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Who Is Violating International Agreements?



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**WHO
IS VIOLATING
INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS?**

**The testimony of US
politicians, scientists and
experts on disarmament**

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INTRODUCTION

"Pacta servanda sunt"—treaties must be observed. The importance of this principle of international law, probably the oldest one, has been stressed by statesmen of all times and all nations. Significantly, many of them violated their commitments just as easily as they made them, if these commitments no longer served their interests. Historians have reckoned that in the past three thousand years more than 8,000 peace treaties were signed "for all time". But they were effective for an average of not more than two years each. Even less durable were agreements on trade and political cooperation. Moreover, agile diplomats, courtiers and dodgy lawyers put in a great deal of effort to justify the flagrant violations of international law and to blame the other side for failure to comply with the terms of the treaties.

Ironically, the role of defenders of international law, of the custodians of justice and legality was most often assumed by the very politicians who themselves breached legal norms, committed acts of lawlessness and tyranny. From time immemorial aggressors have accompanied their actions in the international field with the active brainwashing of the masses both in their own countries and abroad, building up a propaganda myth in an effort to show the "legitimacy" of their policy, to lull the vigilance of the peoples, to sow the seeds of mistrust and alienation among them and make them an obedient tool of the aggressors' will.

It has long been noted that the first victim of aggression is the truth. It was at the very time when troops of the Entente were disembarking in Murmansk and Vladivostok, in Arkhangelsk and Odessa, that the Western press produced the bogey of

a man with a knife between his teeth, a Bolshevik who flouted international law and was threatening the whole civilized world. The view that any treaty or agreement with Soviet Russia was not worth the paper it was written on, along with such cliches as "red militarism", "the hand of Moscow", "the Kremlin intrigues", filled Western publications in those years.

The peaceful initiatives of the Soviet state, beginning with Lenin's Decree on Peace in 1917, were invariably rejected as a "treacherous tactical move" by the Communists who were trying to set up a trap from which there would be no escape. That was what happened at the Genoa conference in 1922 where the Soviet delegation put forward a wide-ranging set of measures to strengthen international security and curb the arms drive and at the Geneva conference on disarmament in 1932-1935 which the Western powers turned into a mere talking shop. That was what happened to the numerous Soviet proposals to create a system of collective security in Europe before the outbreak of the Second World War.

At the same time talk about a "threat from the East", to which were added allegations that the USSR did not recognize international law and did not honour its commitments was used by the leaders of some Western countries to justify not only brazenly anti-Soviet actions but also their betrayal of the interests of their allies. Amid the claptrap that "the Russians cannot be trusted" Hitler's war machine was being built, the anti-Comintern pact was formed, Czechoslovakia was partitioned and seized and the Second World War was unleashed.

Humankind has paid a high price for this near-sighted policy. But even the grim lessons of the Second World War did not rid Western ruling circles of the "demonology" syndrome. The doctrines of "containing" and "rolling back" communism in the years of the cold war were again being implemented to the blustering refrain that "the Russians cannot be trusted", do not recognize international law and do not observe treaties and agreements. These aspersions were readily taken up by Truman and Dulles, Churchill and Adenauer and other Western leaders.

It is hard now to tell if the postwar leaders in the West were sincere or not in mistrusting the Soviet Union. Possibly the long years of anti-Soviet and anti-communist frenzy prevented them from seeing the world situation as it really was. Very possibly their thesis that there could be no dealings with the Soviet Union was a ploy for bamboozling voters and fanning war hysteria.

But one thing is clear: the refusal of the leaders of the Western countries to hold constructive and fruitful talks with the Soviet Union and to sign mutually advantageous treaties and agreements had a lasting harmful effect on the international climate and led to tremendous losses for humankind.

Again today, the White House is once more alleging that the Russians are prepared to resort to any deception to achieve their goals, that Soviet promises and commitments are worthless and are made only for the purpose of violating them at a later date. Significantly, it is the US President himself, Ronald Reagan, who has made such allegations.

The latest such statement was Reagan's special report to the US Congress at the end of January 1984, accusing the Soviet side of "possible violations of a number of agreements in armaments control".

Washington officials are clearly going back to the ideological clichés and rhetoric of cold-war days. But what could pass in the late 1940s is absolutely unacceptable in the mid-1980s. Truman and Dulles could say anything they pleased about the Soviet Union and its attitude to international law, because in those years the treaties and agreements between the USSR and Western powers were concluded on a much lesser scale than in subsequent years. Meanwhile the question of Soviet respect for treaties can be judged by experience itself. In the 1970s the Soviet Union concluded many multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements, some of them with the United States. The US President is well placed to have very exhaustive information as to how the Soviet Union is honouring these treaties and agreements.

This information does not necessarily come from Soviet sources. One only has to examine what American experts say on this question. We would like to emphasize here the word "experts"—not professional propagandists of the cold war who are ready to present any Soviet foreign-policy move as a violation of international law, without offering any cogent proof except the charge that all Communists are liars and frauds just because they are Communists.

This booklet presents the views of Americans—senators and congressmen, scientists and public figures, military men and diplomats, officials and journalists—on how the Soviet Union and the United States are observing their joint treaties and agreements on arms control. We would like to emphasize that not all those whose views are quoted here are friends of the Soviet Union,

nor are all of them unreserved critics of the Reagan Administration. Nevertheless, their assessments and conclusions tend to point to one thing: the Soviet Union has a more responsible attitude to its international commitments than the United States.

The final judgement, however, should be made by the reader himself. We don't want to press our point too far and so we shall make only a few comments.

It is hardly accidental that the propaganda campaign over alleged Soviet violations of Soviet-US agreements and treaties was mounted, and deliberately unscrupulous sources of information—at times outright fabrications—were resorted to at the time of an unprecedented US arms build up. While scaring US voters with the alleged perfidy and scheming of the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration planned to allocate more than 1,500 thousand million dollars for the needs of the Pentagon in the 1981-1986 period. At the very time when the press was carrying vague reports about possible Soviet violations of the provisions of SALT-I and SALT-II, reports originating from "quarters close to the White House", the legislators on Capitol Hill were hurrying to push through programs for building MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines equipped with Trident missiles, as well as new B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, and long-range cruise missiles to be launched from land, sea and air. At the same time the United States was forging ahead with its efforts to enlarge and strengthen its surface fleet by building aircraft carriers and new types of naval vessels. It was also starting production of new types of chemical weapons, stepping up preparations for siting neutron weapons outside the United States and speeding up the development of laser weapon and other "futuristic" systems of armaments. When the US press was raising a hullabaloo over the alleged Soviet violations of the USSR-USA Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Systems, signed in 1972, the Pentagon was seeking a sharp increase in allocations for developing various systems of space-based weapons. It goes without saying that the demands of the military were satisfied. One cannot help wondering: are not the accidental information "leakages" from the White House and the Pentagon, portentous "indiscretions" of US officials and grim predictions by some mysterious "reliable sources" a part of a carefully planned campaign to secure the approval of new major military programs?

There is another interesting "coincidence". One of the latest uproars about the Soviet Union's alleged defaulting on its interna-

tional legal commitments was in the autumn of 1983, at the very time when the United States was planning to invade and invaded Grenada. The aims of the White House were particularly clear in this case, to start a propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union in order to direct public attention in the world and the United States away from Washington's flagrant violation of the norms of international law.

As for fresh escalation of the propaganda hullabaloo over mythical Soviet violations, prompted by the above-mentioned Reagan's report, its instigators are clearly pursuing several objectives.

In the first place the White House wants to inject anti-Soviet feelings into the election campaign—interlarded with the "peace" rhetoric now in style in Washington—in order to knock out of the saddle those of Reagan's possible rivals in the race for presidency who take a more realistic stand, especially on questions of limiting the arms race and preventing nuclear war.

Second, the presidential report is regarded by Pentagon strategists as a kind of battering ram for opening the way to new military allocations, to new and even more terrible systems of mass destruction.

Third, the men in Washington are evidently intending to wreck the process of multilateral and bilateral talks on arms limitation. "If you don't adhere to agreements, then you don't have much when you have an agreement," said State Secretary **Shultz**.

