


**THE  
SOVIET  
UNION  
AND CHINA**

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BORIS KOLOSKOV

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THE SOVIET UNION  
AND  
CHINA:  
FRIENDSHIP OR ALIENATION?

NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY PUBLISHING HOUSE  
MOSCOW, 1971

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## IN LIEU OF PREFACE

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In February 1952, the Peking magazine *People's China* reported that in the previous year, 1951, nearly 20,000 friendly letters were sent from the Chinese People's Republic to the Soviet Union. Written by workers, peasants, servicemen and students, either collectively or individually, "these letters," the magazine wrote, "express the friendly feelings that the Chinese people have for the Soviet people."

Since then almost twenty years have gone by—a space that can be divided into two distinct periods: before and after 1960. Marked by the development and consolidation of Sino-Soviet friendship and cooperation, the first period witnessed the rapid growth of China's economy and culture, the strengthening of its position in the world, its growing authority and influence. The second period, during which Soviet-Chinese relations increasingly deteriorated through the fault of the Peking leaders, is characterised by a sharp intensification of the difficulties facing China, the catastrophic disorganisation of its national economy, the decline of culture, the lowering of living standards of its working population, and China's growing isolation on the international scene.

There is an obvious connection between the state of Soviet-Chinese relations, and China's internal situation and international standing. The fact is that the Soviet Union has always been a faithful friend of the Chinese people giving them all-round assistance in the carrying out of their most important tasks.

The Soviet Union's contribution to the national-liberation and revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, and its role in building up the new People's China are recorded in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations as brilliant examples of genuine friendship and solidarity. They should not be minimized or forgotten. They are inseparable from China's own history beginning from the new era ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution.

## CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR VICTORY

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The founding of the Chinese People's Republic came as a result of the heroic Chinese liberation and revolutionary struggle. Prolonged and grim, this struggle was full of outstanding feats which testified to the inflexible will of the Chinese people to win freedom and independence, and to their courage and perseverance.

Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the efforts of the Chinese people to achieve national liberation and social emancipation would have been vain for a long time to come had they not been able to rely on strong international support.

The chief international factor in favour of the Chinese liberation and revolutionary struggle, which culminated in the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, was the support given by the Land of Soviets immediately after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The Soviet Union played a special role in liberating China from the colonial domination of Japanese imperialism, and this became the decisive factor for the victory of the Chinese revolution. In his article of June 30, 1949, Mao Tse-tung acknowledged: "If the Soviet Union did not exist, if there had been no victory over

fascism in the Second World War, if Japanese imperialism had not been defeated... Could we have won victory under such circumstances? Obviously not.”<sup>1</sup>

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese aggressors seized Shenyang (Mukden)—the largest town in North-East China (Manchuria)—and began to occupy the whole of Manchuria. In March, 1932, they proclaimed the establishment of the puppet Manchukuo Government, which became the springboard for realising their plans to subdue the whole of China. For 14 years the Chinese people waged a fierce struggle to liberate themselves from the foreign invaders—a struggle that entailed enormous sacrifices and sufferings.

Without the slightest hesitation or delay, the Soviet Union expressed its support for the Chinese people against Japanese aggression. On September 24, 1931, a few days after the beginning of the Japanese attack on North-East China, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs announced that “the Soviet Union fully sides with China both from the standpoint of justice and morally, and is willing to give whatever help is needed.”<sup>2</sup>

In an effort to promote cooperation with China, with the aim of helping it to repel Japanese aggression, the Soviet Government made strenuous efforts to re-establish the diplomatic relations with China which had been severed in 1929 by the Kuomintang Government. In this connection, fifty leading Chinese progressives, headed by the

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<sup>1</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Peking, 1953, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Peng Ming, *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Socio-Economic Literature Publishers, M., 1959, p. 186.



prominent writer Lu Hsin, sent the following telegram to the Soviet Government: "The Soviet Union is the only sincere friend of the oppressed nations."<sup>1</sup> The meeting called by the All-China Association for the Salvation of the Country on December 17, 1932, in Shanghai sent to the Soviet Government this message: "China and Russia are two states which share their joy and their grief. Peace in South-East Asia can be ensured only through their alliance and joint efforts."<sup>2</sup>

From 1931 to 1937, the Soviet Government made diplomatic efforts to halt Japanese aggression in the Far East, and tried to curb the predatory aspirations of Japanese militarism in China by collective effort and also bilateral Soviet-Chinese action. In June, 1937, the Soviet Government proposed the conclusion of a regional pact on mutual assistance between China, the USSR, Japan, Britain and France. If the other powers rejected the pact, the Soviet Union was ready to sign a bilateral Soviet-Chinese agreement on mutual assistance. Unfortunately, these proposals failed to materialise because of the disapproval of foreign powers and the Kuomintang Government, which thereby showed its disregard for the national interests of its country.

On July 7, 1937, less than a month after the rejection of the Soviet proposals on the protection of China's security, the Japanese aggressors started their campaign for the conquest of the whole of China by attacking the Lukuowuchiao Bridge, situated eleven kilometres from Peking.

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<sup>1</sup> Peng Ming, *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Socio-Economic Literature Publishers, M., 1959, p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.

From that time Soviet assistance to the Chinese liberation struggle became more extensive and more effective. A month after the launching of the Japanese offensive, the Soviet Government offered China credits for large quantities of Soviet arms which were delivered to China long before the official agreement was drawn up. From March, 1938, to July, 1939, the Soviet Union and China signed three agreements on credits totalling \$250 million.<sup>1</sup> For comparison it may be noted that China received her first credits from the Western states almost two years after the beginning of the Japanese offensive. By the beginning of 1941, US credits amounted to \$120 million—less than 50 per cent of those received from the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

The purchase of Soviet arms with Soviet credits helped in a large measure to equip China's National Liberation Army. The first credit, valued at \$50 million, provided more than 20 divisions with Soviet weapons. In the first period of the anti-Japanese war alone Soviet deliveries to China included 885 fighter planes (at the beginning of the war China had, according to various sources, from 150 to 450 air force planes, but they were almost all destroyed in the earliest confrontations), 82 tanks, 700 trucks, 690 guns, 3,900 light and mounted machine guns, and large quantities of ammunition.

A valuable contribution to the Chinese struggle against the Japanese invaders was made by

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<sup>1</sup> Peng Ming, *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Socio-Economic Literature Publishers, M., 1959, p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Nauka Publishers, M., 1968, p. 100.

the Soviet men who fought in the Chinese army. By mid-February, 1939, China had 3,665 Soviet advisers, instructors, volunteer military and civilian pilots, technicians and drivers.

A glorious page in the history of international friendship was written by the Soviet volunteer pilots who displayed considerable skill and heroism. More than 200 of them gave their lives for the freedom and independence of the Chinese people.

Various political leaders in China highly valued the Soviet assistance during the anti-Japanese war waged by the Chinese people. On May 5, 1938, the head of the Chinese Nationalist Government, Chiang Kai-shek, sent the following telegram to the Soviet Government: "Thanks to your extensive aid, China has been able to hold out till the present time in the war with Japan. The enemy is suffering considerable losses. Not only I personally, but also all the commanders, soldiers and the people at large, are extremely grateful to your country for your assistance and support to the weak." <sup>1</sup>

The Communist Party of China has repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet Union's attitude to the Chinese liberation struggle against the Japanese invaders is a manifestation of genuine proletarian internationalism. In December, 1949, Mao Tse-tung said: "At the beginning of the war none of the imperialist powers gave us any real assistance. The Soviet Union alone helped us with huge manpower, material and financial resources." <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Nauka Publishers, M., 1968, p. 110-111.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

The Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan on August 9, 1945, predetermined Japan's defeat and its expulsion from China. The Soviet Army routed the picked Kwangtung troops, which made up the main military force of Japanese imperialism. By August 9, 1945, the Kwangtung Army totalled 443,308 men, 1,155 tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 1,800 planes. In addition, the Japanese Military Command had control over the troops of the local puppet governments—the Manchukuo Army, the Inner Mongolian Army and the Suiyuan Group.<sup>1</sup>

“The Soviet Union's entry into the war,” writes the celebrated Chinese historian Peng Ming, “was crucial in the rout of Japanese fascism. Before that the Anglo-American troops had been in action for more than three years in the Pacific Ocean, but they had failed to deal Japan the decisive blow. At the time the Japanese ground forces totalled over four million (Japan could mobilise a maximum of 10 million).

“Relying on these forces, Japan hoped to continue its persistent resistance in North-East China and in Korea even if it failed to hold its own territory. That is why, a month after the capitulation of German fascism, on June 8, the Imperial Council officially endorsed the military plan according to which the war was to be carried on to the end.”<sup>2</sup>

These conclusions are confirmed by competent American generals. General Claire Lee Chennault,

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<sup>1</sup> *History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, p. 548.

<sup>2</sup> Peng Ming, *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Socio-Economic Literature Publishers, M., 1959, pp. 229-230.

who commanded the US Naval Forces in China at the time, told a *New York Times* correspondent that the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan was a decisive factor in bringing about the end of the war in the Pacific Ocean even without the use of the atomic bomb. He said that the swift blow the Red Army dealt to Japan completed the encirclement that brought Japan to its knees.<sup>1</sup>

The decisive effect of the Soviet action is acknowledged by the Japanese themselves. On August 9, 1945, the day when the Soviet Union started military action against Japan, Prime Minister Suzuki told the High Military Council: "The Soviet Union's entry into the war this morning definitely puts us in a dilemma and makes further continuation of the war impossible."<sup>2</sup> Five years later, on August 9, 1950, the Japanese newspaper *Jiji Shimpo* wrote: "After the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan's military forces still continued to offer resistance, whereas the Soviet Union's entry forced them to capitulate."<sup>3</sup>

The utter defeat of the Kwangtung Army by the Soviet Armed Forces brought freedom to a vast area of China (1,100,000 square kilometres), which accounted for more than 20 per cent of the country's total industrial output. The Communist-led National Liberation Army set up headquarters here. It was able to reform and re-equip itself with the weapons the Soviet troops had captured

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<sup>1</sup> *History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, p. 594.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 584.

<sup>3</sup> Peng Ming, *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Socio-Economic Literature Publishers, M., 1959, p. 232.

from the Japanese. All the arms of the Kwangtung Army were handed to the Chinese Communists.

The Soviet Union was largely responsible for promoting economic rehabilitation in the districts where people's power had been established after Manchuria's liberation from the occupying Japanese forces. Within the period from 1947 to 1949 Soviet exports to these districts were more than 220 million roubles worth.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet deliveries provided for the urgent needs of not only the local population, but also for those of the National Liberation Army, which had entered the decisive phase of struggle against the reactionary Kuomintang rule.

The Soviet Union assisted Manchuria in the large-scale restoration of the railway lines ruined by the retreating Kuomintang troops. At the request of the popular democratic administration in the liberated areas, in June, 1948, a group of Soviet railway engineers came to Harbin with the necessary equipment, including break-down trains, diving implement and cranes. The Soviet Union also supplied all the material required for restoring railway lines. By December 15, 1948, Soviet specialists had completely restored the railways in North-East China, including 120 bridges, 150 kilometres of railway track and all the auxiliary and maintenance facilities. This made it possible for the economic development of the liberated areas to proceed. The restoration of Manchuria's railway network was vitally important for organising the offensive of the Na-

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<sup>1</sup> Peng Ming. *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Socio-Economic Literature Publishers, M., 1959. p. 133.

tional Liberation Army to the South.

Relying on their Manchurian base, China's revolutionary forces scored one victory after another, driving the Kuomintang regime to the wall. Throughout this difficult time, which led to the formation of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949, the people were always aware of the constant assistance and support of the Soviet Union.

The Communist Party, which led the working people's struggle to establish the new China, attached paramount importance to Soviet assistance in achieving this glorious aim. In March, 1949, the seventh assembly of the Second Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee pointed out: "As a result of the victorious popular revolution and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, owing to the leading role of the Communist Party and to the assistance rendered by the proletariat in all countries of the world, especially the Soviet Union, China's rate of economic development will not be slow, (it may even be rapid) and prosperity will soon be achieved."<sup>1</sup>

## "GOING HAND IN HAND WITH THE SOVIET UNION"

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On October 5, 1949, four days after the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic, 2,500 delegates and representatives of public organisations came from all parts

<sup>1</sup> Peng Ming, *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Socio-Economic Literature Publishers, M., 1959, p. 259.

of China to Peking to attend the Constituent Assembly devoted to the founding of a nation-wide organisation—the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society. This showed the aspirations of various sections of Chinese society to link the fate of the new China with the development and consolidation of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. It also reflected the deep faith of the Chinese people in Soviet assistance and support in dealing with the immense tasks facing the young republic. Expressing these feelings, the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for founding the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, widow of the great Chinese revolutionary, Doctor Sun Yat-sen, declared in her opening speech made at the Assembly: “We must remember the behest of Sun Yat-sen: ‘Go hand in hand with the Soviet Union.’ We treasure our friendship with the Soviet Union which has always been our most reliable and selfless friend.”<sup>1</sup>

By its deeds the Land of Soviets proved its determination to work vigorously in order to consolidate the achievements of the Chinese liberation and revolutionary struggle and to facilitate the construction of the new China.

The Soviet Union was the first state to announce its recognition of the new People’s China immediately after the latter’s formation on October 2, 1949, and to establish diplomatic relations with it. Welcoming these steps, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented: “The Chinese Government and the Chinese people are infinitely happy that today the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> *Ten Years of the Chinese People’s Republic*, International Relations Publishers, M., 1954, p. 207.



