all private landownership and for "universal and equalised land tenure". Why do the "rustics" want to introduce equalised land tenure? Because they want to abolish the distinction between rich and poor. This is a

socialist aim. All socialists want this. But there are different kinds of socialism; there is even clerical socialism; there is petty-bourgeois socialism, and there is proletarian socialism.

Petty-bourgeois socialism expresses the dream of the small proprietor of how to abolish the distinction between rich and poor. Petty-bourgeois socialism assumes that it is possible for all to become "equalised" proprietors, neither poor nor rich; and so the petty-bourgeois socialists draft Bills providing for universal and equalised land tenure. But in reality, poverty and want cannot be abolished in the way the small proprietor wants to do it. Equalised use of the land is impossible so long as the rule of money, the rule of capital, exists. No laws on earth can abolish inequality and exploitation so long as production for the market continues, and so long as there is the rule of money and the power of capital. Exploitation can be completely abolished only when all the land, factories and tools are transferred to the working class, and when large-scale socialised and planned production is organised. That is why proletarian socialism (Marxism) shows that all the hopes of petty-bourgeois socialism of the possibility of "equalised" small-scale production, or even of the possibility of preserving small-scale production at all under capitalism, are groundless.

The class-conscious proletariat fully supports the peasant struggle for all the land and for complete freedom; but it warns the peasants against all false hopes. The peasants can, with the aid of the proletariat, completely throw off the tyranny of the landlords, they can completely put an end to landlordism and to the landlord and bureaucratic state. The peasants may even abolish all private ownership of land. All such measures will greatly benefit the peasants, the working class, and the whole people. It is in the interests of the working class to render the utmost assistance to the peasants' struggle. But the overthrow of the power of the landlords and the bureaucrats, however complete, will not in itself undermine the power of capital. And only in a society freed from the rule of the landlords and bureaucrats will the last great struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the fight for a socialist system, be fought out.

That is why the Social-Democrats fight so resolutely against the treacherous programme of the Cadets, and warn the peasants against harbouring false hopes about "equalisation". To achieve success in the present struggle for land and freedom, the peasants must be entirely self-reliant and independent of the Cadets. They should not be misled by the discussion of all sorts of land reform Bills. As long as power remains in the hands of the old autocratic, landlord and bureaucratic government, it will be a waste of time to discuss these proposals for "labour norms", "equalisation", etc. The peasants' struggle for the land will only be weakened by this jumble of clauses and regulations in the various Bills, which the old authorities will either throw out or else transform into new instruments for deceiving the peasantry. "Land Reform Bills" will not help the peasants to understand how to obtain the land: if anything, they will make it more difficult. They merely clutter up the question of the power of the old bureaucratic government with petty and trivial legalistic crotchets. They merely muddle heads with hopes of the coming of good, kind government officials, when as a matter of fact the old savage officials retain all their unlimited power of violence. Drop this playing with paper "Land Reform Bills", gentlemen. The peasants will settle the land question easily enough as soon as the obstacle of the old authorities is swept away. Better devote all your attention to the peasants' struggle for the complete removal of all such obstacles.

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THE SORRY GOREMYKINS,¹⁹⁰ THE OCTOBRISTS AND THE CADETS

Yesterday we commented on the latest inglorious victory the Cadets have achieved over the Trudoviks in the State Duma. The Cadets compelled the Trudoviks to withdraw their proposal to appeal to the people and to open the debate on the Bill for the abolition of capital punishment without observing the formalities which reduce the Duma to a wretched and impotent appendage of the bureaucracy.

Today, the sorry Goremykins of *Novoye Vremya* and the Octobrists of *Slovo* fully confirm our appraisal of the Cadets' victory over the Trudoviks. "The Trudovik Group," writes *Novoye Vremya*, "proposed something that ran counter to the law establishing the Duma. It proposed that the Duma should proceed to discuss the substance of the Bill and then to take a vote, without the prescribed one month's interval, and therefore without giving the Minister of Justice an opportunity to express his opinion. The slightest indulgence towards the sort of laxity to which Russians are at times prone to the detriment of the law would have the Duma committing actions that would undoubtedly have been outside the law, with all the consequences that follow from pursuing the smooth and slippery path of "unauthorised action'."

The Cadet speakers, continues *Novoye Vremya*, "hotly protested against the illegal measures proposed by the Trudoviks" and "gained a brilliant victory". Concerning the withdrawal of their proposal by the Trudoviks *Novoye Vremya* observes: "Things ended to everybody's satisfaction, and to the greater triumph of law." It is quite natural for the sorry Goremykins to rejoice at the triumph of *this sort*

of law; nobody expects anything different from them. From the Cadets, unfortunately, too many people expect something different. In conclusion *Novoye Vremya* writes: "Any deputy who follows Mr. Aladyin's example will undoubtedly deserve to be reproached with his unpardonable frivolity."

In the Octobrist *Slovo*, Mr. Hippolit Hofstätter lectures the Cadets and admonishes them in a fatherly way. "Real revolution is in the air," he says. The Cadets don't want that, and therefore, they must be sensible. "As long as the present law provides the slightest opportunity of achieving further, fully legitimate, legal, political and social gains, it is the sacred duty of the intelligently-progressive members of the State Duma to act as a steadfast opposition while keeping within the law, and not to provoke conflicts at all costs...."

The position of the sorry Goremykins and the Octobrists is clear. It is high time we made a clearer and more sober appraisal of the Cadets' position, which is akin to it.

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NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

FREEDOM TO CRITICISE AND UNITY OF ACTION¹⁹¹

The editors have received the following communication, signed by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

“In view of the fact that several Party organisations have raised the question of *the limits within which the decisions of Party congresses may be criticised*, the Central Committee, bearing in mind that the interests of the Russian proletariat have always demanded the greatest possible unity in the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P., and that *this unity in the political activities* of the various sections of our Party is now more necessary than ever is of the opinion:

(1) that in the Party press and at Party meetings, everybody must be allowed *full freedom* to express his personal opinions and to advocate his individual views;

(2) that at public political meetings members of the Party should refrain from conducting *agitation* that runs counter to congress decisions;

(3) that no Party member should at *such* meetings *call for action that runs counter to congress decisions*, or propose resolutions that are out of harmony with congress decisions.” (All italics ours.)

In examining the substance of this resolution, we see a number of queer points. The resolution says that “at Party meetings” “full freedom” is to be allowed for the expression of personal opinions and for criticism (§1), but at “public meetings” (§2) “no Party member should call for action that runs counter to congress decisions”. But see what comes of this: at Party meetings, members of the Party *have the right* to call for action that runs counter to congress decisions; but at public meetings they are *not* “allowed” full freedom to “express personal opinions”!!

Those who drafted the resolution have a totally wrong conception of the relationship between *freedom to criticise* within the Party and the Party’s *unity of action*. Criticism within the limits of the *principles* of the Party Programme must be quite free (we remind the reader of what Plekhanov said on this subject at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.), not only at Party meetings, but also at public meetings.

Such criticism, or such "agitation" (for criticism is inseparable from agitation) cannot be prohibited. The Party's political action must be united. No "calls" that violate the unity of definite actions can be tolerated either at public meetings, or at Party meetings, or in the Party press.

Obviously, the Central Committee has defined freedom to criticise inaccurately and too narrowly, and unity of action inaccurately and too broadly.

Let us take an example. The Congress decided that the Party should take part in the Duma elections. Taking part in elections is a very definite action. During the elections (as in Baku today, for example), no member of the Party *anywhere* has any right whatever to call upon the people *to abstain from voting*; nor can "criticism" of the decision to take part in the elections be tolerated during this period, for it would in fact jeopardise success in the election campaign. *Before* elections have been announced, however, Party members *everywhere* have a perfect right to *criticise* the decision to take part in elections. Of course, the application of this principle in practice will sometimes give rise to disputes and misunderstandings; but *only* on the basis of *this* principle can *all* disputes and all misunderstandings be settled honourably for the Party. The resolution of the Central Committee, however, creates an impossible situation.

The Central Committee's resolution is essentially wrong and runs *counter to the Party Rules*. The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy for local Party organisations implies universal and full *freedom to criticise*, so long as this does not disturb the *unity of a definite action*; it rules out *all* criticism which disrupts or makes difficult the *unity* of an action decided on by the Party.

We think that the Central Committee has made a big mistake by publishing a resolution on this important question without first having it discussed in the Party press and by Party organisations; such a discussion would have helped it to avoid the mistakes we have indicated.

We call upon all Party organisations to discuss this resolution of the Central Committee now, and to express a definite opinion on it.

BAD ADVICE

Comrade Plekhanov, in *Kuryer*,¹⁹² has addressed a letter to the workers. In that letter he advises the workers how to act. He argues as follows. The government is allowing full freedom for the sharpest criticism of the Duma. It is doing so in order to weaken the people's support of the Duma. The government wants to provoke the workers to fight before they are ready. The workers must thwart the government's plans. The fact that bourgeois parties predominate in the Duma should not deter them. The bourgeoisie, which predominates in the Duma, is demanding freedom for all and land for the peasants. Therefore the whole people should support the Duma.

This argument is a mixture of truth and error. Let us calmly examine Comrade Plekhanov's ideas and advice in detail.

According to Comrade Plekhanov's first idea, the government is allowing full freedom for the sharpest criticism of the Duma in order to weaken the people's support of the Duma.

Is that true? Let us see. Where has the sharpest criticism of the Duma been expressed lately? In the columns of such newspapers as *Nevskaya Gazeta*, *Dyelo Naroda*¹⁹³ and *Volna*, and at public meetings. The liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets who are in the majority in the Duma, are beside themselves with rage over this criticism, and particularly over the public meetings held in St. Petersburg. The Cadets even went so far as to express surprise that the police is ignoring socialist meetings.

How has the government reacted? It has suppressed *Dyelo Naroda* and *Nevskaya Gazeta*, and has prosecuted *Volna* three times. It has banned public meetings and has

announced that it will take proceedings against those responsible for the meeting held in the Panina Palace on May 9.

This clearly shows that Comrade Plekhanov is *wrong*. He is guilty of a gross error.

Now let us examine Comrade Plekhanov's second idea. The government wants to provoke the workers to fight before they are ready. The workers would be unwise to allow themselves to be provoked; they would be unwise to issue a call to arms at the present time.

This is quite true, but Comrade Plekhanov expresses this idea so inadequately as to invite the most harmful misinterpretation. He forgets to add, first, that the government's whole conduct and its entire attitude towards the Duma are making inevitable another struggle outside the Duma. Secondly, he does not say that the workers in common with the peasantry will have to take up this struggle despite the wavering and treacherous liberal bourgeoisie.

Comrade Plekhanov does not realise that by inadequately expressing a correct idea he brings grist to the mill of the liberal bourgeoisie, which has secured the banning of socialist meetings. The bourgeoisie is making out that *all* of the socialists' references to the Cadets being no good and to the struggle outside the Duma are a harmful challenge to the workers to fight *immediately*. The bourgeoisie is deliberately lying about the socialists, and Plekhanov, wrongly appraising the political situation, helps these lies.

Take *Volna*, for example, which the bourgeoisie has attacked and reviled most of all. Has *Volna* called for a fight immediately? No. The bourgeoisie was lying about *Volna*. *Two weeks ago Volna* (No. 10) wrote: "We must not force the pace of [i.e., artificially accelerate, drive on, whip up] events. It is not in our interest to hasten an explosion at present. There can be no doubt about that."* That is clear enough, isn't it? Why, then, did the bourgeoisie spread lies and slander about the socialists? Because the socialists were telling the truth when they said that a struggle outside the Duma was inevitable, and that this struggle would be

* See p. 390 of this volume.—*Ed.*

waged by the proletariat and the peasantry *despite* the treachery of the liberal bourgeoisie.

Take the resolution adopted at the meeting in the Panina Palace (this resolution was published in *Volna*, No. 14, and in a number of other newspapers).^{*} Does this resolution call for an *immediate* fight? No, it does not. Why, then, did the liberal bourgeoisie and all the Cadets go mad with rage against this resolution? Because it tells the truth, by exposing first of all the government ("making a mockery of popular representation", "preparing to resort to force"), and then the liberals ("*timidly and inadequately* express the people's demands", "waver between freedom and the old regime"); because this resolution calls upon the Trudoviks, the peasant deputies, *to act resolutely, absolutely independently of the Cadets*; and lastly, because this resolution plainly says that a decisive struggle outside the Duma is *inevitable*. The bourgeoisie has distorted the meaning of this resolution in order to make it appear that the socialists were insanely calling for a fight immediately, and in order to *divert attention* from the charges that were actually being made against the bourgeoisie. It has behaved in this way because it understands its own interests correctly. Comrade Plekhanov is wrong in echoing the bourgeoisie, for he misunderstands the proletariat's real attitude towards the government and the bourgeoisie.

Take Comrade Plekhanov's third idea. "The bourgeoisie in the Duma is demanding freedom for all and land for the peasants." Is this true? No, it is only half true, or only a quarter true. The bourgeoisie is not demanding, but begging from the old authorities. The bourgeoisie has forbidden all talk about "demands" in the Duma. The bourgeoisie (the Cadets) is demanding *such* "freedom", of the press for example, that people can be clapped in gaol or sent to penal servitude for publishing socialist speeches.^{**194} The bourgeoisie is demanding, *not* land for the peasants, but *sale of part of the land* to the peasants (for the payment of compensation is a form of buying and selling). Is Comrade Plekhanov right in keeping silent about this *inadequacy*

^{*} See p. 409 of this volume.—Ed.

^{**} See the article, "The New Draconian Bill", in *Volna*, No. 22.

and *timidity* of the bourgeois proposals, about the wavering of the Cadets? No, he is absolutely wrong. What is the significance of Comrade Plekhanov's mistake? It is extremely dangerous for the proletariat, and jeopardises success in the struggle for freedom. All socialists agree that this struggle will be decided outside the Duma, and that it may flare up, even if we do not wish it, in the not very distant future. In this struggle the proletariat can, and must, march with the peasantry, and *not trust* the wavering, treacherous, turncoat liberal bourgeoisie. There is nothing more dangerous in a fight than trust in turncoats. Keeping silent about the timidity, vacillations and treachery of the liberal bourgeoisie on the eve of a new turn towards a new struggle, we do harm to the proletariat and to the cause of freedom.

Now for Comrade Plekhanov's last idea, or piece of advice. "The whole people must unanimously support the Duma." The fact that bourgeois parties predominate in the Duma should not deter the workers.

It is true that the workers should not be "deterred" by this. In fact, they are not. They are prepared to support the bourgeoisie in the fight against the government. But the question is, *which* bourgeoisie, *how* is it to be supported, and in *which* struggle? It is customary for the Cadets to hush up these questions, which expose their instability; but it is unseemly for the Social-Democrat Comrade Plekhanov to keep silent about them.

Supporting the "Duma" as such means supporting a *Cadet* Duma, for the Cadets predominate there. Marxists should not regard the Duma as an organ of "popular" representation in general. They are in duty bound to inquire which classes this Duma represents.

Can we support a Cadet Duma at all? No, because the proletariat must expose and denounce every wavering and irresolute step the Duma takes. On the very page on which Comrade Plekhanov's article appears, the comrades of *Kuryer* write: "...the Left section of the Duma [i.e., the Trudovik and Workers' Groups] meekly suffer the humiliating and *reactionary* tutelage of Mr. Muromtsev and Mr. Dolgorukov..." (the Chairmen of the Duma, Cadets both). Now that is true. That is exactly what genuine socialists should

say. Can the "people", or the proletariat, unanimously support a "Duma" that is the instrument of the reactionary tutelage of the liberals over the Trudoviks? No, they cannot and will not.

There are two main bourgeois parties in the Duma—the Cadets and the Trudoviks. The former represent the compromising, treacherous bourgeoisie, which is obviously preparing to make a deal with the autocracy and is obviously incapable of waging a resolute struggle. The latter represent the toiling petty bourgeoisie, who are incredibly downtrodden, who dream of an equalised division of the land and who are capable of waging a resolute and self-sacrificing struggle, into which they are being driven by the whole course of events and by the whole conduct of the government. *Which* bourgeoisie should the proletariat support "*immediately*"? The *latter*, warning the "people" against the unreliability of the former. The proletariat must and will support the Trudoviks against the Cadets, exposing the "reactionary tutelage" of the Cadets over the Trudoviks, and calling upon the Trudoviks to throw off this tutelage.

Now for the last question: how to support, and in which struggle? To support anybody in the Duma means voting for him. It is common knowledge that the Workers' Group refused to vote for the Cadet (in general, the "Duma's") reply to the address from the throne. The workers' deputies unanimously refused to "support" the Duma. Were the workers "mistaken" in this, too? If Comrade Plekhanov thinks they were, let him say so plainly; such things must be said without equivocation.

Real and serious support will be given outside the Duma. It is not we who determine this, but the whole course of events, the very nature of the present struggle; for this is not a struggle between the Duma and the Ministry, but a struggle between the people and the old authorities. It is strange and wrong to call such "support of the Duma" merely "support". It will be a resolute fight outside the Duma. The proletariat must start this fight only jointly with the peasantry. The proletariat and the peasantry will win this fight, despite the instability, vacillations and treachery of the liberal, Cadet, "Duma" bourgeoisie, and its philandering with reaction.

We now see how bad is the advice Comrade Plekhanov gives the working class. Our Unity Congress made a slight mistake in pushing the Party somewhat towards the right, and in inadequately appraising the danger of overdoing support of the Cadets. Comrade Plekhanov is making a big mistake by going much too far to the right, and by calling upon the proletariat to support the Cadets and the Cadet Duma fully, completely and without reservation.

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TALK AND RUMOURS ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE STATE DUMA

The newspapers have already commented on the brief communication published by *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*¹⁹⁵ to the effect that it is proposed to adjourn the State Duma on June 15 for the summer recess! Now the news agencies are denying this, but as *Rech* quite rightly says, they are denying it in an ambiguous and unconvincing way.

Nevertheless, the possibility that in a few weeks' time the Duma will be adjourned "for the summer" is real. Hence the question asked by *Kuryer*—whether the Duma will *disperse*—is a very interesting one. *Kuryer* quotes Mr. Rodichev as saying in the Duma: "We will not disperse until we have done what we were sent here to do." And it also quotes another Cadet, Mr. Gredeskul, as saying: "In its struggle [against the government] the Duma still has another very important resource—its legislative power; and only when it has exhausted this will it have the right to disperse, and to announce to the people that it is powerless."

"*Kuryer*" *hopes* that Mr. Rodichev was "in earnest" when he proposed that the Duma should not disperse if the government dissolves it. And so *Kuryer* emphatically supports Rodichev against Gredeskul, and in this connection speaks with legitimate contempt of the prospect of "piling up a heap of laws" (and we will add—some of them positively Draconian, and some timid and irresolute) "only to certify their impotence to the people, and step aside".

We are very glad that our comrades of *Kuryer* have admitted that the Duma will play a ludicrous and sordid role if it merely "piles up a heap of laws" and "displays its impotence". And we are also very glad that our comrades of

Kuryer can speak of the Duma as “the rallying-centre of the forces of the people, the core around which the organisation of these forces is being built up, and the movement is uniting” *only* in connection with the prospect of the Duma *refusing* to disperse. We are ready to admit that the Duma, by *refusing* to confine itself to the present legal limits, could serve the movement better than it is serving it now. The only fight we have seen the Cadet Duma wage so far, however, is that against the timid attempts of the Trudoviks to take this line. We have no “hopes” that Mr. Rodichev spoke “in earnest”. Moreover, we think that if the Rodichevs are at all capable of going beyond the legal limits and of taking a step like that of refusing to disperse, then *the choice of the moment for such a step should not be left to the government*. Refusing to disperse means timing a decisive collision to a moment that will be determined by the government, for it is the government which will decree the dissolution of the Duma. Those who want to choose the best moment for the collision (we mean the Trudoviks, for we have no right to trust the Cadets) must proceed in such a way as *to choose* the moment *themselves*, and not leave it to the government to do so. After all, the government may do nothing to prevent the Cadets from “piling up a heap of laws”, as *Kuryer* puts it so aptly and venomously.

KAUTSKY ON THE STATE DUMA¹⁹⁶

A new pamphlet by K. Kautsky has appeared, entitled *The State Duma* (Amiran Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1906, price 3 kopeks). The author expresses a number of highly interesting ideas on questions that are matters of controversy among Russian Social-Democrats. First of all there is the question of the boycott of the Duma. Our readers are, of course, aware of the cheap manoeuvre to which our Right Social-Democrats resorted and still resort to evade this issue. Their argument is a very simple one. Participation in the parliamentary struggle is Social-Democracy, non-participation is anarchism. *Therefore*, the boycott was a mistake, and the Bolsheviks are anarchists. This is how that sorry Social-Democrat, Comrade Negorev, for example, argued, and how a great many of his friends argue.

Kautsky is a Marxist. *That is why* he argues differently. He thinks it necessary to examine the *concrete historical* conditions in Russia, and not repeat what to Europeans are battered phrases.

“In these circumstances,” writes Kautsky, after briefly describing the Dubasov regime, “*it is not surprising* that the majority of our Russian comrades regarded a Duma convened in this way as nothing more than a most outrageous travesty of popular representation, and decided to boycott it and not take part in the election campaign.”

Kautsky sees nothing surprising in the tactics of “Blanquism” and “anarchism”. It would be very useful for Comrade Plekhanov and all the Mensheviks to think about this, wouldn’t it?

“It is not surprising,” continues Kautsky, “that most of our Russian comrades thought it *more advisable* to fight

in order to wreck this Duma and to secure the convocation of a constituent assembly, than to join in the election campaign in order to get into the Duma."

The inference is clear. In solving concrete historical problems, Marxists must carefully analyse all the political conditions of the moment, and not draw deductions from empty phrases about the antithesis between Blanquism-anarchism, etc.

While it is becoming the fashion among our Social-Democrats to repeat after the Cadets that the boycott was a mistake, Kautsky, examining the question quite impartially, does not even think of drawing such a conclusion. He does not hurry slavishly to bow before the fact that the Duma is being convened, although he is writing at a time when the failure of the attempt to "prevent the Duma" from being convened has already become obvious. But Kautsky is not one of those who after every set-back (like that in December, for example) hastens to repent and to confess "mistakes". He knows that set-backs in the proletarian struggle do not by a very long way prove that the proletariat had made "mistakes".

Another important passage in Kautsky's pamphlet is the one dealing with the question of who, i.e., which classes or groups in society, can win in the present Russian revolution.

"The peasants and the proletariat," writes Kautsky, "will more and more vigorously and unceremoniously [remember this, comrades of *Nevskaya Gazeta* who wrote so approvingly about the "wisdom" of the Cadets] push the members of the Duma to the left, will steadily strengthen *its Left wing*, and steadily weaken and paralyse their opponents, until *they have utterly defeated them*" (p. 8).

Thus, Kautsky expects *the peasants and the proletariat* to win in the present Russian revolution. Will not our Menshevik comrades explain to us the difference between the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry and the victory of the proletariat and the peasantry? Will they not accuse Kautsky of being a Blanquist, or a follower of Narodnaya Volya, because he thinks that the peasants and the proletariat, and not the bourgeoisie, can *win* in a *bourgeois* revolution?

Whoever takes the trouble to ponder over this question will get a clearer idea of the fundamental mistake of the Mensheviks, who are always prone to believe that only the bourgeoisie can be at the head of a bourgeois revolution, and are therefore always scared by the idea of the peasants and the proletariat winning power (and victory in a revolution means winning power).

The third important and valuable idea expressed by Karl Kautsky is that about the Duma being a new centre, an important step forward in the organisation of the movement. "No matter which direction the Duma may take," says Kautsky, "the indirect or direct, the deliberate or unintentional impulses it henceforth gives the revolution will have a simultaneous effect over the whole of Russia, and will everywhere call forth a simultaneous reaction."

This is quite true. Whoever now says the Bolsheviks are advocating that the Duma be "disregarded", or even dissolved—whoever says they are ignoring the Duma—is not telling the truth. At the Unity Congress the Bolsheviks moved a resolution which said:

"The Social-Democrats *must utilise* the State Duma and its conflicts with the government, or the conflicts within the Duma itself, fighting its reactionary elements, ruthlessly exposing the inconsistency and vacillation of the Cadets, *paying particular attention* to the peasant revolutionary democrats, uniting them in opposition to the Cadets, supporting such of their actions as are in the interests of the proletariat,"* etc.

Those who want to judge the Bolsheviks by their resolutions, and not by what the Negorevs say about them, will see that there is *no disagreement whatever* between Kautsky and the Bolsheviks on the question of the *State Duma*.

In his pamphlet Kautsky says nothing at all about a Social-Democratic group in the Duma.

* See p. 293 of this volume.—*Ed.*

CADETS, TRUDOVIKS AND THE WORKERS' PARTY

However distorted popular representation in the State Duma may be by virtue of the election law and the conditions under which the elections were held, it nevertheless provides a fair amount of material for a study of the policies of the various classes in Russia. And it also helps to correct erroneous or narrow views on this question.

The correctness of the division of the bourgeois parties into three main types that the Bolsheviks insisted on in their draft resolution for the Unity Congress is becoming ever more evident.* The Octobrists, the Cadets, and the revolutionary, or peasant, democrats—such are these three main types. We cannot, of course, expect the full and final consolidation of the parties of each type: the open entry of the various classes in Russian society into anything like a free political arena is too recent for that.

The Octobrists are a real class organisation of the landlords and the big capitalists. The counter-revolutionary (anti-revolutionary) character of this section of the bourgeoisie is perfectly obvious. It stands on the side of the government, although still haggling with it over the division of power. The Heydens and Co. sometimes even merge with the Cadets in opposition to the old authorities, but this does not make even the most credulous people, who are taken in by all sorts of "opposition", forget the real nature of the Octobrist Party.

The Cadets are the chief party of the second type. This party is not exclusively connected with any particular class in bourgeois society, but it is thoroughly bourgeois

* See pp. 157-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

none the less. Its ideal is a well-ordered bourgeois society, purged of feudal survivals and protected from the encroachments of the proletariat by institutions such as an Upper Chamber, a standing army, a non-elected bureaucracy, Draconian press laws, etc. The Cadets are a semi-landlord party. They want to ransom themselves from revolution. They long for a deal with the old authorities. They are afraid of independent revolutionary activity by the people. The more this party develops its public political activities, particularly in the Duma, the more marked become its inconsistency and instability. That is why the voices of short-sighted people, who are dazzled by momentary successes, in favour of supporting the Cadets, will never find wide support among the working class.

The third type of bourgeois party is the Trudoviks, i.e., the peasant deputies to the Duma, who issued their programme the other day. Revolutionary Social-Democrats have long been watching the rise of this type of political party in Russia. The Peasant Union was a nucleus of such a party. The radical unions of propertiless intellectuals gravitated towards it to some extent. The Socialist-Revolutionaries developed in the same direction, growing out of the narrow shell that encased them as a group of intellectuals. The variety of types and shades of this trend fully corresponds to the variety of types and vast numbers of the "toiling" petty bourgeoisie in Russia. The main bulwark of this trend, of these parties, is the peasantry. Objective conditions compel the peasantry to wage a determined struggle against landlordism, against the power of the landlords and the whole of the old political system that is closely connected with it. *These* bourgeois democrats are *compelled* to become revolutionary, whereas the liberals, the Cadets and so forth, represent the bourgeoisie, whose conditions of existence *compel* it to seek a deal with the old authorities. It is natural also that the peasantry should clothe its aspirations in the mantle of utopias, i.e., unrealisable hopes, such as equalised land tenure under capitalism.

