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A NEW MODERN AGE BOOK

ONE-FIFTH OF MANKIND

by Anna Louise Strong

China Fights for Freedom

有土斯有財



The Book and the Author

The author of *I Change Worlds* goes straight to the heart of the War in China, authoritatively and brilliantly answers the questions that are in everyone's mind: Can China be beaten? What about everyday life? What part do women play? How Communist is China? One does not have to be an expert on foreign affairs and Far-Eastern politics to relish Miss Strong's warm, human writing. This is a book for those who realize that an epic struggle of world-wide significance is being fought out on the plains and in the valleys of the world's most populous country—part of the greater struggle that may ultimately engulf *them*—unless they are fortified by the knowledge and the conclusions so ably presented here.

It takes a descendant of pre-revolutionary ancestors to point out the curious parallel between the American Revolution and the latest war in China—a parallel which extends right down to the critical role of tea-taxes, and of ill-shod soldiers walking in the snow. But this is the least of Anna Louise Strong's qualifications for writing an informal and vivid book about China's age-old struggle for freedom.

This minister's daughter and former social worker, turned foreign correspondent, was never satisfied merely to record and interpret; for many years she has been an active participant in events—in the United States, in Russia, in China. Based on profound research and a deep respect for accurate facts—Miss Strong was a Ph.D. at 23—her fast-moving, lucid story of the historic fight in the Far East bears not the faintest trace of academic airs. Nor is it a hurried rehash of surface dispatches. Its simplicity and clarity spring from an intimate first-hand acquaintance with China extending back more than a decade and brought up-to-the-minute by a journey to the theater of war from which the author has just returned. She is a friend of many outstanding Chinese leaders, including Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, whose letter introduces this book.

BOOKS BY ANNA LOUISE STRONG

FIRST TIME IN HISTORY
CHINA'S MILLIONS
RED STAR IN SAMARKAND
ROAD TO THE GREY PAMIR
SOVIETS CONQUER WHEAT
I CHANGE WORLDS
THIS SOVIET WORLD
NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION
SPAIN IN ARMS 1937

ONE-FIFTH OF MANKIND


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CHAHAR
MANCHUKUO
U.S.S.R.
SEA OF JAPAN
KOREA
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KWANGTUNG
Canton
KWANGSI
Hongkong
CHINA
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SCALE OF MILES

ONE-FIFTH OF MANKIND

by

ANNA LOUISE STRONG

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Thanks are due to many Chinese friends who helped in securing and preparing this story of their country, and especially to Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, whose expert critical editing of the facts of Chinese history was invaluable. The responsibility for opinions and conclusions is entirely my own.

—ANNA LOUISE STRONG.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO

Wuchang, China
27 July 1938

Dear Dr. Strong,

I have just received your letter of July 1 telling me that your book is on the stocks...

...One point I would like to make is that China, in her second year of war, continues, paradoxically, to fight a single-handed battle against the whole world, since the democracies as well as the totalitarians are supplying Japan with anything which she can use to destroy us so long as she pays for it. China is grateful, however, for the sympathetic attitude of large sections of the population of the democracies who are doing their utmost to have an end put to injustice, to inhumanity, and to international brigandage of the worst kind.

I hope your book has great success and that it will be able to influence thoughtful people who understand the realities of the situation in this part of the world.

Yours sincerely,

Mayling Soong Chiang

(Madame Chiang Kai-shek)

Dr. Anna Louise Strong
New York City, New York
United States of America

1. WHY CHINA FIGHTS—AN AMERICAN PARALLEL

"THE United States of America fought nine years for its independence. If China has to fight nine years for independence, we can fight nine years."

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek spoke thus to a conference of his generals in the Second War Zone in January, 1938, the darkest hour of the first winter of war.* For six months the mighty military machine of Japan had crashed inland over Chinese cities and farms. The invaders had seized the northern fourth of China. They had occupied Peiping, the ancient capital. They had stormed and sacked Nanking, the modern seat of government. They had bombed and burned to earth Shanghai, great port of Central China, Queen of the East. On far-flung fronts the Chinese armies and population were fleeing; the scale was as great as if New York, the south Atlantic coast and the Ohio valley fled from invaders all at once. Japanese planes rained death from the air even on distant inland cities, tearing children to bloody bits before the eyes of mothers, mixing fragments of workers at lathes with the fragments of their factories.

This broken people the Generalissimo dared compare with America, that peaceful, powerful land beyond the sea. He told those beaten generals, those bombed workers, those bereaved mothers what this war, loosed upon 450,000,000 people might mean to them and to the world. "The United States of America fought nine years for its independence. . . . We have more resources than they began with." This was the fight—and the hope—to which he summoned the people of China.

* Reported to the writer by General Peng Teh-hwai.

The war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders is the fight of one-fifth of the human race for what our American forefathers called "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In spite of obvious differences in the two conflicts, there are deep similarities in China's fight to our own early struggle. In both cases an economically undeveloped and loosely united country was invaded by a better armed and industrially stronger aggressor. In both cases the throes of war brought to birth in the invaded land a new and unified nation, demanding a new democracy. The causes and the results of both the conflicts were world-wide. But the Chinese conflict is on a vaster scale than ours was and even more decisive for the future of the world.

The Chinese have even better cause for fighting than had the early Americans. Our colonies rebelled against a previously lawful king and had never been in any sense a nation. China has known a stable, cultural unity reaching back forty centuries; never in all those centuries had Japan a shadow of claim to any Chinese soil. The people of China were far more patient than our colonists, and endured much greater aggression before resorting to war. Our colonists revolted against Britain's interference with their trade and tariffs, and especially her attempt to restrict colonial commerce to the mother country alone. Japan made similar claims to exclusive rights in China; she even set up in East Hopei a puppet government, one of whose special functions was to smash the Chinese control of their own customs by flooding the land with smuggled goods. The Chinese endured this; they endured even the invasion and seizure of several provinces. Only when the physical existence of their homes and the cultural unity that had endured forty centuries were threatened, did the Chinese fight.

Though the Chinese had an even better case at law than we had and have shown themselves less easily aroused to war, the actual situation is very similar. China's twenty-eight * provinces—America's thirteen colonies—were striv-

* Formerly 18 in China proper, recently subdivided into 19. With outlying territories, the total is 27, or now 28.

ing toward the closer union which their economic growth demanded, and this union was prevented from outside. For fifteen years America's colonial leaders tried to organize some form of union; Benjamin Franklin was especially active in calling inter-colony conferences. Britain prevented their unity of action by setting up different forms of government in the different colonies and forbidding contacts between them. When the Massachusetts House of Representatives sent a circular letter to other colonial legislatures urging the need of closer unity—in 1768, seven years before the Revolution—Britain sent instructions to the governors forbidding all such "unwarrantable combinations." Japan similarly tried to put the clock back in China and to prevent unity by intrigues and pressures on various provincial governors. Yet in both cases the very measures taken by the aggressor to destroy a growing nation called forth the war which speeded up its union.

Not all Americans—not all Chinese—desired the test of battle. All wanted increasing independence and unity if these could be easily won. But as the clash approached, the large-scale American merchants who lived by British trade, the great landowners of the northern Atlantic seaboard, and the prosperous and privileged generally, turned neutral or even Tory, fearing both the interference with their business and the rising strength of the common people, which a war for independence would increase. Similar causes kept Shanghai bankers and important elements in China's government long complacent toward Japan. The strength of both revolutions lay in the common people and in capitalists whose trade was not with Britain—or with Japan—but threatened by her. They saw that the tremendous possibilities of America—and of China—could be developed only in independence.

In both these wars for national independence the invaders won the first battles. In America the British invaders kept on winning for many years. They won because their victims had been long kept disunited. They won

through superior armament, greater military knowledge and a more advanced industry. The invaded people had to build an army out of nothing; this gave rise to inefficiency, graft, desertions, lack of discipline. China suffers from corruption and disorganized armies, but perhaps not so much as did America. Washington groaned over unscrupulous profiteers who made money from the national misery; he called them "murderers of our cause and worthy of being gibbeted."

There were similar sources of strength for both invaded peoples: the vast geography of their land, its distance from the invader, and the heroism of ordinary farmers and artisans fighting for their own homes. The farmers of Lexington and Concord sprang to arms on signal brought through the night by Paul Revere; they drove the British back from their towns. Similar signals summon today the farmers of North Shansi and of Hopeh when the Japanese raid their villages. Guerrilla warfare was organized in America by the famous "Marion's men" of the southern Atlantic seaboard, as today by Chu Teh in North China. When George Washington and Chiang Kai-shek learned how to draw the common folk of the land into the battle, both through guerrilla fighting and through support of the regular armies, then they began to win.

It was not in American history, it was only last winter in a valley of North Shansi, that a group of farmers went forth at night to keep the invader from their homes. The Japanese came down the railway and main highway; from the hills you could mark their path by the light of burning villages. The farmers from this valley took hand grenades, shotguns, and knives and spearheads beaten out of their kitchen-pans. They fought all night and dawn brought victory; the invader withdrew down the railway and left their valley alone. But thirty of those farmers froze their feet and were permanently crippled by fighting in zero weather without socks or proper shoes. It was in North China that this happened; but it might have been in Valley Forge.

In almost the exact words used recently by Premier Konoye, George III, at the beginning of the American Revolution, threatened to "beat the colonists to their knees" and to "drench America with blood and reduce its towns to ashes." Later he became alarmed at the size of the job he had undertaken and offered better terms. The time came when he was ready to grant all the demands of the colonists, except one thing—national independence. It was too late. This hasn't happened yet in China, but it will happen. Japan will offer to give up everything except perhaps Manchuria. China by that time will want—as America did—a greater measure of freedom than would have contented her in the beginning. But some Chinese will try to accept the compromise. There were some in America too.

For both these revolutionary wars were complicated by a "revolution within the revolution." The common people, suffering already under many abuses, increased their power by taking up arms for war. As the American Revolution progressed, many of the privileged classes who helped to start it, as well as those who had always opposed it, became alarmed at the growing independence of long-submerged people, and sought to head it off by a quick compromise with Britain. But at this stage of the war, when the mass of patriots were starving, freezing and dying for their country's freedom and for the better life they expected it to bring, it was "dangerous business to thwart the will of revolutionary America."* Those who persisted in doing so were punished as traitors and their property was seized and divided; this begins to be done today in some parts of China. Men of property who used their wealth to help the country were honored; George Washington was among them. The right of the common people to bear arms and fight for freedom became the guarantee of American democracy, listed in the Bill of Rights. China similarly moves

* Jack Hardy: *The American Revolution.*

toward democracy by organizing and arming the people to fight for their own homes.

Not by the might of their own arms alone did the early American colonists finally win. They made secret arms deals with France, who in those days was somewhat of an outcast among the nations of Europe, as the Soviet Union is today. France, Holland and Spain all helped that early America; France finally sent an army and gave the assistance of her fleet. Britain attacked those nations for the help they gave the colonies; the Americans' struggle for independence thus merged in a general European war. This locked up Britain's forces and created the conditions which gave victory to American arms.

Will the Chinese war for independence follow the same path, ending also in world war? Chiang Kai-shek's call to nine years of struggle ended with a significant phrase: "It is not only our own independence we fight for but the sanctity of international agreements, that is, for the peace of the world." China has far juster claim to international aid than America had. Britain broke no international agreements when she sent armies to colonies over which she ruled; yet European countries defied the strongest world power of their day in the interests of their own trade. Japan's invasion of China has broken agreements with most of earth's peoples, expressed in the League of Nations, and especially with the signers of the Nine-Power Pact initiated by America to guard its Open Door policy and the peace of the Pacific.

"This is not only a war against China," said President H. H. Kung to me in Hankow, "it is the first step in Japan's war against the world." But unlike the war of that earlier century the powers of the world could stop it without resorting to war. America alone could probably stop it, or slow it down so that the Chinese people could easily end it. For Japan is far weaker and more dependent upon other nations for her supplies than was that earlier Britain, then the first industrial power on earth. The forces of peace and

democracy are world-wide today and powerful, as they were not then. But they must act swiftly, for the world today moves swiftly. Unless Japan is checked in China, she will march on down through Asia and across the Pacific till the world flames up in battle. That would be a war in which all the peoples of earth—and all their hopes of better life and wider freedoms—would be threatened by another, and world-wide, Dark Ages.

But there is a brighter outlook, bright for the whole world. For decades after the American people achieved their independence, the results of their struggle echoed throughout Europe, strengthening democratic movements, overthrowing kings. The results of China's victory will be even vaster. This is the fight for freedom of one-fifth of mankind. When the Chinese unite, organize, clear out invaders, and make free the land which they have made independent, the echo of their victory will break more chains in Asia. It will stabilize democracy on earth.

2. ROADS TO THE EAST

WHILE China's war for independence is similar in many ways to our own American Revolution, it takes place in a different world. In the past century and a half the steamship, the railroad, the telegraph, radio and airplane have knit the ends of the earth. No struggle today takes place in isolation; China, for centuries aloof within her own borders, stands now where paths of many empires meet.

"The Pacific, its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond will become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter," said William H. Seward of Alaska fame prophetically in 1852. Facing this great ocean and the closely connected Indian Ocean on the south live half of earth's population in crowded countries industrially undeveloped. The roads to this East are the paths of more than a century's imperialist expansion which has tied the world together in modern trade.

Yet there is no direct sea-route from America to China; all liners stop first at Japan. This for the tourist is merely a pleasant interlude; it is dangerous for well-known Chinese. Even before the war Japan assumed the right to investigate through-travelers and to take them off the boats on various pretexts. This bluff can be called by any stubborn ship captain backed by his consul, but the democratic nations today are noted for their submission to bluff. American liners avoid trouble in the present war by not carrying the kind of freight to which Japan objects. The Canadian boat on which I traveled warned its passengers to avoid unpleasantness by destroying all anti-Japanese literature in their cabins, even all newspapers from the British port of

Hong Kong. Chinese travelers avoid trouble, if they are wealthy, by taking the "China Clipper" airplane which lands on American-owned islands; otherwise they often go to America all the way around the world by Europe. Japan thus blocks America from China and even from the Philippine Islands on all the normal steamship lines. This is the first significant fact on the roads to the East.

From Europe to China the swiftest way is by rail through Siberia. Japan lies also athwart this route. Chinese returning home from Europe in the summer of 1937 went a week by rail to the Manchurian border and had to go all the way back. If your Japanese connections are good, this road is usually open, but in late 1937 when I planned my trip from Europe to China, the American Consul in Kobe, assisted by Japanese police, had just removed from a French steamer twenty American women passengers bound for their Shanghai homes. It seemed to spoil this route.

There are other land ways, intriguing and mysterious, by camel-caravan or adventurous auto-truck across the deserts and mountains of Asia. These were taken two thousand years ago by the conquerors of the great Han dynasty, and later by Marco Polo through the oases of Turkestan. In the autumn of 1927 I went by one of these difficult land routes from Central China to the Trans-Siberian railway; it took our rather battered auto caravan two months. Since that time roads have improved; in April 1938 the Chinese bragged of a new highway across Turkestan. But its details are a military secret between China and the Soviet Union; foreign travelers are barred.

The usual traveler's road from Europe to the East—by the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the southern shore of Asia—is leisurely and hot. It is pictured on advertisements of world cruises—the tropics, the jungles, the exotic, storied East—Port Said, Aden, Bombay, Colombo, Singapore, Hong Kong. Each of these names sounds the call of far romantic countries, but each of them is a Westernized British port. This is the route by which Britain sailed the

path of empire. Not until you travel and arrange your passport do you realize how many great countries of the East, with teeming populations and old civilizations—Egyptians, Hindus, Arabs, Malays—are drained by ports that fly the Union Jack. Unless you wish to turn aside to the Dutch East Indies, or to stop just south of China at French Indo-China, which is not on most lines a port of call, a single British Empire visa covers this whole long way to the East.

China is thus surrounded chiefly by Japan, the Soviet Union and the British Empire; these lands hold the roads to the East though that of the Soviet Union is undeveloped. Surprisingly enough, however, the fastest steamers from Europe to China are not British or French but Italian and German. These newer imperialists have subsidized rapid liners which capture the passenger trade by reaching Hong Kong from the Mediterranean in three weeks instead of four. Even wives of British merchants going out to India "sail Italian"; there were several of them on the liner by which I traveled. There was also a Chinese editor returning to Hankow, and a half-dozen Austrian doctors who, fearing the approaching invasion of Hitler, were going out for the Chinese Red Cross. An American businessman was returning to Shanghai to wind up his affairs which the Japanese had ruined. He warmly assured an American woman tourist who thought the Japanese "were just restoring order in China" that on the contrary they were the world's worst looters and that no Chinese bandits had ever dreamed of the savage thoroughness with which Japanese gangsters cleaned out the Yangtze delta. None of the officers or crew paraded Italian politics, but pro-Japanese radio news colored our information as we slipped through the Red Sea and along the coast of India, swimming in tanks on the deck in the hot sun of tropical December. Far to the north of us in the wintry hills of Shansi and Hopeh the Chinese farmers, fighting for their homes, were freezing their feet in the snow.

Singapore, gateway between the Indian Ocean and the

Pacific, brought the sudden impact of Chinese influence into these southern seas. Its ownership is British, its surrounding population is Malay, but its civilization is Chinese. For centuries Chinese traders and settlers have pushed southward, bringing the highest culture known to these lands. Singapore today is the British naval base set up to protect Australia and India from the southward drive of Japan. The port is menaced by the many possessions of Japan surrounding it: its oil and rubber concessions in Borneo and Sumatra, where secret airports have been reported on plantations; its mines of various metals in the South Sea Islands; its rich iron mines in nearby Trengganu where secret military depots are reported. Japanese influence had already extended far beyond Singapore on the long route toward Europe. Japan had sent a commission to Afghanistan and Japanese instructors were teaching in Afghan military schools north of India. Japanese had helped draft the program for the industrialization of Irak. Young Arabs from Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Hedjas were invited to Japan to be educated at government expense.*

The penetration toward Africa and Asia Minor is only beginning, but over all the South Seas the threat of Japan already lies heavy. Passengers going to Java told us the fear of the Dutch East Indies, declaring that the Dutch would gladly stop shipping oil to Japan if the stronger nations—America and Britain—would agree. "We furnish fuel for our own later enslavement," they said. "If China is conquered, we will be next. You Americans also are building up your future attacker. Your turn comes after ours." Despite such comments, the only obvious anti-Japanese action in the South Seas was that of workers in Japanese mines striking against Japan. The four thousand Chinese miners in Trengganu quit soon after the war began. The Japanese brought a crew of Tamils from South India; after a time these also struck. Malays were brought in to replace the Tamils; they quit and appealed to the Chinese population

* Tanin-Yohan: *When Japan Goes to War.*

of Singapore for financial support. None of these races had previously cooperated or could talk to each other, but workers of all of them protested the aggressions of Japan.

What are these Japanese islands that block the northern and the Pacific routes to China, and threaten the route from the south? In spring they are the cherry blossom islands, in autumn the chrysanthemum land. Their common people are trained from youth to love beauty and to create it, to be deeply courteous in manner, to smile happily at the comfort of others. Wherever I have stopped in Japan, kindly folk, met briefly in passing, went out of their ways to show me mine. In the lobby of my hotel in Tokyo, a courteous stranger rose to offer me with deep bows his better place by a window in the sun; he was aware even before I was that this might be pleasant for me.

Crashing into the picture of kindly, courteous civilians comes an item in one of the leading Japanese newspapers * —the cheerful account of the "Slay-1000-Persons Contest!" Subaltern Noda, with the Japanese army in China, made a wager with Subaltern Sakii that he would be the first to kill one hundred persons. He found this so easy and agreeable that the wager was raised to one thousand. "In North China," wrote the gleeful Noda, "the pleasure of the game was minimized by the fatigue of chasing the enemy, but in Central China one can kill and kill without much trouble. . . . Just before I entered the city of Nanking I had slain 105 persons. . . . Afterwards, in the rounding-up battles, I took another 253. The slaying was quite easy, but one must yet indulge in a hearty massacre to be really satisfied. . . . I have now entered into an agreement with Subaltern Sakii to slay one thousand." Anyone familiar with the story of the taking of Nanking knows that what Noda called "rounding-up battles" was the massacre of unarmed men. The account of this "game" in the Japanese newspaper was endorsed by many readers' comments of approval.

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* *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, February 9, 1938.

"Always remember that there are two Japans," said a high American diplomat with whom I dined in Tokyo.

How does it happen that islands of such "sweetness and light" also contain a militarism so openly savage? The answer lies in Japanese history. Unlike China, whose semi-autonomous villages were held together loosely by trade and tribute, Japan had a close-knit feudal system under a Divine Emperor. The great feudal lords of Japan ruled their serfs, not through a bureaucracy of scholar-officials, but through the samurai, a professional soldier class. For centuries the soldier was superior to the ordinary civilian; in China the soldier was despised. The Japanese army today comes straight out of feudalism; the Japanese people have never yet freed themselves from the tradition of soldier-rule.

When Japan was invaded by Western industrialism, her upper class quickly seized the tools of modern capitalism. Great feudal houses promoted great capitalist companies and continued to rule through feudal privilege combined with capitalist wealth. The Emperor's position is typical; he is both a demi-god worshipped by his loyal people, and also one of the world's wealthiest landlords and most powerful capitalists.* Half a dozen of Japan's great families form one of the strongest financial oligarchies on earth. The house of Mitsui controls 224 concerns with six billion yen capital; that of Mitsubishi 92 concerns with three and a quarter billion. Under the concentrated might of great capital allied with feudalism, Japanese people live in conditions of poverty unequalled in any other industrial country. More than two-thirds of the farming families are tenant on all or part of the soil they till; they pay half or more of the crop to the landlord, and half the remainder for fertilizer to the chemical trusts. Each year large numbers of farmers

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* Imperial estate consists of 3,800,000 acres, including forests, farms and city tenements, valued at 637,234,000 yen. Imperial shares in great capitalist companies amount to 300,000,000 yen. The annual "civil list" for upkeep of his status as Emperor is 4,500,000 yen.
—Bisson: *Japan in China*, p. 194.

are forced to sell their daughters into the factories; 80 per cent of Japan's women workers get no money wages for themselves, but only work off the debts of their families. Men workers in industry get one-eighth the wage of an American worker.* In Manchuria, Korea and Japanese-owned factories in China, the wage scale is still lower; wherever the Japanese go on the Asiatic continent, they push the wages down in the desperate effort to gain sufficient profits to support their unstable social structure.

This social structure is rotten with the oppressions of both feudalism and large-scale capitalism. Only thoroughgoing social change could relieve the common people of Japan. This change the powers that rule Japan refuse. They seek rather to hold the masses in subjection by a combination of economic, political and military control. This poverty-stricken people pays more to support its army, in proportion to its wealth, than does any other country in the world. The frame-work of government is a complex one in which institutions of rising capitalism are modified by decaying feudalism. Besides the elected Diet and the Cabinet, where different political parties fight for the interests of different (chiefly) capitalist groups, there is also the "Elder Statesman" who helps the Emperor choose the Prime Minister, and the Imperial Household Ministry which influences events by controlling access to the Emperor.

The most striking characteristic of the Japanese government is that it is a "dual government." The Supreme War Council and the general staff of army and navy are responsible not to the Diet or Cabinet, but directly to the Emperor. The army's general staff can start a war without consulting the Cabinet; it can block the formation of cabinets by refusing to approve the suggested Minister of War. When the more prudent of the capitalists attempted in recent years through the Diet to limit some of the extremer plans of the army, the military clique turned to methods of fascist gangsterism, not very alien to their feudal tradition. Sev-

* Utley: *Japan's Feet of Clay.*

eral times in the last few years these military gangsters have changed governments by assassinating Cabinet Ministers. Today they are linked, not only to feudalism, but to the largest capitalist interests—those of heavy industry and war. In recent elections the Japanese people have shown growing anti-fascist tendencies; but the militarists are well-organized and the people are not. The gangster clique, supported by feudal tradition and the might of modern big business, rules over a people taught for generations to worship the Emperor, to obey the soldier, and to accept life with a courteously humble bow.

Efficient military censorship sees to it that the Japanese people do not know what their army is doing in China today. Incredible as it may seem, even the officials of the Japanese Foreign Office are not always immediately informed. My Japanese friends told me wistfully that their purpose in China was only "to change China's mind" and make her friendly to Japan. They are tragically blind to the savage tactics of an army which destroys all possibility of friendship so long as that army rules. They told me that they wish to save the Chinese from banditry. They did not know that the systematic rape, looting and massacre of civilians by their army has disgraced them in the eyes of the world. Japanese small shop-keepers, suffering from heavy taxes, told me they made this sacrifice "to help the friendly sister state of Manchukuo." They did not know of the bitter irony by which "protected villages" mean concentration camps into which millions of Manchurian farmers are herded under military compulsion, punished with death for the slightest suspicion of disloyalty to their conqueror.

Thousands of Japanese were deeply disturbed when they learned in late 1936 that some of their aviators—quite by mistake they were perfectly certain—had bombed the American gunboat "Panay" in the Yangtze River. They sent gifts to the American Ambassador in Tokyo for the families of the sufferers, expressing deep regret for "the ter-

rible accident." Ambassador Grew knew from naval reports that, as the American gunboat was convoying three other American ships up the Yangtze River, all loaded with American refugees from Nanking and all of them with large American flags painted on their upper decks, in clear weather with high visibility, three Japanese bombing planes, six fighting planes, six more bombing planes and two additional bombing planes in sequence made attacks which sank three of the steamers and damaged the fourth. He knew that twenty bombs had been dropped on or near the "Panay," that two of the planes had attacked with machine guns, one of them firing on a ship's boat bearing wounded ashore, that a Japanese power boat filled with armed soldiers had fired on the "Panay" with a machine gun and boarded the boat.* He also knew, as he told me later, that kindly Japanese citizens, deprived of the facts by their censorship, really thought it an accident.

There is no doubt whatever about the intentions of the Japanese militarists. They aspire to rule all Asia, put the white race in retreat and dominate the world. They make this plain in official and unofficial writings. Young Noda ended his account of his "Thousand Killings" with his hope of "going beyond the Kun Lun Mountains and across the River Indus in India, and driving on to the Pamirs." Official pamphlets from Ministry of War announce the imperial morality: "War is the father of creation and the mother of culture. War is the source of life and develops life. It gives impulse to and stimulates creative culture in the individual as well as in the state."† General Araki, a frequent holder of cabinet positions, says that "the vision 'to conquer the world and embrace the universe as our state' . . . has been our traditional policy. . . . If the actions of any of the powers are not conducive to our imperialism, our blows descend upon that power. . . . Our imperial morality . . . must be preached and spread over the whole world.‡

* Navy Department's Report released for newspaper publication.
† Japanese Ministry of War pamphlet of Sept. 1, 1934.
‡ General Sadao Araki: *The Problems of Japan in the Showa Era.*

The Japanese dreams of conquest are no mere wishful thinking; they are formulated in concrete plans. Clearest and most comprehensive of these is the famous memorandum submitted to the Emperor by General Tanaka in 1927 when he was Premier. It thus outlines the steps to world dominion: "In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia; in order to conquer the world we must first conquer China. . . . Such is the plan that has been bequeathed us by the Emperor Meiji. . . . Having the resources of China at our command, we shall proceed to conquer India, the South Seas, Asia Minor, Central Asia and finally Europe." The memorandum has been officially denied by the Japanese, but it is admitted in private. Its details have been amplified in many official documents: in the declaration of the Japanese government of April 17, 1934, which virtually demanded a protectorate over China; in the pamphlets published by the Ministry of War in October, 1934. Six weeks before the invasion of Manchuria, General Hondo, Japanese military commander in Manchuria, wrote to the Minister of War: "Before we go forward against America our troops must take up a decisive position in China . . . occupy the far eastern territories of the Soviet Union and secure these countries for ourselves." *

All these roads to China, in December 1937 when I traveled, met at last in Hong Kong, a British port. The Japanese had either seized or blockaded the Chinese coastal cities; they had not dared to try conclusions with Britain by blockading Hong Kong. From this British port a railroad ran inland into China—a few hours west to Canton, and then on to Hankow, two days' journey north. By this long, single-track line, finished only a little more than a year before, traveled most of the war supplies that came to China from the outer world. And along this last, most dangerous

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* Quoted in *War in China*, by Ray Stewart, International Pamphlets, N. Y.

"road to the east," tens of thousands of unarmed Chinese farmers challenged the might of the Japanese air force, and kept open that narrow line.

Sitting at lunch with the mayor of Canton I heard the siren, warning of an air raid—the fourth of the day. Canton is accustomed to bombing; serious attacks prolonged for several days send people fleeing to Hong Kong, but for minor raids they do not stop their work. The Mayor said: "So stupid, the Japanese, with all this bombing of civilians. Yesterday they bombed the little villages all round about here; no military objectives at all. Just the little ancestral homes of all our Canton people. Don't they realize that they are only organizing our province for us? Last year the farmers hereabouts took no interest in the government; they only sought to evade taxation. But now that the villages have been bombed and the boatmen machine-gunned as they tow their boats upriver, all I have to do is to announce that we are building an 'anti-Japanese highway,' and I get a hundred thousand volunteers working for two meals a day on that road. Eagerly, too; they go from house to house to urge each other on. That was the way we built the new highway from Canton to Hong Kong—ninety miles in twenty-four days. One hundred thousand farmers found that way to answer the airplanes. . . ." It was a good enough answer, for the Japanese news agency in Hong Kong estimated in February, 1937, that half a million tons of war supplies had already entered Central China by that highway.

More than fifteen hundred bombs had been dropped on that railway by February, 1938—it must be three times that number today. Yet the railway still ran; it is running today in August, 1938, as I write. It is kept open by the heroism of tens of thousands of Chinese farmers. Every eight or ten miles along the track there is organized an emergency repair gang of the local population. As soon as a bomb falls on the railway, the local gang rushes to the spot and fills in the dirt. In an hour or two the repair train comes down the

line with ties, rails and skilled workers, and installs the track over the earthfill which the farmers have made. The chief of the railway told me about it, but when I asked him for "hero stories," he answered: "It's all settled down to routine bombing, routine damage, routine repairs and routine traffic. Once we closed down for two days when a bridge was hit. But the bridges aren't hit easily; we protect them with anti-aircraft. Ordinary bomb-holes on the line don't stop us more than two or three hours. We have enough surplus rails to keep on at the present rate for a year and a half. Only," he added, with his Cantonese love of good business accounting, "our railroad began last year to pay interest on its bonded indebtedness, but this year unfortunately we shall operate at a loss because there are so many repairs."

"It costs the Japanese twenty thousand yen to make a hole in the ground and it costs us ten dollars to fill it up." This is the grim jest which the Cantonese coolies fling at the airplanes of Japan. The Chinese have survived centuries of disillusion; when their homes are broken, they rebuild.

But the gentle, blind folk of the cherry-blossom islands must learn that the god of all their childhood days is evil, and must gain the desperate courage to tear him down. Only some defeat of their army, great enough to smash through censorship, will break their blindness. Till then their meek submission feeds a militarism that threatens slavery to both peoples and war to the world.

3. AN AIR VIEW OF CHINA

OUR airplane rises from the British port of Hong Kong, circles above a jagged coast, gaunt cliffs and bright blue water, and then turns north across the Chinese hills. It is five hours by air to Hankow in the central heart of China —temporary capital of the Chinese government. This route is crowded, for railway passenger traffic to Hankow is delayed by frequent bombing. Thus far Japan has not attacked the air line, doubtless because it is German.

Our German pilot remarked before leaving that this was his last trip. His three-year contract is almost over and he is going "home." We who know Nazi tactics in Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia realize at once that his chance of a good job in Germany depends on bringing back "information"—photographs of military importance. Such espionage is easy, for the whole land lies open below him. No Chinese inspector accompanies his flight to Hankow in the center, to Sian in the Northwest, to Chengtu in the Far West, to French Indo-China in the South. How vulnerable seems this land to its foes of many nations!

Hour by hour we glide above almost uninhabited hills, brown now in the grasp of winter. Piercing their desolate expanse are river valleys, covered with a crazy-quilt of farms thickly dotted with towns. But these come seldom; the land seems vacant. Is this China, most populous of the countries of earth? Then we recall the proverb that southern China is "eight-tenths hills, one-tenth water, one-tenth plain" and that less than one-fifth of it—even including hill terracing—can be cultivated. It is just because most of the surface is so inhospitable that the life of the land

must cluster so thickly along the river courses. But the hills have their uses as refuge, for in all the invasions which in forty centuries devastated the plains of northern China, this rugged South was seldom—and very slowly —conquered.

Let us take an air view of China—China in space and time! It lies in a sheltered pocket of southeastern Asia, held in a natural isolation by barriers on all sides—tropical jungles, earth's highest mountains, widest deserts and largest ocean. In a great semicircle its southeastern coast bulges into the waters of the South Pacific, catching the warm rains. Southwest it is bounded by the steaming Malayan jungles. Westward in Tibet the Himalayas' mighty range divides it from India; the lowest passes are higher than the highest mountain peaks of America or Europe. Northwest these drop to the desert plateaus of Turkestan and Mongolia, two thousand miles of wastes, pierced perilously by a few difficult caravan routes. Only from the north is there easy access to China, by the pioneer plains of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, across which, at intervals down the centuries, invaders came. China herself reached out, with cultural and at times political domination, a thousand miles beyond all these barriers, but within them are the million and a half square miles of "China Proper," about one-half the size of the United States.

And now we fly northwest, following a wide river, thickly beset with cities, villages and farms. This is the Yangtze, the mightiest river of Asia, which drains with its tributaries the farms of 200,000,000 people, one-tenth the population of the world. Cutting China in half, it flows eastward from the high mountains of Tibet to the Pacific Ocean; its great valley is known as Central China. Just north of it and paralleling its course, the sharp backbone of the Tingling Range forms the climatic boundary between the two great parts of China.

China south of this range—all the way south to Canton —is a land of many hills and abundant rainfall which

drains into rivers and lakes. Because of its hills and water-filled valleys, travel has always been difficult here. Access was by sea and river courses to the main centers, and thence on foot by stone paths across rice fields and mountain trails through the hills. Only recently have there been roads on which wheeled vehicles could travel, and these are not yet many. China of the South has therefore been split into many separate regions in which different races and dialects have long remained. To most of its provinces the Yangtze and its tributaries act as thoroughfare, but the three southernmost provinces are reached by sea-coast or by other rivers which meet at the great port of South China, Canton.

Every bit of level land in this China of the South is intensely cultivated, and terraces creep up the gentler hills. A sub-tropical climate, reaching tropical in the southern provinces, makes it possible for the hardworking Chinese farmers to raise two or three crops a year. The largest areas of level land are found in three places: the Canton delta in the South, the Yangtze delta on the central sea-coast, and the Red Basin fourteen hundred miles up the Yangtze in far west Szechwan. These are among the world's most highly developed farm areas. In them are most of China's 200,000 miles of canals, especially in the Yangtze delta, which is sometimes known as "sea on land." The Red Basin, which because of isolation is less known to foreigners than the other two regions, but which gains in importance now as China's center of life moves inland, supports a farming population of 2,150 per square mile on crops that range from wheat to rice, sugar cane and cotton. It is one of earth's loveliest garden spots, famous for its hill terracing and for its remarkable series of irrigation canals built by the great engineer Li Ping two thousand years ago.

North China—north of the Tingling Range—is in every aspect of nature a contrast to the China we have just described. Instead of the warm, moist breezes from the South Pacific, it is swept by dust-laden storms from the deserts of Central Asia. It is a land of fertile soil but uncertain

rainfall. In the Northwest, driest and nearest to the desert, are the highlands of "Yellow Earth," or loess, a wind-blown silt hundreds of feet deep. Despite the inexhaustible fertility of this soil, this is the "famine belt." For water is infrequent; it runs in deep river beds cut in the porous earth.

This is the land of the famous Yellow River, so heavy with silt that it seems half-mud, half-water. It sweeps in great snake-like bends, southward between Shensi and Shansi, then east across the central plain of Honan to the coastal plains of Shantung, which have been built up through the ages with earth brought from the heart of Asia by this river to the sea. The process of this building is a constant war between man and nature. Century by century the river raises its muddy bottom higher and higher above the surrounding plain, while the toiling people of China confine its waters by dikes. Yet often at high water, especially when war or internal disorder have slackened the eternal vigilance of the people, it breaks through its banks in floods which destroy hundreds of villages, yet leave behind increased fertility of soil for the generations to come.

All parts of China, north and south, are filled to capacity with people. More people probably have lived on China's level areas than in any similar area in the world. Four-fifths of them are, and have always been, farmers—the most industrious, patient, thrifty farmers on earth. Pressing for forty centuries hard on the limits of subsistence, they have penetrated steadily into every corner of the available land. With canals and hill terraces they have modified the appearance of nature. "Trillions of men and women have made their contribution to the contour of hill and valley and the pattern of the fields." * In the cultivated parts of China the blue-trousered farmers seem a living part of the landscape; nature has been adjusted to man and man to nature in interaction for four thousand years.

These toiling farmers utilize every resource. Land is

* Cressey: *China's Geographic Foundations.*

economized; lowlands are protected by dikes, hills are terraced. Many—sometimes too many—river and lake bottoms have been generations ago reclaimed. Roads are narrow in the North; in the South they shrink into footpaths. Water is economized; the same canal furnishes transportation and irrigation to a long succession of fields, and mud dug up from its bottom is applied as fertilizer to the soil. Human and animal wastes are utilized; even from large cities they are collected and carried painstakingly to manure the fields. By-products are utilized; straw and stalks go into building or for fuel. By hard, continuous work, skillful practices, and exceptional economy in using soil, water, human and animal wastes, the Chinese farmer still gets good crops on the same earth after four thousand years.

These farmers of forty centuries * have lived through all the generations on what the land immediately around them could produce. Houses are built of mud in the North and of woven bamboo in the South; in both regions they take on the appearance of natural forms, hardly distinguishable from the landscape. Roofs are thatched with grain stalks. Windows are of paper, of which the Chinese were the first inventors; they are opaque to vision but let in light. Ten years ago I still found villagers in northwest China who had never seen glass, and who thought the windows of our Dodge sedan a kind of magic. In the loess highlands, where the hard-packed yellow soil can be cut in vertical walls, the people live in caves of many rooms, carefully carved in the sides of cliffs. "Cool in summer and warm in winter," they tell you. Often the fields on top of these cliffs are pierced with chimneys from the dwellings below, so that farmers in the field see smoke from their homes issuing between their crops. Today these cliff-homes are found to have another virtue; they are bomb-proof to air attacks.

Fighting through centries for survival, the Chinese farmers have learned a grim economy of food. They hope for three meals a day during harvest labors, but in winter

* F. H. King: *Farmers of Forty Centuries.*

their diet drops to two scant meals of rice (in the South) or millet (in the North), flavored with a rough vegetable. Meat is a rare luxury for feast days and is then used in tiny slivers to extract its utmost flavor. The food supply has conditioned even the village transport. Since fodder-grass is plentiful in the North, they have draft-animals with two-wheeled carts. But the narrow valley-lands of the South with their three annual crops, are too precious for grass; southern transport is by canalboats and on the backs of human beings, who are cheaper to feed than animals.