Union has become the first friendly power to recognise the Chinese People's Republic." <sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union considered it highly important to place Soviet-Chinese relations on a firm basis governed by international law. This was the object of the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed by the USSR and China on February 14, 1950. Embodying the highest principles of full equality, respect for national sovereignty, the treaty was an example of the new type of inter-state relations characteristic of the socialist countries. In a telegram of greeting sent on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing ceremony, Mao Tse-tung remarked: "The Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between China and the USSR not only renders tremendous help in building up the new China, but also provides a reliable guarantee against aggression and for the safeguarding of peace and security in the Far East and in the rest of the world." <sup>2</sup>

The treaty played an important part in consolidating the position of the Chinese People's Republic on the international scene: for many years it failed to gain world recognition. After the Soviet Union, other socialist countries established diplomatic relations with China. Still its recognition by the non-socialist states was delayed for many years. By 1954, only six countries in Asia had officially announced their recognition of China: India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon and Afghanistan. None of the Latin-American states,

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<sup>1</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, October 3, 1949.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, February 14, 1951.

except socialist Cuba, has recognised China up to the present time. It was only in the mid-60s that China's relations with the African countries began to develop. In the course of 1950, some West European states (Britain, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands) established diplomatic relations with People's China, but this did not lead to the development of friendly contacts between these countries and China, nor did they assume positions favourable to Peking. The United States has pursued an undisguisedly hostile policy (political and economic boycott) towards the Chinese People's Republic since its inception.

In this situation the Soviet Union resolutely upheld the interests of the Chinese People's Republic in the international arena, worked persistently to establish its legitimate rights at the UN, came out in its defence at international conferences, constantly expounded the essence and significance of its revolutionary transformations, and laid bare the attempts to slander the Chinese people and isolate them from the world progressive forces.

Soviet support of People's China in the most complex and difficult period of its formation was not confined to diplomatic and political measures. It included effective actions to protect the security of the young republic. This support played an important role in foiling the USA's attempts to hamper, by military means, the consolidation of the popular government in China, to turn back the course of events and to impose Chiang Kai-shek domination on the Chinese people once again.

At the request of the Chinese Government,

in 1949 and 1950, large Soviet air formations shielded Shanghai, the key industrial centre of East China, from American air raids. In 1950, again at the request of the Chinese Government, the USSR sent to Manchuria picked air divisions which reliably protected North-East China, its industrial centres and urban population from air raids.

The Soviet-Chinese Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and the Soviet Union's consistent fulfilment of its obligations as China's ally, frustrated the enemy's designs against the new China during the Korean war. In his memoirs the then US President Truman said on this point that had they decided to extend the war in Korea to China, they could have expected retribution. Peking and Moscow were allies both ideologically and by treaty. If the Americans had begun an offensive against communist China, they could have expected Russian interference.<sup>1</sup>

## THROUGH YEARS OF DEVASTATION AND ECONOMIC CHAOS

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The popular government in China inherited an extremely backward economy from the past. Prior to 1949, the highest annual output of electric power was 5,955 million kilowatt-hours, of coal—61 million tons, raw oil—320,000 tons, of pig iron—1.8 million tons, of steel—923,000 tons, of cement—2.2 million tons, and of cotton fabrics—45,000 pieces. In 1933, China's production of steel was only 1/28 the amount produced

<sup>1</sup> *Ten Years of the Chinese People's Republic*, p. 146.

in India, of spindles half the figure, and of weaving looms one-fifth the figure registered in India. China had to import 95 per cent of the steel, 76 per cent of the machinery, 99.8 per cent of the oil, 60 per cent of the sugar and 21 per cent of the textiles it needed.<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding its huge population, in 1942 China's share in the world's production of iron was two per cent, of steel—0.6 per cent, of coal—4.5 per cent and of copper—0.4 per cent. China did not have motor-car, aircraft and machine-tool industries at all; nor did it produce heavy equipment for mining, metallurgy and power engineering. This predominantly agricultural country did not have a single modern enterprise for the production of mineral fertilizers. And it was the same with light industry. Before the Second World War, China held ninth place in the world in the number of spindles for the cotton industry, its most developed branch.<sup>2</sup>

The backward economy was catastrophically ruined and disorganised by decades of war. In 1949, China produced 30 million tons of coal, 246,000 tons of iron, 158,000 tons of steel, 4,380 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, and 30,000 pieces of cotton fabrics.<sup>3</sup>

The country's agriculture was in a terrible plight. The harvest of food crops was only three-quarters of the pre-war figure and that of cotton had dwindled to half the amount.

The people lived in dire poverty. By November 1, 1949, the price of Manchurian millet in Peking was 15 times more than it had been on

<sup>1</sup> Chao Yi-wen, *The New China's Industry*, M., 1959, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> *Ten Years of the Chinese People's Republic*, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

April 1, 1949, and the price of rice had increased by more than 13 times in the same period. In November, the prices of foodstuffs again more than trebled, and those of industrial goods increased between two and three times. The budget adopted by the Central People's Government for 1950 had a deficit of 18.9 per cent of the total expenditure.

The situation became worse in 1951, when the capitalist countries put an embargo on trade with China. As early as December, 1949, the NATO countries and Japan had set up a Coordination Committee (COCOM) designed to exercise control and to keep under observation the export of "strategic" goods to the socialist states, including the Chinese People's Republic. In September, 1952, COCOM grew into the "Chinese Committee" (CHINCOM), with Australia, the Latin-American and some other countries as new members. The Committee periodically published a list of "strategic" goods prohibited for export to China. These measures prevented China from purchasing the materials, machinery and equipment it needed on the capitalist market, and buying through intermediaries involved additional expenditure of its small foreign exchange reserve.

Under these circumstances, Soviet assistance played a decisive role in rehabilitating and stabilising China's economy and facilitating its successful development.

The foundations for Soviet-Chinese economic and cultural cooperation were laid by the agreement of February 14, 1950. It legally consolidated the development of relations between the two countries on the principles of equality, mutual advantage, respect for state sovereignty, territorial

integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs.

At the same time the Agreement on the Chinese Changchung Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen, and the Agreement on granting Soviet credits to China were concluded. The Soviet Government then sent its Chinese counterpart a special note informing it that the property appropriated by Soviet economic organisations from Japanese owners in Manchuria and all the buildings of the former Russian cantonment in Peking would be handed over to China without compensation.

The above-mentioned agreement on railways stated that not later than the end of 1952 the Soviet Government would transfer to China, without compensation, all its rights to the joint management of the Chinese Changchung Railway and all the railway facilities. Before the same date the Soviet Union was to withdraw its troops from the jointly used naval base of Port Arthur and hand over all the installations of the base to the Chinese Government. With regard to Port Dairen, the Soviet Government agreed to hand over to China, in the course of 1950, all property being temporarily used or leased by the Soviet Union on terms to be drawn up within three months from the date the agreement came into force. This arrangement was carried out within the time limit.

Under the credit agreement, the Soviet Union granted China \$300 million or 1,200 million roubles<sup>1</sup>—the biggest loan China had ever re-

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<sup>1</sup> The Agreement made no mention of the sum in roubles. Recalculation into roubles was made later, after the establishment on March 1, 1950, of the new exchange rate of the rouble (\$1=4 roubles).

ceived from a foreign government. The Soviet deliveries to China were for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the key branches of the national economy. Within a period of five years (1950-54), the Soviet Union was to send China deliveries, to the value of the whole loan, of equipment and materials for power stations, metallurgical and machine-building plants, coal mines, railway and motor transport, and other branches of the economy.

In view of the immense damages caused to the Chinese economy by prolonged military actions on Chinese territory, the Soviet credit was granted on terms exceptionally advantageous to China: one per cent interest per annum—the lowest interest rate the world had ever known. The debt was to be paid by means of deliveries of Chinese raw materials, tea and other goods sent in equal annual portions over a period of 10 years.

Under one of the agreements of February 14, 1950, the Soviet Union undertook to help China build 50 large industrial enterprises. This was the beginning of direct Soviet participation in developing a modern industry for China.

The trade agreement signed in Moscow on April 19, 1950, determined the main legal bases of trade relations between the two countries. Under this agreement the USSR was to provide China with petrol, paraffin and lubricant, various machines, tools and equipment, means of transport, cotton, raw materials, fuel and other things indispensable for economic rehabilitation and development. From then on the two governments drew up protocols every year to determine the annual volume of mutual deliveries. During the three years of the rehabilitation period (1950-52),

Soviet-Chinese trade turnover increased by 70 per cent in terms of value.<sup>1</sup> In 1952, the Soviet Union accounted for more than 53.4 per cent of China's overall foreign trade turnover.<sup>2</sup>

From the outset Soviet-Chinese trade was built up on a plan basis: deliveries were made under long-term agreements at stable, long-standing world prices, free from sporadic fluctuations. Arrangements were made so that each partner would be able to carry out all the operations involved in the manufacture of goods (production processes, transportation, financial accounting) on his own territory. In this way, the entire Soviet-Chinese trade was done at common wholesale prices, the goods were shipped by national transport, the high-quality processing of goods complied with the government standards and conditions established by each of the parties, and all financial accounting was carried on through the USSR State Bank on the Soviet side, and through the National Bank of China on the Chinese side. Apart from the great political importance of the equitable terms of Soviet-Chinese trade, these terms gave substantial financial advantages to both countries.

In 1950, a number of other agreements were concluded between the USSR and China, including those on postal, telegraph and telephone communication, on showing Soviet films in China, and the agreement and regulations for navigation in rivers bordering the two countries.

Speaking about the importance of the agreements signed by the two countries in that period,

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<sup>1</sup> *Ten Years of the Chinese People's Republic*, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> Sladkovsky, *Articles on China's Foreign Economic Relations*, Vneshtorgizdat Publishers, M., 1953, p. 279.



Mao Tse-tung said at a government conference held in April, 1950: "The new Sino-Soviet treaties and agreements have legally consolidated the friendship between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union and have given us a reliable ally. They have facilitated the work of our internal construction, and at the same time have prepared the way for joint counteraction against imperialist aggression, in the name of preserving world peace."<sup>1</sup>

Under the agreement of February 14, 1950, and subsequent ones, there was a massive flow of Soviet goods indispensable for economic rehabilitation and development into China. The overall value of the Soviet-made equipment, machinery and other goods delivered to China between 1950 and 1952 exceeded 5,680 million roubles.<sup>2</sup>

In October, 1952, the General Secretary of the Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, Chi Chao-ting, wrote: "The goods delivered by the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy are of first-rate quality; their prices are very moderate... The imports from the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy quite adequately meet our requirements for economic reorganisation.

"Most of our surplus agricultural and artisan products, including some which were formerly not in great demand abroad, have likewise found a good market in the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. Our trade with these friendly states is based on the principle of equality

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<sup>1</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, April 13, 1950.

<sup>2</sup> *Ten Years of the Chinese People's Republic*, p. 173.

and mutual benefit, and we are in a position to supply one another with the required goods.

“These facts show that those who hoped to create difficulties for us by means of political blockade and embargo have grossly miscalculated.”<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet deliveries of industrial equipment, including complete sets of plant, used in building more than 50 large industrial enterprises, were of special importance for Chinese economy. Some of the enterprises built in this way were the Anshan iron and steel works, the Fengman hydro-power station, and the thermal power stations in Penhsihu, Taiyüan, Chungking, Siang and Changchow. The Soviet-equipped textile mill in Harbin, the country's largest one to date, the 25,000-kilowatt thermal power station in Fusin and the motor-repair plant in Urumchi went into service in 1952. Six other motor-repair plants which got going late in 1951 have reached the designed capacity. Thanks to Soviet assistance, in 1952, China's power production showed an increase of 200 per cent over the 1949 figure.<sup>2</sup>

The delivery of complete sets of plant was accompanied by assistance in research and designing work, in commissioning the enterprises, developing the production of new types of industrial goods, and in assembling and adjusting the equipment. Further, and this was a matter of considerable importance, the Soviet machinery and industrial equipment, according to the estimates of the Chinese economist Li Ching-yun,

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<sup>1</sup> *People's China*, 1952, No. 19, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Sladkovsky, *Articles on China's Foreign Economic Relations*, Vneshtorgizdat Publishers, M., 1953, p. 278.

were at least 20 per cent cheaper than those of the capitalist countries.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet exports of ferrous metals and oil products to China were of great importance to the Chinese economy during the rehabilitation period. In the course of three years Soviet deliveries of ferrous metals reached 943,000 tons, including 722,000 tons of rolled metal and 117,000 tons of iron pipes. This was approximately 40 per cent of China's total output of ferrous metals within the same period.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet exports of oil products to China over 1950-52, exceeded 1.5 million tons (China's biggest oil output before it became a people's republic was 320,000 tons, the figure for 1943). This included 506,000 tons of petrol, 477,000 tons of paraffin, 160,000 tons of diesel fuel and 154,000 tons of lubricants.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet Union endeavoured to help the young republic develop the production of the goods it needed. For example, in 1952, when the Chinese Government decided to start the production of natural rubber, the Soviet Union gave it a loan of 8.55 million roubles to finance the development of rubber plantations on the Island of Hainan and in the coastal regions of South-East China.

Thanks to Soviet assistance, the development of China's national economy proceeded on a plan basis. With the help of Soviet advisers, in the course of 1951, the Chinese Government passed a number of decisions which paved the way for the improvement of central and local planning

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<sup>1</sup> *People's China*, Nos. 7-8, Vol. 3, 1951, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

and intensified planned work. These decisions laid the basis for the drawing up in July, 1951, of the first unified annual state plan for economic reconstruction and development, and marked the beginning of systematic, planned work in the provinces.

In the autumn of 1952, China began to revise all its educational programmes and curriculums to make them correspond to Soviet ones, and enormous work was undertaken to translate textbooks used in Soviet higher educational establishments into Chinese. In 1952, the agricultural institute in North-East China translated Soviet curriculums for 141 subjects into Chinese and sent them to all agricultural institutes in the country. This work extended beyond those higher institutions which taught the natural sciences or technical subjects. In 1958, Peking's Chinghua University taught more than 60 per cent of the subjects according to the curriculums of Soviet universities, and more than 66 per cent of the educational materials used by the North-East People's University and North-East Pedagogical Institute were borrowed from the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

Cooperation with the Soviet Union and its effective assistance and support were important factors in the consolidation and growth of the socialist sector of China's economy, its industry above all. In 1951, the state had a share of 80 per cent in the heavy industry, 100 per cent in the oil, 98 per cent in the iron, 76 per cent in the power, 72.5 per cent in the coal, 82 per cent in the machine-building (judging by the number

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<sup>1</sup> *People's China*, No. 7, 1953.

of employees), about 33 per cent in light industry and 70 per cent in the cotton industry.