Being aware that its class interests differ from the interests of the revolutionary democrats, the proletariat is compelled to organise in a strictly independent class party. But its duty to criticise idle dreams never causes the socia-

list proletariat to forget its positive duty to do all it can to support the revolutionary democrats in their struggle against the old authorities and the old order, warning the people against the instability of the liberal bourgeoisie, and counteracting the harmful effects of this instability by its fighting agreement with the revolutionary peasantry.

Such should be the *basis* of all the tactics, of the whole political conduct of the Social-Democratic proletariat at the present time. To be able to act in common with the peasantry, it must strive to enlighten, rouse, and draw the peasantry into the struggle, while at the same time steadily weaning it from its faith in "petitions" and "resolutions", and in the Duma, that all-Russian institution for petitioners. "To make the broad masses of the people realise the utter uselessness of the Duma" (resolutions of the Unity Congress)—such is the proletariat's task. And for the sake of joint actions with the peasantry, it must strictly refrain from isolated and untimely outbreaks. But bearing in mind this very same object—ensuring success in the inevitably coming struggle—it must most ruthlessly expose the instability of the Cadets, emphasise as clearly as possible "the utter uselessness of the Duma", and most resolutely counteract every attempt to obscure the distinctions between the Cadets and the Trudoviks.

This is the light in which the socialist proletariat should appraise the relations between the Cadets and the Trudoviks. Take the land reform question. The Cadets advocate *compensation*. The Trudoviks declare only for some *reward*—perhaps in the shape of pensions, or free places in an alms-house. *Volna* has already explained the vast difference between compensation and a free place in an alms-house. The workers' party demands the *confiscation* of the land, i.e., alienation without compensation or reward, although, of course, it does not reject the idea of sheltering indigent landlords in alms-houses. Obviously, the workers' party must support the Trudoviks against the Cadets. Compensation for the land has already once before had a most harmful effect in Russia, ruining the peasants, enriching the landlords and strengthening the old state power. Compensation can be advocated in Russia today only by those who are half-supporters of the government.

Take the political programme. The Cadets want an Upper Chamber and incomplete people's rule. The Trudoviks emphatically declare that over a parliament elected by universal etc., suffrage, there must be "no superstructure or barriers in the shape of a Council of State, House of Lords, Second Chamber, and so forth". The Trudovik Group accepts almost in its entirety the workers' minimum programme, including an eight-hour day, etc. Obviously, here, too, the workers' party must support the Trudoviks in opposition to the Cadets.

Let us take the question of what to do with the land. The Cadets want to leave part of the land in the possession of the peasants and the landlords, and to transfer part of it to the state. The Trudoviks want to transfer all the land to the state, although not all at once, and to introduce equalised tenure. Obviously the Trudoviks *go further* than the Cadets in the struggle against landlordism, and against the private ownership of land in general. The workers' party would be committing a gross error if, in this question as well, it did not support the Trudoviks in opposition to the Cadets. The fact that both parties are mistaken should not serve the workers' party as an excuse for refusing to support the genuinely revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Both the Cadets and the Trudoviks are mistaken in thinking that even part of the land can be transferred to a state that is far from democratic. Division of the land would be far better than transferring it to such a state. Unfortunately, the Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. also made this mistake by allowing for the transfer of part of the land to a "democratic" state, without *specifying* the *degree* and *fulness* of the democracy of that state. This comparison between the Cadet and Trudovik programmes shows up with particular clearness the mistake committed by the Social-Democratic Congress.

The Trudoviks are also mistaken in believing that "equalised" land tenure is possible in a commodity economy. The workers' party must emphatically expose and refute this petty-bourgeois utopia.

But it would be unwise to allow this fight against the trivial *dreams* of the small proprietors to obscure the genuinely revolutionary *action* of this class in the present

revolution. A Marxist cannot do that. This mistake is committed, for example, by *Kuryer* when it says (No. 5): "In its main features, the Bill proposed by the Trudovik Group is far from satisfactory [this is true!] and does not deserve the support of the working class [this is not true!]."

In this, too, the workers' party must support the Trudoviks in opposition to the Cadets, while preserving its complete independence. In exposing the mistakes of the Cadets and the Trudoviks, we must not forget that the latter go further than the former, that the Trudoviks' mistakes will be of practical importance at a higher stage of the revolution than are those of the Cadets. With the help of the Cadets, the people are *casting off* illusions about the possibility of combining people's freedom with the old authorities. With the help of the Trudoviks, the people *will cast off* illusions about the possibility of combining "equalisation" with capitalism. With the help of the Cadets, the people are casting off their first bourgeois illusions; with the help of the Trudoviks, the people will cast off their last bourgeois illusions. The Cadet illusions are an obstacle to the victory of the bourgeois revolution. The Trudoviks' mistakes will be an obstacle to the immediate victory of socialism (but the workers are not uselessly dreaming about an immediate victory for socialism). Hence the vast difference between the Cadets and the Trudoviks: and the workers' party must take this difference strictly into account.

If we did not do this, we would convert the socialist proletariat from the vanguard of the revolution, the more class-conscious adviser of the peasantry, into an unwitting accomplice of the liberal bourgeoisie.

HOW COMRADE PLEKHANOV ARGUES ABOUT SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC TACTICS

The last two issues of *Kuryer* contain Comrade Plekhanov's first letter "On Tactics and Tactlessness". The liberal-bourgeois press has already quite rightly observed that Comrade Plekhanov is going far more to the right than *Kuryer*. The whole of this press is praising Comrade Plekhanov to the skies, and holding him up as a model for all other Social-Democrats.

Let us, then, examine Comrade Plekhanov's arguments as calmly as we can.

Comrade Plekhanov is arguing with the Poltava Social-Democratic newspaper *Kolokol*,¹⁹⁷ and quotes the following passages from it:

"The mere adoption of a Social-Democratic programme does not in itself make a single individual, or even a whole group, Social-Democratic. To become a Social-Democrat, one must also adopt in their entirety the principles of Social-Democratic tactics.

"The feature that sharply distinguishes the Social-Democratic Party from all other parties is, in addition to its programme, its unrelenting class position in relation to all other, bourgeois parties."

Comrade Plekhanov is very severe in his "strictures" of this passage. First, he demands that the word "opposition" be substituted for the word "position". In our opinion, this change would not improve the original wording in the least: if anything, it would worsen it. Secondly, Comrade Plekhanov undertakes the functions of a proof-reader. In the original there was no comma after the word "other". Unpretentious proof-readers usually correct such mistakes without making a fuss about it. Pretentious proof-readers write a *feuilleton* nearly half a column long about it!

But let us get down to the subject. What is Comrade Plekhanov's objection on the point at issue? He says: "The author depicts all the other* bourgeois parties as one reactionary mass."

This is *not true*. There is not a hint of anything like it in the passage we have quoted. And in the ensuing lines, which Plekhanov himself quotes, the author *clearly distinguishes* between two types of bourgeois party: "Cadet opposition" parties and (2) "Right" parties. Comrade Plekhanov's attempt to ascribe to the author the idea of "one reactionary mass" is not only unfair, but positively unworthy of a socialist who wants to discuss a real issue.

"Different bourgeois parties wear different colours", says Comrade Plekhanov. We have already demonstrated that this correct idea is by no means alien to the author of the article in *Kolokol*, for he distinguishes between the Cadet opposition "colour" and the Right "colour". Hence the author has not transgressed against the "principles" of Social-Democratic tactics, in spite of the opinion of the carping, but clumsy, critic. But for the purpose of defining *Russian* Social-Democratic tactics *in the period* of revolution it is *not enough* to distinguish between these two "colours" of the bourgeois parties. Here indeed there is a gap in the ideas, or in the way they are set forth, in *Kolokol*, but Comrade Plekhanov did not notice it. While inventing non-existent gaps, he overlooked the real gap.

If Comrade Plekhanov had wanted to debate real issues with the Bolsheviks** and not argue for the pleasure and entertainment of the Cadet newspapers, he could not but have mentioned that it is the Bolsheviks who have long insisted that it is necessary to distinguish at least *three* main "colours" among the bourgeois parties. Herein lies one of the main differences between the *two tactics*; and Comrade

* Comrade Plekhanov *also* forgets to put a comma here, or to leave out the word "other", i.e., *he himself makes the same slip* that he so sternly admonishes our comrade for!

** We know neither the author of the article in *Kolokol*, nor the editors, nor the trend of this Social-Democratic newspaper. We are here concerned with the general ideas underlying Plekhanov's "criticism", and not specifically with his polemics with *Kolokol*.

Plekhanov's hopes of being able to obscure this difference in political tactics by sighing like a philistine petty bourgeois over "tactlessness" are vain.

A year ago the Bolshevik pamphlet *Two Tactics** appeared abroad, and was subsequently republished in Russia. Its author maintained that the main fallacy of Menshevism as a whole was the fact that it did not understand which elements of the bourgeoisie can, together with the proletariat, carry through to the end the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. The Mensheviks even now go astray by thinking that the bourgeois revolution must be made by the "bourgeoisie" (bourgeoisie in general, irrespective of "colour"!), while it is the function of the proletariat to help it. That explains why the Mensheviks (including Plekhanov) have never been able to define, in anything like a Marxist way, *what* the "decisive victory of the present revolution" will be in the light of the political regrouping of classes, although they did not mind talking about the decisive victory, even in resolutions. The Bolsheviks' assertion that decisive victory can mean only the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was repugnant to them, but they have been unable to refute, correct, or modify it.

The Bolsheviks have asserted, and still do, that the only firm and reliable ally the proletariat can have in the epoch of the bourgeois-democratic revolution (until that revolution wins) is the peasantry. The peasants are also "bourgeois democrats", but entirely different in "colour" from the Cadets or Octobrists. Before *these* bourgeois democrats, irrespective of what they themselves want, *history has set* aims that are genuinely revolutionary as regards the "old order" in Russia. *These bourgeois* democrats are *compelled* to fight against the *very foundations* of landlord power and the old state authority connected with it. *These* bourgeois democrats are not "compelled" by objective conditions to do their utmost to preserve the old authorities and to complete the revolution by *striking a bargain* with the old authorities. Therefore in their tendencies—which are determined by what they are *compelled* to do—*these* bourgeois democrats are *revolutionary democrats*. And the Bolsheviks defined

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

the tactics of the socialist proletariat during the bourgeois-democratic revolution as follows: the proletariat must lead the peasantry, without merging with it, against the old authorities and the old order, paralysing the instability and inconsistency of the liberal bourgeoisie, which wavers between people's freedom and the old authorities.

It is exactly these principles of the tactics of the Russian Social-Democratic proletariat in the present period that the Mensheviks have not understood. Nor has Comrade Plekhanov understood them. And it is this *concrete* question of our tactics that he is trying to evade, obscure and cover up by his arguments about slips and misprints, by his irrelevant quotations, and so forth.

Judge for yourselves. In *Kuryer*, No. 5, Plekhanov goes to the length of ascribing to the Bolsheviks the idea that "the proletariat cannot march by the side of the bourgeoisie ... this would be opportunism".

We are not dead yet, Comrade Plekhanov! Anyone who invents legends about us as if we were dead makes himself ridiculous. Even those who are only slightly familiar with *Vperyod*, *Proletary*, *Two Tactics*, *The Victory of the Cadets*, and other Bolshevik pamphlets, will see at once that Plekhanov is not speaking the truth.

For eighteen months already the Bolsheviks have been asserting that the Mensheviks' mistakes are due to their inability to distinguish between the revolutionary bourgeois democrats and all those bourgeois democrats who precisely at the present time are rapidly shedding their revolutionism. For eighteen months already the Bolsheviks have been asserting that owing to their ludicrous dread of "coming close" to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks are coming far too *close* to the Cadets, and are underrating the importance of the bourgeois democrats of the *revolutionary colour*. The Bolsheviks assert that the *opportunism* of the Mensheviks consists in their forgetting the basic interests of democracy, and consequently of *socialism*, because it cannot achieve real successes in an era of bourgeois revolution unless democracy is successful—on account of the temporary successes of liberalism, and in blind awe at the tawdry triumphs of the Zemstvo people or the Cadets.

This is what constitutes your *opportunism*, Comrade Plekhanov!

Marx taught us, exclaims Plekhanov, "to inquire what the bourgeoisie is *compelled* to do, and not what it *wants* to do".

Quite so, Comrade Plekhanov. But it is this lesson of Marx's that you forget when you take his name in vain, just as Bernstein did while undermining Marxism. You forget that the *Cadets* are "compelled" to seek a *bargain* with the old authorities, while the *peasant or revolutionary democrats* are "compelled" to wage a resolute struggle against it; or at any rate, that the Cadets are only capable of striking a bargain, whereas the peasants are also capable of waging a serious struggle. By means of *general* phrases about what the "bourgeoisie" *in general* is compelled to do, Comrade Plekhanov *obscures* the concrete issue, namely, what the "bourgeoisie" of the Cadet *colour* and the bourgeoisie of the revolutionary-democratic *colour* are compelled to do.

Now judge who is *actually* incapable of distinguishing the different colours among the *Russian* bourgeoisie in our day. Who treats the workers to scholastics, pedantry and "mummified truth", instead of pointing to the differences within bourgeois democracy that are essential precisely today?

Readers who are seriously interested in this problem should solve it not on the basis of casual impressions, but by seriously studying Social-Democratic literature and congress decisions. Compare the resolution on the State Duma adopted by the Congress with the resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks.* You will find that it is the Congress (Menshevik) resolution that *is unable* to draw a clear distinction between the peasant democrats and the Cadet democrats. On the other hand, it is just the Bolshevik resolution that stresses this distinction. The Congress resolution merely advises us to expose the inconsistency of *all* the bourgeois parties, whereas our resolution refers to the instability of the Cadets, and states that we must unite the peasant democrats against the Cadets. The Congress reso-

* See pp. 292-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

lution is quite worthless in this respect, for to expose *all* bourgeois parties is the duty of the socialists in *all* countries at *all* times. Whoever confines himself to this merely repeats Marxist phrases—like a schoolboy learning a lesson by heart—without being able to digest them and apply them to Russia. It is in the period of a bourgeois revolution that to say “expose all bourgeois parties” means saying nothing, and indeed, saying what is not true; for bourgeois parties can be seriously and thoroughly exposed only when *particular* bourgeois parties step into the foreground of *history*. Our resolution, on the other hand, distinguishes those particular “colours” that are of political importance *today*. And that is why the very first steps taken by the Duma confirmed the correctness of *our* resolution, for they clearly revealed to all the instability of the Cadets and the more revolutionary nature of the “Trudoviks”.

Another example: the attitude to be taken towards the bourgeois parties. How did the Mensheviks decide this question before the Congress? With general phrases—see their draft resolution. And the Bolsheviks? They pointed to *three* types of bourgeois opposition: the Octobrists, the Cadets and the revolutionary democrats (see the Bolsheviks’ draft resolution).^{*} How did the Congress decide this question? The Mensheviks *did not dare* to submit their resolution, and *endorsed the Amsterdam resolution!* The Russian Social-Democrats in the period of a bourgeois revolution have nothing to say about the Russian bourgeoisie of different colours except to repeat what is being said in all European countries a hundred years after a bourgeois revolution!

Is it not obvious that our esteemed Plekhanov is laying the blame at someone else’s door?

Take Comrade Plekhanov’s arguments about “true socialism” in Germany in the 1840s. What was the essence of this “true socialism”? First, incomprehension of the class struggle and the significance of political liberty. Second, inability to see the relative importance of the different strata of the bourgeoisie in the political struggle then being waged. Is it not ridiculous for Comrade Plekhanov to accuse *us*

^{*} See pp. 157-58 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of this, when it is he, at the head of the Mensheviks, who is *obscuring* the fundamental—because of present conditions—difference between the Cadet oppositionist bourgeoisie and the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie?

This accusation that there is an affinity between the Bolsheviks and “true socialism” in any case deserves a good laugh. Just think of it. We have always heard a chorus of accusation that we were too inflexible and ossified, too adamant. And yet our opponents call us “Blanquists”, “anarchists” and “true socialists”. The Blanquists are conspirators (they have never been in favour of the general strike), they exaggerate the importance of revolutionary government. The anarchists completely repudiate all government, revolutionary or otherwise, and as against the strict organisation of the Blanquists, they advocate complete licence to disorganise. The “true socialists” are something like peaceful Lavrovists,¹⁹⁸ semi-uplifters, non-revolutionaries, heroes of abstruse thought and abstract sermonising. The Mensheviks could not have found a better stick with which to beat themselves than these *mutually exclusive* accusations against the Bolsheviks. Our best answer to their charges is to point to this confusion in the Mensheviks’ minds.

We, on the other hand, have always said, and say, that the Mensheviks constitute the Social-Democratic Right wing, inclining towards opportunism, i.e., towards forgetting the permanent, important and fundamental interests of the proletariat for the sake of momentary interests, for the sake of seeming possibilities of “adjusting” oneself to momentary moods, situations and relations.

What do Comrade Plekhanov’s present tactics come down to? To grovelling before the Cadets’ successes, forgetting the very shady sides of their present conduct, disguising their reactionary character *compared with* the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, and befogging the minds of those workers and peasants who are prone to believe in “petitions” and in a toy parliament.

The Cadets are doing their utmost to appear like ordinary bourgeois democrats, to hide their disagreement with the Trudovik Group, to cover up their disagreements with the peasant democrats and to obtain support for precisely the Right, unreliable wing of the bourgeois democrats.

No matter what Comrade Plekhanov's intentions may be, all he achieves is that he is in practice supporting these reactionary strivings of the Cadets. And that is why they are so lavish in their praise of him.

Comrade Plekhanov says that as far back as 1903 (Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.) he, in controversy with the then Right wing of the Party (Akimov, Martynov and others), urged that it was necessary to support every opposition movement against the autocracy. Marx held the same opinion in 1847. And Plekhanov wants to assure his readers that the Bolsheviki have forgotten this axiom.

Comrade Plekhanov is mistaken. The general thesis that oppositions must be supported is not rejected by those who answer the concrete question whether a particular section of the opposition and revolutionary bourgeoisie should be supported at a given moment. The mistake Comrade Plekhanov makes is, first, that he substitutes an abstract consideration for a concrete historical question. And secondly, his views on bourgeois democracy in Russia are totally unhistorical. He forgets that the position of the different strata of these bourgeois democrats changes as the revolution advances. The higher the revolution rises, the faster do the least revolutionary strata of the bourgeoisie desert it. Those who do not understand this cannot explain anything at all in the course of the bourgeois revolution.

We will take two examples to illustrate the foregoing.

In 1847 Marx supported the most timid opposition of the German bourgeoisie to the German government.¹⁹⁹ In 1848, he ruthlessly, furiously denounced and lashed the extremely radical German Cadets—much more to the left than our Cadets—who were carrying on “constructive work” in the Frankfurt Parliament, assuring the world that this constructive work was of the greatest agitational importance, and being unable to understand that the struggle for real power was inevitable.²⁰⁰ Had Marx been false to himself? Had he changed his mind? Had he slipped into Blanquism (as the Bernsteinians and the German liberal professors think)? Not in the least. *The revolution had advanced.* Not only the German “Shipovites” of 1847, but the German “Cadets” of 1848 as well had *fallen behind.* As the true guardian of the interests of the advanced class, Marx ruthlessly

flayed the stragglers, particularly the more influential among them.

In quoting Marx, Plekhanov misrepresents him.

Second example.

In 1903, and even earlier, in 1901-02, the old *Iskra* supported the "Shipovites", i.e., the timid liberal Zemstvo people of that time who, together with Mr. Struve, issued the slogan of "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo". The revolution advanced, and the Social-Democrats descended, as it were, from the opposition upper ranks of the bourgeoisie to its revolutionary lower ranks. They "badgered" the Shipovites for their vague demands for a constitution; the constitutionalists, for ignoring universal, etc., suffrage; those who accepted the latter, for not accepting the revolution, etc., always in proportion to the development, expansion and deepening of the whole democratic movement. Did the revolutionary Social-Democrats contradict themselves, if from support of the oppositionist "Shipovites" in 1901-02 they went over to support of the revolutionary peasants in 1905-06? Not in the least. They were quite consistent.

It is Comrade Plekhanov who is inconsistent, in allowing the momentary successes of the Cadets to obscure from him the loftier democratic tasks that experience is already bringing to the front.

To proceed. Here is a particularly striking example of Plekhanov's exceedingly uncritical attitude towards the Cadet Duma.

Comrade Plekhanov quotes the following passage from *Kolokol*:

"Applying these general propositions to the parliamentary workers' group, we may say that this group will express the real aspirations of the more militant and class-conscious section of the Russian proletariat, in other words, will deserve to be called a Social-Democratic group insofar as it bases its activities in the Duma on the fundamental tactical principles of Social-Democracy.

"Not to sink in the general Cadet-opposition marsh in the Duma not to trail behind the Cadet majority in it, but to oppose this majority, and to expose the narrowness of its aspirations its leanings towards compromise with the 'Right' parties and with the government—these are the only tactics worthy of representatives of the proletariat the truly Social-Democratic tactics that we must strongly recommend to the representatives of the workers in the Duma. If they pursue any

other tactics, tactics that obscure the class-consciousness of the proletariat whose representatives the members of this group consider themselves to be in the Duma, they will become hangers-on of the bourgeois parties, tools with which to hinder the proletariat in fulfilling its independent tasks in the general course of the Russian revolution."

Plekhanov comments on this as follows:

"If our Poltava comrade had to apply his general propositions to the Socialist Party in France, he would not have to make any serious changes in the last lines of his article. He could merely substitute the word 'radical' for the word 'Cadet', 'Chamber of Deputies' for 'Duma', and lastly, the phrase 'social-historical movement' for 'Russian revolution'. That is amazingly convenient."

We invite our readers to go over this passage from *Kolokol* and Plekhanov's comment once again. The latter reveals to us with rare clarity one of the causes of Plekhanov's turn towards Bernstein.

Just think. "*Kolokol*" could merely substitute, in the last lines of its article, the word "radical" for "Cadet" and the phrase "Chamber of Deputies" for "Duma".

This argument nails Comrade Plekhanov's fallacies to the counter. It shows how very far he is from understanding what constitutional illusions are, and hence from understanding the present situation in the Russian bourgeois revolution.

Plekhanov has lost sight of the *fundamental* difference between the Russian Cadets and the Russian Duma, and the French radicals and the French Chamber of Deputies, between the relations of the former and those of the latter. He has overlooked a *very short phrase* in the *Kolokol* article, a very short but very characteristic and notable one. That phrase is: "*compromise with the government*".

Think of it, Comrade Plekhanov. Can there be any talk in France about a "compromise" between the Chamber of Deputies and the government? No. Why? Because in France, in all things that matter, the government is subordinate to the Chamber. The majority in the Chamber is itself the actual *government*, for it appoints to the Ministry the men it desires. *By* securing a majority in the Chamber, the radicals *become* the government. Today the alignment of parliamentary forces corresponds, more or less, to the alignment of real forces among the people, and to the attitude

of the state to the people. Today the written Constitution does not to any extent diverge from the actual Constitution, from the alignment of forces.

In Russia there can *and must* be talk about an agreement between the majority in the Duma and the government. Why? Because in our country real power belongs, in law and in fact, *not at all to the Duma*, but to the old autocratic government. Unlike the Chamber of Deputies, the Duma is not an organ of state power, but merely an instrument for the presentation of the petitions, requests and demands of a section of the people to the old authorities. Therefore the majority in the Duma can "enter into an agreement" with the government; for France this would be an absurdity. The alignment of parliamentary forces does not in the least correspond either to the alignment of real forces in the country or to the relations between the state and the people.

In France the actual class struggle is being waged between the forces that are represented in the Chamber, and even the proportion in which these forces are represented corresponds, more or less, to their present relative "fighting strength".

In Russia the actual struggle is *not being waged at all between the forces* that are represented in the Duma, and their representation in the Duma is just now very distinctly and fundamentally out of proportion to their present relative "fighting strength". The real government of Russia is hardly represented in the Duma at all: it has other "institutions". The proletariat, too, is hardly represented, while the peasantry is very poorly represented in proportion to its numbers.

Comrade Plekhanov's attempt to draw a parallel between Russia and France shows that he is entirely immersed in constitutional illusions. He takes the name (parliament, chamber) for the object; the label for the contents. That is why he completely loses sight of all the more important special features of the present situation in Russia, when a struggle is maturing between the "people"—which is least represented in the Duma—and the old authorities, and the role of the "compromisers", of deserters in this struggle, *is becoming* particularly important and particularly *dangerous*.

Just as Bernstein in 1899 did an enormous amount of harm to the German proletariat by taking the petty-bourgeois intellectual "compromisers" (the social-liberals who were trying to reconcile the proletariat with the bourgeoisie) for the actual bourgeoisie that was wielding real power, so Plekhanov in 1906 is doing enormous harm to the Russian proletariat by taking the semi-reactionary bourgeois "compromisers" (the Cadets, who are trying to reconcile people's freedom with the old authorities) for an independent political force in the state, for an authority which it is possible and worth while to support.

Bernstein, in appealing for "tactfulness" towards the social-liberals, in appealing for support for them and pleading that they should not be pushed into the camp of reaction, appealed for support for a *fiction*. He was chasing the *shadow* of social peace and was oblivious of the fundamental tasks of the struggle for power.

Plekhanov, in appealing for "tactfulness" towards the Cadets, in appealing for support for them and pleading that they should not be pushed into the camp of reaction, is appealing for support for a *fiction*. He is chasing the *shadow* of parliamentarism (in the period of a bourgeois, not a socialist revolution) *and is oblivious of the fundamental tasks of the struggle for power*.

The social-liberal, Cadet bourgeoisie is carrying both Bernstein and Plekhanov shoulder-high, praising them to the skies, advertising them, reprinting their writings *for the services* they are rendering it in its struggle against the proletariat.

Make no mistake about it, workers. These phrases about Social-Democrats having to be "tactful" and about "supporting" the Cadets have a *specific* meaning in real politics, a meaning that is determined *by the actual alignment of forces* and not by Plekhanov's good intentions. It may not have been Plekhanov's intention to allay or blunt political and social antagonisms between the classes, and between the people and the old authorities; he may assure other people that he had no such intention; but in the present political situation this is *precisely the effect* of his arguments, whether he wanted it or not.

Bernstein was not striving for social peace (or so he said);

but the bourgeoisie rightly understood that this is what his arguments implied. And look at the Cadet press here in Russia. It is praising Plekhanov and, regardless of his wishes, is drawing its *own deductions* from what he says. In yesterday's *Duma* (No. 22), Mr. Kotlyarevsky argued that all "*class struggle and class hatred*" were an obstacle to the cause of national liberation. He drew a parallel between the struggle that *Volna* is conducting and the struggle of the Guesdists against the Jaurèsists, of Ferri against Turati, and of Kautsky against Bernstein. He expressed fear that "this preaching of class hatred that is now making itself heard in Russia, by undermining the solidarity of the various social groups that is so essential for joint political action, may cut away [mark this!] the ground for the activities of any sort of properly constituted popular representative body". "Is not this [class hatred] sapping the very spirit of constitutionalism?"

In today's *Svoboda i Kultura*²⁰¹ (No. 7), Mr. Struve bewails the fact that the Social-Democrats "are throwing liberty to be rent asunder by the *furies of class strife*", that they have "a biassed and morbid craze for the *ideas of the class struggle*" (p. 458), that "*political peace* [recall the words "social peace" uttered by the European bourgeoisie!] is making entirely new claims upon us" (p. 514?). The bourgeoisie understands perfectly well that Plekhanov's ideas foster false hopes of "political peace" and in practice serve to blunt all class strife and all class struggle. Like the bird in the fable, Comrade Plekhanov was caught in the snare by only one tiny claw, but the whole "birdie" now finds itself entirely in Mr. Struve's cage, so far as present-day politics are concerned.

