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**THE TRUE
FACE**


**OF MAO-
ISM**

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OF MAOISM**

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● Today it is patently clear to everybody that the “great proletarian cultural revolution” is neither “proletarian” nor “cultural” nor a “revolution.” Certainly if one deems it fitting to call a barracks-ordered pauperized village a “commune,” then why not apply the name of “cultural revolution” to a crusade against the more cultured sections of the Party and people, to the rampages of misled mobs let loose to bolster autocracy? Not that the “final battle of world revolution” or “eradication of the vestiges of capitalism” or any other leftist-sounding catchword would not have done just as well.

Six years ago, when Chinese Party leaders first made known their particular stand, one could still think it might be due to rashness and one-sidedness of sincere people. It is no longer

possible to think so now. Too much has occurred in recent years to leave any such illusions. There is no question that it is a conscious policy behind the revolutionary phrase. And the farther it proceeds the clearer it becomes that the aims, to say nothing of its methods, have nothing to do with world communism.

Communists the world over are trying hard to find the answer to poignant questions arising from the present situation in China. Why would the leaders of a reputedly socialist country which maintained such intimate contacts with the USSR and other socialist countries be so fanatically resentful of the world communist movement and the socialist community? How far do Mao Tse-tung and his group propose to carry their policy of dissension? What are the causes of acute differences among the Chinese Communist Party leaders who marched together for some thirty years? There are more such questions and it will take time to find the answers if for no other reason than the lack of sufficient information about what has been going on in the Communist Party of China for some years past.

Even so it is obvious that recent data alone could not help to explain present developments. They have their roots in the history of the Communist Party of China, a history of conflicting trends with scientific communism slowly but surely being ousted by Maoism.

In the present paper, we are going to deal mainly with some aspects of this process and theoretical concepts bearing directly on the "cultural revolution." We are far from thinking that the line adopted by the CPC springs entirely from fallacious theoretical views. Generally it is

not customary for ideology to precede politics, rather the reverse. It is class or group interests and political aims that engender various theories. This is all the more true of the Mao Tse-tung group whose theoretical efforts have always served to provide substantiation for the tasks at hand. By analyzing the tenets the Mao group abide by, we shall be able to arrive at the true motives underlying their activities.

MARXISM OR MAOISM?

The decisions and communique of the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China allege that the "cultural revolution" aims to abolish the "old ideology" and assert the "new," that is, Mao Tse-tung ideology. Speaking in Peking, Lin Piao urged that the "new ideology, new culture, new habits and new customs" should be instilled in people and insisted that "the ideas of Mao Tse-tung should determine all ideological positions."

Now, what is this "old ideology," that is so censured? On closer examination of appeals for its overthrow we find it means Marxism-Leninism. The slogans of the millions of the *hungweipings* (Red Guards) mention neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin; there is nobody but Mao, glorified and worshipped more than any ancient Chinese emperor. This substitution of Maoism for Marxism-Leninism is not accidental. It has a history of its own, and a rather long history at that.

The Communist Party of China, which emerged in 1921 under the direct impact of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, adopted the

ideology of Marxism-Leninism. However, there immediately began a painful search for tactics best suited to the highly specific conditions and character of the approaching revolution in China. From the very start there began a conflict between two essentially different tendencies.

There were those who believed China should apply the experience of world socialism and above all of the October Revolution. Their object was to secure proletarian dictatorship, to ensure the leading role of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and establish a government of workers and peasants in the initial stages of the revolution.

Other proceeded from the fact that conditions in China differed vastly from those prevailing in the European countries and many major principles of Marxism-Leninism were not applicable. Therefore they rejected the idea of the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution and of working-class dictatorship favouring the development of the revolutionary movement in the countryside rather than in town. Mao Tse-tung supported the latter trend.

Though one of the twelve people who attended the 1st Party Congress, he had been kept from top positions in the Central Committee, not becoming a member of the Politburo nor the Secretariat, until 1935. His first work *Report on the Examination of the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province* (March, 1927) was not published, having been considered an expression of "peasant deviation," and the author was denied a deciding vote at the 5th Party Congress held soon afterwards.

Undaunted, Mao Tse-tung kept on propagating

his views. At that time he produced *Why Can Red Power Exist in China?, A Spark May Start a Fire* and other works. Even then the ideological trappings he brought along to the Party were fairly identifiable. He believed that Marxism should be attuned to China's specific conditions, disregarded completely the leading role of the working class in the Chinese revolution, and proposed the tactic of establishing revolutionary strong points in the countryside and conquering towns by means of guerrilla warfare. All this was set against the background of secretly cherished dreams of a revival of "China's greatness" and her "messianic role" in the world.

It was the misfortune of the communist movement in China in the twenties and early thirties that many Party leaders were infected with dogmatism to a greater or lesser degree. It was not that they altogether disregarded China's peculiar features. They were aware that the future revolution would be a bourgeois-democratic one and paid much attention to the agrarian question. But they concentrated their efforts on the towns and practically ignored the peasants. Insisting on the hegemony of the proletariat in the democratic revolution, they opposed not only the bourgeoisie—the national bourgeoisie included—but the upper petty bourgeoisie as well.

These leaders favoured the tactics of armed uprisings in big cities. Such uprisings often ended tragically. And, as is often the case, one fallacy breeds another, the errors of honest fighters for the proletarian revolution actually helped their theoretical opponents win key positions in the Party.

The struggle between the two trends reached

a high pitch as seen by Mao Tse-tung's expulsion from the Central Committee in 1934. As soon as after January 1935, however, when many Party organizations in central cities had been smashed by the Kuomintang, at sittings of the Politburo of the Central Committee (not at a plenum or a congress) a new leadership was elected with Mao Tse-tung at the head. At that time Chu Te, Liu Shao-chi and others were elected, many of whom are now the victims of ruthless persecution.

Mao and his aides lost no time in having their tactics implemented meanwhile taking certain organizational steps to consolidate their own influence. First they dealt with the former leaders whom they called the "Moscow opposition." Some of them were removed from their posts, others were banished and still others were killed. All this took place regardless of the fact that many of these people were closely connected with the Comintern. Mao Tse-tung and his supporters renounced the principles of Party democracy. Though their election had not been endorsed by at least a plenum of the Central Committee, no Party congress was convened until 1945, ten years later. All in all, there had been six CPC congresses before 1935, and only two since. The Party's organizational principles were revised and a different spirit instilled in the membership. Now the attention was concentrated entirely on discipline and unquestioning obedience of the rank and file to their leaders on having a carefully picked, stable top leadership, which came to be known as "kan-pu" (the cadre).

The succession of Mao and his following to Party leadership, which to all intents and purposes resembled a palace coup, heralded a marked

change in Party strategy and tactics and, as time showed, affected the very basis of its ideology. It is from these beginnings that the swing of the late fifties started.

Then how did it happen that the Mao line prevailed in the Communist Party of China even though Mao Tse-tung's views were not supported by many leading Party members or the world communist movement?

The reasons are to be sought in China's specific conditions and in the nature of the approaching revolution. Even today peasants make up over 80 per cent of China's population while at that time the proportion was still greater. Aside from that, small tradesmen, artisans and other petty-bourgeois elements formed a considerable part of the urban population. When the revolution triumphed in China the proletariat accounted for hardly one per cent of the population. Mao Tse-tung was one of the first to take up and actively promote the Comintern idea of revolutionizing the peasants, which was not without objective justification and found ready response. At the same time he plainly took advantage of the fact that Kuomintang had succeeded in smashing the core of the Party leadership to take the reins into his own hands.

The line Mao Tse-tung and his associates took was one-sided and blundering from the start. It was not so obvious during the anti-Japanese struggle, in the period of the civil war or at the initial stage of democratic and socialist reforms when Chinese Party leaders relied heavily on the support of the Soviet Union, the CPSU, and other Communist Parties. But as the new government gained strength and socialist targets increasingly

became the order of the day, Mao's fallacious notions on many key points of strategy and tactics, and his petty bourgeois and nationalist leanings became more apparent.

Describing how his viewpoint evolved, Mao Tse-tung wrote in 1957: "I harboured various non-Marxist views before I embraced Marxism. I studied Marxism from books a little and made some first steps to re-educate myself ideologically, but in the main my re-education came along in the course of the protracted class struggle."¹

We can take him at his word: he hardly ever studied the works of Marx seriously, if only because his views were formulated in a period when there were generally very few books by Marx and Engels available in Chinese.

According to Mao's supporters, it is a feather in his cap that he has "Sinofied" Marxism (Chen Po-ta). In substance this implies not so much a creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory in a Chinese context as the dissection of the principles of scientific communism.

Mao Tse-tung wrote in an article: "We must imbibe all that may be of use to us today. However, everything of foreign origin should be treated like food, which is first chewed in the mouth, digested in the stomach and the bowels, moistened by the saliva and gastric and intestinal juices, and then separated into the excreta, which are removed, and the extract, which is assimilated; only then does the food become good for the body. Similarly, we should not swallow everything

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*. Moscow, 1957, pp. 26-27 (Russ. Ed.).

foreign at a gulp, without discrimination.”¹ He urged that Marxism should be given a “definitely national forms.”²

Leaving aside the unappetizing simile, what is the gist of the matter? What did Mao borrow from Marxism, and what did he reject?

The theoretical groundwork of Marxism—dialectical and historical materialism, Marxian political economy—interested him least of all.

We shall not be able to find among Mao Tse-tung’s writings a single serious attempt to contribute in any way to the philosophy of natural science, the theory of cognition, logic, or at least to present in popular form some of the problems involved. Nor do any of his works contain an analysis of modern capitalism or the peculiarities of capitalist development in China. Economics and economic analysis have always been a “blank spot” with Mao and Maoists. They did not even try to tie in the theory of the class struggle and revolution with the economic laws of social development. Disregard of theory, of the ultimate cognition of reality, inevitably led the Chinese Party leaders to form oversimplified, schematic and crude notions of the problems of the modern world.

As for historical materialism, in Mao Tse-tung’s works we find, generally, two or three favourite themes: practice as the gauge of truth, social contradictions, and some others, all considered from an astoundingly biased approach.

He has always viewed the theory of the build-

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 3, p. 270 (Russ. Ed.), Moscow.

² *Ibid.*

ing of socialism in China from a purely speculative angle and made no attempt to analyze the economic structure of Chinese society. One does not gather from his works that he is aware of the existence of the objective laws of transition from capitalism to socialism. On the contrary, he pins his hopes on voluntarist, administrative, coercive measures. This view naturally tells on his understanding of socialist ideals as well. He does not perceive them as an expression of the needs of highly developed socialized production, of the class interests of the proletariat, the vanguard of society, but deduces them from all sorts of concepts, some of them plainly contradictory.

Certainly Mao Tse-tung's works are not devoid of correct ideas. Before he had developed pretensions to being the "leading theoretician," he willingly borrowed ideas—as well as complete passages—from the classics of Marxism-Leninism. It is also worth noting that Mao Tse-tung's *Collected Works* were thoroughly edited before publication. The passages in glaring contradiction to Marxism were accordingly deleted and some of his statements modified. Nonetheless all his works, not excluding his early writings, show that he never took a definitely Marxist stand, whereas in recent years he began to defy scientific theory more openly.

Mao Tse-tung practically reduced Marxist teachings to a few dogmas bearing mainly on tactical questions like the theory of coercion and "leaps" in social development, guerrilla war as a way to power, the peasants as the mainstay of social revolution in poorly developed countries, which amounts to renunciation of the leading role of the working class, world conflict and civil war

as the inevitable and only path of the world revolution.

The point is whether it was advisable to apply the general principles of Marxism-Leninism in China's conditions. Admittedly China differs greatly from the countries of Europe and America. First of all it is a country with a preponderantly petty bourgeois, peasant population. It has had no significant experience of capitalist development and a long history of imperial traditions (2,000-3,000 years). Besides, there is the difference in the psychological make-up, deeply stamped by Buddhism, Confucianism and other exclusively oriental philosophies.

It was not a socialist revolution, but an anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, in effect, a bourgeois-democratic revolution that was pending in China in the thirties and forties. All this ought to have influenced the tactics of the Communist Party, but not the ideology or general principles. Mao Tse-tung, however (as we shall see later), modified, dissected and distorted Marxist-Leninist theory in an attempt to make it fit the concrete objectives of the Chinese revolution, mainly at the initial stages. That was what he meant when he wrote: "We must imbibe all that may be of use to us today."

Such "Sinofied" Marxism adjusted to China's conditions could do only at the initial stages of the Chinese revolution when it was essentially anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. When, however, the country neared its socialist objectives, the one-sidedness and inaptitude of Maoism became obvious. An example of it is the erroneous attempts of the Peking leadership in the late fifties to "leap" to communism without seriously going

about establishing a modern industrial base, developing democracy and improving living standards. In turn, the many disappointments these blunders entailed, found an outlet in nationalism and an adventurous foreign policy.

Marxists proceed from the conviction that the development of society basically depends on certain objective prerequisites, above all on the mode of production. There should exist objective conditions, economic and socio-political as well, to pave the way for a revolution. In order to build socialism, one must first create a corresponding basis.

Maoists, however, have a different approach. They make voluntarist and ideological methods unconditional both at the preparatory stage and in the process of the revolution, as well as during the building of socialism. Hence the theory that a handful of revolutionary enthusiasts and a firm belief that society can develop by leaps performed at will are all that is needed to start a guerrilla war in any country. From this, too, springs the idea that the enthusiasm engendered by the "cultural revolution" may have a radical effect on the economy and social relationships.

As described in the decisions of the 11th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, the chief contribution of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" is that it "reaches the hearts of the people," "revolutionizes the people" and "may help achieve more significant, speedier, better and more efficient results in all spheres of activity." The idea is that all you have to do is change man's ideology and any task will become feasible. Mao Tse-tung wrote in 1955: "How can one contend that 600 million paupers shall not be

able to make their country rich and mighty in a matter of a few decades?" In 1958 Mao's supporters explained this by saying: "Many living examples prove the following: there are no unproductive areas but only unproductive thought. There is no poor soil but only a poor system of cultivation. Let people use their subjective potentialities to the full, then it will be possible to change natural conditions."

This breeds a host of incongruities that are explainable from a "Maoist" point of view: the Chinese entry in the world table-tennis championship won the title by arming himself with the sayings of Mao Tse-tung; a surgeon, a train driver, a scientist and milkmaid all appear to have succeeded for the same reason. Hence the mass-scale learning by rote of quotations from Mao Tse-tung, which, if anything, resemble Confucian maxims or Christian proverbs.

Each book of quotations is a haphazard collection of utterances made at different times and not the least connected with one another with no references as to when and in what context they were made or current relevance. The quotations are presented as invincible perennial truths, good at all times, in any circumstance.

From the psychological angle, the "cultural revolution" is meant to rear zealous, and unreasoning partisans of Maoism and mould them into blind tools to serve any bidding.

At no time do Mao Tse-tung and his followers appear so feckless as when they essay to deal with contemporary problems of the world communist movement. Ignorant of the scientific method of examination, grossly oblivious of reality, they pick out quotations to "confirm" the string

of vacuous pronouncements they make on the multiform, intricate processes taking place in the mid-20th century. This playing at quotations earnestly believed to refute deductions based on a penetrating analysis of real facts clearly demonstrates the lack of understanding of the productive, continually developing teachings of Marx and Lenin.