Utilising the experience of the USSR, Chinese industry gradually perfected its organisation of production, introduced new techniques and developed new types of machinery and equipment. Industrial and mining enterprises effectively applied Soviet production methods—high-speed metal cutting, high-speed smelting of steel, fast inspection and repair of equipment, and others. All that led to higher labour productivity and the discovery of hidden resources in the enterprises. As a result of employing the method of high-speed metal cutting, the productivity of metal-working machine-tools increased by an average of 4-5 times, and in some cases by even 30 times.

The introduction of advanced Soviet methods led to great achievements in the field of capital construction too. Here are but a few examples dating back to 1950-52. One of the teams working in the mines run by the Fusin Mining Industry Board almost tripled labour productivity by using Soviet methods of drilling. The application of Soviet experience in making vertical shafts in the Sian coal mine reduced the planned period by half, saved one million man-days and cut the cost of work by 40 per cent. Following Soviet methods enabled the Anshan iron and steel works to carry on large-scale construction work in winter conditions, and this accelerated the rate of construction considerably. Studying Soviet experience promoted the speedy development of communication and transport.

Under the slogan of "Learn from the Soviet Union," extensive popularisation of Soviet ex-

perience was organised in various fields of economic and cultural construction. This was manifested in, among other things, the mass movement to study the Russian language that started in the early years after liberation. Within two years of the existence of the popular government in China, 12 Russian language institutes, with 5,000 students, were opened. In addition, 57 higher educational establishments had Russian language departments and courses in 1952; the Russian language was taught in all secondary schools in North-East China and in 59 schools in Peking and other cities.

Addressing the 4th session of the Standing Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council, Mao Tse-tung mentioned the following as one of the three major, or "historic" as the Chinese press called them, tasks: "...it is necessary to learn from the Soviet Union. We have to carry out vast state construction—a difficult job for which our experience is insufficient. That is why we must make a thorough study of the advanced methods of the Soviet Union. Everyone must make it his duty to learn from the Soviet Union: Party members and non-Party people, old and young personnel, technicians and intellectuals, workers and peasants." <sup>1</sup>

A tremendous part in the rehabilitation of the Chinese economy was played by the Soviet specialists, who worked tirelessly in the various spheres of economic and cultural construction from the time of the birth of the new China. They numbered nearly 1,000 in 1952.

Deputy Chairman of the Central People's

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<sup>1</sup> *People's China*, No. 4, 1953.

Government of China Sung Ching-ming remarked: "The Soviet specialists have brought to China precious experience in solving practical problems of any magnitude. They have brought with them methods based on the latest scientific achievements, the rich experience of work for the benefit of the people. Many of them participated in the rehabilitation of national economy after the October Socialist Revolution. All of them have been involved in the heroic construction of socialism and communism in the USSR. The conditions prevailing in China and the obstacles we have to surmount are already familiar to them and have been overcome by them at the time. They are extremely enthusiastic over the task assigned to them: to help the Chinese people to assimilate this experience for building up the new China."

Soviet specialists and advisers participated in research and design work, and in the construction, assembly and commissioning of enterprises built according to Soviet projects and fitted out with Soviet equipment. They also worked as instructors so as to help the local engineering personnel to build and operate enterprises constructed by Chinese organisations according to their own projects. A large number of Soviet experts participated in drawing up and implementing hydrotechnical projects on China's biggest rivers, and in reconstructing the railways.

Soviet specialists were involved in the reorganisation of China's higher educational and judicial systems, in the establishment of new ministries, state planning bodies and so on. For the first three years they helped to publish in the Chinese language 3,131 Soviet books, including

943 on the social sciences and 348 on culture and education.<sup>1</sup>

Addressing a meeting dedicated to the third anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and China, Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Po Yi-po said: "The assistance which the Soviet specialists have given us is exceedingly varied, and all our economic measures have been carried out under their advanced technical supervision. It is impossible to count the benefits our country has gained through their help. Without the disinterested assistance of the Soviet specialists, it would have been very difficult for us to score such colossal successes during the three years in which the wounds of war were being healed, radical improvement made in the financial and economic situation, and various conditions created for the fulfilment of the first five-year construction plan."<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Union never sought to use its specialists to gain any kind of control over the Chinese economy. On the contrary, from the outset it worked vigorously to train Chinese personnel. Large groups of Chinese engineers and technicians engaged in various economic fields used to go to the Soviet Union every year to study the latest Soviet techniques and the art of administering enterprises and organisations, and for practical training in industrial enterprises, research laboratories and experimental stations.

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<sup>1</sup> *People's China*, No. 22, 1952.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, February 15, 1953.



Soviet educational establishments organised wide-scale training of Chinese specialists of diverse professions. Tens of thousands of Chinese workers came to the USSR to improve their qualifications and acquaint themselves with the latest techniques and equipment.

The talks, held in Moscow in September, 1952, between Soviet leaders and the Chinese Government delegation headed by Chou En-lai were a momentous event in Soviet-Chinese relations. The two sides agreed to make arrangements to transfer to the Chinese People's Republic, without compensation, the full ownership of the jointly-managed Chinese Changchung Railway with all its facilities. At the same time the Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministries exchanged notes on the question of extending the term of the joint use of the Chinese naval base of Port Arthur. In this connection the Chinese note stated: "Japan's refusal to sign a comprehensive peace treaty and its conclusion of a separate treaty with the USA and some other countries—owing to which it does not have, and, apparently, does not want to have, a peace treaty with the Chinese People's Republic—have created conditions that are dangerous to peace and favourable for a repetition of Japan's aggression.

"In view of this, and in order to safeguard peace, and basing itself on the Sino-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the Government of the Chinese People's Republic asks the Soviet Government to postpone the date, established in Article 2 of the Sino-Soviet agreements on Port Arthur, of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the jointly-used Chinese naval base of Port Arthur until Japan

signs peace treaties with China and the Soviet Union.”<sup>1</sup>

In the course of 1950-52, the whole length of the Chinese Changchung Railway was restored. On December 31, 1952, the date agreed upon, the Soviet Government handed over to China, without compensation, the rights to the management of this railway with all its property, which, according to the exchange rate of that time, was valued at 22,800,864 million yuans.

The property of the Chinese Changchung Railway, gratuitously transferred to China, included the tracks running from Manchuria Station to Suifenho Station and from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur, railway structures and installations, rolling stock (locomotives, freight and passenger carriages, diesel trains), repair shops for locomotives and carriages, power stations, telephone exchanges and telegraph offices, the means and lines of communication, auxiliary railway branches, buildings for technical and personal services, economic organisations, subsidiary and other enterprises and institutions operating the railway, together with the property acquired, restored or newly-built in the period of joint Soviet-Chinese management.

As the Chinese press noted, the introduction of more than 130 advanced Soviet methods of work and the combination of Soviet know-how with the experience of Chinese employees turned the Chinese Changchung Railway into the country's foremost line within three years. In the period of joint Soviet-Chinese operation, more than

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<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, September 16, 1952.

20,000 Chinese railway supervisors, engineers and technicians were trained.

In his speech made at the signing of the final protocol relating to the transfer of the Chinese Changchung Railway, Chou En-lai said: "The Chinese people will never forget the fraternal assistance rendered by the Soviet people. Special mention should be made of the fact that patient training by the Soviet comrades enabled the Chinese employees of the Chinese Changchung Railway to learn the advanced methods of the Soviet Union and helped us to prepare an adequate number of personnel for railway construction in the new China." In an editorial (December 31, 1952) *Jenmin jihpao* stated that the gratuitous handing over to China of the Chinese Changchung Railway and the agreement to postpone the established date of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur "manifested still more plainly the reverence that the Soviet Government has for the national independence of that part of our country which is under people's rule."

In connection with the transfer of the railway to China, *Jenmin jihpao* wrote: "By comprehensively conveying to us their advanced methods, the Soviet workers engaged on the Chinese Changchung Railway have promoted the development of the creative powers of the Chinese working class in conformity with the specific conditions of our country. This has been invaluable in the various spheres of our country's construction."<sup>1</sup>

Relying on Soviet aid and support, the Chinese people performed wonders and by 1953 had

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<sup>1</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, December, 31, 1952.

successfully accomplished the tasks of the reconstruction period. In 1952, China's output of electricity exceeded the highest level attained before the country's liberation by 21.9 per cent, oil by 36.3 per cent, steel by 41.1 per cent, rolled stock by 67 per cent, cement by 154 per cent, cotton fabrics by 98.3 per cent, paper by 125 per cent. The gross output of the entire national economy in 1952 was 77.5 per cent (at fixed prices) above the 1949 figure, with an increase of 178.6 per cent in the output of modern industrial goods, and of 48.5 per cent in agricultural (including artisan) production.

## ALONG THE PATH OF INDUSTRIALISATION

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Taking account of the impressive results achieved in the reconstruction period, in 1953, the Chinese Communist Party advanced a general line for the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. This general line was endorsed in 1954 by the All-China Meeting of People's Representatives and later recorded in the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic.

Besides the general line of the Party, China's first five-year plan was likewise adopted in 1953. Its chief task was to lay the foundation for industrialisation. Attention was focussed on the construction of hundreds of large heavy industry enterprises equipped with the latest machinery. The first five-year plan allocated a total of 76,640 million yuans to economic and

cultural construction, out of which 55.8 per cent, or 42,740 million yuans, were earmarked for capital construction. In the sphere of industry the plan envisaged concentration of the main efforts on the construction of 694 projects, among which the major ones were 166 industrial enterprises to be built with Soviet assistance.

In the first five-year-plan period Soviet aid to China was on the increase. This first five-year plan was drawn up with the active participation of Soviet specialists and it ensured the speedy and systematic development of the republic. In its financial, scientific and technological aspects it depended completely on Soviet aid. Deputy Prime Minister Li Fou-tchoung's report to the All-China Meeting of People's Representatives held on July 5, 1955, entitled "China's First Five-Year Economic Development Plan for 1953-57," contained a special section called "The Importance of Aid from the Soviet Union and the Countries of People's Democracy for China's Development." Among other things, this section pointed out: "It is common knowledge that the prompt implementation of the first five-year plan of our country's economic development is inseparably linked with aid from the Soviet Union and the countries of People's Democracy, especially from the former. . . . It is obvious that Soviet assistance largely facilitated our large-scale development, carried out so speedily and at such a high technological level, and that it helped us to avoid many mistakes."<sup>1</sup>

A new stage in Soviet-Chinese economic co-operation was marked by the conclusion of a

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<sup>1</sup> *Supplement to People's China*, No. 17, 1955,

whole series of major agreements between the two countries in the period from 1953 to 1956.

Under the agreement signed in Moscow on March 21, 1953, the Soviet Union agreed to help China to build new power stations and to retool the existing ones.

According to the agreement signed on May 15, 1953, the Soviet Union took upon itself to assist China in building and reconstructing 141 industrial projects, including 50 envisaged in the agreement of February 14, 1950, and 91 new large industrial installations.<sup>1</sup>

In his letter sent to the Soviet Government in connection with this agreement, Mao Tse-tung noted: "The meeting of the Central People's Government Council of the Chinese People's Republic heard with satisfaction the report made by Comrade Li Fou-tchoung, member of the Government delegation of the Chinese People's Republic, which dealt with the talks with the Soviet Government on the question of rendering Soviet assistance for the economic development of our country. The Central People's Government Council unanimously considers that, thanks to the agreement of the Government of the Great Soviet Union to give economic and technical aid to China in the building and reconstruction of 91 enterprises and of 50 enterprises now being built or undergoing reconstruction, the Chinese people, who are actively studying the advanced methods and the latest technological achievements of the Soviet Union, will be able gradually to build up a powerful heavy

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<sup>1</sup> *The Soviet Union's Leninist Policy Towards China*, M., 1968, p. 166.

industry. This will be of tremendous importance for China's industrialisation, for its gradual transition to socialism, and also for the consolidation of the forces of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union.

"The fact that, in the course of only one round of talks, two states have resolved the questions concerning the construction of 91 enterprises and long-term assistance is unprecedented in history."

As a result of the consolidation and development of trade between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, the trade turnover between the two countries was 25.5 per cent higher in 1953 than in 1952. The volume of Soviet technical aid rendered to China through the channel of foreign trade alone was almost double the 1952 figure.

The foundation of Chinese industry had to be laid at the beginning of the five-year plan. That is why during those years Soviet aid in the key industries was especially important for the Chinese economy.

In 1954, the Soviet Union took new important steps to further the development of Soviet-Chinese cooperation. Significant progress in this direction was made as a result of the official visit of a Soviet Government delegation to China in the autumn of 1954.

The talks between the Soviet delegation and the Chinese Government ended on October 12, 1954, with the signing of important documents, including:

- an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation;
- an agreement obliging the Soviet Union

to give China a long-term credit of 520 million roubles;

— a Soviet-Chinese communique on the construction of the Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma-Ata Railway and the organisation of direct communication;

— a joint communique issued by the Governments of the USSR, China and Mongolia concerning the construction of a railway line running from Chi-ning to Ulan Bator and the organisation of direct communication;

— a protocol according to which the Soviet Government was to help China build 15 additional industrial enterprises and to increase the deliveries of equipment for 141 enterprises, the total cost of the additional Soviet deliveries exceeding 490 million roubles.

On October 16, 1954, after hearing and discussing Chou En-lai's report on the Soviet-Chinese talks, the Permanent Committee of the All-China Meeting of People's Representatives approved the results of these talks. As *People's China* magazine pointed out, the conclusion of the agreements between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government delegation was met with great joy by the whole Chinese people. In view of this, in factories and plants, in the countryside and villages, in institutions and educational establishments, meetings and discussions were held whose participants expressed satisfaction with the further growth and consolidation of friendly relations between the Chinese and Soviet peoples.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *People's China*, No. 21, p. 38, 1954.



In October, 1954, the President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Kuo Mo-jo, wrote in *Jen-min jihpao*: "I am especially happy about the signing of the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic... On behalf of all the Chinese scientists, I want to express our firm determination to study advanced Soviet science and technology thoroughly in order successfully to fulfil the task assigned to us by the Government—the construction of a socialist society."