"Abuse is not criticism," writes Comrade Plekhanov. "Criticism really develops the mind, whereas abuse obscures it. Take the abusive term 'treachery'. We shout so often about the treachery of the bourgeoisie that when it does 'betray', that is, when it makes peace with the bureaucracy, and it becomes really necessary for us to shout about this from the house-tops, our cries will no longer have the desired effect, and we shall meet with the same fate as the boy who shouted, 'Wolf! Wolf!', when there was no wolf."

What a beautiful specimen of Russian Bernsteinianism is this little fragment of Plekhanov's reasoning!

First, see how clear it is that Comrade Plekhanov has not a leg to stand on. In November 1905, he wrote in *Dnevnik*, No. 3: "... we have had a lot of shouting lately about the bourgeoisie having betrayed *something or other* [!]. But what can the bourgeoisie have betrayed? At all events, not the revolution, for it has never served the idea of revolution."

As you see, in November 1905 Comrade Plekhanov did not even understand what the bourgeoisie *could* betray. Now he does. He not only believes that the bourgeoisie *can* betray something, but holds that it *actually will betray*. Within six months Comrade Plekhanov has changed his mind. First he said that the bourgeoisie could not betray anything. Now he says that it actually will betray, that is, will make peace with the bureaucracy.

We should have been very pleased with Comrade Plekhanov's progress, had his views in other respects not remained just as changeable. Treachery is an abusive term, he says. This opinion is not new. It is the opinion held by every liberal bourgeois. The Cadets are dinning into the ears of the Russian public in thousands of newspaper articles that this talk about the "treachery" of the bourgeoisie is merely the abusive language of the "wild" Bolsheviki. Now the bourgeoisie has found a new ally on this issue. Comrade Plekhanov has also become convinced that "treachery" is an "abusive term".

Just as it was necessary at one time to repeat and reiterate the ABC of Marxism to counter Bernstein, so it is necessary to do so now to counter Plekhanov. He is greatly mistaken. "Treachery" is not "an abusive term"; it is the only scientifically and politically correct term with which to express the actual facts about, and the actual aspirations of, the bourgeoisie. The word "treachery" expresses the same idea as the phrase "striking a bargain". Plekhanov himself cannot help admitting this, for he identifies treachery with reconciliation with the bureaucracy. And now see what the "wild" *Volna* has said about the phrase "striking a bargain".

"But what, in substance, are the bargains struck by the Cadets?" we read in *Volna*, No. 13. "*Not personal acts of*

treachery, of course. Such a crude opinion is utterly alien to Marxism. The substance of the bargains is (and is only) that the Cadets don't abandon, and don't want to abandon, their stand for preserving the old regime and for obeying the commands of this regime."*

Thus the essence of treachery, or of striking bargains, is not personal acts of treachery. Treachery, or striking bargains, *only* means that the party of "people's" (read "bourgeois") freedom is striving to keep the old autocracy in power, to induce it to *share* power with the bourgeoisie.

The party of "people's freedom" is betraying people's freedom just because it is surrendering a large share of the people's rights and the people's power to the representatives of the *old authorities*. Comrade Plekhanov's unwillingness to understand this simple truth is quite monstrous. He is making out that the bourgeoisie in Russia has not *yet* betrayed anything, that it will do so only in the future.

This is total incomprehension of the very essence of treachery and bargains.

The bourgeoisie and the Cadets have betrayed freedom and *made peace with* the bureaucracy *a thousand times*. What is the programme of the Constitutional-Democratic Party? Does it represent a certain political step taken by the bourgeoisie? Undoubtedly it does. But this programme is precisely a programme of treachery, of striking bargains! And *every* political step the Cadets take is, in one way or another, a step in the fulfilment of *this* programme. Trubetskoi's²⁰² speech in the summer of 1905, the Cadets' hedging on the issue of the four-point system and the Draconian Freedom of the Press Bill, are all steps taken by the liberal bourgeoisie in fulfilment of this programme of treachery.

As Comrade Plekhanov sees it, the bourgeoisie cannot be accused of treachery unless it takes some new *special* step. This is not true. If the bourgeoisie, and the Cadets in particular, continue doing what they have been doing so far, *the sum-total of all their actions will produce the most complete picture of treachery*. The essence of present-day

* See p. 405 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Social-Democratic opportunism is precisely failure to understand this.

If the philistine dreams of the Cadets come true, if the "peaceful pressure" of the Duma and of "public opinion" compels the government to make minor concessions, if the Council of State is prepared to yield a little—as it is advised to do by Mr. Khomyakov, a member of the Council, whose plans the Cadet newspaper *Duma* reported yesterday—if the old government reorganises the Ministry and gives several comfortable seats in it to the Right Cadets, and so forth, the result, in the long run, will be *precisely* "reconciliation" between the Cadets and the bureaucracy. The sum and substance of Plekhanov's mistake is that he thinks that the path of "treachery" is, or will be, a "new" path for our bourgeoisie, whereas it is really a continuation of its old path that constitutes the "*corpus delicti*" of its treachery, to use a legal term.

When the bourgeoisie does "actually" betray, says Plekhanov, nobody will believe us when we raise a cry about it, because everybody will have become too accustomed to the word "treachery".

What infinite political naïveté! The whole policy of Social-Democracy is to *light up* the path that *lies ahead before the masses* of the people. We hold aloft the torch of Marxism and show, by every step the various classes take, by every political and economic event, that life *confirms* our doctrines. As capitalism develops, and as the political struggle becomes more acute, larger and larger sections of the people become convinced by what we say and by this factual (or historical) *confirmation* of what we say. At present, let us say, hundreds of thousands of men and women in Russia are convinced that our appraisal of the Cadets is correct. If the revolution develops fast, or takes a sharp turn towards an important deal between the Cadets and the autocracy, millions and even tens of millions will be convinced that we are right.

Therefore it is the greatest absurdity to say that later on people will not believe us when we raise a cry about treachery, because we are shouting about it *too often* now. Comrade Plekhanov is vainly trying to cover up this absurdity by arguments that elderly spinsters, *dames de classe* and

the like, usually produce for the benefit of high-school girls. "Criticism must be well founded," he tells us for our edification.

Both new and clever. Your criticism too, Comrade Plekhanov, should be well founded. As it happens, you *do not quote* a single *fact*, or a single important example, to prove that our criticism of the Cadets is unfounded; by your general arguments, however, you have sown a number of *unfounded* opinions in the minds of your readers! Just imagine, you are reducing the concept of "treachery" to that of a term of abuse!

Then there is this sentence. "In our ranks, the realisation of this antithesis [the antithesis of the interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat] has acquired, one may say, the *rigidity of a prejudice*." What do you mean by "our ranks", Comrade Plekhanov? The ranks of the Russian philistines in Geneva? Or of the members of our Party, in general? But should not the broad ranks of the masses of the people also be borne in mind?

As a worker aptly remarked in *Prizyv*,²⁰³ Plekhanov judges "*from afar*". The masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians have as yet no idea of either this general antithesis or the bourgeois character of the Cadets. The Cadet press just now is probably ten times as large as the Social-Democratic press. The Cadets are also steadily corrupting the minds of the people through the Cadet Duma and through all sorts of liberal institutions. One must indeed have lost all sense of reality to imagine that we are *running ahead* of events and of the needs of the masses by exposing the instability and treachery of the Cadets. On the contrary, in this matter we are *lagging behind* events and the needs of the masses! It would be far better, Comrade Plekhanov, if you wrote a popular and "well-founded" criticism of the Cadets: that would be more useful.

Let us now examine Plekhanov's deductions concerning the Duma.

"Our government has already committed many unpardonable blunders," he writes. "These blunders have brought it to the brink of an abyss, but they have not yet pushed it into the abyss. *It will fall into the abyss when the Duma is dispersed....* The Duma is rousing even the most somnolent;

it is pushing forward even the most backward; it is dispelling from the minds of the masses the last political illusions bequeathed by history.... The organic work of the Duma will have the most agitational effect."

Examine these arguments closely. The government will fall when the Duma is dispersed. Let us admit this for argument's sake. But why assume that the Duma will be dispersed if it engages solely in organic work? What is organic work? The work the Duma does within the law. The Duma submits Bills to the Council of State and interpellates the Ministers. The Council of State and the Ministers procrastinate and, as far as possible, smooth out all the conflicts that arise. *Russkoye Gosudarstvo*, the mouth-piece of the Russian Government, long ago said: let the Duma be an opposition Duma, but not a revolutionary one. In other words: you may engage in organic work, but not a single step beyond that!

What sense would there be in dissolving the Duma for doing organic work?? *And it never will be dissolved* if it never takes a revolutionary, quite non-organic step, or if no movement flares up outside the Duma that will convert even a Cadet Duma into an obstacle to the government. We think that there are far more reasons for such an assumption than for the bare statement that "the Duma will be dispersed".

The dissolution of the Duma is not the only cause likely to bring about the fall of the government. The government may fall for other reasons; for the Duma is by no means the *chief* factor, nor the surest index of the movement. It will not fall of itself, but as a result of the vigorous action—of a third force (neither the government, nor the Duma). It is the duty of the Social-Democrats to explain that this action is inevitable; to explain the forms it is likely to assume, the character and class composition of the forces capable of carrying out such an "action"; to explain the conditions under which it can be successful, and so on and so forth. It is the Cadets, however, who are relentlessly fighting the Social-Democrats for doing this. Therefore one of the conditions for success in this work, and a guarantee that the masses will sympathise with it, is that the Cadets must be discredited.

Whoever talks about the government "falling" into the abyss and yet says that it is inopportune to criticise the Cadets and to accuse them of treachery, is utterly inconsistent. If I wanted to copy Plekhanov's style, I would say: falling "into the abyss" is merely a figure of speech, it is a revolutionary *phrase*. Into whose hands will power pass? Can the workers and peasants permit power to pass to the Cadets, who would at once share it with the old autocracy? Is it not, therefore, particularly necessary to *warn* the people against the Cadets?

We think it is. We think that Plekhanov's opportunism, his absolutely groundless opposition to tactics which expose the true nature of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, is hampering and damaging this necessary work of enlightening the masses about the Cadets.

In saying that constructive work in the Duma will have the most agitational effect, Plekhanov shows that he takes an extremely one-sided view of things. As we have already pointed out in *Volna*, the Mensheviks themselves put Plekhanov right on this point when they quite justifiably ridicule the prospect of the Duma "piling up a heap of laws".* So far Russia has been the country with the largest number of paper police laws. If the Duma spends all its time on "constructive" work, Russia will soon become the country with the largest number of paper radical laws. It is the greatest pedantry to imagine that the agitational effect of these laws or Bills will be in direct proportion to their length and number. To think so, one must have forgotten the example of the Frankfurt Parliament, which very zealously engaged in "constructive work" and, as Plekhanov does now, imagined that it was constructive work that had the most agitational effect. To think so, one must be blind to what is already going on in Russia; one must be blind to the signs that the public is growing weary of the endless blather of Cadet speeches in the Duma, blind to the impression that is being created by the Cadets' "Draconian" Bills and their lame excuses in justifying themselves for introducing them; one must be blind to the Cadets' infinitely loathsome, philistine fear of the new wave that is approaching, of the in

* See pp. 450-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

evitable new struggle, of what Plekhanov has called "falling into the abyss". Exposing the Cadets, Comrade Plekhanov, means preparing the minds of the masses of the people for this fall, preparing them to take an active part in bringing it about, to *keep the Cadets away* from the government "pie" when the fall comes; it means making bold and vigorous preparations for it.

The Duma is rousing the people; the Duma is dispelling the last illusions, we are told. True. But the "Duma" is doing this only to the extent that *we* are exposing the timidity and instability of the *Cadet* Duma, only to the extent that *we* are explaining the facts about the Duma that indicate the dispelling of illusions. The Cadets are not doing this. They are trying to counteract it. They are spreading constitutional illusions. Zubatovism also roused the workers, also exposed illusions; but it did this only to the extent that we combated the corruption of the minds of the people by Zubatovism. And let no one try to attempt to refute this argument by stating that the Duma is not Zubatovism. Comparing things does not mean identifying them. Show me a Cadet newspaper, or an important political statement by the Cadets, which does not contain elements of the political *corruption* of the minds of the people.

That is what Comrade Plekhanov forgets when he declares majestically and portentously: "This is the meaning of all philosophy: all that contributes to the political education of the people is good; all that hinders it is bad." Everything else is prejudice, scholasticism.

Yes, yes, a certain wing of Social-Democracy is indeed slipping into hopeless scholasticism. But which wing, the Right or the Left? Can one imagine anything more pedantic, lifeless and truly scholastic than reducing the tactics of the proletariat in a period of revolution to the task of politically educating the people? Where, then, is the borderline between the Social-Democratic class struggle and the struggle of a common or garden bourgeois "uplifter"? Revolution is in full swing, different classes are coming to the forefront, the masses have set about making history, bourgeois parties of different shades are arising, the complicated political crisis is becoming more acute, the struggle is entering a new stage for which the ground was prepared by

the unusually rich crop of events and experience of 1905—and all this is reduced to one thing: the political education of the people! Truly, our *dame de classe* has made a brilliant discovery. Truly, a wonderful “key” to all the concrete problems of politics and, moreover, a key that any Cadet, and even the Party of Democratic Reforms, and even Heyden, would accept in full, would clutch at with both hands. Yes, this is exactly the “broad” criterion we need, this is what will rally and unite the classes, and not sow hatred and strife. Precisely! Bravo, Plekhanov—say all these good people. This is the “solution” that will certainly obscure, or force into the background, that new “period of madness”, the new “whirlwind” which the bourgeois dreads so much. No whirlwinds—then no cataclysms, Comrade Plekhanov, be consistent: no abysses either! The political education of the people—that is our banner, that is the meaning of all philosophy!

Comrade Plekhanov has wholly and completely taken on the likeness of that average German Cadet in the Frankfurt Parliament. Oh, how many matchless speeches these windbags delivered on the political consciousness of the people! How many magnificent “constructive” laws they drafted for this purpose! And how nobly they protested when they were dispersed *after* they had bored the people to death and had lost all revolutionary importance.

We are told that the Russian revolution goes deeper, its tide is rising, it will not be stopped at the dam of the Cadet Duma, Cadet phrase-mongering, Cadet timidity, and Cadet Draconian Bills. Yes, gentlemen, that is absolutely true: the Russian revolution is broader, mightier and deeper. Its tide is rising. It is sweeping on over the Cadets. And we revolutionary Social-Democrats express this deeper movement, we are striving to explain this loftier task to the workers and peasants, we are helping them, as best we can, to rise above the Cadet dam.

RESOLUTION (II)
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE
OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON THE ATTITUDE²⁰⁴

The autocratic government is treating the representatives the people of Russia have sent to the State Duma with coarse mockery and scorn. It rejects every declaration of the Duma that in any way expresses the needs and demands, of the people, and persists in its policy of murder and violence.

The Duma is powerless. It is powerless not only because it lacks the bayonets and machine guns that the government has at its command, but also because, as a whole, it is not revolutionary, and is incapable of waging a resolute struggle. The liberal parties in the Duma only inadequately and timidly back the strivings of the people; they are more concerned to allay and weaken the revolutionary struggle now proceeding than to destroy the people's enemy. Apart from the workers' deputies, the Trudovik Group is the only group that shows any inclination openly and boldly to proclaim the demands of the people; but it too is still being handicapped by the influence of the liberal parties and by its lack of independence in relation to them.

We call upon the Trudovik Group to pursue a more resolute and consistent policy. We call upon it to demand that the Duma shall make a direct and public appeal to the people; and if the majority in the Duma refuses to make such an appeal independently, the Trudovik Group should tell the people *the whole truth* that the Duma is powerless, that land and freedom cannot be expected from it, that obviously the people must take these themselves, and that

events are marching towards a decisive struggle outside the Duma.

The Trudovik Group should declare that the old authorities can be overthrown only by *joint* militant actions of the workers and peasants, that they must prepare and organise for these actions pending the arrival of the decisive moment for a revolutionary uprising. Until that moment comes, the people must collect and husband their forces and not fritter them away in fruitless minor struggles; they must not allow the government to provoke them to untimely action.

If the Trudovik Group does all this, it will perform its duty to the people; and then only will it be able, side by side with the revolutionary organisation of the proletariat, to take its place at the head of the great people's movement which will smash the old chains that are fettering the development of society.

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THE SLOGAN OF A DUMA MINISTRY

The documents reproduced above reveal an extremely important controversy in the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party. This controversy is important for two reasons.

First, the right of every autonomous Party organisation to adopt its own independent resolution, and not merely to subscribe to the resolutions of the Central Committee, is absolutely indisputable—if one regards it from the formal point of view.

That the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee does not contradict any of the decisions of the Unity Congress is obvious. It is, indeed, the duty of the local organisations to work out independently—within the framework of the Congress resolutions—their own directives.

Secondly, on the point at issue, the Central Committee's resolution is obviously unsatisfactory and *contradicts the decision of the Congress*. This resolution does not contain a single word to explain what is meant by "the Duma is useless", nor does it widen and sharpen the conflicts within the Duma. The resolution proposes a slogan ("substitute for the present Ministry a Ministry appointed by the Duma") which *does not in the least follow from the resolution of the Congress*. This slogan is ambiguous. It confuses the minds of the proletariat. For the Cadets use the demand for a Duma Ministry as a screen to hide their desire to strike a bargain with the autocratic government and to weaken the revolution, to hamper the convocation of a constituent assembly.

We propose to go into this resolution in greater detail on another occasion*; in the meantime we invite all members of the Party to pay the closest attention to the extremely important controversy in the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Vperyod, No. 2, May 27, 1906

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* See pp. 500-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

The political situation is clearing up at a rate that is truly gratifying. It is good to be alive at a time when the masses begin to stir with political life. All the main social groups in Russia today have already, in one way or another, taken the path of open and mass political action. Open action relentlessly reveals the basic differences of the interests involved. The parties are seen in their true colours. Events, with an iron hand, sort out the adherents of the various classes and make them decide who is on one side and who is on the other.

In the Duma, these fundamental differences of class interests which are bringing about political realignment show themselves much more dimly and obscurely than they do among the masses of the people. In the Duma there is for this purpose the Constitutional-Democratic Party, whose particular function is, by fair means or foul, to rub off the sharp edges, blunt acute antagonisms, subdue the clashes of struggle that break out here and there. But among the "masses" the ferment is rising. Again the proletarians, the peasants, the soldiers, the railwaymen are stirring in all their mass strength. The strike movement is growing and assuming new forms ("striking by turn", one industry after the other—we shall deal with this form of strike another time). The direct struggle of the peasants for land is becoming more intense. Reports of the awakening of the downtrodden soldiers and sailors are coming in more often. The railwaymen are beginning to "recover". Something fresh and new is moving, rumbling, fermenting and heaving everywhere. New shoots are forcing their way up out of the heaps of ruins.

And although the Cadets are trying to close the shutters of the Taurida Palace as tightly as they possibly can, they cannot keep out the fresh breeze of life that is blowing. Even there the process of class differentiation and political clarification is going on. The Cadets still dominate the Trudoviks. They are still celebrating their recent victory in blocking the Trudovik motion for the immediate enactment of a law abolishing capital punishment, and in compelling them to withdraw their motion for the immediate establishment of land committees, local, freely elected committees for settling the land question.

But the very fact that the Cadets are compelled to fight more and more frequently to maintain their supremacy in the Duma clearly shows that there is some profound difference between them and the Trudoviks. The more frequent and sharp these collisions become, the more definitely the masses of the people see the difference between the liberal landlords, factory owners, lawyers and professors—and the peasants. The peasants are striving heart and soul for freedom for the people, and that is why they cannot live in harmony with the party of “people’s freedom”. The peasants are striving to obtain land and freedom, and this striving of theirs alone is enough to burst at the seams the vaunted love for the people of the vaunted party of “people’s freedom”.

The Cadets are still defeating the Trudoviks, but their victories either result in real trouble for their party, or expose their true “nature” with a thoroughness that gladdens the heart of the proletariat.

The first incident occurred over the Cadets’ Draconian Freedom of the Press Bill. They wriggle and twist to justify themselves, but their miserable efforts only worsen the tangle in which they are caught. They have admitted that they made a “mistake” in publishing a “rough draft”, but to this day they have been unable publicly to rectify the mistake or produce a finished draft.

The second incident was in connection with the local land committees.²⁰⁵ The open political struggle immediately united all the “Lefts”, i.e., the Trudoviks and the Social-Democratic proletariat, against the Cadets. The Mensheviks agreed with the Bolsheviks in their appraisal of the Cadets’

true intentions: to betray the revolution, extinguish the revolution with the aid of "bureaucratic" schemes, by *uniting the bureaucrats and the liberals against the peasants*. The issue became clear: should the bureaucrats and the liberal landlords submit to the tens of millions of peasants, or should these tens of millions submit to a handful of bureaucrats and liberals? The whole working class, all the Social-Democratic representatives of the proletariat, to a man took the side of the peasants against the bureaucrats and the liberals. The Cadets discredited themselves splendidly. We compelled them to admit in public that *they do not want to give the peasants complete freedom and all the land*, and that *they seek the aid of the bureaucrats against the peasants*. One side said: the peasants must certainly predominate in the local land committees; the peasants number tens of millions while the bureaucrats and the landlords number hundreds of thousands. The other side replied: the landlords and the peasants must be equally represented, while the bureaucrats will participate and "supervise".

The proletariat and the politically-conscious peasants on one side and the bureaucrats and the Cadets on the other—this is the alignment that experience is dictating in the present, immediately impending, struggle.

All praise to you, Cadet statesmen! All praise to you, writers for *Rech* and *Duma*! You are helping us revolutionary Social-Democrats immensely to explain unvarnished political reality to the people! You are helping us both with your theories and with your deeds.

In your theories, you *have* to go further and further. You state the issue very well today: it is all a matter "of a fundamental difference of opinion" (*Rech*, No. 84). "Some say the Duma is only a 'stage in the revolution',* while others say the Duma is a means of consolidating the constitutional system on a broad democratic basis."

Excellent, admirable, gentlemen who write for *Rech*! Quite true: we have before us *two* fundamentally different opinions. Either the Duma is a stage in the revolution, or it is an instrument for securing an agreement between the

* The resolution of the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. says: "instrument of the revolution".

bureaucrats and the Cadets against the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry. What, you don't like this paraphrase? You protest? You are joking! Have you not completely shown your hand on the question of the local land committees? Is there anybody so foolish as not to understand that "a broad democratic basis" is a screen for *as equal* a representation of peasants and liberals *as possible*, with the Goremykins or other bureaucrats *participating and having the right to supervise*?

And whoever remains deaf to all the Cadets' phrases, speeches, declarations and theories will be enlightened tomorrow by their *deeds*. Nor is that a long way off. We can only say to the party of "people's freedom": "That thou doest, do quickly!"

As for what it is doing, this is evident from what follows.

Our government's change of policy is being zealously discussed in the newspapers. The French bankers are not lending any more money: they refuse to pay the next instalments. *Le Temps*, the most influential French capitalist newspaper, is strongly advising the Russian Government to make concessions to the Cadets. Witte and Durnovo have gone abroad to try to talk over the French bankers. But it doesn't come off. The bankers won't believe them. Trepov is busily discussing the question of the composition of a new Ministry. Kokovtsov, or some other bureaucrat, is contemplated as Prime Minister. Certain Right Cadets are contemplated as Ministers.

We shall probably be told that this is all newspaper gossip. Perhaps it is, but it may well contain a particle of truth. There is no smoke without fire. *Novoye Vremya* has long been known as a weathercock. Its ability to keep its nose to the wind and to obey orders from above has been proved for decades. And this newspaper has been obviously changing front during the past few days. Instead of a continuous torrent of abuse of the Cadets, we now read in its columns the most fervent appeals to the government to make concessions to the Cadets and *to form a Cadet Ministry*. But perhaps the Cadets are indignant about the lies *Novoye Vremya* is telling? Not in the least. *Rech* has already quoted "*Novoye Vremya*" twice on this question (in Nos. 82 and 84) without a word of protest, with obvious

satisfaction, merely regretting now and again the echoes of the past that one still finds in that same *Novoye Vremya*.

And so, it is possible that we are on the eve of a Cadet Ministry headed by someone like Kokovtsov. The evening papers today even report that the Goremykin Ministry resigned yesterday. Again we shall say to the party of "people's freedom": "That thou doest, do quickly!" Nothing would serve to clear up the present political situation as fully and finally as the appointment of a Cadet Ministry by the supreme authority. This will help to dispel the last short-sighted hopes pinned on the Cadets; then all the "Lefts" will finally unite for real political action; then all the arguments about supporting the Duma and a Duma Ministry will cease; and the political alignment that is now taking shape will become an actual fact, and the basis of a new "stage".

Incidentally, this "stage" will come even if a Cadet Ministry is not appointed. We are "well shod on all four hoofs", gentlemen of the Cadet Party!

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THE TACTICS OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE TASKS OF THE MOMENT

The report we published the other day of the resignation of the Goremykin Ministry is officially denied. But the newspapers which have some access to "reliable" sources of information do not believe this denial. The *Novoye Vremya* campaign in favour of a Cadet Ministry is now more cautious, but is going on. *Novoye Vremya* has discovered a Japanese diplomat who believes that "the Cadet Party is pursuing state aims". It even assures its readers, in an article by Mr. Rozanov, that "the Cadets will not relinquish civilisation even for the revolution", and that "this is all that can be expected at the moment". *Rech* believes that "the resignation of the Goremykin Cabinet can be considered a foregone conclusion, and the only question is, who is to be its successor". In short, the question of a Cadet Ministry is still on the order of the day.

The Cadets realise this, and perhaps something more. They have come to a dead stop and are "standing rigid" like setters. They are clutching with both hands at even the shadow of support from the left that would help them to execute their plans. It is significant that *Rech*, the chief organ of the Cadet Party, devoted the leading article in its last issue to the question of the Social-Democrats' attitude towards the idea of a Cadet Ministry. We publish elsewhere the full text of that article as a most instructive sign of the times.

The authors of the article sum up their main idea as follows: to create "common ground on which the liberation movement could take its stand with complete unanimity, *without distinction of shades*". This, in fact, is the principal

aim of the Cadets' entire policy. Moreover, this, in fact, is the principal aim of all the liberal-bourgeois policy in the Russian revolution in general. To eliminate the "different shades" in the liberation movement means eliminating the difference in the democratic demands of the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the proletariat. It means recognising with "complete unanimity" the liberal bourgeoisie as the medium of expression and champion of the aspirations of the whole liberation movement. It means converting the proletariat into a blind tool of the liberal bourgeoisie. But since everybody knows that the supreme political ideal of the liberal bourgeoisie—dictated by its most profound class interests—is a deal with the old authority, we may formulate our last thesis differently. We can say that the bourgeois *Rech* wants to convert the proletariat into a blind accessory to the deal that the liberals want to make with the old authority. But the main target against which this deal will be directed will be the proletariat, and the next, of course, the revolutionary peasantry.

This is what a Cadet Ministry really means. The recent conflict in the State Duma over the question of instituting local land committees threw a glaring light on Cadet policy. The committees should have been the local authority, while the Ministry is to be the central authority; but in substance the Cadets' policy remains unchanged, always and everywhere. They are opposed to the election of local committees by universal suffrage: they are in favour of "equal representation of the landlords and the peasants, under the supervision of the old authorities". They have been *compelled* to admit this, against their own will, because for a long time they *concealed the truth*, tried to befog the issue and asserted that, "in general", they were wholeheartedly in favour both of local land committees and of universal suffrage. Similarly, the Cadets are opposed to the convocation of a constituent assembly: they are in favour of a Cadet Ministry to be appointed by the supreme authority. Such a Ministry, as the instrument of central authority, will be quite on a par with local committees established on the vaunted principle of equal representation, etc.