Lenin was a brilliant theoretician and a genius when it came to revolutionary practice. And practice, the experience of millions, is the main criterion of the truth of theory for all who would follow him.

In his work *Certain Features of the Historical Development of Marxism* Lenin quotes Engels: "Our doctrine—said Engels, referring to himself and his famous friend—is not a dogma, but a guide to action. This classical statement stresses with remarkable force and expressiveness that aspect of Marxism which is very often lost sight of. And by losing sight of it, we turn Marxism into something one-sided, distorted and lifeless; we deprive it of its life blood; we undermine its basic theoretical foundations—dialectics, the doctrine of historical development, all-embracing and full of contradictions; we undermine its connection with the definite practical tasks of the epoch, which may change with every new turn of history."¹

It is an explicit description of the most essential feature of Marxist teachings—its inseverable bond with practice, its effective, truly revolutionary nature. An all-round objective assessment of the balance of class forces and the peculiarities

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 17, p. 39.

es of each historical period is an indispensable condition for mapping out a correct realistic political course.

Lenin taught that every concrete situation should be analyzed in a concrete way. He never tired of repeating that that was the very essence of Marxism. It is relatively easy to learn some theoretical propositions of scientific communism. It is incomparably more difficult to master revolutionary dialectics, to develop the ability to analyze each new situation, unique in its way, and correctly determine the course of action which will ensure success. Lenin saw the wisdom of political leadership not in an abstract knowledge of theory but in the ability to apply it in practice, to comprehend concrete political tasks and consolidate the social forces able to carry them out.

These instructions become all the more significant now that the leaders of the Communist Party of China have plunged into an attack against creative Marxism-Leninism, against the present line of the world communist movement.

It is revealing that Maoism, with its petty bourgeois roots, is beginning to conflict with the interests of the very masses from whom it sprang. The "cultural revolution," just like the "leaps" and setting up of communes that preceded it, is also against the interests of the peasants, who are at the receiving end of the ill-planned economic and political ventures. An *entrepôt* of the worst varieties of nationalism, Maoism at the same time is growing increasingly anti-national, clashing with the key national objectives of China both in the country and in the world.

In his time Lenin emphasized that compared with advanced Western European countries it

was easier to launch a socialist revolution in economically retarded countries but much more difficult to carry it through. Consequently it was very important for Communist and Workers' Parties to pursue a consistent policy and creatively apply international socialist experience to the concrete conditions prevailing in their own countries/It was especially important that the proletariat should provide competent guidance to the peasants, petty bourgeoisie and all other social strata. In that case, too, it was especially dangerous to try to oppose oneself to more advanced socialist countries, ignore the experience of world socialism and—worst of all—to put oneself above the world communist movement. Maoism with all its implications for China is sad proof indeed of the seriousness of Lenin's warning and his great foresight.

Lenin's demand for concrete comprehensive analysis is especially significant today when events develop rapidly and the situation changes very quickly. World events have never been so dynamic and complex. A multitude of forces are at play. Numerous factors—economic, political, military, psychological—are influencing the development of foreign relations. And there is no greater danger for Communists than to try to fence themselves off by abstract slogans and formulas from concrete facts.

Creative development of Leninism is the law of life for the entire world communist movement. The 20th, 22nd and 23d congresses of the CPSU and congresses of other fraternal Parties as well are evidence of this. The 1957 and 1960 conferences of representatives of fraternal Parties have been of decisive importance in elaborating pre-

sent policy in communist movement. Their programme documents—the Declaration and the Statement—are an example of scientific analysis of the current span of world history. The major propositions of Marxist-Leninist theory are as valid today as ever. But it is equally certain that the historic changes the world has undergone have made it incumbent on the communist movement to develop this theory further so as to allow for these changes in working out their strategy and tactics.

—Mao Tse-tung, to whom the notorious “25 points” of the “general line” are now ascribed, calls the entire present trend of world communism “revisionism” and strives to oppose his home-made recipes to creative Marxism of our time.

Today, when CPC leaders no longer bother to conceal their aim to split the communist movement, they turn more and more often to the history of this movement hoping to find in it some justification for their shabby activities. Each time they distort the history of the fight of Communist Parties against opportunism describing it as a fight against Right-wing opportunism and revisionism only. In one article, some Peking splitters mention the “three great polemics” the Communist Parties have engaged in: “Lenin’s polemic against the leaders of the 2nd International, Stalin’s polemic against the Right-wingers and Trotskyites of the twenties, and the present polemic of the CPC leaders against the CPSU and other Parties.”

Such a scheme for the development of the communist movement is puzzling, to say the least. For throughout its history revolutionary Marxism has had to fight not against the right alone but

against left opportunists as well. One need only recall how Marx and Engels fought against Blanquism, against the anarchic views of Bakunin and Proudhon, against Dühring and other exponents of the revolutionist aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie.

Lenin's most important post-revolutionary work on opportunism was levelled at none other than leftist theorizers. With the advent of the proletariat to power, some people are liable to think there is nothing they cannot do and attain by applying enough pressure.

One reason why such ideas catch on in our day is the great diversity of economic and social-political levels of the countries which have embarked on the socialist path. The example of China shows that the Party of a country with a predominantly peasant population is most susceptible to leftist petty bourgeois influences.

Without going into every aspect of Maoism, let us consider those which more directly reveal the ideological roots of the current Maoist policies. We shall examine theoretical questions closely connected with revolutionary practice in China for many of the concepts now being foisted on the world communist movement are nothing more than an attempt to impose a strictly individual, highly specific experience.

DOCTRINE OF BACKWARD PETTY BOURGEOIS MASSES

Mao Tse-tung was sold on the idea (proposed by the Comintern in its time) that the Communist Party of China should win the peasants over its

side. But he overdid this sound idea to the point where it amounted to a denial of the historic role of the working class, which is the keystone of Marxism.

Incidentally Mao Tse-tung and his supporters only refer to leading role of the proletariat in passing, in deference, as it were, to the accepted Marxist view.

In Mao Tse-tung's works one can find statements to the effect that "without the leadership of the proletariat the Chinese revolution certainly cannot triumph."¹

In his article *Against Stereotyped Schemes* Mao Tse-tung wrote: "China is a country where the petty bourgeoisie are extremely numerous, and our Party finds itself surrounded by this enormous social stratum. As it is, many of the Party membership themselves have petty bourgeois antecedents, and each of them has inevitably dragged into the Party a petty bourgeois tail behind him, either more or less long."²

He does not worry about such things now.

It is no secret that on assuming power, the proportion of workers in the Communist Party of China was at most two—three per cent of the membership. There were hardly any workers among the commanding officers of the Liberation Army while, as admitted by Chinese leaders themselves, more than a quarter of them came of the families of rich peasants and landowners. The state apparatus, too, had a similar make-up.

It is clear that in a predominantly peasant country like China the peasants must play a pro-

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 3, p. 170 (Russ. Ed.).

² *Ibid.*, p. 96.

minent role in the revolution and in building socialism. It is, however, the very reason why Chinese leaders should determinedly battle with the petty bourgeois tide and strive to instil proletarian consciousness in the minds of the peasants. Here the union of the working class and the peasants was and is the crucial point of Communist Party policy.

Working-class guidance is all the more indispensable in China as the peasants there have not been through the capitalist mill and so have retained many semi-feudal features in addition to their petty bourgeois characteristics.

From the very first Marxism has been an ideology of the masses—not the masses at random but the more advanced sections of society, the proletariat above all. It should be noted that Lenin always addressed himself to the thinking proletarian, the progressive intellectual, the conscious peasant. And it is not to be wondered at, for only advanced social forces can become the advocates of advanced theory. Petty bourgeois ideology is an entirely different matter. It appeals to the backward masses, cleverly playing on their sentiments.

In our age, any political philosophy seeks mass support. Fascism, too, was a mass ideology. It relied on the most backward nationalistic throng, apt to extol and worship certain individuals. Primarily it depended on the petty bourgeoisie.

The frenzied "Red Guards" also constitute a mass movement. Millions of people have been involved in it. But the ideology and aims of this movement have nothing in common with either socialist ideals or the interests of the proletariat. It is a mass bent on destruction, fervidly desiring

to deify the leader. Once roused, they quickly become senselessly rancorous, brutal and chauvinistic. It is highly revealing that Mao's favourite concept of the "line of the masses" is being employed to smash Party units, mock at people and train robots to obey the leaders blindly.

Such a petty bourgeois throng is characteristically anti-intellectual. While advanced workers and intelligent peasants eagerly strive for culture and welcome science as a source of knowledge, the backward throng treats not only the cultural heritage of their country but proletarian culture as well with spiteful contempt.

Maoists completely disregard the humane core of Marxism which considers the main aim of revolution to rid man of his social fetters. The individual with his vital interests, needs, emotions and sentiments could very well not exist as far as petty bourgeois ideologists are concerned. They think in terms of millions. They believe that if a social group has gained the upper hand (for instance, the victors in a military conflict), it no longer matters at what price victory was achieved, for the individual is nothing compared with the mass. This kind of "philosophy" found its crudest expression in Mao Tse-tung's notorious formula, ("Even if a half of mankind should perish in a world war, imperialism will also perish, and the rest will be able to build a new society unmolested.")

In practice, however, disregard of the individual turns out to be oppression of the masses, of the most progressive sections of the people. Events in China have been developing precisely in this way. First they picked on some intellectuals, next some Party leaders were victimized

and finally hundreds of thousands of Party and government workers, army officers, trade unionists, factory workers and peasants fell victims to the "purge." What is more, a disastrous political course gained ascendancy.

The petty bourgeois affinity of the Chinese Party leaders is also clear from the way they leap to extremes. Thus at the start they came out for a broad coalition of class forces for carrying out the revolution and building socialism; Communist Parties of developing countries can still learn from their experience in enlisting the participation of the bourgeoisie in setting up the new social order. Far from pursuing these tactics today, the Maoists introduce methods of tyrannical suppression both in public and Party life.

The CPC Central Committee resolution of August 29, 1958 declared: "Evidently the achievement of communism in our country is no longer something remote. We must actively employ the form of people's commune and through it find a concrete way of transition to communism." In December 1958, the Plenum of the Central Committee adopted the slogan "We must not linger at the socialist stage!" However, some years after the "leap" fell through it was claimed that the building of socialism was a lengthy process of a hundred years or more. Having begun with the "hundred flowers" movement, Mao Tse-tung and his group wound up slaughtering the intelligentsia and suppressing with a heavy hand every trend of thought other than theirs, not sparing Party members.

Foreign policy, too, is stamped with the same vacillation between vociferous calls for a resolute fight against US imperialism and avoiding

any action—be it contributing to the liberation of Taiwan or aiding the heroic Vietnamese people—that may strain relations with the United States.

Here you have the petty bourgeoisie consumed with an urge for supremacy, hankering for “national greatness;” and along comes Mao Tse-tung peddling his ideological wares. If he tried to put across the idea that China today has better living standards, a higher level of science, technology and culture than any other country, nobody would listen to him. But he offers two things: a monopoly on “Revolution” and the “only true” doctrines of Revolution. That is enough to muddle the heads of millions of credulous youngsters with the grandiose idea that Maoist China is destined to lead mankind to a “glorious future.”

Incomprehension of the historical role of the proletariat, the appeals to the anarchic petty bourgeois mass, so nakedly revealed in the course of the “cultural revolution,” attempts to win petty bourgeois support for the terrorist campaign against the Party and the more progressive workers, peasants and intellectuals, all prove the non-Marxist nature of Maoism.

AUTOCRATIC REGIME

Then how can such a development as the “cultural revolution” occur in a professedly socialist country? There is no doubt that the policy of Mao Tse-tung and his following is to blame for

it. But how could they pursue a policy in glaring contradiction to the principles of socialism and the national interests of the people in a country which has set out to build socialism? This question must be answered, to explain China's present plight.

We do not propose to deal here with the mental evolution of the leader of the Communist Party of China, who headed the Party and people in the years of the revolution and struggle for socialism, distinctly contributing to the success of both. The psychological metamorphosis of one invested with supreme power is rather a matter for a novelist or a psychoanalyst. We are much more interested in the reason why the Party, people and country have to suffer for the leader's ruinous policy, why they cannot say "No" to it. If a group of leaders were to try to plunge the country into war, who would rise to avert the disaster?

In thinking over this question we must scrutinize the theory and practice of Maoism in the sphere of political power. It is here that Mao Tse-tung's departure from Marxism is more clearly evident.

It is known that Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Party leaders characterize the nature of power in China in a number of different ways. They describe it as the dictatorship of the people or the dictatorship of a coalition of various social forces—the working class, the peasants and even the national bourgeoisie or as the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In Mao Tse-tung's article *Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* we read: "Ours is a democratic dictatorship of the people led by

the working class and resting on the union of the workers and peasants. This means that democracy has been established for the people and that all those who enjoy the civil rights, consolidated as they have been by the working class, the peasants coming first among them, assume dictatorship over the reactionary classes, reactionaries and the elements resisting socialist reforms and opposing the building of socialism.”¹

It is of interest to know whom the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China classes as “the people.” He writes in the same article: “At the present stage of building socialism the people comprise all the classes, strata and social groups which approve and support the cause of building socialism and contribute to it; the enemies of the people are all those social forces and social groups which resist the socialist revolution, are hostile to the building of socialism and subvert it.”²

This is quite an extraordinary definition. Socialist society is not to be divided into the “people” and the “enemies of the people,” into the “pure” and the “foul,” into those who exercise dictatorship and those who are subject to it. Of course such terminology is utterly inapplicable. As for the man styled the “greatest Marxist theoretician” mentioning the “enemies of the people” as a social category, it is unbelievably absurd.

An official article in the army newspaper *Tse-fanshun pao* and reprinted in *Jenminjihpao* stated: “We are not popular with the landlords, rich

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, Moscow, 1957, p. 7 (Russ. Ed.).

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

peasants, counterrevolutionaries, pernicious and Right-wing elements. With respect to these elements, proletarian dictatorship can only exercise 'despotic tyranny' but not 'humane rule.'" Here, again, we come upon the contention that dictatorship is a method—even a "despotic" method—with respect to the enemies, a notion (as demonstrated by developments in China) which can easily be made to include any persons dubbed "pernicious elements." Yesterday it was "Right-wing intellectuals," today it is Party leaders Peng Chen, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping. And who knows what tomorrow may bring?

On considering more closely Mao Tse-tung's definitions of the state, it is not difficult to see that he always lays the emphasis on dictatorial methods, at all times, regardless of circumstances. In the phrase "proletarian dictatorship" he puts the stress on the second word, ignoring the first. He does not care which classes wield power—whether it is the people, a class coalition, or the proletariat; the important thing for him is that it should be a dictatorship.

It is not accidental that whether referring to the dictatorship of the people or to the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao Tse-tung unfailingly and promptly states on whom the dictatorship is imposed. He says, dictatorship is exercised "over the forces of reaction," "The method of dictatorship is employed against the enemies." In the above cited article he writes: "Dictatorship is coercion which applies to the enemies but does not apply to the people."