Generations have taught a close economy of fuel. Houses in the cold north are built facing southward to catch the sun and avoid the harsh desert winds from the northwest. As much as half of the interior is filled with the "kang," a platform of clay brick raised two feet above the floor and gently heated by the exhaust of the family stove and by straw fires inserted from outside the house. This slightly raises the temperature of the whole room, especially at night when the kang serves as a bed for many people. Even in zero weather Chinese farmers do not wastefully heat their homes. Chilled hands are kept warm over little charcoal fires in metal basins. Bodies are kept warm by layers of padded cotton garments, far warmer than our woolen clothes. These garments saved the lives of thousands of Chinese soldiers this past winter, for they are thick enough to turn back shrapnel if its impact is not too hard.

Generations also have taught the efficient cherishing of every bit of metal and wood. Since wood is especially scarce in the North, its use in building is limited to upright posts, roof beams, and door and window frames—all of which are family heirlooms, taken from house to house as the mud walls crumble with the years. Stoves are made of clay bricks. I recall even a small portable stove made of clay held together by a framework of iron wire, which served in Shansi to heat water for our tea. Our host fed charcoal a piece at a time into a two-inch hole in the middle of the stove-top. Over the tiny flame a wide-bottomed but narrow-

topped copper kettle was raised on three small stones just high enough to allow the fire to draw. The shape of the stove, of the kettle, and their relation to each other, had all been carefully adjusted to use every smallest bit of heat. In the summer the stove could easily be carried outdoors; in summer, to cool the house, the paper is torn from the windows and replaced—if the householder has funds for such luxuries—by a net.

Since land is the source of life and is tilled by the family's labor, each family has been held together for centuries by its land. It was a patriarchal family under "the old man," who directed the toil of his children and ruled their lives, even when he could no longer toil. Sons grew up and the family secured wives for them, bringing these to the family homestead, building perhaps an annex of clay or bamboo walls. Receiving the land from the fathers, the family treasured it for the children, improving it that they might live in after years. As the parents died they were buried in their own soil, and remained a part of the family life through the tablets erected to their memory, to which their descendants did reverence as the source from which they and their means of life had come.

These large, self-sufficient families lived in villages. Heads of families chose the village chiefs, who managed the common life and carried on relations with other villages in such matters as irrigation, water supply and minor trade. Village life has changed little since a poet of the T'ang dynasty described it thus:

> Each family maintains its rural occupations,
> Men grow white-haired, yet never go abroad.
> Alive, they are the villagers,
> And dead, they are the village dust.*

Sharp class divisions, however, arose even in this seemingly placid countryside. Richer families became landlords, exploiting both share-croppers and hired labor; they became

* Po Chu-i, translated in Helen Pratt: *China's Unfinished Revolution.*

moneylenders, extorting robber-rates of interest. Poorer families, hard-pressed in years of drought, sold daughters into slavery. Village officials bowed to the will of the rich and did "justice" against the poor. Peasant revolts and land reforms succeeded each other through the centuries. But always—from the feudal era down to the present—millions of the hard-working rural population have been in various ways exploited. Today, especially in the southern part of China, less than half of them own the land on which they toil.

Based on the labors of these trillions of farmers, the most continuous civilization the world has ever known arose in China. Toiling so steadily and living so meagerly, they produced a surplus, and on this surplus grew handicraft, trade, invention and art. Great walled cities arose, centers for the commerce of vast areas. In them lived merchant-princes, scholars and military rulers, and some of the greater landlords, drawing tribute of profits, rent, interest and taxes from the tillers of the soil. Handicraft manufacture developed in them to a point unequalled in the world. Particular centers produced specialized products—fine silks, furniture of rare wood, woven rugs, exquisite porcelain—and the trade in these extended centuries ago across Asia into those lands which would some day become Europe.

The history of China is that of an expanding culture, rather than of a conquering empire, though she has been at times a conquering empire too. She has been not so much a nation in the modern sense as a fusion of peoples, held together by a common civilization, written language, tradition and art. This Chinese civilization began in the loess highlands of the Northwest and spread slowly southward. Two thousand years ago it conquered the Yangtze valley and marched on south to Kwangtung. It spread still farther to the islands of the southern seas. Westward and north it marched across deserts and mountains, centuries before Europe was able to cross them.

Three thousand years ago China had irrigation works;

mighty constructions built two thousand years ago still function in Ningsia and the Red Basin of Szechwan. Written records of water-control projects go back more than twenty centuries; they are found today in the "provincial gazeteers." The Chinese were the first to use the compass for navigation. They were the inventors of gunpowder and silk-culture. They had books on medicine and the human body before the birth of Christ. Two thousand years ago their military leaders discussed the importance of grain reserves for armies of many tens of thousands. The Great Wall built by their early emperors against the northern hordes was the greatest continuous fortification ever erected. The Grand Canal, built and kept open by the labor of centuries for the passage of tribute grain to the imperial capital, is the world's longest artificial waterway.

Whenever the development of new lands or the discovery of new means of production increased China's surplus wealth, or when a juster land division increased the prosperity of her common people, there arose brilliant epochs of stability and culture, great dynasties flourishing for centuries, golden ages of poetry, painting and scholarship. Always the nomad hordes of the North and of the great Asian deserts pressed against this settled civilization; again and again, especially when internal division was bred by entrenched abuses, they invaded and overthrew it. Dynasties rose and fell, political unity was followed by conflict and by unity again, but through all the fluctuations of the centuries the area of Chinese civilization steadily increased. By military conquest, peaceful penetration, commercial intercourse, or absorption of its conquerors, this civilization molded scores of races, tribes, clans, languages, into modern Chinese—a task neither the ancient Roman nor the modern British Empire ever attempted, much less accomplished.

In all those forty centuries until the last one, the Chinese never came in contact with any civilization superior to their own.

4. HERITAGE OF FORTY CENTURIES

WHILE our plane still glides above the Yangtze River let us watch the sweep of centuries across this Chinese land below us. For the long past ages still influence through heritage and tradition the pattern of today.

Four thousand years ago, when this populous Yangtze valley was still a jungle-covered swamp and the whole world had as yet no iron tools with which it might be cleared, men had begun already to till the soil in the drier, more open lands of the North. Bronze implements were known to the Shang kings on the central plain of Honan, and crude irrigation was done for the kings of Chou on the loess lands of what today is Shensi.* After a thousand years of toil there appeared authentic dated records which show a Chinese feudal society. There was as yet no buying and selling of land, but peasants tilled "private fields" for their families and "public fields" for their lord. In 771 B.C. nomads from the North sacked the Chou capital, and Chinese war lords fought with each other for the five hundred years that followed. The uses of iron were discovered and the use of oxen for plowing; thus surplus wealth and the might of princes increased.

The unity of the land came first not in politics but in culture. Five centuries before Christ there arose the "hundred schools of philosophy," contemporary with the age of philosophy in ancient Greece. In both these lands, so far apart and so unknown to each other, there was a similar problem, not altogether alien to our present day. Individual states

* Hu Shih in *Symposium on Chinese Culture*, edited by Sophie Chen Zen.

were at war, yet felt themselves part of a larger cultural unity, and philosophers therefore sought some principle of moral authority which could unite the entire group under one harmonious sway.* In both ancient Greece and ancient China the philosophers created a common cultural tradition, but failed to remedy the political evils.

The fame of Confucius is world-wide. In the West he is known chiefly as the ethical teacher who propounded the negative form of the Golden Rule—"Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself"—five hundred years before the birth of Christ. In China he is known rather as the philosopher who developed a code of social ethics based upon the family system. Seeking, in the midst of feudal wars, stability rather than change, he found that stability in the old family community, which preceded and persisted in all upheaval. The relations of dominance and submission, accompanied by a firm, considerate reciprocity, which insured family continuance, he applied to the wider social life based on the family. "Right Relations" between father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend, ruler and ruled—and by "right" he meant stable, traditional and benevolent relations—were the chief duty of man. He taught that popular revolts were due to the sins of rulers, and that even foreign invasions were a judgment on the inferior morality of the sovereign, since "if a prince were really just, he would have no enemies. . . . When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without issuance of orders." When Chiang Kai-shek blamed himself before the people of China for the lack of discipline in his armies which led to his detention in Sian, he was thinking in Confucian terms.

The words of some of those ancient Chinese philosophers sound strangely modern. Mo Tsu (fifth century B.C.)

* Fitzgerald's *China, a Short Cultural History* is chief authority for much of this chapter.

taught—in opposition to Confucius—an all-embracing love of humanity reaching beyond the family and the state. "The man of Ch'u is my brother," he said. Modern, indeed, is his denunciation of war:

> The murder of one person is called unrighteous and incurs a death penalty . . . the murder of a hundred persons is a hundredfold more unrighteous and there should be a hundredfold death penalty. But when it comes to the great unrighteousness of attacking states, the gentlemen of the world do not know that they should condemn it; on the contrary, they applaud it, calling it righteous. Shall we say that these gentlemen know the difference between right and wrong?

In many others there is the same timeless note—for example, the lines of Hsun Tse, 208 B.C.:

> You glorify nature and meditate on her.
> Why not domesticate and regulate her?

Or the musings of Chuang Tsu (third century B.C.) on ultimate reality:

> Once Chuang Tsu dreamed that he was a butterfly, flying about enjoying itself. It did not know that it was Chuang Tsu. Suddenly he awoke and veritably was Chuang Tsu again. But I do not know whether it was Chuang Tsu dreaming that he was a butterfly, or whether now I am a butterfly dreaming that I am Chuang Tsu.

These exquisite fragments of thought come to us down twenty-four centuries. But the era of feudal warlords came to an end not through philosophy but with the rise in 221 B.C. of the first Emperor of All China, a harsh dictator from the region which is now Shensi. He abolished the feudal lords in his own domain and established a somewhat freer relation of classes, in which soil-tillers paid with grain for their use of land, instead of with labor and "feudal duties." This, together with his possession of the biggest

irrigation canal and of more of the recently invented iron implements, led to a more productive kind of farming, and so strengthened his rule that he was able to conquer all his rivals and establish himself as Emperor Shih Huang-ti. He ordered the abolition of feudal rights throughout the empire, created a uniform legal code, a uniform written language, uniform weights and measures, and even uniform wagon axles to enable all the peasant carts to travel easily in the same deep ruts. He extended the Great Wall of China, of which parts had been previously built, till it reached from the sea fourteen hundred miles to the western mountains, a formidable barrier against invading tribes. His ruthless use of the forced labor of tens of thousands of criminals and disbanded soldiers aroused hate among the common people. He also burned the books of the past and thereby aroused the hatred of the scholar-officials, who had served earlier rulers. These twin hates overthrew his dynasty fifteen years after it began. This was in the time of his son, for he himself ruled only eleven years. From that brief rule he left to succeeding centuries the ideal of a unified empire and a name as ruthless dictator, which is still mentioned with hatred by the Chinese people after twenty-one hundred years.

A common soldier started the uprising that overthrew this first dictator; the whole empire of oppressed farmers and soldiers "answered him like an echo." After seven years' struggle, a man of humble origin, Liu Pang, sat on the throne as founder of the great Han dynasty, which built the greatest empire then known in the world. The expanding power of this regime was based on the building of great public works for irrigation, on the widening use of the newly discovered metal, iron, and on the trade made possible from this surplus wealth. Merchants grew rich, sought to buy land and to advance into new regions. These forces did more to break down feudalism than had the edicts of Huang-ti. Liu Pang identified himself with the new rising class of merchants. He was a realist; it was said of him that

he lost more battles than he won, but never the final battle, for his sense of social and political forces always gave final victory. He passed a law that all sons should inherit equally from their fathers, thus gradually extinguishing the feudal families by making them many, but small and powerless. He made scholarship, rather than feudal rank, a qualification for high office; men proficient in philosophy and ethics were given government jobs. Thus he won support both from conservative scholars and the new businessmen, and established on the ruins of feudalism a new society in which men might rise through trading to wealth, and through knowledge to government posts.

The Han dynasty discovered the West and conquered it. In the early decades of what today is known as the Christian era, Pan Chao, a brilliant administrator, whose sister was equally famous as the foremost woman scholar of her day, carried the rule of the Han across the oases of Turkestan—chiefly by prestige, and by using the local tribes to fight his battles, as shrewd trading capital does today—till one by one fifty "kings" submitted and seventy thousand Chinese troops reached the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, separated only by its waters and the Armenian mountains from the Roman Empire of that day. Pan Chao sent an envoy to contact the Roman Empire, then (A.D. 97) at the height of its power, but the Parthian guides misled the envoy and brought him south through Asia to the Persian Gulf. Thus the two great world empires stood side by side for a moment, but through the guile of intervening tribesmen never met.

Trade of those days, however, crossed all these boundaries. Chinese silk, jade, lacquer and art products penetrated the Roman Empire, and reached even the far shores of Britain, that isolated isle in the cold northern seas where our early forefathers were fleeing through the woods from the troops of the Caesars. This silk trade from China was the most far-reaching large-scale commerce of antiquity. But it was to be in the end the doom of the Han. By abolishing feudal-

ism these ancient-modern rulers ran into new problems that had never been known before: depreciation of currency, unstable prices and the cost of national defense—all of them negligible in the feudal era when payments were made in labor or in kind. Iron-masters and salt-boilers became richer than the old feudal princes and used their wealth to buy land. A new semi-feudalism developed in which farmhands and share-croppers were exploited on lands owned by wealthy merchants and government officials.

The Han dynasty fought hard against the evils of those centuries. When Liu Pang first came to power, he declared a liberal government, replacing the iron code of the first dictator by three simple laws:*

One who murders another shall incur the death penalty.

One who wounds another shall pay compensation.

One who robs another shall make good the loss.

This was the freedom of a rising free trade. These laws soon proved insufficient. About the time of Christ, when the evils of large land-holding and tenant-farming were becoming serious, and the prosperity of the empire was threatened by the growing misery of the people under rents, taxes and debt, a progressive emperor—Wang Mang—opposed the land-owners. He decreed all land the property of the state, to be divided among the tillers of the soil under state protection; he also decreed state control of industry and trade with "more equable division of goods." The wealthy and powerful assassinated him in A.D. 23.

No efforts of individual emperors availed against the economic law that in a society where the chief wealth is obtained from small-scale working of the soil, small ownership breeds large ownership, landlordism, rural debt and revolt. Bankrupt peasants became bandits, as they have done in modern days under similar pressure; the empire weakened and the northern hordes came in. But the changes consolidated in the centuries of Han rule became permanent factors in unifying China: the uniform script which preserved

* Helen Pratt: *China's Unfinished Revolution.*

a common heritage of philosophy, art and science, and the permanent civil service not based on birth as in feudalism but open, at least nominally, to all classes through study of the national culture. So, though with the fall of the Han there came four centuries of barbarian invasion and internal wars somewhat resembling the Dark Ages of Europe, they were never as dark as in Europe. For the memory of the past was never lost; the unity of culture endured.

A chief factor in the dismemberment of empire was the rise of the Yangtze delta and the Red Basin of Szechwan into independent areas. With the new iron implements the industrious Chinese farmers had expanded century after century into those steaming jungles which, once cleared, gave surer harvests than the older, dryer lands. This furnished the basis* for that period of internal strife known as "The Three Kingdoms," when war-lords of Szechwan and the Yangtze delta strove against rulers of the North. After centuries of such strife when China was again subdued by a single emperor, it was a different country. The Yangtze valley had matured as a main region of crops and wealth, held tributary to the northern capital by the building of a Grand Canal for transport of tribute grain. The barbarians had been absorbed and with them new influences had modified thought and stimulated art. After a few decades of the harshly efficient Sui dynasty—which conquered its rivals, completed the Sui Grand Canal, and made the civil service examinations compulsory and universal—China, again at peace on her expanded wealth of fertile farming lands, entered her Golden Age.

The flowering of the great T'ang dynasty (617 to 907 A.D.) made China for the second time the largest and most populous state in the world. This was no crude, democratic setup based on the first rough rise of trading capital as in the days of the Han. Li Shih-min, second of the T'ang, but the dynasty's real founder, was a prince of the great new families, allied to two other princely houses, a scholar, an

* Ch'ao-ting Chi: *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History.*

administrator, a patron of art. He appeared to a war-weary society as the man of destiny, the bringer of unity and internal peace. He at once insured prosperity by a re-division of farming lands in the sixth year of his rule.* The allotments were limited in size and given "in perpetuity" to the actual soil-tillers, with restrictions on land purchases. The civil service was improved, the examination system extended, and China was for the first time divided into provinces, with more logical boundaries than those of today. With the increase of farm production and government efficiency, the empire and its treasury expanded. Central treasury receipts for the year 746 A.D., after a century of T'ang rule, showed in a single year 125,000 pound weight of silver, over 1,000,000 tons of grain, 7,400,000 bolts of silk of mixed quality, 1,800,000 bolts of finest quality, and 1,350,000 pieces of cloth. China extended southward into the Malay jungles and southwestward through Tibet till—in the region of present-day Afghanistan—it met the Moslem Empire.

Brilliant and cosmopolitan in those days were the streets of Ch'ang An—capital of the T'ang dynasty, on the present site of Sian, but a far larger city than now. There were four thousand poets in the three centuries of the dynasty and painting flourished equally, though little of it survived the later invasions. The capital was thronged with races and nations from north, south, east and west—Siberian tribesmen from the Baikal region, jungle peoples of India, Greeks, Arabs, Persians, Japanese. Japan in those days was just beginning to develop, and adopted with eagerness the high civilization of the T'ang. Canton was a great center of sea-borne trade, carried on by Arabs, who transmitted Chinese goods to Europe. Though the European world knew nothing of China, but only received its goods, a Chinese traveler of those days wrote a description of Constantinople.

This was the epoch of religious wars and persecutions in Europe, but Emperor Li Shih-min was hospitable to all the

* Pratt: *Ibid.*

strivings of the human soul. He himself studied all available teachings; by Chinese tradition philosophic and ethical thought was more worthy of an emperor than war. To the first Christian envoy whom he knew by the name of O Lo Pen, the Emperor said: "The Way (of truth) has more than one name. There is more than one man of wisdom. Doctrines vary in different lands, their benefits reach all mankind. . . . O Lo Pen, a man of great virtue from the Ta Ts'in (Roman Empire) has brought his books and images from afar. . . . After examining his doctrines we find them profound and pacific. . . . They stress what is good and important. . . . This religion does good to all men. Let it be preached freely in our empire." He similarly honored the Buddhist envoy, approved of Taoism, favored the Confucians and permitted Zoroastrianism. His tolerance was typical of his country and his age.

Few periods of world history have known so large and civilized an area which remained stable for so long a period as the Golden Age of culture established by Li Shih-min. Even the invasions which finally overthrew the dynasty and sacked again and again its capital, destroying priceless paintings, did not disturb the continuity of culture. Scholars and artists took refuge in the South, especially in Szechwan—where China's scholars and artists have in large numbers gone today. After five decades of anarchy and chaos, which especially affected North China, another great dynasty, the Sung, reigned for another three centuries, at first over all China and then by barbarian encroachments confined increasingly to the South. As the empire diminished, the dynamic vigor of the T'ang tradition was replaced by increasing refinement, but art and scholarship still flowered. Painting touched perfection in the Sung dynasty, before the Mongol hordes laid waste the Eastern world.

Yet inner weaknesses existed and grew through the 650 years of these two great dynasties, and in the end assisted their decay. Hardly a century of the T'ang's first vigor had

passed before poets were writing—with a freedom of speech that seems rather marvelous—of the sufferings of peasants under the empire's wars:

The frontier posts stream with blood enough to make an ocean,
Yet the desire of our warlike emperor for more land is not appeased. . . .
In ten thousand hamlets
There grow only brambles. . . .
The soldiers returning from war's horrors
Drive wildly over them like dogs or chickens. . . .
During this very winter
While the men are still at the front
Officials are pressing for taxes.
Whence shall we bring them taxes?
Now we know that it is bad to have sons.
Rather give birth to daughters.
They may at least be married and live in the same village
While our boys lie buried under the weeds.
Have you not seen them?
All the way from Kokonor
White bones lie ungathered.*

Another poet, who was also a village official, contrasted his own lot with that of a poor peasant woman, gleaning behind the reapers with her child in her arms:

After the farmers have harvested all they can
She gleans their leavings to feed her starving belly.
What have I done to deserve it—
I who planted neither grain nor mulberries—
That my official salary should be three hundred loads of wheat. . . .
Thinking thus, I feel ashamed of myself.†

* Tu Fu, 727 A.D., quoted by Pratt: *Ibid.*
† Po Chu-i, quoted by Pratt: *Ibid.*

Behind the increasing class frictions reflected in such poetry lay the fact that the Yangtze valley lands were reaching their full development. As in the America of our own generation, there was no more free land. The laws dividing land among the tillers and restricting land purchase were soon evaded and finally revoked. The Chinese state—like America today under Roosevelt—turned to enormous expenditures for public works as a cure. One official reporting for forty-three hsien (counties) listed the completion in a single year (1174) of 24,451 water-control projects irrigating some 752,000 acres.* The Sung capital moved to Hangchow in the Yangtze delta, and this still more increased the population and its need of land, and led to wide-spread reclamation of river and lake beds by dikes and drainage. But the poets of that time make it plain that these lands fell chiefly to corrupt officials, who squeezed out smaller farms and increased the general taxes by the improvements and themselves evaded taxes for decades on these thrice-fertile but unlisted lands. Irrigated farming needs honest centralized control of water, with individual cherishing of soil; private property in land hampers the first, and share-cropping the second. This became the central problem of the Yangtze valley in the Sung dynasty; it is still the problem today.

If the Sung failed it was not for want of clever thinking. Two schools of thought developed into two great political parties which strove for centuries: the Conservatives tied to the Confucian scholars and upper class, and the Innovators, who became the champions of the common people. One of the earlist Innovators, Wang Anshih, gained power for a few years to try daring experiments which seemed to have faced clearly the problems of the day. He made loans to farmers from state funds at low interest on the security of growing crops; this was known picturesquely as the "Young Shoots" law. He abolished forced labor on public works—which bore hardest on the poor, and substi-

* Chi: *Ibid.*

tuted hired labor paid for by taxation on wealth. He introduced price fixing and limited profits to one-fifth the selling price. The Conservatives got into power and smashed his laws. A hundred years later, barbarian invasions overwhelmed all factions in a common ruin.

The war-like hordes of Mongol nomads descended in the thirteenth century upon the settled lands of China, already weakened by internal corruption and unrest. They exterminated the population of the Northwest so thoroughly that great irrigation works ceased to exist and many cities were forever overwhelmed with sand. The South escaped the worst fury of the invasion and remained the center of Chinese culture which the savage Mongols themselves were proud to adopt. They established a new northern capital at Peking and connected it with the South by a new Grand Canal.

It was in the days of Kublai Khan, a Mongol emperor, that Marco Polo came from Europe across the desert route, opened by Mongol destruction of all the intervening tribes, and found in China a civilization surpassing that of his native Venice. He noted especially the Chinese skill in the working of metals; he brought back strange stories of the "black stone that burns." Coal had been known for fifteen centuries in China, but Marco was surprised. He also wrote of the Yangtze River: "I assure you that it flows so far and traverses so many countries and cities that in good sooth there pass and repass on its waters more wealth and merchandise than on all the rivers of Christendom together."

Six centuries have passed since Marco's day. After the Mongols, two other dynasties arose and fell. A son of poor Chinese peasants founded the Ming dynasty which ruled on the ruins of the Mongol Empire as far north as Lake Baikal in Siberia, and grew into Manchuria to modern Mukden. The Chinese went adventuring by sea, penetrating the Philippines, Indo-China, Annam and the South Sea Islands, not merely as traders but as settlers seeking new land. Japanese pirates subsidized by Japanese nobles appeared in the Ming days to harry the Chinese coasts and

take captives for ransom. European sea trade—Portuguese, Dutch and then British—reached the Chinese seas, also acting like pirates. Under the Ming the Chinese Empire was larger territorily than it had ever been. The Manchus succeeded the Ming, and still the Empire expanded; it included Tibet, Turkestan, Mongolia, Korea, Burma and Annam. But culture became rigid and stereotyped, fearing change. For no real change was possible any longer while the old methods of production and the old basis of society endured. Against this was set the weight of a system entrenched for centuries.

Not swiftly did the splendor of Chinese culture fade. French missionaries who came in the eighteenth century described it as the most splendid empire in the world, surpassing the magnificence of the great French kings. The decades which saw in the West the storm of the American and French Revolutions found Emperor Ch'ien Lung ruling in China for sixty years of unbroken tranquillity as scholar, poet and patron of art. The facade of his empire was still as gorgeous as in the beginning of the great T'ang, but behind the facade was suppression of thought, stagnation, decay. Civil service examinations, designed to raise to office men acquainted with the national culture, became stereotyped and even corrupted to allow Manchus to succeed. Former emperors had eagerly sought the best foreign knowledge, but now when foreigners beat at the gates they were kept out. Science was ignored as non-Confucian. The Manchu dynasty and the Chinese upper class had learned one thing from the past of forty centuries—that any change would be their overthrow.

So China, land of 400,000,000 industrious, skillful, thrifty and patient farmers, became to the world a symbol of supreme changeless magnificence based upon supreme changeless poverty. Leadership of civilization passed in the nineteenth century, with the development of science and the machine, to the Western world, to the lands which brought to the Yangtze Valley the plane in which we are flying and the factory chimneys and steamships we see below.

5. THE WEST BREAKS INTO CHINA

OUR plane sweeps down to ten thousand roofs of small, squat houses, cut by wide rivers into the three Wuhan cities—Hankow, Wuchang, Hanyang—the industrial heart of the central Yangtze Valley, the Chicago of China. Since war has seized for its own uses the Hankow airdrome, we descend in Wuchang, ancient provincial capital. On a raw, wet field we are met by a Chinese official who ignores our extended passports but courteously requests our calling-cards. Then—jostling crowds, thousands of cavernous shop-fronts, a street congestion increased by barricades and bomb-proof shelters, and at last a primitive, crowded ferry.

Half an hour's hard push against the muddy current in a chill wind brings Hankow, where we especially feel the penetration of the West. The National City Bank of New York and the British-owned Shanghai-Hong Kong Bank dominate a modern avenue along the river. Streets run from it with names in English, French, German, Russian, or Japanese. All of these nations owned until recently their private sections of Hankow's water front, known as "Concessions," where the courts of their consuls replaced the Chinese law. Only the street names and some of the business firms remain now; the Concessions, except the French, have reverted to China.*

Hankow in late December, 1937, was waging a war and organizing a country. The vast, many-sided life of China

* German Concession reverted during World War; Russian given up by Soviet Government in 1920; British taken by Hankow workers in 1927; Japanese given to the Chinese mayor at the beginning of the present hostilities "in trust till we return."

strove here to achieve its new base. Now that Shanghai was destroyed, the Wuhan cities were the largest center of modern industry in China. From a thousand miles in every direction, traffic pours into this center, by the ancient routes of Yangtze and Han Rivers and by the great modern north-south railway line. It comes from all China—the dry northern wheatlands, the wet southern rice fields, the ancient walled towns. But now it was refugees and army representatives that came from a dozen battle fronts. Courageous men and women fought shaky politicians' talk of surrender; patriotic devotion warred against inefficiency and chaos. And the struggling soul of Hankow was split by many alien pressures, typified by the ex-Concessions along the water front. Enormous swastikas adorned the roofs of the German ex-Concession, in the apparent hope of deterring Japanese bombers. The vacant Japanese territory was occupied by new Chinese armies and government departments. The French Concession, still under foreign law, was presumed to be the safest in air raids; people who owned houses there rented out spots of refuge. Hankow was torn by a hundred burning facts and a thousand false rumors, spread by spies and agents of half a dozen nations.

Whence came these foreign pressures which both develop and hamper the industrial life of China? They came by the will of the West and not by China's desire. For centuries the Europeans sought the excellent products of this country —silk, porcelain, jade, lacquer, tea. But the Chinese, who had welcomed for more than a thousand years the Arab and Persian merchants had little use for Europe. They considered the early European navigators, like the Japanese pirates who at times harried their coasts, as savage folk who could not safely be allowed within their civilized empire. They had reason to think this, for from 1517, when Portuguese ships sailed into Canton harbor and obtained permission from the local viceroy to trade, the adventurers from Europe were pirates whenever they got the chance. All alike—Portuguese, Dutch, British, Spanish—plundered

Chinese junks trading to the Philippines and shot up cities on the Chinese coast, considering the inhabitants "heathen" whose massacre was legitimate and profitable. The Spaniards coming to the Philippines killed all the Chinese settlers there.

So it was not surprising that when George the Third—in 1792, shortly after his defeat by the American colonies—sent an envoy asking for trade relations with Emperor Ch'ien Lung, that serene poet-potentate replied: "The Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance; there is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians." He courteously overlooked King George's ignorant presumption with the words: "I do not forget the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of our Celestial Empire." The Chinese merchants of the South, however, were interested in these new traders, and restive under the Manchu Emperor's control. Under their pressure the Emperor finally permitted foreign trade through one open port—Canton—the farthest removed from his northern capital. This one permission built in the South a commercial capitalism, which was to overthrow his dynasty after 150 years.

In the year before the American Revolution, American clipper ships began trading to China. The "Empress of China," fitted out by Robert Morris—later a financial backer of the Revolution—sailed from New York harbor February 22, 1774. The Revolution itself was precipitated in part by the Far Eastern tea-trade. When Washington was president, the China trade formed one-seventh of all American imports and created the great fleet of clipper ships which made the Yankee sailors the speed kings of the seas. The clever Yankees, knowing the Chinese lack of interest in foreign wares, took ice from New England to tropical Canton; Icehouse Street in Hong Kong is a souvenir of those days.

With the passing of American clipper ships, Britain's

dominance in the China trade was uncontested, but her manufactured goods were so little wanted that her traders denuded Europe of silver to pay for tea and silk. Then the British East India Company discovered the possibilities of opium, which creates an expanding demand. They forced this trade on China in 1842 in the Opium War, which also compelled China to open five "treaty ports" where foreigners might settle, to permit trial of foreigners by their own consuls and not by Chinese laws, to fix a 5 per cent maximum duty on imports, and to cede to England the rocky island which later became Hong Kong.

Desire for Chinese wares and need for a market for their own products, drew all the great powers of the world to this Eastern treasure box in the next sixty years. Treaty ports increased in numbers; in some of them "Concessions'" were established where foreigners governed themselves, supported by the armed might of their home governments. Greatest of these Concessions was the International Settlement of Shanghai, trade outlet for 200,000,000 people of the Yangtze Valley; after 1850 it became the chief center of foreign trade and finance in China. Outlying parts of the Chinese Empire fell during these decades one after another to foreign rule. England annexed Burma and other semi-Chinese lands adjoining India; France took Indo-China; Russia moved into the almost uninhabited territory north of the Amur.

The Opium War caused a wave of social unrest throughout China. It was strongest in the South which had always hated the Manchu Dynasty. Here the burden of landlordism pressed hardest on tiny plots of irrigated land. The cost of the Opium War and the forcible introduction of foreign goods intensified the burden by bankrupting ancient handicrafts. Chinese leaders of thought felt deeply humiliated that the dynasty had not been able to defend their country. Under all these pressures the Chinese people arose in violent rebellion.

The T'aiping Rebellion (1848-65), unlike previous agra-

rian revolts in Chinese history, was complicated by foreign pressures. It began in the South and swept through sixteen of the eighteen provinces of China proper, setting up its capital in Nanking, capital of the last Chinese dynasty, the Ming. The leaders were not anti-foreign; they blamed the Manchus for China's weakness, and even sought help from foreigners. Influenced by missionary teachings, they adopted a confused Christianity, calling their rule the "Kingdom of Peace" and their leader "the Heavenly Prince, younger brother of Jesus Christ." They burned landlords' title deeds and usurers' promissory notes and announced a new "land-system" to give land to the tillers who had none. Britain at first assisted their movement in order to force a treaty from the Manchu Emperor. This secured, both Britain and France helped with armed force to suppress the T'aipings in long protracted wars which cost tens of millions of lives. The Chinese people learned that they could no longer get rid of corrupt dynasties by simple, internal revolt, but must struggle at the same time to free their land from foreign control. From this time on, all progressive movements in China included slogans which, though vaguely worded, took cognizance of the pressure of foreign powers.

Decade by decade China slipped downward into deeper enslavement. The pace was suddenly accelerated at the end of the century by the rise of Japan, that nearby island-nation, whose smaller and more centralized ruling class was able to seize more swiftly than China the machines of modern industry and especially of war. She signalized her entrance into the world arena by attacking her sister nation in 1894-95. Swiftly victorious over a China so decentralized that only the northern provinces even showed interest in the war, Japan seized Formosa, detached Korea from China, and imposed the cost of the war on China in a heavy indemnity. Its size and the high terms of interest brought China for the first time under alien financial control.

Now that Japan had uncovered China's weakness, all the great powers moved to rob her. England, France, Germany,

Russia secured large blocks of territory on long-term leases. Foreign powers took control of China's customs revenues, using them to pay her debts to them. Foreigners gained the right to build factories in China and use her cheap labor, unhampered by Chinese law. In 1898 a weak Chinese emperor tried to put through a reform movement, but it was based only on upper officials and lasted but a hundred days. The Boxer Rebellion, a blind upsurge of peasant revolt, was diverted by the reactionary Empress Dowager into general hatred of foreigners and foreign ideas. It was ruthlessly suppressed by foreign troops. A little more than a century after the tranquil emperor Ch'ien Lung disdained all foreign intercourse, the troops of many foreign powers sacked and looted the Peiping palaces and the priceless library of generations of scholars. New indemnities were added, leading to deeper financial enslavement. With the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, China had become to the world powers no longer a living empire, but booty to be divided, a fate from which their conflicting appetites rather than her own strength saved her.

The commercial South was the first to demand for China a modern government, modelled on the democracies of the West. Allied in trade with foreign capitalists, competing with them yet profiting by them, they wished an independent government which should sieze foreign methods for the Chinese. They were joined by enlightened scholars who had studied Western learning, and by discontented farmers organized in ancient secret societies. They were also stirred by the 1905 Russian Revolution against autocracy, which touched hundreds of millions throughout Asia and played a part in revolutions in Turkey and Persia. In China the revolt against the Manchu empire began in Wuchang on October 10, 1911; two days later it crossed the Yangtze to Hankow and Hanyang, and then swept swiftly throughout the country. It was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen through the newly organized Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang.

The rising businessmen of China shattered the ancient

empire but proved unable to consolidate their rule. They were weakened by confused alliance with northern militarists, remnants of the old Manchu bureaucracy, and the semi-feudal landlord class. Yuon Shih-kai, representing these reactionary forces, was able to disrupt the parliamentary government but not strong enough to make himself emperor. The empire fell apart; provincial generals seized power in their own localities and fought for wider rule. Foreign imperialists seized the chance to bargain for mining rights and concessions from these local war lords, buying China's treasures cheaply and increasing her chaos. The hard-pressed tiller of the Chinese soil supported with his labor not only his family, his landlord and the local officials, but past and present and future war lords, who collected taxes for years ahead. Yet in all this disorder new hopes were arising. Desires for a fuller life and a wider freedom, which Western goods typified and Western machines made possible, seeped downward even into the rural life of China.

The shock of the World War dislodged the weight of China's European aggressors, handing the role of aggressor-in-chief to Japan. "Now is the most opportune moment. . . . Such an opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come, . . ." said officers of the Black Dragon Society, forerunner of the present fascist groupings in Japan.* European powers were busy in Europe; American attention centered on profitable war trade and then on war itself. Japanese militarists began their drive to enslave and conquer China.

The worst conditions yet imposed in China's history were the now notorious Twenty-one Demands, presented by the Japanese minister to the Peking government January 18, 1915. For several months Japan denied to the United States the very existence of the document, which transferred German territories and interests in China to Japan, opened the

* Harley, Farnsworth, Macnair; *Modern Chinese History*, pp. 760-768.

road for penetration into Manchuria and Mongolia, provided that China might not lease any bay, harbor or island to any power except Japan, installed Japanese advisors in army, police and finance, and threw in for good measure vast steel and coal interests, railway concessions and a naval base in South China. In a modified form the demands were accepted by the callously corrupt gang in power in Peking. The "Anfu clique," practically a puppet government, borrowed $400,000,000 (Chinese) in a single year from Japan and squandered it corruptly, giving Japan control of natural resources and industries in return. Japanese capitalists advanced into China, building Japanese-owned mills, bound by no scruples and practically no law in exploiting Chinese. China entered the Machine age, not in freedom, but enslaved by alien restrictions, above all by the growing dominance of Japan.

Yet out of the heart of increasing slavery China's awakening began. Not from her merchants and not from her politicians, but from the youth in her schools. They were the scholars—by long tradition the leaders, most sensitive to their country's degradation, most aware of Western achievements. The Renaissance came first in culture. Avidly they seized the literature of the West, absorbing with it not only modern science, but also the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet Power's success in casting out the imperialists of the world. Scholars also simplified the written language and made their knowledge more widely accessible. Japan's Twenty-one Demands came as a shock to the students; they waited for the Versailles Peace Treaty—and Woodrow Wilson—to save them. When that treaty ratified Japan's seizure of territories in Shantung, their trust in Wilson liberalism was broken; they organized to save themselves.

Fifteen thousand Peking students rushed into the streets demanding punishment for the "traitor government" which agreed to that treaty. The movement spread like a prairie fire from city to city till more than fifty thousand students

took part. Arrests, beatings, torture failed to halt them. They formed a National Students' Union and poured into villages to the farmers, into factories to the workers. They declared an anti-Japanese boycott and drew in the Chinese merchants. Beginning May 4, 1919—a date forever after famous —they forced by the middle of July the resignation of the traitors in the government. Though almost equally corrupt politicians followed and no immediate outer change took place, yet the May Fourth Movement marked a greater turning-point than the fall of the Manchu dynasty.

Prodded for a century by the brutal superiorities of Western technique and science, China's youth turned to seize in its own hands that Western knowledge to free the country. For the first time the progressive movement was clearly directed both against foreign domination and against the semi-feudal past of China. For the first time this progressive movement touched all classes. For the first time the young leaders of China's thought accepted their destiny not only as leaders of China but as part of the modern world.

6. REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE

MORE social changes in China were packed into the decade after the World War than into many slow-moving centuries of Ming or Manchu emperors. Cheap machine-made goods from the Western world flooded the Chinese market. American kerosene replaced the homemade oil which the farmer had pressed from rape seeds; cotton goods from factories displaced home spinning and weaving. For generations the Chinese peasant had lived close to the edge of subsistence; now he lost the supplementary home industries with which he had precariously balanced his life. Conflicts of rival warlords ruined him still further. Meantime new industries had come to China demanding cheap labor. From the crowded soil the toilers swarmed into the cities, driven by flood, famines and the social pressures of rural life and lured by jobs on wharves and in factories.

Thus a new working class arose in China. Hundreds of thousands of them received at first no wages at all but only a few bowls of rice a day. Handicraft apprentices were accustomed to living in the master craftsman's family, unpaid while learning but sharing the family food and working without fixed hours. The new factories took advantage of these traditions; they crowded workers together in factory-owned barracks with unlimited hours of work, in return for hardly more than food. Child workers in Hankow factories received at first thirty cents a month. Skilled railway mechanics, the best-paid of all industrial workers, got from fifteen to twenty-five dollars (Chinese) monthly. Factories ran from twelve to sixteen hours a day with two restdays a month. Similar conditions have attended the rise

of modern industry in all countries, but the situation was aggravated in China by the vast numbers of industrious low-paid workers, and the fact that capital had become international and very powerful.