The tactics the proletariat must adopt in face of this Cadet policy are clear. The proletariat must ruthlessly expose

the true meaning of this policy, tolerating no ambiguities, no attempts to obscure the political consciousness of the workers and peasants. The proletariat must fully use all the vacillations in the policy of the "powers that be" and of the would-be "sharers of power" to enlarge and strengthen *its own* class organisation, and to strengthen its contacts with the revolutionary peasantry as the only class that is capable of carrying the liberation movement *beyond* the Cadet "dam", beyond a Cadet deal with the old authorities.

But should not the proletariat *support* the demand of the liberal bourgeoisie that the supreme authority should appoint a Cadet Ministry? Is it not the duty of the proletariat to do so since the appointment of a Cadet Ministry would facilitate the struggle for freedom and for socialism?

No, such a step would be a gross mistake, and *betrayal* of the interests of the proletariat. It would mean sacrificing the fundamental interests of the proletariat in the revolution for the sake of a momentary success. It would mean chasing a shadow and advising the proletariat to "lay down its arms", without even the slightest *real* guarantee that its struggle will *really* be facilitated. It would be the worst kind of opportunism.

The appointment of a Cadet Ministry by the supreme authority will not shake the foundations of the old authorities in the least. It will not necessarily change the real alignment of forces in favour of the truly revolutionary classes. Such a "reform" will not eliminate the struggle between the people and the old authorities in the least. There have been cases in the history of revolutions where such liberal Ministries appointed by the old authorities (for example, in Germany in 1848) served only as a screen for autocracy, and did more to stamp out the revolution than many a bureaucratic Ministry.

The Russian proletariat has no reason to fear a Cadet Ministry, which, at all events, will help the people to realise the true nature of the Cadets; but it must under no circumstances support the appointment of such a Ministry, for, in essence, this is a most ambiguous, sinister and treacherous measure.

Since the Duma was not swept away, it was to the proletariat's advantage that the Cadets obtained a majority in

the elections. They will "exhaust" themselves much sooner than they would have done had they been in the minority. But the proletariat refused to render the Cadets any support during the elections, and the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. endorsed this decision by prohibiting all blocs (agreements, alliances) with other parties. A Cadet Ministry will be to the proletariat's advantage *in the sense* that, if one were formed, the Cadets would the sooner "spend" themselves, become "played out", "winded", and reveal themselves in their true colours. But the proletariat will never support a *deal* between the bourgeoisie and TrepoV for the purpose of carving up the people's freedom.

The only real way of "supporting" the liberation movement and really developing it is to stimulate the growth of the political and industrial organisations of the proletariat and to strengthen its ties with the revolutionary peasantry. This alone will really sap the strength of the old authority and prepare for its downfall. The bargaining of the Cadets is a dubious game. It would be both useless to support it, with a view to achieving some truly lasting gains for the revolution, and harmful to do so, because of the effect it would have on the development of the political consciousness, solidarity and organisation of the revolutionary classes.

THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ON THE CADETS

The liberal-bourgeois press throughout Russia is doing its utmost to convince its readers that the Russian Social-Democratic "Bolsheviks" have nothing in common with international Social-Democracy. They are anarchists, if you please, rebels, conspirators. They still have a lot to learn from the German Social-Democrats. They ought to recognise that the "parliamentary" path is the main path, as the German Social-Democrats have done. This and similar stuff can be read in the columns of dozens of Cadet newspapers.

The open political struggle is still a novelty for the Russian public. The Russian public does not yet know that it is the common trick of *the bourgeoisie in all countries* to assert that the socialists in their particular countries are rascals, rebels, and so forth, whereas the socialists in neighbouring countries are "reasonable" people. The French bourgeoisie abuses Jaurès and praises Bebel. The German bourgeoisie abuses Bebel and praises Jaurès. The Russian bourgeoisie abuses the Russian Social-Democrats and praises the German Social-Democrats. It is an old, old trick!

But here are the facts. *Vorwärts (Forward)*, the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party—which we get very rarely, thanks to the "zeal" of the Russian police censors—recently published two articles entitled "The Duma and the Cadets". The editors not only published these "Letters from Russia" as leading articles, but even wrote a comment, stating that they contained "a true description of the position of the Cadets in the Russian revolutionary movement".

Let us see the assessment of the Cadets that the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party regards as a *true* one. We hope our readers will forgive us for quoting these lengthy excerpts, but Russian liberal newspaper hacks must be taught once and for all to stop inventing disagreements between the Russian and the German Social-Democrats.

“Until quite recently,” we read in the article “The Duma and the Cadets”, “nothing was heard about the Cadets. They were not to be found where blood was flowing and bullets flying. They were not to be found where the masses of the people, inspired by the heroism of the revolutionary struggle, were sacrificing their lives, determined to die or win under the banner of proletarian freedom. These realist politicians were too statesmanlike, too far-sighted, to allow themselves to be carried away by the mass movement headed by ‘reprobates’, dreamers and revolutionary ‘fanatics’. These cool-headed, sapient phrase-mongers and tinsel knights of pseudo-liberalism, sat quietly by their firesides. They shook their heads disapprovingly, fearing lest the revolution should go too far and shake the ancient and sacred pillars of bourgeois life, property, political decorum and order.

“The Cadets have long shown their versatility in the flunkey’s art. At the time of the Bulygin Duma they already dreamed of throwing a bridge between the as yet ‘innocent’ Witte and liberalism, which was brazenly flirting with the foreign stock exchanges. Generally speaking, the stock exchange is the weak spot of our Party of ‘People’s Freedom’. Only a few days ago the Cadets were indignantly denying the accusation that they were conducting ‘treacherous’ propaganda against the new loan of many million rubles. And this is quite understandable. When police tyranny was rampant, they tried to explain that it was called forth by the conduct of the democrats. When fires and riots organised by the camarilla were raging, they, with might and main, defended the throne and the altar²⁰⁶ from the attacks of the socialists, who recognise nothing and deny and destroy everything.

“Then came the celebrated boycott, the great October strike, the bloody period of popular insurrections, civil war and mutiny among the armed forces on land and sea. The Cadets were swept away by the great, purifying tide.

“Then, nothing was heard of the Cadets. The knights of the golden mean ran to cover. At best, they loudly protested and loudly complained; but owing to the raging revolutionary storm, nobody heard them.

“The reaction rendered the Cadets the greatest service. When the prisons were filled again, when the Russian fighters for freedom were again being packed off to a living death in exile, the Cadets found their opportunity. Their opponents on the left were gagged. The Cadets got to the newspapers; they were only slightly affected by the persecutions of the counter-revolution. Punitive expeditions were not sent against them. Their houses were not razed to the ground. Their children were not raped by Cossacks. The Wittes and Durnovos did not apply to

them their 'pacification' measures. It was not against them that guns and machine-guns, artillery and infantry, the Navy and the Cossacks were turned. And so the Cadets came into the foreground. The battle of words began. Polemics took the place of revolution; and in this field the Cadets proved to be past-masters and matchless virtuosos. They first and foremost hurled themselves into the fray against the revolution and the revolutionaries; they reviled the socialists and slandered the workers' party. They polemised against opponents who were gagged. They flung accusations against those who could neither answer nor defend themselves. But Russian liberalism was not content with this. Through the mouth of one of its most prominent leaders it declared that the entire heroic liberation movement in Russia was the work of its hands: that the fall of the autocracy stands to its credit. The Cadets insolently claimed the glory for the deeds in which the proletarians had shed their blood. They decked themselves with the shreds of the tattered scarlet banner and proclaimed liberalism the soul of the struggle for liberation, the liberator of the country from tyranny. And although the prisons remained overcrowded, and gallows continued to be erected, the Cadets were loud in self-praise and furiously denounced the turbulent, audacious and reckless revolutionaries."

The author then goes on to describe the legal status of our Duma, the law governing the Council of State and the part the Cadets played during the elections.

"The dear Cadets passionately desired evolution instead of revolution, law and order instead of revolutionary anarchy and civil war." But during the elections the people gave them a revolutionary mandate that was not at all to their liking.

"Like the born diplomats and honest brokers they are, they consoled themselves with the hope of being able to subdue the revolution, revive the stock exchange, soften the rigour of the autocratic regime, reconcile all antagonisms and eliminate all conflicts. They called for peace, but reality brought something different. They came before the electors as 'Constitutional-Democrats', but they were elected as an opposition party, as the sole or chief opposition party. They strove for a compromise, but they were given a revolutionary mandate. They made fine speeches, but they were sent to fight; they were compelled to give a pledge, and they were promised every support, even to the extent of armed struggle.

"Intoxicated with victory, carried away by revolutionary oratory during the election campaign, finding themselves in the midst of revolutionary voters, the Cadets went further than they intended. They did not see that behind their backs a new force had arisen that was pushing them into the fight.

"The Cadets realised too late who had sent them to parliament, who had given them such a categorically imperative mandate, who had im-

posed upon them the role that they dreaded most of all, and which they tried to get out of with all their might. They had been sent by the Russian revolution to clear the road for a further advance, they had been sent by the Russian people who were using the Cadets as a battering-ram to make a new breach in the walls of the autocracy, the main strongholds of which will be captured later, not with the aid of the Cadets, but of the broad masses of the people."

The Cadets were displeased to see revolutionary peasant deputies in the Duma who threatened to spoil their game. They had dreamt of a "*unanimous Cadet Duma*". "Then it would have been possible to shirk the revolutionary tasks somehow, to drown all real action in a flood of beautiful oratory.... It would have been possible to confine themselves to drafting resolutions and Bills and to obtaining—at most—a Cadet Ministry, consolidating a constitutional monarchy, subduing the revolution through minor concessions, dragging out all reforms to infinity, and at last reaching the goal: bourgeois-liberal parliamentarism.... Yes, all this would have been possible, had there been no peasants in the Duma!" And then the author goes on to describe, sometimes in positively rapturous terms, the revolutionary spirit of the peasant deputies in the Duma. "The revolution not only carried Cadets into the Duma, it also created a 'Mountain', a 'Party of the Mountain', which will not agree to compromise. The revolution is represented in the Duma, too."

"Poor Cadets, poor Russian Girondists! They have fallen between the hammer and the anvil, between the bayonets of the government and the revolution of the proletariat and peasantry.

"No wonder the Cadets have now begun shamefully to hide their scarlet trappings. No wonder they are now dropping their high-sounding slogans. No wonder they have now begun to talk about respecting the prerogatives of the old authority. The situation is becoming serious. The government is not in a joking mood, and will concede nothing unless it is compelled to. But neither is the revolution, which sent the Cadets to the Duma. It will never forgive the Cadets their treachery. It will have no mercy on the poltroons who pledged themselves to play a revolutionary role and funk'd it.

"On the one side is absolutism, on the other revolution. What will the Cadets do?"

Thus ends the article with which the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party has expressed its agreement. These "reasonable" German Social-Democrats have put

the “Bolsheviks” frightfully to shame, haven’t they? Their opinion of the Cadets is totally different from ours, isn’t it? Our slogan—the revolution of the proletariat and peasantry—is nothing like theirs, is it?

Let our readers also consider whether we should find ourselves at odds with such people in our appraisal of a Cadet Ministry.

International revolutionary Social-Democracy in its attitude to absolutism and to the liberal bourgeoisie, is as united today as ever it was!

Vperyod, No. 5, May 31, 1906

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to the *Vperyod* text

AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

In *Rech*, No. 86, Mr. P. Milyukov sums up “the first month’s work of the Duma”.

Speaking generally, writes this worthy author,

“all that we have cited here in proof of the enormous success of the activities of the Duma during the one month it has been in existence represents an imponderable magnitude.”

Nevertheless, the “first month’s work of the Duma” has also produced fairly “ponderable” results—at all events in prospect.

“When *Le Temps* abroad, and *Novoye Vremya* in St. Petersburg, demand a ‘Cadet’ Ministry, everybody knows what this means.”

Perhaps it is going a bit too far, Mr. Milyukov, to say that “everybody knows”; but there is no doubt that today very, very many people already know “what this means”. We are compelled to beg of the Cadet gentlemen once again: “That thou doest, do quickly! “Then, Mr. Milyukov, everybody will indeed know “what this means”.

LET THE WORKERS DECIDE

The Social-Democratic proletariat of Russia, and particularly of St. Petersburg, is confronted with the extremely important problem of how to conduct the immediate political campaign in relation to the State Duma. It goes without saying that the united Social-Democratic Party can discuss this question of the *immediate* campaign only *within the framework* of the resolution of the Unity Congress.

The St. Petersburg Social-Democratic proletariat has two plans of campaign before it: one in the resolution of the Central Committee, and the other in the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee. These two resolutions* have already been published in *Vperyod* (No. 2),²⁰⁷ and now we propose to discuss the material difference between them. The main point in the Central Committee's resolution reads: "We will support the Duma in all the steps it takes towards overthrowing the present Ministry and substituting for it a Ministry appointed by the Duma, for we see in such a change favourable conditions for the convocation of a constituent assembly." The resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee says nothing about supporting such a demand; it concentrates on the government's outrageous behaviour, on the impotence of the Duma, on the need for the Trudovik Group to appeal to the people, on the inevitability of a new and joint struggle by the workers and peasants.

Thus the main point at issue is whether or not we should support the steps of the Duma towards the formation of a Cadet Ministry. The Central Committee's resolution is vague on this point, and talks about a "Ministry appointed

* See pp. 481-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

by the Duma". But everybody knows, and the whole liberal-bourgeois press is emphasising it, that what is actually being discussed is the appointment by the supreme authority of a Ministry acceptable to the Duma, that is to say, a Cadet Ministry. And this is the only construction that the broad masses of the working class can put upon the Central Committee's resolution.

Can the Social-Democratic proletariat support the demand that the supreme authority should appoint a Cadet Ministry? No, it cannot. A Cadet Ministry can be appointed only as the result of a *deal* between the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie against the socialist workers and the revolutionary peasantry. The Social-Democrats will, of course, take the utmost advantage of the new situation that would be created by such a deal. They will carefully consider their tactics if this deal even temporarily creates better conditions for the struggle for freedom and for socialism. We will do all we can to turn even this counter-revolutionary deal to the advantage of the revolution. But we cannot *support* a deal between the *bourgeoisie and the bureaucrats* concluded *behind the backs of the people*. To call upon the people, or the proletariat, to support such a deal would only be corrupting their minds, concealing from them the truth about the *nature* of this deal, about the *dangers* it involves, and about the fact that the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy want thereby to *make more difficult* the convocation of a constituent assembly.

We must call upon the workers and peasants not to support deals, but to fight. Only serious preparations for a fight can *really* weaken the autocracy; a fight alone can guarantee that *any* step the autocracy or the bourgeoisie take will really benefit the revolution. The Central Committee's resolution is *mistaken*. The class-conscious Social-Democratic workers *cannot* accept it.

Now for the second question. Is it not our duty to accept this resolution in the name of discipline and of submission to the Congress? Read the resolution on the State Duma adopted by the Unity Congress; you will find nothing in it to suggest that we must support the demand for the formation of a Cadet Ministry. It does not contain *a single word* about "supporting" the Duma at all. The following is the

full text of that part of the Congress resolution which *defines* our attitude to the Duma itself: "The Social-Democratic Party must (1) systematically *utilise* all the conflicts that arise between the government and the Duma, as well as in the Duma itself, for the purpose of expanding and deepening the revolutionary movement, and with this end in view it must (a) strive to *expand and intensify these conflicts* to such limits as will enable them to be used as the *starting-point for broad mass movements for the overthrow* of the present political system; (b) strive in every case to link the political tasks of the movement with the social and economic demands of the masses of workers and peasants; (c) by means of extensive agitation among the masses of the people in favour of *revolutionary demands* to be presented to the State Duma—organise *outside pressure upon the Duma* with the object of *revolutionising* it. (2) *Intervene* in such a way as to make these growing conflicts (a) reveal to the masses the inconsistency of all the bourgeois parties in the Duma that claim to express the will of the people, and (b) help the broad masses (the proletariat, the peasantry, and the town petty bourgeoisie) to realise that the *Duma is utterly useless* as a representative body, and that it is necessary to convene a national constituent assembly", etc.

From the passages we have underlined, it is evident that the Central Committee's resolution on supporting the demand for a Cadet Ministry, far from being in harmony with the Congress resolution, actually *contradicts* it. The demand for a Cadet Ministry is *not* a *revolutionary* demand. It serves to *allay* and *obscure* the conflicts with the Duma, and in the Duma; it leaves out the question of the uselessness of the Duma, etc., etc. We will add that the Congress resolution *says nothing* about "supporting" the Duma; it speaks only of "exerting pressure", "utilising" and "intervening".

The inference is obvious. The Central Committee has *absolutely no right* to call upon the Party organisations to accept its resolution in favour of supporting the demand for a Cadet Ministry. It is the *duty* of every Party member to take an absolutely independent and critical stand on this question and to declare for the resolution that in his opinion *more correctly* solves the problem within the framework of the decisions of the Unity Congress. The St. Petersburg

worker Social-Democrats know that the whole Party organisation is now built on a *democratic* basis. This means that *all* the Party members take part in the election of officials, committee members, and so forth, that *all* the Party members discuss and *decide* questions concerning the political campaigns of the proletariat, and that all the Party members *determine* the line of tactics of the Party organisations.

We are sure that this will be the attitude of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic proletariat on the present issue: that it will discuss it earnestly and thoroughly, from every angle and decide for itself *whether or not the demand for a Cadet Ministry should be supported*.

The St. Petersburg workers will not allow themselves to be diverted from their *right*, from their Social-Democratic and Party *duty* by any sophistry, that is to say, by any obviously fallacious arguments. We will very briefly mention these sophistries. L. Martov in *Kuryer* (No. 13) says: in the name of discipline, do not disorganise the Central Committee's political campaign. This is sophistry. Discipline does not demand that a Party member should blindly subscribe to all the resolutions drafted by the Central Committee. There is no rule anywhere that compels a Party organisation to forego its right to have an opinion of its own and to become a mere *subscriber* to the Central Committee's resolutions. L. Martov says: the Mensheviks submitted in the case of the boycott, now it is for you to submit. This is sophistry. *We all* submitted to the decisions of the Congress. *Not one of us* called for opposition to participation in the Duma elections and to the formation of a Social-Democratic parliamentary group. Conforming with the decision of the Congress, we submitted, we gave up the boycott. But we have a right and duty to oppose, *within the framework of the Congress decisions*, support for a Cadet Ministry, which *no Congress has decreed*. L. Martov evades the whole issue with awful words and insinuations about disorganisers: but he does not say a word about whether the St. Petersburg Committee resolution contradicts the Congress decision. He says nothing about the rights of the *opposition*, that is, about the right of *any* Party organisation, within the bounds of the will of the Congress, to ques-

tion the tactics of the Central Committee and to correct its deviations and mistakes. Therefore we will calmly reply to Martov that those are disorganisers who violate the legitimate rights of the Party organisations.

We will calmly point to the fact that even Mensheviks (see Comrade Vlasov's²⁰⁸ letter to the editor elsewhere in this issue) disagree with the proposal to support a Cadet Ministry. Even Comrade Ryanshev, in *Kuryer*, No. 13, calls upon "*the Workers' and Trudovik Groups*" to "fight with all their might" against the Cadets' Freedom of Assembly Bill, that is to say, he proposes *purely Bolshevik* tactics, which *preclude* support for a Ministry consisting of these same Cadets.

When the Vyborg District Committee proposes that a general city conference be called for which the delegates are to be elected "irrespective of faction, i.e., *without any discussion*"—without discussing the point at issue!!—the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic workers can, of course, only laugh at them for their proposal. Class-conscious workers will never decide an important question *without discussion*. Neither complaints about "sharp language" in discussion, nor L. Martov's wailings about certain harsh words that have offended him, nor threats of a split uttered by him, or anybody else, will prevent the workers from settling the question *by themselves*. To threaten a split, to provoke a split, is a trick unworthy of a Social-Democrat, and can only give pleasure to the bourgeoisie (see *Duma*, No. 29). The workers will *by a majority* vote decide whether or not a Cadet Ministry should be supported. And they will see to it that nobody, not even the Central Committee, *dares to thwart the decisions they arrive at* absolutely freely, independently and legitimately, *on the basis* of the decisions of the Unity Congress.

“DON'T GAZE UP, GAZE DOWN!”

This is what Mr. I. Zhilkin says in today's issue of the Left-Cadet *Nasha Zhizn*. He sadly notes the “glow of self-satisfaction” on the faces of the Cadets. He is moved to protest by Mr. Milyukov's delighted statement that “the Cadets are dissociating themselves from the extreme Left”. He scoffs at the “unusual political wisdom” of the Cadets, who admit that the situation is “hopeless” and at the same time talk boastfully about boldly steering the ship of state into the fairway.

Let us examine these reflections, for they concern the fundamental question in the present political situation. We think it particularly important to emphasise that events *are compelling* even those who totally disagree with the views of the Left Social-Democrats, and are most vehemently opposing us, to appraise the situation correctly.

According to rumours emanating from the Russian reactionaries' club in Paris, “all wavering in Peterhof has ceased. Goremykin has been given a free hand”, i.e., freedom to make short work of the Duma. And *Nasha Zhizn*, which does not share the Bolsheviki's proclivity to paint everything in gloomy colours, says: “We have every reason to believe that these rumours are trustworthy....” “The fight is becoming more intense.... He who raises the sword shall perish by the sword,” says the leading article in this newspaper in conclusion. And Mr. I. Zhilkin writes: “Are there many people in Russia who believe in a peaceful, victorious outcome of parliamentary work? One must be a romantic, a visionary, an idealist, to be carried away by such rosy dreams.” And in the next column Mr. V. Khizhnyakov writes: “We cannot avoid revolutionary storms—this must be

admitted. The Duma is powerless to turn the movement to the peaceful path, for it lacks the power to improve the conditions of life of the people, and without such a power there is no other road but that of revolution. One is already conscious of an ever-growing feeling of discontent, of a rapidly waning faith in the almighty power of the Duma and giving way to despair [lack of faith in the Duma, like lack of faith in God, is by no means an indication of "despair"]. The atmosphere is gradually becoming electrified: sometimes we hear the distant roll of thunder; it will not be very long, perhaps, before the storm bursts."

This is said by people whose opinion we particularly value because of their preconceived hostility to revolutionary Social-Democracy. Events have *compelled* these people to repeat the very propositions on which we have always insisted, and for which the liberal bourgeoisie has always denounced, abused and reviled us, inventing a heap of scandal, lies and slander about the "Bolsheviks".

"Don't gaze up, gaze down!" This means that in view of the objective historical conditions, which do not depend upon our will, the parliamentary struggle *cannot* become the *main* form of the liberation movement in Russia at the present time. Needless to say, it is not a matter of "repudiating" this form of struggle, not a matter of rejecting it. The fact is that, owing to the course of events, the *main* and decisive struggle is advancing in another arena. The liberal bourgeoisie has on innumerable occasions slanderously stated that we Bolsheviks "are recklessly pushing the people towards extreme measures" (*Rech*, No. 88). But, gentlemen, was it really we who "pushed" Zhilkin, Khizhnyakov and the leader-writer of *Nasha Zhizn*? Was it really we who "pushed" the Kursk and Poltava soldiers, the Kiev, Saratov and other peasants?

We have "pushed" and roused those whose faces were always "glowing with self-satisfaction". We have said that the form of the struggle for liberation does not depend upon our will, that we must soberly and fearlessly look in the face of reality, which precludes the "path" that even *Nasha Zhizn* now admits is closed. We have said that socialists cannot and must not sacrifice the fundamental interests of democracy and of socialism for the sake of momentary

successes; that it is their duty to tell the masses the bitter truth that the Cadets are unreliable, that the Duma is powerless and that revolutionary storms are inevitable. If, having been enchanted by the oratory of the Cadets at election meetings, the masses do not understand us today, and if, carried away with joy in the first days of the first Russian parliament, they do not understand us tomorrow, the day after tomorrow they will be convinced that we are right. Events will make them see that the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party is not tempted by tawdry successes, that it calls upon them firmly and consistently to “gaze” in the very direction where the struggle is inevitably developing that will decide the fate of genuine (and not Cadet) people’s freedom.

Our revolution is the great Russian revolution precisely because it has roused vast masses of the people to participation in making history. Class contradictions among these masses are still far from having revealed themselves in full measure. Political parties are only just taking shape. Therefore it is not within our power either to direct the masses or restrain them to any great extent. But we can, after studying the actual situation and the relations between classes, foresee the inevitable trend of their historic activities, the main forms of their movement. We must spread our socialist knowledge among the masses as widely as possible, undaunted by the fact that truth is often very bitter, and not easily discernible beneath the tinsel of fashionable political labels or gaudy political institutions: and not allowing ourselves to be enchanted by beautiful fiction. We shall do our duty if we do everything to enlighten the masses and prepare them for forms of the movement which, though imperceptible to the superficial observer, nevertheless, inexorably follow from the whole economic and political situation in the country. We shall fail in our duty if we only gave “up”, and miss what is going on, growing, approaching and impending below.

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THE REACTION IS TAKING TO ARMS

The Social-Democratic press has long been pointing out that the vaunted "constitutionalism" in Russia is baseless and ephemeral. So long as the old authority remains and controls the whole vast machinery of state administration, it is useless talking seriously about the importance of popular representation and about satisfying the urgent needs of the vast masses of the people. No sooner had the State Duma begun its sittings—and liberal-bourgeois oratory about peaceful, constitutional evolution burst forth in a particularly turbulent flood—than there began an increasing number of attacks on peaceful demonstrators, cases of setting fire to halls where public meetings were proceeding, and lastly, downright pogroms—all organised by government agents.

Meanwhile the peasant movement is growing. Strikes among the workers are becoming more embittered, more frequent and more extensive. Unrest is growing among the most backward military units, the infantry in the provinces, and among the Cossacks.

Far too much inflammable material has accumulated in Russian social life. The struggle which ages of unprecedented violence, torment, torture, robbery and exploitation have paved the way for has become too widespread and acute. This struggle between the people and the old authority cannot be confined within the limits of a struggle of the Duma for a particular Ministry. Even the most downtrodden and ignorant "subjects" can no longer be restrained from proclaiming the demands of awakening human and civic dignity. The old authority, which has always made the laws

itself, which in fighting for its existence is resorting to the last, most desperate, savage and furious methods, cannot be restrained by appeals to abide by the law.

The pogrom in Belostok is a particularly striking indication that the government has taken to arms against the people. The old, but ever new story of Russian pogroms!—ever, until the people achieve victory, until the old authorities are completely swept away. Here are a few excerpts from a telegram received from a Belostok elector, Tsirin: “A *deliberately-organised* anti-Jewish pogrom has started.” “In spite of rumours that have been circulated, *not a single order has been received* from the Ministry all day today!” “Vigorous agitation for the pogrom has been carried on for the past two weeks. In the streets, particularly at night, leaflets were distributed calling for the massacre, not only of Jews, but also of intellectuals. *The police simply turned a blind eye to all this.*”

The old familiar picture! The police organises the pogrom beforehand. The police instigates it: leaflets are printed in government printing offices calling for a massacre of the Jews. When the pogrom begins, the police is inactive. The troops quietly look on at the exploits of the Black Hundreds. But later this very police goes through the farce of prosecution and trial of the pogromists. The investigations and trials conducted by the officials of the old authority always end in the same way: the cases drag on, none of the pogromists are found guilty, sometimes even the battered and mutilated Jews and intellectuals are dragged before the court, months pass—and the old, but ever new story is forgotten, until the next pogrom. Vile instigation, bribery, and fuddling with drink of the scum of our cursed capitalist “civilisation”, the brutal massacre of unarmed by armed people, and farcical trials conducted by the culprits themselves! And yet there are those who, seeing these phenomena of Russian social life, think, and say, that somebody or other is “recklessly” calling upon the people to resort to “extreme measures”! One must be, not reckless, but a poltroon, politically corrupt, to say such things in the face of events like the burning of the People’s House at Vologda (at the time of the opening of the Duma) or the pogrom in Belostok (after the Duma had been in session a month).