Referring to the functions of the socialist state he discusses only two of them, suppression of the domestic reactionary classes and defence of

the state from subversive activities and possible aggression by external enemies. And what about the main goal of the socialist state, the building of a new society? It is not even mentioned.

The Maoists completely disregard the constructive aims of proletarian dictatorship and its democratic nature as the government of the overwhelming majority of the nation. They snatch various quotations out of context hoping in this way to bolster their one-sided notions of proletarian power as coercive dictatorship and nothing else.

Lenin paid much attention to proletarian dictatorship. In many of his speeches he supplied a general definition of working-class power which holds for its entire duration, and also analyzed certain of its aspects which predominate at one or another stage or situation. When speaking of the struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution before Soviet power was established, Lenin often stressed the coercive aspect of proletarian dictatorship. After the victorious October Revolution, the problems of socialist construction became the order of the day. In that period Lenin showed that it was necessary to put down the resistance of the reactionary bourgeoisie but emphasized at the same time the constructive role of proletarian dictatorship in ensuring the success of the economic reform and changing social-political and cultural patterns in Russia. He wrote: "If we translate the Latin, scientific, historico-philosophical term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' into simplest language, it means just the following:

"Only a definite class, namely, the urban workers and the factory, industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole mass of

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the working and exploited people in the struggle to throw off the yoke of capital, in actually carrying it out, in the struggle to maintain and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist social system and in the entire struggle for the complete abolition of classes."¹

This definition covers all the principal features of working-class political power at any period of its existence. It states the ultimate aim of this power, which is to set up the socialist system and then to abolish all classes; it singles out from amongst the classes and sections of capitalist society the force that is to head the struggle for these changes, namely the industrial workers; it denotes the form and nature of relations which should exist between the workers and all other working classes.

The idea of proletarian dictatorship is the logical sequence of Marxist-Leninist theory of the historic mission of the proletariat, the most revolutionary and organized class, to create a new society, free from exploitation. Lenin stressed time and again that the teaching of proletarian dictatorship was the core of Marxism. And it should be so. The historical mission of the working class after the socialist revolution is to provide guidance for building socialism and then communism.

But while suppression is the main function of exploiter society determining all its activities it is far from being the case with regard to the state of the workers. Lenin wrote: "...But the essence of proletarian dictatorship is not in force alone, or even mainly in force. Its chief feature

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 29, p. 420.

is the organization and discipline of the advanced contingent of the working people, of their vanguard; of their sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism, abolish the division of society into classes, make all members of society working people, and remove the basis for all exploitation of man by man.”¹

These definitions, however, are never cited in Chinese literature, and it is all too clear why. It contradicts the Maoists’ assertion that despotic, coercive methods form the foundation of proletarian dictatorship.

First and foremost, proletarian dictatorship is there to provide guidance in building the new society which involves staggering economic, organizational, cultural, educational and ideological efforts, requiring the close and constant unity of the workers, peasants and intellectuals.

The Leninist point of view is that proletarian power must in substance and form be the most democratic kind of government. As to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the tendency has been towards ever broader union of the democratic forces on whose support workers’ power relies from the very start. While at the beginning the working class in the USSR united with *the poorest* peasants and only *some* of other non-proletarian strata of the working people, in other socialist countries the union included *all* the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and other democratic forces.)

It must be noted that Lenin always used the word “dictatorship” in reference to the landow-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 29, p. 388.

ners, reactionary bourgeoisie and their henchmen who came out against workers' power but never with regard to the working people. Dictatorship is directed against the reactionary bourgeoisie and their hangers-on, and against them alone.

And what does Mao Tse-tung make of this principle? (He insists on employing dictatorship methods even against a part of the working class, the working people and Party leaders who presumably "are following the capitalist path.")

In their polemic with the CPSU, Chinese leaders dwell on the correlation between the masses, the Party and the leaders. But this is, so to say, "for export," while at home they support Mao's theory that the people are a "clean sheet of paper." Mao Tse-tung says: "There is nothing on a clean sheet of paper, but one can write on it the very newest, the most beautiful words; one can draw on it the very newest, the most beautiful pictures." What else is it but an avowed justification of autocracy?

Unqualified repudiation of the personality cult follows from Marxist teachings. The cult of "omnipotent" heroes, of deified leaders is utterly inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism, which proceeds from the recognition of the decisive and creative role of the popular masses. It runs counter to the spirit of the workers' and communist movement, whose motto is expressed in the words of the immortal *Internationale*:

We want no condescending savior
To rule us from a judgement hall.

None but the collective leader, the Communist Party equipped with revolutionary theory and the knowledge of the process and tendencies of his-

torical development, can be expected to conduct successfully the socialist revolution and the building of new society.

Marxism-Leninism does not belittle the role individuals may play in history. But it repudiates any overestimation of this role. This is exactly the meaning of the well-known remark Marx made in a letter to W. Blos (October 10, 1877) expressing his "aversion to any personality cult."¹ It is not merely a personal opinion but the definition of a basic attitude epitomizing the contrast between Marxism and idealistic petty bourgeois thinking.

Lenin undeviatingly adhered to the principle of collective leadership and the masses' broad involvement in state government. It was on the basis of Leninism and under Lenin's direct guidance that the Party cadres who headed the struggle for the victory of the October Revolution, consolidation of Soviet power, and the building of socialism were reared and tempered. Though his prestige both in the Party and throughout the nation was enormous, Lenin was always unassuming in his ways—an ordinary man, inseparable from the masses, from the common workers and peasants, the recipient of their unbounded love. He had no liking for flattery or any ambition to be glorified. His brilliant mind and energy were dedicated entirely to the struggle for the interests of the working class, of the toiling masses.

Lenin warned against leaders becoming independent of elected bodies and the Party rank-

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels. *Sel. Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1955, p. 310.

and-file and emphasized the vital necessity of adhering strictly to the principle of collective leadership. Such was his concern for the normal performance of proletarian dictatorship, for the correct direction of all activities of the ruling Party.

The June 30, 1956 decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences" conclusively show that the personality cult is incompatible with the principles of socialism and Marxism-Leninism. The decisions state: "The Congress instructed the Central Committee to carry out consistently the measures for removing wholly and entirely personality cult, foreign to Marxism-Leninism, for removing its consequences in every aspect of Party, governmental and ideological activity, and for strict enforcement of the standards of Party life and of the principles of collective Party leadership elaborated by the great Lenin.

"...By taking a determined stand against the personality cult and its consequences, and by openly criticizing the errors it caused, the Party has once more demonstrated its loyalty to the immortal principles of Marxism-Leninism, its loyalty to the interests of the people, its concern for providing the best possible conditions for the development of Party and Soviet democracy in the interest of the successful building of communism in this country."¹

¹ *On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences*, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 30th June, 1956, Soviet News Booklet, No. 20, 4D, Lnd, pp. 7, 9.

The Marxist-Leninist Parties drew the necessary conclusions from the lessons of the past. Unfortunately, through the fault of its leaders, the Chinese Communist Party did not benefit from this.

Chinese leaders allege that to oppose autocracy is to defy the authority of the leaders of the working class. But a leader's authority and the disgusting fuss around Mao's name are two different things. A leader gains authority because of his dedicated effort on behalf of the people, and it is the people who invest him with this authority in recognition of his services. But it is not to be decreed.

We do not intend to understate the contribution certain Chinese leaders made to their country's long struggle for freedom and the revolution. But we cannot reconcile the spate of eulogy that is deluging China with the Marxist view of a Party leader's prestige.

(Printed organs of the Chinese Communist Party dub Mao Tse-tung the "great helmsman," the "genius of all time and all peoples," the "greatest strategist." He is the "genius," who has developed a consummate theory of the classes, class struggle and revolutions. He is the "peerless authority on the national question." What is more, he is the "greatest of Chinese poets." It has got to the point where the sun is likened to him, not he to the sun. Posters depicting him against the sun spreading its bountiful rays all over China seem to have been found wanting in expression. The *Danjung jihpao* newspaper wrote: "They say that Chairman Mao's works are like the sun. We would not liken them to the sun because the sun rises and

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sets but Chairman Mao's works radiate light always."

Lately there has been a persistent attempt to have the Chinese people believe that Mao Tse-tung's ideas are the "supreme embodiment of Leninism" and that our epoch is the "epoch of Mao Tse-tung." Chinese leaders are now more openly substituting Maoism for Leninism, suggesting plainly enough that Maoism is the main thing and that Leninism is secondary. Peking is described as a sort of new Mecca for the "true believers" in the line adopted by the Chinese leaders. Not long ago *Jenminjihpao* went so far as to say that in Mao Tse-tung's works "dialectical and historical materialism have been extricated from the mysterious-mystical philosophic sphere" in which, it is alleged, the teachings of Marx and Lenin were submerged until now.

The Chinese press has come to abound in assertions like the following:

"Mao Tse-tung's ideas—from ideology to methods of thinking and working—are a developing and advancing Sinofied Marxism, a scientific theory of socialist revolution and the building of socialism and communism" (*Jenminjihpao*.)

"In their time, Marx, Engels and Lenin could not definitely foresee the entire process of development. The summing up of historical tasks the present epoch has put before the proletariat and the revolution-led people had to be shouldered by Mao Tse-tung" (*Lishi Yanjiu* magazine.)

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung has integrated the principal views of Marxism concerning production, the class struggle and the role of the masses

and the theory of knowledge into a single whole.”
(Chinese textbook on dialectical materialism.)

“Having discovered the law of surplus value, Marx revealed the essence of capitalist exploitation. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, by his analysis of imperialist contradictions, has disclosed the law of the development of imperialism and all reactionary forces, ‘To run riot, to lose, to run riot again, to lose again, and so on until final collapse,’ and has thereby profoundly revealed the essence of imperialism. . .” (Chinese textbook on dialectical materialism.)

“Mao Tse-tung’s ideas are Marxism-Leninism developed, the greatest, most correct, most integrated Marxism-Leninism of the contemporary epoch.” (*Shetsien* magazine.)

That, however, no longer gives satisfaction. We hear from Lin Piao that “Chairman Mao is far greater than Marx, Engels, Lenin. . .” and that his ideas are “the highest level of Marxism-Leninism.” Lin Piao goes on to say that “though there are numerous Marxist-Leninist books, but they are not applicable to China. Therefore the study of the classics of Marxism-Leninism must be based 99 per cent on the works by Mao Tse-tung.”

In fact “mastering of theory” consists of cramming Mao Tse-tung’s dicta.

“The selected works of Mao Tse-tung are the best textbook for the Chinese people to learn Marxism-Leninism from,” *Jenminjihpao* claims. It is not accidental that many major works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism have not been published in China to this day. Chinese Communists have hardly any access to the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The publication of Lenin’s

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Collected Works in the Chinese People's Republic was completed only in 1959, the circulation of most volumes not exceeding 40,000-50,000 copies for 18 million members and candidate members of the Party and the 700 million Chinese. In place of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, Chinese and other Parties' documents, the Chinese publishing houses put out collections of selected quotations to justify and support the policies of the Peking leaders.

In a speech made to the Red Guards Lin Piao said: "You must always be committed to Chairman Mao Tse-tung, committed to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung." Thus they try to replace dedication to the cause of socialism and the people's state by devotion to individuals claiming absolute power and infallibility. The Chinese press keeps reiterating that feelings towards Mao Tse-tung are the touchstone of true revolutionary spirit.

The point, however, is not so much this deification as the organizational principles of political power in People's China and the methods whereby it is implemented.

In China's political system we observe, first, the concentration of autocratic power in Mao's hands; second, violation and brutal disregard of the democratic norms of Party and government proceedings; third, cultivation of bureaucratic methods, administration by mere injunction and a high-handed approach to economic and social problems.

To function normally, proletarian dictatorship must be furnished with a mechanism of sufficient scope to enable the working class to extend its influence to every facet of public life. This me-

chanism includes a comprehensive system of administrative bodies assigning the key role to the working class and trade unions, which play an important part in managing the economy, down to every enterprise. And what do we see in China?

We see that the leading role of the proletariat is practically ignored. For years, it has been Party law that any injunction of the leadership, however arbitrary, should be implicitly obeyed. They have to pay for it now. Though many in the Party realize that the present course is ruinous, they do not speak up, for there are no traditions, or norms, or institutes which would have made criticism possible.

Proletarian democracy presupposes the existence of a developed system of workers' and peasants' representation under which the key role in the Party, state and trade unions must belong to the bodies directly elected by the masses. In China, however, representative bodies are convened irregularly and their function is nominal.

Let us turn for illustration to the congresses and plenums of the Communist Party of China. Under the Party Rules adopted in 1956, the Central Committee is to be elected for a term of five years; Party congress sessions are to be convened once a year and plenums of the Central Committee twice a year at least. However, the 8th Congress was held eight years ago and there has been no indication of when the 9th Congress will be convened. In all the eight years only one congress session—the 2nd Session of the 8th Congress—was held, in May 1958.

Publicity is an essential attribute of the pro-

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letarian state. Lenin wrote that Soviet power derived its strength from the fact that the masses were informed about everything, passed judgment on everything and went about everything consciously. Publicity is indispensable to the normal functioning of proletarian government bodies. In China, the proceedings of the top government bodies are very often kept from the public. The 3rd Session of the All China Assembly of People's Representatives held in April 1962 is an example of this. None of the materials were published. Furthermore, according to some sources, anybody divulging information about the proceedings was liable to prosecution for treason.

Meetings of the Permanent Committee of the Assembly and sessions of the State Council of the Republic are also secret. Brief communiques in the press only mention the points discussed, despite their interest to the Chinese public at large.

A distinguishing feature of the proletarian state is that people in high office are elected, may be recalled and must regularly account for their activities. This principle is not observed in China. Replacement of Party, government and trade union leadership is effected by the simple method of ousting those in disgrace and installing others in their places. Nobody knows these new people. Nobody has ever discussed their political or administrative competence. All that is required of them is to be faithful to Mao Tse-tung.

According to Lenin's teaching, as the building of socialism progresses and the exploiter classes are eliminated the state gradually relin-

quishes its suppressive functions and revamps the corresponding agencies. In China, the security bodies not only have retained their old structure and patterns of activity but, on the contrary, have extended their functions. Today they have been reinforced by millions of the Red Guards.

The Communist Party of China is curtailing democracy. Proletarian dictatorship in China has been replaced by an autocratic regime thereby permitting the gross distortion of home and foreign policy spotlighted by the "cultural revolution." And what are the social roots of this regime? We know that regardless of its individual features, a policy is basically an expression of the interests, sentiments and prejudices of a certain class. There can hardly be any doubt that the policy pursued by Mao and his following represents the interests of the more backward rural and urban petty bourgeoisie. The peasants, however, cannot be a dominating or leading social force, for they are disunited, disorganized and lack the necessary culture and administrative experience. This gives the leaders all the more opportunity to follow any course they choose.

At some stages of China's development the utmost centralization of power combined with rigorous army-style discipline might have been more or less expedient. Even so there came a time when these methods could no longer serve to solve economic and social problems or ensure efficient management.

But autocracy is at its worst with regard to the question of the succession of the leadership. As there is no regular mechanism of nomination

and succession, factions spring up and arbitrary persecution follows.