Fourth, in trying to shift the blame from the guilty to the innocent, official circles in Washington want to camouflage their policy aimed at undermining the agreements already signed on limiting the arms drive, and at the same time to conceal their own sins in defaulting on their legal and political commitments in this field. That there are plenty of such sins will be evident to readers of this booklet.

TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF ARMS LIMITATION

In the late 1940s and early 1950s the US policy of tough confrontation with the Soviet Union according to the doctrine of "containing" and "rolling back" communism, and of establishing US world domination, left no place for constructive and mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviet Union. In those years the USSR made several important proposals, the implementation of which could have substantially eased international tension, halted and reversed the nuclear arms race and helped improve Soviet-US relations. Unfortunately these initiatives met with no positive response from the United States.

When the pressure of world public opinion forced the United States to respond to Soviet proposals on normalizing relations and curbing the arms race the US counterproposals were, as a rule, one-sided and totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Official circles in Washington regarded negotiations not as a means of arriving at a mutually beneficial compromise but as part of a propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the world public of the "peaceful" nature of US foreign policy.

Prominent US scientist and politician, **Morton H. Haiperin**, who in the 1950s took part in working out the US position in negotiations with the Soviet Union, wrote later that Washington viewed the presentation of "reasonable" proposals, that is, proposals that would place the United States on "moral high ground" in the eyes of the world community, as an important part of the political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The most typical and widely-used ploy in drafting such proposals was the inclusion of a provision obviously unacceptable to the Soviet Union. **Morton Halperin** continued:

Another invariable characteristic of all such proposals is that they included a "joker" which insured that they would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Usually a "joker" was a demand for such intrusive on-site inspection that one could be sure the Soviet leaders would never go along. By demanding that there be agreement on inspection first, one could generally avoid serious and detailed negotiations.¹

In the 1960s and 1970s the strengthening of the positions of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, coupled with more realistic trends in the policies of US ruling circles, made possible the attainment of several bilateral Soviet-US agreements and a considerable number of multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union were parties. The most important of these accords were those dealing with curbing the arms race, above all, the nuclear arms race, and preventing a nuclear war: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963); the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty; the Soviet Union signed Additional Protocol II to that treaty in 1978); the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967); the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968); and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1971).

The significance of these agreements can hardly be overestimated. Apart from blocking some of the channels of the nuclear arms race they have notably lessened the threat of nuclear war and helped improve the international situation as a whole. These treaties have also indicated further ways of limiting the arms drive and worked out the machinery and procedure for reaching new accords based on the principle of equality and equal security.

The Soviet Union has invariably followed the spirit and letter of the treaties and agreements which it has signed, in keeping with its traditional line of rigorous observance of commitments. This is borne out by statements of authoritative US public organizations, experts, scientists and statesmen.

Specifically, a bulletin issued in early 1983 by the **American Committee on East-West Accord**, a public organization, said:

As the Reagan, Carter, Ford and Nixon Administrations have said, the Soviets have abided by their obligations under the SALT agreements. They continue to abide by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, and numerous other arms control agreements as well. The record shows that the Soviets will abide by their commitments on nuclear weaponry that are of direct benefit to them, as well as to us...²

It is noteworthy that **William Colby**, former CIA director, is of the same opinion:

The Soviets generally have complied with specific treaties which they have adopted.³

Further testimony. Addressing the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations early in 1982, then US Secretary of State **Alexander Haig** said:

To the best of our knowledge, they (the USSR—*Ed.*) are generally complying with the provisions of existing agreements (in the sphere of arms control—*Ed.*).⁴

Everything seems to be quite clear, yet the special report by President Reagan which we have mentioned above accuses the Soviet Union of "violating" its commitments, above all, in the field of arms control. "Who is to be believed?" the reader may ask. He should believe the facts, of course. But before we proceed to examine them we would like to quote **Sidney Lens**, an American writer, who pointed out that deliberate misinformation is the long-term strategy of the militarist circles, one that was planned in the early postwar years:

The historic record tells us that the you-can't-trust-the-Russians thesis was deliberately injected into American political consciousness after World War II to win support for a rearmament program. Early in the Cold War, President Truman's close collaborator, Republican Senator **Arthur Vandenberg**, advised the President that if the Government intended to expand military "preparedness", it would have to "scare the hell out of the country". The Soviet "threat" has dominated US policy—and US propaganda—ever since.⁵

Another, probably no less important purpose of this strategy is to distract public attention from the position of the US leaders themselves, who far from always display a proper sense of responsibility and integrity with regard to their international commitments. The policy of the present Administration is the cause of particular apprehension in this respect because, we must say again, this Administration acts in open violation of many agreements whose importance it demagogically extols.

Stressing that many people in the United States are well aware the Reagan Administration has taken a course of aggravating international relations and undermining arms control agreements, Congressman Stewart McKinney, of Connecticut, quotes an editorial in his state's largest newspaper, the *Hartford Courant*, which, he says, "asks several very good questions on where US policy is headed":

The pattern of a radically new direction in policy has been evident for more than a year. Mr. Reagan has asked for relaxation of export controls on nuclear fuel and sensitive nuclear technologies. He has deferred negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. He has raised the possibility of abrogating the 1972 ABM Treaty, which imposes limits on defense against ballistic missile weapons.

Mr. Reagan has refused to send to the Senate for ratification, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Chemical weapons are to be developed. The President is unhappy with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibiting the production, development, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical and biological weapons.⁶

On this attitude of the Reagan Administration former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie ironically commented:

Many of us have resorted to looking for small signs of hope that the Administration wasn't really serious after all about its foreign policy directions. Maybe the President didn't really mean it when he rejected the Law of the Sea treaty because he thought "that when you go out on the high seas, you can do what you want... Or maybe we aren't really serious about violating SALT-II provisions with something called "Dense Pack".⁷

Now let us briefly examine some of the most important Soviet-US agreements in the field of arms control, concluded in the postwar period, to see how the Soviet Union and the United States have been abiding by them.

THE SOVIET AND US APPROACH TO OBSERVANCE OF SALT-I AND SALT-II

The most important of the Soviet-US agreements signed in recent decades are certainly those concerning the limitation and reduction of arms, above all, strategic arms. These are the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow in 1972, and the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-II), signed in Vienna in 1979.

It should be noted that even in the course of the talks the US position had been so evasive and inconsistent that the Soviet side had occasion to doubt whether Washington was really interested in reaching agreement in principle. Each new US Administration reviewed the official position of the US side and made its own demands, setting back the negotiations to a stage that had long been passed. This was particularly manifest in the course of talks on SALT-II and in the subsequent refusal by the United States to ratify it. Addressing the students and faculty of the American University, Senator Daniel Moynihan said:

The Soviet leadership negotiated the Treaty (SALT-II) with three Presidents. President Carter clearly accepted it for the United States, but then the Senate demurred. Now if we find Soviet ways mysterious, so surely must they find ours. How are they not to suspect a change in United States policy, even perhaps an elaborate, if as yet undeciphered, deception?¹

It should be recalled that back in 1978, when negotiations

were in full swing between the Soviet Union and the United States on the SALT-II Treaty, the US press clamoured that the Soviet Union had allegedly failed to abide by the provisions of the SALT-I accords concluded earlier. As a result of the press campaign, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the State Department for a special report giving a clear and conclusive answer on the matter of Soviet observance of the SALT-I Treaty. When the report was ready Senator **John Sparkman**, the Committee Chairman, who presented the document to the Senate, said:

The report addresses eight issues which the United States has raised in regard to Soviet compliance with SALT-I, and five issues which the Soviet side has raised...

The Committee on Foreign Relations has spent a great deal of time over the years investigating the charges which have been made in regard to Soviet compliance with SALT. The committee has questioned former Secretary of State Kissinger; the present Secretary of State, Mr. Vance; Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and numerous representatives of the intelligence community. The committee has never found reason to accuse the Soviet Union of violating the provisions of SALT-I. Three successive Presidents of the United States have been appraised in detail as to Soviet compliance with SALT-I, and, significantly, none has seen cause in a single instance to charge the Soviet Union with violating the terms of the SALT-I agreement...

I believe that this report should help resolve the many ill-founded charges of Soviet cheating—which were undermining the search for a good SALT-II agreement that would enhance our national security...