A single event like this will have more effect upon the people than millions of appeals. And to talk about "reckless" appeals is just as hopelessly pedantic and as much a sin of a deadened civic conscience, as to condemn the wild cry for revenge that is going up from the battlefields of Vologda and Belostok.

The Duma did the right thing by immediately discussing the interpellation on the Belostok pogrom, and sending some of its members to Belostok to investigate on the spot. But in reading this interpellation, and comparing it with the speeches of members of the Duma and the commonly-known facts about pogroms, one has a deep feeling of dissatisfaction, of indignation at the irresolute terms in which the interpellation is worded.

Judge for yourselves. The authors of the interpellation say: "The inhabitants *fear* that the local authorities and malicious agitators may try to make out the victims themselves to be responsible for the calamity that has befallen them." "...False information on these lines is being circulated." Yes, the downtrodden and tormented Jewish population is indeed apprehensive of this, and has every reason to be. This is true. But it is *not the whole truth*, gentlemen, members of the Duma, and authors of the interpellation! You, the people's deputies, who have not yet been assaulted and tormented, know perfectly well that this is not the whole truth. You know that the downtrodden inhabitants will *not dare* to name those who are *really responsible* for the pogrom. *You must name them*. That is what you are people's deputies for. That is why you enjoy—even under Russian law—*complete* freedom of speech in the Duma. Then don't stand *between* the reaction and the people, at a time when the armed reaction is strangling, massacring, and mutilating unarmed people. Take your stand *openly and entirely* on the side of the people. Don't confine yourselves to conveying the fear of the townspeople that the vile instigators of the pogroms will say it is the murdered victims who are to blame. *Indict the culprits in unequivocal terms*—it is your direct *duty* to the people. Don't ask the government whether measures are being taken to protect the Jews and to prevent pogroms, but ask how long the government intends to shield the real culprits, who are mem-

bers of the government. Ask the government whether it thinks that the people will long be in error as to who is really responsible for the pogroms. Indict the government openly and publicly; call upon the people to organise a militia and self-defence as the *only* means of protection against pogroms.

This is not in keeping with "parliamentary practice", you will say. Are you not ashamed to advance such an argument *even* at a time like this? Don't you realise that the people will condemn you if, even at a time like this you do not give up playing at parliaments and do not dare to say straightforwardly, openly and loudly what *you really know and think*?

That you know the truth about the pogroms is evident from speeches delivered by members of the Duma. The Cadet Nabokov said: "We know that in many cases the administration has not succeeded in allaying the suspicion that the simultaneous outbreak of the pogroms is the result either of the Black-Hundred organisations operating *with the knowledge of the local authorities*, or, at best, of the latter's systematic inaction."

If you *know* that this is so, gentlemen of the Cadet Party, you should have said so in your interpellation. You should have written: We *know* such-and-such facts and therefore ask questions about them. And if you know what happens "at best", it is *unseemly* for people's deputies to keep silent about what happens at *worst*, about the deliberate organisation of pogroms by the police on orders from St. Petersburg.

"Belostok is not an exceptional case," rightly said Levin. "It is one of the consequences of the system that you want to combat." Quite right, citizen Levin! But while in newspapers we can only speak of the "system", you in the Duma ought to speak out more plainly and sharply.

"Pogroms are part of a whole system. In the October days ... the government ... found no other means of combating the liberation movement.... You know how that chapter of history ended. Now the same thing is being repeated.... This system is *perfidiously* prepared and thought out, and is being carried out with *equal perfidy*. In many cases we know very well who organises these pogroms; we

know very well that leaflets *are sent out by the gendarmerie departments.*”

Once again, quite right, citizen Levin! And therefore you should have said in your interpellation: does the government think that the Duma is not aware of the commonly-known fact that the gendarmes and police send out those leaflets?

Deputy Ryzhkov bluntly stated that the allegation that pogroms are due to racial enmity was a *lie*, and that the allegation that they were due to the impotence of the authorities was a malicious invention. Deputy Ryzhkov listed a number of facts which proved that there had been “collaboration” between the police, the pogromists and the Cossacks. “I live in a big industrial district,” he said, “and I know that the pogrom in Lugansk, for example, did not assume ghastly dimensions *only because* [mark this, gentlemen: *only because*] the *unarmed workers* drove back the pogromists with their bare fists, at the risk of being shot by the police.”

In *Rech*, this part of the report of the debate in the Duma is headed “The Government Is Indicted”. This is a good heading, but it belongs into the *text of the Duma interpellation*, not into a newspaper report. Either draft these interpellations in such a way as to make them a passionate indictment of the government before the people, or in a way that they may arouse ironical taunts and jeers at the crying discrepancy between the monstrous facts and the bureaucratic evasions is bureaucratically-restrained interpellations. Only by adopting the first-mentioned method will the Duma teach the reactionaries not to jeer at it. As it is, the reactionaries are jeering, quite openly and frankly. Read today’s *Novoye Vremya*. These lackeys of the pogromists are chuckling and making merry: “One cannot help observing with particular satisfaction [!!] the haste with which the Duma interpellated the Minister on the anti-Jewish pogrom in Belostok.” You see: the pogromists are particularly pleased—the flunkey blurts out the truth. The reactionaries are pleased with the Belostok pogrom, and with the fact that they can now abusively call the Duma the “Jewish” Duma. The reactionaries jeer and say: “If, as was stated in the Duma today, we must pardon the riots

against property made by the peasants in the Russian gubernias, then we must also pardon the pogroms against Jewish property in the Western territory.”

You see, gentlemen of the Duma, the reactionaries are more outspoken than you are. Their language is stronger than your Duma language. The reactionaries are not afraid to fight. They are not afraid to associate the Duma with the peasants' struggle for freedom. *Then don't you be afraid to associate the reactionary government with the pogromists!*

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**RESOLUTION (III)
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE
OF THE R.S.D.L.P.
ON THE QUESTION OF A DUMA MINISTRY²⁰⁹**

Whereas:

(1) The demand for the appointment at the present time of a responsible Ministry representing the majority in the State Duma is mistaken and ambiguous, for:

(a) the appointment of such a Ministry would not really signify the transfer of power from the autocracy to a popular representative body;

(b) in essence, it would be a deal between the liberal bourgeoisie and the autocracy, concluded at the expense of the people and behind its back;

(c) in view of the present alignment of real political force, the proletariat has no guarantee that this deal will give it real security in waging its class struggle (at all events, not real enough to compensate for the material harm that will be caused to the development of proletarian class-consciousness by the active support of a bourgeois deal transacted in a period of revolutionary upswing).

(2) In the light of the foregoing, the demand for the appointment of a responsible Duma Ministry can only serve to strengthen constitutional illusions and corrupt the revolutionary consciousness of the people, by creating hopes that power will be peacefully transferred to the people, and by obscuring the fundamental tasks of the struggle for freedom;—

Therefore, this meeting resolves:

(1) that the proletariat cannot at present support the demand for the appointment of a Duma Ministry;

(2) that the proletariat supports the idea of forming an Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the revolutionary elements in the Duma, for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of the local free organisations of the people.

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NOTES

- ¹ “*Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers Deputies*”—an article appraising the Soviets for the first time as an organ of insurrection and the rudiments of a new revolutionary power. It was written by Lenin early in November 1905 in Stockholm, where he stayed for a while on his way back to Russia from exile. He contributed the article to *Novaya Zhizn* which, however, did not publish it. The manuscript was not discovered until the autumn of 1940. p. 17
- ² *Novaya Zhizn (New Life)*—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, published daily from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905, in St. Petersburg. Lenin became the editor of the paper upon his return to Russia early in November 1905. The paper was the virtual Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky were closely associated with the paper, and Maxim Gorky contributed articles and appreciable funds.
- The paper had a circulation of up to 80,000 though it was constantly persecuted, 15 issues out of 27 being confiscated and destroyed. It was closed by the government after issue No. 27; issue No. 28, which was the last, appeared illegally. p. 19
- ³ *Socialist-Revolutionary Party*—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 as a result of the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and circles (Socialist-Revolutionary Union, Socialist-Revolutionary Party, etc.). The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya (Revolutionary Russia)* (1900-05) and the magazine *Vestnik Russkoi Revolyutsii (Herald of the Russian Revolution)* (1901-05) became its official organs. The Socialist-Revolutionaries did not see the class distinctions between the proletariat and the small proprietor. They glossed over the class differentiation and antagonisms within the peasantry, and rejected the proletariat's leading role in the revolution. Their views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism; they tried, as Lenin put it, to patch up “the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist ‘criticism’ of Marxism” (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The tactics of individual terrorism, which the Socialist-Revolutionaries advocated as the basic method of struggle against the autocracy, did much harm to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries envisaged the abolition of private landownership and transfer of

the land to the village communities on the basis of the "labour principle", "equalised" land tenure, and the development of co-operatives. There was nothing socialist in this programme, which the Socialist-Revolutionaries described as a programme for "socialising the land".

The Bolshevik Party exposed the Socialist-Revolutionaries' attempts to pose as socialists; it waged a stubborn struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries to gain influence over the peasantry, and revealed the harmful effect which their tactics of individual terrorism had on the working-class movement. At the same time, on definite conditions, the Bolsheviks concluded temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the struggle against tsarism.

In analysing the Socialist-Revolutionary programme, Lenin showed that if commodity production and private farming on commonly-owned land were preserved, the rule of capital could not be eliminated nor the labouring peasantry delivered from exploitation and ruin. He also showed that co-operatives functioning under the capitalist system could not save the small peasant, since they served to enrich the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time Lenin pointed out that the demand for equalised land tenure, while not socialist, was historically progressive, revolutionary-democratic in character, being directed against reactionary landlordism.

The fact that the peasantry did not constitute a homogeneous class accounted for the political and ideological instability of and organisational confusion among the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and for their constant wavering between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There was a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party as early as the period of the first Russian revolution. Its Right wing formed the legal Labour Popular-Socialist Party, which held views close to those of the Cadets; the Left wing became the semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the Stolypin reaction the Socialist-Revolutionary Party experienced a complete ideological and organizational break-up, and the First World War saw most Socialist-Revolutionaries adopt social-chauvinist views.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917 the Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets formed the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, which included leaders of their party, Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party refused to support the peasants' demand for the abolition of landlordism, and indeed, stood for its maintenance. Socialist-Revolutionary ministers of the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against the peasants who had seized landed estates. Late in November 1917 the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries founded an independent party. To retain their influence among the peasant masses, they recognised Soviet power in form and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon began to fight against Soviet power.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Socialist-Revolutionaries carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activities, vigorously supported the interventionists

and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against Soviet statesmen and Communist Party leaders. After the Civil War, they continued their activities against the Soviet state within the country and among whiteguard émigrés. p. 22

⁴ The reference is to the all-Russian political strike in October 1905. p. 24

⁵ *The Union of Unions*—a political organisation of the liberal-bourgeois intelligentsia. It was founded in May 1905 at the first congress of 14 associations of lawyers, writers, doctors, engineers, teachers, etc. The congress demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly by universal suffrage. In July 1905 the Union declared for boycotting the Bulygin Duma; but before long it abandoned that stand, and decided to take part in the Duma elections. By the end of 1906 the Union had fallen apart. p. 24

⁶ *On January 9, 1905*, by order of the tsar, the troops fired on a peaceful demonstration of St. Petersburg unarmed workers who marched with their wives and children to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar describing their intolerable conditions and utter lack of rights. This massacre of unarmed workers started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia under the slogan "Down with the autocracy!" The events of January 9 marked the beginning of the 1905-07 revolution. p. 28

⁷ *All-Russian Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation founded in 1905. Its programme and tactics were elaborated at its first and second congresses, held in Moscow in August and November 1905. The Union demanded political freedom and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly. It adopted the tactics of boycotting the First State Duma. Its agrarian programme provided for the abolition of private landownership and for transfer of the lands belonging to monasteries, the Church, the Crown and the government to the peasants without compensation. The Union pursued a half-way and erratic policy; while demanding abolition of the landed estates, it agreed to partial compensation of the landlords. An object of police reprisals from the first, it had ceased to exist by the end of 1906. p. 28

⁸ "*The Reorganisation of the Party*"—Lenin's first article published in *Novaya Zhizn*. He wrote it upon his return to Russia from exile, and it served as a basis for the resolution "The Reorganisation of the Party" adopted by the Tammerfors Conference in December 1905. p. 29

⁹ The "*Independents*"—members of the Independent Social Labour Party, an organisation of *agents-provocateurs* founded in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1905 on instructions from the tsarist government, with the direct assistance of the secret police. The party, which was Zubatovist in type, sought to divert the workers

- from the revolutionary struggle. Its programme, published in the magazine *Russky Rabochy* (*The Russian Worker*), No. 4, on December 15 (28), 1905, called for combating Social-Democracy. By the beginning of 1908 the party had ceased to exist, having failed among the masses of the workers. p. 29
- ¹⁰ The appeal "*To All Party Organisations and All Social-Democratic Workers*", subheaded "On the Occasion of the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", was published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 8, on November 10 (23), 1905. p. 29
- ¹¹ This refers to the new, opportunist *Iskra*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks, aided by Plekhanov, took *Iskra* into their own hands. From November 1903 on, beginning with its issue No. 52, *Iskra* became a Menshevik mouthpiece. It existed till October 1905. p. 30
- ¹² *Vendée*—a department in western France, where the backward peasantry began a counter-revolutionary uprising against the republic at the end of the eighteenth century, during the French bourgeois revolution. The uprising was led by the Catholic clergy, the nobility and émigré royalists, and had the support of England. Vendée had become a synonym for reactionary rebellion and hotbed of counter-revolution. p. 36
- ¹³ Lenin's article "*The Proletariat and the Peasantry*" was reprinted by the Sumy group of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905 as an appendix to the "Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. p. 40
- ¹⁴ *The Emancipation of Labour group*—the first Russian Marxist group. It was founded in Geneva by G. V. Plekhanov in 1883, and did much to spread Marxism in Russia. p. 40
- ¹⁵ *Izvestia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov* (*Bulletin of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies*)—an official newspaper of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. It appeared from October 17 (30) to December 14 (27) 1905. Being in effect an information bulletin, it had no permanent staff and was printed by the workers themselves in the printing-works of various bourgeois papers. Altogether ten issues were brought out. Issue No. 11 was seized by the police while being printed. p. 44
- ¹⁶ *Guchkov, A. I.* (1862-1936)—a monarchist representative of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. p. 45
- ¹⁷ *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. founded by decision of the Third Party Congress. On April 27 (May 10), 1905, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party appointed Lenin editor-in-chief of *Proletary*. The weekly appeared in Geneva from May 14 (27)

to November 12 (25) 1905. Twenty-six issues were published in all. The weekly continued the line of the old Leninist *Iskra*, and of the Bolshevik paper *Vperyod*.

Lenin contributed about 90 articles and short items to *Proletary*. His articles determined the political line of the weekly, its ideological content and Bolshevik course. Lenin did a tremendous amount of work as the leader and editor of the weekly. He edited the material to be published, lending it the utmost fidelity to principle, a Party spirit, and precision and clarity in discussing important theoretical problems and elucidating questions of the revolutionary movement.

The editorial board was constantly assisted by V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. S. Olminsky. N. K. Krupskaya, V. M. Velichkina and V. A. Karpinsky had a big share in the editorial work. The weekly was closely linked with the working-class movement in Russia. It carried articles and other items by workers directly engaged in the revolutionary movement. V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, S. I. Gusev and A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova arranged for the collection of articles in Russia and their dispatch to Geneva. N. K. Krupskaya and L. A. Fotieva were in charge of the weekly's correspondence with Party organisations and readers in Russia.

Proletary was prompt to react to all major events in the Russian and international working-class movement. It fought relentlessly against the Mensheviks and other opportunist revisionist elements.

The weekly did much to propagate the decisions of the Third Party Congress and played a prominent role in the organisational and ideological unification of the Bolsheviks. It was the only Russian Social-Democratic paper that consistently upheld revolutionary Marxism and dealt with all the principal issues of the revolution developing in Russia. By giving full information on the events of 1905, it roused the broad masses of the working people to fight for the victory of the revolution.

Proletary had great influence over the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia where some of Lenin's articles were reprinted from it by Bolshevik papers and circulated in leaflet form.

Proletary ceased to appear shortly after Lenin had left for Russia early in November 1905. Its last two issues (Nos. 25 and 26) were published under the editorship of V. V. Vorovsky. The several articles Lenin had written for those issues appeared when he had left Geneva.

p. 45

¹⁸ *Oblomov*—a landlord the chief character in a novel of the same name by the Russian writer I. A. Goncharov. Oblomov was the personification of routine, stagnation, and incapacity for action. p. 46

¹⁹ At the meeting of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies held on November 13 (26) 1905 Lenin spoke of measures to counteract the lock-out organised by the capitalists in reply to the eight hour day which the workers had introduced by their own decision. He moved a resolution on the basis of which the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet on November 14 (27) took a decision on measures against the lock-out. Lenin stressed the sig-

nificance of that decision in the article "The Provocation That Failed" (see pp. 52-53 of this volume). p. 50

²⁰ *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local self-government bodies introduced in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. The powers of the *Zemstvos*, which were headed by the nobility, were limited to purely local economic matters (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the governors and the Ministry of the Interior, which could overrule any decision that did not suit the government. p. 53

²¹ *The Congress of Zemstvos and municipal leaders* sat in Moscow from November 6-13 (19-26), 1905. It declared against the convocation of a constituent assembly and expressed the hope that the Duma would play the role of queller of peasant unrest by slightly increasing peasant allotments. p. 53

²² In the latter half of October 1905 Kronstadt was the scene of meetings of protest over the tsar's Manifesto, issued on October 17 (30) of that year. The Bolsheviks who addressed the meetings exposed the tsar's attempt to deceive the people. In view of the rapid growth of revolutionary sentiment among the masses, the Kronstadt Social-Democratic organisation planned an armed uprising for the end of the month. But events took a spontaneous turn. On October 24 (November 6) a meeting of sailors demanded better food, higher pay, shorter service and a treatment fit for human beings; it also put forward political demands: a democratic republic, universal suffrage, freedom of speech, assembly and association, inviolability of the person, abolition of the social estates, and so on. The sailors' demands were backed by the soldiers. On October 26 (November 8) the struggle developed into an armed uprising. But the insurgents were poorly organised for lack of firm leadership and a plan of action.

The authorities, which ordered troops from St. Petersburg, proclaimed martial law early on October 28 (November 10) and took the offensive. The uprising was crushed. Many of the arrested insurgents were faced with the death sentence, penal servitude or imprisonment. The St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. issued a leaflet "To the Soldiers and Sailors" revealing the truth about the events of October 26-27 (November 8-9). At the call of the Bolsheviks, the workers of St. Petersburg and other cities stood up for the Kronstadt sailors and soldiers. On November 2 (15), the proletariat of St. Petersburg called a general strike. Frightened by the masses' revolutionary action, the government announced that the insurgents would be tried in civil and not in military court. The court sentenced the defendants to disciplinary punishment or imprisonment, and some of them to penal servitude.

The Kronstadt insurrection was a result of the influence exerted on soldiers and sailors by the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants throughout Russia and by the Bolsheviks' activity in the Army and Navy. p. 54

- ²³ On October 17, 1905, at the height of the all-Russian political strike, the tsar issued a Manifesto promising "civil liberties" and a "legislative" Duma. A manoeuvre designed to gain time, split the revolutionary forces, wreck the strike and put down the revolution, the Manifesto was a fraud, and was never carried into practice. p. 54
- ²⁴ *Rus (Russia)*—a liberal-bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg intermittently from December 1903 to June 1908. It changed title twice—to *Molva (Hearsay)* and *Dvadtsaty Vek (The Twentieth Century)*. p. 54
- ²⁵ This refers to the part which the troops of Tsar Nicholas I took in suppressing the revolutionary national-liberation movement in West-European countries. In 1848, the tsar moved his troops into Rumania, Poland, the Baltic Provinces and Right-Bank Ukraine, and granted the Emperor of Austria a loan of six million rubles to suppress the national-liberation movement in Italy. In 1849, tsarist troops helped in putting down the Hungarian revolution. p. 54
- ²⁶ *The great strike of post and telegraph employees* lasted from November 15 (28) to December 15 (28), 1905. It was provoked by the authorities' prohibition to form a union of post and telegraph employees and the discharge of a number of employees who had taken part in organising the union. The All-Russian Congress of the Post and Telegraph Union, which opened in Moscow on November 15 (28), resolved to send Premier Witte a telegram insisting on the readmission of the discharged employees. The dead-line it set for a reply was 1800 hours of the same day, November 15 (28). As the government had sent no answer by the appointed time, the Congress circulated a telegram ordering a strike. The strike involved the whole of Russia. p. 58
- ²⁷ *Nasha Zhizn (Our Life)*—a daily paper close to the Left wing of the Cadet Party. It appeared, in St. Petersburg intermittently from November 6 (19), 1904 to July 11 (24), 1906. p. 60
- ²⁸ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 33-45. p. 60
- ²⁹ *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905, its membership included representatives of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries from among the landlords, and bourgeois intellectuals. Among the more prominent Cadet leaders were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. The Cadets called themselves the "party of people's freedom" to mislead the working masses. In reality they never demanded anything beyond a constitutional monarchy. Their main task they considered to be the right against the revolutionary

movement. They tried to persuade the tsar and the feudal landlords to share power with them.

During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of conquest. At the time of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, they tried to save the monarchy. In the bourgeois Provisional Government, in which they played the key role, they pursued a counter-revolutionary policy, opposed to the interests of the people but favourable to the U.S., British and French imperialists. Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Cadets became rabid enemies of Soviet power and participated in all armed counter-revolutionary actions and the campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and whiteguards had been defeated, the Cadets fled abroad, where they continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity. p. 63

- ³⁰ *Manilovism*—a term derived from the name of the landlord Manilov one of the characters in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Manilov is a typical philistine, sugary sentimentalist and empty visionary. p. 65
- ³¹ The article "*The Dying Autocracy and New Organs of Popular Rule*" was published as a separate leaflet by the Committee of the United Social-Democratic Organisations of Nikolayev on December 14 (27), 1905, and reprinted in *Zabaikalsky Rabochy* (*The Trans-Baikal Worker*), No. 2, the paper of the Chita Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., on December 18 (31), 1905. p. 66
- ³² *Slovo* (*The Word*)—a dally published in St. Petersburg from 1906 to 1909. A paper of the Right-wing Zemstvo, it was first (November 1905 to July 1908) a mouthpiece of the Octobrist Party and then became an organ of the constitutional-monarchist party of "peaceful renovators", who were virtually indistinguishable from the Octobrists. p. 67
- ³³ *The Party of Law and Order*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, the landlords and the top ranks of the bureaucracy, founded in the autumn of 1905. It fully supported the tsarist regime, and welcomed the dissolution of the First Duma. During the elections to the Second Duma it formed a bloc with the Black-Hundred Union of True Russians. It fell apart in 1907. p. 72
- ³⁴ *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a fortnightly bourgeois-liberal magazine published abroad from 1902 to 1905, and edited by P. B. Struve. In January 1904 it became the organ of the liberal-monarchist League of Emancipation. Subsequently the *Osvobozhdeniye* group formed the nucleus of the Cadet Party. p. 80
- ³⁵ *Radical-Democrats*—members of a petty-bourgeois organisation that arose in November 1905. Their position was intermediate between those of the Cadets and the Mensheviks. They started a newspaper of their own—*Radikal*—but were able to bring out only one

issue. They demanded a democratic republic, even though they were willing to settle for a constitutional monarchy, provided the government was accountable to parliament. Concerning the agrarian question they favoured the expropriation of state, crown, monastery and church lands without compensation, and the expropriation of private holdings for a minimum compensation. Their organisation disintegrated early in 1906, its one-time members joining the semi-Cadet papers *Bez Zaglavia* (*Without Title*) and *Tovarishch* (*Comrade*).
p. 80

³⁶ See Frederick Engels, "Flüchtlings-Literatur", *Volksstaat*, Nr. 73 vom 22.6.1874.
p. 86

³⁷ The "Majority" Conference met in Tammerfors, Finland, from December 12-17 (25-30), 1905, instead of the regular Party Congress which the Central Committee had planned and announced and which could not take place because of revolutionary developments (the railwaymen's strike and the Moscow armed uprising). The Conference was attended by delegates from 26 Bolshevnik organisations. Lenin reported on the current situation and the agrarian question. The Conference passed the resolutions on the agrarian question and the reorganisation of the Party drafted by Lenin. It declared for the restoration of Party unity and for the merger of the practical centres of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and of their central organs on the principle of equality, and instructed the Joint Central Committee to convene a unity congress. The Conference also discussed the stand to be taken on the Duma, and resolved to boycott the First Duma. The relevant resolution was drafted by a committee which included Lenin. As the Moscow insurrection had already begun, the Conference hastened to conclude its work on a motion by Lenin, and the delegates went home to take part in the insurrection.