To justify their stand, the Chinese leaders again allude to China's specific conditions. Admittedly the proletarian state in China, an economically backward and predominantly peasant country, is bound to possess certain specific features, some being quite significant. It is also true that the use of force could well have been unavoidable, especially when we recall that the revolution in China grew out of the war against the Japanese invaders. And it is equally true that proletarian dictatorship in China, as well as in some other countries, need not have necessarily evolved at the initial stage of the revolution.

The experience of China, a former semi-colony, and its progress from stage to stage on the way to becoming a proletarian state could be instructive for Asian and African countries where similar conditions prevail. In its first years people's China acquired very valuable experience in socializing industry, paying compensation for the means of production and in organizing production co-operatives in the semi-feudal, patriarchal countryside. All Marxist-Leninists approved of these efforts. But paying due heed to specific conditions and substituting autocracy for proletarian dictatorship are not the same thing.

Maoists claim that setting up a huge government mechanism and inculcating army discipline and blind obedience to leaders strengthens the country. It is a cruel misconception. Lenin pointed out more than once that one should not confuse force and violence. It is possible to be

strong and avoid unnecessary violence, and it is possible to be weak and commit outrages.

What, above all, strengthens the proletarian state is the feeling of the workers and peasants, of all working people, that it is their state, meriting their devotion and support. By trampling on democracy the leaders of the Communist Party of China are weakening the state. Certainly in ordinary times this weakness is not as obvious as at a time of upheavals and trouble. But China's difficulty in coping with the effects of a temporary crop failure and the mess they made of the economy must spell a grave warning to the leaders if they really are concerned about strengthening the state.

There can be no justification for attempts to furnish ideological substantiation of the autocratic regime. Of course we realize that it is difficult to build socialism in a country like China. It is also clear that the larger the petty bourgeois stratum, the easier it is to introduce the personality cult.

But does it mean that Marxists should merely sit by and wait? They will no more agree to that than they would support restoration of capitalist ways, also a tendency engendered by the petty bourgeois environment. Besides it is no secret that the personality cult does not spring from the masses but is imposed on them.

The outcry raised against the decisions of the 20th, 22nd and 23rd Congresses of the CPSU relating to the Party and state development and the theory and practice of the state of the entire people is not at all accidental. Since the Maoists cannot imagine a socialist state without the personality cult, coercive methods and a bu-

reaucratic hierarchy, they loath all that has been done in the USSR to sweep away the aftermath of the personality cult and promote socialist democracy.

The June 14 letter of the CPC Central Committee and other documents sharply criticize the conclusions and decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress. This is quite the reverse of the documents of the international conferences of the world communist movement, namely the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, which were signed by the Chinese representatives among others, stating that apart from their paramount significance for the CPSU and the building of communism in the USSR, the historic decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU have launched a new stage in the world communist movement and furthered its development on a Marxist-Leninist basis.

Speaking at the 1957 Conference in Moscow Mao Tse-tung said: "In the recent four or five years after Stalin's death the situation in the Soviet Union has considerably improved both domestically and internationally. The *Jenmin-jihpao* editorial "Once Again on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship" (December, 1956) mentioned the "great resolution and courage" of the 20th CPSU Congress and stated that "Marxist-Leninists and friends of communism the world over support the efforts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to correct mistakes and wish the Soviet comrades success in their efforts." ¹

¹ *Once Again on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship*. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Peking, 1960, p. 40 (Russ. Ed.).

Later on Chinese Party leaders began to write in a rather different vein. And no wonder. As they embraced a policy of "leaps" and "communes" and boosted the Mao cult in every possible way, they were naturally bound to criticize world communist opinion, which condemns such practices.

Much has been done in China to change ownership patterns both in town and the countryside and important steps taken towards socialism. Sooner or later the political structure of society must accord with the economic basis, that is, develop along the lines of socialist democracy. Failing this, the state will act as a brake on the development of economic and social processes in China.

"LEAPS" AND "COMMUNES"

From 1949 to 1957 the Communist Party of China pursued a realistic course in the main. Drawing on the experience and support of the socialist countries it successfully promoted the economic and socio-political development of the country. At that time the Chinese People's Republic began to acquire original experience with regard to socialist reforms in industry and farming.

In 1956, the 8th Congress of the CPC endorsed the second five-year plan envisaging an approximately twofold increase of gross industrial output and a 35-per cent increase for agriculture. Speakers at the Congress said that China was facing essentially the same tasks the Soviet state had had to cope with at the beginning. The decisions of the 8th Congress emphasized that

it was necessary to heed the prevailing conditions and the difficulties that existed. The decisions pointed out: "If this situation is not taken into account and overly high growth rates are set, it will hinder economic development and the fulfilment of the plan and will amount to an adventurous blunder." The decisions warned against the tendency of "blindly rushing ahead of events" regardless of actual facts and real possibilities and without paying due attention to the planned, proportional development of the economy.

The Communist Party and the people of China approved the decisions of the 8th Party Congress as the proper course to follow for successfully building socialism, consistently developing social production and technological standards, and creating the material base of the new society.

Such was the state of affairs until the Chinese leaders began to defy the laws of building socialism.

All of a sudden the policy elaborated by the 8th Congress was revised. In 1958 the so-called course of "three red flags—the general line, the big leap, and the people's communes" was announced. Mao Tse-tung summed up this course in the following way: "to wage a stubborn struggle for three years and effect a change in the principal aspect of most districts of the country." The already endorsed economic growth rates were declared "conservative" and those in favour of the decisions of the 8th Congress labelled die-hards and Right-wingers.

Peking leaders put forth a "new programme" of economic development whereby gross industrial output was to be increased not twice but

6.5 times in the same five years. Farming was now expected to cover a twelve-year programme in three years' time and turn out 2.5 times more produce. Steel output was scheduled to grow from 5.3 to no less than 80-100 million tons in five years.

The decisions of the Central Committee of the CPC "On Setting Up People's Communes" dated August 29, 1958 runs: "... a situation has arisen wherein agricultural production is developing rapidly, agricultural output increasing twice, several times, more than ten times, several dozen times."

Deceit and self-delusion, these unfailing attributes of the autocratic regime, had a sorry effect on the plans. As early as the summer of 1958 it was announced that a grain harvest of 360 million tons was expected compared with 185 million tons the previous year. The target for 1959 was set at the fabulous figure of 525 million tons of grain. Subsequently the Chinese leaders had to admit officially that the figures had been overstated. It was announced that the 1958 harvest was 250 million tons while in fact it was less.

In 1956 Mao Tse-tung claimed the yield was so abundant that he was concerned about the problem of surplus grain and might find it necessary to reduce the area under crops. This empty boast, without an iota of truth to back it up, was nevertheless considered worth acting upon. The 6th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, held in 1959, produced the following directive: "It is necessary to see to it that over a period of some years, and in keeping with local conditions, arable land under crops should be gradually re-

duced, say, to one-third." This was declared shortly before the Chinese had to be put on starvation rations.

No sooner had the Chinese leaders announced their grand plans than they began to boast of victories. They even advanced the "theory" of three types of socialist countries whereby countries of the first type were those forging ahead towards communism at an accelerated rate; the second type included countries "marking time" at the socialist stage; and those of the third type were described as reverting from socialism to capitalism. The purpose of the theory was to prove that the only country marching towards communism—on the double-quick, too—was China. In August 1958, the Peking theorizers declared that "implementation of communism in our country is no longer a matter of the remote future." It was proclaimed that the Chinese peasants, thanks to the communes organized that same year (1958), were "to go over to the communist way of life and enter the stage of communism in three-four or five-six years."

The economic experiment, launched in violation of the decisions of the 8th Congress, produced deplorable results. Though growth statistics have not been published in recent years, it is still possible to infer from fragmentary data cropping up in the speeches of top leaders that in 1962 the output of some major industrial goods fell short of the planned figures, and was far behind the "big leap" targets. In 1962 agricultural output was even lower than in 1957. There is no doubt that recent natural calamities have resulted in grave economic losses in China. But regardless of what they say the leaders cannot conceal the obvious

fact that they alone are responsible for the harm caused by their rash experiments.

According to available data, China's present grain production is about 185 million tons a year. This is roughly what it was before the "big leap" (1957) despite the measures taken during this time to improve irrigation, eliminate pests and produce fertilizer. Also, much fertilizer was imported from abroad. Meanwhile since 1957 China's population has grown by approximately 100 million.

The idea of rapid industrialization via the "big leap" in so-called small-scale metallurgy was also an utter failure. Hundreds of thousands of primitive pig-iron and steel furnaces, scores of thousands of primitive coal workings manned by some 60-70 million commandeered peasants were abandoned after a year and left scattered all over China, a mute reproach to those who would defy economic laws and replace scientific methods of industrialization by "the speediest possible implementation of the leader's brilliant idea."

The "people's communes" fared no better. Under this system, the peasants' individual plots were taken away, household utensils were socialized, payment according to results was abolished, and uniform distribution introduced. Life in the communes was organized on army lines, commune members being formed into companies, battalions and regiments.

Lenin's observation that politics is a concentrated expression of economics is well known. Chinese leaders, however, declare that "politics is the power to give orders." But to ignore existing economic conditions and productive forces is to defy science and deal in utopian fancies which go up in smoke at the least contact with reality. Such

was the fate of the "three flags" policy which did not accord with prevailing economic conditions. Chinese leaders regarded even the problem of turning co-operative property into public property as a purely organizational measure supposedly applicable at the low level of the productive forces and naturally drew a blank.

The 9th Central Committee Plenum (January 1961), which adopted the so-called adjustment course, admitted there were grave political and economic difficulties. Capital construction was drastically curtailed, most projects were suspended, and over 20 million people were forcibly moved to villages. The people's communes were to be reorganized, the peasants got back their individual plots. Though "people's communes" are still mentioned in propaganda material, in reality they have returned to a somewhat altered form of farming co-operatives.

With all that, no assessment of the results of the previous policy, no self-criticism or acknowledgement of mistakes was ever offered. The withdrawal was described as a further advance. The new resolutions were declared yet another "contribution to Marxism-Leninism." Mao Tse-tung and his group in fact abandoned industrialization in favour of the idea that "agriculture is the basis of the economy." That, too, was presented as a general law of the development of socialist economy and an "outstanding contribution" to the theory and practice of Marxism.

From the theoretical point of view the policy of leaps and communes was essentially an attempt to "speed up" the transition to communism, bypassing the obligatory stage of full-fledged socialist society. Let us recall that the "speeding up"

implied curtailing commodity relations, "converting" co-operative property to state property, cutting down on material incentives, giving up the idea of payment according to results, and so on. The transformation of socialism into communism was presented as a leap, not a gradual process. As was to be expected the result was a setback from what had already been achieved in the way of economic and socio-political progress.

State and co-operative ownership finally took over in China some seven or eight years ago. That, however, did not mechanically bring about socialism in social relationships, in the administrative and ideological sphere. For socialism does not simply mean the elimination of capitalist and feudal exploitation but also implies high standards of production and distribution and genuinely socialist—that is, fraternal—relations between members of society. That required a persevering effort. Unfortunately the Chinese Communist Party leaders paid no attention to this fundamental truth.

The errors committed in China have confirmed once again that it is relatively easier to start a socialist revolution in a retarded country than in an advanced country but it is more difficult to carry it through to the end. Here the process of building socialism is especially complex, consisting of many stages. Here, more than anywhere else, the energies of the people and the entire national resources must be mustered to provide the only valid foundation of socialism, a modern industrial and scientific-technological base. Here it is of paramount importance for the Communist Party to conduct a consistent proletarian policy permitting steady progress along the correct path. Otherwise

floundering and setbacks are inevitable. We mention this not to rebuke the Chinese leaders but because of the lessons to be learned from the lamentable "leaps."

Marx and Engels foresaw that socialism would be an independent stage of transition to communism. They wrote that in order for the new system to triumph, besides abolishing private ownership it was necessary to solve some major social problems.

Engels emphasized that socialization of property did not in itself amount to socialism, for "if. . . the taking over of the tobacco trade by the state was socialistic, Napoleon and Metternich would rank among the founders of socialism."¹ Marx and Engels roundly criticized those who did not understand that the new form of ownership should be made the basis for changing society and the status of the individual.

Marx was bitingly sarcastic about petty bourgeois communism, which sees the sole task of social revolution in the abolition of private ownership and "denies the human individual altogether."

Lenin predicted that "From capitalism mankind can pass directly only to socialism, . . . socialism must inevitably involve gradually into communism."² As we see, Lenin wrote that not only would transition to communism be gradual but there must first be built a full-fledged socialist society which would later develop into a communist society.

Soon after the Revolution Lenin had to contend with so-called left opposition, which maintained

¹ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, p. 312.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 24, pp. 84-85.

that War Communism was not a temporary stage imposed by circumstances but a straight road to the highest social phase, communism. Also rejected were the views of the Trotskyites, who suggested that the building of the new society should be "accelerated" by way of leaps and extensive use of coercion with regard to production. The Party subjected all such suggestions to criticism and worked out a programme for the systematic transformation of the economy, culture and social relationships along socialist lines. Lenin stressed that it was dangerous to attempt building communism before socialism had been firmly consolidated and had reached a developed stage. It was as senseless as trying to start with the roof for a building before laying the foundation and erecting the walls.

Lenin considered it especially important to attain a high level of productive forces and labour productivity. He wrote: "A large-scale machine industry capable of reorganizing agriculture is the only material basis that is possible for socialism."¹ Without a highly efficient economy, advanced industry and agriculture it is impossible to ensure high living standards for the people and to implement the main principle of socialism—to each according to his work. That is why in determining the practical tasks of the Soviet State Lenin placed the main emphasis on industrialization of the entire economy, mechanization of agriculture and stepping up labour productivity beyond what had been achieved under capitalism.

Nor did capitalism emerge just as we see it now in the advanced capitalist countries. It started

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 32, p. 459.

with manufacturing, then came industrial capitalism, monopoly and state-monopoly capitalism. Socialism, too, has its stages.

The establishment of social ownership is a major stage in building socialism. But that is not all, for then it becomes necessary to alter production relations, the system of control and inspection, the patterns of distribution, the forms of political life and methods of government. Lenin foresaw this. He wrote: "...while being based on economics, socialism cannot be reduced to economics alone. A foundation—socialist production—... must also carry a democratically organized state..."¹ "...victorious socialism must necessarily establish a full democracy."² In turn, revamping of the entire social superstructure allows society to develop its productive forces at an accelerated pace thereby providing for distribution according to work and high living standards.

The experience of the Soviet Union has confirmed Lenin's forecasts. Social ownership both in town and the countryside was established in the USSR by the mid-thirties. That, however, did not signify the attainment of a full-fledged socialist society. In subsequent years the country made a stupendous effort to develop its productive forces and improve economic and socio-political relations.

Today the experience of the Soviet Union and that of the European socialist countries confirms the Marxist-Leninist precept that after the foundations of socialism have been laid there follows a more or less lengthy period of all-round deve-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 22, p. 325.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

lopment of socialist society, when full use is made of socialism's inherent potentialities for increasing the productive forces, improving the people's living standards, achieving a cultural renaissance and perfecting democratic institutes.

What do fraternal Parties in the socialist countries understand by "full-fledged socialist society"? Certainly, every country has its own specific tasks. Nonetheless, some common tendencies are clearly observable.