Workers began to organize against these conditions. The first Chinese trade unions sprang up in Hong Kong and spread into Canton until there were two or three score such organizations. At once they found themselves at war not only with individual employers but with the whole system of foreign imperialism, since large-scale industry was mainly in the hands of foreign capital. The demonstrations begun by students on May 4, 1919, against the Japanese Twenty-one Demands aroused also the industrial workers to the possibilities of organized action. Three years later in 1922 the success of the great fifty-day Seamen's Strike showed Chinese workers for the first time that foreign capital might be beaten. The following year a general strike of twenty thousand railwaymen led to a clash with Chinese troops in Hankow; more than sixty workers were killed in this first open battle with the militarists of their own country. A national labor congress, held May 1, 1923, in Canton, represented over 250,000 organized workers; it decided that labor organizations should follow the industrial form. Two years later a second congress, representing twice as many workers, formed an All China Federation of Labor and unanimously decided to establish fraternal relations with the farmers and take part in the "National Revolution" against foreign imperialism and internal militarism.

The same years and influences that produced the first trade unions also gave birth to the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning with only a few dozen members in 1921, its third congress held in Canton in June, 1923, the year after the seamen's strike, already contained many representatives from the newly organized working class. The congress decided to propose a united front to the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party organized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and composed chiefly of the liberal upper classes and pro-

fessional men. The need of organizing "the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, the peasants" was emphasized in a resolution received by the congress from the Communist International.

For generations in the rural districts of China secret societies have existed under such picturesque names as "Red Spears," "Yellow Wands," "Big Swords," "Heavenly Gates." They were usually controlled by local landlords and the wealthier farmers and were strongly suspicious of city people. The desperate need of the population for protection against bandits and soldiers of provincial war lords stimulated many of these societies to seize control of local areas.

Their landlord leadership, however, prevented them from developing a social program, though the need for such a program was great, especially in the crowded lands of the South. In many provinces less than half the population owned the soil they tilled; landlords exacted 50 to 75 per cent of the harvest while usurers took interest rates, reckoned in rice, of 100 per cent for two months' food. The first Farmers' Union with a program against high rents and merchants' exactions, was organized in 1923 in Haifong, not far from Canton, by a young student. So fearful were the peasants of new oppressions that the first attempt to list their names caused them to flee in terror. When they learned the power of collective action and received support from the rising patriotic movement, their organizations grew with tremendous speed, and began to demand not only reductions of rents and taxes but basic changes in government.

In the midst of all this stirring revolutionary ferment—student uprisings which overthrew cabinets, workers' strikes against foreign capitalists, new peasant unions and a growing Communist movement—Dr. Sun Yat-sen opened the first nationwide congress of the Kuomintang in Canton on January 20, 1924. These forces had overthrown the Manchu dynasty but had split thereafter into conflicting tendencies, unable in the confusion of Chinese war lords and

foreign pressures to establish an independent modern government. Under the influence of the Russian Revolution and with Russian advisors, Dr. Sun decided to strengthen the movement by including the awakening workers and farmers. Delegates came from all the provinces of China, from Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Turkestan and Chinese overseas. They reorganized the Kuomintang and re-stated its program. They admitted the Chinese Communists to membership, supported the unions of workers and farmers, and declared friendship with the Soviet Union as "the only country anxious to see China a liberated nation."

The famous "Three People's Principles" which Dr. Sun had first mentioned many years earlier were clearly formulated by this congress as the basis for the "National Revolution." "People's Nationalism" was declared to mean both the struggle for independence from foreign control and the equality of the many nationalities composing China, including Mongols, Manchus Mohammedans, Tibetans. "People's Democracy," previously referring to voting rights only, was defined to include free speech, press, assembly and the right of workers and farmers to organize. "People's Livelihood" was expanded into a program which included land for landless farmers, tax reform, rent reductions, state farm loans, the eight-hour day and social insurance for workers, equality for women, compulsory education, and a citizens' army replacing the armed mercenaries of warlords. Such was the platform on which all the progressive forces in China united.

In three triumphant years, from 1924-27, unity and hope carried the nationalist forces to power in the greater part of the country. They began by establishing a progressive Nationalist Government in that citadel of southern commerce, Canton. Nationwide patriotic solidarity was aroused when a strike of textile workers in a Japanese mill in Shanghai led to the fateful demonstration of May 30, 1925, in which foreign police killed nine Chinese workers and wounded several score. An anti-imperialist general strike

of 350,000 workers at once tied up both ports of Shanghai and Hong Kong. The workers of Hong Kong moved to the competing Chinese port of Canton, whose newly organized Nationalist Government championed their cause in a boycott which lasted more than a year and almost ruined the British port.

From all over China patriotic workers and students flocked to Canton to join the new army of the Nationalist Government. Its officers were trained in the Whampoa Military Academy under Russian advisors, chief of whom was General Blucher, today commanding the Soviet Far Eastern Army. Political advice to the government was also given by Borodin, a Russian whom Dr. Sun himself had invited. The prestige of the patriotic movement represented by the Kuomintang was united with the enthusiasm of workers and farmers organized chiefly by the Communists. In 1926, under General Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist armies began their northward march designed to arouse and unify the country.

Up through the hills and valleys of southern China, the new devoted peasant unions led "their armies" by secret paths to take provincial war lords by surprise. In Shanghai the armed workers, led by the Communists, themselves threw out the troops of northern militarists and seized power, turning it over to Chiang Kai-shek's army. Tens of millions of peasants, banded in unions, and three million organized workers, furnished the popular strength which carried the Nationalist armies within six months through all South China and across the Yangtze valley to the edge of the northern plains. Demonstrations of Hankow and Kiukiang workers poured into the British Concessions in those cities and took them back for the government of China.

Farmers in most of South China broke for a time the control of landlords and corrupt magistrates and set up local governments under the name of "People's Power." Yungfong, in Hunan Province, which I visited in 1927, may be taken as an example. The land immediately around was

owned by twelve rich families who rented it out to share-croppers in return for half the crop. Filling their granaries to bursting with half the rice of the district, they were accustomed to hoard it until the poor had eaten their rice, and the price went up. Sometimes they hoarded until riots from hunger increased the price. Farmers who could not pay were forced to borrow, giving at harvest a two- and three-fold return.

Yungfong itself, the trading and warehousing center for this district, was a town of twelve thousand people; it ran in a single street along a rapid brown river, fresh from the gray-blue hills. Its shop clerks got a monthly wage of a dollar and a half to four dollars (American) and their food; women clerks got a few cents a month and the cast-off clothes of the employer's family. Traffic arriving by boat was met at the dock by hordes of coolies; the young and strong leaped aboard at risk of their lives to earn a few coppers, while the old waited for starvation. Long processions of coolies carried the wares on their backs by narrow stone paths over the ricefields to the villages; horse-power was crowded out by cheaper man power.

In the year when the Nationalist armies marched north preaching the rule of the people, students from the upper and middle schools of Hunan Province poured out to organize the countryside. Farmers' unions were formed in all the villages around Yungfong, correlated by a Central Farmers' Union in the town itself under two tenant-farmers of good reputation. Twenty-four labor unions were also organized in the town—wharf coolies, servants, cooks, bamboo workers, iron workers, rice huskers, and many more. A new Woman's Union demanded equality for women. A local branch of the Kuomintang was organized and a Merchants' Union. Each organization passed regulations for its members; the wharf coolies' union, for instance, demanded that men should be hired in rotation to give the older, feebler ones a chance.

All of this amazing organization was accomplished in

three months, from December, 1926 to March, 1927. The unions, taken together, made up the "People's Power." Most of the larger landlords fled from the district, but most of the magistrates remained. In the words of a local German, "Their power existed no longer except to sign the resolutions issued by the 'People's Power'." The Farmers' Union took control of all surplus rice supplies, promising to repay after harvest, but only pound for pound without interest. Three or four thousand pounds of this rice were weighed out daily and sold in carefully rationed amounts to needy families; People's Food Depots were set up at three-mile intervals. Some of the funds received were used for "People's Schools," which were established very simply by ordering the local teachers who tutored the sons of the rich to open classes for all. Plans were discussed for a farmers' cooperative which should use the rice funds to finance further rice purchases and better seed. The organizing genius of Chinese farmers has seldom been shown more amazingly than in this upheaval; in less than six months' time these illiterate, superstitious people, still children of the semi-feudal ages, were dealing fearlessly, democratically and shrewdly with local government, food control, education.

People's Tribunals were also set up, usually by representation from the different unions. In small towns like Yungfong they gave only minor sentences; Tribunals in the county seats took powers of life and death. A conscientious young woman, Miss Lang, educated in an American mission school, who served on one of these Tribunals as representative of the Woman's Union, told me of two death sentences which illustrate the bitter problems of Chinese rural life. "There was a man named Chang Hua-tang, a high official and rich, who tried by every means to oppose our Farmers' Union. He had over two hundred acres of land and seventy-five illegal riflemen. When a tenant on his land was unable to pay, he threw him into jail. He sent his armed men against a peaceful parade of peasants and killed thirty

people. There was another man named Shung, a small official who usurped power and forced people to pay taxes to him personally. Under his oppressions a poor widow took a rope and strangled herself. He arrested men and hung them by one hand and one foot tied together and beat them until they gave what he asked for. Forty-five men came to the Farmers' Union to complain against him, asking for his death. The People's Tribunal condemned both these men to die—these were the only cases of death sentence in our district—but the seizure of power by the reactionaries saved their lives."

All the social tensions revealed in these stories—between tenants and landlords, workers and employers, gangsters and the people—were brought to a head by the capture of Shanghai, center of China's most strongly organized workers, most reactionary capitalists, and also of international capital. When the armed workers seized power in this city and gave it to Chiang Kai-shek, the alarmed upper classes demanded that Chiang "restore order" by disarming the workers and "reorganizing" the trade-unions with the revolutionary elements left out. They offered in return financial support for his government. Chiang complied. By suppressing the workers' organizations with considerable violence, he won the help of China's most powerful business group and recognition from foreign powers. For several months the majority of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang denounced his action, and maintained a government in the Wuhan cities on the original united front principles. Then they also suppressed the people's organizations, expelled the Communist Party and declared it illegal, and eventually made their peace with the new Nanking government.

The peasant leaders of South China were scattered, hidden in the refuge of high hillls. The leaders of Shanghai and Canton trade-unions were also in hiding, for if captured they were killed. But the hope which had been aroused in tens of millions of people could not be so easily suppressed.

The Chinese Communist Party and the All China Federation went underground, organized secret cells in factories, workshops, villages, and sent representatives into the countryside to give form to the uprisings that were sweeping through China.

Bewildered local farmhands and share-croppers fought at first with spears, knives and farm implements to protect their "People's Power" from the attack of local landlords and war-lords. They appealed to provincial and central governments and to the Kuomintang to save from "reactionary soldiers" the rights which they felt they had been promised. They were joined by sections of the Nationalist armies which refused to suppress the workers' and farmers' movement, but broke away from the government in protest. When it became clear to the people that both government and Kuomintang sided with the landlords and militarists, some of the revolutionary forces began to fight under the name of "soviets." Communist leaders Mao Tse-Tung, Chu Teh, Ho Lung, and others organized the scattered troops into "Red Armies."

The first of these local soviets was set up in two villages near Canton on November 7, 1927, tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. A month later workers in Canton itself seized power, set free 3,400 political prisoners, and proclaimed the Canton Commune. A swiftly chosen Congress of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Delegates announced to thunderous applause the birth of Soviet Power in China. Three days later the Commune was drowned in blood. Japanese marines assisted the Kuomintang armies to slaughter the "Reds." But the program so spectacularly announced, which included division of big estates among landless farmers, nationalization of big industries, abolition of human slavery and child labor, and many other progressive laws, became a torch to rally workers and farmers of southern and central China in the following years, under the new name, "Soviet China."

In the spring of 1928 the Red Armies of Mao Tse-tung

and Chu Teh, who henceforth were to be known as the chief Communist leaders, met on the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan and formed a "Soviet Border District" of seven counties, with a military training school, an arsenal and hospitals. Land was taken from landlords and given to peasants, title deeds were destroyed, schools were opened. By 1930 scattered soviet districts existed in more than ten provinces. The Red Armies claimed 100,000 men and were admitted by the Kuomintang to have 66,000. In the summer of 1930 they somewhat too recklessly captured Changsha, capital of Hunan Province, and were dislodged by bombardments from foreign gunboats, assisting the Kuomintang armies. Foreign governments demanded that Chiang Kai-shek suppress the "Red" districts if he wished to be considered ruler of all China. Within a single year from autumn of 1930 to autumn of 1931, Chiang launched his first three anti-Communist military campaigns, each larger than the one before; the third he led in person with 350,000 men. All these campaigns failed, for the Red Armies were rooted in the loyalty of local peasants to whom they had given organization and land.

For three years more the Soviets held power in a large section of Kiangsi and in many other scattered and changing areas. The Second All China Congress of Soviets, held in January, 1934, consisted of 700 deputies from many different provinces. They included 303 poor peasants, 244 artisans, 122 farmhands, 53 coolies, 25 middle peasants, 8 industrial workers, 2 shop employees, 64 small tradesmen and professional people—a fair cross section of China's rural population, barring only landlords and wealthy merchants. They held a three-hour review of the Red Army in a central stadium and then opened the Congress to the playing of a band in a hall decorated with Red mottoes. Mao Tse-tung's report* made available to the world the first authentic account of their problems and achievements.

* *Second Congress of Chinese Soviets*, issued 1935 in Russian. Partizdat, Moscow.

"The sections of the Red Armies in all parts of China now act under a common command. . . . Soviet elections are no longer a general mass meeting, but have lists of electors posted and checked. . . . In many places, 80 per cent of the electors turn out. . . . Women constitute one-fourth of the elected deputies in some places." New schools were listed with a total of 184,227 pupils, with extra courses in reading and writing attended by 155,671 adults. In some of these courses more than two-thirds were women. "The hunger of women for knowledge is something never before seen in our history." The strength of the government was shown by the successful raising of a three-million-dollar internal loan for building state industry, by the organization of 1,423 cooperative warehouses, by the existence in most of the local soviets of regular committees on irrigation, schools, sanitation, and assignment of land to families of Red soldiers. Difficulties mentioned were the fight against graft in the division of land and livestock—"these must be given to poor peasants, not to soviet officials"—and the desperate lack of necessary products, especially salt, caused by Chiang Kai-shek's blockade. The condition of the poorer people had clearly improved. "Formerly most peasants starved part of the year, but now, because of better land division and lower taxes, hunger is abolished, and people live at least twice as well as before. . . . Farm laborers now get the same food as their masters. . . ." Figures of wages in a dozen trades showed a 20 to 40 per cent increase in two years. "The eight-hour day has actually been established everywhere on Soviet territory; in all towns and in many villages, inspectors now exist to enforce this law."

It was an impressive list of achievements. The influence of these districts seeped through China, despite all efforts of the government to suppress them. Year after year the Nanking government sent military expeditions against the Red districts, in the effort to bring all China by force under one central rule. They conquered area after area, but the greater part of the Red Armies always escaped to organize

new areas. Their propaganda was more effective than their bullets, for most of the government soldiers were also sons of poor peasants and were very susceptible to the calls that were shouted at them during the night or in the lulls of battle by men, boys, and women: "Brothers of the White troops, why do you fight for the landlords? We are poor peasants and workers, fighting for your interests! Land to the peasants and soldiers! Pay no rent, no debts, no taxes! Brothers, come over to us; bring your guns and bullets and fight for the Revolution!"*

The revolutionary hopes that flamed in a great light across China when the armies of the Kuomintang—with the Communists among them—marched north in 1926-27, were banked down under heavy ashes in the ten years that followed, or were carried from place to place by heroic, harrassed torchbearers to light new beacons. They never died out.

* Agnes Smedley: "The Truth about the Chinese Reds," *Mercury*, October, 1934.

7. JAPAN DIVIDES AND CONQUERS

IN a moonlit orchard in Shensi in late summer of 1927, after the Wuhan government had fallen, ex-High Adviser Borodin conversed with a Chinese ex-official. They discussed Japan's imperialism and her influence on Chinese generals; then Borodin made a remark that has remained with me ever after. "From now on the imperialists will oppress China more than before. When the Kuomintang relied on the masses, the Chinese nationalists were top dogs; the workers of Hankow and Kiukiang took the foreign concessions back for China. Now that the Kuomintang suppress the masses, imperialist exactions will grow worse. The big business group of Shanghai cannot free China from foreign imperialists, for they are allied with them and profit by them."

There seemed little to prove these words in the years that immediately followed. Chiang Kai-shek's government in Nanking went from success to success. In 1926-27 his armies had advanced from Canton to the Yangtze with the help of the workers' and farmers' organizations; the following year they went on to Peking with the help of the Shanghai financiers. Peking—the name means "northern capital" and it represented the rule of northern invaders, first the Mongols, then the Manchus—was re-named Peiping, or "northern peace," expressing hope that wars with the North were over. The new capital was established at Nanking in the Yangtze delta, where the last Chinese dynasty, the Ming, had ruled. Chinese tradition thus combines with modern industry and commerce. Despite the "reorganization" of workers' and farmers' organizations, which in practice

meant their violent suppression, many patriotic hopes of a united, independent China clustered around the Kuomintang. When in October, 1928, the new government was formally inaugurated in Nanking, with the announced support of northern and southern generals including even Manchuria, a chorus of congratulations arose from East and West.

There was one discordant note in the congratulations. Japan made it clear from the beginning that she resented the influence of the Nanking government in the northern provinces; these were her own sphere. Shrewd in Oriental politics, she had taken advantage of all China's changing conditions, dominating at first through pressure on the last weak emperor, then by bribery of corrupt Peking politicians, and later by subsidy of the magnificently feudal Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord who from time to time held power in Peking. When Chiang Kai-shek's new forces first moved toward Peking in 1928, they found in Shantung some fifty thousand Japanese troops impeding their advance. Several hundred Chinese soldiers were killed by Japanese fire; the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and his staff of twelve were killed in his office. Neither side, however, was ready for serious warfare; so the Chinese armies pressed forward to Peking. Chang Tso-lin gave up his capital; it was the signal for his assassination by Japan. His son, Chang Hsueh-liang, still controlling Manchuria, was warned by the Japanese not to hoist the Chinese Nationalist flag; he disregarded this warning and declared his support of the Nanking government. General Tanaka, however, at that time Premier in Tokyo, informed representatives of foreign powers that "the Chinese civil war will not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria."

Japan, nevertheless, did not at once take openly aggressive action. For three years she confined herself to preparatory maneuvers, playing one faction in China against the other, especially strengthening the anti-Nanking factions. The echo of the congratulations to the new Chinese unity

had hardly died away before they were found to be somewhat premature. Chiang Kai-shek's first attempt to reduce the military budget by disbanding troops of other rival generals led to open battle, first with Kwangsi generals of the Southwest and then with the generals of the Northwest. War lords of the western provinces remained aloof, giving at most lip service to Nanking. Under the Kuomintang's "revolutionary flag" of the blue sky and white sun, generals of different provinces still maneuvered for power. Japan maneuvered with them, waiting for a chance to intervene.

Among the causes which kept Japan from immediate action was the famous Nine-Power Pact, backed especially by the strength of America. The World War which had given Japan the chance to become aggressor-in-chief in the East, had also given America for the first time a major importance in world affairs. Shortly after the Versailles Peace Conference, while Chinese patriots still smarted over Japan's possession of territory in Shantung, the American State Department called in 1922 in Washington a conference of the chief powers interested in the Far East. The nine powers represented—the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and China*—bound themselves to respect China's territorial integrity. All nations received equal trading rights in China; this was the American policy of the "Open Door." Japan was required to restore the territory she had seized in Shantung; President Harding also made it plain to the U. S. Senate—and thereby to Japan—that the new pact abolished any idea of Japanese "special interests" in China.

The situation in Japan itself also delayed aggressive action. A severe earthquake in 1923 destroyed part of Japan's navy and cost her property damage of several billion dollars, a temporary halt in her national advance. Laws passed in 1925 extended the franchise to a larger number of voters,

* The Soviet Union and Germany, both still suffering from loss of prestige following the World War, were not included.

and thus brought Japan nearer to a democracy during the next five years than ever before or since. Political parties became more active; the two great parties—the Seiyukai and Minseito—dominated by different groups of capitalists, tried to exalt the powers of Parliament and to bring the army somewhat under its control. The Japanese businessmen, like the army, demanded expansion into Manchuria and China, but they sought it in more prudent and modern ways. Baron Shidehara, as foreign minister, declared that friendly relations with the Nanking government, rather than conquests, were the best basis for the expansion of Japan's prosperity through trade. The Minseito Party, representing the more moderate capitalists, even tried to hold down armaments in the interests of a sound budget. In 1930 a Minseito government went so far as to ratify the London Naval Agreement fixing the number of Japanese ships. The army officers replied by assassinating Premier Hamaguchi—the first of a long series of assassinations by which the militarist clique regained and increased its power.

Opportunity for aggressive action in Manchuria was given by the world economic crisis of 1929 and the following years. Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of State at the time, later wrote* that Japan chose what was perhaps the most critical moment of the economic crisis in the United States and Great Britain to begin her world-shaking military advance. The situation in China was favorable. Chiang Kai-shek was involed in his third major campaign against the Chinese Soviet Districts. The two northern war lords, Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Hsueh-liang, were threatening to attack each other. A new government was arising in South China at Canton containing at least half of the better-known leaders of the Kuomintang. The Chinese press charged with considerable plausibility that Japan encouraged these various factions. In Japan itself the strength of the Minseito government was sapped by the depression which brought actual starvation in the rural districts,

* In his book, *The Far Eastern Crisis.*

widespread unemployment in the cities, bankruptcy to large numbers of small businessmen, and increased class conflicts. A program of fascism at home and aggression abroad was the solution proposed by the military; its advantages were realized by the big capitalists, though with some disagreement as to who should control.

The pretext used for the invasion of Manchuria was the blowing up of a section of track on the South Manchurian Railway—one of those incidents which can be counted on to occur when the time is considered ripe for imperialist advance. Six weeks before the invasion General Hondo, military commander in Manchuria, wrote to the Minister of War: "It is necessary immediately to take advantage of the world economic position as well as the circumstance that the Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union is not yet completed, and that China is not a united country."* Japanese troops were already in Manchuria by an agreement which allowed them to police the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway. On the same afternoon as the explosion, and clearly acting on pre-arranged orders, they occupied several widely separated cities. Within forty-eight hours they had seized the whole of southern Manchuria, disarming more than 100,000 Chinese soldiers. Within a month they had occupied northern Manchuria to the borders of the Soviet Union. It seemed for a time that Japan's next move might be to attack the U. S. S. R., which was then in the throes of the difficulties of the first Five Year Plan and the first years of farm collectivization, and had not yet thoroughly fortified the Manchurian border. Even then, however, it seemed clear to Japan that China presented an easier and more profitable conquest, and the necessary first stage in her attack. She turned south to strengthen her hold along the Great Wall, which divides Manchuria from North China.

For the Chinese government at Nanking the invasion of Manchuria posed sharply the major political problem of the next five years. Which of her two main enemies should she

* *War in China*, by Ray Stewart. New York. International Pamphlets.

fight first, the Chinese Soviet Districts or the invader, Japan? Chiang Kai-shek held that China was not yet strong enough to resist Japan; he was reported to have said at a meeting of his generals, after the Japanese attacked him in 1927 in Shantung, that it would take ten years before China would be able to resist. To the Manchurian invasion he announced the policy of non-resistance. When Chang Hsueh-liang, who possessed in Manchuria a large army and some of the finest munitions factories in the world, flew hastily to Nanking for advice and assistance, he was sent back, in an airplane presented to him by the Generalissimo, to arrange his submission to Japan.

The Chinese people refused to take the Japanese invasion calmly. Anti-Japanese agitation and a boycott of Japanese goods swept through the country, centering especially in Shanghai, where Japan had heavy investments. Shanghai was also the source of the Nanking government's economic strength. The Japanese, therefore, followed up their invasion of Manchuria with an attack on Shanghai in January, 1932. Their first assaults were repulsed by the now famous Nineteenth Route Army, whose heroic defense, even though eventually broken, sent a thrill of surprised self-respect throughout China, and damaged the prestige of Japan in the eyes of foreign military observers. Whatever reputation Japan had for chivalry and correct behavior was also permanently shattered by the savage slaughter of civilians in Shanghai, which set the precedent for all later fascist invasions whether in Ethiopia, Spain or North China. Even the hardened reporters of this rather callous Oriental port were shocked by the cold-blooded massacres they themselves saw.

"The entrance to my favorite stand at the racecourse is blocked with corpses, fresh corpses newly made before my eyes," wrote T. O. Thackery, editor of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.* "There are women and children among them; women shot through the back, their padded

* Feb. 22, 1932.

coats run through with military sabres, children whose bodies are riddled with bullets; men garbed as peasant farmers heaped grotesquely about, their wounds soaking the ground. . . . The houses are burned; I saw them burned, with neat precision—not a wasted match, nor an extra piece of kindling." He described how a Japanese officer killed farmers fleeing from burning huts. "His shining sabre flashes up to its hilt in the human sheath; the body falls. A second takes its place and once again the sabre finds its pulsing scabbard. The next, a tall and likely lad, is flung unbound face down upon the two who clutch the earth in death; and as he falls a volley from six officers' revolvers make an outline on his back and up his spine." Such were the typical brutalities of the invasion of Shanghai which ended in a compromise peace, giving Japan a permanent foothold in the city.

"The impending war will be a struggle for the domination of the world. The Manchurian conflict is only a beginning." These words in the press of the Japanese militarists* made plain the real objective of the invasion. The Japanese military clique sought in Manchuria not an outlet for Japanese surplus population, as sometimes claimed; except for officials, military colonists and a few technicians, the Japanese do not settle there. They did not even seek primarily raw materials and a market; as Shidehara saw, these could be more easily secured through friendly trade. Japan sought power in Manchuria, a base for future conquests. The invasion was the first move in a whole series of world-wide aggressions by fascist powers, leading toward a world war. America's attempt to secure joint action by the signers of the Nine-Power Pact against the treaty-breaker, was thwarted by Britain; this encouraged the Tokyo militarists and set the fashion of timidity toward fascist aggression and indirect assistance to fascism, which the Western democracies have since followed.

The fertile wheat-plains of Manchuria were only the first

* *Nihon*, January 4, 1932.

objective on Japan's path of empire. The iron, coal and cotton of North China were the next. Four provinces of the North — Chahar, Hopeh, Shantung and Shansi — contain nearly 60 per cent of China's coal and iron and one-half of all her cotton. Here lies the basis for the future heavy industry of East Asia. Japan could secure these raw materials peacefully from China if she chose to remain at peace, but Japan's militarists seek not merely access to raw materials but monopoly control, in order to check the industrial development of China, to allow Japan to undersell other countries in world markets in peacetime, and to guarantee supremacy in war. Japan's plan of conquest was the first cause of all her actions; she sought in North China not war for the sake of coal and iron, but coal and iron for the sake of later war.

With Manchuria as base, Japan pushed steadily into the provinces of North China in the years that followed. The full extent of her aggression there from 1931 to 1937 is little realized.* It took many forms, economic, political, military. Pursuing the policy "divide and conquer," Japan organized Chinese, Manchurian and Mongolian troops of one province and sent them under Japanese officers to fight against another province. She brought pressure also on Nanking, demanding that northern officials be composed only of men "friendly to Japan," by which she meant those who recognized her special interests even against Nanking itself. As one by one even the most subservient officials balked at Japan's increasing demands, she insisted that they be replaced by others still more submissive. Japanese finance capital took steps to control iron and coal mines and the Chinese railway running from Peiping westward, which would be important in Japan's future plans against both North China and the U. S. S. R.

Thus Japan marched southward month by month into Jehol and westward into Chahar in a continuous war which was never officially declared. The northern provincial gov-

* Excellent detailed account in Bisson: *Japan in China.*

ernments, including that of Peiping, which still had traditions as a national capital, came increasingly under her control. News of Japan's advance and of the Chinese government's further surrender was hidden from the Chinese people through government censorship of the press. The full terms of the Tangku truce which the Nanking government signed on May 31, 1933, were never published, but actions spoke louder than published terms; all Chinese troops were withdrawn south of a boundary-line which ran only ten miles north of Peiping, while Japanese airplanes and troops were allowed to police the territory north of this. The following year Chiang Kai-shek himself made a trip to North China in November, 1934, to reorganize the local governments in a way that would appease Japan. He installed many Japanese advisers in these governments including one at Shanhaikwan, the strategic pass between Manchuria and North China.

Even the interests of Central and Southern China were sacrificed under Japanese pressure. In 1934 the Chinese government passed a new tariff which raised the duty 43 per cent on the raw cotton used by Chinese textile mills (thus handicapping their competition with Japan), and which at the same time reduced the duty on thirty-nine items of cotton fabrics which Japan was sending into China to compete with Chinese goods. The naval secrets of China were put at Japan's disposal by the placing of seventeen Japanese engineers in charge of building a Chinese warship in the naval yards of Central China.

The appetite of militarists grows by what it feeds on. In 1935 the Japanese made a serious attempt to secure a completely autonomous government in North China, which should separate the five provinces north of the Yellow River from Nanking's control and place them under the domination of Japan. The way was prepared by agreements with the Nanking government* which removed all the Chinese Central Government troops and political organizations from

* The Ho-Umetsu and Chin-Doihara Agreements.

both Chahar and Hopeh, the province which includes Peiping. The Japanese tried unsuccessfully to induce the northern Chinese generals, especially the Shansi dictator Yen Hsi-shan, to head an autonomous government. The Japanese army itself began arresting Chinese citizens in Peiping and Tientsin and detaining them in Japanese barracks. One hundred well-known leaders of business and education were thus arrested in the first two weeks of November, 1935; the arrests were only discontinued when the local Chinese officials promised that they would themselves arrest all persons whose names were given to them by the Japanese military.*

The plan for an autonomous government for North China was defeated by the rising patriotic movement described in the following chapter. Japan did, however, secure an autonomous regime under her control in East Hopeh, a strategically important region which ran from the sea-coast to within ten miles of Peiping. This regime was systematically used to break down the Chinese government's control of North China and especially the customs administration. The entire sea-coast of East Hopeh was continually filled with ships smuggling opium and Japanese goods into China, and smuggling silver out in an attempt to disorganize the new Chinese currency system. To protect the silver smugglers, Japan compelled the disarming of Chinese customs officers along the Great Wall; three months later she compelled the removal of machine-guns from the vessels of the Chinese customs service patrolling the coast and ordered them to remain three miles outside the coast of East Hopeh. When they tried to apply the right of search outside the three-mile limit, Japan advised them that this would be treated as piracy. The illicit cargoes were guarded by armed Koreans who were ready to attack any customs officers that appeared. The estimated duty evaded on goods brought in by this wholesale armed smuggling reached the staggering figure of fifty million dollars.†

* *China Weekly Review*, Dec. 16, 1935.

† Bisson: *Ibid.*, p. 133.

The effect of Japanese domination on the life of the Chinese people is given by many correspondents. The Japanese Concession in Tientsin became the largest opium and heroin center in the East* The traffic was stimulated both for revenue and to debauch the Chinese people and render them less able to resist. "Opium dens, pawn-shops and brothels appeared like bamboo-shoots after spring rain," wrote Lin Young.† "Most of them are operated by Koreans and registered with the Japanese Embassy and hence under extra-territorial control. The Chinese authorities can arrest Chinese after they emerge from the opium dens, but the drug sellers are beyond the reach of the law. . . . Another profitable business is the importation of forged Chinese money. Bank notes of the Bank of China, Central Bank and Bank of Communications printed in Japan and sold to North China merchants at 60 to 70 per cent of their face value. . . . Still another profitable business is moneylending with interest compounded monthly at the rate of 10 to 20 per cent. The local Peiping people call it the 'jump-jump play' or the "horse-race interest.' It is quite a common occurrence to see Korean moneylenders taking children away as slaves from parents who can't pay their loans. Nobody resorts to the courts for justice, for cases involving Japanese citizens are tried in Japanese courts."

Japanese troops behaved in North China as if they were already in a conquered country. "They marched and countermarched through the villages, taking possession of everything they wanted," writes a correspondent‡ describing maneuvers near Tientsin. "The peasants were ordered to assign one person in each home as a servant to the Imperial troops. With death hanging over them, they had to perform all menial tasks and to use for the 'guests' their own stores of fuel for which they were not paid. When the

* Report of Stuart J. Fuller, U. S. Observer to Opium Advisory Committee, 1937.

† *Voice of China,* March 15, 1937.

‡ Ying: *Voice of China,* February, 1937.

troops were tired of shooting at fixed targets, they would aim at any living animal that came within their vision. Loss of chickens and dogs was terrific. Even human beings never knew when they would be targets for playful marksmanship. After this strenuous practice, the 'friendly troops' turned their attention to the young village girls for relief. Nobody dared protest. Communication between villages was prohibited while the troops were there."

The full fruits of Japanese rule are seen in Manchuria. When Mr. Bisson visited it in 1937* he found that the living standard of the people had seriously deteriorated since 1931. The consumption of the main food products, cereals and beans, declined from 445 kilograms per capita in 1931 to 340 kilograms in 1935. "Except for a few heavy industries serving military needs, virtually no industrial development has occurred in Manchukuo." The condition of the farmers is most clearly shown by the increasing number of articles forfeited in the local pawnshops. The farmer is accustomed to mortgage his clothing and personal possessions in the spring to get seeds and fertilizer; after the harvest he redeems the clothing which he needs for winter. In recent years he has been unable to redeem these articles. Military highways are built with forced labor of the farming population, which is often demanded in time of harvest. Hunger and need have driven many farmers into banditry.

Education also has deteriorated. The budgets of the Department of Education are only about half that spent by the former Chinese governments of the four northeastern provinces in 1929. "There is not one *bona fide* university in the whole of Manchukuo. The half dozen colleges and universities which flourished in Chang Hsueh-liang's day have been closed. . . . Students who return to Manchukuo from advanced schools in China or Western countries undergo police inquiry and supervision; while they are abroad their parents are visited and questioned by the police." According

* Bisson: *Ibid.*, last chapter.

to a Chinese educator,* books used in primary schools consist chiefly of the sayings and deeds of Japanese, but the teachings and deeds of the Chinese are forbidden. No Chinese history or geography is taught, the name of China being eliminated from all textbooks. Six hours of Japanese language are required per week in all schools. "The only subject receiving as much attention as the Japanese language is so-called labor training which consists of doing the menial tasks for which otherwise servants would be employed. . . . The education is in accordance with the slogan: 'The Manchurian people have only to use their hands but not their brains, since we Japanese have planned everything for them'."

Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers in Manchuria refused to yield to the invader but continued fighting from 1931 to the present day. They took refuge in hills and woods and were protected by the local farmers, practically all of whom were on their side, and many of whom joined them. The Japanese army therefore devised in 1936 a drastic method of separating these armed volunteers from their civilian base. The population of whole areas was concentrated in "protected villages" surrounded by high mud walls, deep ditches and barbed wire fences. Outlying farmhouses were burned to the ground and in some districts the standing grain was fired. The villagers were registered to control the entrance of outsiders. Periodic checkups were made. Villagers unable to produce their residence certificates were executed. In a typical village visited by Mr. Bisson some thirty or forty of the 150 families living there had been forcibly moved in from surrounding territory after their homes had been burned by the Japanese. The Japanese authorities gave them no financial assistance to build new homes inside the village; this was done by the help of other Chinese. Taxes on land were from two to three times what they had been in 1931. There were also additional taxes for "military protection." About once a week a de-

* Chin Pei: *Voice of China*, May 15, 1937.

tachment of forty to fifty Japanese troops made a visit and had to be welcomed, quartered and fed for the night at the expense of the village. By the middle of 1937 between five and six million of the rural population had been confined in such villages. As a result of this terror, tens of thousands of Chinese farmers were migrating to the more distant parts of Manchuria or south of the Great Wall. Disorder and insecurity were more widespread than they had ever been.

Year after year the Chinese government in Nanking met this Japanese aggression with conciliation. Chinese citizens who protested were suppressed. Anti-Japanese students and teachers were jailed. Outspokenly patriotic newspapers were ordered to be more friendly to Japan or to close down. Anti-Japanese officials were weeded out of the local governments of North China by the Central Government itself. When the Japanese pressed westward into Chahar, Marshal Feng formed an "anti-Japanese people's army" and in three months re-conquered the territory they had seized. The Nanking government thereupon ordered Marshal Feng to disband his army and leave the province, and mobilized troops to compel him to do so; North Chahar thus fell to the invader. A year later when other northern troops showed indignation at orders to submit to Japanese pressure, Chiang Kai-shek moved 145,000 of them south. So conciliatory was the Nanking government that to some it almost seemed at times to act as Japan's agent.

Many Chinese patriots were not slow to call this policy treason. Treasonable influence by Japanese agents and Chinese who had Japanese interests played, without doubt, a part. Others called it Chinese patience and desire for peaceful relations; this element was in it too. Many Chinese leaders were undoubtedly sincere in their belief that a conciliatory attitude would arouse in the Japanese a similar response. Certainly no pacifist in the world could better the eloquent statement of the Generalissimo at the Fifth Congress of the Kuomintang in November, 1935: "We

shall not forsake peace until there is no hope for peace. We shall not talk lightly of sacrifice until we are driven to the last extremity which makes sacrifice inevitable."*

No concessions made by China appeased the Japanese armies. Surrenders to fascism never do. At the end of 1935 in the midst of Nanking's most humiliating surrenders, Major General Tada, Japanese commander of the North China garrison, declared that it was quite hopeless to deal with Nanking "so long as Chiang Kai-shek and his clique continue to dominate China. . . . Therefore, the Japanese Empire should act independently."† Clearly, despite all the yielding of Nanking—whether that yielding was patience or treason, or weakness or shrewd delay—the Japanese divined an inner resistance in China which might one day challenge their rule.

* *The Chinese Yearbook*, 1936-37, Pages 433-4.
† *China Weekly Review*, November 2, 1935, Page 306.

8. CHINA MOVES TO UNITE

FIGHTING against time while Japan pressed on from the north, the Chinese government in Nanking strove to unify the country in the various ways known to modern capitalist states. It was backed by the Chinese bankers of Shanghai and by foreign recognition; this was followed by foreign loans and consultants. American planes and flyers, German military advisors strengthened Chiang Kai-shek's army and began to bring recalcitrant local war lords under at least nominal allegiance to the central power.

New roads and railroads, new factories, far-flung airlines began to change the face of old China, making the physical basis for a united state. Modern government buildings rising in Nanking reflected such a state in the making. Two-, three- and ten-year plans were made for expanding industry. Dikes were built, wastelands reclaimed and divided among the farmers. National prestige was strengthened when Chiang Kai-shek announced the end of the "unequal treaties" and gained a limited sovereignty in fixing tariffs, although the customs revenue and its handling still remained in foreign hands.

One of the greatest barriers to intercourse and trade between the provinces was the chaotic money system. Local currency was often based on merely the printing presses of local war lords. The soundest currency was silver. America's silver purchasing policy in 1932 raised the price and drew out of all the Chinese rural districts a great silver river flowing abroad; widespread bankruptcies followed. The government used the emergency to create on November 6, 1935, a new stabilized money system throughout the coun-

try. Silver was nationalized through three government banks; paper currency was issued against it. The extraordinary readiness with which the people gave up their silver coins for paper marked a new stage in national confidence and stabilized the new currency at once. It functioned smoothly from the beginning and assisted a general revival in business which enabled the government to push more rapidly its projects for national reconstruction. Even the high price of silver, which had threatened the country with chaos, was cleverly made an asset, for by selling it abroad, large reserves of foreign exchange were acquired in London and New York, which strengthened the Chinese government's foreign credit. A chorus of denunciation arose in Tokyo because China had thus dared strengthen itself without permission from Japan.