The record simply does not support any argument that the Soviet Union has acted in bad faith with regard to the SALT-I Treaty and Agreement.²

Next year discussion on this subject continued in the US press with many journalists, international law experts, technical specialists and politicians taking part. Once again it was confirmed that the Soviet Union had honestly and consistently complied with its SALT-I commitments. In an article in the *Washington Post* entitled "Is It Worth Negotiating With the US?" **Bruce Bishop** wrote:

The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), a super-secret joint American-Soviet body established under the

provisions of the SALT I Treaty, which became effective in 1972, provides part of the record on Soviet capacity to live up to agreements. A former US representative on the SCC, Sidney N. Graybeal, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979: "I do not believe that the Soviets would enter into any agreement which required them to cheat in order to attain their military objectives, or on which they planned to cheat." Graybeal stressed that the Russians had lived up to the letter of any nuclear arms treaty they had signed.³

The observance of agreements on strategic arms limitation certainly presents both a political and technical problem. Each side may have uncertainties and difficulties in the interpretation of certain provisions of the agreement which may require explanation from the other side. In this connection, as has been shown in the above-cited statements of **John Sparkman** and **Sidney Graybeal**, a matter of great importance is the clarification of disputed questions within the above-mentioned Standing Consultative Commission. But the present Administration refuses to avail itself of this tested procedure; it leaves disputed issues unclarified and arbitrarily accuses the Soviet side of failure to comply with its commitments. Senator **Joseph Biden** criticized such dishonest US practice as follows:

This Administration has adopted a deliberate policy of refusing to challenge the USSR for possible violation of SALT-II in the established mechanism of the Standing Consultative Commission. It also rings hollow for the Administration to complain about violations of a not-yet-binding treaty which they consider flawed and refuse to ratify. ...

Driven by his own campaign rhetoric, the President has pronounced the SALT-II treaty "fatally flawed" and has even refused to challenge the Russians about possible violations of that still-unratified agreement. Nevertheless, he has pledged not to "undercut" the treaty's provisions so long as the Soviet Union does likewise. This formula guarantees maximum uncertainty about the durability and effectiveness of SALT-II's limits. We are now in the position of trying to negotiate substantial cuts and radical changes in the superpowers' strategic forces without an agreed consensus on the starting point, the basic definitions of terms, or the units of account.⁴

In another statement on this matter Senator **Biden** spoke of a report he had prepared in which he exposed the false nature of the accusations of treaty violations, levelled at the Soviet Union, and left no room for doubt that the USSR had abided by its commitments under the treaty. He said:

First of all, I want to criticize the general form of these allegations. With these allegations, individual governmental officials, in the Administration or the Congress, have unilaterally released classified information and also thrown in heavy portions of speculation and hypothetical thought. As I have already stated, this approach to classified information is totally unacceptable. It places people who both disagree and respect classified information in the position of not being able to respond to these charges. I will not, as I could, disclose... hard, factual classified information... that convincingly refutes highly dubious speculation and hypothetical thought.

In some cases, the intelligence shows apparently conscientious Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. For example, the Department of Defense's publication "Soviet Military Power" states that "with the addition of each new SLBM, the Soviet Navy has dismantled older submarines in order to remain within the number of launchers and number of hulls allowed under provisions of the SALT-I agreement, as extended..."

In either case, however, it is important that the American public and news organizations realize that there is not intelligence information available at this time which discloses Soviet violation of the SALT agreements...⁵

Senator **Biden** also cited specific instances of downright falsehood in such allegations:

There is a series of allegations of Soviet violations of the SALT agreement that are quite simply false and false in term of unclassified information which the US Government has released.

For example, it is asserted that the Soviet Union, in conducting two tests of apparently dissimilar solid-fuel ICBMs, has violated the SALT-II provision permitting only one new type of ICBM.

In fact, if these two missiles tested to date have the same number of stages and same propellant of each stage, there has been no violation of the provisions in

the SALT-II text governing the testing of one new type of permitted ICBM.

Article 4 of SALT-II requires only that, in the beginning of a test program, every missile tested of the one new type have the same number of stages and the same propellant of each stage as the first missile tested.

As another example, it has been argued that the Soviet Union has exceeded the SALT-II ceiling of 1,320 MIRV'd missile launchers and bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. While the exact figure is classified, according to the intelligence community's most recent analysis, the Soviet Union is in fact under this ceiling of 1,320. Furthermore, even if current, nuclear-capable Bear, Bison, and Backfire bombers were considered to be carriers of long-range cruise missiles and, therefore, counted under the 1,320 MIRV'd ceiling, the total number of Soviet MIRV'd systems would still fall below the ceiling. Similarly, it was recently argued that the Soviet Union has deployed more than the 1,200 MIRV'd ICBMs and SLBMs allowed under SALT-II. This allegation is also incorrect. Again, while the exact figure is classified, according to the intelligence community's most recent analysis, the Soviet Union is beneath this ceiling.⁶

Senator **Biden** quoted the Defense Department's publication "Soviet Military Power" to refute the claim that the Soviet Union had exceeded the SALT-II ceiling of 820 on MIRV'd ICBM launchers. Far from exceeding that ceiling, the Soviet Union, according to the US Defense Department, has no intention of doing that. Senator **Biden** continued:

It was also claimed that the Soviet Union violated a SALT-II ban in giving some of its ICBM systems a rapid reload capability. This argument would seem to be succinctly rebutted by page 21 of the Defense Department's "Soviet Military Power" which states, "The Soviets probably cannot refurbish and reload silo launchers in a period less than a few days". Although the Soviet Union might have a limited capability to reconstitute its strategic forces after an initial firing, there is no real indication of a rapid reload capability.⁷

A characteristic statement was made by **Eugene Rostow**, the founder and leader of the Committee on the Present Danger, and until recently Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Reagan's Administration. In an article in the conservative publication *Commentary* **Eugene Rostow** wrote:

So far as the 1972 Interim Agreement itself is concerned, Secretary of State Rogers testified to the Senate that we had made a number of unilateral interpretations of the agreement and that we should regard any breach of these policies by the Soviet Union as a violation of the "spirit" of the treaty. All these unilateral interpretations of the agreement were violated by the Soviet Union.⁸

To be sure, if one is to view observance of the treaty provisions from the angle of the unilateral and biased interpretation of these provisions by the US leadership, one can hardly expect the Soviet Union always to abide by such "interpretations".

Meanwhile, in planning its new strategic programs for the 1980s, the Reagan Administration is not only departing from certain important provisions of the SALT-II Treaty, but actually undermining the very spirit of the agreement.

The early plans proposed by the Reagan Administration for basing new MX missiles implied a significant violation of the SALT-II Treaty. Of one such plan, the "Dense Pack", authoritative observer **Tom Wicker** wrote:

Building a Dense Pack field, moreover, would violate the provisions of SALT-II, which established limits on the number of missile launchers each side can have. The United States has not ratified the treaty, but both sides have agreed to abide by its limitations; for either side to violate that agreement probably would cause the other to respond in kind.⁹

In the light of such facts it is no wonder that the Soviet Union is accused of violating the SALT-II Treaty, because such allegations can serve as a cover for steps deliberately taken at variance with the agreement.

Forced by its critics to give up its "Dense Pack" plans, the US Administration created a bi-party commission under Lieut.-Gen. Brent Scowcroft to work out other plans for deploying MX missiles. The commission's recommendations, providing for deployment of the missiles, as well as the development of a single-warhead "Midgetman" missile, were accepted by the Administration. Senator **Dale Bumpers** had this to say about the Administration's decision:

Under the SALT-II treaty, we are allowed one modification of a missile system and one new missile system. If there is no START treaty as a result of this Administration's initiatives, we either live with SALT-II, though it is unratified, or violate it. We cannot abide by SALT and have both the MX and Midgetman because both sides can only have one new system, and if we build the MX, we would have

to give up one thing the Scowcroft Commission said we must have: that is mobile Midgetman.¹⁰

Senator **Aian Cranston**, a Democratic presidential candidate, spoke in the same vein:

The Administration plans to proceed not just with the MX, but with Midgetman as well.