In the economic sphere it means establishing a system of economy in keeping with the standards of the scientific technological revolution which would ensure high labour productivity, a well-balanced development of the whole economy and above all raise agriculture to the level of industry so as to provide amply for all members of society.

In the social sphere it means enhancing the leading role of the working class acting in alliance with the peasants, enhancing the role of scientists and technologists, and eliminating the difference between manual and mental work and between town and countryside. It is most important in this connection to raise the professional, educational and cultural standards of the entire working people.

In the political sphere it means consistently applying the principles of scientific guidance of society by the Party, further developing socialist democracy, having the personnel at factories and members of co-operatives play a greater role in economic management.

In the ideological sphere it means furnishing conditions whereby the Marxist-Leninist outlook will have the greatest appeal to working people.

The Communist Parties believe that these aims

can be achieved by consistently applying scientific principles of economic management, improving the knowledge and ability of management personnel and wide-scale involvement of the masses in all these activities. That is why the decisions of the Communist and Workers' Parties of European socialist countries on economic reforms focus attention on these very tasks.

Discussion on this question was closely tied in with the recent economic reforms in the European socialist countries. In the course of these reforms the erroneous view that commodity-money relations and the law of value had no place in the development of socialism, was rejected. There began a fruitful search for an economic system which would combine the advantages of planning with the employment of such levers as demand, profit, and material incentives.

The economic reform now under way in a number of socialist countries has nothing in common with the theories and notions the Maoists are spreading. It is worth dwelling here on the so-called struggle against "economism" in China.

First of all, what do they mean by "economism"?

A joint editorial in *Jenminjihpao* and *Hunchi* reads: "Economism is a certain form of bribery which undermines. . . the revolutionary will of the broad masses. . . encouraging them to ignore long-term national interests and care about nothing but immediate interests. Its aim is to stifle the great proletarian cultural revolution. . . , to undermine social production, the national economy and socialist ownership."

The Maoists allege that those favouring "economism" "are following the capitalist road."

Late in 1966, *Jenminjihpao* frankly asked if "the mining and industrial sectors would remain loyal to socialism or whether they would side with the capitalist camp," regardless of all that has been achieved during the 17 years of people's power. According to *Jenminjihpao* "economism" has become deeply entrenched: "Many of our industrial and ore-mining enterprises have more or less fallen under the influence of capitalist, revisionist and even feudalist ideas in the realm of political ideology, management of production and production methods."

Defamatory wall-posters accuse even people like Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping of economic crimes although they have nothing directly to do with the economy. They charge that after the failure of the "big leap" these people advocated a return to "bourgeois economic policy." They say, for instance, that Liu Shao-chi urged the government to solve the economic problems with a minimum of sacrifices, that he had no confidence in Mao's "big leap" economic strategy. The "economists" are accused of being "overly anxious about the well-being of the masses."

Lately the label of "high priest of economism" has been pinned on Sun Ye-fang, formerly deputy director of the State Statistical Board and the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who—as witnessed by some prominent figures in China—has "numerous supporters among 'economists.'"

The "heretic" Sun Ye-fang is accused of insisting on a maximum increase of labour efficiency and optimum utilization of the country's insufficient resources. Judging by the accusations levelled against him Sun Ye-fang suggested making al-

locations to enterprises directly dependent on their prospects for obtaining profits insisting that a catastrophe was imminent unless priority was given to projects which promised greater returns.

If, nevertheless, in making allotments they still had to be guided by political considerations, the possible effect of the latter on further profits should also be taken into consideration. Sun Ye-fang ridiculed the slogan "Let politics rule everything" describing it as the "economics of idlers." He insisted on the paramount importance of the law of value and the principle of profitability for the economy. From this one can conclude that Sun Ye-fang disapproves of "big leaps," which tend to boost output at all costs.

An opponent wrote recently: "Sun Ye-fang says that by putting the accent on ideology we may go too far and undermine productivity. The truth of the matter is, however, that by continually enhancing the revolutionary content of our policy and ideology and steadily ridding ourselves of old notions, old culture, old customs and the old way of life we shall release productive forces and extend production never swerving from the socialist course."

Bemuddling people with their political rhetoric, the Maoists urge that all material incentives for workers should be stopped. There have been instances when overzealous "revolutionary" workers incited by the Red Guards, have demanded that all material incentives for good work be stopped at once. Nanking transport workers, for example, "would not" draw their regular bonuses. In Fuchow, workers returned to the state the extra money they were paid. In Peking, machine-builders and glass-makers "declined" a proposed wage rise.

These manifestations of willing self-denial were evidently expected to be an example for the rest of the Chinese working people to follow.

So much for the fight against "economism" on the home front. It is, however, the economic policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and their economic reforms that Mao Tse-tung and his supporters are attacking with particular doggedness. They do not and will not understand that the revamping of management and the planning system in the USSR and other socialist countries has been prompted by profound objective reasons, reforms dictated by the laws of the development of productive forces in the current scientific-technological revolution and the present economic level of many socialist countries. Economic reorganization has been the answer to accelerating technological progress in the socialist countries, the growing demand for quality goods and need for a more flexible, practical system of stimulating production.

The aim of the reforms is to improve scientifically-grounded state planning; to work out the principles of combining centralized planning with greater independence for the enterprises and industrial associations; to give more scope to such internal stimuli of industrial research and development as cost accounting and financial incentives for collectives and individuals; to more fully employ cost categories (profit, price, credit, etc.), to stimulate production and assess its effectiveness; to introduce the achievements of science in industry and agriculture.

The main purpose of recent economic research and practical steps taken in the socialist countries have been to make the economy more efficient. It

is genuine expression of the Communist Parties' concern for the vital interests of world socialism, denoting their desire to make an all-out effort in the economic competition between socialism and capitalism.

In the polemic with the Maoists we are faced with a crucial question: What is meant by the foundations of socialist economy? On the face of it this question seems elementary. But let us not jump to conclusions. When arguing about the role of the plan, on the one hand, and commodity-money relations, on the other, about combining centralism with the enterprises' independence, we ultimately have to return again and again to this crucial question.

To begin with, we should remind the reader that Marx—and Lenin after him—always drew a line between two things: the form of ownership as the basis of the economy and the entire social system, and the forms and methods of economic management. They believed that the absolute predominance of social ownership was the principal distinguishing feature of the socialist mode of production and distribution, both of material and spiritual values.

At the same time the classics of Marxism-Leninism warned against entertaining vulgar, primitive notions of socialist economy. They stressed that economic balance was not to be arbitrarily ordained but should follow from the objective needs of production itself.

Lenin held that democratic centralism was the most important organizational principle of socialist economy. The development of Soviet economy and other socialist economies has demonstra-

ted the universal character of this principle. Simultaneously, practice has disclosed the enormous diversity of applying democratic centralism in different countries and at different stages of building socialism and the constant necessity for economic planning and management methods to be brought in line with the economic, socio-political and cultural progress of society. Since these reforms are connected with the more consistent application of democratic centralism they are both timely and legitimate.

Probably nothing irritates the Maoists as much as the use by socialist countries of cost levers, commodity-money relations, material incentive, profit. They imagine that here they catch the socialist countries "red-handed" employing bourgeois methods. It is hard to say whether it is spite or ignorance that moves them more.

Long before the socialist system came into being Marxism-Leninism classics predicted that commodity production would continue under socialism and so would the law of value, although it would play an essentially different role. Marx wrote that in the first phase of communist society "...the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give anything except his labour, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass into the ownership of individuals except individual means of consumption. But, as far as the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity-equivalents, a given amount of labour in one form is ex-

changed for an equal amount of labour in another form.”¹

Lenin developed these ideas further. At the dawn of Soviet power he already viewed material incentive as the major lever of the socialist economy, characterized by the following main features: economic cost accounting (whereby enterprises are self-sustaining) and remuneration in accordance with the quantity and quality of work performed.

Chinese propagandists are careful to get around the important question of the social function of cost categories such as material incentive, profit and credit. They play on superficial likeness of concepts. But surely quibbles are not arguments.

Let us take, for instance, the principle of material incentive. As long as private ownership dominates, as is the case under capitalism, material incentive remains a means of concentrating wealth in the hands of a few, a source of cutthroat competition and ever increasing exploitation of man by man.

There is no need to prove that material incentive has an entirely different meaning in a socialist context. Under socialism, payment according to the amount and quality of work performed is a powerful stimulus for increasing efficiency, improving skills and developing effective production techniques.

Or let us take profit. Under capitalism profit is pocketed by property owners, by the capitalists; under socialism it is invested in production and used to raise living standards.

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 2, p. 23, Moscow, 1962.

The practical experience of socialist countries guided by creative Marxism-Leninism refutes any arbitrary claims that society can "leap" into communism.

APOLOGY OF FORCE

Outrageous exaggeration of the role of coercion is a major aspect of Maoism. Mao Tse-tung's dictum "the gun is the source of power" has become about the most hackneyed phrase in the political vocabulary of Chinese theorists and the keystone of their interpretation of Marxian theory of the class struggle.

Mao Tse-tung reduces the class struggle to the exercise of force. He maintains that the logic of the class struggle is the logic of a war of annihilation, not stopping short of physical extermination. This interpretation contradicts Marxism, which views the class struggle as connected above all with solving economic problems, changing the nature of ownership.

The Marxists recognize the possibility of class coercion in the struggle against the exploiters who resist the working people. Nevertheless, to Marxists coercion is not an end in itself but a means of gaining power and putting down the resistance of the overthrown classes.

Mao Tse-tung makes the principle of coercion a universal law for deciding all problems—social, political, economic, educational. Whether it pertains to methods of gaining power, home or foreign relations, a new system of training, the Chinese theorists invariably wave the gun as their most conclusive argument. They claim that, besi-

des being a means of expropriation, force is also the way to handle purely economic and other problems.

Hence the theory of "leaps," which Mao continues to cling to despite its many miscarriages. This is apparent, for instance, from the decisions of the 11th Plenum, which declared that the country was on the eve of "another big leap."

The apology of force has also furnished the basis for the theory of "explosions and upheavals" which, it is argued, society should experience from time to time to rekindle the flagging enthusiasm of the masses. The alleged inevitability of such explosions and upheavals is supposedly the explanation of the mass movement of the Red Guards and "rebels." The organ of the Red Guards, *Hungweiping Pao*, wrote on Mao's authority that "human society since its very origin has been advancing through upheavals and changes. Without great upheavals, there could not be revolutionary achievements, which means that leaps in society's development would not be possible. From this point of view the present upheavals and changes are a singularly normal phenomenon, a very good thing."

It would be strange indeed if the "cultural revolution" which has landed the country in a dire political crisis and aggravated its economic troubles is such a "good thing" after all. The efforts to provide some theoretical justification for it look even more odd and futile. Their authors make no distinction between bourgeois and socialist society or between the different stages of the latter or the changing tenor of mass movements in different epochs. The important thing, it appears, is that there should be an upheaval and therefore an

excuse to apply force on a large scale. For what purpose? Today there is no doubt as to that.

In dividing society into the "people" and the "enemies of the people" Mao has accused very many of his closest associates who would no longer follow him implicitly of "taking the capitalist road." He seeks to have them removed from responsible positions, arrested and possibly killed. Chen Po-ta says: "The great proletarian cultural revolution has been from the first a class struggle for the seizure of power. In the course of this movement it became clear once again that the chief exponents of the bourgeois reactionary line are Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Tao Chu."

Now we see in a new light the real motives for the publication of Mao Tse-tung's *Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* stating "Today it is imperatively necessary for us to raise the question of drawing a clear line between ourselves and our enemies and contradictions in the country. . ." The arrests and persecution of Mao's erstwhile comrades give it a particularly sinister meaning.

The Red Guards and "rebels" actively spread the thesis: "Revolt is a just cause!" But against whom and in the name of what? Clearly, it is to displace all Mao's opponents or do away with them bodily.

The thesis of coercion which the Maoists try to substitute for the theory of the class struggle merits separate attention. Despite all protestations to the contrary, coercion does not follow from scientific socialism. ". . . violence is, of course, alien to our ideals," Lenin wrote. And he pointed out: "the entire trend of development is towards aboli-

tion of coercive domination of one part of society over another".¹

The Communists set out to build a society where there will be no room for coercion of any kind nor for the state with its special coercive apparatus. Communists choose appropriate means to attain this lofty aim. They have always been against terroristic tactics, conspiracy, military coups and putsches, to which the reactionary bourgeoisie so often resort in their fight against the working people. Communists have always supported the broad, truly democratic movement of the masses themselves.

The class which has been for centuries the object of suppression, savage reprisals and persecution abhors any social order permitting oppression and humiliation of man. Nor does the working class nurse revengeful feelings. It does not capture power to revenge itself on its former oppressors but to build a new society in which people would be free from any oppression.

In pursuing its humane and noble aims the working class seeks appropriate means of struggle. It seizes on every opportunity to avoid violence both in fighting for power and in building socialism. And if the working class has to resort to coercion, it is because of the unrelenting resistance of the outgoing classes. It is not the emerging society that is to blame for but the old, capitalist society.

Bourgeois propaganda has always sought to present political suppression under proletarian dictatorship as nothing but intimidation, persecution and wholesale restriction of democracy. Today it

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, p. 69.

gladly cites examples from the Chinese scene. But what is happening in China through the fault of her leaders is a recession from socialism. The experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has shown that extreme coercive measures were only applied when it was necessary to counteract active resistance of the bourgeoisie. And in any case proletarian dictatorship never rests on arbitrary rule but sets up a stable system of revolutionary law and order in the country, which is binding on all citizens and officials. These very principles are, however, being trampled under foot in China where a frenzied throng opposes the regular mechanism of government, law has been forced to give way to lawlessness, and the despotic rule of the leader and those around him has taken the place of democracy.

In working out the tactics of the revolutionary workers' movement, Marx, Engels and Lenin repeatedly warned the workers that they should neither underestimate the role of coercion in the struggle for socialism nor try to vindicate it. Marx wrote: "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power."¹

These words cannot be repeated often enough for it would be hard to find a more precise, comprehensive and graphic definition. It puts in a nutshell all that determines the Communists' position on this point. It contains recognition of the historical necessity of applying coercion in the struggle for revolutionary transformation of society; comprehension of the fact that coercion it-

¹ Marx. *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 751, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954.

self results from the pressing economic and social needs of social progress; and an explicit definition of its advisability under concrete historical conditions.

Marx developed his theory battling against exaggeration of the role of violence, coercion and voluntarism in the historical process. The prevailing notion in sociology at that time was that the activities of those wielding power—kings, heroes, political leaders—were the determining factor of social development since these people could steer events in any direction they chose. Are these not the very notions being spread in China today, where the Mao cult and the “leader’s omnipotence” are proclaimed the motive force of progress.

“The idea that political acts and grand performances of state are decisive in history is as old as written history itself,” Engels wrote “. . . force is only the means, and . . . the aim is economic advantage. And ‘the more fundamental’ the aim is than the means used to secure it, the more fundamental in history is the economic side of the relationship than the political side.”¹

“Here, too,” Engels continued, “therefore we see absolutely clearly that it is not by any means true that ‘the primary must be sought in direct political force and not in any indirect economic power.’ On the contrary. For what in fact does ‘the primary’ in force itself prove to be? Economic power, the disposal of the means of power of large-scale industry.”²

To hope to rebuild society in a revolutionary way and establish a new economic and social sys-

¹ F. Engels. *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 220, 221.