The Conference resolutions were published by the Central Committee in leaflet form and printed in No. 1 of *Molodaya Rossiya* (*Young Russia*) on January 4 (17), 1906 (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1953, Part I, p. 98, Russ. ed.).
p. 88

³⁸ *Cut-off lands* (*otrezki*)—the lands which were "cut off" from the peasants' allotments in favour of the landlords in 1861 when serfdom was abolished in Russia. Subsequently the landlords leased those lands to the peasants on onerous terms.
p. 88

³⁹ *Land redemption payments* were established by the "Regulation Governing Redemption by Peasants Who Have Emerged from Serf Dependence..." adopted on February 19, 1861. The tsarist government compelled the peasants, in return for the allotments assigned to them, to pay redemption to the landlords amounting to several times the real price of the land. When the deal was concluded, the government paid the landlord the purchase price, which was considered a debt owed by the peasant, to be repaid over a period of

49 years. The instalments to be paid annually by the peasants were called land redemption payments. These were an intolerable burden on the peasants and caused their impoverishment and ruin. The peasants formerly belonging to landlords alone paid nearly 2,000 million rubles to the tsarist government whereas the market price of the land that the peasants received did not exceed 544 million rubles. In view of the fact that the adoption of the redemption scheme by the peasants did not take place at once but dragged on until 1883, the redemption payments were not to have ended before 1932. The peasant movement during the first Russian revolution (1905-07), however compelled the tsarist government to abolish the redemption payments as from January 1907. p. 88

⁴⁰ Lenin's article "*The Workers' Party and Its Tasks in the Present Situation*" appeared on January 4 (17), 1906, in *Molodaya Rossiya*, a socio-political and literary weekly published legally by Social-Democratic students. The police department immediately took action to arrest the author of the article. The weekly, whose first and only issue carrying Lenin's article appeared in St. Petersburg, was seized and its editor arrested. p. 93

⁴¹ *Dubasov, F. V.*—tsarist reactionary leader who took part in butchering the Russian Revolution of 1905-07; from November 1905 Governor General of Moscow, directed the suppression of the Moscow armed uprising in December 1905. p. 93

⁴² The reference is to the heroic insurrection of the Moscow workers against the autocracy in December 1905, the climax of the revolution of 1905-07. For details see Lenin's article "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising" (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 171-79). p. 94

⁴³ *Bulygin Duma*—the consultative "representative assembly" which the tsarist government intended to convene in 1905. The Bill for its convocation and the regulations governing the elections were drafted by a commission under Minister of the Interior Bulygin and published along with the tsar's Manifesto on August 6 (19) 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. The government was unable to convene the Duma, which was ruled out by the revolution. p. 94

⁴⁴ *Novoye Vremya (New Times)*—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. At first it was moderately liberal, but in 1876 it became an organ of the reactionary circles among the aristocracy and bureaucracy. It was opposed not only to the revolutionary, but to the bourgeois-liberal movement. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called it a specimen of the venal press. p. 94

⁴⁵ The article "*The State Duma and Social-Democratic Tactics*" was written in support of the resolution "On the State Duma", adopted by the First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Tammerfors in December 1905. p. 101

- ⁴⁶ *The Law of December 11 (24), 1905*—a law on the elections to the Duma, promulgated by the tsarist government as a certain concession to the workers at the height of the Moscow armed uprising. Unlike the regulations governing the “consultative” Bulygin Duma (August 6, 1905), the new law envisaged the establishment of a “legislative” Duma. It added to the curias established earlier—agricultural (landlords), urban (bourgeoisie) and peasant—a workers’ curia, and somewhat extended the composition of the urban electorate, without increasing, however, the total number of electors from the urban curia. The suffrage was not universal, for upwards of two million working men, landless peasants, nomads, servicemen and young people under 25, as well as all women, were disfranchised. Nor was the suffrage equal. The class character of the electoral system found expression in the fact that there was one elector for 2,000 voters from the agricultural curia, 7,000 from the urban, 30,000 from the peasant and 90,000 from the workers’ curia, that is, one landlord vote was equated with three votes cast by the urban bourgeoisie, 15 peasant votes and 45 workers’ votes. The electors from the workers’ curia made up a mere four per cent of the total number. In the case of the workers’ curia, only workers in undertakings employing not less than 50 workers were allowed to vote. Undertakings employing from 50 to 1,000 workers sent one delegate. Major undertakings sent one delegate for every 1,000 people. The suffrage was not direct. The electoral system established for the workers was three-stage, and for the peasants four-stage. The ballot was practically not secret. The law ensured an overwhelming predominance of landlords and capitalists in the Duma. Lenin pointed out that the law virtually added nothing new to the procedure of election to the Duma. p. 103
- ⁴⁷ *Durnovo, P. N. (1844-1915)*—one of the most reactionary statesmen of tsarist Russia. In 1905, he was Minister of the Interior and took drastic steps to crush the first Russian revolution. p. 105
- ⁴⁸ Lenin is referring to the “Financial Manifesto” published by the Social-Democratic and liberal press on December 2 (15), 1905, over the signature of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Chief Committee of the All-Russian Peasant Union, and other organisations. The Manifesto stressed the necessity of depriving the tsarist government of budget revenue, and called on the population to refuse paying redemption or any other payments to the Treasury, and to withdraw its deposits from the loan and savings banks and the State Bank.
- The Bureau of the Union of Unions, which met on December 4 (17), 1905, resolved to put the question of adherence to the Manifesto on the agenda of the next congress of the Union. But the Fourth Congress of the Union, called in January 1906, did not discuss that item. p. 107
- ⁴⁹ The reference is to the leading article in *Narodnaya Svoboda (People’s Freedom)*, No. 5, December 20, 1905 (January 2, 1906), written by the Cadet V. M. Hessen. p. 108

- ⁵⁰ The article "*The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers' Party*" appeared in *Partiiniye Izvestia (Party News)*, No. 1. *Partiiniye Izvestia* was the organ of the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. formed after the merger of the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organising Committee by decision of the Tammerfors Conference. It was published illegally in St. Petersburg before the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. Its editorial board consisted of equal numbers of editors of the Bolshevik and Menshevik organs (*Proletary* and the new *Iskra* respectively). The Bolsheviks were represented on the board by Lenin, Lunacharsky and others. Two issues appeared—in February and March 1906. Issue No. 2 carried Lenin's article "The Russian Revolution and the Tasks of the Proletariat", signed "A Bolshevik".
- The publication of *Partiiniye Izvestia* was discontinued following the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., as the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had begun to publish their separate newspapers. p. 112
- ^{50a} *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata (Diary of a Social-Democrat)*—a non-periodical organ published by G. Plekhanov. See present edition, Vol. 11, Note 88. p. 113
- ⁵¹ The reference is to the "Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War. To the Members of the International Working Men's Association in Europe and the United States", September 9, 1870 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 491). p. 113
- ⁵² *Pravo (Law)*—a juridical bourgeois-liberal daily published in St. Petersburg from the end of 1898 to 1917. p. 116
- ⁵³ *Trepov, D. F.* (1855-1906)—Chief of Police in Moscow from 1896 to 1905. In January 1905 he was appointed Governor General of St. Petersburg, and later became Vice-Minister of the Interior. He inspired Black-Hundred pogroms. p. 118
- ⁵⁴ *The St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was called by the St. Petersburg Committee on February 11 (24), 1906, to decide on the Party's attitude to the State Duma. It was led by Lenin. There were 65 delegates with the right to vote. Delegates to the Conference were elected after the discussion and voting of the tactical platforms of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—one delegate per 30 voting Party members. The Bolsheviks won an impressive majority. The Mensheviks demanded that the votes cast by the Okruzhnoi organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., which consisted almost entirely of Bolsheviks, be declared null and void. But the Conference decided to recognise the delegation elected by the Okruzhnoi organisation. It heard a report of the St. Petersburg Committee and passed a resolution moved by Lenin, which recog-

nised the Conference duly representative and valid and its decisions binding. The report on the attitude to the Duma was made by Lenin (it was not recorded in the Conference minutes). At the close of his report Lenin read his draft resolution on the tactics of an active boycott. The Mensheviks moved a resolution of their own. The Conference voted by a majority for an active boycott of the Duma.

To discuss and finally approve the resolution on the tactics of an active boycott, a second city conference of the St. Petersburg organisation was held between late February and early March 1906. It was attended by 62 delegates. Following the debate, in which Lenin took the floor several times, the Conference approved as a basis the resolution proposed by him. The committee that was elected to edit the resolution included Lenin. The Mensheviks refused to participate in the committee and left the Conference. p. 120

⁵⁵ *Akim*—the Menshevik L. I. Goldman, a Conference delegate. p. 120

⁵⁶ Lenin has in mind the following indication of the workers' ironical attitude to the Duma: in February 1906 workers at the St. Petersburg Mechanical Works made a dummy inscribed "Deputy to State Duma" and paraded it round the premises. p. 124

⁵⁷ *Rural superintendent (zemsky nachalnik)*—an administrative office instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to strengthen the authority of the landlords over the peasants. The rural superintendents were appointed from among the local landed nobility and were granted very great powers—not merely administrative, but also judicial—with regard to the peasants. p. 124

⁵⁸ *Union of October Seventeenth, or Octobrists*—a counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and the big landlords using capitalist methods of farming. It arose in November 1905. While accepting in theory the Manifesto of October 17, in which the tsar, frightened by the revolution, promised the people "civil liberties" and a constitution the Octobrists unquestioningly backed the home and foreign policies of the tsarist government. Their leaders were A. Guchkov, a big industrialist, and M. Rodzyanko, owner of huge estates. p. 124

⁵⁹ *Zubatovism*—the policy of "police socialism", so named after Colonel Zubatov, chief of the Moscow Secret Police on whose initiative legal workers' organisations were formed in 1901-03 to divert the workers from the political struggle against the autocracy. Zubatov's activity in this field was supported by V. K. Plehve, Minister of the Interior. The Zubatovists sought to direct the working-class movement into the narrow channel of purely economic demands, and suggested to the workers that the government was willing to meet those demands. The first Zubatovist organisation—the Society for Mutual Assistance of Mechanical Industry Workers—was set up in Moscow in May 1901. Similar organisations were founded in Minsk, Odessa, Vilno, Kiev and other cities.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, in exposing the reactionary character of Zubatovism, used legal workers' organisations to draw large sections of the working class into the struggle against the autocracy. The growing revolutionary movement in 1903 compelled the tsarist government to abolish the Zubatovist organisations. p. 124

- ⁶⁰ Speaking at the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (II), held late in February and early in March 1906, Dan, a Menshevik leader, openly declared for the first time that it was permissible to participate in the Duma. He referred to the stand of the Poltava Social-Democratic organisation, which had expressed itself to that effect. Until then, the Mensheviks had formally advanced the half-way slogan: participate in the election of delegates and electors, but not in the Duma elections. p. 125
- ⁶¹ *United Landtag of 1847*—the joint assembly of the social-estate provincial Landtags, convened by Friedrich Wilhelm IV in Berlin in April 1847 to overcome financial difficulties by obtaining a foreign loan. It opened on April 11, 1847. As the king refused to meet the humblest political demands of the bourgeois majority in the Landtag, the latter refused to guarantee the loan. The king reacted by dissolving the Landtag in June of the same year, which increased oppositionist sentiment in the country and hastened the revolution. p. 125
- ⁶² Lenin wrote the leaflet "*To All Working Men and Women of the City of St. Petersburg and Vicinity*" following the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. on February 11 (24), 1906, in line with its decisions. p. 127
- ⁶³ Lenin submitted the *Draft Resolution on the Tactics of Boycott* to the St. Petersburg Conference at its February 11 (24), 1906, session. The original wording of the draft has been lost. The draft was discussed at the Second St. Petersburg Conference at the end of February and beginning of March 1906, and was edited by a specially appointed committee which included Lenin. p. 131
- ⁶⁴ *The Law of February 20, 1906*, and two decrees to the Senate concerning the Duma and the Council of State reduced to nought all the promises made in the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. That law transformed the Council of State from a consultative into a legislative body. The Council of State, half of whose members were appointed while the other half were elected from among the Black-Hundred sections of the nobility, big capitalists and the clergy, was thus legally empowered to approve or reject any decision of the Duma. p. 132
- ⁶⁵ *The All-Russian Union of Teachers and Public Education Personnel* arose in the spring of 1905. The Second Delegates' Congress of the Union, which met on December 26-29, 1905 (January 8-11, 1906), passed a resolution on the attitude to the First Duma. The resolution described the Duma as a further government attempt to de-

ceive the people. The Congress declared against participation in the Duma elections, and stressed the need to reveal the true meaning and significance of the Duma to the population and to make every effort to organise the people for the struggle to bring about the convocation of a constituent assembly. p. 133

⁶⁶ *Polish Socialist Party*, or P.P.S. (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna)—a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. Led by Pilsudski and his adherents, it carried on separatist, nationalist propaganda among the Polish workers, and strove to distract them from the struggle in common with the Russian workers against the autocracy and capitalism.

Throughout the history of the P.P.S. Left-wing groups arose within the Party under the influence of ordinary workers. Some of them subsequently joined the revolutionary wing of the Polish working-class movement.

In 1906 the P.P.S. split into a *Lewica* (Left-wing) P.P.S. and a Right-wing, chauvinist P.P.S., known as the “revolutionary faction”.

Under the Influence of the Bolshevik Party, and also of the S.D.K.P.L. (Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), the *Lewica* P.P.S. gradually adopted consistently revolutionary views.

During the First World War a large section of the *Lewica* P.P.S. took up an internationalist position, and in December 1918 it merged with the S.D.K.P.L. The two merged parties formed the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (the name borne by the Communist Party of Poland till 1925).

Throughout the First World War the Right-wing P.P.S. continued its national-chauvinist policy. In Galicia it formed Polish legions which fought on the side of the Austro-German imperialists. With the rise of the Polish bourgeois state the Right-wing P.P.S. merged in 1919 with those sections of the P.P.S. that found themselves on the Polish territory seized at one time by Germany and Austria, and reassumed the name of P.P.S. Placing itself at the head of the government it helped in transferring state power to the Polish bourgeoisie and then steadily carried on anti-Communist propaganda and backed the policy of aggression against the Soviet Republic, and the policy of annexation and oppression of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Various groups within the Party, which disagreed with that policy, joined the Communist Party of Poland.

After Pilsudski's fascist coup d'état in May 1926 the P.P.S. was in parliamentary opposition in form, but in fact conducted no active struggle against the fascist regime, and continued its anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. In those years the Left within the P.P.S. co-operated with the Polish Communists and in a number of campaigns supported the tactics of united front. During the Second World War the P.P.S. split again. Its reactionary, chauvinist part, which assumed the name of *Wolność, Równość, Niepodległość* (Freedom, Equality, Independence), entered the reactionary Polish “government” in exile (London). The other part,

the Left-wing section of the P.P.S., which named itself the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists (W.P.P.S.), joined the people's struggle against the Hitlerite invaders—under the influence of the Polish Workers' Party (P.W.P.), founded in 1942. It fought for the liberation of Poland from fascist enslavement and took a stand for the establishment of friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

In 1944, following the liberation of eastern Poland from German occupation and the formation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the W.P.P.S. reassumed the name of P.P.S. and together with the P.W.P. took part in building up a people's democratic Poland. In December 1948, the P.W.P. and the P.P.S. merged into the Polish United Workers' Party (P.U.W.P.). p. 133

- ⁶⁷ *Shipovite-constitutional regime*—a regime of police autocracy slightly restricted by a constitution to be “granted by the tsar”. So named after D. N. Shipov, a moderate liberal, one of the leaders of the Zemstvo movement in the 1890s and 1900s, and of the counter-revolutionary Octobrist Party in 1905. Lenin described Shipov's political programme which was adapted to the conditions imposed by the police, as “Zemstvo Zubatovism”. p. 135
- ⁶⁸ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 106-17; K. Marx, *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln*, Hottingen-Zürich, 1885. p. 137
- ⁶⁹ Frederick Engels, “Concerning the History of the League of Communists” (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 354). p. 137
- ⁷⁰ Marx and Engels, “Third International Review. From May to October” (see Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 7, Berlin, 1960, S. 416). p. 137
- ⁷¹ (*Mr.*) *Coupon*—a synonym of capital and the capitalists, used by writers in the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. It was coined by the Russian author Gleb Uspensky, who first used it in his sketches entitled *Grave Sins*. p. 139
- ⁷² *Thirty Years' War (1618-48)*—a war that resulted from an aggravation of the antagonisms between various alignments of European states, and took the form of a struggle between Protestants and Catholics. It began with a revolt in Bohemia against the tyranny of the Hapsburg monarchy and the onslaught of Catholic reaction. The states which then entered the war formed two camps. The Pope, the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs and the Catholic princes of Germany, who rallied to Catholicism, opposed the Protestant countries—Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, and a number of German states that had accepted the Reformation. The Protestant countries were backed by the French kings, enemies of the Hapsburgs. Germany became the chief battlefield and object of military plunder and predatory claims. The war which at first was in the nature of resistance to the reactionary forces of feudal-absolutist Europe, developed, particularly from

1635 onwards, into a series of invasions of Germany by rival foreign conquerors. It ended in 1648, with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia, which reaffirmed the political dismemberment of Germany. p. 140

⁷³ See Frederick Engels "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany" (New York *Daily Tribune*, April 17, 1852-September 18, 1852 and the "Introduction" to Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, pp. 130-34). p. 141

⁷⁴ *Kuropatkin*, A. N. (1848-1925)—tsarist general, commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces in the Far East in 1904-05. p. 141

⁷⁵ The reference is to Frederick Engels's "Introduction" to Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*. Vorwärts, which published the "Introduction" in 1895, eliminated, without the author's knowledge, all the more important formulations concerning the class struggle of the proletariat, and thus produced a distorted text. For details of this, see Frederick Engels's letters of April 1 and 3, 1895 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 568-69).

The opportunist leaders of the German Social-Democrats took advantage of the document to justify their policy of renouncing the revolution, rejecting the necessity of insurrection and barricade fighting by the proletariat, and to uphold conciliatory tactics.

The "Introduction" was first published in full in the Soviet Union—see Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1930. Besides, it was included in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 118-38. p. 141

⁷⁶ *Brentanoism*—"a liberal-bourgeois doctrine which recognises non-revolutionary 'class' struggle by the proletariat" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 209), and affirms that the working-class problem can be solved within the framework of capitalism, through factory legislation and the association of workers in trade unions. So named after L. Brentano, one of the principal exponents of the *Katheder*-Socialist school in bourgeois political economy. p. 144

⁷⁷ *The Bolsheviks' tactical platform for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was drawn up in the latter half of February 1906. All the draft resolutions making up the platform, except the one headed "The Class Tasks of the Proletariat at the Present Stage of the Democratic Revolution", were written by Lenin. The platform was discussed in preliminary form at meetings of Party leaders in Kuokkala, Finland, where Lenin lived for a while.

Early in March the platform was discussed in Moscow, at a meeting of members of the Moscow Committee, a group of agitators and propagandists, the literary group, the Moscow Bureau of the Central Committee, members of the Okruzhnoi Committee and other Party functionaries, with Lenin participating, and then, in the

middle of March, at a conference in St. Petersburg, with Lenin presiding. On March 20 (April 2), the platform appeared in *Partiinyye Izvestia*, No. 2, and was also published in leaflet form by the Joint Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Joint Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 147

- ⁷⁸ The reference is to the leaflet "To the Party", issued by the Joint C.C. R.S.D.L.P. in February 1906. It dealt with questions relating to the convocation of the Fourth (Unity) Congress. p. 149
- ⁷⁹ In view of differences over the agrarian question, which became particularly marked on the eve of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Joint Central Committee appointed a special committee including Lenin to present the issue to the Congress. The committee reduced all the different views on the agrarian question that had found expression among the Social-Democrats to four basic types of draft and submitted them to the Congress. Most of the committee members adopted the point of view of Lenin, whose draft was therefore submitted to the Congress as that of the committee majority. The draft was approved together with the tactical platform in March 1906, at the Bolshevik meetings preceding the Congress. p. 149
- ⁸⁰ *The Commercial and Industrial Party*—a counter-revolutionary party of big capitalists, founded in Moscow after the publication of the Manifesto of October 17 (30), 1905. Its founders were G. A. Krestovnikov, V. P. Ryabushinsky and other big capitalists. The party, which proclaimed itself a supporter of the October Manifesto, insisted on the establishment of a strong government authority to put down the revolutionary movement. It opposed the convocation of a constituent assembly, nationalisation of the land, the introduction of an eight-hour working day, and freedom to strike. It formed a bloc with the Octobrists in the elections to the First Duma. It disintegrated at the close of 1906, most of its members joining the Union of October Seventeenth. p. 158
- ⁸¹ *The Party of Democratic Reforms*—a party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie founded early in 1906, during the elections to the First Duma, by elements who considered the Cadet programme too leftist. Among its more prominent leaders were K. K. Arsenyev, I. I. Ivanukov, M. M. Kovalevsky, V. D. Kuzmin-Karavayev and A. S. Posnikov. Lacking a solid basis as it did, the Party had gone out of existence by the end of 1907. p. 158
- ⁸² The pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party* was written in support of the Bolshevik draft submitted to the Fourth (Unity) Congress on behalf of the majority in the Agrarian Committee of the Joint C.C. R.S.D.L.P. It contains the fundamental ideas which Lenin subsequently expounded in his report on the agrarian question to the Unity Congress. p. 165
- ⁸³ *Narodniks*—adherents of a petty-bourgeois trend that arose in the Russian revolutionary movement in the sixties and seventies of

the nineteenth century. They sought the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants. On the other hand, they denied that the development of capitalist relations and the growth of a proletariat in Russia was a law-governed process, and hence regarded the peasantry as the chief revolutionary force. Seeing the village community as the embryo of socialism, they went to the country ("went among the people") and tried to rouse the peasants to the struggle against the autocracy. Taking an erroneous view of the role of the class struggle in historical development, they believed that history was made by heroes passively followed by the masses of the people. In their struggle against tsarism, the Narodniks used the tactics of individual terrorism.

In the 1880s and 1890s, the Narodniks took the path of conciliation with tsarism. At that period they expressed the interests of the kulaks and waged a bitter struggle against Marxism. p. 169

⁸⁴ *Sotsial-Demokrat (Social-Democrat)*—a non-periodical literary and political collection published by the Emancipation of Labour group. Its only issue appeared in 1888. p. 170

⁸⁵ "*General redistribution*"—a slogan popular among the peasants of tsarist Russia. It expressed their desire for a general redistribution of the land. p. 170

⁸⁶ *Iskra (The Spark)*—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper. Founded by Lenin in 1900, it played the decisive role in building the Marxist revolutionary party of the working class in Russia.

It was impossible to publish a revolutionary newspaper in Russia on account of police persecution, and while still in exile in Siberia, Lenin evolved a plan for its publication abroad. When his exile ended (January 1900), Lenin immediately set about putting his plan into effect. In February, in St. Petersburg he negotiated with Vera Zasulich (who had come from abroad illegally, on the participation of the Emancipation of Labour group in the publication of the newspaper. At the end of March and the beginning of April a conference was held—known as the Pskov Conference—with V. I. Lenin, L. Martov, A. N. Potresov, S. I. Radchenko, and the "legal Marxists" P. B. Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky participating, which discussed the draft declaration, drawn up by Lenin, of the editorial board of the all-Russian newspaper (*Iskra*) and the scientific and political magazine (*Zarya*) on the programme and the aims of these publications. During the first half of 1900 Lenin travelled to a number of Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riga, Smolensk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ufa, Samara, Syzran) and established contact with Social-Democratic groups and individual Social-Democrats, obtaining their support for *Iskra*. In August 1900, when Lenin arrived in Switzerland, he and Potresov conferred with the Emancipation of Labour group on the programme and the aims of the newspaper and the magazine, on possible contributors, and on the editorial board and its location. The conference almost ended in failure (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 333-49), but an agreement was finally reached on all disputed questions.

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* was published in Leipzig in December 1900; the ensuing issues were published in Munich; from July 1902 the paper was published in London, and from the spring of 1903 in Geneva. Considerable help in getting the newspaper going (the organisation of secret printing-presses, the acquisition of Russian type, etc.) was afforded by the German Social-Democrats Clara Zetkin, Adolf Braun, and others; by Julian Marchlewski, a Polish revolutionary residing in Munich at that time, and by Harry Quelch, one of the leaders of the British Social-Democratic Federation.

The editorial board of *Iskra* consisted of V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov, and V. I. Zaslulich. The first secretary of the board was I. G. Smidovich-Leman; the post was then taken over, from the spring of 1901, by N. K. Krupskaya, who also conducted the correspondence between *Iskra* and the Russian Social-Democratic organisations. *Iskra* concentrated on problems of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and all working people of Russia against the tsarist autocracy, and devoted much space to major international events, above all developments in the working-class movement. Lenin was in actuality editor-in-chief and the leading figure in *Iskra*, to which he contributed articles on all basic questions of Party organisation and the class struggle of the proletariat in Russia.

Iskra became the centre unifying Party forces, and gathering and training Party workers. In a number of Russian cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara, and others), groups and committees of the R.S.D.L.P. were organised on Leninist *Iskra* lines, and a conference of *Iskra* supporters held in Samara in January 1902 founded the Russian *Iskra* organisation. *Iskra* organisations sprang up and worked under the direct leadership of Lenin's disciples and comrades-in-arms: N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin, S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, P. A. Krasikov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, P. N. Lepeshinsky, I. I. Radchenko, and others.

On the initiative and with the direct participation of Lenin the *Iskra* editorial board drew up a draft programme of the Party (published in *Iskra*, No. 21) and made preparations for the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. By the time the Congress was convened most of the local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia had adopted the *Iskra* position, approved its programme, organisational plan and tactical line, and recognised the newspaper as their leading organ. A special resolution of the Congress noted *Iskra*'s exceptional role in the struggle to build the Party, and made the newspaper the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

Shortly after the Congress the Mensheviks, backed by Plekhanov, took *Iskra* into their own hands and turned it into an organ fighting against Marxism and the Party, into a platform for the advocacy of opportunism. Beginning with issue No. 52, *Iskra* ceased to be a militant organ of revolutionary Marxism. p. 171

⁸⁷ *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political magazine, legally published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* editorial board. Four issues (three books) appeared in all.

Zarya criticised international and Russian revisionism, and defended the theoretical principles of Marxism. It published Lenin's writings: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", "Messrs. the 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question" (the first four chapters of *The Agrarian Question and 'The Critics of Marx'*), "Review of Home Affairs", and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". p. 171

- ⁸⁸ The *Borba (Struggle)* group consisting of D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov and E. L. Gurevich, emerged in Paris in the summer of 1900. It assumed its name in May 1901. Seeking to reconcile the revolutionary and the opportunist trends in Russian Social-Democracy, the group undertook in June 1901 to call in Geneva a conference of representatives of the Social-Democratic organisations abroad—the editorial boards of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, the organisation called "Sotsial-Demokrat", the Foreign Committee of the Bund, and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad—and participated in the work of the "unity" congress of the organisations abroad of the R.S.D.L.P. in Zurich on September 21-22 (October 4-5), 1901. In November 1901 the group issued a programmatic "Advertisement of the Publications of the Social-Democratic Borba Group". Its publications—"Materials for the Drafting of a Party Programme" (issues I-III), "Leaflet of the Borba Group", etc.—distorted revolutionary Marxist theory, which they interpreted in a doctrinaire and scholastic spirit, and took a stand against Lenin's principles of Party organisation. In view of its departure from Social-Democratic concepts and tactics, its disruptive actions and its lack of contact with the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the group was not admitted to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., and was dissolved by decision of the Congress. p. 172
- ⁸⁹ X—pseudonym of the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 172
- ⁹⁰ *Pravda (The Truth)*—a Social-Democratic monthly magazine of art, literature and public affairs, published in Moscow between 1904 and 1906, with the Mensheviks as the main contributors. p. 174
- ⁹¹ The symposium "*The Present Situation*" appeared in Moscow early in 1906. Compiled by the group of writers and lecturers under the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., it expressed chiefly the Bolshevik point of view. It was confiscated shortly after its publication. p. 175
- ⁹² *Mir Bozhy (The Wide World; literally, God's World)*—a monthly literary and popular-scientific magazine, liberal in trend; it was published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1906. During the first Russian revolution its contributors were Mensheviks. In October 1906 it changed its title to *Souremenny Mir (Contemporary World)*. p. 175
- ⁹³ *Moskovskiye Vedomosti (Moscow Recorder)*—a newspaper founded in 1756. From the 1860s onwards it expressed the ideas of the more

reactionary monarchist landlords and clergymen, and in 1905 it became an important mouthpiece of the Black Hundreds. During the first Russian revolution its editor was V. A. Gringmut, founder of the Black-Hundred 'Russian Monarchist Party'. The paper was closed shortly after the October Revolution of 1917. p. 179

⁹⁴ *Gringmut, V. A.* (1851-1907)—Russian reactionary journalist, editor of the monarchist newspaper *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* from 1897 to 1907. During the revolution of 1905-07 he was one of the founders and leaders of the Black-Hundred "Union of the Russian People". p. 179

⁹⁵ *Kutler, N. N.* (1859-1924)—tsarist statesman, member of the Second and Third Dumas, a prominent Cadet. p. 179

⁹⁶ The reference is to the democratic electoral system providing for universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. p. 182

⁹⁷ *Poshekhonye* (derived from the name of a small town in tsarist Russia)—a synonym for provincial "backwoods", an out-of-the-way corner with barbarous patriarchal customs. The term became current after the appearance of *Old Times in Poshekhonye*, a story by the Russian satirist M. Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 189

⁹⁸ *The Shidlovsky Commission*—a government commission appointed by the tsar's decree on January 29 (February 11), 1905, "to enquire without delay into the causes of discontent among the workers in the city of St. Petersburg and its suburbs" in view of the strike movement that had followed the "bloody Sunday", January 9. The Commission was headed by Senator N. V. Shidlovsky, a member of the Council of State, and included officials, chiefs of government factories, and factory owners. It was also to have included workers' delegates elected according to a two-stage system. In connection with the elections to the Commission, the Bolsheviks did much to expose the true aims of the government, which hoped the appointment of the Commission would divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle. When the electors demanded from the government freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly, inviolability of the person, etc., Shidlovsky announced, on February 18 (March 3), 1905, that the demands could not be met. Thereupon most of the electors refused to elect delegates, and addressed an appeal to the workers of St. Petersburg, who supported them by going on strike. On February 20 (March 5), 1905, the Commission was dissolved without having started work. p. 205

⁹⁹ The reference is to the tsar's decree of March 8 (21), published on March 11 (24), 1906, during the elections to the First Duma. The decree provided that incitement to boycotting the elections was punishable by four to eight months' imprisonment. p. 206

¹⁰⁰ *Rech (Speech)*—a daily newspaper, central organ of the Cadet Party. It was published in St. Petersburg from February 23

(March 8), 1906, and its virtual editors were P. N. Milyukov and I. V. Hessen, with M. M. Vinaver, P. D. Dolgorukov, P. B. Struve and others closely collaborating. On July 22 (August 4), 1906, the paper was suspended, and on August 9 (22) resumed publication. It was closed by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. It continued to appear till August 1918 under different titles—*Nasha Rech* (*Our Speech*), *Svobodnaya Rech* (*Free Speech*), *Vek* (*Century*), *Novaya Rech* (*New Speech*) and *Nash Vek* (*Our Century*). p. 207

¹⁰¹ *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily paper published in Moscow from 1863 on by liberal professors of Moscow University and Zemstvo leaders. It represented the interests of liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. In 1905 it became a Right Cadet paper. After the October Revolution it was closed along with other counter-revolutionary newspapers.