To proceed with both will be a violation of the SALT-II agreement, which we have agreed to adhere to as long as the Soviets do.¹¹

Senator **Daniel Moynihan** is of the same opinion:

If we go forward with the development of the MX and the flight testing and the simultaneous development of a smaller, single-warhead missile, the "Midgetman", we will be violating the terms of SALT-II. That original thought that we would get the treaty in order to have the MX or get the MX in order to have the treaty will be no longer obtained. At least in the original formulation, there was a certain equivalency, a certain balance. The weapons folk got something, the arms control folk got something.¹²

WHO VIOLATES PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY AND HOW

Reagan's strategic program in fact undermines other important Soviet-US agreements on arms-race limitation. There is particularly great anxiety among people in the United States and the world and among scientists and politicians over the Administration's plans to develop and deploy an anti-ballistic missile system in outer space. Leading members of the Administration claim that these plans do not run counter to the provisions of the 1972 Soviet-US Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. But according to **Christopher Paine**, an active member of the Federation of American Scientists, these claims are far from the truth. He has written:

I first became concerned about the staying power of the ABM Treaty in 1978, when I read in government documents and the aerospace press that the Pentagon was interested in developing large staring infrared sensors that would have the capacity to track Soviet ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft in flight trajectory. This sounded to me like the testing of a prospective space-based component which could substitute for the ground-based radars in some future ABM system. I pulled out my copy of the ABM Treaty and discovered that the testing of such a device appeared to be prohibited under the terms of the Treaty...

One disturbing aspect of the President's March 23 charge to the scientific community to "give us the means of rendering... nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" was the

subsequent revelation that the Administration did not understand the extent of the limitations imposed by the ABM Treaty. The President was apparently taking his cues from his Defense Secretary, who had informed the press corps in Madrid the day after the speech that "the treaty goes only to block deployment". According to Weinberger, "there is no violation of the treaty involved in the study, the research, the development, the examination of that, and the best evidence of that is that the Soviets themselves are doing it."

These statements must be seen either as evidence of an exceptional degree of high-level ignorance, or as part of a deliberate campaign to mislead the press and the public.¹

In analysing the text of the ABM Treaty **Christopher Paine** drew several conclusions proving that the arms buildup programs adopted by the Reagan Administration run counter to the provisions of the treaty which the two sides undertook to observe when it was prolonged in late 1982. He further wrote:

But as both defenders of the ABM Treaty and Pentagon officials at the working level are well aware, the real state of affairs is considerably at variance with the Administration's pronouncements. The ABM Treaty, albeit ambiguously in some instances, imposes a number of constraints on the development and testing of ABM systems and their components. A review of current and planned US ballistic missiles and space-defense programs supports the conclusion that they are oriented towards a decision to "break-out" of the ABM Treaty... However, the ABM Treaty is, or at least was intended to be, far more limiting than the current custodians of our national security would like to believe. Each Party agreed:

"not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based";

not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptors with more than one independently guided warhead;

that if ABM components based on new physical principles were substituted for then-existing types of interceptors, launchers, or radars, these would be subject to discussion in the Standing Consultative Commission and control through agreed amendments to the Treaty...

The Army is presently finessing the ban on testing of MIRVed interceptors by testing its extra-atmospheric multiple kill vehicle concept with only one kill vehicle per booster.

Four such tests are being conducted this year in the Homing Overlay Experiment, in which the prototype homing-and-kill vehicle is launched from the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands at a target vehicle launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.²

Some time earlier the **Federation of American Scientists** issued a special statement expressing anxiety over the Reagan Administration's intention to undermine the ABM Treaty:

Our Federation has long considered the ABM Treaty of 1972 to be the foundation upon which control of offensive weapons would next be based...

We have the clear and present danger to the Treaty that the Administration may ask for an amendment to it for the purpose of expanding the right to use ballistic missile defense to protect land-based missiles.

In sum, the Treaty is now under rising political and technological pressure and a crunch is coming.

To maintain the Treaty's original purpose under this triad of pressures—stepped-up development, easily available circumvention, and desires for limited deployment—would require, under the best of circumstances, mutual vigilance and bilateral cooperation. Unhappily, in a "pro-defense" climate, these preconditions to maintenance of the Treaty may vanish.³

Senator **Larry Pressler** pointed out that the plans for deploying a space-based ABM system are a violation not only of the Soviet-US ABM Treaty of 1972 but also of the multilateral agreement drafted and signed under the auspices of the United Nations—the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967). He said:

This week (September 1982—*Ed.*) the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration commemorated the 15th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty which was ratified by the Senate on April 25, 1967, and entered into force on October 10, 1967. Among other things, that treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit, on the Moon and other celestial bodies, or otherwise stationing such weapons in outer space.⁴

But it is no secret that the Pentagon's plans for deploying a space-based ABM system also include the orbiting of various nuclear-weapon systems.

In summing up we shall quote a US expert on problems of arms control who, according to the *British Observer* said:

The violations report is a back-door way of getting out of the ABM Treaty. Anyone who watches Administration officials closely knows that they are very strongly opposed to the ABM Treaty. There is no way that star technologies can even be tested if we are to adhere to the Treaty.

A lot of pieces are beginning to fit together, and the ABM Treaty is in a great deal of jeopardy.⁵

IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS RESTRICTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

One of the most important ways of halting and then reversing the arms drive is the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing. In the 1960s and 1970s important steps were taken in this direction. In 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was signed. In 1974 the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests was concluded. In 1976 the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. In the 1963 treaty the Parties undertook to work towards a general and total ban on nuclear weapons testing. Regrettably, the important steps in this direction—the 1974 and 1976 treaties—were not ratified by the US Senate. That is why many public leaders, scientists and politicians felt so outraged by the statement President Reagan made in July 1982 that the United States refused to take any further part in the trilateral Soviet-US-British talks on a total and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons testing and would try to “correct” the 1974 and 1976 treaties on the pretext that the measures for verifying their observance were not “sufficient”. Former United Nations official **William Epstein** has written:

The Reagan Administration's recent decision to defer negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and thus reverse a policy actively pursued by every President since Eisenhower, is a disaster. First it clearly harms the political interests of the United States. The dramatic policy reversal

will certainly not sit well with US allies or the non-aligned countries. No other nuclear arms control agreement has been as long sought, and with so much dedication, by the non-nuclear countries of the world, aligned and non-aligned. It is regarded by most of them as the single most important first step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race...

Finally, the Administration's decision raises legal and moral questions. Abandoning a CTB is contrary to the obligations the US entered into in the 1963 partial Test Ban Treaty—which banned all testing except underground—and in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States undertook "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time and to continue negotiations to this end". By the latter treaty it is also legally obligated "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date..."

The decision also means that the Administration wants to continue the nuclear arms race in its most dangerous form—the testing and developing of new, technologically advanced and more dangerous nuclear weapons. It contradicts the repeated statements of the President that he seeks to cut back the nuclear threat and to achieve agreements on arms limitation, and reductions. It is all the more upsetting because of repeated assurances by Americans at the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament of the continuing United States commitment to seeking a verifiable CTB. All persons concerned about a CTB may now regard these assurances as a deception.¹

In the article we have just quoted **William Epstein** speaks of Washington's desire to continue and even expand its current testing program for developing new, more powerful and dangerous types of nuclear weapons as the main reason for the US refusal to continue the talks on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons testing. Commenting on this move by the present US Administration veteran American politician **Theodore Sorensen** wrote in the *New York Times* on July 25, 1982:

Ronald Reagan last week, in a move speaking volumes about his sincerity in the current strategic arms reduction talks, threw out 19 years of bipartisan American support for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. ...

An Administration that can turn the clock back by de-

cedes on child labor and Social Security can easily go back to John Foster Dulles.²

In a speech shortly after this step was taken by the Reagan Administration Senator **Biden** put a different angle on the whole problem, saying that this position of the US Government could only serve to erode the credibility of the American side:

The Russians have good reasons to doubt the seriousness of the United States to reach and implement an agreement, for the United States has failed to ratify any of the three major nuclear arms control treaties signed in the past 8 years. This disappointing record has been made worse by the President's decision last week... to postpone indefinitely talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which had achieved remarkable progress by the end of 1980.³

Many other leading American politicians took a critical view of the Administration's behaviour.