² *Ibid.*, p. 239.

tem in the interests of the working class and working people chiefly by coercion or solely by coercion has nothing in common with Marxism. But such is the line Mao Tse-tung and all his supporters take.

Marx and Engels viewed the state as a highly effective instrument, greatly furthering the establishment of the socialist system, but they never believed that state power, and consequently coercion, was the only means of revolutionizing social relationships.

Lenin pointed out more than once that coercion was not the main feature of proletarian power. He wrote: "As I have had occasion to point out more than once... the dictatorship of the proletariat is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force. The economic foundation of this use of revolutionary force, the guarantee of its effectiveness and success is the fact that the proletariat represents and creates a higher type of social organization of labour compared with capitalism. This is what is important, this is the source of the strength and the guarantee that the final triumph of communism is inevitable."¹

The role of coercion varies at different stages of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism and also in different socio-political situations. The degree and form of coercion directed against the reactionary bourgeoisie depend on the intensity of its resistance. Revolutionary coercion may be decisive during the struggle for power if there is no other way to win, consolidate and defend proletarian dictatorship.

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 29, p. 419.

This is what took place in the USSR where the bourgeoisie, backed by the world capitalist forces, put up frenzied resistance. In the struggle for proletarian dictatorship, the Communists saw no hope of gaining power by peaceful means. In the ruthless class struggle and conditions of capitalist encirclement coercion against the bourgeoisie was bound to assume a sharper form than preferable. It was only when the exploiters began to step up and extend their resistance that the socialist state had to resort to systematic suppression. It was the answer of the proletariat to the conspiracy of the internal counter-revolutionaries, who, jointly with the international reactionary forces of imperialism, attempted to restore the exploiters to power in Russia.

It was a different situation in the European socialist countries. Based on the anti-fascist democratic movement, with the powerful support of the Soviet Union, the working class in a number of these countries managed to achieve a socialist revolution along peaceful lines; here the working class succeeded in avoiding civil war and extraordinary methods of suppressing the bourgeoisie.

Marxist-Leninists recognize the principle but not the absolute need of coercion in dealing with the class enemies of the proletariat.

As to the Maoists, they consider coercion not only the sole means of winning, defending and securing power but also a universal means for solving social, economic and other problems arising in the course of the building of socialism and communism. What is it if not a direct deviation from the scientific idea of socialism?

The exaggeration of the role of coercion is clearly manifest in Mao Tse-tung's interpreta-

tion of the question of war, peace and revolution. The forces which dominated at the 11th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee openly proclaimed that the Communist Party of China refused to follow the general line of the world communist movement and would step up its struggle against all Communist Parties consistently pursuing this line.

The resolution of the Plenum states quite openly: "Proposals regarding the general line of the world communist movement made by the Central Committee of the CPC on June 14, 1963, are a programme document. This document elaborated under the personal supervision of Mao Tse-tung, the nine *Jenminjihpao* and *Hungchi* editorials commenting on the *Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU*, the article *On the March Conference in Moscow* and other articles are a weapon in the struggle against imperialism and contemporary revisionism." As we see, they are openly substituting the special course of the Mao group for the general line of the world communist movement.

Marxist-Leninist Parties have made a significant contribution to generalizing recent world developments, and mapping out ways of struggle against imperialism, war and reaction, for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism in view of the changed alignment of forces; they have jointly developed the general line of the world communist movement as stated in the 1957 Declaration, 1960 Statement and other documents. Marxism-Leninism today embodies not only the great heritage left by its founders but also the rich practical experience and theoretical contributions of the Communist

Parties, the experience of the struggle of the working class and the entire liberation movement. But these recent contributions to Marxist thought are just what Peking leaders are attacking most venomously.

Maoists seek to prove that the conclusions of the world communist movement regarding generalization of the characteristic features and contradictions of our epoch and the prerequisites of transition to communism in the contemporary world are contrary to Leninism. Actually it is the logical development of Lenin's theoretical contribution after the October Revolution in Russia.

It was Lenin who developed a new approach to determining the requisite conditions of socialist revolution. Before him, Marxists mainly paid attention to the internal conditions prevailing in a given country. Lenin proved that it was no longer sufficient since it was necessary to proceed from the condition of the whole system of world capitalism. A revolution was the snapping of a weak link in the continuous chain of imperialism.

Lenin's analysis of the prerequisites of revolution has acquired even greater importance in view of the sweeping changes which have taken place in the international scene in recent decades. It should also be borne in mind that many tendencies and processes which were only emerging in Lenin's time have fully developed, and new ones, which were non-existent half a century ago, have appeared.

When Lenin wrote his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* and other works stating

the principal propositions of the new theory of the socialist revolution, there was not a single country where such a revolution had been carried out. Even after the triumph of the October Revolution, the victory of socialism in the USSR could not be considered as complete.

Immediately before and after the World War I, the national-liberation movement was just in its infancy; a handful of imperialist powers kept the Asian, African and Latin American peoples under their thumb.

Before the October Revolution, the imperialists ruled the world; after the Revolution the Soviet state was surrounded on all sides by capitalist countries, whose combined forces far exceeded the strength of the lone socialist country.

Today imperialism no longer has undivided sway. It is confronted by a strong world socialist system, an immensely augmented national-liberation movement, and the organized forces of the working class and working people as a whole. The present epoch has clearly emerged as the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism.

In this situation the conditions for the onset of proletarian revolution and the course it takes have changed. Marxist-Leninist analysis proceeds as before from an assessment of the intrinsic state of the capitalist system on the whole and in separate countries. But in present conditions this alone is not enough. Today one must consider not only the developmental tendencies of capitalism but also the changed balance of forces between the two world systems, the impact of the successes of building socialism and communism on the international revolutionary pro-

cess, and the part played by the national-liberation movements.

Of particular significance to the prospects of the revolutionary and liberation movements is the inexorably changing balance of the world forces—the progressive weakening of the imperialist system and the growing strength of the world socialist system.

Lenin said that after 1917 no event could be properly construed without due regard for the achievements of the October Revolution. In the present epoch world development depends on the progress and outcome of the competition between two opposed social systems, the socialist system and the capitalist system. This is the main distinguishing feature of the contemporary period. The existence and rapid development of the world socialist system exert a tremendous influence on the course of the liberation movement, knock the bottom out of capitalism, aggravate all its contradictions and inexorably challenge the prospects of the capitalist order as such.

It certainly does not mean that the socialist system would export revolution to the capitalist world by armed interference.

The impact of the world socialist system on the popular liberation movement is not because it instigates revolution but for an entirely different reason.

First of all the achievements scored by socialist countries show the peoples that the socialist system provides favourable opportunities for the growth of the productive forces and raising cultural standards, for the satisfaction of man's material and spiritual needs. Coupled with socialist democracy and a consistent policy of

peace and friendship among peoples it enormously enhances the appeal of communist ideas. This new factor will exert an ever growing influence on the working class of the capitalist countries and on the peasants, white-collar workers and urban petty bourgeoisie as well.

Besides benefiting from the experience of socialist rebuilding of society, countries going over to socialism can now depend on the economic and political support and close co-operation of the socialist countries. Transition to socialism need no longer entail the colossal economic difficulties the first socialist state experienced due to the resistance and sabotage of the national bourgeoisie and the foreign economic blockade. The radical change in the world balance of forces in favour of socialism has given rise to an entirely new historical situation which did not exist early in the century: the socialist community, enjoying the support of all progressive forces in the world, is in a position to frustrate any attempts of the world reaction to intervene in a country in the throes of revolution.

Years ago, the founders of scientific communism stressed that the close international contacts of Big Business made it easy for world reaction to interfere in revolutionary developments in practically any country. Socialist revolution could succeed at that time only if it were to take place simultaneously in all capitalist countries or at least in the major ones.

Pointing out that in the initial period of the revolution the overthrown exploiters are still stronger than the exploited, Lenin explained it mainly as "the strength of international capital, the strength and durability of their international

connections.”¹ However, the extreme unevenness of the economic and political development of capitalism and the intensification of differences among imperialist countries allowed Lenin to conclude that the proletariat winning in one country would be able, with the support of the international workers’ movement, to rebuff world reactionary forces. But true as it was, the threatening spectre of fresh intervention and possible restoration of capitalism loomed over the first socialist country—the Soviet Union—for many years.

In the present period, the situation has changed radically. Today even the joint forces of imperialism are unable to triumph over the socialist countries. Moreover, there is now the real possibility, by consolidated and vigorous action on the part of all socialist and democratic forces of preventing foreign reactionary interference—or open intervention at least. It would no longer be correct to say that immediately after the Revolution the exploiters remain, by virtue of their international ties, stronger than the exploited since the latter can rely on the strong support of the world socialist system and the entire international workers’ movement.

The experience of the socialist countries in this respect is highly instructive. At the time they were being formed the interference of world reaction was frustrated not only in those European People’s Democracies where Soviet troops were present but in China as well. The smashing defeat of militarist Japan created a fa-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 24

vourable international situation for a successful revolution in China. In such conditions the US imperialists who lavishly supported Chiang Kai-shek, thought better than to interfere openly in the civil war on the continent despite the fact that the United States at that time was the only country that possessed nuclear weapons.

Now that this monopoly no longer exists and the world socialist system has greatly increased its might, successful opposition to imperialist interference in various countries is even more feasible.

In this situation the possibility of separate countries or groups of them breaking away from the world imperialist system has become greater than ever before. Assured of the economic and political support of the socialist community, any country, regardless of its level of development, can now undertake the transition to socialism.

The Maoists, however, completely disregard these new developments, ignoring the changed conditions in the world, the present state of affairs in the capitalist countries, or the new methods and forms of struggle between socialist and capitalist countries. Their lack of understanding manifests itself first of all in the way they approach the question of the correlation of world wars and revolutions in the present epoch.

To Mao Tse-tung, war is the inevitable and, practically, the chief method of resolving contradictions on a world scale. He writes: "Wars began with the emergence of private property and the classes and are the highest form of struggle, a form employed in the resolution of differences between classes and nations, states, political blocs when these differences have reach-

ed a certain stage." War is presented as a universal remedy for conflicts.

It is, however, entirely wrong to claim that class contradictions are to be resolved by war at all times and in any conditions. It is equally wrong to presume that in our time international conflicts, such as arise between nations and blocs of nations, inevitably lead to war.

While stating that it was necessary to turn to account the differences among capitalist powers Lenin repudiated the idea of provoking war between them, let alone between Soviet Russia and the imperialist powers. He wrote: "All our politics and propaganda... are directed towards putting an end to war and in no way towards driving nations to war."¹ And further: "We know, we know only too well, the incredible misfortunes that war brings to the workers and peasants. For that reason our attitude to this question must be most cautious and circumspect. We are ready to make the greatest concessions and sacrifices in order to preserve the peace for which we have paid such a high price."²

Fomenting war has never been fraught with such grave danger as now, when the use of thermonuclear weapons of mass extermination may result in a world-wide catastrophe.

Regardless of this, the Maoists openly express their preference for war as a means of resolving international contradictions. An article in the magazine *Hungchi* (No. 8, 1966) ran: "As long as counter-revolutionary violence continues, revolutionary violence must also continue in order

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 470.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 148.

to resist it. Counter-revolutionary violence could not be obliterated without revolutionary violence. A state in which the exploiter classes are in power is counter-revolutionary violence... War is the acutest form in which violence is expressed, one kind of it being civil war, and the other, foreign war...”

“...Imperialist war inflicts tremendous losses on people... (including the peoples of the United States and other imperialist countries). But should the imperialists impose these losses on the peoples of all countries, we are confident that such losses—as follows from the experience of the Russian revolution and the Chinese revolution—shall not be in vain. The victorious peoples will very rapidly establish on the ruins of dead imperialism a civilization a thousand times higher than capitalist civilization, they will build their truly glorious future.” (Ibid.)

What is to be inferred from this? First, that as long as “counter-revolutionary violence continues,” that is while capitalism exists, there must also exist “revolutionary violence,” that is war, regardless of changes in the balance of world forces. Second, that following another world war the peoples allegedly will build “very rapidly” a new, socialist society.

In the article *Further Comment on Comrade Togliatti's Controversy With Us*, published in *Hungchi*, Chinese theorists, after loudly reasserting that as a result of the war the peoples will rapidly build a “glorious future” on the ruins of imperialism, produced a series of quotations from Engels, Lenin and Togliatti referring to the building of a new society “on the ruins of the old,” whereupon they draw the as-

tonishing conclusion that nuclear world war does not imply anything new in principle. This amounts to completely ignoring the possible consequences a new world war could entail.

In 1946, Mao Tse-tung called the A-bomb a "paper tiger." Even then it was doubtful whether such descriptions were justified while in the ensuing years the meaning of the weapon itself has greatly changed. Shortly after World War II there were few A-bombs and the extent of their devastation was incomparably less than today. Now the situation is different. Nuclear "abundance" has set in. Swift and accurate means of nuclear delivery have been developed, that were undreamed of in 1945. There is a vast difference between a few A-bombs and thousands of much more powerful hydrogen bombs, and this difference should not be forgotten.

But Mao and his supporters prefer to ignore it. They keep repeating the same formulas. *Hung-chi* writes: "One of the key precepts of Marxism-Leninism on war is to fully appreciate man's role in it. Nevertheless, some people who claim to be 'Marxist-Leninists' often forget this precept. . . We have always believed and still maintain that atomic weapons can by no means affect the laws of historical development of society nor can they finally determine the outcome of war..."

Take another aspect of the question, that of world wars and revolutions. Mao Tse-tung insists time and again that unless such wars occur there will be no revolutions. He turns to history to bear out his assertion. True, the imperialist system lost Russia after World War I, and after World War II China and some other countries

also broke free. These facts, however, do not prove that there is any common law regarding the maturing of socialist revolution.

The problem of war and revolution is a much more complex matter than the Chinese leaders seem to think. It must be regarded from all aspects with due consideration of the prevailing situation. The influence of war on social processes, on the liberation movement of the masses and the conditions of its development is contradictory. Wars have always been a tremendous calamity for the people; spelling famine and ruin for civilian population and mutilation and death for the soldiers at the front. They destroyed the productive forces of society thus retarding progress. Aside from that, both the preparation for predatory war, and the war itself boosted reaction and gave the ruling classes more opportunity to step up their offensive against people's right and liberties and suppress their militant organizations.

On the other hand, wars, as Lenin wrote, engendered crises, shattering world-wide crises, economic, political, national, and international. Predatory wars aroused the wrath and indignation of peoples against the system breeding international strife and slaughter. This inevitably intensified the antagonistic tendencies in capitalist society and facilitated the materialization of revolutionary situations.

Communists have never lost sight of the mingled influence of wars on social processes. The working class and its Parties have always been the most consistent champions of peace and opponents of aggressive wars and militarism. Lenin wrote that "Socialists have always condemned wars

between nations as barbarous and brutal.”¹ It is indicative that the October Revolution was carried out under the banner of peace and that the civil war was unleashed by home and foreign counter-revolutionary forces, not by the Communists.