To promote a corresponding modernization in the manners of the people, Chiang Kai-shek launched the "New Life" movement, to which Madame Chiang especially gave her enthusiasm. It preached the application to modern life of Confucian principles of "right relations"; its four virtues were: "Courtesy," "Service," "Honesty," "Honor." It prompted education, playgrounds, clean city streets, sports and healthful activities and aroused popular sentiment against opium. It touched the youth of the intellectual and upper classes, but utterly failed to reach into the deep gulfs where the tens of millions of China's farmers and city workers lived and suffered.

The burdens of the Chinese farmers and share-croppers were not eased by these changes; they even increased. The cost of armies absorbed 60 to 80 per cent of the government's income. Famines increased: that of 1927 affected 9,000,000 people, that of 1928 27,000,000, that of 1929 57,000,000.* The terrible flood of 1931, aggravated by lack of proper upkeep of dikes, covered an area the size of Great Britain. Even the new roads, spectacular sign of China's progress, were to the poorer peasants an added burden. They were

* Gannes: *When China Unites*, p. 125.

built by forced labor, sometimes without payment; the right-of-way was taken without recompense; and the local peasants were not allowed to use their sharp-wheeled carts upon them.

Seven years after the establishment of the national government in Nanking, a competent foreign observer said: "Big landlords are consolidating their position at the expense of the poor peasantry. . . . Through the connivance of corrupt military authorities, they acquire age-old state and community lands and entrench themselves at the expense of the poor and middle farmers. . . . An army of refugees, driven from home by banditry, civil war, flood, drought, famine, has become the visible sign of China's plight. . . . When the Nationalists became ascendant in 1927, a population greater than that of Holland was homeless. In 1933 that toll reached the population of post-war Germany, 65,000,000. . . . The twin plagues of the rapacious landlord and the village usurer continue their seasonal triumph over the masses virtually unchecked.*

There is evidence that Chiang Kai-shek felt and regretted the separation between his government and the needs of the common people. In the third year of his power, calling upon members of the Kuomintang to correct their faults, he said: "We who staged the revolution have come to be regarded by the people as a privileged caste. They cherish toward us the same hate as formerly toward the Manchus. . . . It is impossible to find a single (Kuomintang) Party headquarters which really ministers to the welfare of people; all are stigmatized for corruption, bribery, scrambling for power." †

Despite his realization of these evils, the Generalissimo found no means but military force to deal with the popular unrest. The Soviet Districts seemed to him the chief hindrance to national unity; they must first be crushed before

* Professor Charles Hodges: *Asia Magazine*, May 1934.

† *China Yearbook*, 1931, p. 541. Speech made Oct. 30, 1930, at Central Party Headquarters.

China could deal with any foreign foe. He launched his fourth anti-Communist military campaign in 1932 at the very time when the heroic resistance of the Nineteenth Route Army to the Japanese in Shanghai was sending a unifying thrill of self-respect throughout the country, and when the Chinese Soviets were appealing for a common front against Japan. When the fourth campaign failed, a fifth and far more extensive one was begun with a new strategy. A force of 700,000 soldiers with modern war equipment, including an air force, closed slowly in from all sides on the central Soviet District in Kiangsi, building hundreds of miles of military roads and thousands of fortified blockhouses as they went. The local farmers were wooed by promises of land and freedom from oppressive taxes.

The pressure of this steadily narrowing iron ring slowly starved the Soviet Districts; they were especially tormented by lack of salt. They replied in 1933 with an appeal "to the Kuomintang Government, to all political leaders and to all political groups in China," offering a military alliance with any armies who would resist the Japanese invasion. They had already "declared war" against Japan in 1932 during the invasion of Shanghai, but had no means of putting this declaration into effect. They now asked that war against the Soviet Districts be stopped, and that the people of China be given democratic rights and be armed to fight for China's independence. No reply was received; their proposals were not even allowed to be printed in the press. They therefore determined upon one of the most dramatic exploits in modern times and one of the great marches of all history. Ninety thousand armed men, comprising the main forces of the Red Army, broke by surprise attack through four lines of fortifications on October 15, 1934, to begin what is now famed as the Long March.

Eight thousand miles over some of the world's roughest country, zigzagging south and west and then swinging far around to the north, across eighteen mountain ranges and

twenty-four rivers, the Red Army marched for more than a year with almost daily skirmishes and many critical battles. Besides eluding or defeating various forces of Central Government troops sent against them, they broke through the armies of ten different provincial war lords and occupied in passing sixty-two cities. They crossed six different districts of aboriginal tribesmen, some of which had not been penetrated by any Chinese force for a generation. They passed through great uninhabited grasslands in the Far West.

One spectacular single feat was the crossing of the Tatu River, in whose gorges many great armies of the past—from the days of the Three Kingdoms down to the T'aipings—had perished. To reach it they passed through the territory of the wild Lolo tribesmen, overcoming their age-long distrust of the Chinese by swearing a blood brotherhood pact with the Lolo chieftains. Thus they reached the Tatu River before they were expected and found the last remaining chance to cross it a suspension bridge of iron chains from which the wooden floors had been removed. In the face of a withering machine-gun fire, thirty volunteers swung hand over hand by the iron chains across the boiling river. Some of them perished, others reached the far side, stormed the machine guns and replaced the boards for the rest of the army. They were awarded the Gold Star, the highest decoration of the Chinese army. Edgar Snow, who met these heroes two years later in Northwest China, found them all under twenty-five.*

Throughout the Long March the Red Armies proclaimed that China must prepare for coming resistance to Japan. They used the very emergency of civil war, which had driven them forth on this difficult trek, to preach the need of national unity to eleven provinces. They proclaimed that they themselves were going to the Northwest to prepare for the inevitable war with Japan. Thus they came in early 1936 to Shensi, the earliest cradle of Chinese culture in the

* Edgar Snow: *Red Star Over China.*

far Northwest, now a harsh, arid, sparsely settled land on the edge of the Mongolian deserts. Though part of the "famine belt" and hence a poor base economically, it was a strategically important region for it was set squarely across the route where Japan was advancing in her efforts to drive a barrier between China and the Soviet Union.

If the Long March was thus used by the Red Armies to unify the country against Japan through propaganda, it also paradoxically assisted Chiang Kai-shek's military unification of China. His pursuit of the Red Armies took him personally with his Central Government troops into distant provinces whose provincial governors had never given any but the most formal recognition to Nanking. Officially he was coming to help them, with his superior troops and better equipment, against the joint enemy, the Red Army; actually it was not always clear what the local war lords most dreaded, a passing fight with the Red troops or a permanent subjection to Nanking. When the Long March was ended many distant provinces, especially Szechwan, Kweichow and Yunnan, had been brought, to a far greater extent than since the fall of the Manchus, under Central Government control.

During the year and a half when the Long March was helping to unify the interior provinces of China, another movement to unite and save the country began in Peiping. Japanese aggression in North China had increased throughout 1935 and threatened to set up an autonomous regime. Frequent Japanese airplane flights were made over Chinese cities; a large Japanese airdrome was feverishly being built on Chinese soil near Tientsin.* Japanese troops with full war equipment marched provocatively through the streets of the northern cities and occupied the railway junction of Fengtai, one of the two main entrances to Peiping. The inauguration of a new government for the two northern provinces was announced for December 16, 1935; it consisted of local army generals and several members of the notorious

* Bisson: *Japan in China.*

pro-Japanese Anfu clique, which the Chinese students had driven from office in 1919. The Japanese claimed that this new Hopeh-Chahar Political Council would be completely autonomous, separate from the rest of China.

Again the Peiping students rose to save their country. From early dawn to long after dark of December 16, they staged a monster demonstration. Ten thousand paraded the streets in disciplined order, save where their marching lines were broken by police assaults. Even while the students were being mercilessly beaten by leather belts, revolver butts and fists, they argued peaceably with the police, and filled their pockets with propaganda leaflets, reading: "To the police, to our dear countrymen bearing arms. . . . We are all Chinese together. Help us to save the country. Don't fight us, fight the Japanese." When the fire department turned a hose on these youths who had been standing or marching from six o'clock in the morning till four in the afternoon, they marched unflinchingly into the icy water to be met with beatings. The victims were carried off and cared for by their comrades. The remarkable self-control of these young people so aroused the city that the inauguration of the new government was postponed for two days. It was never announced as "autonomous." The Japanese hope of separating North China from Nanking by intrigues and pressures without large-scale war had been thwarted by the students.

The patriotic movement rapidly reached nation-wide proportions. All railway traffic in Shanghai was tied up when thousands of students seized the North Station, demanding transportation to Nanking to present their protest to the government. Some actually commandeered a train and held such rousing meetings in the towns and villages along the railway that the military authorities destroyed a bridge to stop their approach to the capital. In the Wuhan cities the provincial authorities suspended ferry service for three days to prevent the demonstrations, but were finally forced to allow a parade of more than ten thousand students in

Hankow. During the New Year vacation student groups carried thousands of pounds of leaflets into North China villages.

Not only students but people of all occupations were drawn into the rising patriotic movement and formed "Save-the-Nation" * associations. They demanded the immediate stopping of all civil war, the freeing of political prisoners and negotiations between all parties in the country for joint resistance to Japan. At the end of May a Students' Save-the-Nation Union was formed in Shanghai by a congress of delegates from twenty-one districts. The following day the All China Federation of Save-the-Nation Unions was organized by sixty delegates from fifty different callings and professions.

The sincerity and judgment of this new organization were immediately tested by the announcement by General Pai Chung-hsi of Kwangsi Province that he was organizing an anti-Japanese expedition. He demanded passage to the northern provinces in order to fight Japan. Since the Nanking government was not yet ready for this action, a sharp political crisis followed which threatened civil war. Though General Pai was a friend of the Save-the-Nation movement, they condemned the proposed expedition—after considerable discussion—since it could not be carried on without internal disunity. The strained situation was peacefully settled; this was the first time public opinion had been strong enough in China to prevent a sharp disagreement between rival military forces from leading to civil war. It was the more important since the Kwangsi generals were, after the Communists, the most important group still unreconciled with Chiang.

The first indication that Chiang Kai-shek's attitude was stiffening toward Japan came with the celebration of his fiftieth birthday, marked by the presentation to the government of fifty-five airplanes paid for by popular subscription. In an address to the nation, the Generalissimo declared: "So

* Sometimes translated "National Salvation Associations."

long as we have not recovered our lost sovereign rights and restored our territorial integrity, we will never be free as a people or independent as a nation." In the same speech, however, he declared that all "traitors" must be eliminated, "especially the Communists." Anti-Japanese activities by the Chinese people were classed as Communism. Seven officers of the All-China-Save-the-Nation Union were arrested on November 23, 1936; they were all prominent national leaders, including a school president, the vice-president of a bank, and several well-known lawyers and writers.

Meantime dramatic events of tremendous import for China's unity were preparing. The background was the fighting in Suiyuan province, northwest of Peiping, where local Chinese generals were beating back Manchurian and Mongolian forces led by Japanese. All China in late 1936 was flaming with enthusiasm for these defenders. Women's organizations in Peiping sent them ten thousand first-aid kits. Coolies contributed coppers, officials a tenth of a month's salary. Large supplies of military equipment including eighty bombing planes were sent by the Nanking government northwest to Sian, the end of the railway, presumably en route to Suiyuan. The Generalissimo followed, but at once made it plain to the local forces in Sian, who were clamoring to be sent north to aid their heroic compatriots in Suiyuan, that they were to march first not against Japan but against the Communists.

The forces in Sian consisted chiefly of the Tungpei troops under Chang Hsueh-liang, former war lord of Manchuria They had been impressed, as had been all military men in China, by the remarkable fighting ability, tactics and generalship shown by the Red Armies in the Long March. They were still more impressed by the slogans of the Reds, urging them to fight back to their old home in Manchuria where most of their families still lived:

> Fight back to our old home!
> Drive away the Japanese robbers!
> Manchuria is ours!

North China is ours!
Arise, people of China!
We refuse to be slaves!
Fight back to our old home!
Arise, ye who refuse to be slaves,
Let us stand together and form a new Great Wall!

The Tungpei men had already had several months' experience in fighting the Red Armies in the Northwest during which two of their crack divisions had deserted to the Communists. Others were captured and released, and brought back glowing accounts of the discipline, morale and anti-Japanese spirit of the Communist troops. Finally, Marshal Chang himself had met one of the Communist leaders and established an informal truce.

When it became plain that the Generalissimo had come to Sian to renew the war against the Red armies, Sian students staged a demonstration in which police authorities seriously wounded two demonstrators, aged twelve and thirteen years. Marshal Chang asked to be sent against Japan instead of against the Communists; the Generalissimo replied by showing him an official order disbanding his troops and replacing him with another general, and gave him till the following morning to choose. That night, December 11, 1936, thirteen Tungpei officers made the decision; by six o'clock in the morning it was accomplished. The insurgents seized not only the Generalissimo in a dramatic early morning pursuit up a mountainside in the snow, but disarmed and arrested all his bodyguards, took over the police stations and the bombing planes at the airport. Similar action took place in Kansu province, putting two provinces in the position of apparent rebels to the Central Government.

Wide-spread civil war at once threatened. The insurgent group declared that they still considered Chiang their leader and had no intention of rebelling, but wished only to offer "advice by military force." The advice included cessation of all civil war, release of the famous seven Save-the-Nation

leaders and all political prisoners, freedom for patriotic movements, and the reorganization of the government so that all parties might share the responsibility of saving the nation. The Generalissimo refused all parleys. Militarist elements in Nanking began hostilities by bombing a town not far from Sian, undeterred by the fact that this might lead to the execution of the Generalissimo. It became clear that pro-Japanese elements in Nanking were willing to see this happen and to rise to power on the ruins of civil war. Patriotic forces throughout China were also deeply stirred and bent all efforts toward securing a peaceful release of the Generalissimo. Madame Chiang herself flew to Sian with Mr. Donald, the Generalissimo's foreign friend and advisor, and was followed by her brother, T. V. Soong, known as a liberal patriot.

The most effective influence in the situation was the attitude of the Communist leaders in the Soviet District in Shensi, north of Sian. They had had no part in the action and had not even known of it until afterwards. They had, however, become convinced that in spite of Chiang's campaigns against them he was preparing to lead China eventually against Japan. "We became convinced not by his words, but by the way he built his roads and railroads, and fortified points on the rivers and some of the northern passes," said Jen Peh-hsi to me long afterward in Shansi. "This changed our own view of the united front. Instead of wishing to unite the Chinese people against Japan and against Chiang Kai-shek, we began to wish for a united front with Chiang against Japan. He, however, was not convinced of our sincerity but thought our intent was still to overthrow him. Then the events at Sian convinced Chiang of our sincere desire for Chinese unity against the invader. After that, cooperation became possible.*

* Mao Tse-tung, secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, had already declared in early 1936: "If Chiang Kai-shek really means to take up the struggle against Japan, then obviously the (Chinese) Soviet Government will extend to him the hand of friendship on the field of battle against Japan." *International Press Correspondence.* London, March 14, 1936.

As soon as the Communists learned of the detention of the Generalissimo, they sent a delegation from the Soviet District to Sian, led by Chou En-lai, who ten years earlier had cooperated with the Generalissimo in the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, and been by him later in Shanghai condemned to death. He used his very considerable influence with the Tungpei officers to urge the Generalissimo's release. Madame Chiang herself states:* "Contrary to outside beliefs, they were not interested in detaining the Generalissimo. They preferred instead his quick release." By voicing the passionate demand that was arising throughout the country against this new threat of civil war, they succeeded with some difficulty in prevailing upon the hotheaded Tungpei officers to give up their demand for a public trial of the Generalissimo, which might have resulted in his death and certainly in the destruction of his prestige. Chiang Kai-shek was aware of these discussions, and finally agreed to listen to his captors and to Chou En-lai. The price of eighty thousand dollars, placed on the head of Chou En-lai years earlier, had not been removed when he came to Sian to argue for the release of the man who had placed it there.

This amazing sequence of events in Sian whereby the leader-in-chief of all China was forcibly detained, with many apologies, by his own followers, and then set free through the intercession of his enemies, was a turning point in modern Chinese history. Beginning as a threat of the most serious civil war China had yet known, the final results placed the finishing touches on the growing unity of the country. The Generalissimo was convinced by these dramatic events that the Communists were sincere in placing above all ancient enmities the unity of China against Japan. During the ensuing months the path led steadily to the building of an alliance against the common foe.

It was not attained immediately. Drama at Sian was followed by many weeks of anti-climax: the arrest of Marshal

* May-ling Soong Chiang: *Sian. A Coup D'État.*

Chang for insubordination; his pardon by the Generalissimo; the denunciation of "Communist-bandits" at the February session of the Kuomintang, combined with the offer of "a chance to repent." By the agreement finally reached, the Soviet District was reorganized as the "Special Border District" under the general authority of the Central Government; local democratic elections were held which in most cases returned the Communists to office. Landlords were allowed to return but not to receive their lands again, except enough for their own use. In all new districts the Communists agreed to refrain from land confiscation in return for the Kuomintang's promise to increase democratic rights throughout China and to concern itself with "People's Livelihood." The Red Army was reorganized as one of the government armies and sent to the front against Japan, thus fulfilling the prophecy they had made on the Long March. This, however, took place months later, after Japan had struck.

The Japanese militarists well knew the importance of the events in Sian. During the negotiations the Japanese Prime Minister declared that if reconciliation between the Chinese factions were achieved there, Japan could no longer continue her "wait and see" policy. Four hundred political prisoners released in Sian, the first of many thousands to be released in China, were also sharply conscious of the importance of the event. Ill from long confinement, many with tuberculosis, heart trouble, or half-healed wounds, they seemed upon release to forget their physical misery and began eagerly reading the news and discussing the coming resistance to the Japanese invader. For they knew that the growing Chinese unity achieved in Sian would not be endured by Japan.

9. JAPAN STRIKES

THE lightning struck in the midst of calm, for the calm itself was electric with reasons why the lightning must strike. China was progressing toward internal peace and national independence in the spring of 1937 more rapidly than at any time for a decade. Troops of both northern and southern generals were being reorganized under the Central Government. Communists were working out the details of cooperation with the Kuomintang. Internal economic conditions, government revenues and foreign trade were rapidly recovering from the depression levels of 1934. Roads, railroads, airplane lines and all forms of communication were being swiftly extended; the new Canton-Hankow railway, completed in 1936, formed the last link between North and South across the center of China.

The Chinese government showed increasing independence in diplomatic discussions with Japan at the end of 1936. To Japan's request for the right to establish an air line to Shanghai, China suggested that Japan first stop illegal airplane flights over North China. To Japan's demand for further reductions in Chinese tariffs, China suggested that the puppet regime in East Hopeh stop wholesale smuggling. To Japan's demand that China employ Japanese advisers, China answered that she would gladly do so in any fields where Japanese technicians were the best, but that this was her own internal affair. To Japan's demand that "anti-Japanese activity" be suppressed in China, the Nanking diplomats said that they were doing their best but that Japan's own policy caused such activity. Japan's demands

for a "special position" in North China and her offer of help to suppress Chinese Communists were not publicly answered, but it was widely believed that Nanking had turned both these suggestions down. The expected "autonomous" North China had been balked by the student demonstrations. The fighting in Suiyuan had made it clear that Japan could advance no farther by using Manchurian and Mongolian troops under Japanese officers; these were not only beaten by the local Chinese armies, but they began in the spring of 1937 to stage anti-Japanese uprisings of their own. The Japanese military must either break the growing strength of China by large-scale war or give up hope of further advance.

The internal situation of Japan also demanded action. The Japanese people had begun to declare themselves against the growing fascism of the army. The elections in February, 1936—the first to be held for four years—showed a strongly rising anti-fascist sentiment.* The army extremists replied to this election by an uprising in which they temporarily seized Tokyo and assassinated several high government officials, including four Cabinet ministers. The chief loss was that of Takahashi, the able finance minister who was driving the country along the lines of a prudent capitalist expansion, curtailing army expenditures and even denying the need of a war with the Soviet Union. The hot-headed young officers who staged the revolt were suppressed, but their policies were adopted under more conservative army leadership. The anti-fascist drift of the people continued. A sharp rise in the cost of living brought about a wave of strikes; the first four months of 1937 showed by official figures 929 labor disputes, more than in any similar period in Japanese history and almost twice as many as in the corresponding period of the previous year. In another unexpected general election held April 30, 1937,

* Elections February, 1936: Seiyukai, most conservative party, lost 68 seats and Minseito, mildly liberal party, gained 78. The Social Mass Party (trade union) rose from 3 seats to 18. The Proletarian Labor Party from 0 to 3, and Independents, mostly liberal, rose from 10 to 31.

the Social Mass Party, rather confused but representing the trade unions, doubled its vote, chiefly at the expense of the Minseito. It was clear that unless the army acted swiftly, its hopes of foreign conquest and of fascist domination at home might be stopped by the Japanese people.

The international situation also seemed favorable to the militarists' hopes of conquest. Europe's mind was on Spain; she was fearful of Hitler and Mussolini. The Soviet army was absorbed in purging its ranks of traitors. The United States had passed the Neutrality Act and was showing herself more "isolationist" than at any time in her history. All these facts, but especially the growing unity of China, suggested speedy action, unless the hopes of the Japanese militarists for world conquest were to be permanently thwarted by the rise of an independent nation of 450,000,000 people across their path.

Rumors of impending trouble filled the air at Peiping at the end of June, and multiplied in the first week of July. Chief among the causes for Chinese anxiety were the military maneuvers by Japanese troops at Marco Polo Bridge, an area of extreme strategic importance south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow railway, controlling the only still unobstructed access to the rest of China. No treaty permitted Japanese maneuvers in this area. Despite Chinese protests, the maneuvers continued ten days. In the middle of the night of July 7-8, the Japanese army, claiming that a soldier was missing and that "certain persons" had fired on them and fled in the direction of a nearby walled city, demanded permission to search the town. Since it was after midnight, the guards at the city gates refused to open. Fighting broke out at 4:30 A.M. of July 8 and lasted until 9:30, the Chinese troops suffering some two hundred casualties from heavy artillery fired by the Japanese.* Thus began the present war in China.

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* *China Weekly Review*, October 30, 1937. For a complete analysis of all events and reports of the first month of war, see Bisson: *Japan in China*, Chapter 1.

Local peace parleys, mixed with confused armed clashes, filled the next three weeks. The one thing completely clear in all this period is that while the Chinese commanders hesitated, some advocating resistance and others surrender, thousands of Japanese troops were pouring into North China. Japanese consuls in China were ordered on July 11 to prepare Japanese citizens for evacuation; on the same day, Japanese troops with field guns, armored cars and airplanes arrived in Tientsin. From the outset it was clear that the Japanese War Office was beginning war. On July 12, the Nanking government proposed cessation of troop movements on both sides, and declared that no local settlement would be valid without its sanction. Japan, on the other hand, demanded that the northern provincial government submit without Nanking's interference, and that no Chinese government troops should be sent north. Her own troops continued to arrive in increasing numbers; on July 15 the Japanese commander of the North China garrison, Katsuki, announced his intention "to chastise the outrageous Chinese."* Throughout July the Japanese people showed considerable suspicion of their army's intentions; Tokyo used the many minor clashes to arouse the people with a picture of small Japanese forces in danger of their lives in China.

Beginning large-scale operations on the morning of July 28, the Japanese troops smashed down through China. The Chinese had no unified command or purpose, no military preparations and no general plan for resistance. Chinese troops cried bitterly when ordered to leave Peiping without fighting. Almost at once, however, a revolt in the government of East Hopeh showed that the Japanese could no longer count on their subsidized Chinese mercenaries. Some of these former bandits, suspected by the Japanese of not being entirely reliable, had been expelled from the East Hopeh capital on July 27, a few hundred of them being

* *Peiping Chronicle Interview*, July 15, 1937.

killed in the process. Within two days, on July 29, the rest of the Chinese mercenary troops in the capital revolted, slaughtered the handful of Japanese troops and also more than two hundred Japanese and Korean residents, who were connected mainly with the smuggling activities of the East Hopeh government.

The same day, July 29, is memorable to China for another military event, the Japanese attack on Tientsin, where they not only confiscated warehouses full of privately owned commodities, including a million dollars worth of Chinese flour, but systematically destroyed Nankai University. This was the first of the many attacks on Chinese centers of learning, which convinced the Chinese that Japan's purpose was not merely to subdue their country but to blot out all independent Chinese thought. A Chinese student described it as follows:

> Who could watch the swarms of planes carrying deadly loads over Nankai without a bitter curse on his lips? Watch the first plane drop a flag for a target on the roof of our irreplaceable library. See the squadrons follow, methodically drop their bombs and return to their base for more. And to make certain that destruction was complete, soldiers with kerosene tins set fire to the trees and brushwood all around the campus . . . then artillery opened up on the concrete buildings which escaped the fire. . . . Nankai was the first Chinese institution to bring the great achievements of modern science to our country. It furnished engineers, chemists and economists to develop our North.*

In Hankow, months later, Chinese intellectual leaders told me, with trembling emotion, that after the attack on Nankai they realized that the culture of four thousand years, which even the Mongol hordes had been proud to

* *Voice of China*, August 15, 1937.

spare and to copy, was faced with doom unless they resisted.*

Rapidly the military and civilian leaders of China consolidated around the Central Government. Telegrams of support poured into Nanking from Chinese inside the country and overseas. The ban on anti-Japanese agitation and songs was lifted. On July 31, the seven famous patriots, officials of the Save-the-Nation Union, were released from Soochow, where they had been in jail for eight months for the crime of opposing Japan. In the first week of August, military leaders from all parts of the country arrived in Nanking to offer their services: Marshall Yen Hsi-shan from the Far North, General Pai Chung-hsi from the Far South, General Liu Hsiang from the Far West, and General Lung Yun, who came from the distant southwest mountains of Yunnan for the first time in his career. The agreement with the Communists was completed; the Red Army, reorganized under Chu Teh as the Eighth Route Army of the government, moved toward the front in northern Shansi. By the end of August, every military leader in China was under the command of the Central Government.

Japan's aim was to seize the five northern provinces which contained China's chief supply of coal and iron, and at the same time to so paralyze the Nanking government that Central and South China would be submissive. North

* A statement issued November 5, 1937, from Shanghai, signed by nearly one hundred presidents of colleges and eminent educators, declared:

"For more than three months the Japanese army has with singular thoroughness attacked with shellfire and aerial bombs one university after another. At the time of writing, no less than twenty-three universities and colleges have been destroyed. . . . Reliable information shows that the National Central University was actually marked as a bombing objective on the map given to Japanese pilots. . . . It was the object of attack at four different times. The Japanese cannot claim to have mistaken it for a military establishment so often. Other institutions—the National Sun Yat-sen University and the Tung-chai University—were miles away from any possible field of military operations, with which they have never been connected in any way."

China was to be seized by southward drives along three railways; one due south from Peiping to Hankow; another southeast from Tientsin to Nanking; the third swinging west and then south over the highlands of Shansi toward Sian, where the southernmost bend of the Yellow River meets the westernmost point on the Lunghai Railway line. These three north-and-south railway routes dominate all North China. Since no campaign in North China, however destructive, could immediately affect Nanking's military strength, which was based on the Yangtze Valley and especially on the port of Shanghai, Japan invaded Shanghai early in the campaign.

Taking advantage of the extra-territoriality of the International Settlement, a Japanese naval squadron landed directly on Shanghai docks on August 11, demanding the withdrawal of all Chinese forces and the dismantling of all Chinese military defense works near the city. The Chinese government rushed two divisions of its army into defense positions in the Chapei-Kiangwan area. The following morning fighting began in several places, marked at first by the swift retreat of the Japanese forces. Only at heavy cost and with the aid of the Japanese navy were more and more troops landed along the shores of the river. Japanese airplanes meantime raided not only Shanghai but cities far in the interior of China. Despite far greater power in military equipment and planes, the Japanese were forced to pay a heavy price for every foot of territory. For seventy-six days the Chapei-Kiangwan line withstood a terrific battering from airplanes, battleships and mechanized troops. Finally outflanked by the landing of more Japanese, the Chinese withdrew to a new line which was again similarly outflanked. The occupation of Shanghai was completed on November 12, after three months of fighting which had cost Japan her heaviest miltary losses since the Russo-Japanese War.

The fall of Shanghai did not shake the morale of the Chinese people; the heroic stand of their soldiers had for

the first time convinced them that they could eventually beat Japan. In hand-to-hand combat Chinese soldiers proved at least equal, and often superior, to the Japanese. Many heroic battalions held out to the last man under the deadly rain of iron from the sky. These included a battalion at Paohan, whose members all died at their posts on September 9, and four battalions from Hunan, not a single man of which retreated from his machine gun before the battalions were wiped out on October 24 by the mechanical superiority of the invaders. The most famous of the "lone battalions" was a body of men from the 88th Division, who barricaded themselves in a warehouse within sight of the International Settlement and held out with hand grenades and machine guns for four days against a concentrated attack of artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and incendiary bombs. Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai watched breathlessly from the sidelines; a huge Chinese flag was smuggled to them from the Shanghai Civic Association and hoisted to the top of the warehouse in full view of the crowds. When at last Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent them orders to retire from the already flaming building, the whole of China hailed the heroism and endurance of her soldiers and began to believe that she might win the war.

China had on paper more than a millon troops throughout the country, but many of these were badly trained and poorly equipped provincial armies, almost worthless for real war. Even the best divisions of Central Government troops had only one-quarter as many rifles and one-sixth as many machine guns as the Japanese divisions.* The other forces had come under the command of the Central Government so recently that there was no unified staff work, no correlation between aviation, artillery and infantry, or even between the separate infantry divisions. "The disparity in armaments between the two armies nearly equalled that of rifles against bows and arrows," said the *North China News,* describing one of the northern battles. "The Japan-

* Soviet estimate in *The Bolshevik.*

ese had hundreds of motor lorries, tanks, and every kind of modern army artillery, An air fleet of one hundred planes did most of the fighting, raining down death on Chinese forces who had not a single plane or anti-aircraft gun. This broke up all the Chinese formations and prevented their making a stand anywhere."

These grave defects in the Chinese military organization were not so obvious in the hand-to-hand fighting in Shanghai where individual courage counted, but they produced catastrophic results on most of the northern battle-fronts and in the Yangtze delta as soon as the theater of war was enlarged beyond the city of Shanghai. During the last three weeks in November Japanese troops occupied all the territory near that city and advanced in several parallel columns toward the National Government's proud capital at Nanking. By the second week of December this also was taken. So long had the Japanese prepared for this day, and so good had been their espionage, that it was noted that Japanese forces knew the whole intricate system of canals in the Yangtze delta better than most of the Chinese generals did.

The wholesale rape, looting and massacre, which accompanied the fall of Nanking, shocked the whole world. Similar atrocities had occurred in other cities and villages, but Nanking was full of observing foreigners and uncontroverted facts went abroad. Thousand of Chinese soldiers who gave up their arms and surrendered without fighting, some of them on the advice of foreign missionaries who sought thus to save their lives, were tied together and executed in batches. A similar fate attended thousands of civilians who were suspected of having helped the Chinese armies, and even women and children who in any way irritated Japanese soldiers. One Chinese, who had escaped with his life by falling under a heap of bodies, reported to the foreign missionary friend who had advised him to surrender that some of his companions had been used for bayonet practice, others for rifle targets; others had been ma-

chine-gunned, then covered with gasoline and set ablaze. Wounded men in the Presbyterian Hospital were slaughtered in their beds, and Chinese nurses and doctors were violated or slain.

Wholesale seizing of women by the Japanese troops was a common practice. An American mission doctor told me of a city in the Yangtze delta where the Japanese troops threw guards around a section of the town, driving out all the men and detaining the women to use at will. Ten girls belonging to the American mission sent out an appeal by their expelled male relatives and were rescued by a heroic American doctor who pulled them out past the bared bayonets of Japanese guards. Other missionaries have told me of the same practice in Chinese villages; the whole male population, unarmed, was forced to leave their women to their fate.

Even American homes and missions were not always able to protect their Chinese women servants and the terrified refugee women within their walled courts. Fifteen cases in which American homes were entered and the American flag torn down were listed in the protest sent by the U. S. State Department to Japan. The disregard of Japanese troops for foreign rights, shown both by this invasion of foreign homes and by several deliberate airplane attacks on American and British ships in the Yangtze River—the most daring being the destruction of the American gunboat "Panay" and three American oil tankers—almost made it seem that Japan was now so confident of her conquest of China that she was already beginning the defiant expulsion of Western powers.

After the fall of Nanking, Japan expected complete surrender by the Chinese government. That this did not happen is due to several factors, chief of which was a battle that had taken place two months earlier, little heralded, between the Japanese and the Eighth Route Army in a distant mountain pass on the Great Wall in the North. Pinghsing Pass was so far away and so unreported by foreign

correspondents that only weeks later was it realized that the victory there and the battle of Sinkow that followed were even more important in saving China than the later better-known victory at Taierchwang.

Of the three railway lines by which the Japanese were driving southward into China, the one to the west through the Shansi highlands was strategically the most important, since its high plateaus flanked the other two valley routes. The Japanese showed their appreciation of its importance by sending to seize it large numbers of fresh crack troops under their most famous officer, Major General Itagaki—who was later made Minister of War in Tokyo. These forces entered Shansi full of such contempt for Chinese armies, that they approached the high passes where the Great Wall crosses the mountains without even bothering to send out reconnoitering patrols. As the Japanese advanced through a narrow canyon on September 25, troops of the Eighth Route Army swooped down on them from the hills and completely destroyed a two-mile column of men, horses, supplies and vehicles. By the end of the day they had annihilated half a regiment and occupied all the enemy's positions.

This Chinese victory sufficiently demoralized the Japanese advance so that after they had crossed by other passes into northern Shansi, a combined defense by Chinese armies of General Wei Li-huang in frontal positions and Eighth Route Army troops harrying the enemy's rear, held the Japanese at Sinkow for nearly a month. This delay of Itagaki's crack troops in North Shansi made it impossible for the other Japanese forces on the Peiping-Hankow line to continue their advance. They were eventually compelled to abandon for the time their own objective—Chengchow and Hankow —and turn westward to help Itagaki.

Time was of the essence in that situation. The delay in Shansi and the diversion of other troops from the direct march south kept the Japanese out of Central China at a time when their appearance there would have been decisive. Hankow at that time was practically undefended; all the

Generalissimo's best forces and his chief attention were concentrated on the war in the Yangtze delta. The Japanese clearly planned to converge on Nanking not only from the direction of Shanghai but also down the river after taking Hankow. Had they been able to do this, as they probably would have been but for the Pinghsing Pass battle,* the fall of Nanking would have left no place of retreat for the Chinese government. Occurring at a time when the influence of defeatist groups was still strong, it would have meant that complete surrender to Japan must have followed.

When Nanking fell at last, it was under quite different conditions. The victors themselves were exhausted by the unexpected strength of resistance at Shanghai; the Chinese armies had withdrawn to a new base. While both sides rested and reorganized for future battles, the Chinese had time to absorb the full lessons of the first stages of war. They had learned that they might expect from these conquerors not merely political oppression, but ruthless destruction of Chinese culture, security and life. They had learned that defeat meant slaughter of old men and children, looting of homes and raping of women. They had learned that capitulation brought no mercy, but slavery in "protected villages" for the farmer and frustration of educational chances for aspiring youth. They had also learned with pride that Japanese could be beaten in hand-to-hand combat, although they could wipe out even the most heroic soldiers by superior mechanized might. Last of all, they had begun to learn from the battle of Pinghsing Pass, that even this mechanized might could be broken through surprise attacks on its flanks and its communication lines.

Out of this knowledge was evolved both increased determination to continue resistance and the future plan of campaign. Out of it also came a new base for the Chinese government. The ten-year-old dependence on the port of Shanghai, its bankers, its foreign trade, its world imperialists, was broken by the fall of Nanking. Chiang Kai-shek showed

* For fuller account of this battle, see Chapter 11.

his awareness of the new base of power in his statement to the nation broadcast in early December from his new military headquarters in Wuchang. "The basis of China's future success in prolonged resistance is not found in Nanking or big cities, but in villages all over China and in the fixed determination of the people." With these words the Generalissimo returned to the source of power which ten years earlier had given such unconquerable vigor to the northward drive of the Kuomintang.

"When the Japanese took Nanking they lost the war," they will tell you shrewdly, paradoxically today in China. Two capitals were gone and five provinces invaded, big industry and commerce had been destroyed. But planted foursquare on a million square miles of stubborn, hard-working farmers, with her back against the great mountains and deserts of Asia, China had just begun to fight.

10. CHINA MOVES INLAND

DRIVEN by the whirlwind of war the life of China fled inland. The capital was moved to Chungking in far west Szechwan, the "Heavenly Residence" where China's leaders have found refuge in past historic invasions. This was but the formal sign of a more momentous movement. More than government, more than the whole city of Nanking, went west into the hinterland. Life, industry, culture—banks and factories from Shanghai, students and professors from Peiping, many-millioned populations from the coastal provinces—were all swept westward. They strove to stabilize themselves in the back country. A new China of the inner provinces began.

Shanghai, once chief center of China's commerce, became a dead city. The Chinese spoke of it as "the dead island," referring not to physical geography, but to the encircling sea of Japanese armies which cut it off from the Chinese mainland. The International Settlement and French Concession still existed physically—corpses of giant office buildings through which the lifeblood of commerce no longer flowed. Save for Japanese boats bearing troops and munitions, the number of ships that called was greatly diminished; they dropped Shanghai not because it was any longer dangerous, but because it no longer had paying cargo. Foreign businessmen and journalists went through rather dazed routine motions, habits of past decades. Some began to move to other cities; others guessed—will Shanghai come back in a year, in five or ten years? It was hard for them to admit that the old prosperity of Shanghai grew not from foreigners but from the vast back country of China. Cut off

from the life of that hinterland, Shanghai, greatest port of the East, died.

The far greater Chinese city of Shanghai around the foreign settlements, with more than two million people, no longer existed even physically. It was not merely a dead city but a murdered one. I drove for miles through once populous factory districts that now are heaps of ashes. Never in any other war have I seen such devastation; for this was not the normal run of war. It was done afterwards; a month after the Japanese occupation, the suburb Nantao was flaming. In the small suburb Hongkew, nine hundred factories were destroyed. The number of factories demolished in all China was estimated at 8,297,* the larger part of which were in the Yangtze delta.

Wandering with special permit into the ruined area—where months after the destruction the Chinese homeowners were not yet permitted by the Japanese to return—I saw for miles no life in the jumble of ashes and twisted columns except occasional gangs of coolies under Japanese bayonets, collecting scrap metal from broken buildings. Plumbing fixtures, metal utensils, even rusty nails from the ashes were quite thoroughly picked over. By January it was estimated that more than 100,000 tons of scrap iron had gone to the Japanese munition factories from the broken homes of Shanghai. Near some identifiable parts of walls and gutted interiors, my accompanying friend told me: "Here was a Cantonese with fifty apprentices. . . . Here was a man from a Chekiang village, who by sweated labor of his family bought at last a lathe and employed labor. . . . Matsui can go back to the Japanese industrialists and tell them, 'Your chief competitor in the East is dead.'"