Lenin borrowed the data on the electors from the item "The Elections", published in *Russkiye Vedomosti*, No. 76, on March 19 (April 1), 1906. p. 210

¹⁰² Judas Golovlyov—a sanctimonious, hypocritical serf-owner described in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 215

¹⁰³ *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (*The Pole Star*)—a weekly magazine of the Right wing of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg in 1905-06 and edited by P. B. Struve. In April and May 1906, the Cadets published *Svoboda i Kultura* (*Freedom and Culture*) instead of *Polyarnaya Zvezda*. p. 216

¹⁰⁴ *The Second Congress of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party* took place in St. Petersburg on January 5-11 (18-24), 1906. On the issue of Party tactics, the Congress resolved to approve "as a declaration of the Party" the report which M. M. Vinaver delivered to the Congress on January 11 (24). The fundamental thesis of the declaration was recognition of the political strike as a peaceful means of fighting against the government. The declaration said that the Party considered the chief field of its activity to be "an organised representative assembly" that is, the Duma. The Congress virtually took a stand for a deal with the government. p. 217

¹⁰⁵ The reference is to the puppets in Saltykov-Shchedrin's tale of that name. Izuverov, the skilful craftsman who made them, said: "They have no wits or deeds or desires. All they have instead is a semblance." p. 218

¹⁰⁶ Under a treaty signed between the tsarist and the French governments in April 1906, the former was granted a loan of 843 million rubles to suppress the revolution in Russia. p. 225

¹⁰⁷ This refers to the article "Revelation of the Circumstances Attending the Events of March 1st", which M. N. Katkov, a reactionary

- publicist, contributed to *Moskovskiy Vedomosti*, No. 65, on March 6 (18), 1881. p. 229
- ¹⁰⁸ *Svoboda i Kultura (Freedom and Culture)*—a weekly magazine of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. It was published in St. Petersburg instead of *Polyarnaya Zvezda* from April 1 (14) to May 31 (June 13), 1906. Its editor was S. L. Frank, with P. B. Struve as a close associate. Eight issues appeared in all. The publication was suspended due to a sharp drop in circulation. p. 246
- ¹⁰⁹ *The lady with many good points*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 246
- ¹¹⁰ *Bez Zaglavii (Without Title)*—a political weekly published in St. Petersburg from January 24 (February 6) to May 14 (27), 1906. Its editor was S. N. Prokopovich, with Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, V. V. Khizhnyakov and others as his associates. The *Bez Zaglavii* group was made up of Russian bourgeois intellectuals with semi-cadet and semi-Menshevik leanings. Under cover of their formal non-partisanship, they advocated bourgeois liberalism and opportunism, and backed the revisionists among the Social-Democrats in Russia and abroad. p. 249
- ¹¹¹ *Yemelyan Pugachev (1742?-1775)*—leader of the war which Russia's peasants waged against feudal tyranny in 1773-75. p. 250
- ¹¹² In March 1885, during the Reichstag debate on government subsidies to private business for the establishment of regular steamship services to East Asia, Australia and Africa, a majority of the Social-Democratic Group (the Right wing, which virtually supported Bismarck's colonial policy) voted for an East-Asian and an Australian line. It also promised its support for other lines provided all new ships were built in Germany. It was not until after the Reichstag had rejected this condition that the whole group voted against granting any subsidy. The conduct of the group majority was denounced by Social-Democratic organisations. Engels condemned the opportunist stand of the Reichstag group. p. 251
- ¹¹³ The "Youth" were a petty-bourgeois group that arose in 1890 among the German Social-Democrats. The group consisted chiefly of university students who had broken off their studies and of young writers (which accounted for the name of the group). It advanced a platform rejecting all Social-Democratic participation in the Reichstag. The Erfurt Congress, held in October 1891, expelled the group from the Party. p. 251
- ¹¹⁴ *Bernsteiniad (Bernsteinianism)*—an anti-Marxist trend in international Social-Democracy. It arose at the end of the nineteenth century in Germany and was so named after the German Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein, an opportunist. After Frederick Engels's death Bernstein undertook an open revision of the revolutionary theory of Marx in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism, and

sought to turn the Social-Democratic Party into a petty-bourgeois party advocating social reforms. p. 251

¹¹⁵ *Severny Golos (The Voice of the North)*—a legal daily newspaper of the R.S.D.L.P., published in St. Petersburg from December 6 (19), 1905 onwards and edited jointly by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. It was closed with issue No. 3 on December 8 (21), 1905. *Nash Golos (Our Voice)*, published once—on December 18 (31), 1905—was its continuation. p. 252

¹¹⁶ *Nachalo (The Beginning)*—a legal Menshevik daily, published in St. Petersburg from November 13 (26) to December 2(15), 1905. Altogether 16 issues were brought out. p. 252

¹¹⁷ See Frederick Engels, "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848-49)" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 328-37), and Frederick Engels, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany", VII. "The Frankfort National Assembly", *New York Daily Tribune*, 1852. Articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, June 1-November 7, 1848 (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, Berlin, 1959). p. 261

¹¹⁸ F. Engels, *Die preußische Militärfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, Hamburg, 1865; Marx and Engels, "To the Editorial Board of the *Social-Demokrat*" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 201); F. Engels, "Notizen zur Broschüre: *Die preußische Militärfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei*" (*Berliner Reform*, Nr. 53, 1865); K. Marx, "Rezension von Engels' Broschüre: *Die preußische Militärfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei*" (*Hermann*, März 18, 1865); K. Marx, "Erklärung vom März 18, 1865" (*Berliner Reform*, Nr. 67, 1865). p. 261

¹¹⁹ *Riman, N. R.* (1864-1917)—colonel of the tsarist army who was in command of a punitive expedition on the Moscow-Kazan Railway during the suppression of the Moscow armed uprising in December 1905.

Luzhenovsky, G. N. (1870-1906)—one of the organisers of Black-Hundred pogroms in 1905-06, notorious for the cruel suppression of the peasants' revolutionary movement in the Tambov region. He was assassinated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1906. p. 263

¹²⁰ *Tovarishch (Comrade)*—a daily bourgeois newspaper published in St. Petersburg from March 15 (28), 1906, to December 30, 1907 (January 12, 1908). Closely associated with it were S. N. Prokopovich and Y. D. Kuskova.

Though not the official organ of any party, the paper served as the mouthpiece of the Left Cadets. Its contributors included Mensheviks. p. 271

¹²¹ Bourgeois liberalism, which subsequently grouped itself as a political trend round the magazine *Osvobozhdeniye*, was criticised by Lenin in his article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the

Hannibals of Liberalism”, published in *Zarya*, Nos. 2 and 3, in 1901 (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80). The early issues of *Osvobozhdeniye* were criticised in Lenin’s articles “The Draft of a New Law on Strikes”, “Political Struggle and Political Chicanery” and “Mr. Struve Exposed by His Colleague”, published in *Iskra* (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 215, 251 and 352). p. 273

¹²² See Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 139-242.) p. 276

¹²³ *The Girondists*—a bourgeois political group during the French bourgeois revolution. They represented the interests of the bourgeois moderates, and vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution, pursuing a policy of compromise with the monarchy. p. 276

¹²⁴ *The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* took place in Stockholm from April 10-25 (April 23 to May 8), 1906.

The Congress was attended by 112 delegates with the right to vote, who represented 57 local Party organisations and 22 delegates with voice but no vote. Other participants were delegates from various national Social-Democratic parties: three each from the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party, one each from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Finnish Labour Party, and also a representative of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Among the Bolshevik delegates were M. V. Lunacharsky, F. A. Sergeev (Artyom), S. G. Shaumyan, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and V. V. Vorovsky. The main items on the Congress agenda were the agrarian question, an appraisal of the current situation and the class tasks of the proletariat, the attitude to the Duma, and organisational matters. There was a bitter controversy between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over every item. Lenin made reports and speeches on the agrarian question, the current situation, and tactics regarding the Duma elections, the armed uprising, and other questions.

The preponderance of Mensheviks at the Congress, while slight, determined its character—the Congress adopted Menshevik resolutions on a number of questions (the agrarian programme, the attitude to the Duma, etc.). The Congress approved the first clause of the Rules—concerning Party membership—in the wording proposed by Lenin. It admitted the Social-Democratic organisations of Poland and Lithuania and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party into the R.S.D.L.P., and predetermined the admission of the Bund.

The Congress elected a Central Committee of three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks, and a Menshevik editorial board of the Central Organ.

Lenin analysed the work of the Congress in his pamphlet Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (See pp. 317-82 of this volume). p. 277

¹²⁵ Lenin's report on the agrarian question at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party was not recorded in the Congress minutes and has so far not been found. Nor is there in the Congress minutes, edited chiefly by Mensheviks, any record of Lenin's report on the current situation or of his speech in reply to the debate on the attitude to the Duma. His speeches on other questions were not recorded in full in the minutes. p. 279

¹²⁶ *John*—the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 279

¹²⁷ Lenin is referring to the following passage in Marx's article published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, No. 169, on December 15, 1848: "The whole *French terrorism* was nothing but a *plebeian manner* of settling accounts with the *enemies of the bourgeoisie*, with absolutism, feudalism and philistinism." (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 67.) p. 281

¹²⁸ *Narodnaya Volya (People's Will)*—a secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists, came into being in August 1879 as a result of a split in the Narodnik organisation known as *Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom)*. The *Narodnaya Volya* was headed by an Executive Committee made up of A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya, A. A. Kwiatkowski and others. While upholding the views of Narodnik utopian socialism, its members began a political struggle, above all with the aim of overthrowing the autocracy and winning political freedom. Their programme envisaged the organisation of a "permanent people's representative assembly elected by universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic freedoms, the transfer of the land to the people, and the elaboration of measures for the transfer of the factories to the workers. "The *Narodnaya Volya* members made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism," wrote Lenin (present edition Vol. 8, p. 72).

The *Narodnaya Volya* fought heroically against the tsarist autocracy. However, proceeding from the fallacious theory of "active" heroes and a "passive" crowd, they expected to bring about the reorganisation of society by their own efforts—through individual terrorism, through intimidation and disorganisation of the government—without the participation of the people. After March 1, 1881, when Alexander II was assassinated, the government routed the *Narodnaya Volya* through cruel reprisals, including executions. Throughout the eighties members of the *Narodnaya Volya* made fruitless attempts to revive their organisation. In 1886, for example, a group was formed under the leadership of A. I. Ulyanov (a brother of Lenin's) and P. Y. Shevryyov, which shared the traditions of the *Narodnaya Volya*. In 1887, following an abortive attempt to organise the assassination of Alexander III, the group was discovered, and its more active members were put to death.

Lenin, while criticising the erroneous, utopian programme of the Narodnaya Volya, spoke very highly of the selfless struggle which its members waged against tsarism, as well as of their secrecy techniques and strictly centralised organisation. p. 283

¹²⁹ *Kartvelov*—N. G. Chichinadze, a Caucasian Menshevik. p. 285

¹³⁰ *Borisov*—S. A. Suvorov, who at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the Bolsheviks. p. 286

¹³¹ Lenin is quoting Karl Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 405). p. 287

¹³² *Petrunkovich, I. I.*, and *Rodichev, F. I.*—landlords, prominent Cadets and Zemstvo officials. p. 287

¹³³ *Russkoye Gosudarstvo (The Russian State)*—a government newspaper published in St. Petersburg from February 1 (14) to May 15 (28), 1906. p. 287

¹³⁴ *Ptitsyn*—the Menshevik B. I. Soloveichik. p. 289

¹³⁵ *Leonov*—the Menshevik V. O. Levitsky (Tsederbaum). p. 290

¹³⁶ *Legitimists*—supporters of the French Bourbons, overthrown in 1830. The Bourbons represented the interests of the big hereditary landowners.

Orleanists—supporters of the Orleans family in France. The family, which came into power in 1830, was backed by the financial aristocracy and the big bourgeoisie. p. 290

¹³⁷ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 208. p. 290

¹³⁸ *Convention*—the third National Assembly during the French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth century. It was established as the supreme legislature following the people's uprising on August 10, 1792, which overthrew the monarchy. Elections to the Convention were held in August and September 1792. The deputies formed three groups: the Jacobins, or the Left wing, the Girondists, or the Right wing, and the "Marsh", or the vacillating majority. Under the pressure of the people the Convention on September 21 abolished the royal power, and on September 22 proclaimed France a republic. The activity of the Convention was particularly fruitful under the Jacobin dictatorship (May 31-June 2, 1793-July 27, 1794), when the Girondists were expelled. The Convention completed the abolition of the feudal system; it dealt mercilessly with all counter-revolutionaries and compromisers, and fought against foreign intervention. At the same time it upheld the inviolability of private property.

After Thermidor 9 (July 27, 1794), when a counter-revolutionary coup d'état was accomplished, an after the adoption of the so-

called Constitution of the Year III, the Thermidor Convention was dissolved on October 26, 1795. p. 291

- ¹³⁹ The Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks drafted for the Fourth (Unity) Congress their resolutions on the attitude to the Duma. By the time this question had come up for discussion at the Congress both drafts, written prior to the Duma elections, were obsolete, and new drafts were proposed instead. The committee which was set up at the seventh session of the Congress to draft a joint resolution on the Duma and which comprised G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Lenin, F. I. Dan, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov (Fyodorov), A. V. Lunacharsky (Voyinov) and O. A. Yermansky (Rudenko), did not reach unity, and submitted two draft resolutions to the Congress: a Menshevik one, prepared by Plekhanov, Axelrod and Dan and a Bolshevik one, prepared by Lenin, Skvortsov-Stepanov and Lunacharsky. The new Bolshevik draft, written by Lenin, was read by the chairman of the Congress at its sixteenth session, and by Lenin at its seventeenth session, during his co-report on the Duma. It was published in *Volna*, No. 12, after the Congress, on May 9, 1906, with an afterword by Lenin (see p. 401 of this volume). p. 292
- ¹⁴⁰ Lenin is referring to an incident that occurred at the twenty-first session of the Congress. After the Mensheviks had rejected a Bolshevik amendment to the last clause of the Menshevik draft resolution on the Duma ten Bolshevik delegates, including Lenin, demanded that the amendment be put to a vote by roll-call. Then a Menshevik delegate from the Kharkov organisation accused the Bolsheviks of "collecting agitational material against the authority of the Congress decisions, thereby hampering its work". In reply Lenin, speaking on behalf of the Bolsheviks, pointed out the narrow factionalism shown by the Mensheviks (see p. 308 of this volume). p. 299
- ¹⁴¹ *Vorobyov*—the Caucasian Menshevik V. B. Lomtadidze. p. 299
- ¹⁴² At the Congress, the Bolsheviks described the Menshevik draft resolution on "Armed Uprising" as a resolution "against armed uprising". Lenin also stressed this in his "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." (see p. 368 of this volume). p. 299
- ¹⁴³ *Winter*—L. B. Krasin. p. 299
- ¹⁴⁴ *Akimov*, V. P. (Makhnovets)—extreme opportunist, one of the ideologists of Economism, who adhered to the Menshevik Right wing. At the twenty-second session of the Congress, he made a special report on armed uprising, in which he openly voiced his opposition to insurrection. p. 300
- ¹⁴⁵ *The first clause of the Menshevik draft resolution on armed uprising*, discussed by the Congress, read: "Whereas (1) the stupid obstinacy of the Russian Government confronts the people with the

necessity of wresting their rights from it....” It was formulated by Plekhanov. On the drafting committee Plekhanov had insisted that “wresting their rights from it” be substituted for “wresting state power”, the phrase given in the original draft. Faced with objections, he had renounced his amendment. But just before the Congress met in session the Menshevik section of the committee submitted the first clause of the resolution as worded by Plekhanov. The amendment drew an emphatic protest from Lenin and the Bolshevik section of the Congress. Plekhanov was compelled to withdraw it

p. 300

¹⁴⁶ *Muratov's amendment* (“Muratov” was M. Morozov, a delegate from the Samarkand organisation), submitted at the twenty-first session of the Congress, said that in view of the Party's non-participation in the elections, the question of forming a parliamentary Social-Democratic group could be decided “only when the composition of the group of Social-Democrats elected to the Duma was known and they had been recognised by all the workers' organisations in whose areas the elections had taken place” (see *The Fourth [Unity] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1934, pp. 368-69). The Menshevik majority at the Congress rejected the amendment.

p. 302

¹⁴⁷ *Stodolin*—the Bolshevik N. N. Nakoryakov.

p. 303

¹⁴⁸ Lenin wrote the *Appeal* immediately after the Unity Congress of the Party. It was discussed and approved by the conference of Bolshevik delegates held at People's House in Stockholm, and was signed by 26 Bolshevik delegates to the Congress who represented the largest Party organisations.

p. 310

¹⁴⁹ The merger of the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the R.S.D.L.P. was considered necessary, and proposed more than once, by the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.P. & L.) at its congresses. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), which discussed the question, the S.D.P. & L. did not join the R.S.D.L.P. because of differences over the national question. In January 1906, the Executive Committee of the S.D.P. & L. resumed talks on a merger with the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The talks resulted in the drafting of a treaty which the S.D.P. & L. representative brought to the Fourth (Unity) Congress. After introducing some amendments into the draft, the Congress approved it.

p. 310

¹⁵⁰ *The Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party* was founded by its First Congress in June 1904. Its Second Congress, which met in June 1905, adopted the Party Programme and passed a decision on the necessity of a merger with the R.S.D.L.P. In 1905, it led the revolutionary actions of the workers and prepared the masses for an armed uprising.

At the Fourth (Unity) Congress, the Party joined the R.S.D.L.P. as a territorial organisation. After the Congress it was renamed the Social-Democracy of the Lettish Territory.

p. 310

¹⁵¹ *The Bund (The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia)* was formed by a founding congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups held in Vilno in 1897; it was an association mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the western regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (1898) "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in respect of questions affecting the Jewish proletariat specifically". (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1954, Part I, p. 14, Russ. ed.)

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the working-class movement of Russia. Its Fourth Congress, held in April 1901, resolved to alter the organisational relations established by the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. The resolution said that the Congress regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federation of national organisations and that the Bund should be treated as a member of that federation.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. had rejected its demand that it be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party. In 1906, the Bund again entered the R.S.D.L.P. on the basis of a resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists persistently supported the opportunist wing of the Party (the "Economists", the Mensheviks, the liquidators) and struggled against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. The Bund countered the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination by a demand for cultural-national autonomy. During the period of the Stolypin reaction, it adopted a liquidationist position and was active in forming the August anti-Party bloc. During the First World War (1914-18) it adopted the position of the social-chauvinists. In 1917, it supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Bund leadership joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time a change was taking place among the rank and file of the Bund in favour of collaboration with Soviet power. In March 1921, the Bund decided to dissolve itself, and part of its membership joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) according to general procedure. p. 310

¹⁵² During the Congress debate on Clause 7 of the Party's organisational Rules the question of the relations between the Central Committee and the Central Organ gave rise to a controversy. The Mensheviks insisted that the editors of the C.O. be elected by the Congress, with the right to vote when political matters were discussed by the Central Committee. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, insisted that the editorial board of the C.O. be appointed by the Central Committee, which should also have the right to recall the board. The Menshevik majority of the Congress succeeded in carrying its proposal through. In 1907, the Fifth (London) Congress, revising the clause, adopted the Bolshevik wording of it (see

The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, Moscow, 1954, Part I, pp. 170-72, Russ. ed.) p. 314

- ¹⁵³ The pamphlet *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, (A Letter to the St. Petersburg Workers) became an object of persecution. The police searched the *Dyelo* printing-works in St. Petersburg, where the pamphlet was being set, and delivered the latter to the St. Petersburg Press Committee. The Committee banned the pamphlet. But the Party succeeded in sending the text to Moscow, where its printing was completed.

In the *Vperyod* edition, the pamphlet had an Appendix including the draft resolutions submitted to the Congress by the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki, resolutions adopted by the Congress, and other matter. Lenin refers to them more than once in his pamphlet. At the end of the pamphlet there is a brief introduction to the Appendix (see p. 382 of this volume). p. 317

- ¹⁵⁴ *Revolutionary Ukrainian Party* (R.U.P.)—a petty-bourgeois, nationalist organisation founded early in 1900. In December 1905, it renamed itself the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (U.S.D.L.P.), and decided to join the R.S.D.L.P., provided it was recognised as “the sole representative of the Ukrainian proletariat” within the R.S.D.L.P. The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. rejected the proposal which the U.S.D.L.P. spokesman had made for the immediate discussion of the terms of a merger, and referred the matter to the Central Committee for decision. No agreement was reached on a merger. Subsequently the U.S.D.L.P. found itself in the camp of the bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolution. p. 322

- ¹⁵⁵ *The Credentials Committee* elected at the first session of the Congress was composed of two Bolsheviki, two Mensheviki and one so-called “neutral”, who was in fact a conciliator (he headed the Committee). The Congress approved the terms of reference of the Committee and passed Lenin’s draft resolution, which made it a duty of the Committee to submit written reports to the Congress. The work of the Committee and the discussion of its reports at the plenary sessions of the Congress took place in an atmosphere of intense struggle between the Bolsheviki and Mensheviki. Relations became particularly strained at the sixth session of the Congress over the Committee proposal to cancel the credentials of Artamonov (F. A. Sergeyev, or Artyom), a Bolshevik delegate from the Kharkov organisation. The Bolsheviki on the Committee declared that they were leaving the Committee, and then the Congress elected a new Committee made up of Mensheviki and conciliators. p. 324

- ¹⁵⁶ *The protest of the Tiflis workers against the powers of the Menshevik delegation*, signed by 200 persons, was read at the twentieth session of the Congress. It said that in drawing up the lists of Party members the Tiflis Mensheviki had ignored the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P., and had included chance people in the list. The Men-

- sheviks had “discovered” over 3,000 Party members in Tiflis. The worker Social-Democrats of Tiflis maintained in their protest that the city could not be represented at the Congress by as many as 11 delegates. p. 325
- ¹⁵⁷ The minutes of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., published in 1907, had serious shortcomings—they did not contain records of a number of reports and speeches made at the Congress, specifically by Lenin. p. 326
- ¹⁵⁸ *Schmidt*—P. P. Rumyantsev, who at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the Bolsheviks. p. 328
- ¹⁵⁹ The reference is to the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. p. 330
- ¹⁶⁰ *Klyuchevsky, V. O.* (1841-1911) and *Yefimenko, A. Y.* (1848-1919)—prominent Russian historians. p. 331
- ¹⁶¹ *Demyan*—I. A. Teodorovich. p. 332
- ¹⁶² “*Demyan Hash*”—title of a fable by I. A. Krylov. p. 333
- ¹⁶³ *Kostrov*—N. N. Jordania, Caucasian Menshevik leader. p. 336
- ¹⁶⁴ *Voyinov*—the Bolshevik A. V. Lunacharsky. p. 340
- ¹⁶⁵ Lenin is quoting Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 405). p. 345
- ¹⁶⁶ *Boris Nikolayevich*—the Menshevik B. I. Soloveichik. p. 351
- ¹⁶⁷ *Nevskaya Gazeta* (*The Neva Newspaper*)—a legal Menshevik paper published in St. Petersburg in May 1906. p. 359
- ¹⁶⁸ Shipov’s slogan “Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo”, which Struve supported in his introduction to Finance Minister Witte’s memorandum “The Autocracy and the Zemstvo” was criticised by Lenin in the article “The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism” (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80). p. 361
- ¹⁶⁹ *Trudoviks* (from *trud*, “labour”)—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Russian Duma, consisting of peasants and also of Narodnik-minded intellectuals. The Trudovik Group was constituted in April 1906 from the peasant deputies to the First Duma. The demands of the Trudoviks included the abolition of all restrictions based on the social-estates and on nationality, the democratisation of the Zemstvos and town self-government bodies, and universal suffrage in the elections to the Duma. The Trudovik agrarian programme proceeded from the Narodnik principle of

equalised land tenure: the formation of a national fund made up of state, crown and monastery lands, and also of private estates where they exceeded the established labour norm, with provision for compensation in the case of confiscated private estates. Lenin pointed out that the typical Trudovik is a peasant who "is not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his own plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts are concentrated on the fight against the landlords for land, on the fight against the feudal state for democracy". (See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 229.)

In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, their vacillations being due to the very class nature of the peasants, who are petty proprietors. Since the Trudoviks represented the peasant masses, the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the Duma were to arrive at agreements with them on individual issues with a view to waging a joint struggle against the Cadets and the tsarist autocracy.

In 1917, the Trudovik Group merged with the "Popular Socialist" Party, and gave active support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution of 1917, the Trudoviks sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 361

¹⁷⁰ *Nazar*—the Bolshevik N. N. Nakoryakov. p. 361

¹⁷¹ For the Central Committee instructions on the parliamentary group, which were approved by the Unity Congress, see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1953, Part I, pp. 137-332, Russ. ed. p. 362

¹⁷² *Duma*—a daily evening newspaper published by the Right wing of the Cadet Party in St. Petersburg from April 27 (May 10) to June 13 (26), 1909. Its editor was P. B. Struve, and among its contributors were S. A. Kotlyarevsky, P. I. Novgorodtsev, I. I. Petrunkevich, F. I. Rodichev, L. N. Yasnopolsky and other members of the First Duma. p. 362

¹⁷³ "Economism"—an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, a variety of international opportunism. The newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl (Workers' Thought)* (1897-1902) and the magazine *Rabocheye Dyelo (The Workers' Cause)* (1899-1902) were organs of the "Economists", whom Lenin called Russian Bernsteinians and whose programme was set forth in the so-called *Credo*, written in 1899 by Y. D. Kuskova.

The "Economists" limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the concern of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the

Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could arise out of the spontaneous movement of the workers, denied the necessity of socialist consciousness to be brought into the working-class movement by a Marxist party, and thereby paved the way for bourgeois ideology. The "Economists", who denied the need for a centralised working-class party, favoured a sporadic and amateurish Social-Democratic movement. "Economism" threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and to turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The views of the "Economists" were thoroughly criticised in Lenin's writings "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (directed against *Credo*; written in Siberian exile in 1899, it was signed by 17 exiled Marxists), "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", "Apropos of the '*Profession de Foi*'", and "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82, 255-85, 286-96 and Vol. 5, pp. 313-20). Lenin completed the ideological defeat of "Economism" in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). Lenin's *Iskra* played a major part in the struggle against "Economism". p. 363

¹⁷⁴ On October 24, 1905, *Vorwärts* carried in its issue No. 249 a communication of the Central Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party of October 23, 1905, on the changes made in the editorial board of *Vorwärts*. Six editors who belonged to the revisionist trend in the Party had been removed and persons belonging to the Left wing of the Party included in the renewed editorial board. Rosa Luxemburg had been assigned a key role in the paper.