But, though Marxist-Leninists came out against unjust, predatory wars, they had to allow for the fact that the forces of peace were at that time not organized enough to pit themselves against the warmongers’ schemes.

Imperialist wars, which plunged various countries and the world at large into a state of crisis, objectively promoted the emergence of situation favourable for the development of proletarian and other movements and revolutions. Therefore they could be considered as a factor bringing the revolutionary crisis to a head.

Today, the problem of war and revolution is different. It is different first of all because there has emerged the real possibility of preventing war. The Communists spare no effort to realize this possibility. The working class does not propose to build a communist civilization on the ruins of world centres of culture, on the earth laid waste and contaminated by thermonuclear fallout.

It is quite evident that under the new alignment of forces a lasting peace is the major condition for extending the liberation movement. The main reason is that the imperialists have made their economy, policies and ideology more dependent on war and on war preparations than ever before. Militarization of the economy and

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 21, p. 299.

the arms drive have acquired unprecedented scope in the imperialist countries and affected the very structure of capitalist economy. Imperialist foreign policy is based on preparing for aggression, brinkmanship, and spreading the myth of the "communist threat." The home policy of imperialist powers is steeped in the spirit of war, and in this atmosphere the brass hats gain more control over imperialist governments and the reactionary forces intensify their activities all along the line.

When the imperialists manage to dupe the masses with the bogey of external danger and poison their minds with chauvinistic ideas, the class struggle often gets "throttled." It was so in fascist Germany and Italy where all progressive organizations were ruthlessly suppressed to the drum beats of revenge and militarism and the more conscious and active workers were imprisoned or tortured to death in concentration camps. Certainly that did not contribute to the strength of the proletariat or the intensity of its efforts.

The Chinese leaders, however, maintain that the idea of peaceful coexistence is hardly different from that of "class collaboration." They purposely misconstrue the concept developed by Lenin concerning relations between states (but not classes) and which by no means implies a reconciliation of differences between socialism and capitalism. Of course the differences remain and so does the class struggle, but in the present period it may express itself in peaceful economic and ideological competition instead of war.

The thesis of peaceful coexistence certainly does not apply to the relations between the anta-

gonistic classes of capitalist society. The class struggle and the struggle of the oppressed peoples against imperialism naturally stem from the capitalist system and they cannot cease. In a situation when social contradictions reach an especially high pitch, the class struggle and national-liberation movement may, and do, result in revolutionary wars. That such wars are just and legitimate is an axiom of Marxism. But this view does not rule out the principle of peaceful co-existence. Far from it.

But what is the attitude of Mao Tse-tung and his group? Overexaggeration of the role of armed force—its justification in effect—is the keynote of literally all Mao's statements concerning the forms and ways of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Here are a few illustrations.

“The central task of the revolution and its highest form is the seizure of power by armed force, i.e. solving the problem by war. This revolutionary principle of Marxism-Leninism is universally true; it is certainly true both for China and other states.”¹

“Any Communist must learn the truth that the ‘gun is the source of power’.” “All there is in Yunnan has been achieved with the help of the gun: with the help of the gun one can get anything and everything.” “Some people are ironic at our expense calling us partisans of the ‘Theory of the omnipotence of wars’. Yes, we are partisans of the theory of the omnipotence of wars. It is not bad, it is good. It is Marxist-like”. “The

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 2, p. 379 (Russ. Ed.).

gun is the only means of changing the world.”¹

War, Mao Tse-tung writes, is the bridge “mankind will cross to reach a new historical epoch which will know no wars.” “We would like to end all war, we want no war, but war can be abolished by war alone. If you would have a world without guns—take up a gun now.”²

Dealing with “the place of antagonism among other contradictions” in his work *Concerning Contradictions* he compares antagonism to a bomb, and the resolution of an antagonistic contradictions to the explosion of the bomb.

Hence the doctrine that compulsion by force of arms is the universal and the only possible means of the class struggle, both on an international and a national scale thereby equating revolution and civil war.

This attitude is contrary to the Lenin theory. Thus, Lenin held that peaceful development was “extremely rare and difficult, because revolution is the maximum exacerbation of the sharpest class contradictions.”³ But, like Marx, he recognized the possibility in principle of peaceful revolution. Moreover, when, in April-June 1917, there was a prospect of gaining power in a peaceful way, Lenin urged that they immediately avail themselves of the opportunity. He wrote that “. . . a peaceful development of the revolution is possible and probable if all power is transferred to the Soviets.”⁴ And only in answer to violence on the part of the bourgeoisie (the shooting of

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 2, p. 379. (Russ. Ed.).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 388, 455.

³ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 26, pp. 36-37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

a peaceful demonstration in July 1917) did the Bolsheviks put forward the slogan of armed uprising.

Lenin emphasized time and again that the proletariat should master all forms of struggle, both non-peaceful and peaceful. He wrote that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class "must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception," that it "must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another."¹ Now as before this principle essentially determines the Marxist-Leninist Parties' stand with respect to the working class gaining power. Any attempt to overlook the diversity of methods whereby the working class can attain power, to equate revolution with armed uprising and civil war, would mean a setback for the workers' movement. It has now become possible to achieve transition to socialism in a greater variety of ways, and also in a peaceful way, but not because the imperialist bourgeoisie is a whit different or more "compliant," as the revisionists would have us believe. Today the reactionary bourgeoisie may be confronted with such superior odds that it will be forced to capitulate to the revolutionary people. Therefore in this case, too, the process and outcome of the revolution depend on the actual balance of class forces.

The greater possibilities for the working class gaining power in a peaceful way do not rule out non-peaceful means of socialist revolution.

Communists do not hold that socialist revolution can only come about by peaceful means. History

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 96.

shows that in our time, too, the non-peaceful way, the use of armed force to achieve revolution is by no means excluded. Cuba may serve as an example. No Marxist Communist Party rejects in principle the possibility of the working class taking power in a non-peaceful way. The intensity and forms of the class struggle in that case will be determined not so much by the inclination of the proletariat but rather by the persistence and violence of the opposition put up by the reactionary forces at various stages of the struggle for socialism. Just how a country at a certain stage of development goes over to socialism depends on concrete historical conditions.

The more adept the working class and its party become at all forms of struggle, peaceful and non-peaceful alike, the more successful the outcome will be.

The distinguishing feature of the revolution in China was that the struggle against the oppressors' rule there chiefly took the form of war, predominantly a guerrilla peasant war. Concentration on war as the only method of revolution in China sprang from that country's specific internal and external conditions. Notwithstanding this, Mao Tse-tung is seeking to make it some sort of general line for the entire world communist movement to adopt. It goes without saying that the fraternal Parties do not support this idea which is at variance with conditions in many countries. In postwar years, the people of more than fifty countries have achieved independence, and each country went about it as it saw fit. How much better it will be to ponder over this fact instead of trying to produce "universal rules" and foist them on other Parties and countries.

SECTARIANISM AND SELF-ISOLATION

The Chinese Communist Party leaders are completely at sea when they presume to judge about the problems of the workers' movement in Western Europe and America. They do not make the slightest attempt to study the situation, so vastly different from the conditions of the Chinese revolution, nor do they have the slightest idea of the economic structure of the countries in those parts of the world or the contemporary working class, the struggle for working class unity and Communist Party tactics. In place of the serious attitude one would expect there are eloquent pronouncements, supercilious remarks about the West European Communist Parties, and narrow-minded dogmatism.

A standing example of this is a *Jenminjihpao* editorial printed some time ago and entitled *Further Comment on Comrade Togliatti's Controversy With Us*. Here is its version of the tactics of the Communist Party of Italy: "...Comrade Togliatti and some other comrades from the Italian Communist Party in fact not only seek to replace the class struggle by class collaboration on an international scale but also extend their concept of 'peaceful coexistence' to the relations between the oppressed and oppressor classes in capitalist countries."

"However, Comrade Togliatti and some other comrades from the Italian Communist Party believe that the analysis given by Lenin in his work *The State and Revolution* is no longer 'adequate,' that the meaning of proletarian dictatorship has changed. According to his theory of 'structural reforms' Italy today can 'gradual-

ly' and 'peacefully' become socialist without a proletarian revolution, without demolishing the bourgeois state machine or establishing proletarian dictatorship by merely effecting a series of 'reforms' within the framework of the Italian Constitution, nationalizing large enterprises, introducing economic planning and extending democracy. Actually they view the state as some kind of supraclass instrument and believe that the bourgeois state is also able to pursue a socialist policy; they view bourgeois democracy as supraclass democracy and believe that based on this democracy the working class can also rise to the position of a 'leading class' in the state. This so-called theory of 'structural reforms' is from beginning to end a deviation from the Marxist-Leninist teaching of proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship."

"...The theory of 'structural reforms' of P. Togliatti and some other leaders of the Italian Communist Party is based not on historical materialism and a scientific study of objective reality but on idealism and illusions. But they still actively preach what they themselves know to be unreliable and present it as the 'common line of the world communist movement.' By doing so they can only act as those who corrupt and weaken the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, protect capitalist domination and root out socialist revolution. What else is it if not a new social-democratic trend?"

And further:

"In recent years certain degenerate elements from some Communist Parties and Right-wingers from some social-democratic parties of capitalist countries have been proclaiming the so-called

theory of structural reforms and using it as a weapon against the Communist Parties. These facts alone are sufficient to prove how much the so-called theory of structural reforms savours of social-democratism and how far it is from Marxism-Leninism!"

"...The thesis of Comrade Togliatti and some other leaders of the Italian Communist Party on the so-called advance towards socialism in the atmosphere of peace and democracy is reminiscent of some statements of the old revisionist K. Kautsky."

As we see, *Jenminjihpao* goes at it hammer and tongs. But what grounds are there, if any, for this kind of interpretation of the activities of the Italian and other Communist Parties? Let us consider more closely some points of present-day tactics of the Communist Parties of advanced capitalist countries.

Lenin repudiated the notion that the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian revolution must be separated by an interval of many years, during which the working class gradually builds up its strength. Lenin proved that in the imperialist era no lengthy period of bourgeois domination following the bourgeois-democratic revolution was obligatory, that this revolution, too, could be headed by the working class, and the bourgeois-democratic revolution could then develop into a proletarian revolution. Lenin's theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into a proletarian revolution makes it possible to define correctly the relative importance and perspective of all democratic movements of our times. Our epoch is characterized by an upsurge of the democratic movement. The entire

climate of the present stage of the general crisis of capitalism favours its growth.

This is connected in the first place with the further intensification of the reactionary and aggressive character of imperialism. In the present situation, such invariable characteristics of imperialism as negation of representative democracy and predilection for strong-arm home and foreign policy have become intensified in the extreme. Especially important in this regard has been the change of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism. This process is characteristic of all advanced capitalist countries. Despite what the bourgeoisie hoped, state-monopoly capitalism has not only intensified traditional capitalist contradictions but has bred new irreconcilable antagonisms.

The natural consequence of this process is that the more powerful imperialist states seek to establish their world domination. Their expansionist aims are not limited to economically underdeveloped regions alone but include industrially developed bourgeois countries as well. The attempts of Hitler Germany to enthral Western Europe and other countries of the world, the efforts of the United States (in the postwar period) to make Japan, Italy and some other capitalist countries politically dependent on it are cases in point.

The concentration of wealth, power and privileges at one pole inevitably generates an opposing tendency at the other, activizing the movement of the broadest sections of the people for their rights, against the militarists and monopoly rule. Lenin said: "Capitalism in general, and imperialism in particular, turn democracy

into an illusion—though at the same time capitalism engenders democratic aspirations in the masses, creates democratic institutions, aggravates the antagonism between imperialism's denial of democracy and the mass striving for democracy.”¹ The interests not only of the workers and peasants but also of the middle strata in towns and villages, including the intelligentsia, are objectively concentrated at the anti-monopoly pole; even a part of the middle-class bourgeoisie are plainly dissatisfied with the monopolies' omnipotence.

The class struggle in bourgeois society, as we see, is growing in scope and intensity, permitting the emergence and development of broad democratic movements uniting different classes and strata. This includes the movement for universal peace, against the menace of nuclear war, the patriotic struggle for the preservation of national sovereignty, the movement in defence of democratic freedoms and institutes, against the onslaught of the forces of fascism and reaction. It also includes the moves to nationalize the property of capitalist monopolies; demands for agrarian reform and more rights for women and the youth; the humanist movement in defence of culture, and many other mass movements.

The fact that the development of capitalism in recent decades has given a sharper turn to democratic struggles does not, however, signify any deviation from the laws of the social process, as the Chinese leaders presume, nor does it imply a return to the past. Sufficient to com-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 24, 25.

pare the content of today's democratic tasks with the tasks that earlier bourgeois-democratic revolutions had to contend with. Today it is not a question of wiping out feudalism or a monarchy, or of clearing the way for capitalist development. The democratic changes for which the working class and broad popular masses are fighting now exceed the limits of bourgeois democracy. The point now is to restrict and subsequently abolish the stranglehold of the monopolies, the suppressors of democracy and national freedom, the instigators of nuclear slaughter.

The revolutionary workers' movement had to develop its tactics in line with the new tasks and new conditions. The need for this became apparent after the 1929-33 economic crisis, when the imperialist powers sharply veered towards reaction and militarism. It was then that the foundations were laid for the new tactics, which have acquired such significance today,—the tactics of the broad popular front of anti-fascist forces, approved by the 7th Congress of the Communist International. The new tactics allowed Communists in many countries to secure unity of action with Socialists and other anti-fascist forces. A Popular Front emerged in France; the Spanish people waged a stubborn struggle for three years against the joint forces of home counter-revolution and world reaction. It is not accidental that the memory of 1936 and the Popular Front struggles are being revived today. Indeed, it was thanks to the Popular Front that the working class and working people at large prevented fascism from gaining a foothold in France at that time; they managed to wring concessions from the bourgeoisie that the masses

enjoy to this day despite the reverses of subsequent years.

Since the present internal and world situation differs from what it was in the thirties, the West European Communist Parties do not raise the question of repeating the experience of the Popular Front. Today a wider alliance of anti-monopoly forces is needed, an alliance of the forces of democracy, social progress and peace. To ensure unity of action in the struggle against the reactionary forces, the Communist Parties of many countries have worked out a complete programme of democratic and social moves taking into account the interests of the working class, peasants, and the middle strata in town and countryside.

Popular-democratic revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries have demonstrated the great importance of democratic aims and movements in the contemporary epoch. These revolutions developed under anti-fascist democratic slogans (anti-feudal slogans were added where vestiges of feudalism still remained). Practice has also shown that given correct guidance by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist Parties democratic revolutions tend to grow into socialist revolutions at a comparatively rapid rate.

The experience of the countries of the Socialist Community has proved the viability and great promise of the policy of broad class unions at the time of a revolution. In popular-democratic revolutions the working class acted in union with the peasants, urban and rural middle strata, and in some countries in union with the national bourgeois middle class, as was the case in China,

for instance. In many fraternal countries no radical re-grouping of the class forces took place when the revolution passed from its first, democratic, phase into the second, socialist, phase; the overwhelming majority of the allies of the proletariat supported the socialist transformations.