As a token of Soviet-Chinese friendship and on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, a Soviet Government delegation presented the latter, on behalf of the Soviet people, with equipment and machinery for a grain-growing state farm having a crop area of 20,000 hectares. The gift included 98 tractors, 100 harvesting combines, 39 lorries and motor-cars, 120 tractor grain drills, more than 2,000 other farm machines and implements, 14 different machine-tools for the repair shop, two sets of electric-welding equipment, installations for a 220-kilowatt power station, 13 radio stations of various makes, a telephone exchange with 100 numbers and a mobile power plant. To help organise the farm, the Soviet Government sent its own specialists to China and assumed responsibility for their maintenance.

Expressing the gratitude to the Soviet Government for this gift, Mao Tse-tung wrote in his message of October 12, 1954: "There is no doubt that this state farm for the production of grain will not only provide an example of progress in the socialist reorganisation of agriculture, but will also help China to train technical per-

sonnel for agriculture and to study the Soviet Union's valuable experience in developing virgin and fallow lands. We look upon this generous help of the Soviet people as another manifestation of their cordial friendly feeling towards the Chinese people and of their concern and support for the construction undertaken by the Chinese people." <sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Government also gave China 83 lathes and large quantity of farm implements that were displayed at the Soviet exhibition held in Peking in 1954. Mao Tse-tung described this as a "tangible expression of the Soviet people's sincere friendship towards the Chinese people." <sup>2</sup>

The Soviet delegation that came to China in the autumn of 1954 signed a communique on the withdrawal of Soviet military units from the naval base of Port Arthur and on placing the base at the entire disposal of the Chinese People's Republic. This decision took into account the change in the situation in the Far East brought about by the cessation of the war in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indo-China, and by the reinforcement of China's defences.

Under the agreements concluded in 1954, Soviet aid to the Chinese People's Republic increased still further. In 1954, the Soviet Union helped China build 169 enterprises. The total volume of technical aid was almost double the 1953 figure. Soviet specialists in China rendering technical aid alone numbered nearly 800 as of

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<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, October 13, 1954.

<sup>2</sup> *Izvestia*, October 14, 1954.

January 1, 1955. Besides fulfilling their main tasks, they also trained Chinese personnel, among whom there were more than 1,400 electricians and over 1,000 skilled workers in various fields.

The Soviet adviser-specialists appointed in government departments and institutions under the Soviet-Chinese agreement of March 27, 1950, continued to render valuable assistance in China's economic development. On January 1, 1955, there were nearly 500 of these adviser-specialists in China.

In December, 1954, the Moscow Conference on Scientific and Technical Cooperation agreed that the Soviet Union should give China, free of charge, blueprints for the construction of metallurgical and mechanical engineering plants and power stations, drawings for the production of machinery and equipment, technological documentation, Soviet scientific and technical literature and various reference materials. China received abundant documentation and drawings for the technical equipment of various branches of the economy. From 1950 to July, 1954, the Chinese obtained technical documents for 698 items, which helped their enterprises independently to produce building and mining equipment, 10-, 20- and 30-ton travelling cranes, excavators, etc.

In January, 1955, the Soviet Government offered the Chinese People's Republic and other socialist countries every assistance in designing, equipping and building experimental atomic reactors with the power of up to 5,000 kilowatts each and accelerators of elementary particles. These countries were to be supplied with the required amount of fissionable material for the

atomic reactors and for research work. The engineers and scientists of the socialist countries were given the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the research carried on in the Soviet Union in the field of the peaceful use of atomic power and with the work of experimental atomic reactors.

This is how China's State Council appraised this Soviet move in its resolution of January 31, 1955: "This is a wonderful expression of the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union, a fresh contribution to the cause of strengthening the great friendship between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese people and Government express their sincere gratitude for the selfless assistance of the Soviet Union."<sup>1</sup>

On April 27, 1955, a Soviet-Chinese agreement was signed under which the Soviet Union participated in the construction in China of an experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron. In accordance with the terms of this agreement, in 1955-56, the USSR designed and delivered to China an experimental atomic pile and accelerators of elementary particles, and helped Chinese scientific institutions to assemble and set the equipment in motion. To acquaint the Chinese public with Soviet achievements in the field of the peaceful use of atomic power, in the summer of 1956, the USSR Academy of Sciences organised an exhibition on this theme in Peking. The exhibition became an open popular laboratory visited by Chinese scientists, specialists and large numbers of the working

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<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, February 1, 1955.

people. On September 27, 1957, the Chinese experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron were put into operation.

An important event in China's life in 1954 was the opening in Peking of the Exhibition of Soviet Economic and Cultural Achievements, which was visited by 80,000 people on the very first day and by 3 million during the period of operation. The Chinese were delighted with the successes of the Land of Soviets. Mao Tse-tung wrote in the visitors' book: "We are proud to have such a mighty ally. The power of the Soviet Union is an important requisite for the general economic and cultural upsurge taking place in the democratic camp, an important factor in the struggle for world peace and the progress of mankind."

The employees of the Soviet exhibition often went to Peking enterprises to give practical help in perfecting production. They conducted about a thousand lectures and discussions, which were attended by more than 55,000 people. Soviet educational films were regularly shown in the cinema hall of the exhibition.

At the request of the Chinese Government, after it closed in Peking, the exhibition was moved to Shanghai and then to Canton, where it was also very popular. In Canton alone it attracted about two and a half million visitors. Here, too, the Soviet specialists running the exhibition did useful work in conveying the scientific and technical know-how of the Soviet Union to their Chinese friends. They delivered 400 lectures attended by about 60,000 people, and frequently went to local industrial enterprises, agricultural farms and cooperatives to

give technical assistance and advice. The exhibition sponsored 28 groups for the elementary vocational training of Chinese specialists and workers and they were attended by 1,170 people.

Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation increased still further in 1956.

In April, 1956, a Soviet Government delegation led by A. I. Mikoyan went to China to continue the earlier Moscow talks on expanding economic cooperation between the two countries. The talks resulted in the signing on April 7, 1956, of an agreement under which the Soviet Union was to help China develop various industries and build 55 new industrial enterprises in addition to the 156 projects erected under agreements concluded earlier. Among these 55 enterprises there were iron and steel works, mechanical engineering and chemical plants, factories for the production of artificial fibre and plastics, electrical and radio-engineering enterprises, a synthetic liquid fuel factory, power stations, and research institutes for the aircraft industry. This involved Soviet deliveries of equipment, blueprints and other forms of technical aid 2,500 million roubles worth. The agreement also provided for more aid for China for carrying out geological survey.

This was another indication of the USSR's truly fraternal attitude towards the Chinese people, for the Chinese economy was in urgent need of these branches; moreover, the enterprises concerned were to be equipped with the latest machinery.

On April 7, another agreement was signed to lay a railway line from Lanchow to Aktogai

Station situated on the Turkestando-Siberian Railway and to organise through traffic along the new line from 1960 on.

An agreement on cultural cooperation between the USSR and China was concluded in Moscow on July 5, 1956. It provided for further development of all-round cooperation in the fields of science, technology, education, the printing and publishing trade, broadcasting and television, cinematography and sports, broader ties between research institutions, higher educational establishments, museums and libraries in both countries, and the exchange of lecturers, scientists, artists, art teams and exhibitions. This agreement summed up the results of the long-standing and fruitful cultural cooperation between the two countries and laid the basis for the further development of cultural ties.

In 1956, the Soviet Union sent a group of prominent scientists to the Chinese People's Republic to help draw up a comprehensive 12-year plan for the development of science in China. China was also given more assistance in organising research work for the peaceful use of atomic power. More than 1,800 Chinese students and post-graduates came to study in the USSR in 1956 alone.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Red Cross hospitals in Dairen and Urumchi were given to China free of charge.

On July 27, 1956, a protocol was signed in Peking according to which the Soviet Union undertook to send to China, in the same year,

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<sup>1</sup> *Jenmin shoutse*, Reference Book for 1957, Ta Kung Pao Publishers, p. 371.

additional deliveries of machines, cranes, air compressors, pumps, diesel engines, generators, tools and other goods needed for its economic development.

On August 18, 1956, the two countries signed an agreement in Peking to carry out joint research in exploring the natural resources of the Amur basin, to determine the prospects of developing the productive forces there and draw up a plan for the use of the waters of the Argun River and the upstream current of the Amur. The agreement stipulated joint survey in the Amur basin over the 1956-60 period, in order to improve conditions for navigation, build power stations, develop the fishing industry and so on.

The year 1956 witnessed the conclusion of several other Soviet-Chinese agreements whose implementation fully accorded with the interests of the Chinese People's Republic. Among these were:

— The June 15 agreement between the USSR, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, China and the Korean People's Democratic Republic to cooperate in carrying out fishery, oceanological and limnological research in the western part of the Pacific. (On December 15, 1958, Mongolia became a party to the agreement.) The agreement covered a period of ten years and its objective was to carry out coordinated research in these fields in the fishing grounds of the Pacific. The concerted efforts of the socialist countries produced the most comprehensive data on the raw material potential and fishing resources of this region.

— The July 3 agreement between the USSR, China and North Korea on cooperation in sav-



ing human lives and assisting vessels and planes facing disaster at sea.<sup>1</sup>

— The March 30 protocol stipulating the transfer to the Chinese Government of the property belonging to the former Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking. In conformity with this protocol the Chinese side received, free of charge, church and monasterial buildings, plots of land with their edifices in various towns and parts of China, a printing-house and its equipment, the livestock and implements of a dairy farm in Peking, and other property.

The last year of China's first five-year plan—1957—was marked by a number of important events.

At the invitation of the Soviet Government, a Chinese Government delegation headed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chou En-lai, paid a friendly visit to the Soviet Union early in January, 1957. The delegation visited a number of industrial enterprises, collective farms and higher educational establishments in Moscow, Irkutsk, Omsk and Tashkent. It exchanged views with Soviet leaders on major international issues, including the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression against Egypt and the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary. The further development of Soviet-Chinese cooperation was also discussed.

On March 13, 1957, the Soviet Red Cross hospital built in 1952 in Peking was handed over to the Chinese Government without compensation. The hospital had treated more than 500,000

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<sup>1</sup> In 1966-67, both these agreements were unilaterally cancelled by the Chinese side.

out-patients and over 9,300 in-patients during its existence. With the help of Soviet specialists it had trained over 300 Chinese doctors and produced more than 300 works on medicine. The hospital had been visited by 17,000 medical workers from all parts of China.

In March-April, 1957, K.Ye. Voroshilov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, paid a friendly visit to China. Together with the officials accompanying him he made a trip around the country and visited Peking, Anshan, Shenyang, Tientsin, Shanghai, Hangchow, Canton, Wuhan and Kunming, where he went to industrial enterprises, agricultural co-operatives, scientific and educational institutions, and was shown historical and cultural monuments. The Chinese people cordially welcomed the Soviet guests. The meetings with the people were a great demonstration of Soviet-Chinese friendship.

During the stay of the delegation in China the Chinese leaders made several declarations in which Soviet policy towards China was very highly spoken of. On meeting K. Ye. Voroshilov at the Peking airport on April 15, Mao Tse-tung said: "The Soviet people have always given us tremendous support and sympathised with the Chinese revolution and with the cause of our country's development. Allow me to express our sincere gratitude to you and, through you, to the Soviet people, the Soviet Government and to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."<sup>1</sup>

The 6th session of the Soviet-Chinese Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation

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<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, April 16, 1957.

held in Peking in July, 1957, was of great importance for the development of relations between the two countries. The session resolved to further the development of direct contacts between the allied departments, ministries, research institutions and design bureaus of the Soviet Union and China, and to call a scientific and technical conference on the most urgent industrial and agricultural problems.

In accordance with the session's protocol, the Soviet Union undertook to give China, without charge, blueprints and technological documents for the construction of hydropower stations and enterprises producing building materials, for making power engineering and metallurgical equipment, and also lathes and machines for the light industry; technological documentation for the production of steel, tyres, rubber, pulp and paper goods, dyes and medicaments; seeds and saplings for agriculture, and also various information and reference material.

The Soviet Union also undertook to acquaint Chinese specialists with the technology of producing electric motors, control measuring instruments, power units, and with research work in the field of production of some valuable chemical products.

Between 1954 and August 1957, the Soviet Union gave China scientific and technical documents for all the leading industries, transport and other branches of the economy. These were used to develop the production of more than 200 types of machine-tools, 1,400 types of electric motors, about 900 items of metallurgical and mining equipment and products of general machine-building, and more than 100 types of trans-

port vehicles. The Soviet Union helped China to start the production of 12,000-kilowatt steam turbines, 16,000-kilowatt hydraulic turbines, complete sets of mining equipment with an annual capacity of 600,000 tons of coal, and many other types of machinery and equipment.

During the five-year-plan period more than 7,000 Chinese underwent training in Soviet enterprises and about as many Chinese students attended higher educational establishments in the USSR.

Close cooperation and extensive exchange of scientific information were established between research institutes in both countries. By late 1957, 55 research organisations in China were collaborating with 105 Soviet institutes.

To make the scientific ties more systematic and purposeful the Academies of Sciences of the USSR and China concluded on December 11, 1957, a five-year agreement in Moscow. At the same time a protocol was signed providing for mutual assistance in training specialists.

Soviet-Chinese trade turnover considerably increased during the five-year-plan period. It is natural that machinery and equipment were the chief Soviet exports to China. They accounted for 23.1 per cent of the Soviet export in 1953, 26.2 per cent in 1954, 30.7 per cent in 1955, 41.6 per cent in 1956, and almost 50 per cent in 1957.

The total cost of the Soviet equipment delivered to China in the 1953-57 period was estimated at 4,664 million roubles, including 2,839 million roubles for complete sets of plant. During the first five-year-plan period the Soviet Union sent China about 3,000 metal-cutting

lathes, more than 10,000 agricultural machines and 100 million roubles' worth of scientific equipment.