Tens of millions of people from the Yangtze delta were moving westward across the face of China before the storm of war. Traveling along the Lunghai line I saw them jamming the stations, fighting to get on trains. But they spread

* Chinese report to International Labor Conference, Geneva, *New York Times*, June 12, 1938.

far beyond the rail lines and waterways. West from Hankow, Sian, Changsha, they thronged the highways; the newly built motor roads, which till recently kept off heavy peasant carts to protect their surfaces, now contained a variegated assortment of primitive means of transport. The well-to-do traveled in sedan chairs and rickshas, in horse-drawn carriages, on donkeys and mules. Others had handcarts or wheelbarrows to transport their meager possessions; millions had merely their own backs. Sailboats, junks, even sampans, carried refugees in hordes along the rivers.

The chaos of this human misery is difficult to picture. In a refugee camp in Hankow one couple mourned a boy of nine, lost days back in the confusion of boarding a train. This separation of families was a commonplace; sometimes it was complicated by more poignant details. One family protected the two hundred dollars which comprised all its wealth by hiding it in the diaper of a sick baby. The baby died en route, and, unable to keep a corpse on the crowded boat, they threw it overboard, distractedly forgetting the family fortune. Another family told how all their funds had been in the possession of the mother, who rolled overboard in her sleep from a crowded junk, leaving her husband with six children.

Part of the great westward trek went organized. Nanking was evacuated by military plan, first the wounded soldiers, then the civil service employees—who received orders in the morning for special trains and boats leaving in the afternoon—then the ordinary citizens. Factories and universities went upriver, sometimes with a surprising amount of equipment intact. The National Central University from Nanking put on boats its eleven hundred students, all its faculty, its library and laboratory equipment, and sailed a thousand miles westward to Chungking, where, no vacant buildings being available, they studied in mud huts and set up twenty-four temporary structures in forty days. The famous Hing Fu-tsai restaurant of Nanking, which claims

unbroken history from the Ming Dynasty and was patronized by an Emperor in the fifteenth century, declined to await Japanese patronage and went to Hankow. The indefatigable Madame Chiang Kai-shek even succeeded in saving hundreds of cases of art treasures from Nanking museums, priceless works from the golden age of Chinese art; they were evacuated to towns in western China.

In the midst of the great trek moved heroic people, who worked not only to save themselves but to bring order, unity and knowledge to others. I met in Hankow a group of clear-eyed, fiery, devoted textile workers from Shanghai who had been doing volunteer work for their country ever since the war began. They had studied first aid in the Y.W.C.A. night school and helped the wounded of Shanghai until the great retreat. Then, one in military uniform, one in blue, padded trousers, the rest in sheepskin-lined dresses, and with no baggage except the clothes they wore, they had decided to accompany the retreating soldiers "to organize cooperation between the people and the army." Such organization was painfully needed, not only because of the age-old antagonism between Chinese peasants and soldiers, but because the 87th Division, to which the girls were attached, was composed of men from western and southern provinces who could not talk the Shanghai dialect and might be mistaken for the enemy. The girls interpreted for them, explaining to the soldiers the political importance of being polite to farmers, and explaining to the farmers why they should feed the army and care for its wounded.

With all of its chaos, its suffering, its patriotic endeavor, this great trek westward not only brought to the back-country of China great problems; it brought also the energy and intelligence to solve them. The organizing brains of China—in industry, commerce and education—which for more than a generation had turned to the banks and factories and universities of the coast for support and employment, turned inland now to develop the Chinese countryside. New roads and railroads, arsenals, airports, fac-

tories and universities were being constructed—sometimes slowly and inefficiently, sometimes with amazing speed. Every provincial government of the interior felt itself stimulated to heroic exertions by the arrival of the national leaders of China and the emergency of war.

Chungking, to which the National Government had moved its capital, is the chief river-port of western China, outlet for the fertile Red Basin of Szechwan. Fourteen hundred miles upriver and beyond the Yangtze gorges, it is inaccessible to Japanese gunboats and too far away for effective air attacks. Most of the administrative departments, however, had stopped for a time halfway, in the Wuhan cities where the great north-south railway and the Yangtze River gave communication to all provinces and the battlefronts. Government officials were flying back and forth between the two new "capitals"; the speed with which they transferred their departments farther inland depended partly on the housing accommodations in Chungking, and partly on the estimated danger in Hankow. At the time of my arrival in Hankow at Christmas, 1937, many people predicted the arrival of Japanese troops within a fortnight. The city was full or rumors of surrender. The rout at Nanking and the tens of thousands of demoralized and wounded soldiers and the millions of refugees flooding inland, appalled the government. Chinese resistance was at it lowest ebb.

The Japanese offered peace through the German ambassador. "The world will be surprised at our moderation," said the Japanese ambassador in Washington. The surprise of the Chinese, however, was not occasioned by moderation. It came in the nature of a shock that Japan was no longer satisfied to seize North China only; that she demanded control over the whole of China. The document handed to the Generalissimo included: Japanese control of China's foreign relations ("adherence to the anti-Comintern pact"); of China's internal police power ("cooperation in suppressing Communists"); of China's natural resources ("cooperation

in economic development"); and Japanese army garrisons scattered in strategic points of China as a military guarantee. If China was to survive as a nation, there was nothing to do but to fight.

I have it on excellent authority that when the German ambassador came that December with the terms to Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, the indomitable Madame, knowing, though not yet officially, the nature of the terms, startled the ambassador with the greeting: "Oh Mr. Von Trautman, you bring us luck! We shot down this afternoon four Japanese airplanes!"

Somewhat unbalanced by this reception, the ambassador handed her the papers (she reads foreign languages for the Generalissimo), saying, "I transmit these without any comment."

"I should think so," said the lady, pushing the papers to one side as unworthy of further attention. Then, smiling with hospitable brightness, "And how are your very charming children today, Mr. Von Trautman?" Thus diplomatically the incident was closed.

To the publication of those peace terms in China the Chinese people reacted much as had Madame Chiang Kai-shek. They pushed them aside as unworthy of further attention, and began to prepare for protracted war. The Generalissimo announced complete reorganization of the army and began to tour the various fronts. In each of the war zones he said to the summoned generals: "The United States of America fought nine years for independence. If China has to fight nine years for its independence, we can fight nine years. China has greater resources than America had. It is not surprising that we have been defeated so far, for we have had a nineteenth-century army. We must build a new army with new relations between officers and men and between army and people. There must be ways in which even the common soldiers can make suggestions and criticisms, possibly through some sort of soldiers' club. There must be a unified discipline; generals who retreat without

orders or sufficient reason will be executed. We must organize not only the army but the whole of the Chinese people. We have funds enough at present to carry on for another two years, and if these are exhausted we shall find other means. We must not rely upon foreign nations but upon ourselves; if we show ourselves strong, then foreign nations will help." *

The strategy determined by these conferences was evolved from the bitter experiences of the past six months' defeats, and from the success which the tactics of mobile warfare, employed by the Eighth Route army, had attained in Shansi. It involved a combination of positional warfare with mobile tactics. No longer would heroic battalions be ordered to hold out till the last man, as in Shanghai; the loss of such heroes was too costly. Positions would be held only until the weight of Japan's mechanized might made it not worth the cost to hold them; then they would be destroyed and abandoned, drawing the Japanese farther inland into China. Meantime the enemy's lines of communication would be harassed by countless guerilla attacks, thus delaying his advance. Such strategy envisaged years of struggle, which would eventually wear out Japan. The farther the Japanese penetrated into China, the longer their lines of communication would grow. Somewhere in the interior they would reach a point where they could no longer continue and where growing attacks by the Chinese would destroy them.

"The Japanese big guns and airplanes can wipe out or capture any single city, but never all our cities," was said to me often in Hankow. "There are not enough people in all those little islands to hold all of China all the time against the will of us all." The strategy implied in this statement relied on the patriotism and endurance of the Chinese people. The people must, therefore, be aroused to unity, organized and armed. This was prepared for by a drastic reorganization of the army. Han Fu-chu, the waver-

* Quoted to me by Peng Teh-hwai who attended the Loyang Conference.

ing war lord of Shantung, who gave up his capital to the Japanese almost without fighting, was executed for treason, together with several lesser traitors. His northern province was put under the command of the famous fighting generals from the South, who had brilliantly organized the masses of Kwangsi province, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen. The assistant commander of the Eighth Route army, Peng Teh-hwai, went on the Generalissimo's private train to Hankow, discussing guerrilla tactics on the way. Shortly thereafter the conservative chief of "mass mobilization" (civilian organization for the war) was replaced by General Chen Cheng, the able general who in 1934 finally expelled the Communist armies from Kiangsi. Appointed as assistant chief was Chou En-lai, chief representative in Hankow of those same Communists. Thus daringly the unity was welded.

In all the unoccupied parts of China, from Canton in the South to Kansu in the Northwest, energetic development advanced. The railroad west from Changsha, in South China, was rapidly rushed into Kweichow, that mountain-isolated province in the Southwest which till recently had never even seen a wheeled cart. Preparations were made for a railroad still farther to the southwest to reach the ocean in French Indo-China. Highways were built in the first six months of the war at a rate four times as fast as in the preceding ten years of peace. They were built not only for internal communications but to connect the interior of China with Europe and the outer world. Most spectacular of these routes were the two "10,000 li roads" (3,000 miles), one southwest to Burma, the other northwest to Russian Turkestan. The energy and speed of Chinese labor, even without modern equipment, were strikingly shown in the airdrome improvement in Hankow. A great new runway was needed for the new bombers. American engineers said it would have taken, with American machinery, one month to build. Forty thousand Chinese coolies, without heavy machinery, laid it in ten days. They tore up hard-surfaced

roads in places where these were not essential, and laid them down again for the runway. "I came into the city at 2:00 P. M. from the Griffiths-Jones mission school," said a friend to me. "I went back at 7:00 P. M., and the road by which I had come was all gone. They had taken it bodily to the airport.' Chinese for centuries have built great dikes, walls and canals, using the organized labor of large numbers of people instead of modern equipment.

In all the inland provinces, attention was given to the food supply for the coming year. The Central Government forbade the growing of opium poppies and ordered the lands diverted to food crops. The area sown to glutinous rice used for wine-making was decreased in favor of rice used for food. Hunan banks during my visit allotted six million (Chinese) dollars for farm credits to be spent for improved seed, fertilizers, and irrigation projects. Szechwan made a similar allotment of ten million. The mayor of Canton explained the lunch of sweet potatoes he served me—delicious food they were, but the poor man's dish. "We have decreed three riceless days per month in this province. Next year we will produce enough rice for ourselves, but this year there is not quite enough. We must not use transport from abroad for rice while we have other food."

Two surveying expeditions set out from the Ministry of Agriculture, during my visit, to investigate mineral resources of Kansu and Szechwan. Many minerals useful for war industries were being located; even oil was said to have been found in quantities suitable for development. Since lack of gasoline fuel was one of the main problems for the war's future, all civilian auto-busses in the interior were ordered to run on charcoal. The inventive Chinese have produced a charcoal-burning attachment which runs automobiles; it deposits too much carbon and demands frequent cleaning, a problem on which they at once began to work.

A young Chinese engineer of my acquaintance, graduate of a Pittsburgh university, brought intact out of Nanking a group of forty technicians whom he had trained in the

making of steel. "Accurate, punctual, just like Americans." He was going to Singapore with government funds to import and assemble a "mobile steel mill." He explained that large-scale steel mills demand big mines and modern transportation, but that a small-scale steel mill such as he contemplated could be erected for less than $50,000 gold, and duplicated for still less. This unit would be set up near small scattered mines in the back country, too far away to be reached by Japanese bombing and too small to be much affected by it in any case. Each would produce thirty tons of steel daily, and would be moved where most needed.

Even that great chaotic trek of unorganized millions fleeing as refugees from the zone of war began to be fitted into the organized life of China. The city of Hankow, stripped bare of food and medical supplies by the first impact, busily shipped the refugees to rural districts where they could be fed for one and a half American cents per day. Meantime, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. organizations opened camps for the refugees, taught them to read, tried to find jobs for them. So did practically all the foreign missionary stations. The old Provincial Guilds of China—organizations of people from one province temporarily living in another—which in recent days have been considered a reactionary force, since their wirepulling for fellow provincials endangered national welfare and unity, found a useful function in caring for refugees from their home provinces. They competed with one another for the prestige of maintaining the best refugee camps, which supplied not only food, but barbershops, medical centers, reading rooms and recreation places. Various agencies organized the leisure time of the refugees for purposes useful to the country, from building air-raid refuges to making stretchers.

These were only samples of the tremendous organization going on in interior China in the first months of 1938. Parallel with economic development went a great cultural upswing. More than half the institutions of higher learning had been located in Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai dis-

tricts; as these institutions were destroyed or forced to close by the war, education moved inland. Many ruined universities combined to form two "united universities" in Sian and Changsha. Others moved intact; Nankai University from Tientsin and Central University from Nanking both went to the new capital in Chungking. The folk of the back country were elated to receive famous Peiping professors. Never in China's four thousand years had the sons of the interior had such chances of education as now. Education itself began to be more practical because of the needs of war and the contact with the interior. Civil engineering students studied the making of pontoon bridges, bombproof shelters and concrete pill-boxes. Students of social science learned to organize farmers.

Against Japan's superiority in modern arms China had set the resources of her vast geography and of a population consciously fighting for its homes. The government began to orient itself toward the folk of the interior, to arouse them, organize them and arm them to win. A people thus aroused, organized and armed will express themselves not only in the war but in the peace thereafter, in national reconstruction and in government. To know the new China it was necessary not only to see Hankow; I secured in early January the opportunity to travel on the special train of Marshal Yen Hsi-shan to Shansi, to see the already famous fighters of the Northwest.

11. FIGHTERS OF THE NORTHWEST

GUARDS with bared bayonets turned back all comers from the Hankow railway station at early evening with the announcement that the day's train had already left for the North. "We go by 'Old Man Yen's" special," said my interpreter proudly. So we came into the dim light of the station and saw the long train with Marshal Yen's private car and dining car in the center, flanked by two cars full of bodyguards. Two light anti-aircraft guns were carried on a steel truck near the engine, for the region through which we were to travel was frequently bombed.

In a dozen or more freight cars at the rear of the train six hundred students were going north with us to start a new university under Marshal Yen. Several professors in a second-class railway coach were inventing the curriculum on the way. I shared a compartment with Professor Li Kung-po, a jovial, energetic man, one of the seven famous patriots who had been imprisoned in Soochow. His past included two years in Reed College, Oregon, where he made the acquaintance of Marx's *Capital,* then a forbidden book in China. Returning home via Panama and Europe to observe the citadels of world capital in New York and London, he had turned down several fat government jobs in Nanking to give his time to liberal journals which were continually suppressed. At the time of his arrest he had been running the largest circulating library in China, an evening school of five thousand students and a progressive fortnightly. His eight months in jail increased his fame and he was now advising Marshal Yen on the new university. Later he planned to travel across the Japanese lines to

organize classes among the peasant guerrillas in the Northwest.

"These young students," he said, "come from all parts of the country. Marshal Yen gets telegrams from the farthest provinces. We have 2,500 applications already. Why do they come? Most of them are not poor. They come from a leisure class that likes peace, culture and an easy life. But here they are rushing like crazy people to get to the front. They travel like common soldiers in freight cars. They know it is freezing cold in Shansi, that they will have a poor place and poor food. They know they may not get home for several years because possibly the railway line will be cut. Yet they are not afraid of all this. They are only afraid they'll have no chance to register.

"Some hesitate. But not because of hardship. They hesitate because they are not sure what this university is going to be. Can you blame them? No, for even I myself don't exactly know yet." He laughed gaily, wholeheartedly. "I know a little bit now, for I've had my first discussion with Yen and he has accepted the first part of the program. We must awaken the people, organize, train and arm them, reorganize the army, get new blood into government. Only thus shall we get the final victory in our national revolutionary fight. We need leaders for this, so the government gives funds for our 'University of National Revolution,' under military headquarters of the Second War Zone. . . . In America they don't like revolution—they like evolution." He laughed. "Now in China of the past our education was not for the national revolution, not even for the national evolution. So we must swiftly train new leaders both for political work in the army and to replace lower government officials, many of whom are either damn fools or corrupt. Already Yen has appointed seventeen county officials from my former students.

"These students here come because they know the strategic importance of Shansi, a high area which dominates the provinces around. They know it is near the front and

near that famous Eighth Route Army. It is more important to hold these hills which are centers of coal and of iron, than to waste so many men defending Shanghai. The students are all crazy to take part at once in mobile warfare, but we require them first to spend at least a three months' term in the school. After this the school and military headquarters decide whether they study longer or do practice work at the front. Their practical work remains at all times under the control of their professors. We must get four or five of the best-known professors in China; then we'll have a notable school."—Famous leaders of thought surrounded by 2,500 eager young patriots, and all of them working out from the school to organize the people—that was his idea for a university to revolutionize the Shansi countryside.

Slowly we passed through the flat, mud-colored landscape of Honan, edged with green where the farmers were hoeing the winter wheat. Then we turned westward by the valley of the Yellow River and saw the hills rise higher in fantastically sculptured cliffs. People dwelt in caves here; sometimes the caves looked down on intensively cultivated family gardens, sometimes they rose in many terraces of cliff-dwellings to flat farms far above. Narrow roads, worn downward into the earth by the traffic of centuries, wound between the cliffs in deep canyons. We crossed the Yellow River in the gray dawn of a dusty morning. A lonely flight of geese was patterned in black on the somber sky above us as primitive ferryboats took us laboriously over the muddy waters. Our new special train was camouflaged; its cars were made in Yen's fine arsenal at Tai Yuan, now lost to the Japanese.

As we went north it grew colder. Knowing that Chinese cars and dwellings are largely unheated even in winter, I had equipped myself with three thicknesses of woolen underwear and sweaters under a silk-padded Chinese gown. Nonetheless I felt the cold the morning after leaving the Yellow River; water in my soap-dish on the dining-car table

froze solid in less than an hour. The Chinese, however, seemed quite accustomed to it. All night Yen's husky bodyguards slept contentedly without blankets; the jumble of legs and of bodies in all positions made the aisles of their car quite impassable. Their padded uniforms with sheepskin coats were thick enough to turn back not only the cold but even light showers of shrapnel. Their shoes were of padded cotton with rope soles.

Old Marshal Yen Hsi-shan wore a shapeless gray-blue uniform with a dignity that revealed the autocrat of Shansi, *de facto* dictator for twenty-seven years. Alone of all the provinces of China, his government had persisted since the Manchus fell. Behind its triple rampart of mountains, Great Wall and Yellow River, it was impregnable to ordinary attack by Chinese war lords. The mechanized might of Japan had driven down the Shansi railroads but had not yet conquered her hills. These were still held by the Shansi farmers, assisted by the Eighth Route Army.

The Japanese had, however, driven the "Old Man" out of his capital; he was housed now with his secretaries in one of the better caves of southern Shansi under bombproof cliffs. He began our first interview by expressing his shame for losing so much of the territory entrusted to his care. This shame was justified, for his Shansi provincial troops had broken under the first attack. Yet, paradoxically enough, even their flight marked a first step in progress. By the old war-lord tradition, conquered troops joined the victors. Neither the "Old Man" nor his troops had joined the Japanese, who had courted him for years to head a puppet government in Peiping. Not very efficient for modern warfare, he nonetheless preferred dignified defeat in a cave to the disgrace of a Peiping palace. For Yen was a scholar-governor of the old tradition, aware of forty centuries of history and of other centuries to come. He was far more interested in posing shrewd questions about the Soviet Union and arguing long his pet theory of social reform through abolishing money, than in discussing un-

pleasant details of war. I shall not soon forget the poise of his manner, his unhurried conversation, his gesturing hands—building states, demolishing them, measuring out vast spaces, caressing towns and villages—never at rest for a moment, yet never seeming restless.

Headquarters of the Second War Zone was at that time at Linfen, a sizable city on the railway in the southern half of Shansi, jammed now with soldiers, officials and refugees from the North. Professor Li and I were assigned quarters in the offices of a flour mill, where each of our rooms had a stove which gave us the unusual luxury of a temperature of fifty degrees. Our host, the bald, old flour-mill manager, told us that the near-by valley had only wheat enough to last four months because the people had chiefly planted cotton. Back in the hills, however, the villagers had enough wheat for two or three years, little of which had been moved into Linfen as yet because the local transport was busy with the army. The merchants of the city had hidden all their valuable stocks of cotton goods and sheepskins some distance away in caves of the hills. If the Japanese should eventually take the railway, the people who moved to the hills would find supplies.*

This picture given by our host sufficiently illuminated the situation throughout Shansi. The Japanese had occupied the railway lines in the northern half of the province but held in area only some 14 of the 105 counties of the province. They were not even able to use the railways at will since these were constantly raided by Chinese guerrilla attacks. Chinese, however, crossed the railway lines from one part of the province to another with considerable facility, choosing lonely places between the Japanese-held cities and railway stations. It was even possible to travel with proper escort from one Chinese guerrilla unit to another all the way to Peiping and even into Manchuria, through territory which the Japanese claimed to have "conquered" but which was actually controlled by

* The Japanese took Linfen some months later.

roving armed forces of Chinese. During the time of my visit of several weeks behind the Japanese lines, an American military observer, Mr. Carlson, was thus traveling; so was an American correspondent, Mr. Bertram. Such travel was slow, for it was impossible to use the railways or some of the motor highways. But the Chinese were used to this slow travel; it was the railway that was new.

The organization of troops under Marshal Yen in the Second War Zone showed China's progress toward unity. Until recently each provincial governor commanded his own men and never lent his troops to another. The Second War Zone, however, consisted of three provinces—Shansi, and further north, Chahar and Suiyuan—under one command. The troops included forces of all these provinces and of several others, a few divisions of the much more efficient Central Government troops, and almost the whole of the former Red Army, now reorganized as the Eighth Route Army. A year earlier, Marshal Yen had been in charge of the campaign for suppressing the Red Army in this district; now they were all cooperating. North of us from Linfen, the Central Government troops and the Shansi troops held the valley, while the Eighth Route flanked them in the hills. Still further north, far beyond the Japanese front, the forces of the Eighth Route Army ranged through parts of five provinces, organizing the local population for resistance over a territory the size of New England.

Intermittent warfare went on between the Japanese strongholds and this surrounding territory. The invaders made expeditions into the countryside, burning and ravaging villages, seizing women for their camps. The Chinese retaliated by wiping out Japanese stragglers and smashing the Japanese-held railways. When cities were occupied by the Japanese, people moved to the country. Even portly Chinese magistrates left county seats and held circuit court from village to village. From time to time the Chinese armed forces recaptured a city, chased out or executed the

puppet government which the Japanese had installed, and put the former magistrate back in his place. The Japanese admittedly dared not leave the shelter of their military headquarters except in armed bands. In the capital city, Tai Yuan, the Japanese were so short of vegetables, which they dared not leave town to buy, that Chinese secret service men dressed as peasants found it easy to go back and forth from Tai Yuan, exchanging vegetables for flour, which they needed.

Far beyond the Japanese lines in northern Shansi, large, continuous areas still remained under Chinese rule. In one of these areas, some three hundred miles north and south by two hundred and forty miles east and west—about the size of the State of Illinois—a deputy-governor, appointed by Marshal Yen, had been escorted to his post across the Japanese lines by the Eighth Route Army. His state within a state was surrounded on all sides by enemy-held railway lines, yet it had its capital in the hills at Wutai, protected by Chinese armed forces. The deputy-governor reported more taxes collected in the name of the Chinese government from this Japanese-encircled region than in the days before the war. This Wutai district is considered very important because it is large and its high mountains are easily held; from this point it is always possible to attack the Japanese on the Ping-han railway, or even near Peiping. Nothing in the first six months of war had so increased morale in China as this demonstration of how thin the Japanese lines really are.

"All the troops in my area take my orders without question," said Marshal Yen, "but a natural division of labor has developed whereby the Central Government troops and most of the provincial troops engage in positional warfare while the Eighth Route Army and some of the newer provincial troops carry on mobile warfare." Chief generals under Yen were Wei Li-huang, commanding all positional warfare, and Chu Teh, commanding the mobile warfare of the Eighth Route.

The forces under Wei were famous for having held the front against the Japanese at Sinkow, the first serious delay in the enemy advance in North China. This battle, which lasted the greater part of a month, was very important strategically because, together with the battle at Pinghsing Pass which preceded it, it prevented the enemy advance into Central China at a time when this might have meant final catastrophe for the Chinese government at Nanking.* It was equally important for all future Chinese warfare because it was here that the technique was first developed of combining positional warfare with guerrilla attacks in the enemy's rear.

Over the passes on the Great Wall the Japanese armies came pouring southward into North Shansi. The Pinghsing Pass was especially tempting because there was no good fortification there. On the morning of September 25, when the first column of 8,000 Japanese was carelessly approaching this pass, they were suddenly attacked on both sides with showers of hand-grenades from the hills. This was the first spectacular emergence of the Eighth Route Army into the war against Japan. The Japanese were cut into two sections. All their positions immediately north of the pass were captured. In the course of a long day's fighting half of the Japanese division was slaughtered and the remainder put to rout. Large quantities of military supplies were also captured. The Japanese pressed on through other passes and eventually took this one also from the rear. But the impact of their advance had been broken and the tactics thus began were continued in a whole series of guerrilla attacks on the Japanese lines of communication, which seriously delayed their advance into Shansi.

Across their road the Central Government troops under General Wei were drawn up at Sinkow, in poor positions, consisting only of shallow trenches on small hills. Like all Chinese troops they were far less well-equipped than the Japanese, who thundered onward with tanks, armored

* For strategic importance of this battle, see Chapter 9.

trucks, big field guns and bombing planes. For the first five days the fighting at Sinkow was desperate and it seemed as if General Wei might be forced to yield. But the forces of the Eighth Route Army hung in the Japanese rear on their lines of communication, Ho Lung on the western flank and Liu Peh-cheng on the east. In a series of more than forty encounters, they constantly attacked the Japanese transport, seizing and destroying materials and munitions.

Many anecdotes were told to me later by the various generals engaged in this fighting. Ho Lung described one of a score of incidents in which his men took part. One hundred Chinese came to a road in the hills and, seeing some two hundred Japanese trucks filled with infantry, attacked the middle of the column with hand grenades, setting fire to several trucks. The Japanese infantry jumped out of their autos at both the front and rear of the column and began to charge, but they were somewhat delayed by the narrowness of the road. A squad of Chinese was hemmed in between an advancing tank and an armored truck, both firing from rifles and machine-guns. Seeing no chance to retreat, the squad leader ordered an attack with hand-grenades and drove back both the tank and truck. A Japanese cavalry unit next dashed in but was also driven back by hand grenades. There were no casualties among the Chinese in this squad but there were some twenty casualties (half killed and half wounded) among the hundred who attacked the whole caravan. "I want to impress you," said Ho, "that Japanese motor units are not so invincible."

The most famous exploit in the fighting north of Sinkow was the destruction in a single night of more than twenty airplanes by the forces of General Liu, a well-known strategist who in 1927 took part in the Nanchang uprising and later did brilliant work in the Red Army, where he took charge of the famous crossing of the Tatu River on the Long March. "At Sinkow," said Liu to me, "one of the chief difficulties of the Chinese troops under Wei was the constant bombing from the air, so we resolved that at all costs

the planes must be destroyed. Through the local farmers we kept in touch with the situation in the airdrome and waited till we knew that twenty-four planes were there. That night the two thousand men of the 769th Regiment, who had sworn in a mass meeting to die if need be to get those planes, made a surprise attack. They divided in three parts, one on each side of the air field to hold off the Japanese counter-attack, while the third group rushed the field itself with hand-grenades. We lost seventy dead, including a heroic battalion commander, and thirty-one wounded. But this battle so helped consolidate the front at Sinkow that the commander of the central air force of the Chinese Government in Hankow made a special visit to our representative, Chou En-lai, to congratulate us."

Fighting of this type in the rear of the Japanese made it possible for General Wei's troops to meet the enemy on somewhat equal terms. Japanese field guns had to be withdrawn from the lines for want of ammunition. Armored trucks and tanks ceased to operate for want of gasoline. Japanese infantry was reduced to such low rations that the planes which were left had to be used to drop food supplies rather than bombs. Thus aided, General Wei's forces held the enemy for nearly a month and might have driven them out of Shansi had not other Japanese armies abandoned the direct southward march to Hankow to rescue their forces at Sinkow. General Wei told me that the Japanese lost 16,000 killed at Sinkow, including many commanders—their greatest loss in their whole campaign in China up to that time.

"Judging by the results in this province," said Chu Teh to me later, "the Japanese will not be able to take China. If all of their forces lose as heavily as did the troops of Itagaki at Sinkow they will be worn out long before they can obtain a final victory." The close coordination of guerrilla and positional warfare, so brilliantly attained at Sinkow, became a model for other Chinese fronts to follow and was to result later in the spectacular victory in Shantung at Taierhchwang.

12. WITH THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY

"SOMEWHERE in Northern Shansi" I found the Eighth Route Army, in a series of villages shown on no map. Our autobus—a rickety structure erected on an old Ford truck —jolted over wintry roads in the midst of dust storms which no kindly snow had yet come to allay. We came to a bridge of straw and boughs built on swaying posts over a swiftly flowing river, and amid the shouted warnings of worried peasants, essayed the bridge and got across. We charged then up the rocky hillsides, grinding great stones beneath the belly of the car. We pushed through canyons so narrow that the dirt walls scraped our roof. Somehow we arrived at a weather-worn earth-built village which to us was in no way distinguishable from others, but which our chauffeur greeted with a series of toots.

Blue-clad men, women and children came tumbling out of the mud huts. In the midst of them a dusty gray-blue figure, like a homely farmer, who leans across the chauffeur to shake my hand, speaking a greeting in broken German. Chu Teh! Red Virtue! The hero about whom they tell the legends; who can see one hundred li in all directions, who scatters his enemies by mildly waving a fan toward them, who stirs up the great winds, who dies and comes to life! Yes, it is he, this kindly, simple, farmer-like person, who has so little care for "face" that he runs out in a cloud of dust with the peasants to greet a foreign friend who has just arrived.

They were all of them there, all the Eighth Route generals. I had had luck. I had arrived in the midst of a military conference for which the division commanders had gathered from all Northern Shansi. Stocky Ho Lung looked

most like a guerrilla general with his solid body and daredevil air, and a shabby tag reading "120th Division" stuck by a safety-pin to his gray-padded cotton sleeve. He had come four days on foot and two by truck to this conference. Liu Peh-cheng, a scholarly gentleman in spectacles, had journeyed farther; the division he commanded was operating ten days to the east in the region south of the railway which joins Tai Yuan to the Peiping-Hankow line. Lin Piao, the youngster of the lot, with the mien of a shy student, held the hardest area, two weeks' journey away at Wutai in Northeast Shansi, a large area surrounded by Japanese-held railway lines. (Since my visit, Lin Piao has been wounded.)

The commanders in the Eighth Route Army have military records as imposing as those of any generals in China. Chu Teh was an officer in Yunnan in the days of the World War; later he studied in Germany. He took part in the 1927 Northern Expedition which established the present Chinese Government, and later participated in the Nanchang revolt, the seizure of Swatow and the forming of the Red Army. Peng Teh-hwai, now assistant commander of the Eighth Route Army, was a regiment commander ten years ago in the Northern Expedition; at that time Ho Lung commanded twenty thousand men. Liu Peh-cheng was a well-known Szechuan general when he joined in 1927 the Kuomintang forces; Lin Piao in those days was a recent graduate of Whampoa Military Academy and led a company north. All of them since then have had ten years' experience in the Red Army.

They each had good posts in the government army ten years ago. They gave these up to become outlaws, leaders of revolt, champions of suppressed peasants. Any of them at any time in the past ten years could have bought high post again by betraying his convictions; none of them did. All of them lived with hardship, with a price on their heads, and survived. They are still living with hardship and fighting for their convictions against Japan in the government armies.

"Are you fighting on this front under a unified command or as allies of the government?" I asked Chu Teh.

"We are a regular government army," he answered, "under the Central Military Council of Chiang Kai-shek. As part of the Second War Zone, our immediate superior is Marshal Yen Hsi-shan. Through his office our work is correlated with that of other forces in this province, both Central Government and Shansi Provincial troops. We can employ either positional or mobile warfare. On our present front, operating behind Japanese lines and with very light equipment, we employ the mobile tactics. We believe that the hope of saving China lies largely in the hands of the mobile units of North China—not only our own forces but the peasant volunteers we help organize. These are the forces which prevent Japan from consolidating her gains and from making North China her economic and military base against China of the south."

Ten days I lived at headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, sharing their meals and talking constantly with men and commanders. A room was found for me in the house of a local villager, much less pretentious than the flour mill in Linfen. The kang on which I slept occupied three-fourths of the space and the remainder was partly filled by a metal basin of smoking charcoal which raised the temperature of the room to about forty degrees. Instead of the dinners of many dishes flavored with hot wine, which Marshal Yen's hospitality had offered, rice was brought at mid-morning in a big five-gallon kerosene can used both for cooking and serving. It was planked on the floor of an alcove, one side of which was open to the freezing weather. Near by a couple of tables held a bowl of greens or turnips and a pot of weak, unsweetened tea. We helped ourselves and ate standing, or sitting on scattered stools. In midafternoon the meal was repeated with steamed buns of wheat flour replacing the rice. Such were the two simple daily meals of five generals at a military conference.

How sharp is the memory of those breakfasts—big, im-

posing Ho Lung strutting about with nonchalant grin, scholarly, bespectacled General Liu bending over the big kerosene can to dish up another bowl of rice; kindly Chu Teh sitting relaxed with bent shoulders, feet on the table rungs to lift them off the cold stones of the floor, and with a gentle, hospitable smile. It was here that I took lessons in guerrilla tactics, heard stories of famous exploits and learned the methods of keeping an army close to the people for whom it fights. It was here also that I learned to know and love the special characteristics of this army—characteristics rare in Chinese armies, rare anywhere in the world—that make its strength and fame.

I would mention first the simplicity and directness of its leaders, their absence of concern for "face." What other Chinese generals would have come so informally to meet my autotruck or have served such casually meager meals? Next I would note sincerity and incorruptibility as illustrated by the fact that both commanders and men cut down their salaries and rations in order to enlarge the size of their army. During the time of my visit, the government sent supplies and pay for 45,000 men, but the army had almost doubled this number by sharing the supplies with additional recruits. Division commanders like Ho Lung got a monthly wage of five Chinese dollars; Chu Teh got six. In American money this is less than two dollars a month, a laughable fraction of the usual pay in China for commanders.

In the ten days of my residence among them, I noted also the depth of comradeship. There were no internal frictions, no quarreling or roughness; but this was only the negative side of the matter. I recall the happy glow that lit the faces of the men as they mentioned their commanders. I noted the way in which they carried their wounded for many days' journeys on litters. What other army cares thus for the common man? To the Eighth Route Army each common soldier was precious; not only his life was precious, but his initiative. For the characteristic of these leaders which most impressed my Hankow interpreter, who had had a

wide experience with Chinese generals, was the total absence of bureaucracy, the friendship among all ranks and the development of initiative from the lowest to the highest.

"I never before saw generals," he said, "who train their subordinates to be just as good as themselves. Usually when the chief general is not present, his subordinates are useless. But look at Chu Teh—you don't see him give a command. He hardly seems to be running an army. He has time to talk with peasants and with foreign correspondents and with common soldiers; he has lots of time and he doesn't seem to 'boss.' Once in a while they all hold a conference and then everyone goes off on his own initiative and does the things they all decided to do." This development of initiative is very essential in mobile warfare where men must act in small groups and yet must be able to correlate their action over a wide area.

"There is nothing so new about guerrilla warfare," said modest Chu Teh to me. "The American War of Independence against the British made extensive use of it. In the French Revolution the people used it against the National Guards. The Russian people also carried on very extensive guerrilla warfare in the war against intervention in 1918-19. It is a tactic to which an embattled population resorts against superior military equipment. My studies in Germany convinced me that the German model is too elaborate and mechanical for China; it cannot easily be changed to suit changing conditions. I therefore studied more mobile methods of fighting. I found my best textbooks in the Chinese Classics, especially an old novel *The Three Kingdoms* written more than a thousand years ago."

"The military use of guerrilla fighting," added Peng Teh-hwai, who is always in action as field-commander, "is to divide the enemy's attention, to cut communications and mop up stragglers. The Eighth Route Army is not entirely a guerrilla force though it operates chiefly with guerrilla methods. Battles the size of that at Pinghsing Pass can hardly be called guerrilla tactics. Since we have so little

military equipment we make use of our knowledge of the topography and our connection with the people, in which we surpass the Japanese. To do this successfully we need first of all the confidence of the rural population, and second, a high degree of initiative and understanding on the part of every one of our ordinary soldiers. Since we have no planes, no field guns, no motorized units, but only hand grenades, rifles, some trench mortars and some machine guns, we must plan our tactics to make maximum use of the type of weapon we have. Similarly China as a whole must plan her tactics to make maximum use of what she has.

"From the point of view of strategy this war as a whole should be prolonged, but individual battles should be short and decisive. A prolonged war is favorable to us because Japan is fighting on our territory surrounded by enemies and therefore loses morale and meets transport difficulties. With us the situation is reversed for the very fact of invasion arouses people to self-defense. 'People's self-defense against oppression'—that is the phrase that sums up guerrilla warfare. The political aspect of this warfare is even more important than the military. We therefore send political rather than military officers to organize the people. They agitate against the Japanese to prevent them from forming puppet governments, collecting taxes and seizing property, and to boycott Japanese goods. The aim of this non-cooperation is to prevent the Japanese from establishing a foothold.

"The advantage of making individual battles short and decisive is that the enemy cannot use his fine equipment advantageously. We attack as quickly as thunder, and leave as quickly; so the enemy has little preparation and his airplanes, big guns and tanks are of little value to him. We must make certain of success in every engagement, for we have no reserves to fall back on and could therefore be completely wiped out unless we know how to get away. So we never engage the enemy unless we have him at a disadvantage; we attack either small groups, or weak spots in

the line of communications, or large groups that are badly placed. We always take the initiative and surprise the enemy. For this kind of warfare we need very little ammunition, while the enemy needs very much. Guerrilla forces, however, cannot carry through any final victory; their function is to keep up the morale of the people and to help the regular army by reducing the enemy's efficiency in a long, drawn-out war."

With such tactics the Eighth Route Army had been fighting continuously in parts of four provinces for five months. During this time they had had five major combats and several hundred minor skirmishes. Not a day passed during my visit without radio reports of these skirmishes arriving from various parts of the vast territory over which they operated. Typical reports are as follows:

January 8. One hundred Japanese autos from A. going south. Detachment W fell on them, killed and wounded many. Destroyed sixteen trucks, burned fifteen, captured three prisoners, five rifles, ammunition.

Same day. Detachment of Lin Piao's men destroyed for the second time railway bridge near C. and burned all near-by repair material.

Same day. Another group of Lin Piao's men seized coal mine held by Japanese, dispersed several dozen guards and captured radio sending set.

January 10. Met ninety Japanese autos south of Niangtze Pass, destroyed seventeen, burned eight, captured radio station, five rifles, two mausers, killed one company commander, one corporal, forty soldiers.