In the postwar period, the Communist Parties of the European capitalist countries, representing an active coherent force, have enriched the tactics of democratic anti-monopoly struggle with new ideas and forms. The recent contributions to these tactics made by the communist movement are summarized in the decisions of the Rome Conference of Representatives of the Communist Parties of European Capitalist Countries held in November, 1959 and the 1965 and 1966 Brussels Conferences of Western European Communist Parties. The programme of anti-monopoly struggle approved at these conferences denotes a creative approach to the assessment of present-day conditions of working-class struggle, and the elaboration of effective tactical slogans and forms of this struggle.

The conferences called on all working peoples and democrats to fight to effectively restrict and subsequently do away with the power of monopolies. Communists believe that monopoly rule can be limited by nationalizing some sectors of industry that have been monopolized and democratizing the management of public sectors of the economy, developing the initiative and participation of the working peoples in all branches of the economy, exercising democratic control over capital investments in industry and agriculture, agrarian reform and protection of small

peasant property and other small to middling producers from monopoly stranglehold.

These measures by themselves do not abolish exploitation of man by man. But if carried out they would limit monopoly power, enhance the prestige and political influence of the working class, facilitate the isolation of reactionary groups and the organization of a bloc of progressives and all social strata victimized by the monopolies to continue the fight for their interests.

How could one define the nature of the demands which the West European Communist Parties are advancing? Certainly, they exceed the limits of ordinary reforms, comprising social transformations of a different type affecting the structure of capitalist society. And it is quite understandable that Communist Parties connect the implementation of demands of this kind with the formation of democratic governments based on a representative coalition of popular forces.

Nationalization of monopolized sectors of the economy and other democratic reforms are far from being the result of "supraclass" activities of the state. They are the outcome of the struggle of the workers' and popular movements against the monopolies and the bourgeois state, which does their bidding.

In substance, both the struggle for peace and democracy and the liberation struggle of the proletariat in present conditions have a common enemy—reactionary monopoly capital. It is the main barrier to lasting peace and democracy and to socialism. Thus the two kinds of struggle, each developing in its own way, have come closer together than before. From this it follows that in certain conditions the struggle for general de-

mocratic demands can objectively facilitate the transition to socialist revolution.

Such conclusions are the only ones to be deduced from the analysis of the prevailing situation in advanced capitalist countries. But here we behold the Chinese dogmatists, who ask: "Is it necessary to struggle for democratic changes? Wouldn't it be better to launch the socialist revolution at once? It would solve the problems of peace and the problems of democracy once and for all. Doesn't the struggle for democratic changes distract the working class from its revolutionary perspective?" They even say in Peking that the decisions of the Rome conference run counter to the Marxist theory of the class struggle since they do not call for direct revolutionary action and establishment of proletarian dictatorship.

It would not be amiss if such people were reminded of this statement by Lenin on combining the struggle for the immediate and final aims of the working class, for reforms and the revolution: "The greatest, perhaps the only danger to the genuine revolutionary is that of exaggerated revolutionism, ignoring the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are appropriate and can be successfully employed. True revolutionaries have mostly come a cropper when they began to write 'revolution' with a capital R, to elevate 'revolution' to something almost divine, to lose their heads, to lose the ability to reflect, weigh and ascertain in the coolest and most dispassionate manner at what moment, under what circumstances and in which sphere of action you must act in a revolutionary manner, and at what moment, under what circumstances and in which

sphere you must turn to reformist action.”¹

The Chinese sectarians assume it is enough to call on the masses to overthrow imperialism and they will immediately rush into the revolutionary struggle. Real life is, however, much more complex than that. It is impossible to rally the masses for a revolutionary fight by just appealing to them to overthrow monopoly rule. The main tactical principle of Leninism states that propaganda alone is not enough to make the millions respond to the call of the revolutionary party. As Lenin pointed out time and again, this requires political experience on the part of the masses. And, what experience could be more convincing than the experience gained in the struggle for the most pressing, vitally important demands of the present period—preservation and consolidation of universal peace, defence of the workers’ immediate interests, protection and extension of democratic rights and liberties? In other words, the solution of general democratic problems becomes the necessary condition of transition to socialism in advanced capitalist countries.

Such are some of the precepts of the Communist Parties of developed capitalist countries, who, in their practical activities, combine the struggle for democracy and the struggle for peace, for the immediate and the final aims of the workers’ movement. These demands, stemming from life itself, are far removed from the schemes and precepts the Maoists are trying to apply to the development of socialist revolution in capitalist countries. Unable to extricate themsel-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 33, p. 110.

ves from their confused notions about the present stage of imperialism and the tactics of the western communist parties, the Maoists turn again and again to the idea of war as the way to settle all social contradictions of contemporary society. This idea is, however, repudiated by all Communist and Workers' Parties which adhere to Marxist principles.

NATIONALISM

How did it happen that nationalism, which finds its ugliest expression in anti-Soviet outrages committed in Peking, has become such a prominent feature of the policy of the CPC leaders? Doubtless, it is greatly due to the fact that when the ideology of the Communist Party of China was shaping up it involved a struggle not only between petty bourgeois and proletarian socialism but also between internationalist and nationalist traditions. As for Mao Tse-tung, he represented the latter from the very outset.

Nationalism has been fostered in China for thousands of years, in a highly specific form. The idea was nurtured that China was the greatest world power in respect to population, significance and the level of culture. The Chinese called their country the Celestial Empire or Middle Kingdom. It was considered the centre of the world surrounded on all sides by nations with a less-developed culture. It is highly characteristic that, though dependent on the capitalist powers, the Chinese emperors invariably treated them as kings or tsars of barbarians.

The present policies of the Chinese leaders are also influenced to a great extent by the fact

that throughout its long history China lacked the experience of alliances with other countries. The emperors desired China to remain secluded, fenced off as much as possible from the rest of the world. All the surrounding states were considered either tributaries or foes.

It was not until the 19th century that Chinese progressives launched a struggle against its traditional seclusion, for utilizing the achievements of European civilization and Western theoretical thought. At first, however, it was limited to the sphere of scientific and technological developments. It was silently agreed that China had nothing to learn as far as ideology, morality and culture were concerned—it was a model for others, for China was “the sea which makes salty all the rivers running into it.”

The first departure from such notions came about after the Great October Socialist Revolution. The revolutionary forces of China, the Communists above all, began to view foreign experience—the experience of Soviet Russia in this case—as something they could benefit from. But at the same time from the first there were some marked tendencies in the Communist Party of China which denoted the influence of the old notions.

One must say that on the whole the nationalist sentiments among the Chinese people and Chinese Communists grew stronger in the period of anti-Japanese war. It enhanced national consciousness but at the same time, as is often the case, it encouraged nationalism too.

The rise of nationalism in China in recent decades is very much the handiwork of the capitalist West. Despite persistent efforts on the

part of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the bourgeois states have managed to keep China out of world politics. People's China has not been admitted to the UN to this day and very few capitalist states maintain relations with her. China is rarely invited to major international conferences.

Nevertheless we believe that the spread of nationalism in the party and in the country in recent years is to be attributed not so much to these external causes as to the inculcation of Maoist ideology, Mao's personal claims to a particular place in the world liberation movement. Just as the Chinese emperors considered themselves to be the only, the infallible "teachers" of their own and other peoples, the only "true exponents" of ancient creeds, so would Mao Tse-tung create an impression of himself as the only "orthodox" communist ideologist called upon to mastermind the revolutions in any country.

The CPC leaders began by aspiring to the leadership of the national-liberation movement. The theories that Asia, Africa and Latin America formed the "epicentre of world revolutionary storms" were to pave the way for theories that the centre of the revolutionary movement has "shifted" to Peking. Striving for hegemony in the national-liberation struggle Mao and his supporters were not above stooping to any means, even frankly racialist ones. For instance, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi told a leading member of the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party, Mr. Matsumura, that "East is East" and that "Asians will change world history."

On March 14, 1967 the Kenyan *East African Standard* carried a brief resume of *New Diplo-*

mats Will Bring the Great Chinese Proletarian Cultural Revolution to Africa, a brochure published by the Hsinhua News Agency in Hong-kong. The brochure includes speeches by Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung's wife, deputy head of the "cultural revolution" group under the CPC Central Committee and the premier of the State Council, Chou En-lai, at a meeting of Chinese diplomats in Africa.

According to Chiang Ching "1967 will be the year of great victories for revolutionary peoples, especially in Asia and Africa." Chairman Mao, she went on, has stated that it is necessary to organize a broad common front of these peoples in order to defeat reactionary imperialist and colonialist rule. Chinese diplomats, Chiang Ching declared, must do everything in their power to help African associations achieve this goal "under the glorious banner of the revolutionary principles of Mao Tse-tung."

But it is not just a question of subordinating the national-liberation movement to the interests of Peking. Mao and his aides are aspiring more and more to a particular role in the world communist and workers' movement. "The generalization of the historical tasks that the present epoch set before the proletariat and the revolution-led people had to be shouldered by Mao Tse-tung," the *Lishi Yanjiu* magazine wrote as far back as 1960. Today Mao Tse-tung is being lauded as the "only," the "infallible," the "greatest" theoretician of all revolutionary movements of the present times.

That Mao and his group seek to monopolize the ideological sphere is also clear from the fact that in the course of the "cultural revolu-

tion" it is asserted with increasing persistence that China is the country which provides a revolutionary pattern for the world, and therefore China is to lead mankind on the road to communism. And if it is indeed so, one need not wonder at the Maoists' bitter attacks against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries which refuse to be ordered about by China.

And, finally, the last question: What are we up against—a purely national, specifically Chinese development, or one which manifests itself, or may manifest itself in one form or another under different circumstances as well? One is inclined to believe the answer is as follows. We see in China very much that is specific, connected solely with the conditions of that country, with its traditions. At the same time there can also be observed such phenomena which, albeit in a different form, in one way or another have always accompanied the revolutionary movement throughout the world, and especially in retarded countries. Marx used to call them the "morbid shadow of socialism." And just as the shadow cast by an object is now accurate and now grotesque, so is petty bourgeois socialism now more and now less like genuine socialism.

Let us cite a few examples from the history of the workers' movement.

A hundred years ago Marx and Engels were preparing for the regular congress of the International to be convened on July 22, 1869, in Basle. It was just when the world communist movement had to contend for the first time with an attempt to destroy it from within, undertaken by the well-known Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin. He was the leader of the semi-anarchist,

semi-liberal "Alliance of Socialist Democracy" recently incorporated in the International. Regardless of the Charter of the International forbidding the existence of an independent international organization within its framework, Bakunin secretly preserved the Alliance as an underground organization hoping in this way to seize the leadership of the International and force his own programme on it. As is known, Bakunin's plans failed, his pretensions being denied by the Basle Congress.

There are several reasons why we should recall this fact. The first is that Bakunin's programme sounded more revolutionary than the programme of the International, which made criticism difficult. Marx wrote to Engels in that connection: "Bakunin thinks: if we approve his 'radical programme' he can make a big noise about this and compromise us, even if only just a little. If we declare ourselves against it we shall be denigrated as counter-revolutionaries."¹

Another peculiarity of Bakunin's programme was that he recognized none but armed, military methods and rejected the political struggle. From this it followed that the "social liquidation" of capitalism was to be carried out not by the working class but by the most discontented "explosive" part of society—the lumpen proletariat, *déclassé* elements of the social abyss, the intellectual Bohemians.

Another feature of this programme was its negativism. Bakunin knew what he wanted to destroy but gave little thought to what would

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels. *Sel. Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 219.

be created instead. And he wanted to destroy everything—industrial relations, the state, law, morality, culture, the family. . . Bakunin's views were rejected by the International, and subsequently he and his group were expelled from the International workingmen's Association. But they left their mark on history: anarchism has been revived in one form or another in different countries and at different times. In Russia, for instance, it found expression in the activities of socialist-revolutionaries and of people like Kropotkin.

Let us recall Spain in the period of the anti-fascist war of 1936-39. Then the anarchists were a very influential force and made a stand against the Communists, though formally they were their allies. They forced peasants into co-operatives, hastily nationalized industry, removed engineers, abolished money, shot clergymen, demolished churches. In a word, they acted in direct opposition to the socialist idea. Such "socialism" repelled people.

The Maoists, who pride themselves on the idea of militarized labour and all social life, had better learn some facts of history. Militarization of the Party, state and trade unions for adventurous aims is by no means new. Here is, for example, what Trotsky said at the 9th Congress of RCP (Bolsheviks): "The military sphere has a corresponding apparatus which is operated to force the men to do their duty. This must be so, in one shape or another, in the labour sphere as well. . ." Workers "should be transferred, assigned to jobs much in the same way as privates are. It is the groundwork of militarization of labour. . ." And this: ". . .It is clear that after we

have chased the wolf from the door at least, we shall be able to leap over a series of successive stages. ..." ¹ How very like the reasoning of the contemporary Peking admirers of "big leaps!"

Belief in force and leader worship were especially typical of "also-socialist" trends regardless of whether they were dubbed anarchism, Trotskyism or any other "ism." Their supporters set their hopes on force alone even when it came to purely economic matters. But absolute force requires absolute power; it needs a leader, a dictator invested with absolute authority. That is why personal ambition loomed so large in the views of Bakunin, Trotsky and other petty bourgeois ideologists. Engels wrote that Bakunin wished to make the proletarian movement serve his bloated ambition and egoistic ends, that people like him used the conquest of power by the working class as a pretext to establish their own autocracy.

Of course, we are far from drawing a direct analogy between what is happening in China and what took place in other countries in the past. But history reminds us that the workers' movement has previously come up against vindication of force, the cult of the individual, and frenzied crowds on the rampage. Today it has manifested itself in a new, and far more menacing form, with a vast country becoming the proving ground of lunatic ideas. This country's leaders are playing with such things as world war and the destinies of world socialism. In other

¹ *9th Congress of the RCP (Bolsheviks). March-April 1920. Records. Moscow, 1960, p. 98 (Russ. Ed.).*

words, it is now far more dangerous than before.

Probably one should not be too hasty to designate as socialism what is an important but still only a first step on the road to it—the abolition of private ownership. It has become clear that it is often easier to divest the old classes of their power and wealth than to establish genuinely new relations among people. It takes a colossal effort to achieve this in a backward country. Here it is easier to launch the socialist revolution but much more difficult to carry it through to victory, for the past and its many manifestations weigh heavily on that which emerges in the struggle.

Then what can we expect in the future? A sociologist might give the following answer: Normal processes will win out in China in the long run, for the trends engendered by the revolution and given palpable form—state ownership in the town and country—must sooner or later take the upper hand. If the revolutionary movement in various countries vigorously overcomes the petty bourgeois disease, why should the Chinese working class and its party not be able at some time in the future to find enough strength to throw off the burden of Maoism and return to genuine socialism?

For a political leader, naturally, this answer won't do. He is interested not only in what will happen ultimately, that is, at some time in the future, but also in what may happen today, tomorrow or the day after. We do not undertake to answer this. However, it is clear that the world revolutionary forces can influence the situation in China in two ways: firstly, by the example of a

genuine socialist policy truly benefiting the peoples and the entire cause of world socialism; secondly, by relying on the support of public opinion. With all that, one must be fully aware of the harm that can come from the ideology and policy of Mao Tse-tung and his group who are seeking to sap the very foundations of international revolutionary brotherhood.

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