During these years the Soviet Union delivered equipment for 166 industrial projects built according to Soviet designs and with Soviet participation. Among them were the major projects of China's first five-year plan, including:

— in the ferrous metal industry: the reconstructed Anshan iron and steel works, the metallurgical works in Penhsihu, the Heilungkiang special steel works, and the iron and steel works undergoing reconstruction in Wuhan and Paotow;

— in the non-ferrous metal industry: the tungsten works in Anyüan, the tin factories in Kienshui, the aluminium factory in Fushun, and the aluminium rolled stock factory in Harbin;

— in the machine-building: the motor-car factory in Changchung, machine-tool plants, aircraft factories, the Tsitsihar heavy machine-building plant, the Harbin electrical engineering factory, the Shenyang perforator factory and the Harbin turbine plant;

— in the power engineering: the reconstructed hydro-power station in Fengman, the thermal electric power stations in Fushun, Taiyüan, Siang, Loyang, Chi-lin, Chendo, Chia-mu-ssu, Changchung, Penhsihu, Fusin, Dairen, Paotow, Lanchow, Wuhan and Urumchi;

— in the coal industry: the coal mines in Chia-mu-ssu, Fusin, Fengfen, Peipiao, Siang, Tunghwa, Tihsi, and the upgraded coal factories in Fushun, Chia-mu-ssu, Fengfen and Tihsi;

— in the chemical industry: the Chi-lin fertiliser factory, the Chi-lin carbide factory, the chemical plants in Taiyüan and Lanchow;

— in the paper industry: the paper mill in Chia-mu-ssu;

— in the oil industry: the oil refinery in Lanchow and the one being reconstructed in Tushang.

According to the statistics published in *Jenmin jihpao*, out of the five million tons of steel smelted in 1957, 2.8 million tons came from enterprises built with Soviet assistance; out of the 130 million tons of coal, 63 million tons came from mines constructed with Soviet aid; out of the 4,4 million kilowatt-hours, 680,000 kilowatt-hours were generated by power stations built with Soviet help.

In a report to the All-China Meeting of People's Representatives the Prime Minister Chou En-lai said: "The Soviet-led socialist camp has rendered us comprehensive assistance for socialist development in our country. The 166 major projects built with Soviet aid during the first five-year-plan period have played a tremendous role in our country's economic development. The rich experience accumulated by the Soviet Union during the years of its existence likewise provides us with an important basis for drawing up and carrying out plans for our economic development. On behalf of the Government and people of our country, I convey from this rostrum deep gratitude to the Governments and peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries." He went on to say that "to cement solidarity with the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries is the basic policy of our country."<sup>1</sup>

As in the time of economic rehabilitation dur-

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, April 19, 1959.

ing the five-year-plan period Soviet deliveries met a considerable part of China's need for oil. Notwithstanding the general increase in the output—from 320,000 tons (highest output before the formation of the Chinese People's Republic) in 1943, to 1,458,000 tons in 1957 (including liquid fuel received through distillation of combustible shales and coal)—China's requirements continued to be covered largely by imports, especially from the Soviet Union. In the last year of the five-year plan Soviet export of oil and oil products to China reached 1,903,000 tons.

The Soviet Union's firm and consistent course aimed at promoting and consolidating relations with the Chinese People's Republic found reflection in the establishment in October, 1957, of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. On October 29 its founders held an organisational meeting in Moscow. The Grand Hall of the Conservatoire was the meeting place of more than 2,000 people, including representatives of state and public organisations, scientists, cultural leaders, workers, collective farmers, students, Soviet Army and Soviet Navy men, as well as representatives of other towns—Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Voronezh, Irkutsk, etc. The report "The Founding of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society in the USSR" was made by A. A. Andreyev, Member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The society set itself the following tasks:

- to further the development and consolidation of the friendship between the two peoples;
- to expand cultural cooperation and effect an all-round exchange of experience in cultural

construction with the Chinese People's Republic;  
— to widen the acquaintance of the Soviet public with the life of the Chinese people and with their experience in socialist construction;  
— to enable the Chinese people to gain a thorough understanding of the life and work of Soviet people.

In November, 1957, the Soviet people celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. A Party and Government delegation headed by Mao Tse-tung came to Moscow for the celebrations. Mao Tse-tung told the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "After the October Revolution, any government will only cause damage to the genuine interests of its people and country if it refuses to live in friendship with the Soviet Union." He also declared: "In its socialist construction China received all-round fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, allow us to express our sincere gratitude to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and to the Soviet people for this friendly help."<sup>1</sup>

Relying on the all-round assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Chinese People's Republic successfully fulfilled its first five-year plan—a significant step towards the development of modern industry, especially the production of the means of production. Within the five-year period, gross industrial output more than doubled, with an especially high growth in the output of steel (almost a 4-fold

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<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, November 7, 1957.



increase), iron (3-fold), oil (3.3-fold), mineral fertilisers (3.5-fold) and electric power (2.6-fold).

The following data show China's output of the principal industrial products for 1957 as compared with 1949:<sup>1</sup>

	1949	1957
Electric power (1,000 million kilowatts)	4.3	19.3
Coal (million tons)	32.4	130.0
Oil (million tons)	0.1	1.5
Iron (million tons)	0.3	5.9
Steel (million tons)	0.2	5.4
Metal-cutting lathes (1,000 pieces)	1.6	28.0
Cement (million tons)	0.7	6.9
Cotton cloth (1,000 million metres)	1.9	5.1

During the first five-year-plan period China set up new industries such as those for the production of motor-cars, aircraft and radio-engineering equipment.

## TOWARDS NEW HORIZONS

The establishment of broad foundations for industrial development enabled the Chinese People's Republic to make swift headway towards a prospering economy and culture. The guarantee of success in attaining this end was the fact that, after the completion of the first five-year plan, Soviet aid to China assumed even greater proportions.

In January, 1958, a Chinese delegation headed by the President of the Academy of Sciences,

<sup>1</sup> Ovdienko, *Economic Geography of the Socialist Countries of Asia*, 1967, p. 177.

Kuo Mo-jo, visited the USSR. During its stay, which lasted more than three months, the delegation discussed with the State Scientific and Technical Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Higher Education and with the Soviet Union's leading research organisations, the chief questions relating to the development of science and technology and to the further expansion of scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries. In these talks the Soviet side was represented by more than 600 prominent scientists and specialists.

In the course of the talks the Chinese delegation asked the Soviet side for help in solving the main scientific and technological problems outlined in China's long-term plan that extended to the end of 1967. This help would have consisted in sending Soviet scientists and specialists to work in China, in improving the qualifications of Chinese scientists, engineers and technicians in the USSR, and in delivering the required equipment, instruments, materials and so on.

The talks ended on January 18, 1958, in Moscow with the conclusion of an agreement on joint research in the major fields of science and technology and on Soviet aid to China in this research.

The agreement provided for joint work over the 1958-62 period in solving 122 major scientific and technical problems which were of great importance to China, and for closer contact between research institutions in both countries.

Agreements were also signed by which co-

ordinated scientific and technological research was to be carried out by the Soviet and Chinese Ministries of Higher Education and the Academies of Agriculture.

On August 8, 1958, a Soviet-Chinese agreement was signed in Moscow by which China was to receive technical aid in building and expanding 47 enterprises for the metallurgical, chemical, coal, engineering, timber, construction and power industries.

Under this agreement a number of Soviet organisations were to carry out research and design work, to hand over the blueprints of certain workshops and installations for re-use, and to supply technological equipment, instruments, cables and some special materials for manufacturing accessory equipment locally. They undertook to send the required specialists to help mount, adjust and put the enterprises into operation, and also train national cadres for work in these enterprises.

The agreement also stipulated that the Soviet side should give China, free of cost, the licences to produce the goods concerned, and the drawings and technical documents required for organising production in the above-mentioned enterprises. China was to cover only the expenses connected with the preparation and transfer of these technical documents.

Payment for the expenses of Soviet organisations rendering the technical aid envisaged in the agreement was to be made by China in the form of deliveries of goods to the USSR according to the terms of the Soviet-Chinese trade agreement in force.

On February 7, 1959, a new agreement was

signed in Moscow by which the Soviet Union undertook to assist China in building, in the period from 1959 to 1967, 78 large enterprises for the metallurgical, chemical, coal, oil, engineering, electrical, radio-engineering, construction and power industries.

The agreement obliged Soviet organisations to apply their latest scientific and technical achievements in performing research and design work, to deliver equipment, instruments, and some special materials, as well as to send a considerable number of Soviet specialists to give technical aid in erecting, assembling, adjusting and putting the enterprises into operation, and to admit large groups of Chinese specialists and workers for vocational training in the appropriate Soviet enterprises.

In conformity with the former agreements, this one too stipulated that the Soviet side should give its partner *free of charge* the licences to manufacture the goods concerned in the above-mentioned 78 enterprises, and that it should transfer the technical documents required for organising the production and manufacture in China of accessory equipment to be used in these enterprises.

The total cost of the deliveries of the Soviet equipment, designs and other forms of technical aid envisaged in the agreement was nearly 5,000 million roubles (in terms of the former value of the rouble). Payment was to be made in the form of deliveries of goods to the USSR in line with the then operative Soviet-Chinese trade agreement.

The report on the signing of the agreement stated: "The Governments of the Soviet Union

and the Chinese People's Republic regard the signing of the agreement as a new important link in the further consolidation and expansion of the mutually advantageous economic cooperation and mutual assistance between the two socialist states." <sup>1</sup>

The trade delegations of the USSR and China had talks in Moscow in late 1958 on the completion of mutual deliveries for that year and on the further development of bilateral trade. The two sides agreed on *additional* deliveries of Soviet goods in the fourth quarter of 1958, as a result of which the volume of Soviet-Chinese trade turnover for 1958, originally established by the protocol of April 23, 1958, was exceeded by more than 600 million roubles' worth of motor-cars, agricultural machinery, power equipment, oil and oil products, and other goods.

The talks on mutual trade for 1959 were also successful. Taking into consideration their common aims and tasks, the two sides agreed considerably to extend their trade and to increase mutual deliveries to a total of 7,200 million roubles.

In addition to the significant growth in the Soviet exports of complete sets of plant under earlier agreements, it was stipulated that the Soviet Union should send China more electric power equipment, including turbo-generators, diesel generators, power transformers, and equipment for small hydropower stations for use in rural areas. As compared with 1958, there was an increase in Soviet deliveries to China of high-capacity boring installations, means of trans-

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, February 8, 1959.

port, bearings and other goods.

In 1959, the Chinese People's Republic celebrated its tenth anniversary. Reviewing the path traversed, the Chinese leaders laid stress on the tremendous role of Soviet assistance in the development of the Chinese economy. In his article entitled "The Great Decade," Chou En-lai wrote: "As we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, our people express special gratitude to the Soviet Union, which helped our country to build 166 projects in the first five-year-plan period and has signed new agreements in the past and during the current years so as to assist our country in building 125 further projects; moreover, within these ten years more than 10,800 Soviet experts in the fields of economy, culture and education were sent to China to work."

Soviet-Chinese economic and cultural cooperation would have developed progressively had subsequent events not taken an opposite direction. 1959 saw the beginning of the rapid deterioration of economic and cultural relations between the USSR and China. In this connection it is relevant to review some of the results of Soviet-Chinese cooperation from 1950 to 1959.

## THE PRICELESS FRUITS OF THE POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY

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From 1950 to 1959, the Soviet Union assumed obligations to help China build, reconstruct and expand more than 400 industrial

enterprises, separate workshops and other installations. China planned to utilise Soviet aid to build 12 iron and steel works (with an annual output of 30 million tons of steel, 28 million tons of iron and 25 million tons of rolled stock); three aluminium plants with an annual output of 738,000 tons; a group of tin enterprises in the Kienshui area with an annual output of 25,000 tons; seven heavy machine-building works producing 240,000 tons of hardware annually for the metallurgical, mining, oil and chemical industries; 17 plants producing steam, gas and hydraulic turbines and turbo-generators with an annual capacity of 11.2 million kilowatts; and 100 munition factories.

The Soviet Union helped China build more than 250 large industrial enterprises, workshops and installations fitted with latest equipment. Among them are Anshan and Wuhan iron and steel works, the Changchung motor-car factory, the complex works in Loyang (producing tractors, bearings and mining equipment), the electrical engineering, turbine and boiler plants in Harbin, the synthetic rubber factory and oil refinery in Lanchow, the nitrogen fertiliser factories in Kirin and Tayung, the slate refineries in Fushun, the heavy machine-building plant in Fulaerhtsi, a number of high-capacity power stations and other special projects.

Describing the importance of Soviet assistance for China's economic development Li Fouchoung, Member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, and Deputy Prime Minister, said: "Our appraisal—and this is an exact evaluation—is as follows: the enterprises we have designed and built with Soviet as-

sistance are indeed an expression of the best and most modern Soviet possessions. They form the backbone of our industry, not only as regards size, but also today's advanced technology... Results show that the Soviet specialists and design organisations have tried to impart Soviet know-how to these enterprises and to transform them into the best in the world. In this they have succeeded."