Senator **William Proxmire** said:

The announcement by the Administration to step back from further negotiations leading toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty disrupts almost 20 years of bipartisan dedication to this cause. Spanning every Administration since the Kennedy years, including every President regardless of party affiliation, the slow but measurable movement toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban held out the promise of achieving a reduction in the intensity and direction of the arms race.

That is until now.⁴

Senator **Claiborne Pell** said:

We were dismayed to learn in news reports today that the Administration has decided not to seek agreement with the Soviet Union and Great Britain on a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions. This decision marks an unfortunate retreat from a commitment by the United States in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek to achieve an end to nuclear weapons tests for all times.⁵

Characteristically, when Reagan took office a campaign began in the United States over alleged violations by the Soviet Union of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. It was also claimed the verification measures were not sufficient to judge whether any given agreement was being implemented. It was on these very grounds that the Reagan Administration decided to halt any further moves in the direction of the mutually agreed renunciation of nuclear weapons

testing. But, as many experts and political figures point out, these allegations have not a leg to stand on. Analysing such claims, put forward by journalist Jack Anderson, the notorious critic of the Soviet Union, Congressman **Berkley Bedell** wrote:

Jack Anderson, citing "secret documents and intelligence sources", charges 11 Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty Agreement of 1974 and suggests a complete US inability to verify Soviet compliance with nuclear test bans ("US Can't Tell If Russia Cheats on Test Ban", Aug. 10). ... As one of the original authors of a new legislative initiative that is designed to **prevent nuclear testing**, I take exception to his conclusions.

An important fact that is frequently glossed over is that the Senate has yet to ratify the Threshold Test Ban. Therefore, although the Soviet Union has voluntarily stated that it would abide by the provisions of the agreement, it is by no means obligated to do so. ...

A second fact passed over by Anderson is that, because the formal instruments of ratification have yet to be exchanged, the detailed and unprecedented verification procedures established in the threshold test ban are not in effect. ...

By failing to ratify this agreement, the United States is denying itself the opportunity to measure accurately both the size of the Soviets' weapons tests and the sincerity of their arms control intentions.

Given our present imprecision in estimating the yield of Soviet tests, statements with respect to Soviet violations of the 150-kiloton limit should be examined carefully. The United States has not formally accused them of violating the treaty. ...

Anderson cites a Soviet test in September 1980 that "had a likely size of 350 kilotons". "Likely" is an accurate conclusion because the United States does not release yield estimates for Soviet tests. According to other press reports, however, British intelligence estimated that test to be well within the 150-kiloton limit, and, based on seismic data from the Hagfors Observatory in Sweden, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute concluded that all Soviet nuclear weapons tests during 1980 were "below or around 150 kilotons".⁶

Ironically, those who accuse the Soviet Union of violating

the Treaty of the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests now take advantage of the fact that the US side itself refused to ratify this document in 1977. They also take advantage of the complexity of the verification procedure. Important evidence in support of the fact that the Soviet Union is honouring its commitments under this treaty is contained in an article by American geophysicist Lynn Sykes, examining the problem of verification:

There has been long debate about how best to determine the size or yields of Soviet explosions. There are two main types of seismic waves that have been used in estimating size. One is the short period waves, P waves, that travel through the deep part of the earth, another is long waves called surface waves.

One of the problems with the P waves is that they are very sensitive to regional variations in the geology of the earth within the outer 100 kilometers.

It does happen that most of the United States' testing experience, in places for which we have yield information, is from Nevada—a region that has undergone geologic activity quite recently and volcanic activity within the last millions of years. That is a place in which the P waves are absorbed more than in other areas of the world; so when the waves come out of Nevada, a seismic station will generally see smaller waves for a given size test than they will see for the waves that come out of the two main Soviet test sites. These are generally in areas of more competent rock that have not been effected by as recent earth activity.

So if we use the United States data on yield, and on the size of these waves, which come mainly from Nevada, and apply it to the Soviet data, the size of the P waves from Soviet explosions will lead to overestimates of the yield of Soviet explosions.

On the other hand, we can turn to surface waves. These are a less biased way of determining size because they are not so sensitive to regional variations in geology.⁷

Sykes made a careful study of the verification procedures in respect of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes and concluded that the formerly used methods of estimating the power of explosions carried out by the Soviet Union were faulty. He wrote:

So clearly, if we are not going to overestimate the size of Soviet tests and we want to use these P waves,

we have to do so with considerable care to correct for this regional bias in geology. And if we do use the surface waves, we find that there is no evidence that recent Soviet tests, since the time that the threshold test ban went into effect in 1976, are above the 150-kiloton limit. Hence, we believe that there is no substance to the contention that the Soviet Union has been repeatedly cheating on the threshold test ban.⁸

This assessment was borne out by Senator **Biden** who, citing classified data of US intelligence organizations, confirmed the conclusions made by scientists:

My distinguished colleague from Idaho (Symms) claimed on the Senate floor on April 14 that since 1976, the effective date of the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Union has conducted over 15 underground nuclear tests in excess of the treaty ceiling of 150 kilotons. This claim is one that is virtually impossible to discuss in a meaningful fashion without reference to classified information. It is the sort of issue that really should not be raised at all in a public forum because of the security concerns which I mentioned earlier. However, I would like to call attention to an article in the October 1982 *Scientific American* by Drs. Lynn Sykes and Jack Evernden, two distinguished geophysicists. In the article, these scientists write:

"In recent years there have been reports that the USSR may have repeatedly violated the 1976 treaty by testing devices with a yield greater than the 150-kiloton limit. Such reputed violations were recently cited as evidence that the threshold treaty, which has not been ratified by the US Senate, is not verifiable and should be renegotiated. On the basis of our analysis we conclude that the reports are erroneous; they are based on a miscalibration of one of the curves that relates measured seismic magnitude to explosive yield. When the correct calibration is employed, it is apparent that none of the Russian weapons tests exceed 150 kilotons, although several come close to it."

In short, these and other scientists argue that previous techniques for estimating the yields of Soviet nuclear explosions were in error because they made an incorrect assumption about the geology of Soviet test sites, an assumption that led to estimates of the yields of these explosions significantly higher than the actual yield. It is this discredited technique for estimating the yield of Soviet nuclear tests that has been improperly used to support the claim that the Soviets have violated the Threshold Test

Ban Treaty limit of 150 kiloton for nuclear tests.⁹

The attitude of the US Administration towards the ending of nuclear weapons tests was summed up in the material published by the **Federation of American Scientists**, an authoritative organization whose members have a wide range of expertise in matters concerning arms limitation policies. They state:

During his Senate confirmation in June 1981 for the position of ACDA Director, Eugene Rostow told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy that he could expect the Administration to give a favorable recommendation on the treaties* "within the next few months". More than a year later, the Administration instead announced that it would first seek revision of the verification provisions of the treaties before asking for Senate ratification, on the avowed grounds that the current provisions do not allow adequate measurement of the yield of Soviet tests.

Administration officials, however, have so far proved unable or unwilling to specify what kind of improved verification measures they want to obtain from the Soviets, saying only that no final decisions have been made. The *Washington Post* reports that some officials are pushing for the right to have "inspectors at their tests" with "our technicians having an opportunity to instrument their test program". The Joint Chiefs of Staff and DOE nuclear weapons specialists are reported to be adamantly opposed to the idea of admitting Soviet observers to American test sites in Nevada.¹⁰

Reviewing the position of the US Administration as regards a total and complete ban on nuclear weapon tests the Federation of American Scientists came to the conclusion that the US refusal to negotiate this problem could not be justified by any considerations:

There is something a bit cynical about linking ratification of the TTB and PNE Treaties with the need to reduce the range of uncertainty surrounding Western estimates of Soviet tests. Framing the problem in this way creates a classic Catch-22 situation—it is precisely ratification of these treaties which will cause the Soviets, under the terms of TTB, to hand over geophysical and test site data to facilitate more precise measurement of Soviet tests...

* The reference is to the Soviet-US Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (1974) and to the Soviet-US Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976).