Same day. Ho Lung's men met two hundred Japanese, killed and wounded over thirty, with ten casualties on our side.

January 11. Six hundred Japanese tried to attack near Chinchin but we learned of it and met them en route, throwing grenades from cliffs, killing and wounding seventy. Our casualties ten.

These are three days' accounts of skirmishes received during my visit; they are pinpricks rather than serious encounters. But with such pinpricks continued over five months the Eighth Route Army had made it impossible for the Japanese to utilize their victories in Shansi. They had broken Japanese use of the railway north of Tai Yuan by removing sixty-five miles of track. They had taken back from enemy hands some thirty county-centers and restored the local governments. In the first two months of fighting they had seized over three thousand rifles, two hundred light machine guns, over one thousand horses, thousands of uniforms and coats, large quantities of munitions, and had destroyed more than a thousand transport trucks, eighty armored trucks and thirty tanks. They were the only Chinese army which regularly killed more of the enemy than it lost of its own men.

Living at headquarters, I saw the program of daily training which developed the initiative and fighting ability of the soldiers and made these successes possible. Military training was only part of the program; general and political education were included as well. Most of the new recruits, like most Chinese peasants, were illiterate but they were immediately taught to read and write. The day's program included rising at six-thirty, morning exercises at seven-thirty, breakfast at nine-thirty, political training at ten, military training at twelve, general education at two, dinner at four-thirty, then games, social gatherings and singing until nine or ten, when they went to bed. A two-hour period was allowed for each type of education, the first hour usually being given to lectures and the second either to discussion, study or rest. The rather long time allowed for sleeping made up to some extent for the very scanty ration of millet or steamed bread with some vegetable, served but twice a day.

A mile over the hills from the village where Chu Teh had his headquarters, a similar village housed the political department of the army which organizes all the education and

the army's contacts with the population. It has five sections: Organization, Education, People's Movements, Enemy Service, and Work Against Traitors. The section on Organization helps pick personnel for higher posts in the army and for work among the farmers. Every company has its "political director" who both carries on education and constantly seeks for men suitable for promotion through training. Appointments of military commanders are made by the commanders of the next higher unit but always in consultation with the political department.

The section on Education not only conducts the training of leaders and the compulsory educational courses in the army, but it organizes clubs and a variety of voluntary educational activities. Even on a march and before a battle, some type of educational training goes on. "If we march only ten or fifteen miles we can still have a short class," said the director of this section. "If we march twenty or thirty miles, we have no formal class on that day, but the political leader in each company uses the halts and the lunch period to lead songs and discuss current events. Before a battle, the commander and political director call together the officers and explain the purpose and importance of the coming fight; then the officers and lower political workers explain it at meetings of the men. The plan of the great battle at Pinghsing Pass was explained to all the soldiers by Lin Piao on the day before. In most armies soldiers are not told where or why they are going. In our army some details are concealed for reasons of military secrecy, but every soldier knows the meaning and general plan of the coming action and must be prepared to act on his own initiative in emergencies."

Much of the agitation among the soldiers is done by simple lists of principles which can be easily memorized, such as: "The Three Points of Discipline" or "Eight Points to Remember" or "The Anti-Japanese Ten-Point Program." These points have changed since the united front was formed with the Kuomintang. The first point of discipline

—"Obey Orders"—remains. But "Don't Steal a Cent From Workers and Peasants" has become "Don't Steal a Cent From the Chinese People." "Confiscated Property of Landowners Must Not Be Made Your Personal Property" has become "Carry Out the Anti-Japanese Ten-Point Program." The "Points to Remember" consist of simple, homely rules for proper treatment of civilians, such as "Clean up before leaving. . . . Return anything you borrow. . . . Repay anything you have destroyed. . . . Pay the right price in buying [Former armies were accustomed to take without paying, or to give half.] . . . Be courteous. . . . Don't rob the prisoners. . . . Don't dirty the streets, use the toilets." Even the actions of wounded and dying men are planned to accord with the safety of the army. In the few minutes' agitation before going with them into battle, the political director tells them, "If slightly wounded, don't leave the line; if seriously wounded, don't groan."

One evening when the generals were holding a military conference I gathered with two or three common soldiers, young guards who had been assigned the extra duty of bringing me firewood and hot water. I asked them each in turn when and why they had joined this army. One was the son of poor share-croppers in Kiangsi who had joined the Red Army in 1931 at the age of seventeen. "For love of country and with the permission of my parents," he said. The next was the son of a boatman who had also joined at seventeen in Kiangsi. "Because I wanted to save the Chinese people from the Japanese." The third was a carpenter in his late twenties who had left a wife and son behind him in the South. "They write sometimes," he said. "My father is a stonecutter and looks after them. My duty is up here. When we win the war we'll have a strong country and plenty of chance to join our families; if we should lose, there'd be no chance for any of us."

This older youth explained to me very clearly that "Japan's plan started long ago when she annexed Formosa and Korea. As soon as they took Manchuria, I knew they

would next occupy China in order to attack the U.S.S.R. So we have to decide whether China shall exist as a country, or come under slavery to Japan. I decided to do my part to save the country. I could not read then, but I learned all this from students who gave lectures on Memory Days. Since then I have learned to read in the Red Army." He told me that the situation for China is much brighter. "Formerly everyone believed Japan unconquerable. Now, after several months of resistance, the whole Chinese army has been improved and has gained confidence in its ability to win. In various ways people have begun to help the government to fight against Japan."

The one I best remember was the simple son of the boatman, whom also I asked, "Is it better now?"

His whole face shone as if a lamp had been lit inside his body as he answered, "Yes."

"Why is it better?" I persisted. My interpreter, a sophisticated journalist from Hankow, began to explain that of course it was better to get two dollars a month as a government soldier than to be a half-starved "Communist bandit." I insisted that he should transmit my question to the boy.

"It is better now," answered the boatman's son, still shining, "because then the government was against us, but now we are all together, and China is unified."

13. THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE

TWO or three miles away from the village which housed Chu Teh's headquarters was another village where a company of Lin Piao's men rested and replenished their ranks. They had seen hard service; of one hundred men, thirty had been lost at Pinghsing Pass and twenty at Kwangyang. The losses had been replaced by one hundred and twenty new recruits, Shansi farmer boys who were now in process of training. One of these, a boy from this very village, had joined the army months earlier on its way to the front and was now telling his family of his many battles. He told us he was glad to see his "old man" and especially glad that several neighbors had volunteered to go back to the front with him.

I went from house to house where the boys were quartered in groups of six to a dozen per room. Each was in spotless order, with canteens hung, rifles stacked in neat rows and blankets laid folded on the kang. Since many of the new recruits were without blankets, the villagers had loaned them sixty until they could get more supplies. Two rooms in a large house held the "Anti-Japanese Club." It was full of rough benches, some of them merely poles supported at both ends. It was gay with festoons of colored paper and with placards on the wall. "Fight For China's Freedom" read one of the placards. Others showed by pictures how to care for a rifle, how to take ambush. A large map of China hung on the wall, showing what parts of the country had been lost and at what time. Over a small stage hung pictures of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Lenin; the political director with me was debating whether Lenin

should be removed, since the club was not a Communist club, or whether he might be left in deference to the united front.

Trophies captured from the Japanese were collected in a small "museum" at one end of the club room; they included flags, notebooks and postcards, and even an ancient one-hundred-ruble note from Czarist Russia. Captured Japanese uniforms were worn by many of the soldiers. Groups of men gathered outside the club in a large courtyard. Some sat on benches reading in the sun, some engaged in rifle practice, others were playing a simple ball-game. Two soldiers were playing ping-pong, using a row of bricks instead of a net. Two others played chess, while an aged, toothless Chinese peasant hovered over the board watching their moves with a friendly grin. It was very plain that these soldier boys had made themselves a welcome part of the village life. They represented not only the war but new games, new education, new contact with the world outside.

Farmers of this village smiled as they told me that it was a good army and that they would like to have it stay. The army had given a New Year's party to the village, inviting one person from every family to supper. The chief man of the village had returned the compliment, inviting the officers of the company to dinner. The soldier boys fraternized with the local "Self-Defense Organization," gave them military training and information about the war. Cheerful grins went from face to face of a group of soldiers when I asked them how the Japanese fight. "They have very good weapons, big guns and planes, but the infantry is not so good though it is well-trained. We Chinese are stronger and firmer in attack." They also told me that only one-fifth of the new recruits from Shansi could read and write when they joined, but now two-fifths could read the newspapers, and all of them were studying. They had learned during the months of war.

I went into a home whose arched brick roof and spacious rooms made plain that its owner was fairly well-to-do.

Some of the rooms were occupied by the army; in others the family still lived. These were full of handsome, polished family chests, red with copper trimmings, or covered with fantastic lacquered designs. Neatly laid mats, piles of warm, padded blankets, and four small panes of glass supplementing the paper windows, emphasized the family wealth. A woman was washing baby clothing in a copper vessel as we entered an inner room; two other women and several babies rested comfortably on the kang. The old man of the house told me: "When the Red Army was here in 1936 they took nothing from me, but they took food and money from our richer neighbors. The poor people loved them then, but now everybody loves them because they protect us against the Japanese." The women all added, "Hao, hao," meaning, "Good, good." The small child took the hand of political commissar Jen and played with it, smiling.

"Our army is among the people like a fish in the sea," is the saying with which the Eighth Route leaders illustrate their movement among the Chinese villages. Closely connected with the people, and serving as their fighting arm, the army works also to arouse and organize the masses themselves for self-defense. Its success in this undertaking has been so great that the methods it employs have served as a model for all the other Chinese armies. Chou En-lai, representative of the Eighth Route Army in Hankow, was in February, 1938, made assistant chief of "Mass Mobilization" for the Central Military Council. It is therefore useful to note the method in some detail.

"Our army gives great attention to arousing the masses," said Jen Peh-hsi, political commissar in charge of all this work, in one of the many conversations I had with him. "Only if the people take part against Japan can we win. The old forces cannot beat Japan, we must release new forces. First of all we arouse the masses by telling them the terrible story of what Japan has done in the occupied areas. Then we organize the people both to resist Japan and to improve their own living conditions. The organization of the

people is the guarantee both of victory and of democracy after the war is over.

"The Japanese, of course, have also their propaganda. Some of them say, 'We also are Chinese who have come back to our old home to save you from your evil government, and especially from the Eighth Route Army.' They preach defeatism through Chinese agents, who say 'We are too weak to fight Japan' or who penetrate into various religious organizations with the cry, 'Let us submit and call upon this god to save us.' They pour heroin and morphine into North China to debauch the people; for years they did this through their puppet government in East Hopeh, so that Shansi, where Governor Yen had succeeded in suppressing opium smoking, is now a prey to these more potent narcotics. When villagers are made homeless by the war the Japanese try to bribe them with food and munitions to form guerrillas under Japanese command. Often the burning of our villages is done by Japanese in Chinese uniform, or by Manchurian Chinese under Japanese compulsion. In all these ways the Japanese try to cultivate division and defeatism among the Chinese.

"However," continued Jen, "wherever we have enough organizers to explain the situation it is easy to get the people on our side. Even guerrilla forces armed by the Japanese often desert to us with their new equipment. The savagery of the Japanese is our best argument. In Kohsien they slaughtered over two thousand Chinese civilians; in Ningwu over one thousand; in Naiwen they burned the county officials alive and killed over six hundred people. They massacred the entire population of seven villages near Pinghsing Pass, accusing them all of being Soviet agents. Throughout North Shansi they burn nearly half the houses in the places they occupy. They shoot up the towns recklessly, not only during the madness of battle but after the occupation, even killing children of two and three years old.

"Rape and compulsory prostitution are very widespread

and many Chinese women are taken out of the district for the use of Japanese soldiers. From the county of Sohsien alone they took three thousand women to send to their camps. They are exceptionally brutal toward any local villagers who try to protect their women. For instance, three Japanese soldiers came to a large village near Lincheng and violated the wife, sister and sister-in-law of a certain farmer. The latter aroused the neighbors and killed the three soldiers. In retaliation, the Japanese sent a large force which massacred the entire population and burned the village. The farmer who had killed the three soldiers was hung on a tree by a hook through his body and disemboweled while alive. Shortly after this our army came into the territory, held a great mass meeting on the site of the burned village, and recruited from surrounding villages a force of several thousand farmers to fight Japan."

When the people are once aroused they are next organized either into civilian organizations or fighting groups. This work is done by the political department of the army through its section on "People's Movements." It contacts the local officials, both civil and military, and also organizes farmers' unions, workers' unions, student unions, teachers' organizations, self-defense corps and farmer fighting groups, according to the situation. It eventually expects to organize special women's organizations, but Shansi countrywomen have always been backward—even foot-binding passes slowly—and so far they only cooperate in the other organizations. Through all these organizations, the people agitate against traitors, furnish emergency help to the army and also try to improve their own conditions of living.

Assistance to the army is given in two ways: by the People's Self-Defense Corps and the Fighting Farmers. The first of these organizations consists of able-bodied but unarmed men and women who continue their daily work as in peacetime but carry on additional activities. They patrol roads, investigate strangers, act as couriers to transmit information, and assist in the care of the wounded, some-

times transporting them by litter as far as a two weeks' journey. When the Japanese approach their village, they hide food and valuables, hurry the women and children off to the hills and destroy roads and bridges in the path of the invader.

The Fighting Farmers consist of men who have secured arms, though sometimes only one rifle for several men. They cut telegraph wires, attack railway stations and harry small groups of Japanese, seizing from them additional weapons. They draw their support from the meager resources of the local population and usually hope to be added some day to the regular army. They supply a great reservoir of strength for the Army, which furnishes them with leaders and draws from them replacements for its own ranks. "The farmers show remarkable ingenuity and organizing ability," said Ho Long to me. "In one place they spontaneously sent out sentries to search strangers, without any suggestion from us. Those who have no rifles make very effective homemade weapons. One group of one hundred farmers who organized to help in the Sinkow battle had the picturesque habit of making nightly raids on Japanese camps, always leaving behind them receipts for the rifles and munitions they took. Sometimes, after depriving a camp of its ammunition, they would reform in the hills and attack it.

Both Jen and Chu Teh himself appealed to me on behalf of these farmer organizations, on whom they believe the fate of the war in China so largely depends. "We do not ask help for ourselves," said Chu Teh, "for we are a regular government army and have no right and no desire to accept contributions from abroad. But isn't it possible to get from America some help for these fighting farmers who live very badly, and are very hungry and cold? Often they have no coats or sheepskins though a warm padded coat costs less than three American dollars. The local villagers support them to the best of their ability but they also are in des-

perate need, often with crops and homes destroyed, and completely without medical supplies or doctors."

As the organization of the people widens, questions of standards of living become very important. The army seeks to lessen rent, taxes and interest through mass meetings called by the local governments. "We try not to have these demands so high as to bankrupt the rich," said Jen, "for we are not seeking to increase class friction but to lessen it in the interests of our common unity against the enemy. There have been several occasions where spontaneous organizations of the farmers began to fight not only the Japanese but the local landlords. In such cases we explain that only traitorous landlords are to be fought, but others are to be convinced of their duties to the common cause. We bring all classes together and explain to the well-to-do that the people cannot keep on resisting unless their burdens are lightened, while if the Japanese win then everybody will suffer. In many counties which we have taken back from the Japanese we have helped to organize the local government, either installing the former magistrate if he is a patriot, or organizing a temporary government from the best-known local people. Wherever there is time we hold elections."

One of the most moving stories I heard in China illustrated this unity of all classes against the invader. A detachment of the Eighth Route Army brought to a village meeting some thirty Manchurian Chinese whom they had captured in the transport service of the Japanese army. The local farmers shouted, "Kill the traitors!" The political director of the army asked the trembling Manchurians to tell how they came to serve the Japanese. They told of the "protected villages" in which they had been confined, and of a Chinese traitor who had seduced them with offers of a good job for the winter. In the Japanese transport service they were given only one meal a day and no pay, and were chained at night by their wrists to the legs of their horses

to prevent their escape. Their wives and children remained in Manchuria as hostages for their good behavior.

At the close of the meeting a local landlord said to the army representative, "Take my house and my lands and my money and take my two sons and myself into your army, for you are fighting well against those devils and it is better to die fighting than to live as slaves like these men." The army accepted the two sons as recruits but said that they had no authority to accept money and land; they advised the landlord to use it to help the local self-defense organizations. After the meeting, the political representative talked with the Manchurian prisoners, telling them that they were now among their own people who were fighting the Japanese. Did they wish to help? Ragged and footsore and weeping, the prisoners raised their hands in supplication, "Tell us how, tell us how!" They were organized as stretcher-bearers for the wounded. Agnes Smedley tells of seeing them carry wounded men along the difficult mountain paths and comments on the intense devotion they showed.*

Because of the closeness of the Eighth Route Army to the surrounding population, its espionage work—section on Work Against Traitors—is undoubtedly better done than that of any other Chinese force. "It is remarkable how the farmers keep our secrets," said Jen. "Every person in this village where we now are will pretend to strangers that he knows nothing about us, while if strangers come we are told of it at once." Even the highly organized Japanese espionage finds it difficult to learn the position of the Eighth Route Army. It was amazing that when five important generals met for a ten-day conference in a village so near the war zone, they should have remained unvisited by a single Japanese plane.

Even the foreign missionaries whom I met in Shansi expressed great friendliness for the Eighth Route Army, saying, "Last year everyone feared them; this year they are popular everywhere." One of the missionaries told me re-

* *China Fights Back.*

gretfully that his best evangelists and teachers were leaving their paid jobs for the hardship and danger of the army, which had succeeded in arousing a devoted self-sacrifice which he had never been able to arouse. On one occasion Chu Teh attended service in a Catholic church with a group of his soldiers, and spoke afterwards in the parish house on similarities between Christianity and Communism. He said that both these views of life expect their followers to sacrifice personal desires and life itself to the community good, without asking any return. "You Catholics claim," he added, "that there is a devil who stirs up evil all over the world and whom everyone must fight. We also agree and we can tell you the name of this devil—it is 'Fascism.'"

Even individual Japanese may be converted, according to the belief of the Eighth Route Army. The tactics of their Enemy-Service section date back to the earliest days of the old Red Army. "A year and a half ago," said Jen, "we captured some of Chang Hsueh-liang's officers and treated them as guests, better than ourselves. Moved by this hospitality they later helped very greatly in the establishment of the anti-Japanese united front."

New methods were needed with Japanese soldiers who did not even understand the Chinese language, and who had been told that if captured they would be tortured and killed. They fought savagely against capture; the biggest Chinese losses at Pinghsing Pass were not in the actual battle but in the disarming of prisoners to whom they could not explain their merciful intentions. After this the political department trained soldiers in every company to shout in Japanese, "Give us your arms and we won't kill you!" Since that time it has been easier to take prisoners. They are not only well-treated but are given better food than the Chinese soldiers, because they are accustomed to it. After a period of explanation they are often sent back into the Japanese lines. It is considered that even if they again fight, the knowledge that they were well-treated will weaken the firmness of the enemy. If they are killed by Japanese officers

for having been with the Eighth Route Army, as often happens, this also will injure Japanese morale.

"Our work in this direction is only beginning," said Jen. "Already we spend several thousand dollars monthly on handbills to distribute to the Japanese saying, 'No Japanese worker or farmer will benefit from your invasion of China. They will only suffer more poverty while your capitalists and militarists gain. . . . They tell you the war is to make peace in East Asia. But could there be peace in Tokyo if our army did there what you are doing here?' "

By the light of a single candle in a cavernous entry open on one side to the freezing weather, I interviewed two Japanese prisoners. They wore Chinese uniforms, but were at once identified as Japanese by their habit of bowing several times as they came in. A Korean from the Enemy-Service section translated first into Chinese, after which my interpreter put it into English. Our candle flickered on dark, hewn rafters above us, stained with years of smoke. We sat at two small, dusty tables, alternately pushing back to get out of the smoke of charcoal fires beneath them, or moving forward to warm our feet at the fire and our hands on the teacups. In this chilled half-darkness, while the sky outside slowly filled with stars above curved Chinese roofs, the tense voices of the prisoners told of their life in the Japanese army, and of the terrible hours out of which they were born, no longer automatons, but thinking, human souls.

Most of the Japanese soldiers, they said, had not wanted to come to China. Nor were any reasons given why they should come, except that "Japanese had been killed" and "it was duty to the Emperor." From day to day they were quite ignorant of the future. "We would merely be told to be ready to leave tomorrow morning at eight o'clock; then we would be told to follow the man ahead." They were trained in the details of fighting, and knew nothing more. They were automatons in the mighty military machine of Japan, crashing through China.

It was on a cold afternoon in the mountains, when a

small body of Japanese troops was split into three sections by the crossing of two streams, that rifle shots suddenly came from the hills, "falling thick as rain." Some of the men jumped into a ditch beside the road to wait till it grew darker; they heard Chinese bugle-calls. At dusk they crept forward to seek shelter in a near-by village. One of them came suddenly upon three Chinese soldiers and received a bayonet wound in his throat before he escaped in the dark and sought shelter in a barn. Exhausted with suffering and believing that he was in any case doomed, he tried to kill himself by cutting his throat with his knife.

Consciousness returned. He found himself naked from the waist up in the midst of Chinese soldiers, one of whom was binding up his wound. Another showed him a paper, which said that they would take him to a hospital; Japanese use Chinese written characters, though the spoken language differs. After this he was carried for many days in a litter. "Everywhere I saw soldiers and officers friendly, and getting the same treatment. I myself was better fed and clothed than any of the Chinese soldiers. Every day a political worker talked to me and explained the things I never knew about the war, and I saw how I had been fighting aimlessly as a tool. Now I understand why the Chinese have to resist our army and I am planning to go back and tell my own people about it." To my query whether such a course would not be dangerous, he answered that of course it was dangerous and that he would not go without careful plans and preparations.

Thousands of politically trained leaders are needed to carry on this organizing work among the people. The Eighth Route Army itself maintained a school near Linfen with six hundred students, of whom one hundred were women. Some of them were preparing for simple mass organization, others for the more complicated tasks of guerrilla fighting. It was not required that the students should thereafter work for the Eighth Route Army; many came from other armies to learn the Eighth Route methods.

Other schools and universities in many parts of the country were beginning to train similar leaders.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has called for the widening of similar armed resistance by the people throughout all the invaded part of China. "The time has come for the whole Chinese people to rise up in struggle, as this is the only way they can save themselves and the country. Let those who have fled from the territories seized by the Japanese return to their home cities and villages and organize there detachments to destroy the enemy that occupies them. As commander-in-chief of the army, I will pay the same attention to these detachments as to units of the regular army."

Before leaving Shansi, I visited the entrance examinations of Professor Li's University in Linfen. The students were housed in the dormitories of the local high school, whose younger students had been scattered by the war. The examinations were held in the open air on a military parade ground. Ice was on the ponds near the field but the students explained to me that it was warmer in the sun than indoors in their unheated rooms. They sat down about ten feet apart in long rows on the hard-packed earth, and each of them received a sheaf of papers containing fifty questions to answer in two hours. "Define society . . . define state . . . nation. . . . Define capitalism . . . socialism . . . imperialism. . . . Define national revolution . . . nationalism . . . social revolution. . . ." These were essential questions for students who were learning to organize the people in war-torn Shansi.

Standing on the frozen parade ground in the bright January sun, with the old jagged wall of Linfen cutting sharp like a toothed gear wheel against a distant haze of hills, I met a professor of philosophy, recently from Peiping, now clad in a soldier's suit of cheap gray cotton. He had studied four years in Germany long ago and we talked in German.

"What can you do with philosophy here?" I challenged.

"The job here is to teach patriotism to peasants and reading and writing to soldiers. Where does philosophy come into that?"

"There is philosophy of war and revolution," he answered. So I said, "All right, what is the philosophy of war?"

"There are progressive wars and retrogressive wars," he told me. "This war for China is a progressive war. It will smash the thousand-year-old social forms, for they cannot sustain the shock of it. It will release the new. The freeing of China will be good for the whole world also."

14. CHINESE DRAMA GOES TO WAR

THE best dramatic acting I saw anywhere in China was in an open-air village theater at Eighth Route Army headquarters. To celebrate the conclusion of the military conference and to honor two guests from Hankow—Professor Li Kungpo and myself—Chu Teh called a meeting of the soldiers in the neighborhood. After a brief exchange of greetings between the army commanders and the guests, the evening was given over to drama. Two dramatic companies put on the program: a group of Shanghai players touring the battle-fronts and the Eighth Route's own dramatic company organized by the famous woman writer, Ting Ling.

At five in the afternoon a pale sun was sinking over the dust-colored village which even three months of zero weather had not yet softened with snow. The air was still; there was no wind to raise the choking dust storm of North China. Only the tread of hundreds of feet going toward the village temple stirred a powdery mist that rose high and slowly settled, making a haze across the setting sun. The last light set aglow with color the high curved roofs around the temple court. Inside the court some seven or eight hundred men found space to stand for the meeting; a few of the more venturesome perched informally on the roofs. The only other seat was one bench fronting the stage, where sat Chu Teh, the Eighth Route generals and the invited guests.

One side of the temple court was filled by the stage, a square box of a house from which the side facing the audience had been torn and only partly covered again by a crude curtain. There was no stage entrance. To reach the platform the actors had to pass in front of the audience and climb up

about seven feet by a crude ladder. All of them did this together at the beginning of the program; then they disappeared into the dark interior, hiding behind furniture and side curtains until their cues. Since an exit from the stage via the audience would have distracted attention during the performance, none of the actors left until the show was over; all waited in that dark box behind the scenery for the many hours of the entertainment; then all came to the front of the stage together and climbed down amid plaudits of farewell.

Under these crude conditions the two dramatic troupes put on their performances which held their audience spellbound for many hours. The sun went down and the winter stars shone on the village drama; kerosene lamps were brought to light the stage. Till after ten on a bitter January night—the blue-gray soldiers stood watching, laughing, applauding. The dramas showed aspects of the war against Japan; they were portrayals of life as those soldiers knew it.

Performances given by the two companies illustrated in technique the two types of entertainment popular today. Ting Ling's group went in for "Big Drum Singing," the ancient Peiping style of chanted ballads accompanied by drum and string instruments. In this form, so popular in Chinese teahouses, her dramatic group declaimed "The Battle of Pinghsing Pass." Half of the men in that village audience had fought in Pinghsing Pass; they listened breathless to the story of their own victory.

Even more applauded were the Shanghai players, student amateurs with a few professional leaders, who put on realistic one-act dramas of the battle around Shanghai. Their most popular piece, "On the Banks of the Whangpoo," was the dramatization of the heroism of wharf coolies who swam out at night to attach bombs to Japanese ships. It opened with an aged coolie on a Shanghai dock, warming his shivering, half-naked body by drinking himself half-drunk Three plain-clothes men came to arrest him for loitering,

which gave him a chance to show his passport and explain his purpose. A younger coolie arrived, serious and worried; he had recently married and hated to die when he had just succeeded in getting such a nice girl. Everyone laughed at his hesitancy. Then the two coolies plunged into the water. After a distant explosion the older coolie returned, saying that his companion was captured. Machine-gun fire caused the guards and the older coolie to withdraw and Japanese entered with the younger coolie, tied him to a pillar and tortured him to make him betray his comrades. He groaned in agony, but did not tell. The ending was happy for reinforcements of Chinese guards returned and saved him.

This war-time melodrama was amazingly full of comedy. The older coolie was a comic character, full of rough jests about life and especially about the dynamite charge fastened to his body, which was visible against his naked skin when his rags flapped in the breeze. Neither of the coolies was shown as a romantic hero. One of them drank and jested; the other was afraid to start and moaned under torture. Yet both of them did their job and neither betrayed. The acting was superb; Chinese seem to be born mimics. The Shanghai troupe clearly conveyed its message, so encouraging to the audience, that ordinary men, plain wharf-coolies of Shanghai, have in them the stuff of heroes.

This Shanghai troupe casually created another drama during their visit. The procedure revealed how many of their dramas are born. A friendly critic suggested that Shanghai life was a little remote from the Shansi peasants and it might be well to supplement it with drama showing rural fighting. All night they worked on a new play "Defense of the Village," and presented it—in Shansi dialect! —to a large audience of farmers the following evening. Though the stage prompter was much in evidence at this first performance, it drew even more applause than the Shanghai plays.

"Defense of the Village" portrayed an old peasant discussing with his daughter-in-law the approach of the Japa-

nese. Should they remain to make peace with the invader, or organize in the hills to fight? The old man decided that the Japanese could not kill everyone, and that he was quiet and law-abiding, so they would probably show him mercy. He denounced his son and another neighbor who were forming a band of Farmer Fighters in the hills; peasants, he said, should submit to those in power. Cannily he hid his valuables in the courtyard and prepared to await the storm. A Japanese officer entered with a local Chinese traitor, dragged the young woman into the bedroom, shot her when he failed to subdue her and, rushing out, shot the old man also for the startled protest he had made. The son returned with the band of Farmer Fighters to kill the Japanese officer and the traitor. The old man, dying, told his son that he had been wrong to rely on Japanese mercy and that resistance was the only way. Such are the plots of today's Chinese dramas.

Chinese drama has gone to war. Not only has the war stirred Chinese writers to new, heroic subjects. War has smashed former centers of dramatic and literary culture —Shanghai, Peiping—and forcibly scattered writers and dramatists across China. Authors and actors move across the country. They seek refuge in interior provinces; they seek subjects at battle-fronts. Art is forced back to the people. A new culture of the inner provinces begins.

For the past two decades Chinese culture faced outward toward Europe. The Renaissance Movement of 1919 turned the attention of Chinese youth toward European and American writers and broke the dominant influence of old Chinese classics. Chinese boys and girls came to the coast for education; wealthier students crossed the seas to America and Europe. They became merchants, bankers, compradores, interpreters—channels through which foreign goods and foreign ideas entered China. Writers and dramatists copied foreign writers.

The shattering by war of centers and channels of culture which for two decades dominated China has forced the Chi-

nese to seek new ones. Universities have moved inland, installing themselves in mud-huts of the back country and speedily building new dormitories and laboratories. Writers, dramatists and actors have also moved inland. Many troupes of actors tour the country. They range from professional troupes to half-trained student-propagandists who recite patriotic poems. Most of the groups are amateurs with a few professional leaders. Some of them are temporary groups of students performing during vacations, like the twenty-seven students I met from Central China College of Wuchang, who used their mid-winter vacation to tour five near-by counties. Other groups are relatively permanent for the duration of the war.

In Hankow, for instance, I met a group of thirteen students—three of whom were women—who had walked nearly a thousand miles zigzagging back and forth from Shanghai to Central China, putting on patriotic dramas. The description of how they had organized is typical. "We collected a group which could sing, make speeches and draw cartoons. We did this on our own initiative, collecting money from friends to the amount of some thirty dollars (gold) which we spent for costumes. Then we registered with the 'People's Association for Resisting Japan' and they gave us a paper saying that we were students agitating in the villages. Because of this paper the local people received us and gave us food and shelter. Sometimes a patriotic magistrate gave it, sometimes a local organization, and sometimes merely the audience. We charged nothing for our performances."

The most picturesque of all the actors' groups which toured the country was a troupe of twenty-four Shanghai children aged nine to nineteen years. War destroyed their homes and drove them with their parents into refugee camps but they refused to stay there. "We will not be refugees burdening our country; we will help the campaign of resistance," wrote fifteen-year-old Tsu on the banner which they carried across China. They called themselves the

"Children's Dramatic Club," and began by reciting pieces and singing songs they had learned in school. Then famous playwrights and actors gave them free lessons. When the Japanese took Shanghai the children made their way to Hankow under their nineteen-year-old leader, a former primary teacher. Once they narrowly missed a battle but Chinese soldiers sent them another way. On another occasion the boats on which they were traveling were requisitioned by the military and they walked many miles carrying their stage equipment. They put on performances all the way. By the time they reached Hankow they had a repertory of nine war-time plays, all written by well-known playwrights for amateur production. The titles sufficiently indicate the contents. They were: "Final Victory," "Arrest the Traitors," "Lay Down Your Whip," "Japanese Mustache," "Aid Our Mobile Units," "At the Crossroads," "Solidarity," "On the Firing Line," and "Dream of Peiping."

All these war-time programs follow a common pattern: Opening speeches by the local authorities followed by a program of chanted poems and one-act plays. To the beating of a crude drum and the twang-twang of strings, the announcer often begins, "I bring you news from all the fronts, from Shantung and Hopeh, from northern Shansi, from Canton in the far South of our great China." Often the traveling players teach the latest patriotic songs to their audiences. Crude as are these amateur performances, they furnish the vehicle for which the best Chinese authors are today writing.

Editors whom I met in Hankow told me that the new trend in Chinese literature dates back to the Sian incident, and the rise of the national united front that followed. Authors turned to biographies of Manchurian guerrilla fighters and to the fighting farmers of North China. When the present war began and fighting spread on a large scale through the country, more and more leading writers put their pens at the service of the war. Literature became simple and full of incident, designed to arouse the people.

It dealt not so much with Japan's internationally imperialist policies but portrayed the invaders very concretely as robbers and murderers, burning houses, raping women. Its theme became "Defend your homes," rather than "Resist imperialism." It is full of heroic deeds of Chinese soldiers and of the sufferings of Chinese people.

A surplus of newspaper writers was created in Hankow by the arrival of large numbers of Chinese journalists rendered jobless by the destruction of the big newspapers on the coast. These writers began to put out "wall posters," hand-written newspapers posted in prominent places and containing digests of news and feature stories on the war. Two or three writers or journalists plan the poster; its actual writing is entrusted to a scholar of good penmanship —which is itself one of the arts in China. In a light, even humorous style, they discuss "how to help the wounded," "how to discover traitors," and other immediate problems. Crowds gather around these posters to look at the cartoons and pictures and to listen while the educated members of the crowd read the wall poster aloud to the others.

Poets, dramatists, even novelists have enlisted in the war for China's independence. In poetry a new form called "Poems to be declaimed" differs from both the classic and the romantic traditions. Mo Mo-tien, formerly well-known for romantic verse, has turned to this declamatory type of poetry, and a less-known younger poet, Kao-lan published a whole book called, *Poems to Be Declaimed,* all written to stir the people. Poets themselves began to go out to villages, declaiming their poetry to rural audiences, sometimes to musical accompaniment.

In drama the prevailing form has become the one-act play of great simplicity, suitable for performance on temple platforms, or even in village streets, and therefore with a minimum of scene changes. Tien Han, leading left-wing dramatist, wrote two short plays which are very popular with the dramatic groups: "Defense of Lukouchiao" and "Final Victory." Some of the dramas are so extremely

simple that teachers from near-by villages are able to take them back to their pupils and perform them, with considerable improvisation, in village schools. One such playlet portrayed "Old Man China" surrounded by a host of blue-clad daughters. An evil neighbor entered, with many flourishing gestures of attack, seized one of the daughters and dragged her from the stage, revealing the inscription "Manchuria" on her back. There followed the seizure of other daughters—Jehol, Chahar. Before all daughters were seized, the son of the family, labeled "Chinese Army," came to defend his sisters. He overpowered the evil neighbor, and thereupon the previously captured daughters smiled through the door at the rear of the stage in token that they would soon return. A playlet as simple as this is soon copied even by children in their games. Many different versions are already current.

Many writers have gone to the front for active service in arousing the people; among these the most important are Ting Ling, the leading left-wing woman writer; Hsu Chen, the well-known novelist; and Chou Li-po, the essayist. Most of them are too active to spend much thought on the theory of writing. When I asked Ting Ling to tell me the latest tendencies in Chinese literature, she answered, "I don't know a thing about literary tendencies; I've been six months at the front. But I have a clear opinion about the duty of the writer. He has only one task today: to help save the country. We must not lose ourselves in theories of literature; we must simply write to arouse the masses."

Then quickly she dismissed all theoretical questions and turned to the work of her "Front Service Dramatic Group." "We have played in the past few months to eighty thousand people—most of them peasants, many of them soldiers. From the standpoint of art our playing is backward, but the peasants like to see us because we dramatize their own life. We live like common soldiers, our food is not plentiful, and our transport is chiefly our own feet. We put on dramas, make public speeches, draw cartoons on the vil-

lage walls and teach the peasants to sing. We must teach at least two songs to every village.

"Our life, you see, is rather hard, but our audiences have smiling faces when we come, even in the midst of all this danger and death. So we are happy too." Thus did Ting Ling voice the "literary tendencies" of China's writers and actors who are working to arouse their fellow-countrymen to win the war. Two days later she and her troupe were again in motion, somewhere along the Shansi front.

15. CHINA'S NEW WOMEN

PROGRESSIVE women in China speak today with approval of a woman of Soochow who gave up her own husband to the police. He had several times sent information to the Japanese about Chinese troop trains; this finally led to an air raid that destroyed many cars of munitions. His wife at first sought quietly to dissuade him but after this final treason, she shouted: "Traitor, traitor!" until the neighbors inquired.

After her husband was shot the neighbors asked the woman if she regretted her action, "No," she replied, "I have lost one husband but I have saved many people of my country, and so I am calm at heart."

Perhaps no Western woman can completely feel the clashing standards in that tragic little story. For centuries Chinese women have been taught to find their only fulfillment in the family, betrayal of which according to Confucian ethics was the greatest crime. The woman of Soochow betrayed her family for the sake of her country; even more significant, the women of China approved her. Yet she still felt, transmuted, the old ethic of China which takes for granted the submission of the individual to the group. A Western woman might have spoken of personal loss, of conflicting emotions. The Chinese woman thought only in terms of her duty; the end and the justification of action was that she was calm at heart.

Never in any land have I found women of more superb character than those I met in China. They inherit a poise which comes from a lack of concern for their own emotions, and from a sense of the long generations in which they feel

themselves but a single link. When they add to this inheritance a modern social understanding, their devotion to the cause they serve is complete, yet without hysteria. They offer their lives, not with romantic gestures, but with the same prosaic yet wholehearted union of desire and duty with which for centuries they have built the family and done its household tasks.

Chinese women have been confined within narrower circles than the women of the modern industrial West, but they have never been suppressed as completely as were women under the feudalism of Japan. The history of China knows many examples of women of high family who took part in public affairs. The queen of the first Emperor, Huang-ti, builder of the Great Wall, was herself famous for discovering the art of raising silkworms. Fu Nu, the only daughter of a great scholar two centuries before Christ, lectured on the classics by order of the Emperor to the doctors of the Imperial Academy. In the first century of the Christian Era, Pan Chao, sister of the explorer-conqueror of the same name, was a famous woman historian. These were exceptions, but they at least indicate that the education of women was not considered an evil, as in most Asiatic lands. Girls went uneducated chiefly because of poverty and because it was more important to educate the sons who carried on the family. Daughters of well-to-do homes were taught not only music and embroidery, but sometimes poetry and the classics. Modern families of the better class have often sent their daughters to foreign missionary schools, and sometimes even abroad.

The subjection of women in China was not that peculiar disdain for the sex which characterizes a feudal war-glorifying society, but was part of the subjection of all individual life to the family. Sons were esteemed because they continued the family, but daughters were temporary; they entered the families of their husbands, where they became the newest and consequently the least regarded members. They were pledged not so much to a man as to a whole new fami-

ly, to serve its aged, tend its young and care for its relatives. Mothers of sons rose to a high status within this home, dominating its life much more than did the women of Japan. In China of an earlier day even divorce was permissible on the initiative of the woman—it always has been on the initiative of the man—until Chu Hsi under Hindu influence in the twelfth century gave an interpretation to the classics which made it better for a woman to die of cruelty or starvation than to marry a second time.