The Soviet Union helped China to build her aircraft, automobile, tractor, and radio-engineering industries, and various branches of chemical production and to call into play large capacities in the metallurgical, power and other industries. Soviet aid in the sphere of nuclear physics was of great importance to China. It was with the helping hand of the Soviet Union that China built its first experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron.<sup>1</sup>

The output of the operating enterprises built with Soviet support is as follows: 8.7 million tons of iron, 8.4 million tons of steel, 6.5 million tons of rolled stock, 17.2 million tons of coal, 7.5 million tons of upgraded coal, 38,000 tons of aluminium, 150,000 tons of ammonia, 250,000 tons of sulphuric acid, 60,000 tons of heavy engineering products, 20,000 tons of mining equipment, 40,000 tons of oil-refining and chemical equipment, generators with a capacity of 0.6 million kilowatts, 42,000 tractors (conventional units), 30,000 lorries, 3,700 metal-cutting

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<sup>1</sup> *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Nauka Publishers, 1968, p. 202.



lathes, etc. Power stations were equipped with turbo-generators rated at 3.9 million kilowatts.<sup>1</sup>

Out of China's 1960 total industrial output, enterprises built with Soviet technical aid accounted for 30 per cent of the iron, about 40 per cent of the steel, over 50 per cent of the rolled stock, 80 per cent of the lorries, more than 90 per cent of the tractors, 30 per cent of the synthetic ammonia, 25 per cent of the electricity, 55 per cent of the steam and hydraulic turbines, about 20 per cent of the generators, 25 per cent of the aluminium, more than 10 per cent of the heavy engineering products and so on.<sup>2</sup>

Giving full credit to Soviet assistance and to the importance for China of the enterprises built with Soviet support, *Jenmin jihpao* wrote in February, 1959: "The construction of these industrial enterprises played a crucial role in laying the foundation for China's industrialisation during its first five-year-plan period. They not only effected a considerable increase in our country's industrial output and enabled it to produce goods which it could not produce earlier, but also helped to train a large number of specialists. Soviet assistance to our economic development is unparalleled in history both in quantity and scale."<sup>3</sup>

Between 1950 and 1960, more than 8,500 highly skilled Soviet specialists (excluding servicemen) were commissioned to work in China. Within the same period the USSR sent to China about 1,500 advisers to help in the fields of

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<sup>1</sup> *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Nauka Publishers, 1968, pp. 202-203.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

science, higher education, health service and culture.

The work of Soviet specialists in China is a glorious page in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations. Their disinterested assistance brought them prestige and the affection of Chinese workers, engineers, technicians and all those with whom they worked. "The specialists from the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy who are working in our country have made an outstanding contribution to our socialist construction," Prime Minister Chou En-lai said in his report to the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Government also sponsored the training of Chinese scientific and technical personnel and skilled workers in enterprises, higher educational establishments, design and scientific organisations in the USSR. From 1951 to 1962, more than 8,000 Chinese citizens received vocational training in the Soviet Union, and more than 11,000 Chinese students and post-graduates attended Soviet educational institutions. About 930 employees of various institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences underwent scientific training and studied research methods in the USSR Academy of Sciences. In addition, over 1,500 Chinese engineers, technicians and scientists came to the USSR under the scientific and technical cooperation scheme to learn about scientific and technological achievements and to be trained in production methods.<sup>2</sup>

For each industrial project built with Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Nauka Publishers, 1968, p. 204.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

aid, the Soviet Union trained practically the whole technical personnel ranging from the director and chief engineer to shop superintendents and section foremen, and many other workers of the enterprise who were responsible for construction work, the assembly of equipment and the preparation of specific production sections for operation.<sup>1</sup>

Six hundred and fifteen competent Soviet teacher-specialists commissioned to China in the period from 1948 to 1960 played an important role in training skilled Chinese personnel. They played a vital part in the setting up in China of a modern system of higher and secondary specialised education and in preparing a large contingent of Chinese specialists for the national economy and for the teaching profession. In the 1949-60 period a total of 1,269 Soviet educational experts worked in educational bodies attached to the Chinese Ministry of Education and in more than 60 leading higher educational establishments and universities.

In 1949, 66 Chinese and 85 Soviet colleges began a systematic exchange of scientific information. They carried out joint research on 124 topics.

After 1954, the Soviet Union gave China more than 24,000 sets of documents (more than 14,000 scientific and technical ones and 10,000 others, including curriculums). China received about 50 per cent of all the technical documents given by the Soviet Union to the socialist countries. One hundred and fifty-nine installations and more than 300 new, important types of products were

<sup>1</sup> Chan Yan-ching, "Soviet Technical Aid—the Cornerstone of Our Success," *Foreign Trade*, No. 10, 1959, p. 22.

developed on the basis of the Soviet documents obtained before July, 1957, alone. Out of a total of 51,500 machines produced by China in 1952-57, 43,500 were based on Soviet documents.

Today, there is not a single industry in China that does not produce goods with the help of drawings, specifications and technological documentation worked out in the Soviet Union. Foreign experts say that the scientific and technical documents received from the Soviet Union would have cost China thousands of millions of dollars on the world market.

A peculiar feature of Soviet-Chinese scientific and technical cooperation is that the Soviet Union gave China far more technical documents than it received in exchange. This can be seen from the following data on the exchange effected in the period from 1949 to August, 1957.<sup>1</sup>

Kind of technical documents	Number of sets the USSR gave China	Number of sets China gave the USSR
Design for capital construction	751	1
Drawings for the manufacture of machinery and equipment	2,207	28
Specifications for technological processes	688	55
Total:	3,646	84

<sup>1</sup> F. Kleimenov, "Scientific and Technical Cooperation—an Important Factor in Consolidating International Economic Relations." *Foreign Trade*, No. 11, 1957, p. 26.

In 1956, the magazine *Friendship* wrote: "Soviet-Chinese scientific and technical cooperation is of immense importance for socialist reorganisation in our country and for the construction of socialism. It not only overcame the technical difficulties that stood in the way of our country's economic development, but also raised the quality of construction and production. It also made it possible to accelerate the country's socialist industrialisation with a minimum expenditure of labour power and material resources and to train scientific and technical personnel and rapidly raise our scientific and technological level."<sup>1</sup>

The large number of scientific and technical publications received from the Soviet Union were extremely useful for the rehabilitation of China's economy and for subsequent systematic socialist construction. Already during the rehabilitation period the fundamental libraries of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow and Leningrad regularly sent Peking 43 periodicals, 142 serial and multi-volume publications, as well as monographs in all branches of science. In 1951 alone, China received 32,000 copies of books and magazines put out by the USSR and the Republican Academies of Sciences and other Soviet scientific institutions. Subsequently there were more extensive contacts between libraries of the two countries. For example, in 1956 alone, the fundamental libraries of the USSR Academy of Sciences sent the Chinese Academy of Sciences nearly 70,000 different scientific publications.<sup>2</sup>

In 1952, China received, free of charge, about

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<sup>1</sup> *Friendship*, December, 1956.

<sup>2</sup> *Friendship*, November 9, 1956.

5,000 titles of Soviet books, many of which were to be translated and issued by Chinese publishers. In the same year 756 titles of Soviet books in Chinese translation were printed in 8.6 million copies. It should be noted that Soviet books made up 78 per cent of the total number reprinted in China in 1952, and that from October 1, 1949, to late 1952, 3,414 titles of Soviet books were put out. Besides, in 1951 and 1952 the Soviet Union sent China about three million copies published in the Chinese language. In the following years the publication of Soviet literature in China greatly increased. In the period from 1949 to 1955, China printed 3,000 titles of purely technical Soviet books in more than 20 million copies, besides the non-technical ones.<sup>1</sup>

In order to promote China's economic development and reinforce its defences, in 1950 the Soviet Government gave it eleven long-term credits on favourable terms, totalling about 2,000 million convertible roubles.<sup>2</sup>

Besides economic, scientific and technical aid, the Soviet Union helped the Chinese People's Republic, from its inception, build up an up-to-date defence industry, gave it technical and technological documents for the production of modern armaments and equipped the National Liberation Army of China with a large amount of present-day materiel.<sup>3</sup>

From the very first days of the Chinese People's Republic, the Soviet Union was the chief

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<sup>1</sup> *For a Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy*, November 21, 1955.

<sup>2</sup> *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, pp. 204-205.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

buyer of Chinese goods. It purchased 28.7 per cent of Chinese exports in 1950, and an average of 59.4 per cent during the first five-year-plan period.

Being a young developing country and owing to the nomenclature and quality of its goods, China found it extremely difficult to break into the world markets and to withstand competition even from some of the economically backward countries, let alone the highly developed capitalist states. Only close economic ties with the socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, enabled it to increase to a large measure its exports of agricultural<sup>1</sup> and industrial raw materials and other goods, and to secure good prices. What is more, the Soviet Union either bought many Chinese goods which it failed to sell on the world market or actively helped to sell them.

*Cultural cooperation* with the Soviet Union was of great practical importance for socialist construction in China. A knowledge of the cultural development of the Soviet people, who had traversed a long path of struggle for socialism, a knowledge of their science, literature and art heightened the impact of the advanced ideology on the builders of the new China. This knowledge also helped them to assimilate a progressive world outlook, and gave them living, tangible examples for orientation in developing their intellectual life.

China's progressives and CPC leaders devoted

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<sup>1</sup> Processed and unprocessed agricultural raw materials and the by-products of farmers made up 90.7 per cent of China's total exports in 1950 and 71.6 per cent in 1957.

to the cause of socialism had realised the paramount importance of deep and all-round cultural ties with the Soviet people and had tried to establish such ties soon after the victorious October Socialist Revolution.

Chinese revolutionary circles were first introduced to Russian literature in the early 20th century, when English and then Chinese translations of the works by Pushkin, Lermontov, Turgenyev, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoi, Chekhov and Gorky began to appear in China. Lu Hsin wrote that the impact of Russian literature was largely responsible for the emergence of revolutionary writings in China.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, the influence of Russian and Soviet literature became one of the important factors in the development of the revolutionary processes in China. It enjoyed exceptional popularity. Chu Chiu-po, critic and political observer, and one of the most prominent Chinese revolutionaries explaining the reason for this popularity, wrote in 1920: "The chief reason is that the Red Bolshevik Revolution in Russia brought about tremendous political, economic and social progress; it stirred the whole world and influenced the development of thought in all countries. Everybody wanted to grasp the essence of this revolution and gain a deeper knowledge of Russian culture; and so the attention of mankind was focussed on Russia and Russian literature. And since in Chinese society, deeply melancholic and tragic, people were searching for new ways of life, they could not help being moved by the hitherto unheard-of thunderous collapse of the old society. That is why everybody in our country took an interest



in Russia, and Chinese writers began to orientate themselves by Russian literature.”<sup>1</sup>

Addressing Soviet cultural leaders on the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution, the All-China Association of Literary and Art Workers declared: “Post-Revolution Soviet literature and art have made an ineffaceable impression on writers and artists all over the world. They especially influenced—and, in effect, bred—the revolutionary literature and art of China.”<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet literary masterpieces devoted to the heroic deeds of the Soviet people during the years of the Revolution, the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War inspired millions of Chinese working people in their revolutionary and national liberation struggle. In his 1950 article entitled “Soviet War Literature—Our Invisible Weapon,” writer Yao Yuan-fang stated: “We were encouraged and spurred into action, not only by the great anger of the Soviet writers against the enemy, but by the ardent patriotism in every line and every word of their works; we learned from and imitated the great heroes portrayed in their works. . . . Owing to their vitality and tremendous impact, the works of Soviet writers have become an invisible force in the victorious war waged by our National Liberation Army against the Chiang Kai-shek gangsters.”<sup>3</sup> Many Soviet novels, like *Volokolamsk Highway* by A. Bek, *Days and Nights* by

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<sup>1</sup> Chu Chiu-po, *Essays and Articles*, Fiction and Poetry Publishing House, M., 1959, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, June 2, 1950.

<sup>3</sup> *Wenyi pao*, Peking, 1950.

K. Simonov and *The Front* by A. Korneichuk were included in the list of "compulsory reading" for Party functionaries and Army men.<sup>1</sup>

Soviet literature likewise played an active role in the life of Chinese society after the formation of the Chinese People's Republic. In some cases Soviet novels and stories giving a broad and vivid generalisation of certain revolutionary reorganisations in the USSR, were like textbooks for the Chinese builders of socialism who were tackling similar tasks in their country. For instance, in his 1954 article entitled "Soviet Literature and Its Chinese Readers," the well-known literary critic, Tsao Ching-hua, wrote that for those who were carrying out the agrarian reform in China, M. Sholokhov's *Virgin Soil Upturned* became a manual that answered many of their questions. Tsao Ching-hua quoted one of the executives of the agrarian reform as saying: "Wherever we were during this tense struggle, we tried to use every spare minute to study this book carefully once again."<sup>2</sup>

The publication in China of classical Russian and Soviet literature expanded from year to year until the time when Peking began openly to curtail its cultural relations with the Soviet Union.

In eight years, more than 13,000 titles of books by Soviet authors alone were translated and printed in a total of some 230 million copies in China.

In 1957, the Union of Chinese Writers sent a message of greeting to the Union of Soviet Writers on the occasion of the 40th anniversary

<sup>1</sup> *Hsinhua yuehkang*, Peking, 1950.

<sup>2</sup> *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, December 9, 1954.

of the Great October Socialist Revolution with the following statement: "The Chinese people are constant readers of Soviet literature, which they regard as a textbook of life and struggle. . . Chinese writers have always taken Soviet literature as a model; they seriously study its rich experience and are ready to take a firm stand in defence of socialist realism in literature, side by side with Soviet writers."<sup>1</sup>

Similarly, Chinese literature was widely published in the Soviet Union. From 1946 to 1960, 976 titles of books by Chinese authors came out in some 43 million copies in Russian translation and 50 other languages spoken in the USSR. There was mass production of the works of Li Sun, Mao Tun, Lao She, Chao Shu-li and other writers, the anthology of Chinese poetry, and classics like *The Book of Songs*, *Triple Reign*, *Slumber in the Red Tower*, *The Riverside Factories*, *Journey to the West* and many others. In 1951, the novels *Sun over the Sangkan River*, by Ting Li, and *The Hurricane*, by Chou Li-po, and the play *The Grey-Haired Girl*, by Ho Ching-chih and Ting Li, were awarded the highest literary prize in the Soviet Union. The plays *The Grey-Haired Girl*, by Ho Ching-chih and Ting Li, *The Hurricane*, by Tsao Yua, and *The Spilled Bowl*, by Wang Shih-fu, were staged in 40 Soviet theatres within a few years.<sup>2</sup>

At the request of the Chinese Government, the Soviet Union, in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism, sent about 2,000 experts to China, during the years 1949-60,

<sup>1</sup> G. M. Novak, *Cultural Construction in China*, Znaniye Publishers, 1959, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 46.

for long-term work in the fields of culture and education. This was approximately 20 per cent of all Soviet specialists appointed to missions in China.

From 1949 to 1960, Soviet teachers trained nearly 17,000 graduates in China. If the number of Chinese teachers trained in the Soviet Union is added to this figure (about 1,700), the total would be roughly a quarter of China's teaching staff—85,000 in 1959.<sup>1</sup> From 1951 to 1962, more than 11,000 students and post-graduates from China attended Soviet higher educational establishments.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Government undertook to pay 50 per cent of the cost of their training.