Just as postponement of the TTB/PNE ratification has really very little to do with the problems of reducing threshold verification uncertainties (which were known and obviously considered tolerable at the time the TTB was signed in 1974), so also would the reduction of these uncertainties have very little impact on the Reagan Administration's refusal to conduct Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations. The Reagan Administration's argument that we must perfect threshold verification techniques before proceeding to negotiations on a Comprehensive Ban is patently phony—the verification tasks and monitoring systems involved in a Comprehensive Ban are sufficiently different from those involved in monitoring the 150-kiloton (KT) threshold so that the difficulties experienced in verifying the latter cannot be attributed to the former.

...The real reason why the Reagan Administration wants no part of a Comprehensive Ban is the desire to test not only new high-yield warheads but a whole new generation of advanced warhead concepts which some officials believe will help to transform current nuclear warfighting fantasies into reality.¹¹

Prominent American scientists and political figures reject the accusations leveled by certain US quarters against the Soviet Union claiming that it is violating its commitments to observe agreements that Washington has not even ratified. Moreover, they show that the United States is itself violating these agreements. All this helps to clarify the main aim of these and other charges against the USSR: to provide a propaganda cover-up for the sweeping program of nuclear weapon tests which the United States is already carrying out. This new program has apparently taken precedence over the pledged word of the US Government which is ready to refuse to conduct talks for a total and complete ban on nuclear weapon tests.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

"You Can't Trust the Russians."

When budget time rolls around for the Pentagon each year, that five-word sentence constitutes the bottom line—the perennial justification for perpetually increasing military expenditures.

Without that basic, unchallenged, and to most Americans—unchallengeable assumption, the arms race could not go on.¹

That is how **Sidney Lens**, a well-known American political writer, starts an article in which he examines the problem of whether the Soviet Union could be trusted after all. This is in fact a very important question for assessing many fundamental issues in international relations. As may be seen from the material in this booklet, the objective facts have forced US experts and politicians to admit that the Soviet Union honours the international commitments formalized in agreements it has signed.

Why then are these regular propaganda campaigns seeking to prove that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted? Despite all the indications and abundant evidence of the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions and actions, these accusations in the face of incontrovertible facts are clearly being made in order to justify the continuing arms drive. The accusations are richly spiced with pretexts and excuses such as the deliberate failure of the United States to ratify treaties, thus making it impossible to set the verification machinery in motion, also the choice of verification procedures which provide deliberately distorted information about Soviet actions.

A readiness to tie the most important questions of international security with the aims of building up armaments reflects the

United States' attitude to the arms limitation talks and to the agreements already signed. Here are some of the treaties signed in the 1960s and 1970s which the United States has violated: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (a commitment to work towards general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests) and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The current programs for an arms build-up have been adopted by the present US Administration in violation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, SALT-I and SALT-II. The Reagan Administration is in effect violating the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Article VI) is also being violated.

The numerous accusations levelled against the Soviet Union offer a propaganda justification for these US violations, serve to excuse the reluctance of the American side to work for preventing war, and create mutual mistrust. When the United States finally consents to negotiations, it is sure to spring a "joker"—a demand, or demands, which they know the Soviet side cannot accept. Then it starts another round of the propaganda campaign, saying the Soviet Union cannot be trusted. Have official US circles, the many opponents of reduction in the stockpiles of weapons, succeeded in convincing their fellow citizens that the Russians cannot be trusted? The material in this booklet shows that they do not always achieve this aim. Truthful information about who is and who is not observing their commitments and why will help create the climate of mutual trust which all the peoples of the world need so much.

By way of a conclusion here is a passage from that same article by **Sidney Lens**:

The military and their political and corporate allies are caught in a fatal trap. They raise the cry: "You can't trust the Russians" to justify ever larger expenditures for arms; the people and Congress respond by providing the necessary funds for the new weapons; the Soviets reply with counter-weapons of their own, whereupon the military demand new counter-counter-weapons to offset the Soviet "advantage". And in order to get those weapons, they raise the cry: "You can't trust the Russians", all over again.

It is a never-ending game.²

This vicious circle of constantly inflated mistrust must be broken.

NOTES

Two Approaches to the Problem of Arms Limitation

- 1 *Federation of American Scientists. Public Interest Report*, June 1983, vol. 36, N 6, Washington, p. 2.
- 2 *East-West Outlook*. February 1983, vol. 6, N 1, Washington, p. 3.
- 3 *Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. US Senate*, Washington, GPO, 1982, p. 314.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 129.
- 5 *The Progressive*, July 1980, p. 19.
- 6 *Congressional Record*, September 16, 1982, p. E 4225.
- 7 *Congressional Record*, July 29, 1982, p. E 3567.

The Soviet and US Approach to Observance of SALT-I and SALT-II

- 1 *Congressional Record*, September 21, 1982, p. S 11913.
- 2 *Congressional Record*, February 26, 1978, p. S 2553.
- 3 *The Washington Post*, August 17, 1982.
- 4 *Congressional Record*, July 23, 1982, p. S 9345.
- 5 *Congressional Record*, May 11, 1983, p. S 6470-6471.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. S 6471-6472.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. S 6472.
- 8 *Commentary*, February 1979, p. 24.
- 9 *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1982.

- 10 *Congressional Record*, May 25, 1983, p. S 7422.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. S 7484.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. S 7421.

Who Violates Provisions of the ABM Treaty and How

- 1 *Federation of American Scientists. Public Interest Report.* September 1983, vol. 36, N 7, Washington, p. 6-7.
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 *Federation of American Scientists. Public Interest Report.* May 1983, vol. 36, N 5, Washington, p. 10-11.
- 4 *Congressional Record*, September 24, 1982, p. S 12284.
- 5 *The Observer*, January 22, 1984.

Implementation of Agreements Restricting Nuclear Weapons Tests

- 1 *Arms Control Today*, September 1982, p. 7.
- 2 *Congressional Record*, July 29, 1982, p. S 9358-9359.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. S 9345.
- 4 *Congressional Record*, July 29, 1982, p. S 9358
- 5 *Congressional Record*, July 20, 1982, p. S 8724.
- 6 *The Washington Post*, August 28, 1982.
- 7 *Federation of American Scientists. Public Interest Report.* April 1983, vol. 36, N 4, Washington, p. 8-9.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Congressional Record*, May 11, 1983, p. S 6472.
- 10 *Federation of American Scientists. Public Interest Report.* October 1982, vol. 35, N 8, Washington, p. 8-9.
- 11 *Ibid.*

By Way of Conclusion

- 1 *The Progressive*, July 1980, p. 19.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

APPENDIX

THE UNITED STATES VIOLATES ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

"Pravda", January 30, 1984

The USSR Embassy in Washington recently presented the following aide-mémoire to the US Department of State:

Aide-Mémoire

The Soviet side finds it necessary to draw the attention of the American side to the latter's actions in the field of arms limitation. The point at issue is the approach of the United States to the very process of arms limitation and reduction and the fulfilment of the legal and political commitments it has assumed in this field.

For a lengthy period of time there has been, and there still is, cause for serious concern in this respect. The Soviet side has repeatedly raised the relevant questions with the American side. At the same time the Soviet side has displayed

patience and restraint in the hope that the American side would take the necessary measures to rectify the situation.

This, however, has not happened. More than that, such negative actions have been stepped up and have become especially serious in the general context of the militaristic policy pursued by the present Administration of the United States.

I.

A "comprehensive strategic program" for the 1980s of unprecedented scope, providing for the accelerated deployment

of new systems of strategic offensive forces, such as the MX and Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered submarines equipped with Trident missiles, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, the multipurpose Shuttle space system and long-range air-, sea- and land-based cruise missiles, was adopted and is being implemented by the United States.

The scale of the military preparations carried out by the United States is evidenced by the huge military expenditures which cannot be justified by any reasonable defence requirements. In the past three years alone this spending has exceeded 640 billion dollars, while in the 1985-1989 period, as it has been announced, it will amount to two trillion dollars, or almost as much as has been spent for these purposes in 35 postwar years.

That all this is being done with the aim of achieving military superiority is not being concealed.