The first steps toward a wider life for women of the common people came, as in other lands, with modern factory industry, which freed women from family domination but introduced a new submission. A group of twenty-year-old girls from Shanghai textile factories, with incredible poise for their age, described to me in 1927 the long oppression of women, voice echoing voice like a chant. "By the old custom, women were not permitted to walk out of the house. . . . Their feet were bound very small, otherwise they could not get husbands. . . . They were forced into marriage, so the marriage relation was embittered. . . . When they worked in factories they were oppressed by foremen, and also had housework to do after the twelve-hour day. . . . Today if they join the union their husbands often oppress them, and the sisters and brothers of their husbands. . . . They are oppressed also by their own ignorance and illiteracy. . . . There was no liberty at all for women until the Nationalist armies taught them to organize."

An explosive "freeing of women" came in 1926-27 with the northward march of the Nationalist armies. Among villagers who still sold daughters to get food, and whose respectable women mourned the death of husbands by lifelong seclusion, there arose daring "bobbed-haired girls" who marched with the Nationalist armies as propagandists in uniform, preaching that both sexes were equal. They aroused the country, formed women's unions, and took divorces by the simple method of announcing them in the newspapers. Later when the farmers' and workers' unions

were suppressed, thousands of women were slain as dangerous characters on the evidence of their bobbed hair alone.

The most striking change I noticed in the China to which I returned in 1937-38 after ten years' absence, was the increased participation of women in work outside the home. Ten years ago when I asked for a secretary-interpreter I was offered a man, whose wife was usually in some distant province in the family home. Today there are women secretaries for such tasks. They are expanding into many other spheres. Women of standing carry on patriotic activities together with their husbands, or in women's organizations. Women serve the army also, as did the daring, bobbed-hair girls of the earlier decade. But they are not demanding their own rights so vociferously and their presence is more respected. Helping to win the war is to them both a right and a duty; after the war they expect that women, with all the people of China, will gain still wider rights.

The whole world knows of the famous Soong sisters, who hold a position in the national life of China unequaled by any women in any other land. Soong Ching-ling, better known to the world as the widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was the first Chinese woman I learned to know as a friend. Slight, clad in spotless linen cut in Chinese style, she is the most gently exquisite creature I know. Yet she has in her a character of steel, unswervingly devoted to the Chinese people's struggle for freedom. Throughout a decade of China's disunity, she has stood firmly by the original program of Dr. Sun for organizing workers and farmers and cooperating with the Communists. Brought up, as Chinese women are, to revere the family, she has held out for more than ten years against every family pressure. Tirelessly she wore out her health organizing movements for civil liberties, and for the liberation of imprisoned Chinese patriots. No woman in all China is so loved by the masses, for during all their years of suppression she was the one champion who, because of her prestige, could not be suppressed. To-

day she stands for the same program; it has now become the program of the government. She who in body is so slight, and in manner so gentle, was firmer in character than all the others.

The younger sister, Soong May-ling, known better as Madame Chiang Kai-shek, is probably the most powerful woman in the world today. Equally slender, with more chic and sophistication in her poise, she handles foreign diplomats for her husband, whose absorption in China's tasks have left him no time for foreign languages. Madame Chiang's interest in social movements somewhat resembles that of the wife of another great national leader, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Madame Chiang was chief promoter of the New Life movement. For a time she was in charge of China's aviation service but gave this up when the widening theater of war made it impossible to carry it on and at the same time remain with her husband; she rightly estimates her assistance to him as her most important job. Her brain and efficiency are so thoroughly Western that some Chinese resent her prominence, and some foreigners mistakenly assume that she is the man of the family, dominating even her husband. This is by no means true; she interprets the foreign world to him through her knowledge of languages, but in all Chinese affairs he is thoroughly master.

Any American president of the Federation of Women's Clubs might envy Madame Chiang's varied abilities. Today she heads the Women's War Aid Society, the nationwide organization to help the war and care for the refugees. She is no mere figurehead but indefatigable in work. She has found time to send me long personal letters about the plight of China's war orphans. She also writes many letters to her Wellesley classmates. She makes speeches over the radio; one such speech was from China to the Y.W.C.A. Congress in America. Madame Chiang is a sincere Christian; she views the savagery and corruption of the world from the standpoint of her Christian training. In the long talk I had with her at the Generalissimo's headquarters in Wuchang,

she told me she had gone into aviation to weed out the deep-rooted corruption there. "Some of your American firms were implicated, but I will say this for them: even though they grafted on the money, they gave us good planes. Some of the Europeans stole our money and sent rotten planes." Letters from her as late as May, 1938, still show the shock she feels at Japan's savagery and the world's aloofness. "It is remarkable that people can witness the revival of barbarism and do so little to condemn the nations responsible. . . . It is with deep sadness that I see people in America and elsewhere coming to accept this condition of barbarism. . . . I hope the time will come when there will be universal revolt against injustice and inhumanities."

It is not, however, in these exceptional women that one may best see the part that women play today in China. Hundreds of thousands of women from workers' and farmers' families, from the homes of business and professional men, give heroic devotion to China's cause. Peasant women organize scythe gangs to cut fodder for the armies in which their men serve in North China; they are trained to scatter and lie flat in air raids. In the distant villages of southern Hunan, knitting needles are clicking, making stockings for fighters in the northern snows. Even the unhappy women in the refugee camps of Shanghai under Japanese occupation, when forbidden the right to celebrate their national holidays, solaced themselves by declaring "General House-cleaning Day," under the double-edged slogan "Sweep out the dirt!"

In the Hankow Y.W.C.A. I met with a conference of women from many backgrounds, who were organizing the Women's War Aid Society of Hupeh Province. There were upper-class women from two generations of missionary influence, undistinguishable in manner and viewpoint from Y.W.C.A. committee women in America. There were also organizers of the New Life movement, girl students, women textile workers and Communist women. Some reported the collection of five thousand shirts for soldiers, others the

campaign to make ten thousand pair of soldiers' rope-soled cloth shoes. Still others spoke of the making of bandages, the sale of Save-the-Nation bonds, the organization of dramatic troupes to tour the villages.

A group of Shanghai textile workers, among those present, had just arrived in Hankow, coming on foot by a thousand-mile zigzag course, helping wounded soldiers and doing propaganda work in villages along the way. They told me the highest wages ever known in the textile industry had been ten to fifteen dollars (American money) a month in 1926-27, when the trade-unions were strong. The biggest drop in wages came in 1932 after the Japanese invasion of Shanghai, especially through the uncontrolled wage-cutting in Japanese-owned factories. When the war broke, most of the girls had been getting only three to six dollars (American) monthly, and had been without trade-union protection. But they were not illiterate or ignorant of world affairs. During the years when trade-union activities were not permitted, the Y.W.C.A.'s industrial courses had provided extensive education for Shanghai's working-class girls. The girls said, "The freeing of workers and of women must be worked out in connection with the freeing of the Chinese people as a whole. Workers and women suffer the most from Japanese oppression. The Japanese mills are the worst; they often made us work sixteen to eighteen hours, and until noon on Sunday without extra pay. Now the Japanese have destroyed all our homes and factories. So the working women are strongest to help the army. We go in the very front lines."

The most amazing account of the work of women behind the lines was given by Hu Lan-shih, a well-known woman writer who organized a group of Shanghai working girls in the earliest days of the war. Most of the girls came originally from farming families; Miss Hu herself had an almost uncannily shrewd knowledge of the Chinese farmer mind. A quiet, well-poised young woman, with a vivid sense of humor and superlatively straightforward and honest, she

went with her uniformed but unarmed group among the soldiers and villagers of the Yangtze delta. Though the spectacle of women organizing a war startled the Chinese villagers, the women often got better results than either army officers or college students. They induced Chinese farmers to harvest at night between battle lines, reclaimed dozens of "child-traitors" and halted demoralized, retreating soldiers.

"In August at the beginning of the war," related Miss Hu, "we offered our services to the commander to whom we were sent. He told us that his first difficulty was lack of food for the soldiers since the near-by farmers had all fled, leaving their crops unharvested. We followed the farmers to the places to which they had fled and urged them to return, at least as long as the soldiers were there. We said, 'A new day has come to China. The army no longer exploits the people but wants to be their friend. They will help you harvest, and you must give them hot water and help the wounded.' At first they would not believe us, but we gave them our word and we also held the general to his promise. Thus a large section of territory behind Shanghai was repopulated; the people gave housing and food to the soldiers, and the soldiers helped get in the crops." Later, the harvest on one of the fronts was dangerously located in a zone of fire and no one had succeeded in persuading the farmers to harvest it. By visiting the families and promising to go with them, the girls got 130 volunteers who harvested all one night and got eighty loads of crops.

With keen intuition the girls worked with soldiers who had violated the "new spirit" by paying too little for farm products. "Suppose a farmer complains that a soldier took a pig that was worth ten dollars and gave only four dollars. We would not humiliate the soldier by reproving him. We would rather congratulate him because he did not take pigs for nothing, but believed in the new spirit between people and army. Then we would tell him how many sacrifices the farmer made to help the army, and suggest that it would be

a gracious gesture if sometime he would pay more than the farmers asked 'For instance, we understand that the price of pigs is ten dollars; wouldn't it be nice if sometime you gave a farmer sixteen dollars?' So he would go back to the farmer and buy another pig for sixteen dollars and everybody's self-respect was saved."

A serious difficulty occurred with "child-traitors." The Japanese gave dollars to small children from six to ten years old, for information about gun locations. When several gun implacements were thus annihilated with all the men in them, the soldiers became so angry that they denounced these children as traitors and demanded their execution. One boy was actually thus executed, but after this Miss Hu persuaded the commander to let the girls handle the children. By clear and simple explanations they succeeded in completely counteracting the Japanese influence, so that even those children who still took the dollars worked for their own people instead of for the Japanese.

The most dangerous task accomplished by the girls was the stopping of a whole column of undisciplined, fleeing soldiers, whose flight endangered the whole line. They had ceased to obey their officers and were throwing their guns away or shooting in all directions as they fled. The girls first secured the cooperation of a village in the path of the approaching soldiers; they cleared several houses, and arranged in them a first-aid station and hot tea. Then they went into the midst of the arriving soldiers and hospitably offered them first aid for the wounded and tea for all. Girls in the tea rooms engaged the men in conversation, telling them the good news from all the rest of the front and asking politely: "Where are you from? Where are you going?" They did not assume to know that the soldiers were retreating; when the men stated this fact, the girls showed great surprise and disbelief. "What then will happen to all the other soldiers who are holding the line so well?" Not once did the girls denounce the fugitives; they merely expressed dismay. The soldiers hung around the village for several

hours talking with each other, and then slipped quietly outside the walls to avoid observation, re-formed their lines and returned to the front. Male self-respect demanded that the girls should not be publicly aware that the men had been influenced.

Thousands of other women carry on such tasks with the Chinese armies. Some do Red Cross work, others are political organizers; only in special situations are any of them actual fighters. When the famous "Lone Battalion" was finally ordered to leave the flaming warehouse in Chapei, the cheering spectators were astonished to see seven girl soldiers emerge with the 370 men. One of these was Miss Yang, who had carried a huge Chinese flag to the defenders; for several years past she had helped guerrilla groups in the North, where irregular activities permit the frequent help of women. A close friend of hers, Miss Yao Jui-fen, in 1931, as a sixteen-year-old student led a company of five hundred Chinese fighters in a mountain battle against the Japanese in Manchuria. She later took part with the Nineteenth Route Army in the defense of Shanghai. She has had many hairbreadth escapes. On one occasion she carried four thousand dollars through Mukden to Chinese guerrillas in the hills while the Japanese combed the entire city for her. She has found time to marry and have two children; her husband fights in the mobile forces of North China. The mother of another guerrilla commander near Peiping is the famous Madame Chao, a simple old lady in a blue cloak who engages in gun-running through the Japanese lines. Still another is the unnamed "Chinese mother" described by Li Po who, despite her bound feet and her sixty-three years, travels part of the time with the guerrillas to mend their clothes and do their laundry. When unable to follow them she conceals anti-Japanese posters in her laundry and pastes them up with starch in prominent places while apparently quietly washing clothes in the village stream.

More than two thousand girls in Kwangsi applied to organize a "Girls' Army." A stiff examination weeded out all

but 150, selected for good health, military knowledge and marksmanship, and ability as organizers and orators. They were trained to organize farmers for guerrilla fighting. Then they marched almost the entire six hundred miles to Hankow, carrying loads of more than fifty pounds of equipment. They wore giant hats of braided bamboo which were not only rainproof but camouflaged in color in order to hide the wearers from scouting airplanes. From the other extreme end of China, Miss Liu, a cheerful Red Cross worker of Peiping, came to Hankow as the representative of the "North China Anti-Japanese Army," a newly organized coalition of nearly a score of different bands of guerrilla fighters. She told me how the women of the occupied territory distribute illegal patriotic handbills at night and publish an illegal journal, *The Tientsin Woman.* They paint slogans on small boards and throw them into the river at Tientsin so that they may drift through the city and be read.

Even the Sing-Song girls of Hankow and the "taxi-dancers" of the Shanghai dance halls have formed Save-the-Nation associations. The leader of the Shanghai organization is a pretty Cantonese girl who formerly was the reigning queen at one of the most popular night clubs. Scores of these professional dancing girls made bandages and comfort-kits, or spent their daylight hours entertaining wounded soldiers in the hospitals. They induced many cabaret owners to turn their establishments into hospitals and later into refugee homes. The Hankow girls changed the love lyrics with which they were accustomed to enthrall cafe visitors to ballads about heroic warriors in Chinese history. They stripped off their gold and silver ornaments for the war fund and canvassed the streets of the city in groups, singing, "Give your gold and silver for the country." This movement caught the popular imagination and led to the donation of many heirlooms and treasured possessions.

No women in all the world have shown greater endurance and courage than the heroic Communist women who went

on the Long March with the Red Armies. Over snow-capped mountain ranges and across swift, perilous rivers, and in the midst of battles, for more than a year they marched and carried their own belongings. Among them were Mrs. Mao Tse-tung, formerly a farm girl; Mrs. Chu Teh, once rented out as a kitchen slave; and Mrs. Chou En-lai, a former village schoolteacher. Mrs. Mao, who prefers her own name, "Commander Ho Tze-chun," is fragile and dainty in appearance, but wore for ten years the uniform of the Red Army, fought at the front, organized groups of women fighters, nursed the sick, and carried full-grown men to field hospitals. She started on the Long March with twenty recent wounds from shrapnel in her body, eight of which were serious; she was also pregnant at the time and bore a child on the way. She was forced to leave her child behind with a peasant family, and has never since been able to find it. Yet all these bitter experiences have not dimmed her spirit or the youth of her twenty-eight years.

Still in her early teens, Mrs. Chu Teh—her personal name is Kang Ke-ch'ing—in 1927 deserted her life as kitchen slave and cowherder to organize the Women Vanguards of her district. She led more than three thousand women armed with everything from kitchen utensils to rifles. When Mao and Chu appeared in the district in 1928, the women joined them. On the Long March two battalions of these Women Vanguards defeated and disarmed a whole brigade of Szechwan troops. Mrs. Chu Teh, who could not read a single character when she joined the army, is today at the age of twenty-six a teacher of political science in the Yenan Red Army schools.

The life of the women on the Long March was related to me by Mrs. Chou En-lai. She herself was sick in bed with tuberculosis when the march started; she was carried in a litter for the first four months of the way. After this she got well and walked with the others. "As soon as we halted and put down the knapsacks, the women held meetings among the people telling them that the Japanese were invad-

ing the country, and that we were going to the Northwest to fight Japan. We also helped the local people arrest corrupt and grafting gentry, and investigate their crimes. The hardest work was the Red Cross. The men who carried the wounded were not able to keep up with the rest. We left Kiangsi with transport units but in Kweichow we had to hire local coolies who sometimes deserted. Then the women had to carry the stretchers, which was very difficult.

"Nearly one hundred children of ten years of age and under went on the Long March. All of them depended on their own legs for transport and carried their own belongings. They also took part in dramatics and singing as part of their contribution. Some of them became too weak and remained behind in various places; others came all the way through and are now very active in the Eighth Route Army in Shansi.

"Eight babies were born on the Long March, four of them in the first army with which I traveled; these four had to be left behind, because there was no way to take care of them on the long trip. We left them with Chinese farmers who promised to look after them; there were one boy and three girls; one of the girls was the daughter of Mao, our chief leader. We have been trying to trace the children but have not yet found them, for it is only very lately that we are able to travel legally through China. The baby about which we are the most worried is the one that was left on the borders of Szechwan among the aborigines; it was very hard there to get anyone who would agree to care for it. The mothers in all cases survived and continued the march. Luckily, at the time of each of these four births, the army chanced to be taking a one-day halt; so the mothers had plenty of time to bear them. The four babies born to the second army were luckier, for this army took a year less to make the march than we did. The babies were born nearer the end of the trip and in places where there was no one to care for them; so the army took them along. One little girl was born in the grasslands where there was neither food nor shelter; she

is named 'Long March.' A son was born to Commander Shiao Keh; this was also on the uninhabited prairie but there was one mud hut to shelter the birth, so he is named 'Little Mud Hut.' All of the babies lived and are well."

When I asked Mrs. Chou how she managed to get rid of her tuberculosis on that terrible journey, she answered: "I think it was happiness that cured me."

"Happiness!" I exclaimed. "But the hardships?"

"What hardships?" she asked.

When I asked whether she had not suffered from lack of food, she replied calmly, "Very often. In the grasslands we were ten days or more with nothing to eat but grass. In Kweichow we were able to pick rice from the fields, but bandits had stolen our utensils and we had nothing in which to cook it. Yes, we were often hungry."

"Why, then, were you so happy?" I asked her.

"Because we had a bright, hopeful future before us. We were all together and knew that we had chosen the correct path and that we could overcome all difficulties. There were also many new things to see and hear."

"Are you as happy now as you were then?" I persisted.

Mrs. Chou considered carefully for a moment and then answered, "More so, I think, for things are even more hopeful now."

16. THE CHINESE SPIRIT GOES UP

THE chief mystery among the foreign correspondents in Hankow in the week of my arrival in late December, 1937, was why the Generalissimo looked so happy. There were certainly no outward grounds for encouragement. On battle-fronts for a thousand miles his troops were fleeing. Hundreds of thousands of his best troops had been slaughtered at Shanghai and Nanking. He had lost both ancient and modern capitals and one-fourth of his country. On what did he base his good cheer in the midst of catastrophe? Had America promised him anything? Or England? Or was this apparent cheerfulness merely a sort of saving of "face"?

No, it was more. I also saw that the Generalissimo was in excellent spirits. I met him in Wuchang after a long conversation I had with his brilliant, efficient wife. She opened the door to the study and he came out to exchange greetings. Seldom have I seen a more serenely competent man. I will not accuse him of lightheartedness; he acknowledged with deep gravity my good wishes for China. But there was that confident spirit which comes when a man is gladly at one with himself—and with more than himself—when thought and action are united, moving strongly and clearly in a desired direction. In that deep sense the Generalissimo was happy. After my trip along the northern front I understood the reason. I have understood it better in the months that followed.

"The more the Chinese fight, the more their spirit goes up," said the young woman from the Shansi battle-front, nodding to the ex-police chief from Tsingtao.

We were crowded in a train of the Ping-han line returning to Hankow from a dozen scattered points of the far-flung northern front. Generals, civilian officials, missionaries and correspondents rode with us bound south on important business. The doors of the train were protected by drawn bayonets against hordes of refugees who at every station tried to storm the cars. The energetic young woman in army uniform in my compartment had been doing Red Cross work behind the lines for Marshal Yen Hsi-shan. A few months earlier she had been forced to retreat from Paoting, leaving a thousand wounded soldiers behind to be slaughtered in their beds.

The former police chief from Tsingtao, in a silk-padded gown, was a delightful combination of suavity and daring. When his city fell, he had led out seventeen hundred policemen, complete with guns and motor-bikes, to form a partisan detachment in the hills. He was on his way to Hankow for supplies and direction, and his jaunty manner showed that he found partisan warfare more satisfying to his spirit than his ancient job of running city police.

Just now, however, this hero was deeply embarrassed at sharing a compartment with two women. "It's war," he apologized. "One must get used to everything in war."

After the usual polite remarks to a foreigner, the woman and the former police chief began to discuss between themselves the difficulties, the backwardness and corruption of old China. "The national disgrace of Paoting. . . . The rout of Nanking. . . . The treason of General ——; he should be shot like Han Fu-chu. . . . Plenty of them need shooting. . . . Some Hankow bureaucrats as well. . . ." The words fell like hammer blows with a freedom of speech I never had thought to find at a battle-front. Yet they spoke with an energy so akin to enthusiasm that at last I said, "In spite of the terrible things you mention, you don't seem discouraged."

The negative snap of the head with which they declared themselves quite undiscouraged seemed fierce enough to

break a spinal cord. Then the woman made a classic answer, which deserves to be cherished by good fighters everywhere. "Things are bad enough now, but if we should get discouraged, they'd be that much worse."

The man added, in words to which I had grown accustomed across China, from the mayor of Canton in the South to Yen Hsi-shan in the Northwest: "There are three reasons for not getting discouraged. First, that the Japanese expected no fight but only submission, and they are getting no submission, but only fighting. Second, that this war has made a new unity in China. Third, that even the most isolated villages are developing a national consciousness, which means a permanent gain in self-government for our country."

Turning to the woman he said with a smile that it must be hard for a woman to leave her home for the front, giving up peace for war. "If I should sit at home while the Japanese take my country," she said, "my spirit would have no peace."

"If spirit is lost, all is lost; if spirit is not lost, nothing is lost," replied the ex-police chief. "The Japanese invasion has stirred a new spirit in China."

The emergence of the Chinese spirit was not unexpected by men who have known China. A former high advisor to the Chinese government said to me shortly after the war started: "Japan has nine points out of ten in her favor, but she will be beated by the tenth—the strength of moral principle in China. The Chinese are a highly ethical people. For more than two thousand years their loyalty to the group—the Confucian family—has been stronger than their desire for individual life. They never developed that individualism which modern capitalism gave to the Western nations. What the conscience of their group tells them is proper has always taken precedence over love of life. If a Chinese doesn't consider it proper to fight, he won't fight even if you kill him. I have seen men who refused to obey a war lord walk, grinning, talking and smoking, to the beheading ground as

casually as to a job. When they finally transfer their loyalty from the family to the wider group of the nation, and decide that it is proper to fight for it, the spirit with which they will offer their lives will astonish the world."

Blows which might have wrecked the morale of any people actually stiffened the Chinese spirit. Under the hammer of war China was becoming a nation; allegiance to family was supplanted by a wider allegiance. In a district near Changsha all feasts for ancestral worship were declared abolished, and the money thus saved was used for the needy families of soldiers. Boys of fourteen rushed to seek admission to the army; even in faraway Chungking the enlistment authorities had to refuse three in a single day. A fourteen-year-old boy in Sian said to his mother, when she sought to detain him: "The robbers are in the house, Mother, and the only choice is to fight or to be slaves." Even youths of wealthy families ran away to the army. One of these announced his departure to his father through an advertisement in a Hankow newspaper: "Dearest Father, I left not because I do not love you but because I love our country more."

This national consciousness was something new in China; one could mark the stages of its growth. When Han Fu-chu surrendered Tsinan, his capital, in December with hardly a gesture of resistance, I remember the hopeless feeling in Hankow. How impossible it seemed for the Central Government to deal with an independent war lord; it just wasn't done. The government contented itself at first with the obvious makeshift of placing Li Tsung-jen's better troops behind Han Fu-chu's to stem the retreat. Then the Generalissimo arrested Han Fu-chu, court-martialled and shot him, together with two dozen other officers who had deserted in the face of the enemy. All through China went a wave of national self-respect: "At last we are strong, we can deal with traitors." So uncertain had been this reaction that it was plausibly believed in Hankow that the first announcement of the execution had been a test of public sentiment

and that only after public approval was manifest, was the execution carried through.

Hangovers of China's past still marked the war's early stages. Not only was there lack of correlation between the newly united armies—some of them still hardly more than semi-bandit armies of the war-lord tradition—but cooperation between army and civilians was at first limited almost entirely to the Shansi districts where the Eighth Route Army operated and to the patriotic actions of Shanghai workers. There were even towns in the North where merchants formed "reception committees" to welcome the conquering Japanese in the hope of securing mercy. But the acid test of war swept from the scene the war-lord type of army. A rising tide of public opinion dealt with the reception committees, who were either shot by patriotic assassins, or executed when Chinese armies returned. Men who greeted conquerors were no longer respected as shrewd men of peace, protecting their families; they were damned as traitors. A venerable scholar near Shanghai, who committed suicide when enrolled by force in a Japanese-controlled puppet government, was hailed throughout China.

The Taierchwang victory, which—together with other minor victories—surprised the world in April, 1938, was chiefly due to this growing national unity. It was won by armies—those of the Kwangsi generals—who a few years earlier had been at war with Chiang Kai-shek's government, but who were now among its ablest fighters. It was won by a tactic which combined the lessons of the World War with the guerrilla strategy developed by the Eighth Route Army, another former enemy. It proved that the combination of positional warfare with guerrilla attacks on the enemy's communications need not be confined to the Eighth Route alone, but could be swiftly widened to other provinces on a tremendous scale. The victory was based on accurate correlation between different Chinese forces over a large area, and showed that these armies were improving in organiza-

tion, in striking power and in the help which they received from the Chinese people.

For months the Japanese had been pushing toward Soochow, key junction point of the Lunghai railway, which would give them mastery of the Yellow River valley, thus strengthening their hold on all of northern China and opening the way to the west and south. As their forces advanced through the coastal Shantung province, guerrilla attacks, at first only pinpricks, struck their lengthening lines of communications. Groups of "peasants" toiling near little rivers broke dikes and flooded highways in the path of Japanese supplies; others blew up railway lines at critical moments. The battle of Taierchwang began March 23, when Japanese forces were converging from three directions on Soochow. It ended sixteen days later with the Japanese in disorderly retreat northward, leaving behind them, out of 62,000, over 40,000 dead, wounded or prisoners. One part of the Chinese had held them at the front while another made a surprise flank attack and caught the Japanese when their supplies were depleted by the guerrilla attacks in the rear. Field guns were without ammunition, tanks without gasoline and some of the captured soldiers were in an almost starving condition.

The world press hailed this Chinese victory as the first major defeat ever suffered by Japanese armies. This was hardly accurate, for the Pinghsing Pass and Sinkow battles in northern Shansi also inflicted heavy losses and delayed the Japanese for as long a time when delay was strategically even more important.* But the effect of Taierchwang on China's prestige throughout the world was greater. In several important ways it changed the whole picture in the Far East. The myth of Japanese invincibility was shattered under the eyes of the World's war correspondents. In Tokyo a cabinet crisis threatened. Conservative military experts

* General Wei claimed 16,000 victims at Sinkow and 3,000 at Pinghsing Pass; they were part of an almost continuous operation. See Chapter 9.

in every country began for the first time to admit the possibility of eventual victory for China. With one important proviso—if the Chinese spirit held out.

The effect of Taierchwang on Chinese morale was equally important. On other fronts the Chinese took the offensive and reoccupied several areas. Chinese guerrilla bands began to attack Japanese detachments even in the outskirts of Peiping and Shanghai. Tremendous celebrations were held in every Chinese city. In Hankow autos and trucks roared through the streets, crammed with shouting people. A hundred thousand people from a hundred organizations gathered in the city's park at early evening, and marched in a huge torchlight procession through the main thoroughfares. Dramatic groups put on moving shows as they marched. Choruses of students and of children sang the new martial songs of China. Tens of thousands of firecrackers greeted them from shops and houses.

For a month after the Taierchwang battle, Japan poured heavy reinforcements into China. Months later than they had expected—or than the Chinese themselves had expected*—they eventually took Hsuchow. Pushing along the Lunghai line up the valley of the Yellow River, they were suddenly overwhelmed by the Yellow River in flood. The breaking of the dikes was apparently due to a variety of causes. Water-control experts had stated for several years that a new change in the river's course was overdue. War conditions prevented the annual repair, and made flood at high water practically inevitable. Japanese guns had also battered at the dikes in their efforts to effect a crossing. Whether or not, as charged by the Japanese, the Chinese armies helped to time the flood's arrival, they clearly knew it was coming. They ingeniously turned the flood into a weapon by a military maneuver which may rank in history with the famous breaking of Holland's dikes to drown an

* A general on Li Tsung-jen's staff told me in Hankow at the end of January that they hoped to hold Soochow another month; they held it four.

invader. They synchronized their retreat so that the flood poured between them and the Japanese armies. Most of the Chinese armies and civilian population had already been evacuated; Chinese loss of life was inconsiderable. Tremendous quantities of Japanese equipment were buried under the muddy waters. The lighter Chinese guerrillas splashed knee-deep through water, taking back large numbers of Japanese positions. The flood saved Hankow from the northern drive, making necessary a much more arduous attack of the Yangtze River; it also preserved the railway communications between Hankow and the Northwest. Months later the Yellow River valley was still impassable to the Japanese.

Two spectacular air raids made during these days by Chinese planes raised Chinese morale and world prestige still higher. A successful bombing raid was made on Formosa, the island off the southern coast of China which Japan was using as air base for her attacks on Canton. This was the first time hostile airplanes ever attacked Japanese-owned soil.

On the very day when Soochow fell, May 20, 1938, the spirit of China replied by a successful flight over Japanese cities. The projectiles dropped were not bombs, but leaflets appealing to the Japanese people to end the war. Five different leaflets were released from the sky into populous Japanese cities: from the Chinese air force, the Chinese people, the Chinese Federation of Labor, the Japanese anti-war organization among Japanese soldiers, and from Japanese prisoners of war in Hankow.

The first two leaflets used the language of diplomacy, which is nowhere more courteous than in the Far East:

> DEAR JAPANESE PEOPLE:
>
> The air force of the great Republic of China is now flying over your honorable country. Our purpose is not to destroy life or property, but to tell you the crimes that the militarists of your honorable country commit on the whole territory of China. . . . [There

followed a long list of Japanese bombings of Chinese civilians.]

In a quite different tone was the appeal of the Chinese Federation of Labor to Japanese workers:

HEAR! HEAR!

Freedom does not come of itself. Now is the time for the people to seize their freedom. Brother workers, you who control production, who have the source of supply for Japanese militarists in your hands, awaken to your great power! You hold the destiny of the Oriental! Down with Japanese militarists! Fight with general strike to free the people of both our countries from their suffering.

The leaflet from Japanese forces was highly significant because it showed to the Japanese people the existence of an anti-war organization among their own soldiers.

FELLOW SOLDIERS!

Now is the time to smash the long tyranny of the military gang who assassinated Takahashi, who coerced Parliament, who have turned half a million of our people into cannon fodder, who have robbed the people of billions in taxes. . . . See the persistence of the Chinese people who are dying for justice. . . . Oh, fellow soldiers, don't die, don't be wounded, try to go home.

ANTI-WAR LEAGUE OF TOKYO, OSAKA,
KYOTO AND MANCHURIAN DIVISIONS.

The leaflet from the Japanese prisoners was important because it proved that Japanese had been captured and that the Chinese had spared their lives, both of which facts the Japanese censorship denied.

Fellow soldiers, we must tell you the truth. We were wounded and captured and thought we would surely

die. We were told that the Chinese army is very cruel but we were well treated and live a free life. The Chinese authorities hate the aggressions of Japanese militarists, but not the Japanese people. Oh, when we think of what we did toward this people who are full of love, we are ashamed.

JAPANESE WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN HANKOW.

The most amazing example of the new Chinese spirit comes from the militant Chinese local governments organized behind the Japanese lines. Army cavalry which plows the soil for the poorer farmers, workers who sing and shout for joy while making uniforms without pay for guerrilla warriors, infantry whose technique for "invisible advance" defeats machine guns—these are part of the account contained in personal letters from North China in the summer of 1938.* American missionaries in cities along the Peiping-Hankow railway now carry two travel permits, one from the Japanese forces who hold the railway, the other from the Eighth Route Army which defends the surrounding territory. They bicycle a few miles from the railway, present their permits to Chinese sentries and enter a district completely controlled by the Chinese. There are several of these district governments. The strongest is in Northeast Shansi at Wutai defended by Lin Piao's troops; the one from which the most reports have come is in Hopeh which is the next strongest and most accessible.

Seven million people live in this Hopeh district of seventeen counties. The entire region is organized on a military basis. Guards patrol every village and crossroads; people and goods move only by permit. Supreme power in each county is held by a "mobilization committee" of local farmers and gentry who can requisition men and material for defense. The defense forces included a small mobile force

* Information from missionaries' letters and from Associated Press correspondent, Hal Hanson.

fairly well armed with machine guns, which operated chiefly against the railway, and a home defense force of half a million farmer-volunteers who still worked in the fields but were organized to guard their own villages with hand grenades and swords and a small supply of revolvers and rifles. Younger men were in training as leaders for mobile warfare. Children acted as scouts. The Women's War Aid had 400,000 members making bandages, shoes and similar supplies at home. Of the entire population of seven million, more than a million were active in tasks of defense.

The description of a military maneuver witnessed by the Associated Press correspondent is highly impressive. Three thousand men lay on the ground in an open space two miles square. They were spaced twenty feet apart and in uniforms the color of the ground; thus they were nearly invisible and a bomb from the air could hit at most half a dozen. At a signal a man arose far off to the right, ran forward and dropped; he was visible about four seconds. When he had gone two-thirds of his distance, another arose at the left, and similarly ran forward. Men advanced from all sides, but in such irregular order that no gunner could have trained a machine gun fast enough to hit them; a dozen machine guns sweeping the field could have hit perhaps ten men in half an hour. "It was a creepy feeling," said the correspondent, "to see this great force advance, yet almost invisible."

Adequate wheat and cotton are produced within the district; strict control keeps most of it out of the hands of the Japanese, compelling them to import their food. A uniform factory was turning out eleven hundred uniforms daily from homespun cotton: brown ones in winter for camouflage against the bare earth, green in summer to match the fields. These cost about thirty-four American cents each; the entire clothing of a soldier—including underwear, stockings, shoes and cap—cost about a dollar and a quarter American money. Eleven small arsenals made rifles, trench-mortars, powder, hand grenades, broadswords. There was adequate

steel from a large shipment of tool-steel and scrap, seized, en route to the Taiyuan arsenal at the beginning of the war, by the Eighth Route Army. Chemistry professors from Peiping were working in the arsenals to supply a deficit in acids. Other shortages were met by an underground grapevine into the Japanese-held cities, or by raids. The population showed great enthusiasm when the Chinese armies offered them fifty Chinese cents a pound for the copper in the Japanese telegraph lines. Whole villages joined in copper-seizing expeditions and brought in so much that the army could not pay for it all.

Ten times as many schools were found in this district by the correspondent as in the entire Japanese-supervised district around that center of education, Peiping. Wherever the common people of China have power, they at once and spectacularly increase the schools. The district's communications included a postal system for three thousand towns and villages and a telephone system with six hundred local offices and three thousand miles of wire, all of which were taken over intact. Ten radio stations communicated military knowledge and brought news from the outside world. This was printed in seventeen daily papers, small sheets but the first that many of these counties ever knew. When Chiang Kai-shek made a speech in Hankow, the metropolitan newspapers in Peiping might suppress it but it appeared the next morning in seventeen rural counties of Hopeh, surrounded by Japanese lines.

All over China, as the Japanese armies advance along the railways, similar organization springs up behind their lines. Increasingly the war becomes a struggle not alone between armies, but between an invading army and a stubborn population. Against Japan's mighty machines of modern war China organizes her vast geography and manpower. The Japanese reply is to form Chinese guerrillas of their own, and to burn and slaughter whole villages. But of a dozen bandit-bands subsidized by the Japanese in Hopeh, eight of them were either disarmed by the Chinese or went

over to them voluntarily in the first few months. Even the burning of villages has been to some extent checked by Chinese counterattacks. When they cannot be protected, the inhabitants are warned by the excellent local espionage system to withdraw, after the Japanese leave, the local government helps rebuild the villages. The man objective of Japan—to break the will of the Chinese people—still eludes them. Even the most savage air attack in history, which claimed in Canton in the first week in June ten thousand civilian victims and called forth protests from America and Britain, succeeded neither in breaking the railway route into Central China nor in terrorizing Canton into breaking with the Central Government.

The farther the Japanese advance, the more they are caught in the quicksand of an organized and hostile population which, for the first time in four thousand years of history, is becoming conscious of the people's power. Madame Chiang Kai-shek was able to write me in the late spring of 1938: "Since you left, the morale of the Chinese people has grown considerably. Our philosophy enables the refugees and all who suffer to bear their trials without complaint. Our soldiers are fighting as they never fought before." And the Generalissimo was saying on July 7, 1938, the first anniversary of the war's beginning, "We have lost territory, but we have lost it fighting and by so doing have made to burn brighter that spiritual flame which is the spirit of China, the spirit which will emerge from the ruins Japan has made to erect the structure of a new China."

I think he means those words, for I myself saw that the Generalissimo was happy, even in December, 1937, a darker hour than now. And I learned the reason in the months that followed. Wherever I travelled in the North and South of China I saw that as the people united they cheered him for resisting Japan. Under whatever pressures he came to that decision, he has now by virtue of that one choice found himself, in the midst of war, supremely at peace with the Chinese people. Canton of the South, which fought him for

years, applauds his picture in the movies. The Communists of the north say: "We have known for ten years that he is stubborn; now we believe that he will be stubborn against Japan."

No one can reach the high post the Generalissimo holds in China without being keenly aware that he inherits four thousand years of history and that he himself will one day be an ancestor, whose deeds are written down. For ten years he strove to unify the land by violence, and received only a sullen half-obedience, mixed with hate. Now he knows that he still has the chance to go down in that long procession of centuries as the leader under whom were achieved that unity, independence and rebirth of China of which Sun Yat-sen and all China's progressive forces have dreamed.

17. HOW COMMUNIST IS CHINA?

IN a shower of facts, rumors and exaggerations, Communism in China has broken into the news. Madame Chiang Kai-shek gets letters from her Wellesley classmates asking whether China is going Communist. The Associated Press runs dispatches from "a Communist state in Hopeh," behind Japanese lines but authorized by the distant Chinese Central Government. Tokyo would have it that the whole of China has gone Communist; how otherwise would it be so unreasonable as to oppose Japan? Some conservative Chinese, on the contrary, will tell you that there is no Communism at all in China, not even in the minds of the Communists. "They recognized the error of their ways," is the formula, "and submitted to the Kuomintang."

Amid contradictory claims a few facts are incontrovertible. It is admitted by all that Chiang Kai-shek is leader-in-chief in China and that he is no Communist. (He warred on the Communists for ten years.) It is known that the Kuomintang is the party in power. It is also clear that the Kuomintang and Communists are cooperating—as are all other openly acknowledged groups or parties—and that this is the basis of China's present strength. But how do they cooperate? Which, if either, has conceded to the other? How firm is the cooperation, and how likely to be permanent? In which direction does it tend? How Communist is China, actually or potentially? These questions form for the world's press the chief news angle in every change in the Chinese government, every Kuomintang Congress, every manifesto of the Communist Party.