There were close Soviet-Chinese ties in the field of cinematic art. From 1949 to 1959, about 750 Soviet films were shown in China and they were seen by nearly 2,000 million people. In the same period over 100 Chinese films were shown in the Soviet Union. During these ten years, 112 Soviet theatrical companies gave guest performances in China, and 134 Chinese art teams visited the USSR.

In 1949-59, the following famous theatrical companies toured China: the USSR State Folk Dance Company directed by I. Moiseyev, the Moscow State Musical Theatre named after People's Artistes of the USSR, K. S. Stanislavsky and V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, the "Beryozka" State Choreographic Company, the State

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<sup>1</sup> *Educational Development During the Ten Years Following the Proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic, Statistics*, Ministry of Education of China, Peking, 1959, p. 5 (published in Chinese).

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, April 5, 1964.

Dance Company of the Ukraine, the touring group of the Soviet circus, the Kurmangazy Kazakh State Orchestra of Folk Instruments, the ballet company of the Novosibirsk Opera and Ballet Theatre, the USSR State Symphony Orchestra, the Azerbaijan Song and Dance Company, the ballet company of the USSR State Academic Bolshoi Theatre and others. During those years China was entertained by the outstanding Soviet performers Maxim Mikhailov, Galina Ulanova, David Oistrakh, Stanislav Rikhter; Sergei Obraztsov, Tamara Khanum, Galina Oleynichenko, Yuri Fayer, Tit Kuuzik, Maya Plisetskaya, Olga Lepeshinskaya, and many others.

In February, 1960, the Chinese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chen Ih, declared: "Soviet assistance is facilitating China's rise to the summit of world science and culture within a brief historical period."<sup>1</sup>

In whatever sphere the Soviet Union promoted cooperation with the Chinese People's Republic, it proceeded from the principal point—to work vigorously to facilitate the construction of the new society in China and to consolidate Soviet-Chinese friendship.

## DEFYING THE INTERESTS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

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The sudden curtailment of Soviet-Chinese economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation was the outcome of a radical

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, February 14, 1960.

change in Peking's home and foreign policy. This change was not unexpected, for it was prepared and implemented by degrees over a number of years, beginning long before the major and open turn in Chinese policy towards the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of 1958, the Chinese People's Republic experienced a wave of labour enthusiasm called forth by the successful completion of the first five-year plan. In the first half of 1958, the exceptionally high rates of economic development reached in the five-year plan period were not only maintained, but even far exceeded. These successes and the growing zeal of the working people were by themselves encouraging and served as good prerequisites for the further development of economic and cultural construction.

But there were other consequences as well. The achievements made the Chinese leaders increasingly intoxicated and they were inclined to overestimate their powers and capacities, to become conceited, to ignore the experience of other countries, to disregard reality and to indulge in economic adventurism. The result was the putting forward of the "big leap" course which was supposed to transform China into a prospering country and the world's leading power within a few years. This idea was expressed in the slogans proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung: "Work vigorously for three years so as to change the face of the greater part of the country." "A few years of persistent work will yield ten thousand years of prosperity."

The 2nd session of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party changed all the

earlier plans for economic development in the direction of their unrestrained expansion. Ardent calls were made for the steady increase of growth rates; almost every day industrial and agricultural ministries, government departments and local production units put forward new reciprocal plans and took obligations that went further and further beyond feasibility.

Faced with the country-wide "rates fever" they themselves had created, the Chinese leaders lost their sense of reality and became over-confident. Mao Tse-tung decided to fulfil, in a few years' time, the tasks to which three five-year plans and more had been assigned in 1956. Gross industrial output was to be increased by 6.5 times within five years (1958-62) at an average annual growth rate of 45 per cent, and gross agricultural production by 2.5 times (average annual growth of 20 per cent). These plans lacked any economic basis and took no account of the country's potentialities. According to the official announcements of the Peking leaders, the people's communes set up in the countryside were supposed to ensure the "leap to communism" in from three to six years!

The widespread unrealistic approach to various tasks facing economic and cultural construction and the development of science and technology was promoted by the Mao Tse-tung initiated movement against "blind faith" in foreign know-how, which in effect is a rejection of everything progressive and advanced.

The application of Soviet know-how too became a target of the struggle against "blind faith." There were more and more frequent cases when the recommendations of Soviet specialists were

criticised and ignored, and the quality of Soviet-made equipment doubted. And the significance of Soviet assistance in general began to be underestimated.

Against the advice of Soviet specialists, in the third and fourth quarters of 1958, China's industrial enterprises eliminated all technical services (engineering divisions, chief mechanical engineer's and chief power engineer's divisions, technical control department) and the necessary instructions and standards were taken away from the workers. All these things caused disruption of production and colossal spoilage.

Neglecting the recommendations of Soviet specialists and gross violations of Soviet technical rates often caused serious accidents with human victims. Such cases happened, for example, at the Hsinganchian and Hsinfuchian hydro-power stations.

The Soviet specialists had to fight against the "innovations" that were causing disruption of production, which had been laboriously built up by the Chinese working people with Soviet help and support. They strongly advised the managers of industrial enterprises not to make groundless deviations from the established and tested technological process, from the technical requirements for the quality of products, and not to allow the break-up of the management system that had justified itself.

Besides oral recommendations, the Soviet specialists sent special letters to the managers of enterprises and to the corresponding ministries in China. But their sincere and well-founded advice was not heeded. This discrediting of



Soviet technical know-how made the presence of Soviet specialists in China senseless.

The leaders of the Soviet specialists repeatedly tried to raise the questions concerning the conditions of their work before the Chinese Government and the CPC Central Committee. This was mentioned many times by the Soviet side at the discussions and talks held in 1958-59 at Party and Government level. The Soviet Government several times proposed recalling its engineers and technicians who were no longer needed due to the training of national cadres in China. But although the Chinese leaders rejected these proposals, they continued a course of action that made it unbearable for the Soviet specialists to remain in China.

The Soviet specialists were looked upon with suspicion, they were watched, their personal belongings were examined and their letters inspected. And, worst of all, their recommendations and advice were no longer taken into consideration.

On top of that, in the spring of 1960, Chinese organisations began ideological indoctrination of Soviet specialists in an attempt to set them against the USSR's home and foreign policy. This naturally made all Soviet people working in China indignant, and they demanded an end to the provocations of the Chinese authorities.

Time and again the Soviet side drew attention to cases of maltreatment of its specialists and insisted that they be provided with normal working conditions.

However, the Chinese authorities continued to act as before. In this situation the only way out was to recall the Soviet specialists from China.

Formally regretting the recall, the Chinese leaders actually took no constructive measures to resolve the problem. This is evidenced by the fact that the Soviet Embassy in China did not receive an answer to the Soviet note about the recall until July 31—two weeks after the Chinese Foreign Ministry had been informed about the departure of the first groups of specialists for home. Instead of finding a solution, the Chinese Foreign Ministry tried to mislead public opinion inside the country and abroad and to present China as the “innocent victim.” Contrary to the standards of international relations, the note from the Chinese Foreign Ministry affirmed the “right” of the Chinese side to continue political incitement among Soviet people.

The Soviet side more than once expressed its readiness to return the specialists to China provided they were given normal working conditions. This was announced in November 1960 to the Chinese delegation that attended the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties, to the Chinese Communist Party delegation that came to the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, to the Chinese delegation at the Soviet-Chinese bilateral meeting held in July 1963, and it was mentioned in the letter of November 29, 1963, sent by the CPSU Central Committee to the CPC Central Committee.

The Chinese Government took no advantage of the above-mentioned proposals despite the fact that Chinese organisations needed Soviet assistance in assembling and setting up the complex, unique equipment delivered by the Soviet Union.

The argument of the Chinese leaders that the

recall of the Soviet specialists caused damage to the Chinese economy—to industry, agriculture, construction and research work, and that this compelled the Chinese Government to revise the whole plan for economic development, for capital construction projects and for the subjects of research—is wide open to criticism.

Chinese industry fulfilled the plan for the second quarter of 1960 by less than 90 per cent; so the failure to fulfil plans began long before the Soviet specialists were recalled.

Indeed, how could their recall influence such branches of the economy as agriculture, the light industry, and the mining, oil and timber industries, if they employed only a small number of Soviet specialists in 1960—three in the mining and seven in the oil industry, two in the system of agricultural machine-building, three in the State Farm and Virgin Land Ministry, and only one in the Ministries of Agriculture and Timber Industry. Incidentally, during the “big leap” years the greatest failures occurred in the light industry and in the mining, timber, and other industries and especially in agriculture.

The events following the recall of the Soviet specialists showed that Peking had embarked on a consistent course of severing all kinds of co-operation with the USSR.

In 1960, for the first time in eleven years, the Chinese side failed to fulfil its trade obligations involving a large sum, and even refused to send some deliveries agreed upon by contract. Throughout 1960, Chinese foreign trade organisations did not meet their commitments, as a result of which Soviet-Chinese trade turnover dropped by 19 per cent as compared with 1959.

At the request of the Chinese side, the conclusion of a long-term trade agreement between the two countries was postponed for an indefinite period.

On October 31, 1960, the Chinese Government made a declaration demanding a revision of all earlier agreements and protocols on economic, scientific and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union with the aim of their sharp curtailment.

At the February-June, 1961, talks on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, which ended in the signing of the agreement of June 19, 1961, the Chinese representatives rejected further Soviet assistance in building 89 industrial projects and 35 others involving a total of 1,100 million roubles. The agreement stipulated that the Soviet Union was to give China technical aid in the 1961-67 period for the construction of only 66 installations indispensable for the development of civilian industry and especially for the defence industry. The aid for these installations was estimated to be worth approximately 500 million roubles. Agreement was also reached on technical assistance in building a gas mains, a semiconductor factory and two research institutions. As a result, in 1961, Soviet deliveries of complete sets of plant to China totalled 60-62 million roubles only, that is, about a fifth of the 1960 figure.

At the talks held in February-June, 1961, the Chinese representatives gave the following reasons for the measures to reduce economic cooperation with the Soviet Union:

“First, the Soviet Union has helped China to build the foundations of a modern industry and technology. In future the construction and

designing of most projects will be done by us so as to facilitate the USSR's efforts to help China. However, in the future we shall have to ask for Soviet assistance for the projects which we cannot design, build and equip on our own.

"Second, the CPC Central Committee and the Chinese Government consider it necessary to concentrate every effort on the construction of key projects, to reduce capital construction and the number of projects which are not urgent in order to better implement the principle of building socialism in China: 'Better, more, faster and more thriftily.' The country will stick to large scales and high rates of development.

"Third, the natural disasters in agriculture of the last two years have given rise to certain difficulties in the balance of trade. So, by reducing the number of projects being built with Soviet assistance, we hope to create the conditions for more favourable cooperation between our countries." (Quoted from the statement made by Ku Cho-hsin, head of the Chinese Government delegation at the Soviet-Chinese talks held on February 10, 1961.)

This explanation did not rule out further development of Soviet-Chinese economic relations. The Soviet Government had to reckon with the arguments of the Chinese Government, which found itself in a difficult position. The Soviet side saw to it that the communique issued after the talks mentioned the desire of both parties for mutual cooperation. It stated: "Both sides have summed up the results of the work done in the last few years and consider that the economic, scientific and technical cooperation carried out by the USSR and China on the principles of

proletarian internationalism, equality and fraternal mutual assistance was fruitful." The communique also pointed out that in order to consolidate and promote Soviet-Chinese scientific and technical cooperation and to bring about a general upswing in the national economy, science and technology in both countries, it had been agreed to exchange know-how and achievements in the various branches of economy, science and technology.<sup>1</sup>

However, on August 15, two months after the signing of the agreement of June 19, 1961, the Chinese Government announced a new cutback in the orders for Soviet equipment owing to the usual "difficulties" facing China. This time too the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government showed due understanding of the wishes of the Chinese side and deferred the deliveries of complete sets of plant, although most of it (costing tens of millions of roubles) was either in the process of manufacture or had already been ordered from other countries and could not be used in the Soviet Union.

But this was not the end of it. In early December, 1961, China announced the *total cancellation* of the import of complete sets of plant from the USSR throughout 1962-63. Thus, three times in less than half a year, the Chinese Government unilaterally changed the terms of the agreements and contracts which were in force, disregarding the harm that this did to the Soviet enterprises fulfilling Chinese orders.

It is obvious that these acts of the Chinese Government could not have been motivated by

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, June 23, 1961.

economic difficulties alone. The main cause was the political considerations emanating from Peking's policy of aggravating Soviet-Chinese relations. This was the reason behind the Chinese Government's decision to close for two years the industrial enterprises being built with Soviet technical aid, irrespective of the degree of their completion and equipment already sent. Among them there were important projects which were completed except for a few accessories needed to put them into operation. The Chinese leaders ignored the fact that postponing the date of putting these projects into operation would inevitably affect the entire development of certain industries.

The agreement of June 19, 1961, envisaged the possibility of sending Soviet engineers and technicians on a mission to China. But despite the urgent need of many Chinese organisations for technical aid, and the "damage" which Chinese representatives many times claimed to have been caused by the recall of Soviet specialists, throughout 1961 they asked for only 11 specialists: four to help assemble equipment at the Sanmen hydropower station and seven to train in the use of aeroplanes for agricultural purposes. The request was granted.

In 1960-61, Soviet-Chinese *scientific and technical cooperation* was sharply curtailed through the fault of the Chinese leaders. In October, 1960, the Chinese side unexpectedly proposed reconsidering the earlier Soviet-Chinese agreements on scientific and technical cooperation and annulling all obligations stipulated by these agreements. This resulted in the annulment of the Soviet obligations regarding the transfer of

1,129 items of technical documentation and 26 points concerning the enrolment of Chinese specialists.