At the same time the talks on nuclear arms in Geneva were blocked and broken off because of the position taken by the American side. Earlier, the United States has unilaterally halted the talks on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, on the Indian Ocean, on anti-satellite

systems, etc. The United States has thereby disrupted the process of limiting armaments which had been developed over many years by the joint efforts of states and which had led to the attainment of tangible positive results.

This line of the United States directly contradicts the generally recognized norms and principles of international law as well as the fundamental Soviet-American accords in which it is clearly stipulated that neither side shall strive for military superiority and that in their relations they shall be guided by the principle of equality and equal security. Neither does the above-mentioned line conform with the obligations of the United States under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to which have solemnly undertaken to conduct negotiations in a spirit of good will on effective measures to stop the nuclear arms race in the nearest future and on nuclear disarmament.

II.

Instances where the American side fails strictly to fulfil the concrete legal and political commitments it has assumed, sidesteps these commitments and sometimes

even directly violates them, are becoming ever more frequent.

1. Having signed the SALT-II Treaty, the United States has refused to put it into effect. This obstructionist stand of the United States has resulted in the non-fulfilment of an essential element of the accord relating to the solution of questions included in the protocol to the SALT-II Treaty which, as is known, is an integral part of the Treaty. Thus, the United States failed to fulfil the provision concerning the working out of mutually acceptable solutions with respect to a certain category of strategic arms, first of all long-range sea- and land-based cruise missiles. As it is perfectly clear now, this was done with the aim of getting a free hand for the mass deployment of long-range cruise missiles, which cannot but have an extremely destabilizing impact.

The question arises: how does such an attitude to the accords under SALT-II tally with statements about the intention of the United States to refrain from actions undermining existing agreements on strategic arms?

2. By commencing the deployment in Western Europe of Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and long-range land-based cruise missiles capable of reaching targets on the territory

of the USSR, the American side has violated the provisions of the SALT-II Treaty prohibiting circumvention of the treaty through any other state or states, or in any other manner, and also the undertaking of any international commitments which would be at variance with the treaty. It is clear that the deployment in Western Europe of nuclear arms, which are an obvious addition to the strategic offensive arsenal of the United States, does not in any way accord with the commitment of the United States to refrain from actions undermining the SALT-II Treaty.

This alone demonstrates sufficiently clearly the attitude of the United States to agreements it has signed and to the observance of obligations it has undertaken. As to the attempts of the American side to cast aspersions on the USSR's honest and responsible approach to the fulfilment of its commitments, they are untenable and can be regarded as being openly directed at worsening Soviet-American relations.

3. There is reason to doubt the proper observance by the United States at least of some of the provisions of the 1972 interim agreement. In this connection special attention should be paid to the fact that the United States has in-

troduced the use of shelters over ICBM launchers. The USSR, as is known, has repeatedly raised the question of the need for the United States to stop using shelters over the launchers of Minuteman-2 and also of Titan-2 ICBMs because these actions contradict the provisions of the agreement on effective verification.

In this connection the use of such shelters over silos for Minuteman-2 missiles arouses serious concern. For a long time the American side did not refrain from the use of shelters. As it transpired later, this was done to conceal work on refitting these launchers. Since the refitted launchers of Minuteman-2 missiles practically do not differ from the launchers of Minuteman-3 missiles, it can be conjectured that it is MIRVed Minuteman-3 missiles that are actually deployed in those silos. If that is so, the outright and defiant non-observance by the United States of the provisions of the interim agreement on verification also means a failure to fulfil one of the main obligations under the SALT-II Treaty on limiting the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles.

4. There have also been other cases giving rise to serious doubt

about the fulfilment by the United States of its commitments concerning strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side has called attention to these matters.

The intention of the United States to develop two new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles—the MX and the Midgetman—does not accord with the tasks of limiting strategic arms, tasks that have found reflection in the agreements reached. There is also a direct link here with the fact that at the talks on strategic arms limitation and reduction the American side insisted that no limitations whatsoever should be imposed on the development of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs.

III.

Likewise, certain actions of the United States in respect of the permanent Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMs), cannot but give rise to concern, and the USSR has repeatedly brought up this matter with the American side.

1. Clearly contradicting the commitments under the Treaty the United States has deployed a big radar station on Shemya Island, for the construction of which radar system elements tested for ABM purposes were used; shelters have been used over anti-missile launcher silos;

work is being conducted to develop mobile ABM radar systems and space-based ABM systems; the Minuteman-1 ICBMs are being tested to give such missiles anti-missile capabilities; multiple warheads are being developed for anti-missiles; etc.

2. Despite the commitment not to deploy ABM systems on the country's territory and not to build up a basis for such defence, the United States is setting up on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the country and also in the southern direction new big Pave Paws radar stations, the parameters of which have been brought up to the level of demands made of ABM radar stations and which can serve as a basis for providing radar backing for the ABM defence of the territory of the United States. No measures have been taken by the American side to remove the anxiety caused by these actions.

3. Lastly, a legitimate question arises: what aims does the United States pursue in developing ABM systems which, in the event of their deployment, would go beyond the limits permitted by the Treaty and would, in effect, lead to the undermining of the Treaty? For it was exactly plans to develop such a large-scale ABM system that were official-

ly announced by the American side in March 1983.

It is hard to imagine that the American side is unaware of the very far-reaching consequences steps in this direction would have, namely, disruption of the organic interconnection between limitations on defensive and on offensive strategic arms, with its most negative effect on the prospects of limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms.

The Soviet side expects that the United States will take practical actions to ensure strict fulfilment of the ABM treaty, including renunciation of preparations to deploy a large-scale ABM system.

4. The American side systematically violates the principle that has been agreed upon of observing the confidentiality of the discussion of questions relating to the fulfilment of commitments on the limitation of strategic arms, and this is detrimental to the normal activity of the Soviet-American standing consultative commission. This is impermissible and must be stopped.

IV.

1. The ambiguous, essentially negative approach of the American side to the cause of arms limitation is evidenced also

by its attitude to the treaties on underground nuclear weapon tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes of 1974 and 1976, which the United States has not ratified to this day, thereby blocking the entry into effect of a number of important measures directed at increasing confidence in the strict fulfilment of agreements.

Such a stand cannot but raise doubts as to the aims that are being pursued. What confirms these doubts is that according to data in the possession of the Soviet side there have been repeated instances of the American side exceeding the imposed ceiling on the yield of nuclear devices being tested. Despite assurances given by the United States that it intends to observe the 150-kiloton limit, the practice of exceeding the permitted limit on the yield of nuclear devices being tested is apparently being continued.

2. The Soviet side has also called the attention of the United States to instances of the discharge of radioactive substances beyond the national territory of the United States as a result of underground nuclear explosions carried out by the American side, this being a violation of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

It seems that all these facts are not of an accidental nature at all. The American program of drastically building up and modernizing nuclear weapons, the reluctance of the United States to conduct talks on the conclusion of an agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, its rejection of the Soviet-proposed moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests speak for themselves.

3. A similar line is being pursued by the American side in the field of chemical weapons as well. The United States declines bilateral talks and coming to terms with the USSR on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on the destruction of their stockpiles, while at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva it is actually blocking the reaching of a realistic agreement on a multilateral basis. Neither has the United States given a positive response to the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member states on ridding Europe completely of chemical weapons, which would be an important step towards a radical solution of this problem.

It is hard to rid oneself of the impression that this line, too, is not an accidental one, for at the same time the United States is accelerating the production of toxic chemical

agents of a new generation (binary ones) and intends to almost double its total stockpiles of chemical weapons. It is also known that the United States has deployed large quantities of chemical weapons in European countries.

V.

Under the Helsinki Final Act the United States undertook to participate in efforts directed at easing military confrontation and promoting disarmament. In reality, however, in recent years it has carried out a whole series of actions that have sharply increased the military danger in Europe. This refers first of all to the deployment there of new American first-strike nuclear missiles, the creation of conditions for a substantial buildup of American troops in Europe and the continuing arming of these troops with nuclear, chemical and other means of mass destruction.

In addition to this, the United States annually stages in Europe military exercises on a tremendous scale, and it is becoming

increasingly difficult to distinguish them from an actual deployment of armed forces for waging war. Notifications of such exercises alone, without a limitation being placed on their scope, do nothing to remove the dangerous nature of such actions.