The first fact that strikes an American visitor in China is that far from approaching Communism, China is just be-

ginning to go democratic in a fairly thorough way. The second fact is that the Communists are the loudest cheerers for every democratic gain. We have even the amazing spectacle of a Kuomintang decree—granting free speech, press and organization, with the eventual promise of a postwar government "of, by and for the people"—described by a *New York Times* correspondent as "a concession to the Communists." The third noticeable fact is that the Communists have as yet only the shadow of a share in the Central Government, but that in any districts where they gain influence or control they make that district especially democratic and also especially loyal to the Central Government.

Reasons for these paradoxes lie in the history of China. Vast, illiterate, peasant China never knew democracy in any modern sense. Villages had—unlike the centralized feudal system of Japan—considerable local autonomy; but their chiefs were chosen by heads of important families without the voice of the young or the poor. The Central Government was for centuries an unlimited monarchy. After the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911, there was for a short time an elected Parliament, but property and literacy requirements barred all but a small minority of the population from the vote. The Nanking government of Chiang Kai-shek made no pretense to democracy; it claimed to be educating the people for some future time of self-rule. Today, in the shock of war, that hope of self-rule draws nearer. Precisely this fact and the hope it gives of a freer, better life for the common people, create the amazing spirit of the Chinese population in this war.

The relation of the Communists toward these growing hopes of democracy becomes at once clearer when it is known that at no time in their existence as a party have they ever tried to establish immediate Communism,* or as-

* The Canton Commune and later Soviet Districts went as far as demanding nationalization of large-scale industry, and dividing the landlord's estates among the soil-tillers—in other words, abolition of all feudal remnants in the countryside and a degree of socialization in the cities, both of which were part of Sun Yat-sen's program.

sumed that this could be done. They regard the full liberation of the Chinese people as a long, complex process, involving factors not only in China but on a world scale. For this reason they are members in good standing of the Communist International; throughout their existence they have contributed to its discussions and decisions and carried them out. Their immediate demands in China, however, since the organization of the party in 1921, have been for the right of workers and farmers to organize, to participate in government, and thus to secure a better life. China's freedom from foreign domination is a prerequisite for these demands. The Communists, therefore, actively helped strengthen and expand the Kuomintang in its struggles from 1924-27 for a united, independent China, considering this the first step toward that better life for all the common people of China—and of the world—which only socialism could finally bring.

Both Kuomintang and Communist parties took part in the Northern Expedition in 1926-27 through which Chiang Kai-shek came to power. Both parties supported the famous "Three People's Principles," which were given their fullest formulation during the period of this united front.* During the ten years of civil war that followed, the Communists can even claim to have supported these principles more aggressively than did the Nanking government. They urged resistance to Japan—"People's Nationalism"—while the government submitted to loss of province after province. They demanded free speech and the right to organize—"People's Democracy"—in the years when these rights were denied. They proclaimed "People's Livelihood" in terms of lower rents and taxes, farm credits, higher wages and social insurance for workers while the banker-dominated govern-

* Dr. Sun himself stated that Communism and the Three People's Principles are quite compatible and that "the teaching regarding the well-being of the people is in fact Communism, Socialism. . . . Communism is the highest ideal for the solution of social problems." (Sun Yat-sen: *Collected Works*, "Lecture 2," pp. 38-48.) His relations with the Communist Party were of the friendliest character.

ment saw it in terms of unification by force, stabilized currency and more roads. The Communists can claim with some justice that the firmer resistance to Japan and the growing democracy fulfill the program they have long demanded.

"Class struggle" was the one great point of difference between the two parties, according to the theoreticians of the Kuomintang. This is correct, though not in the oversimplified form in which it is usually meant. The split between the two parties grew out of class struggle; this struggle thereafter continued on both sides. The Kuomintang government in Nanking suppressed the organizations of workers and farmers; the Communists, wherever they secured power, overthrew the landlords and moneylenders. They gave the land to the soil-tillers, destroying old boundaries and title-deeds. They set up "soviet governments" in which "exploiting elements" were denied the vote. They did this from the conviction that only the overthrow of the power of the landlords and the semibandit militarists allied with them, would relieve the unbearable conditions of the Chinese people. The road to this goal was changed by the Japanese invasion, which modified the relations of classes in China. It threatened all classes with a common and deeper enslavement, but at the same time, through the organizing and arming of the people, strengthened the role of the workers and farmers in the life of the nation.

It is to the Communists' credit that they were the first to see the necessity for joint action against the common national foe. As soon as the Japanese invaded Manchuria they offered to cooperate with any Chinese forces that would resist Japan. The history of these offers and of the final establishment of united action against the invader is given earlier in this book.* It is sufficient here to note that from the standpoint of the Communists' own theory, this cooperation was not a retreat but an advance toward the independence of China, first item on their own program. They are loyal

* Chapter 8.

to Chinese unity against invasion, not merely as good Chinese but as good Communists. They have, however, made several concessions in the interests of unity; chief of these is that in the districts which they control they no longer disfranchise or overthrow the landlords. Even in regions where the local farmers spontaneously organized against both Japan and the landlords, the Eighth Route Army convinced them that they should attack only "traitor landlords," and persuade the others of the need of joint action against Japan.

"We soften rather than emphasize class struggle," said Jen Peh-hsi frankly to me. "In places where we have driven out the Japanese and are called upon to form local governments, we no longer do this by calling a meeting of poor farmers and excluding the rich. We form local governments representing all classes. We do, however, demand that rents, taxes and interest rates be lowered, since otherwise the common people will not be able to endure the strain of the war. In cases where local conflicts have come to bloodshed, as when a landlord has killed a share-cropper and the latter's family has declared a blood feud against the landlord, we try to arbitrate by securing financial compensation from the landlord to the share-cropping family. Chinese must not fight Chinese while we are all faced with a greater danger of slavery to Japan."

The famous "Communist state in Hopeh," from which the Associated Press has carried dispatches,* is the most spectacular recent example of these tactics. It is an emergency government behind the Japanese lines but loyal to the Central Government of China, which authorized its formation. It is in fact far more intelligently loyal to the Central Chinese Government than it has ever been in all its history, for in the past it was controlled by semi-independent northern war-lords. Despite the fact that the Eighth Route Army organized the district, the foreigners who have visited it say

* Described in chapter 16.

that the Communists refuse to take even as many of the local government posts as efficiency might dictate. "Their greatest fear is that elements in the Kuomintang may cease to cooperate against Japan, so they do everything possible to avoid the charge that they are seeking power," writes the Associated Press correspondent.

Without dispossessing the landlords the Communists have however shown considerable ingenuity in passing measures which relieve the farming population. The land of landlords who have fled to Peiping (and most of them have) is still considered the property of the owner, but is temporarily used by the new government which divides it among the poor and among refugees from burned villages. The local governments collect the rent from this land, from which they admit they owe an accounting to the landlord when he returns, but which meantime gives them control of considerable revenue. All rents have been lowered, usually about 25 per cent. A three-year moratorium has been declared on all debts, and the interest is meantime fixed at 1 per cent. Taxes are graded so that requisitions of food, clothing and weapons are borne by the well-to-do, the poorer half of the population being free from assessments. The method of doing this varies from county to county. A typical method is to exempt entirely from taxation one-half acre for each member of the farmer's family, which insures that the families with small plots pay nothing. Farmers who have no animals are helped by the army cavalry to plow their soil; this is done on a very extensive scale. Refugees from burned villages who have no food are fed until harvest by the local governments. All these measures arouse intense loyalty from the greater part of the population.

The district longest under Communist control is the "Special Border District" in northern Shensi, an arid, hilly, poverty-stricken region lying close under the great deserts of southern Mongolia in part of the "famine belt." Though relatively large in area—some 650 by 300 miles—it supports only about a million and a half population on a diet of corn,

millet and potatoes, varied with a very scant amount of wheat and mutton. For nine or ten years there have been small soviet districts in this region protected by local armed bands. The main body of the Red armies came only in 1935 after the Long March across the whole of China; then the largest soviet district yet established anywhere in China was formed.

Less than a year later when Edgar Snow visited this district he found the situation radically improved "for the tenant farmer, the poor farmer, the middle farmer and all the 'have-not' elements."* All forms of taxation had been abolished in the new districts for the first year to give the farmers a breathing space. In the old districts only a progressive single tax on land was collected, and a five to ten per cent tax on business. Land and livestock had been taken from the wealthy and redistributed among the poor, and reclamation had begun of great areas of "waste land"—mostly the land of absentee or fleeing landlords. Opium had been completely eliminated, beggary and unemployment had been "liquidated," foot-binding and infanticide were criminal offenses, child slavery and prostitution had disappeared.

The Soviet District was especially remarkable for the attention it gave to education and other cultural activities. A normal school for primary teachers had been established, an agricultural school, a textile school, a trade-union school, a school for training party organizers and two hundred primary schools. The Red Army had brought with them on the difficult Long March not only their arms but simple, industrial equipment—lathes, turning machines, stampers, dies, and dozens of Singer sewing machines. With these, small factories had been set up. Lithographic blocks and light printing machines had been carried for that year-and-a-half-long journey to begin the spread of culture in the desolate northwest. "I noticed," said Snow, "that most of the farmers talked about the soviets as 'our govern-

* Snow: *Red Star Over China*, pp. 215-216-219-231.

ment' and this struck me as something new in rural China."

When the United Front was established in 1937, the Soviet District was changed into the "Special Border District," a provincial government subject to general control by the Central Government. In token of this change landlords were allowed to return and were given land for their personal use if they desired it, but not the whole of their former estates. The previous "land-reform," which gave the soil to the actual tillers, had proved a chief factor in preventing or lessening famine. On the Communists' own initiative, democratic local elections were held at the end of 1937 in which the formerly disfranchised landlords and trading classes were allowed to vote together with the peasants. These were the first elections by full manhood suffrage ever to be held anywhere in China in all her history. Not only men but women were included. Lively campaigns were held before the elections. Secret ballots were provided, voters who could not read being helped by students to mark their ballots. In most of the villages 70 per cent of the people took part; those districts where only half of the people turned out were considered backward. Most of the localities but not all of them returned the Communists to office.

The present program of the Communist Party for the immediate war situation might be defined as a program of a "national front." The details on which the Communists believe the people of China can unite in the present crisis are announced, with the usual Chinese love of numbers, in "Ten Principles of the Anti-Japanese Front" which are placarded all over the territory where the Eighth Route Army operates:

1. Resist Japan; recover all lost territory; confiscate all Japanese property in China and use for national defense.
2. Confiscate property of traitors and use for refugees.
3. Improve people's livelihood; prevent floods and famines.
4. Remove unnecessary and exorbitant taxes; reor-

ganize the finances of the country; develop industry and trade.
5. Increase wages and improve living conditions of workers, peasants and students.
6. Carry out universal, free, compulsory education.
7. Give work to the unemployed.
8. Carry out democratic principles and release political prisoners except traitors.
9. Equality of all races living in China and defense of Chinese people living abroad.
10. Unite with all opponents of Japanese imperialism, the common people of Korea, Formosa; cooperate with all nations that sympathize with China; friendship with all nations that remain neutral.

These principles are not presented as principles of Communism but as a program for immediate action by the Central Government in China today.

Thousands of Communists, who have seen family and friends wiped out in the civil war with the Nanking government, now loyally support the Central Government of China. When I met Ting Ling, the famous woman writer, I was surprised to find her still alive. Many years before she had disappeared into a Nanking jail with her husband, and he was known to have been killed there. Yet when I asked her, after our discussion of her new dramatic troupe, to tell me something of her personal history and "how she came alive" after being reported dead, she answered, after a moment's hesitation, "Since we are now on a united front with the government, I would rather not discuss my prison experiences." The Communists have many bitter memories to bury, but they have resolutely buried them for the sake of China.

The only groups in China who oppose the united anti-Japanese front are the Trotskyists, the fascists and the pro-Japanese traitors, who are usually found in an unholy alliance, sometimes open, sometimes concealed. In the early part of the war, the Trotskyists openly expressed the theory

—it was stated to me by one of them in Hankow—that the government of Chiang Kai-shek was the "chief enemy of the Chinese workers" who should assist in its overthrow, even at the hands of Japan. This view was so obviously treasonable that it gained no open following and was later renounced in the press by Trotsky himself. There are many indications that it still remains the underground policy, carried on by men who admit that they are "former Trotskyists" but who now hold posts in the Chinese Government or in the Kuomintang. Though few in number, they are one of the gravest dangers in China not only to the lives of Communists, against whom they have staged many gangster killings, but even to China's success in the war.

Men in the "diversion" section of the Kuomintang, for instance, formerly known to be Trotskyists, openly boasted in Hankow that they would organize students to fight the Eighth Route Army. Chou En-lai told me of Trotskyists high in the air force whose chief aim was to cause dissension between Chinese and Soviet aviators, even instigating the shooting—he was only wounded—of a Soviet pilot in Nanchang. I myself found many defeatist rumors and slanders emanating from former Trotskyists who now disclaimed political color. When the Kwangsi generals took most of their army to the front, they left behind them in a high confidential post Huang Kung-tu, an expelled Communist who had later become a Trotskyist. No sooner had they departed than he tried to seize power by a coup d'état; he was unsuccessful and was executed with seventy others. Another expelled Communist who had turned Trotskyist, Chang Mu-tao, tried in 1933 to induce General Feng Yu-hsiang to ally himself with the Japanese against Chiang Kai-shek. Later in Sian he agitated for the execution of the Generalissimo. Discredited by this, he disguised himself and was later found under another name as a Japanese agent in Yen's new university in Shansi. He fled further north, still carrying on work for Japan. He was captured by the Eighth Route Army, which at last accounts was trying to get

permission from the Central Government to execute him.

Because of the success of the Eighth Route Army, Communist popularity and prestige has noticeably grown in China. In all the Hankow book stores during my visit the best-sellers were books about the Communists and especially about their army. *How the Red Army Became the Eighth Route Army* led all the others. Close contenders were *Reminiscences of the Eighth Route Army, Life in the Special Soviet Districts, Mao Tse-tung: Biography of a Revolutionary.* The only books which ranked in popularity with those about the Eighth Route Army were books about the heroes of Shanghai. When on January 11, 1938, the Communists were at last permitted to publish a daily paper in Hankow, its circulation within three months reached fifty thousand, said to be the largest of any paper of interior China.

The position which the Communists hold has not been attained without struggle. When I visited Hankow at the end of 1937 the Chinese Communists had not yet secured the legality which Communists enjoy in the United States. In Wuchang in early December, a meeting of students who invited Chou En-lai as their speaker was suppressed. Yet by February Chou En-lai was assistant chief of the Political Department of the Central Headquarters of the National army. He had won this because of the outstanding abilities of the Communists in this field of work. The Communist daily paper, while legally permitted, was raided in the first week of its existence by a joint gang of Trotskyist and fascist hooligans, who were driven out by the workers in the plant. On other occasions, as late as the early months of 1938, Communist leaders have been assaulted and even murdered by political gangster groups. Reactionary or corrupt officials in various localities, and on some occasions in Hankow itself, have highhandedly suppressed Communist activities. Whenever these highhanded actions have been called to the attention of the Generalissimo, he has immediately countermanded them and reproved the perpetrators. The raid on the Communist newspaper was made at a time

when the Generalissimo was out of the city, as it is well-known that he will support the agreement which he made with the Communists in the United Front.

"If China wins the war, the country will belong to the Communists," is the suspicion that has been at times voiced by some members of the Kuomintang. To allay this suspicion the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued on December 25, 1937, a manifesto offering to continue the united front with the Kuomintang not only during the war but "in building the new China after victory has been achieved." This was eloquently amplified some months later in the Communist's official organ in Hankow, July 19, 1938: "If the Kuomintang and Communist Party drive the Japanese invaders out by joint effort, then the Kuomintang will have proved by action that it is the largest party which fought for the national existence of China, and its leader Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders who determinedly led in the anti-Japanese war will be immortal national heroes of China! Who then can proceed with a struggle to overthrow the Kuomintang? . . . The Chinese Communist Party will also . . . enjoy support and respect from the people and nobody will be able to violate the people's will and overthrow the Communist Party. . . . Both the Kuomintang and Communist Party will develop further the spirit engendered in the period of cooperation during the difficult times of the war."

"The Communist Party has put forward the slogan of a democratic republic for China," said Mao Tse-tung. "This involves something that cannot be attained in two, three or even five years. It must be a long process which will eventually realize national independence, a democratic system of government and the improvement of the people's livelihoods." This democratic republic, "born in the process of victory," adds the official newspaper in the article above cited, will naturally "be different from the old-fashioned democratic republics in Europe and America. But what we propose is absolutely not a Soviet or noncapitalist republic.

It will be and must be a new type of democratic republic."

Democracy in China is itself a revolution; on this all parties agree. The clearest indication of the extent of China's development toward this democracy was given by the Sixth Extraordinary Congress of the Kuomintang held in Hankow March 29, 1938, and by the newly organized National Political Council which met in early July. The Kuomintang Congress guaranteed "freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization, as long as these do not contradict the basic tasks of defense." It declared that victory depends "not on military force alone but on the strength of our masses," and therefore recognized the need to promote "leagues of workers, farmers, merchants and students," which should both draw the people into the tasks of the war and prepare for their participation in government. As the beginning of such popular participation in government, it created a National Political Council representing all parties and political groups. This congress of the Kuomintang was regarded by the Communists—in a statement by Chou En-lai—as "the most satisfactory in ten years."

Two hundred delegates came from all of China's provinces, from five special municipalities, from Mongolia and Tibet to open the new National Political Council in the first week of July. The president and vice-president of the Council were appointed by the Kuomintang, which also had the right to pass on the appointment of all members. Nonetheless, it was the first nation-wide expression of representative opinion for a decade. Among the members were 91 government or party officials, 59 teachers, 6 financiers, 6 cultural workers and 6 journalists. Nine of the delegates were women. Wang Ching-wei, chairman of the Council, announced that its mission was "to unify the people in order to strengthen the national power of resistance and lay a firm foundation of democracy so that China can immediately graduate into constitutionalism at the end of the war." Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek also greeted the council as a step toward China's coming democracy. The Communist

Party, which had only seven members among the two hundred, said in an official resolution: "The political life of China is developing continuously in the direction of democracy."

Only a people fighting for freedom dares increase democracy in wartime. The measures already taken, the organizing and arming of the people, is a guarantee that, after the war is over, whatever changes are made in China's social system will be at the will of the Chinese people. Less than this no party in China dares offer; more than this no party may ask.

But while China moves toward democracy, Japan moves swiftly toward fascism. In November, 1937, the Imperial Headquarters assumed control of the war. In March the National Mobilization Act was passed. In May some sections of it were applied. Before the month was out the army extremists greatly increased their power in the cabinet.

Thus, step by step, the struggle of the Chinese people for freedom from the invader becomes part of the world-wide struggle for the rights of the common people against the fascist oppressors and makers of war.

18. WHITHER CHINA, WHITHER WORLD?

THE question "Whither China?" would be complex enough if it were only China. But every major power on earth is involved in this conflict. So the question becomes "Whither World?"

Official celebrations in both Japan and China marked July 8, 1938, first anniversary of the war's beginning. Japan could boast, by military map, the conquest of one-fourth the Chinese homeland, 400,000 square miles of eastern and northern China. Her troops were still advancing, though at a slower rate. Notable gains she had, but the cost was heavy. Of 1,300,000 men sent to the Continent, two or three hundred thousand had been eliminated in battle, 400,000 were needed to hold Manchuria, and 600,000 were scattered on a broken, lengthening front fifteen hundred miles long.* Some were isolated in Shansi cities, surrounded by Chinese guerrillas and receiving supplies by airplane; others were struggling through the steaming Yangtze ricelands, others marooned behind the Yellow River flood. Japan had been blowing five million dollars† a day through her guns and had spent already more than twice the whole cost of the Russo-Japanese War which left her islands economically prostrate. Yet the end seemed farther off than it had at the beginning. For China, it seemed, had just begun to fight.

China had endured staggering losses, and faced still

*Edgar Snow, in the *Saturday Evening Post*, June 4, 1938.
† *New York Times*, June 2, 1938.

greater suffering to come. More than half a million of her best troops had been slaughtered, and probably another half million civilians had perished. The advance of the foe was lit from horizon to horizon by the burning homes of the Chinese people. Whole towns were deserted; tens of millions were homeless. The Yangtze delta, once one of the earth's most populous regions, was now a shambles. Three-fourths of China's modern industry was gone, two-thirds of her railways, most of her foreign ports and her two famous capitals. What the Chinese had to celebrate was chiefly the new Chinese spirit. Yet this was so great a victory that in spite of all her losses she was stronger than before. "Stronger, better organized and more united than in all our four thousand years of history," was the claim in Hankow. That claim is true.

This Chinese spirit spreads far beyond the battle-fronts; it nullifies the military map. Regions marked as held by Japanese are full of local governments and armed forces loyal to China. Peiping is a walled city in a sea of guerrilla warfare; Chinese mobile bands invade its suburbs, seize its electric power plant. Shanghai dwellers also hear almost nightly the shots of guerrilla bands near the city; tens of thousands of Chinese irregulars operate in the Yangtze delta alone. Magistrates sent out by the Japanese to rule local counties are often killed by the population, who obey and protect magistrates loyal to the distant Central Government of China. Even Manchuria, after seven years' Japanese occupation, shows increasing unrest; in late July a million-dollar arsenal in Mukden went up in explosion. Years before, when Japanese army men gloated over Manchuria that it "went down tasty as a meat ball," Baron Shidehara warned them that the meat ball might contain a bomb that would explode inside them. This warning seems to be coming true.

"At the beginning of a war," say the Chinese, "victories fall to the side with the biggest guns. At the end of a war, the final victory goes to the side with greatest endurance of man against man."

Costly advances weaken Japan, while China gathers strength for a protracted struggle, now slowing the enemy, now halting, now taking the offensive once more. Thus China combines three different kinds of warfare: positional, maneuvering, and guerrilla—all of which strengthen her. "Our vast territory and rich products," says the Generalissimo, "give us confidence that our financial strength will never wear out." Chief of Staff Pai Chung-hsi, who comes from Kwangsi, the best-organized of the southwestern provinces, claims that however long the war and great the losses, China can maintain continuously two million men in arms. Meantime, the fighting farmers in the occupied areas prevent Japan from stabilizing victory. "China's future victory depends very much on the farmer-volunteers of North China," said Chu Teh to me.

China is building a new economic base in her inland provinces which she is developing at tremendous speed. Since Nanking's fall the Chinese capital has been located at Chungking, fourteen hundred miles up the Yangtze, beyond the famous difficult gorges, impregnable to Japanese attack. Here, in the province of Szechwan, China's leaders have more than once in previous historic invasions found refuge and maintained independence for centuries. This province, because of its beauty and richness, is known as the "Heavenly Residence"; two annual crops produce every farm product in abundance. Within the past two years, as if in preparation for emergency, Szechwan has been connected with adjacent provinces through six great highways. These open up territory rich in minerals, coal, iron, lead, nickel, tin, silver and gold; even oil has been discovered. While comparatively isolated, it has access to the world through friendly countries, south to French Indo-China, southwest to British Burma, northwest to Soviet Turkestan—to all of which new roads have been recently built. The people of Szechwan have always been industrious; today they are awake and organizing.

Despite the many victories of the Japanese militarists in

China, they are beginning to lose the war at home. Signs of strain in Japan are already evident after a year of war. The cost of living has risen, major commodities are rationed, non-war industries are being ruined. It is hard to buy an iron frying pan; cotton goods are no longer for civilians; patriotism urges wooden clogs instead of leather shoes. Instead of the economic relief promised from the wealth of North China, Japanese investments there have been destroyed wholesale; mills worth $100,000,000 (American) were blown up in Tsingtao. The North China market, highly profitable to Japan a year ago, is ruined. The war is highly unpopular with the Japanese people. They are still docile and patriotic, but discontent has shown itself in the printing and circulation of a thousand different antifascist pamphlets (admitted by the Minister of Justice), and in thirteen hundred announced arrests for antiwar activities. Even among Japanese soldiers there are occasional mutinies: seven thousand in Osaka were reported to have refused to leave for the front; two thousand in Soochow to have refused to fight longer. Fourteen Japanese soldiers in Nantao committed suicide, leaving a note: "We are forced to do this because we do not want to fight you Chinese."

Most foreign military observers, at the end of the first year of war, agree that Japan is not strong enough to subjugate China if the Chinese remain united. The Japanese militarists, however, are by no means at the end of their resources. They are fighting now, not only for world empire, but for their very existence as a class, which defeat abroad and discontent at home might endanger. Through the National Mobilization Act of March, 1938, and through Cabinet changes in May, the army extremists dominate Japan more than at any time in recent history. Meantime, through channels of foreign trade, Japan's powerful capitalism summons aid from capitalists of other nations, even those nations whose people are friendly to China.

The fate of Japan in China depends not only on Japan's own strength and China's resistance; it depends on iron and

oil in America seeking a market, on gold in the vaults of London City and Wall Street seeking investment. Where is this international aid going, to Japan or to China? Where will this gold be invested—to develop Chinese mines, mills, railroads in the interior, or to finance Japanese development in Manchuria and North China? These are the factors on which depend, if not the final issue of the Sino-Japanese conflict, at least its length. And the length may be decisive for world history; it may prevent, or provoke, world war.

Britain's influence has the longest history. For a generation her foreign policy helped build and maintain Japan's imperialism, first in Japan's war against China in 1894-95, and a decade later, through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in Japan's war against Russia. This Alliance was dissolved by American pressure through the Nine-Power Pact, but its ghost remained to haunt the Pact's operation. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Britain twice refused a proposal of Secretary Stimson for joint diplomatic action; she supported Japan in the League of Nations. This opened the gates, not only to the decay of the League, but also to world-wide fascist aggression. The rise of Hitler-fascism, the invasions of Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria, the defiance of the League by Japan, Germany, Italy, and the formation of their fascist coalition—all flowed from that British act. Today Japanese fascism, helped to maturity by Britain, threatens its benefactor. Japanese soldiers trample the British flag in China, fire on British gunboats, machine-gun the British Ambassador. Even Japanese civilians tell you frankly that Britain must get out of the East.

Britain's policy in China is therefore double-minded. Shrewd Old Man Yen, in his distant Shansi, said it to me: "Britain does not want a strong Japanese Empire on the continent of Asia to threaten her own. Still less does she want strong Soviet influence in China. And if China, all by herself, should become a strong, independent nation, I think this also would not please Britain." London City wants all the major powers as her debtors, sound enough to pay their

bills but not strong enough to challenge her rule. Britain helped Japan when the nine powers held their conference in Brussels; hers was the chief influence which prevented collective action through boycott. Yet the British port, Hong Kong, is the chief entry for China's war supplies; this is profitable business and wears down the strength of Japan. When Chamberlain thinks that Japan is really cracking, one may look for attempts to close Hong Kong to China "for the sake of peace," and for suggestions to "appease" Tokyo with Chamberlain as mediating broker. British imperialism waits for Japan's exhaustion to propose the partition of China under slogans of "order" and "stabilized peace." This is one of China's major dangers in the second part of the war. Yet Chamberlain's moves in this direction may cause the British people to overthrow him, for such moves would sacrifice British interests to the class interests of London City, even more than do his deals with Mussolini and Hitler.

Hitler's Germany is even more double-minded than Britain. Japan is her ally and China is her market. After the World War, her trade with China rose swiftly till she surpassed Britain and approached America and Japan.* One hundred German officers went to China in 1934 in the interests of China's army and of Germany's market for munitions. Many of Hitler's problems may be eased by exchange of China's raw materials for Germany's industrial products. Japan, on the other hand, competes with Germany in the world markets by her cheap industrial goods made by low-paid workers. Thus the interests of trade put Germany on the side of China; but Japan is her military ally against the U.S.S.R.

War between her ally and her market is to Germany a deep annoyance. It both ruins her Chinese market and wears out the Japanese military strength on which she counts. The German ambassador made the first attempt to mediate

* Chinese imports in 1936 were 19.6 per cent from U. S. A., 16.26 per cent from Japan, 15.9 per cent from Germany. Japan's share would be much higher if illegal imports through East Hopeh were included.

the conflict, in order to help Japan accomplish at least part of her objective in China by diplomacy and to save her from exhausting herself in a long war. When negotiations failed, Germany helped China by large munitions shipments and a greatly increased number of advisers, both in war and industry—still seeking to strengthen herself in the Chinese market. German newspapers even began to praise Chinese valor, and "boards of racial research" declared the Chinese "Aryans," * an honor previously reserved among Eastern peoples for Japan. But Japan cracked down on her ally's aid to her enemy in late spring of 1938, a time when Germany's difficult economic situation and desperate maneuvers in Austria and Czechoslovakia made her badly in need of any friend. She was therefore very vulnerable to Japanese pressure; she recalled her military advisers and even talked of curtailing munitions shipments. This she will do only so far as she has to. For her modest desire is both to hold Japan as ally for war against the U.S.S.R. and to win first place in China's industrial reconstruction, both during and after the war.

The Soviet Union's policy is clear and consistent. She desires peace and a friendly neighbor; she needs neither territory nor markets. Both her national and class interests put her on the side of the Chinese people, but against armed participation in the war herself. Her strong defense, without war, of her own eastern border, is of great assistance to China, for it increases the number of reserves which Japan must save for her future plan of attack against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union's greatest aid to China is, however, her effort to bring about collective help from democratic forces. Her permanent "peace policy" is based not on individual aid from one nation to another, but on collective action of world forces desirous of peace.† It is based on the belief, widely

* Peter Drucker in *Asia Magazine*, August, 1938.

† As chief spokesman, for instance, for joint sanctions against Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, and for joint action against the aggressors in Spain.

held among progressive democratic people, and nowhere better expressed than by President Roosevelt in Chicago, that most of earth's people want peace and that the way to get it is to quarantine the aggressors. It is thus the reverse of the Chamberlain policy of "appeasing" aggressors, which only stimulates their appetites. It differs from the point of view represented in the so-called Neutrality Law of America, which aids the aggressor under camouflage of aloofness. Soviet policy is to help both the invaded nation and the cause of world peace by cutting down the supplies of the war-maker, and increasing those of the victim, yet without warlike action.

The U.S.S.R. has taken a series of systematic steps designed both to help China and to strengthen those world forces which may prevent this conflict from becoming a world war. Chief of these steps was her diplomatic pressure in the League of Nations; this secured on October 5, 1937, a resolution, urging all members to "consider how far they can individually help China," and on May 14, 1938, a somewhat stronger resolution "earnestly urging . . . sympathetic consideration of requests received from the Chinese government." These resolutions make it possible for the U.S.S.R. to send arms to China, not as Bolshevik Russia, but as a loyal League member. This seeming quibble is diplomatically important, since any exceptional aid by the U.S.S.R., which could be interpreted as Soviet participation in the conflict, might increase the aid of Germany and Italy to Japan. For the same reason Soviet arms shipments to China are not widely advertised, though they are known to be considerable. Her shipments of iron—and of any materials for war—to Japan stopped in November, 1936, when the Japan-Germany military alliance was concluded. (France, also, sends no war supplies to Japan.) The U.S.S.R. has rapidly decreased all trade with the three powers in the fascist alliance; in the last six months of 1937 it was half what it had been in the same period of 1936. After the present war began, the U.S.S.R. signed with China a nonaggression pact

on August 21, 1937, which binds both parties to give no aid direct or indirect to any attacking third power. All these measures help China without spreading the conflict; they lessen supplies to the war-makers, and strengthen world pressure against them.

America speaks more loudly of her sympathy for China than does any other nation; she does more than any other nation to help Japan. Yet she is more bound than any other to help China, for she initiated the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, both of which call for action against Japan as treaty-breaker. Japan's invasion of China could not continue without the constant help of American oil and scrap iron. America supplies 54.4 per cent of all Japan's war imports,* two-thirds of her oil and scrap iron imports, all of her high-test airplane gasoline, 90 per cent of her autotrucks. American missionaries tell of endless processions of Japanese troops riding in American trucks through the ravaged Yangtze delta. Japan can buy some of these war supplies from other nations if America refuses to sell them, but she depends entirely on America for special steels, machine tools and lubricating oils to which her heavy indus-

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*Since the outbreak of the war, Japan conceals details of war imports but the Chinese Council of Economic Research breaks them down as follows: 54.4 per cent from U. S. A., 17.5 per cent from British Empire, 7.4 per cent from Dutch Indies, 3.8 per cent from Germany, none from France or the Soviet Union. In particular commodities, America supplies:

91.2 per cent of autos and parts
60.5 per cent gasoline (100 per cent of high-test gasoline)
59.7 per cent scrap iron
41.6 per cent iron
48.5 per cent machinery and engines

If the U. S. A. and Britain should cut off their sales of war materials to Japan, the annual loss of trade to the United States would be $210,008,000, or 6.3 per cent of its total export trade; to Great Britain the trade loss would be $67,683,000, or 2.3 per cent of its total (1937 figures).

try is geared. American capitalists respond to her, favoring Japan above their own country. Bethlehem Steel claimed they "could not afford" to reduce the price of steel for the peaceful construction of projects of the New Deal; they cut it $7.50 to $10.00 per ton on steel to Japan.*

When Japan rained death (ten thousand civilian victims) on Canton for sixteen days in early June, 1938, with a savagery that brought protests from America, France and Britain, the aviators were supplied by the Japanese War office. But the bombs, the planes, the high-test gasoline, the lubricating oils, gun-cotton and chemicals, were America's share in that massacre. What wonder that Japan gave to the protests of the American State Department the insolent answer, "Japan will intensify its air attacks—the results are satisfactory."

"It is sheer hypocrisy," said Senator Clark of Missouri, "to deplore the use of bombs while we go on selling materials to make them, and the machines with which they are used." Even the Mussolini-controlled press of Italy commented ironically on the contrast between America's protests and America's deeds.

Many peace-loving Americans raise the question why the Neutrality Act is not invoked to stop these war shipments to the Far East. They are unaware that this Act is in no sense neutral; if applied to the Far Eastern conflict, it would help Japan still more. It prohibits the shipment of finished munitions but not raw materials; hence it always assists the strong aggressor, who buy materials and makes munitions. This is already shown by the application to the present conflict of the neutrality principle, though not yet the Law. Nineteen planes consigned to China were removed on September 16, 1937, from the S.S. "Wichita" by government order forbidding government-subsidized ships to transport "armaments." Yet frequent longshoremen's pro-

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* Paul G. McManus: "America Controls Japan," *New Masses,* May 17, 1938.

tests to the government against loading scrap iron on ships for Japan have met the answer that scrap iron is not technically "munitions" and may, therefore, be loaded, even on government-owned ships.

Many American citizens, ashamed of the help which their countrymen give to Japan's war on China, have organized a boycott of Japanese imports in order to cut down the funds which Japan must have to prosecute the war. The appeal is especially made to boycott all silk, and particularly silk stockings, for nearly all of American silk comes from Japan, and silk is the major source of Japan's revenue from America. The boycott has been remarkably effective. America's imports of Japanese goods dropped from $92,386,000 in the first five months of 1937 to $47,868,000 in the first five months of 1938. The biggest drop was in the later months, as the boycott became more effective; that of May was a 60 per cent reduction, from $18,240,000 to $7,020,000. Many Chinese lives have undoubtedly been saved by this boycott, which has decreased by tens of millions of dollars Japan's capacity to buy. Japan's purchases in America are also slowing down,* though less rapidly than her sales. She is buying war supplies by depleting her reserves of wealth in foreign countries. These are not inexhaustible. They have sunk in the first year of war from $400,000,000 to $35,000,000 and have led to the liquidation of her world-wide docks, except in the Philippines.† The boycott idea is steadily growing in popularity‡.

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* Total purchases in 1937 $288,000,000, of which about $210,398,000 are estimated as war materials; total for the first five months of 1938 was $73,000,000, all of which was for war materials. These contrast with China's total purchases, including nonmilitary goods, of less than $50,000,000 in 1937 and about $17,000,000 in the first five months of 1938. China faces difficulties both in securing credit and in shipping.

† Hallett Abend in the *New York Times*, June 19, 1938.

‡ Gallup poll, October, 1937, showed 37 per cent in favor of boycott; *Fortune* poll, February, 1938, showed 66.2 per cent in favor; the *Nation* poll, April, 1938, showed 77.79 per cent favoring it.

No actions by individuals can take the place of a clear government policy. Until the American government adopts a consistent program to support world peace by quarantining the war-makers, America's businessmen will make their country a major partner in every world aggression. A comprehensive program for peace in the Far East and prosperity in America would involve not only the boycott of Japanese imports and an embargo on sales of war supplies to Japan, but also American assistance in the peaceful industrialization of China's inland provinces. The swift development of that inland empire, so rich in minerals and farm products and in its industrious population, would be China's national salvation. To assist it might also be America's salvation, for it would keep our industrial plant busy for years and relieve our almost continuous depression. It would shorten the second great period of the Chinese war, and lessen the danger of its expanding into a world war. It would build on the other shore of the Pacific a powerful, friendly nation, who would strengthen the peace of the world.

All the leading Chinese are critically aware of the role of America and the other democratic nations in this conflict. "We are the victims of the feebleness of the democratic nations," wrote Madame Chiang to me, adding the warning, "The breakdown of international law can affect other countries as it now affects China."

"Japan's invasion of China could be stopped without resort to force if the United States, England, France and Russia would make a joint display of firmness and solidarity," said Chiang Kai-shek publicly, in late July of 1938. Every American I met in China agreed with him. "China is fighting our battle," they said. "If Japan can enslave her and use her vast man power for the plans of the Japanese militarists, it will mean the collapse of everything we call civilization. If China preserves her independence, her development will strengthen world prosperity, democracy and peace."

"America should consider her own honor," said President H. H. Kung to me in Hankow. "America created the Nine-Power Pact and signed it; how then can she be 'neutral' to Japan's treaty-breaking? A nation cannot make an international agreement, and pass an internal law to nullify it. But if America forgets her pledges to China, can she not see the danger to herself? Against whom does Japan prepare her navy? Not against China, but against the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska; we are only her practice-target. America's 'neutrality' harms both China and America, and even the Japanese people, for it kills all moderate arguments in Japan. The younger officers reply, 'You talk of the Nine-Power Pact and the League of Nations; we smash them all and nothing happens.' When those younger officers rule Japan—if they dominate even a part of China—look out for the fate of the world! The best place to stop that Japanese-American war is right now in China. We'll do your fighting for you if you'll let us have arms. But—amazing insanity—instead of helping us, you are helping Japan!"

"The world's peace rests with China, and whoever understands China . . . holds the key to world politics during the next five centuries," said John Hay, U. S. Secretary of State during the most active period of American advance in the Far East. In our widening earth there are only three or four nations so populous, so vital, so unified, that their destinies are decisive for the fate of mankind. The North American continent is one of these; the Soviet Union is another; China is a third. The British Empire, as long as it remains united, is one of these vital factors; but the British Isles are not. Europe might be one, if she became united, but Europe tears herself asunder today.

China has been, is, and will be a vital factor in mankind's history. In the past she was a source of civilization to the lands around her. When Europe discovered her, she became a treasure box for all the imperialists. Her future lies in the hands of her own people, who for the first time in four thou-

sand years of history grow conscious of themselves as a closely knit nation. No lover of human freedom dare remain indifferent to that future; the freeing of this one-fifth of mankind is the decisive event of our century. For when 450,000,000 Chinese win their freedom, the world will soon be free.

THE END