In the second half of 1960 the Chinese side was inclined to discourage *cultural cooperation* with the USSR and attempts were made to restrict contacts between cultural leaders in the two countries. The Chinese representatives proposed retaining only 34 out of the 94 points included in the Soviet draft plan for 1961. The number of measures envisaged in the 1961 plan was 30 per cent less than in the one for 1960, and after cancelling (as the Chinese side wanted) a number of points in the course of its implementation, the volume of cultural cooperation again fell by nearly 10 per cent.

In subsequent years the policy pursued by the Peking leaders practically put an end to Soviet-Chinese economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation.

On April 21, 1965, the Chinese Government announced the abrogation of the Soviet commitments regarding the 65 enterprises envisaged in the agreement of June 19, 1961—the last projects that were to be built with Soviet assistance. Soviet deliveries of complete sets of plant in 1965 were hundred times less than the 1959 figure, and the volume of Soviet-Chinese cooperation was reduced by several hundred times within this period.

In fact, trade remained the only form of economic relations between the USSR and China, but its volume was so small as to be insignificant, amounting to less than 100 million roubles in 1967-69.



Cultural ties between the USSR and China were broken off completely in 1967.

The rupture by the Peking leaders of economic, scientific and technical, and cultural co-operation with the Soviet Union caused great damage to, and still impairs, the interests of the Chinese People's Republic.

In the years of Soviet-Chinese cooperation China had built up whole industries, including the tractor, aircraft, motor-car, instrument-making and other industries indispensable to the economy of a modern state. The output of key industrial products—such as iron, steel, oil, and chemical fertilisers—had increased several times over. The country had trained an army of highly skilled specialists, scientific and cultural workers: doctors, engineers, musicians, astronomers, chemists, metallurgists, designers of modern machines and instruments.

In the period following the ending by Peking of Soviet-Chinese cooperation, the Chinese economy ceased to progress. As a result of the collapse of the "big leap" course and the catastrophic consequences of the "cultural revolution," the Chinese economy deteriorated far behind the 1959 level. In 1965, on the eve of the "cultural revolution," gross industrial output was 26 per cent below the 1959 level. In 1967, when the "cultural revolution" was at its height, the production of coal, comprising 90 per cent of the country's fuel, fell by 40 per cent, electric power by 30 per cent, and steel by 25-30 per cent. Many enterprises were almost completely paralysed. In 1968, the second year of the "cultural revolution," industrial output dropped by

20 per cent as compared with 1966, when this campaign was still in its infancy.

It was only in 1969, that some economic indices again reached the 1959 level. Some branches, including agriculture, are still below the 1957 level. There has been an irretrievable loss of 10-12 years. It is easy to imagine the great progress the Chinese economy would have made had it developed with Soviet assistance and support, as it did during the first five-year-plan period.

“WE BEAR IN MIND THAT THE  
FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF  
THE CHINESE AND SOVIET  
PEOPLES COINCIDE”

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Throughout the period in which the USSR and China maintained relations, the Soviet side made constant and strenuous efforts to avert the rise and aggravation of Soviet-Chinese dissension, to consolidate friendship and cooperation between the two countries on the basis of proletarian internationalism.

This course is determined by the principled stand of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union towards China. This stand was once again explicitly confirmed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, in his speech made at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969. “The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government,” he said, “chart their policy on long-term

perspective. We are conscious of the fact that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide. We have always preserved and will continue to preserve in our efforts to keep alive the friendly feelings which exist among the Soviet people for the fraternal Chinese people, we are certain that the Chinese people, too, have the same feelings towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.”<sup>1</sup>

After the Peking leaders had proceeded to wind up Soviet-Chinese economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation, numerous steps were taken by the Soviet Union to prevent such a turn of events and to resume the development and consolidation of relations between the two countries. Here are but a few of the facts which bear this out.

In 1960, the Soviet Union invited China to conclude a long-term trade agreement;

in 1961—to sign a protocol on the exchange of information about economic development and foreign trade;

in early 1962—to exchange industrial exhibitions displaying the achievements of the two countries in socialist construction;

in April, 1962—to start joint elaboration of concrete measures for the joint exploitation of the natural resources of the Amur basin;

in late 1962—to hold talks to specify the volume and nomenclature of the equipment which China would like to receive from the USSR above the quantities stipulated by the Protocol of May 13, 1962, and to further examine the question of sending Soviet specialists to

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, June 8, 1969.

China to help assemble and set up the installations delivered by the Soviet Union. In the same year a long-term trade agreement was again proposed;

in April, 1963, the Soviet Government expressed readiness to give China equipment on credit for expanding tin extraction with the aim of increasing China's export resources.

All these and many other Soviet proposals were either rejected or simply ignored.

An extensive programme for the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations was put forward in the letter of November 29, 1963, sent by the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The letter stated that despite the existing dissension, it was necessary to concentrate on promoting co-operation for the sake of consolidating friendship between the USSR and China. Clarifying this idea, the CPSU Central Committee proposed the elaboration of jointly coordinated plans for bilateral trade, and augmentation in the next few years of the export of goods China needed and the import from China of goods in which the Soviet Union was interested. It was also suggested that agreement should be reached to extend technical aid to China for the construction of industrial enterprises, and to discuss the possibility of rendering assistance in developing the oil industry, and in building enterprises for the mining and other industries on terms favourable to both countries.

The CPSU Central Committee again confirmed its willingness to send specialists to the Chinese People's Republic if need be.

In view of the fact that the Soviet Union was

drawing up its next five-year plan, and China, its third five-year plan, the Soviet side suggested discussing the possibility of promoting bilateral trade and other ties and providing for these in the economic plans of both countries.

The proposals made in the letter for the expansion of Soviet-Chinese scientific and technical and cultural cooperation were very important.

For a long time the Chinese leaders did not answer the letter of the CPSU Central Committee (the reply did not come until three months later), but all their acts showed that this time too they had no intention of agreeing to any of the proposals to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations. Undisguised anti-Soviet propaganda continued to fill the Chinese papers. When at last the reply came (February 29, 1964), it contained no mention whatsoever of the Soviet programme for constructive measures to normalise and develop relations between the two countries.

In late 1964—early 1965, the Soviet Union took the initiative to improve relations with China.

The Soviet Government unilaterally resumed the dispatch to China of information about major international issues, supported the Chinese proposal to call a conference of Heads of State to discuss the prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and backed the Chinese Government's requests asking the UN to discuss the restoration of China's lawful rights to membership in this organisation. The Soviet representatives vigorously countered the motion of the hostile forces to bring up the so-called Tibetan question at the 19th UN General Assembly.

In November, 1964, a Chinese Party and Government delegation was invited to Moscow to attend the celebration of the 47th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the talks that followed, the Soviet side pointed out the necessity of starting to normalise the situation, despite the dissension, so as to create the conditions necessary for calm and business-like discussion of the controversial issues, which might be overcome with time and effort. With this purpose in view the USSR suggested that open polemics should be stopped and expressed its readiness to discuss the problems of inter-governmental ties, including trade.

The Chinese delegation evaded the discussion of these proposals and rejected the one on halting open polemics. When asked to say something definite about the development of Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations, it replied that it was not authorised to do so.

At the end of the talks, the Soviet delegation took a new initiative in proposing to hold, as soon as the Chinese side was ready, a high-level meeting of CPSU and CPC representatives to discuss a number of problems and in order to restore confidence between the two countries step by step and consolidate their unity. The Soviet side agreed to hold this meeting either in Moscow or Peking, and to make it either open or closed.

The CPC leaders did not support this proposal either and presented the case in a way that made its realisation appear to be the business of the Soviet Union alone.

In the fourth quarter of 1964, Soviet organisations took the initiative in resuming the active

exchange of delegations with China through cultural cooperation and through the Friendship Societies. Delegations of the USSR Ministry of Culture, writers, representatives of the cinema and theatre, of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, ballet dancers and others were sent to China. In early February, 1965, Soviet organisations submitted to the Chinese Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, and to the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, the draft plans of cooperation for 1965, which provided for a significant expansion of these ties.

On December 18, 1964, it was suggested to the Chinese side that the 24th session of the Soviet-Chinese Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation should be held between December, 1964, and January, 1965. The Soviet State Committee for Coordinated Research handed the Chinese Embassy in Moscow a memorandum with concrete proposals relating to the session.

Peking remained indifferent to these positive steps.

In February, 1965, Alexei Kosygin, Soviet Prime Minister, met Chinese leaders in Peking, where he made a stop while on his way to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to the Korean People's Democratic Republic. He expressed readiness to discuss a number of important problems, including those concerning the prospects of normalising relations between the USSR and China. But this time too the Peking leaders avoided examining the possibility of improving these relations. They also rejected the proposal to hold a high-level bilateral meeting of Party representatives where all controversial

issues might be discussed in detail.

Prompted by its principled stand in the matter of normalising Soviet-Chinese relations, the CPSU Central Committee invited the Communist Party of China to attend the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in March-April, 1966. The CPSU Central Committee informed the Congress of its willingness to discuss with the Chinese leaders the existing discord at any time in order to find ways of overcoming it. This policy was unanimously approved by the Congress, which pointed out in its resolution on the Report of the CPSU Central Committee: "The Congress approves the activities of the CC CPSU and the concrete measures aimed at adjusting differences with the Communist Party of China on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism. The Congress expresses confidence that our Parties and the peoples of our countries will eventually overcome the difficulties and march shoulder to shoulder in the struggle for the common great revolutionary cause."<sup>1</sup>

Nonetheless, the Chinese leaders showed hostility towards the 23rd Congress of the CPSU and stepped up their anti-Soviet campaign.

After the beginning of the so-called cultural revolution, the Peking leaders vigorously aggravated relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Embassy in Peking was surrounded by aggressive demonstrators. There were gross violations of the accepted standards of international law. The authorities connived at, and even encouraged, the destruction of the monuments symbolising the friendship of the two peoples, including the monument to the Russian

<sup>1</sup> *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, M., 1966, p. 279.



poet, Alexander Pushkin, (erected in China before it had become a people's republic) and the monument to Soviet-Chinese friendship in Shanghai.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union showed exceptional restraint called forth by an awareness of the considerable responsibility for the fate of the friendly relations between the two countries. On September 1, 1966, the Soviet press carried a report entitled "In the CPSU Central Committee," which pointed out that the Chinese leaders "are again provoking a sharp aggravation of relations between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic." At the same time the CPSU Central Committee made it clear that "despite the difficulties created by the Chinese leadership, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would continue to follow the policy of consolidating friendship with Chinese Communists and with the millions of Chinese people." <sup>1</sup>

In December, 1966, the CPSU Central Committee Plenary Meeting likewise confirmed the resolute Soviet policy of promoting friendship and cooperation with the Chinese People's Republic.

Although in the course of the "cultural revolution" the anti-Soviet policy of the Peking leaders became increasingly obvious and challenging, the Soviet Union never for a moment ceased to look for a favourable opportunity for developing relations with China. On January 4, 1969, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin said in reply to a question of the Japanese newspaper

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, September 1, 1966.

*Mainichi Shimbun* concerning the state of Soviet-Chinese relations: "However difficult the settlement of our relations may seem, we are optimistic. The genuine interests of our peoples demand that the Chinese people should take their place in the united ranks of the socialist nations and all anti-imperialist forces. The Soviet Union has been pursuing the policy of promoting and consolidating friendship with the Chinese people and will continue to do so. We are confident that sooner or later the cause of Soviet-Chinese friendship will triumph."

In mid-January, 1969, while making their unparalleled group flight in space, the Soviet cosmonauts V. Shatalov, B. Volynov, A. Eliseyev and E. Khrunov conveyed the following greetings to the Chinese people: "We send our regards from space to the millions of Chinese people. We believe in the inviolable friendship of the Soviet and Chinese peoples."<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union maintains an explicit stand on the Soviet-Chinese frontier issue advanced by Peking. After the very first border incidents the Soviet side began to work for a settlement of this issue through negotiations, proceeding from the fact that the Soviet-Chinese frontier has a historical background and is legalised, and that it is only a question of specifying the frontier line in certain areas. In February, 1964, the Soviet Union initiated consultations on this issue, but they were interrupted and brought no positive results.

When the situation at the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated in March, 1969, the Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, January 18, 1969.

Government again put forward constructive proposals for a settlement. Its March 29 statement called for an early resumption of the consultations begun in Peking in 1964. Ardently seeking to ensure lasting peace and security, to maintain friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people, the Soviet Government stressed the necessity of taking urgent practical measures to normalise the situation on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. It called on the Chinese Government to cease hostilities at the frontier in order to avoid complications and to resolve all differences peacefully. This stand was reaffirmed in the Soviet Government statement of June 13, 1969.

The Soviet-initiated meeting of Prime Ministers Alexei Kosygin and Chou En-lai in September, 1969, in Peking promoted the normalisation of relations between the two countries. A number of questions relating to Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations were discussed. The discussion was later carried on by official correspondence.<sup>1</sup>

The still progressing Soviet-Chinese talks on frontier issues were sponsored by the Soviet Union in October, 1969.<sup>2</sup>

The forces hostile to the Soviet Union and China are making all sorts of provocations to prevent the normalisation of relations between the two countries and to hinder the talks on the frontier issues. Especially provocative are the insinuations about the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border. There are rumours that the

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, September 12 and October 28, 1969.

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, February 6, 1970.

Soviet Union is preparing for an "assault on the Chinese People's Republic" by engaging in "large-scale military operations." These instigations are taken up by Chinese propaganda, which has launched a "war preparation" campaign in the country.

To refute these fabrications, on March 14, 1970, TASS issued the following statement: "It is a consistent policy of the Soviet Union and its Government to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations, to develop cooperation and restore and strengthen friendship between the peoples of the two countries. This policy will not be changed by the provocative tricks of imperialist propaganda and the enemies of peace and international cooperation."<sup>1</sup>

The restoration, development and consolidation of friendship and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union accord with the interests of their peoples and would be welcomed by progressive forces throughout the world. There is no doubt that this aim is predetermined by contemporary historical development, and the Soviet side has been doing everything necessary for its successful and speedy achievement.

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<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, March 14, 1970.

Б. КОЛОСКОВ  
**СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ — КИТАЙ**  
*на английском языке*

Цена 25 коп.