These actions of the United States, its entire policy in recent years in respect of Europe undermine the process of strengthening security in Europe, the foundations of which were laid by the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed, among others, also by the United States.

The question of the attitude of the United States to its commitments is becoming an ever more serious and acute one. The Soviet side is raising this question not for the sake of engaging in polemics. We are speaking about very important things, and first of all about trust. If the American side, as it claims, is interested in the continuation of an effective process of arms limitation, it should draw the proper practical conclusions.

THE UNSEEMLY DEEDS OF WASHINGTON

Pravda, February 3, 1984

The United States is making unprecedented efforts to build up its military potential and is thwarting the most important talks on arms limitation. At the same time the United States is increasingly shirking strict observance of its legal and political commitments, either acting in circumvention of the agreements concluded or directly violating them. Such negative actions by Washington, as is pointed out in the Soviet aide-mémoire¹ issued on January 30, this year, and delivered to the US Department of State, have acquired particular gravity in the present conditions.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed to the US side its concern and called on

it to discontinue such a practice and to rectify the state of affairs. The US Administration, however, is not showing readiness to embark upon the road of reason and realism. Washington is not only flagrantly trampling underfoot the accords it has signed but also, in order to divert attention from such actions, is trying to cast aspersions on the USSR's honest and responsible approach to the fulfilment of its obligations.

This unscrupulous line is vividly manifest in the White House's report which recently appeared and in which an attempt is made to impute to the Soviet Union "non-compliance" of the arms limitation agreements.

That entire report is a sheer fraud. Even a number of US experts, among them Gerard Smith and Paul Warnke, former directors of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Herbert Scoville, who at one time occupied the post of Deputy Director of the CIA, have come to the conclusion that the claims made in the report are not confirmed by the facts, are **inessential from a military point of view and unreasonable from a diplomatic viewpoint.** Moreover, many of the so-called claims concern situations which have long since been examined by the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, whose task is to watch over the observance of strategic arms agreements.

An informed person will certainly notice that the report abounds in expressions such as "possible violations", "the evidence is ambiguous", "we cannot reach a definite conclusion", and so on. To put it in a nutshell, an impudent method is used in the report: we know that this is not so, but all the same we are accusing you.

This alone to a considerable degree shows how "trustworthy" the report is.

As for unsophisticated people, and it is precisely to them that the report is addressed,

they may get the impression that there is indeed something real behind the accusations.

The US report contains claims so absurd that there is no need to analyse them in detail. It all boils down to the time-worn propaganda ploy of casting a slur on the policy of the other side in an attempt to cover up one's own unsavoury conduct in international affairs; in other words, to place the blame at the wrong door.

Take, for instance, the issue of chemical weapons. The above-mentioned report again advances the lie that the Soviet Union has either supplied chemical weapons to somebody or used toxic agents in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. This lie has long been exposed. In particular this was done by American and other specialists in the West and by United Nations experts among others.

But certain people in Washington cannot keep quiet. For what purpose is this all being done? It is being done to make the public forget the crimes that were committed by the US military in Vietnam and other countries of Indochina, including the large-scale use of chemical weapons as a result of which many thousands of people were killed or crippled and irreparable damage was done to the environment. The

whole world knows this.

Former US soldiers, who participated in the Vietnam venture and were injured by their own chemical agents and became invalids as a result, know this too. In the whole of this dishonest hullabaloo in which far-fetched accusations have been levelled at the Soviet Union, one can clearly see the desire of the present US Administration to divert attention from the fact that the production of chemical toxic agents of a new generation (binary agents) is being speeded up in the United States and that there are plans almost to double the total stockpiles of chemical weapons. In the light of this it also becomes clear why the United States is stubbornly sabotaging any realistic agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on the destruction of stockpiles of them.

Or take the question of European security. In the report to Congress it is asserted that the Soviet side made notification of the West-81 military exercises in an "inadequate" way. All this has been spun out of thin air. The Soviet Union provided extensive information about the exercises to the full extent envisaged by the Helsinki Conference's Final Act. It was done in advance too. And this fact is known in Washington.

Here once again an attempt is being made to camouflage the United States' own line in matters of European security and to create the impression that an example of adequate observance of the Helsinki Accords are such US actions running counter to the interests of European security as the deployment of first-strike nuclear-missile systems in Europe and the holding of massive military exercises which it is increasingly hard to distinguish from a real deployment of armed forces for the conduct of a war—and this despite the fact that the United States, together with the other countries that signed the Final Act, solemnly undertook to participate in efforts to reduce the level of military confrontation and to lessen the danger of an outbreak of war. Such are Washington's words and deeds. Moreover, can the United States' signature to the document be squared with calls for a "crusade" against socialist countries and with plans to fire "warning" nuclear shots and to conduct a "local" nuclear war in Europe? No, it cannot. The entire policy of the United States in recent years has been undermining the foundations of the Helsinki process.

The report to Congress contains certain invented "violations" by the Soviet Union of

obligations in the sphere of limitation of nuclear armaments. Once again attempts are made deliberately to distort Soviet policy so as to conceal real violations by the American side.

The aide-mémoire of the Soviet side shows in detail the real state of affairs in these matters. The Soviet Union approaches compliance with obligations it has undertaken with the utmost sense of responsibility. The behaviour of the American side is quite different.

Having signed the SALT-II Treaty, the United States refused to put it into effect. Substantial elements of the accord, for instance those pertaining to the solution of questions included in the Protocol to the Treaty, were as a result not implemented. This was done quite deliberately by the United States so that it could begin large-scale deployment of long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes. Such an attitude to the SALT-II Treaty is incompatible with statements about the United States' intention of refraining from actions which would undermine the existing agreements on strategic armaments.

The deployment of US Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe is an obvious violation of SALT-II in which

the sides specially recorded an obligation not to circumvent the Treaty in any way, that is to say, not to upset the established balance of strategic forces. It is absolutely clear that because they are deployed in Western Europe these systems become strategic weapons with respect to the USSR, and are a direct and very substantial addition to the US strategic arsenal. There are a sufficient number of such instances to demonstrate the clear disregard by the American side of the obligations it undertakes.

There are weighty grounds for considering that the United States is not properly observing at least some provisions of the 1972 Interim Agreement. And this applies to very serious problems. The Soviet side has confronted the United States with them many times.

In an effort to justify the development of a large-scale anti-missile defence system currently under way in the United States, something which would undermine the ABM Treaty, the men in Washington are trying once again to call into question the Soviet Union's attitude to the Treaty. The situation is again presented upside down. In reality it is the Soviet Union that is observing its commitments, while the United States is undermining

the ABM Treaty, the entire process of strategic arms limitation of both defensive and offensive armaments.

It is clear what motivated Washington to concoct the report and level fabricated accusations at the USSR.

The aim is to try to mislead the public, who are becoming increasingly convinced that Washington is conducting a militarist policy. The present US Administration would like to make people overlook the fact that if it has achieved anything in its three years in office this has been the escalation of the arms race, the undermining of the process of arms limitation and disarmament and a sharp and

dangerous rise in international tension. In all these manoeuvres there are also many considerations connected with the forthcoming elections.

And how do the absolutely groundless attempts to slander the policy of the Soviet Union, to stir up yet another anti-Soviet campaign fit in with the thesis that the White House wishes to have "more stable" relations with the Soviet Union, a thesis much publicised of late? They are mutually exclusive.

As is clearly pointed out in the Soviet aide-mémoire, if the US side is really interested in continuing the effective process of arms limitation, it must draw the necessary practical conclusions.

КТО НАРУШАЕТ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ?

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Who Is Violating International Agreements?

The Soviet Union has always proceeded and still proceeds from the assumption that the agreements already concluded must be strictly observed. This applies both to multilateral and to bilateral agreements. This is the ABC of international relations, without which no fundamental trust between states is possible. The Washington politicians, to all appearances, have not yet learned this ABC and at every step the United States of America grossly violates its commitments under the international treaties and agreements.

Andrei GROMYKO,
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Central Committee,
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of Ministers of the USSR,
USSR Minister
of Foreign Affairs

*(From the speech at the Conference
on Confidence-Building Measures,
Security and Disarmament in
Europe, Stockholm, January 18,
1984.)*