The opportunists launched a campaign in defence of the removed editors, but the Party rank and file approved of and backed the policy of the Executive. p. 373

¹⁷⁵ The *Amsterdam Congress of the Second International* was held from August 14-20 (N. S.), 1904. Its attitude to bourgeois parties was expressed in the resolution "International Rules for Socialist Tactics". The resolution forbade socialists to enter bourgeois governments, and rejected co-operation between socialist and bourgeois parties. p. 373

¹⁷⁶ *Volna (The Wave)*—a Bolsheviks daily published legally in St. Petersburg from April 26 (May 9) to May 24 (June 6), 1906. Twenty-five issues appeared in all. p. 383

¹⁷⁷ The legal Bolshevik newspapers published in the spring and summer of 1906—*Volna*, *Vperyod*, and *Ekho (The Echo)*—had a section headed "Among newspaper and Periodicals", to which Lenin contributed a number of articles.

In this particular item, Lenin criticises L. Martov's article. p. 400

¹⁷⁸ *Millerandists*—exponents of Millerandism, an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, so named after the French social-reformist

Alexandre Millerand, who in 1899 entered the reactionary bourgeois government of France and backed its anti-popular policy. That move of Millerand's was a striking manifestation of the policy of class co-operation between opportunist Social-Democratic leaders and the bourgeoisie. It indicated those leaders' renunciation of the revolutionary struggle, and constituted a betrayal of the interests of the working classes. Lenin described Millerandism as revisionism and renegacy; he stressed that social-reformists who entered a bourgeois government invariably turned out to be puppets of the capitalists, and a tool which that government used for deceiving the masses. p. 400

¹⁷⁹ This article was written by Lenin as an afterword to the resolution "On the State Duma", which he submitted to the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (see pp. 292-93 of this volume) and which *Volna* published in its issue No. 12 on May 9 (22), 1906. p. 401

¹⁸⁰ *Count Heyden's group*—the "Left" wing of the Octobrist group in the First Duma; it included several Right Cadets. At the Duma session on May 5 (18), 1906, during the discussion of the reply to the address from the throne, the Heyden group refused to vote for the text of the reply, couched by the Cadets in constitutional-monarchist terms, for it considered the text too radical, and left the session. Following the dissolution of the Duma the group organised itself into the Party of Peaceful Renovation, which stood close to the Octobrists. Lenin gave a political characterisation of Heyden and his group in the article "In Memory of Count Heyden" (see present edition, Vol. 13.). p. 404

¹⁸¹ The words in quotation marks are a paraphrase of the closing lines of Lermontov's poem "Meditation" (*Duma* in Russian) (see M. Y. Lermontov, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1934, p. 7). p. 404

¹⁸² Lenin wrote the note "*The Question of Organization*" by way of an editorial afterword to an article of that name dealing with the relations between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in the local Party organisations. p. 406

¹⁸³ The *public meeting* was arranged by the Socio-Political Club in Countess Panina's St. Petersburg palace on May 9 (22), 1906, in connection with the Duma's reply to the address from the throne. Attended by some 3,000 people, over half of whom were workers, it was the first mass meeting in Russia to be openly addressed by Lenin, who was introduced as "Karpov". His speech was an answer to two speakers—the "Popular Socialist" Myakotin and the Menshevik Dan (Bartenyev), both of whom advocated a bloc with the Cadets. In conclusion Lenin proposed a resolution that was carried almost unanimously. p. 407

¹⁸⁴ The information supplied by the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency on the elections in Tiflis and used by Lenin in his article was inac-

- curate. The number of electors elected in Tiflis was not 81 but 80, of whom 71 were Social-Democrats and 9, Cadets. p. 423
- ¹⁸⁵ The reference is to the election of electors in Kutais. Elections to the First Duma took place later. Kutais Gubernia sent three deputies to the Duma—I. G. Gomarteli, S. D. Japaridze and I. I. Ramishvili, Mensheviks all. p. 423
- ¹⁸⁶ Lenin is referring to the resolution "Attitude Towards the State Duma", which said: "...wherever elections are still ahead and the R.S.D.L.P. can nominate its candidates without entering into blocs with other parties, it should strive to have its candidates elected to the Duma" (*The Fourth [Unity] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1959, p. 526). p. 423
- ¹⁸⁷ The reference is to the disruptive conduct of the Menshevik Armavir Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which violated the Unity Congress decision forbidding blocs with bourgeois parties. During the Duma elections the Armavir Committee issued an appeal proposing to vote for the Social-Democrats, or at least for candidates who were "not more to the right than the Cadets". p. 423
- ¹⁸⁸ The article was written by Lenin as an afterword "From the Editors" to the appeal of the worker deputies in the Duma, "To All Workers of Russia". The appeal was published together with Lenin's afterword in *Volna*, No. 21, on May 19 (June 5), 1906. p. 434
- ¹⁸⁹ Lenin has in mind the "Draft of the Fundamental Land Law" prepared by a private conference of Trudovik deputies. Signed by 33 deputies (mostly Trudoviks), the draft was introduced into the Duma on June 6 (19), 1906, and was rejected on June 8 (21). The "Draft of the 33" demanded the immediate and complete abolition of private landownership, it was a supplement to the Trudoviks' agrarian draft demanding equalised land tenure on the principle of labour norms, submitted to the Duma on May 23 (June 5), 1906, and known as the "Draft of the 104". p. 437
- ¹⁹⁰ *Sorry Goremykins*—representatives of the reactionary-bureaucratic government quarters in tsarist Russia, headed by I. L. Goremykin, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Their mouthpiece was the Black-Hundred paper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*). p. 440
- ¹⁹¹ On May 11 (24), 1906, 300 R.S.D.L.P. members of the Moskovsky district in St. Petersburg held a meeting to discuss the results of the Unity Congress. The reports were made by Lenin (no record of his report has been preserved) and the Menshevik Dan. Towards the close of the meeting a controversy broke out between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over whether it was permissible to criticise decisions of the Unity Congress in the press and at public meetings. The Mensheviks, who were doing their utmost to limit the ideological struggle over the Congress decisions, considered criticism permissible only at Party meetings, and proposed a resolution to that

effect. Lenin moved an amendment saying that all the Congress decisions should be discussed not only at Party meetings, but also in the Social-Democratic press and at public meetings. The resolution, including Lenin's amendment, was carried against 39 votes (*Volna*, No. 15, May 12, 1906). In reply to Lenin's amendment the Central Committee, most of whose members were Mensheviks, adopted the resolution which Lenin criticises in his article.

p. 442

¹⁹² *Kuryer (The Courier)*—a legal Menshevik daily published in St. Petersburg in May and June 1906. p. 444

¹⁹³ *Dyelo Naroda (People's Cause)*—a legal Socialist-Revolutionary daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in May 1906. p. 444

¹⁹⁴ Lenin is referring to the Cadet "Draft Law on the Press", published in *Rech*, central organ of the Cadets, on May 17-18 (30-31), 1906. The draft envisaged penal servitude for a term of up to eight years for violating the tsarist censorship regulations. p. 446

¹⁹⁵ *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik (Government Herald)*—a daily newspaper, official organ of the tsarist government; it appeared in St. Petersburg from 1869 to 1917. p. 450

¹⁹⁶ The article "Kautsky on the State Duma" appeared in *Vestnik Zhizni (Life Herald)*, No. 6.

Vestnik Zhizni—a weekly scientific, literary and political magazine, published legally by the Bolsheviks. It appeared in St. Petersburg intermittently from March 30 (April 12), 1906, to September 1907. By November 19 (December 2), 1906, thirteen issues had been published. In January 1907, the weekly became a monthly, of which seven issues appeared. Contributors to *Vestnik Zhizni* were V. I. Lenin, M. S. Olminsky, V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, A. M. Gorky and others. In No. 12 of the magazine, Lenin printed his article "The Russian Radical Is Wise After the Event". p. 452

¹⁹⁷ *Kolokol (The Bell)*—a legal Social-Democratic daily published in Poltava, Ukraine, from January 18 (31) to June 8 (21), 1906. Most of its contributors were Mensheviks. p. 460

¹⁹⁸ *Lavrov, P. L.* (1823-1900)—Russian sociologist and publicist noted ideologist of Narodism. p. 466

¹⁹⁹ See Karl Marx's article "The Communism of the Paper *Rheinischer Beobachter*" (Marx and Engels, *On Religion*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 81-86). p. 467

²⁰⁰ See Frederick Engels, "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 328-37); Frederick Engels, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany". VII. "The Frankfort National Assembly": New York

Daily Tribune, 1852; Articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, Berlin, 1959). p. 467

²⁰¹ See Note 108. p. 472

²⁰² *Prince Trubetskoi*, S. N. (1862-1905)—a liberal advocating a moderate constitution. In June 1905, he addressed a policy speech to Nicholas II as a member of a Zemstvo deputation sent to the tsar. p. 474

²⁰³ *Prizyv (The Call)*—a popular newspaper published in St. Petersburg from January 15 (28) to June 15 (28), 1906. From the end of March onwards its contributors included Bolsheviks. p. 476

²⁰⁴ *The "Resolution (II) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P."* and the article "*The Slogan of a Duma Ministry*", which is printed next to it and which Lenin wrote as an afterword on behalf of the editorial board of *Vperyod*, were expressive of the struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over the Duma, a struggle which took the form of a conflict between the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

On May 13 (26), 1906, the government rejected the demands of the Cadet Duma stated in its Address. In reply the Duma passed a resolution expressing no confidence in the Ministry and insisting on its resignation. The Menshevik C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. circulated to the Party organisations a resolution proposing to support the Cadet Duma's demand for a Duma—that is a Cadet—Ministry. The resolution was opposed by the St. Petersburg Committee led by Lenin. At its meeting on May 23-24 (June 5-6), 1906, the Committee rejected the Menshevik resolution of the C.C. and carried the resolution proposed by Lenin. Nine Menshevik members of the Committee demanded that the Bolshevik resolution be suspended until the matter was dealt with by the C.C. or an inter-district city conference. This demand of the Mensheviks was likewise rejected by the St. Petersburg Committee. At the same time the Committee resolved to call an inter-district conference, acquaint the districts with the minutes and other records of the conference, and publish in the press Lenin's resolution, which had been carried, and the statement of the nine Menshevik members of the Committee as material to be discussed prior to the forthcoming conference. p. 481

²⁰⁵ At the fourteenth sitting of the Duma on May 24 (June 6), 1906, the Trudoviks tabled a motion, signed by 35 deputies, for the immediate establishment of local land committees to be elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. The land committees were to carry out work preparatory to an agrarian reform and participate in the discussion of the draft laws on the agrarian question submitted to the Duma. The issue of local committees and redemption payments was "the very pivot of the agrarian question", as Lenin phrased it, for it was an issue of who was to effect the reform, whether the peasants or the landlords.

The Cadets sharply criticised the Trudovik motion, both in the Duma and in the press. On the very next day after the statement of the thirty-five was made public *Rech*, the Cadet central organ, attacked the Trudovik draft, saying that the contemplated committees might shift the solution of the problem to the "left".

The Bolsheviks supported the idea of setting up local committees, which they regarded as one form of organising the masses for a further revolutionary struggle. Lenin wrote: "Workers' governments in the towns, peasant committees in the villages (which at a certain moment will be transformed into bodies elected by universal, etc., suffrage)—such is the only possible form of organisation of the victorious revolution, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It is not surprising that the liberals hate these forms of organisation of the classes that are fighting for freedom!" (See present edition, Vol. 13, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907".) p. 486

²⁰⁶ In the German text quoted by Lenin, *Vperyod* left out the words *Thron und Altar* (throne and altar) because of censorship. p. 495

²⁰⁷ *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—a legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg from May 26 (June 8), 1906 onwards, instead of the newspaper *Volna*, closed by the government. Lenin played the leading role in the daily. Among the contributors were M. S. Olminsky, V. V. Vorovsky and A. V. Lunacharsky. The paper was persecuted by the police; it was closed with issue No. 17 on June 14 (27), 1906, and was succeeded by the Bolshevik *Ekho*.

The "Resolution (II) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." appeared in *Vperyod* in abridged form. p. 500

²⁰⁸ *Vlasov*—A. I. Rykov. p. 504

²⁰⁹ The resolution was linked with the conflict between the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. over the attitude towards the Duma. Together with Resolution II of the St. Petersburg Committee (see pp. 481-82 of this volume), it constituted the Bolsheviks' tactical platform, on the basis of which a discussion was held and elections took place to the inter-district conference of the St. Petersburg organisation (the conference met on June 11-12 [24-25], 1906, in Terijoki, Finland, under Lenin's leadership).

Vperyod published the resolution with the following editorial comment: "The editorial board of *Vperyod* fully shares the main propositions of the resolution, and recommends the comrades to propose it at workers' meetings." p. 514

**THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN**

Chronology
(November 1905-June 1906)

1905

- Late October-early November* Lenin awaits in Stockholm the papers he requires to return to Russia.
- November 2 (15-17)* In Stockholm, Lenin writes his article "Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. *A Letter to the Editor*".
- November 5 (18)* Lenin arrives in Helsingfors from Stockholm.
- November 7 or 8 (20 or 21)* Lenin arrives in St. Petersburg.
- November 8 or 9 (21 or 22)* Lenin leads a meeting of the Bolshevik section of the editorial board of *Novaya Zhizn*; the meeting determines the composition of the editorial board and elaborates the programme of the newspaper for the immediate future.
- November 9 (22)* Lenin attends a Central Committee meeting, which unanimously adopts the appeal "To All Party Organisations and All Social-Democratic Workers" concerning the convocation of the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
- November 10 (23)* *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 9, publishes the beginning of the article "The Reorganisation of the Party", the first article written by Lenin upon his return to Russia from exile.
- November 12 (25)* In the leading article "The Proletariat and the Peasantry", published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 11, Lenin greets the Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union.
- November 13 (26)* Lenin's article "Party Organisation and Party Literature" appears in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 12. At a meeting of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Lenin speaks on measures to counteract the lock-out organised by the capitalists in reply to the eight-hour day established in revolu-

- tionary manner by the workers. The resolution he proposes is carried.
- November 15*
(28) Lenin's article "The Provocation That Failed" is published as the leader in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 13, which also carries the next instalment of the article "The Reorganisation of the Party".
- Lenin writes his article "The Armed Forces and the Revolution". The article is published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 14, on November 16 (29).
- November 16*
(29) At the seat of the Free Economic Society, Lenin delivers to a meeting of St. Petersburg Party workers a report entitled "A Criticism of the Agrarian Programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party". The conclusion of Lenin's article "The Reorganisation of the Party" appears in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 14.
- November 18*
(December 1) Lenin's articles "The Scales Are Wavering" and "Learn from the Enemy" appear in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 16.
- November 20*
(December 3) Lenin's article "Revolutionary Office Routine and Revolutionary Action", dealing with the question of a constituent assembly, is published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 18.
- November 23*
(December 6) Lenin's article "The Dying Autocracy and New Organs of Popular Rule" is published as the leader in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 19.
- November 24*
(December 7) Lenin writes his article "Socialism and Anarchism". The article appears in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 21, on November 25 (December 8).
- November 26 and*
December 2 (De-
cember 9 and
15) Lenin's article "The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism" is carried in *Novaya Zhizn*, Nos. 22 and 27.
- November 27*
(December 10) Lenin attends a meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P., which discusses questions relating to the preparation of an armed uprising, changes in the editorial board of *Novaya Zhizn*, and the publication of the Bolshevik newspaper *Borba* in Moscow.
- November* At an enlarged session of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Lenin speaks on the Party's attitude to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.
- December 3*
(16) Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya take up their legal residence at 15/8 Grechesky Prospekt in St. Pe-

tersburg. Rigid secret police surveillance compels Lenin to go underground several days later.

Lenin's article "Socialism and Religion" is published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 28.

Lenin attends an urgent joint conference of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P., the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party and the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies called in view of the closing of *Novaya Zhizn*. The conference also discusses the question of armed uprising.

December 12-17 (15-30)

Lenin leads the First Bolshevik Conference in Tammerfors, Finland. He makes reports on the current situation and the agrarian question. The Conference passes his draft resolutions on the agrarian question and the convocation of a unity congress.

Lenin participates in the committee appointed to draft a resolution on the attitude to be adopted towards the Duma, the resolution is passed by the Conference.

December 22 (January 4, 1906)

In St. Petersburg Lenin attends a conference of members of the Central Committee and delegates to the Tammerfors Bolshevik Conference. He makes a report on the Bolsheviks' tactical platform with regard to the Duma.

Late 1905 or early 1906

Lenin writes an outline of his article on the stages, direction and prospects of the revolution.

1906

Early part of year to middle of March

Lenin participates in the committee appointed by the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to draw up an agrarian programme for discussion at the Fourth Party Congress.

January 4 (17)

Lenin's article "The Workers' Party and Its Tasks in the Present Situation" is carried as the leader in *Molodaya Rossiya*, No. 1.

January

Lenin writes an article in support of the Bolshevik tactics of an active boycott of the First Duma. The article, entitled "Should We Boycott the State Duma? The Platform of the 'Majority'", is published in leaflet form in January, both by the Central Committee and by the Joint C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin writes his article "The State Duma and Social-Democratic Tactics". The article appears in Feb-

- ruary as part of the pamphlet *The State Duma and Social-Democracy*.
- Before February 4 (17)* At a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Moskovskaya Zastava district in St. Petersburg, Lenin delivers his report "On the Elections to the State Duma".
- February 7 (20)* Lenin's article "The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers' Party" appears in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 1.
- Before February 11 (24)* Lenin reports on the tactics of an active boycott of the Duma to a meeting of Bolshevik Party functionaries in St. Petersburg.
- February 11 (24)* Lenin guides the work of the St. Petersburg City Conference. He makes a report on the attitude to the Duma, and submits his draft resolution on the tactics of boycotting the Duma. The Conference votes by a majority for the boycott.
- After February 11 (24)* Lenin writes the appeal "To All Working Men and Women of the City of St. Petersburg and Vicinity". The Joint St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. publishes it in leaflet form.
- Late February (early March)* Lenin guides the work of The Second St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. He upholds his draft resolution "The Tactics of Boycott", and the Conference carries it.
- In Kuokkala, Finland, Lenin works on the tactical platform of the Bolsheviks—draft resolutions for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
- First half of March* Lenin arrives in Moscow to organise the discussion of the draft resolutions prepared for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. He takes part in a conference of the leading group of the Moscow Bolsheviks.
- He attends a meeting of the Zamoskvorechye District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Moscow, and speaks in the debate on the draft resolution concerning the attitude to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.
- He also attends a meeting of the Moscow Regional Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. during the discussion of the question whether the Moscow organisation should participate in the Duma election campaign.
- Middle (end) of March* Lenin leads conferences of the Bolshevik group in St. Petersburg, which discuss the tactical platform.

- March 20 (April 2)* *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, publishes Lenin's article "The Russian Revolution and the Tasks of the Proletariat" as the leading article, and "A Tactical Platform for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Draft Resolution for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", prepared by Lenin.
- Second half of March* Lenin writes his pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*. The pamphlet appears in St. Petersburg early in April.
- March 24-28 (April 6-10)* Lenin writes his pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*. The pamphlet is published in St. Petersburg in April.
- March 26 (April 8)* Lenin is elected a delegate to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. for the St. Petersburg organisation.
- March* Lenin writes a preface to the Russian translation of Karl Kautsky's pamphlet, *Social-Democracy Wiped Out!*
- Late March (early April)* In St. Petersburg, Lenin leads a conference of the Bolshevik delegates to the Fourth Congress.
- Before April 10* Lenin arrives in Stockholm to attend the Fourth Congress. At a private Bolshevik conference, he speaks against the proposal to wreck the Congress in view of the Mensheviks' preponderance at it.
- April 10-25 (April 23-May)* The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. meets in Stockholm. Lenin is elected to the presiding committee of the Congress. He takes part in the work of the Congress and of the committee drafting the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P.
- First session* Lenin proposes a resolution during the discussion of the terms of reference of the Credentials Committee. The resolution is carried by the Congress.
- Third session* Lenin presides. He announces the Congress agenda, speaks in the debate on it, and proposes including in the agenda the item "Appraisal of the Present Situation" and the question of the national organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. His proposal is carried.
- Fourth session* Lenin presides. He proposed instructing the Agrarian Committee to prepare reports and appoint reporters.
- Fifth session* Lenin makes the report on the agrarian question.

- Seventh session* Lenin presides. He is elected to the committee on the Duma.
- Eighth session* Lenin presides while the debate on the agrarian question continues.
- Ninth session* Lenin presides. He delivers his speech in reply to the debate on the agrarian question.
- Tenth session* Lenin presides. He proposes that the Congress approve all the minutes.
- Eleventh session* Lenin presides. He speaks in connection with the voting on the tactical resolution concerning the agrarian question.
- Thirteenth session* Lenin makes the report "The Present Situation and the Class Tasks of the Proletariat".
- Sixteenth session* Lenin delivers his speech in reply to the debate on "The Present Situation and the Class Tasks of the Proletariat".
- Seventeenth session* Lenin is elected to the committee appointed to draft the resolution "The Attitude to the Armed Uprising." He makes a co-report on the attitude to be adopted towards the Duma and reads the draft resolution on that question.
- Eighteenth session* Lenin presides. He declares for giving representatives of the national Social-Democratic organisations the floor in the debate on the attitude to the Duma.
- Nineteenth session* Lenin makes his speech in reply to the debate on the attitude to the Duma.
- Twenty-first session* Lenin presides. He speaks in support of the proposal to postpone discussion of the formation of parliamentary Social-Democratic group until the composition of the group of Social-Democrats elected to the Duma is ascertained.
- Twenty-second session* Lenin makes a speech on the armed uprising.
- Twenty-fourth session* Lenin presides. On behalf of the Congress he greets the Polish Social-Democratic Party which has joined the R.S.D.L.P.
- Twenty-sixth session* Lenin presides. He submits a written statement (expressing his dissenting opinion) on the question of forming a parliamentary Social-Democratic group and proposes a note to the rules for a merger with the Bund.

- Twenty-seventh session* Clause 1 of the Rules, concerning Party membership, is carried by the Congress as worded by Lenin.
- April 25-26 (May 8-9)* Lenin writes "An Appeal to the Party by Delegates to the Unity Congress Who Belonged to the Former 'Bolshevik' Group". The Appeal is signed by the Bolshevik delegates from 26 Party organisations.
- Late April (early May)* Lenin returns to St. Petersburg by way of Abo, Finland, upon the conclusion of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
- May 5 (18)* Lenin's article "The Fight for Freedom and the Fight for Power" is published as the leading article in *Volna*, No. 9.
- May 6 (19)* Lenin's article "A New Upswing" is published as the leading article in *Volna*, No. 10.
- May 9 (22)* Lenin delivers a report on the results of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to a Party meeting in St. Petersburg.
- May 9 (22)* *Volna*, No. 12 carries Lenin's articles "The Duma and the People" (leader), "Among Newspapers and Periodicals" and "The Bolshevik Resolution on the State Duma".
- May 9 (22)* At a public meeting in Countess Panina's Palace Lenin, introduced as "Karpov", delivers a speech on the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. with regard to the Duma. The meeting passes the resolution proposed by Lenin.
- May 10 (23)* Lenin reports on the results of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations at the Franco-Russian subdistrict in St. Petersburg.
- May 10 (23)* Lenin's articles "The Workers' Group in the State Duma" (leader) and "The Question of Organisation" appear in *Volna*, No. 13.
- May 11 (24)* At a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Moskovsky district in St. Petersburg, Lenin makes a report on the Fourth (Unity) Congress. He moves an amendment to the resolution proposed at the meeting. His amendment is carried.
- May 11 (24)* Lenin's article "The Peasant, or 'Trudovik', Group and the R.S.D.L.P." is published as the leader in *Volna*, No. 14.

- May 12 (25)* Lenin's article "The Land Question in the Duma" appears as the leader in *Volna*, No. 15.
- May 13 (26)* Lenin's article "Resolution and Revolution" is published in *Volna*, No. 16.
- May 14 (27)* *Volna*, No. 17, publishes Lenin's articles "Neither Land nor Freedom" (leader) and "The Social-Democratic Election Victory in Tiflis".
- May 18 (31)* Lenin's article "Government, Duma and People" appears as the leader in *Volna*, No. 20.
- Lenin writes his article "The Cadets Are Preventing the Duma from Appealing to the People". The article appears in *Volna*, No. 21, on May 19 (June 1).
- May 19 (June 1)* Lenin's articles "They Won't Even Bargain!" and "The Manifesto of the Workers' Deputies in the State Duma" appear in *Volna*, No. 21.
- Lenin writes his articles "The Land Question and the Fight for Freedom" and "The Sorry Goremykins, the Octobrists and the Cadets". The articles appear in *Volna*, No. 22, on May 20 (June 2)..
- May 20 (June 2)* Lenin's article "Freedom to Criticise and Unity of Action" is published in *Volna*, No. 22.
- May 21 (June 3)* *Volna*, No. 23, carries Lenin's articles "Bad Advice" (leader), criticising Plekhanov's articles in *Kuryer*, and "Talk and Rumours About the Dissolution of the State Duma".
- At a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Narva district in St. Petersburg, Lenin reports on the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P
- May 23 (June 5)* Lenin's article "Kautsky on the State Duma" is published in the weekly *Vestnik Zhizni*, No. 6.
- Lenin delivers a lecture on the agrarian question at a workers' meeting in the Sangalsky subdistrict of St. Petersburg. At the request of his audience he also makes a speech on the attitude of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks towards the Duma.
- May 24 (June 6)* Lenin's article "Cadets, Trudoviks and the Workers' Party" appears as the leader in *Volna*, No. 25.
- May 26 (June 8)* Lenin's article "How Comrade Plekhanov Argues About Social-Democratic Tactics" appears in *Vperyod*, No. 1. In the same year it is also brought out as a pamphlet by *Vperyod* Publishers.

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- May 27 (June 9)* *Vperyod*, No. 2, publishes "Resolution (II) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the Attitude Towards the State Duma", written by Lenin (it was also published in leaflet form by the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in May 1906), and Lenin's article "The Slogan of a Duma Ministry".
- Lenin writes his article "The Present Political Situation". The article is published as the leader in *Vperyod*, No. 3, on May 28 (June 10).
- May 30 (June 12)* Lenin's article "The Tactics of the Proletariat and the Tasks of the Moment" appears in *Vperyod*, No. 4.
- May 31 (June 13)* Lenin's articles "The German Social-Democrats on the Cadets" and "Among Newspapers and Periodicals" appear in *Vperyod*, No. 5.
- May* Lenin writes his pamphlet *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. A Letter to the St. Petersburg Workers*. The pamphlet appears in June 1906.
- June 1 (14)* Lenin's article "Let the Workers Decide" appears in *Vperyod*, No. 6.
- Lenin writes his article "Don't Gaze Up, Gaze Down". The article is published as the leader in *Vperyod*, No. 7, on June 2 (15).
- June 3 (16)* Lenin writes his article "The Reaction Is Taking to Arms". The article is carried as the leader in *Vperyod*, No. 9, on June 4 (17).
- June 6 (19)* *Vperyod*, No. 10, publishes "Resolution (III) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the Question of a Duma Ministry", drafted by Lenin.
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