

# The U.S.S.R. and World Peace

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*NOTE: It has not been possible in the space of this small booklet to publish the complete text of all the speeches made by Mr. Vyshinsky on the occasions reported. An effort has been made to give the most pertinent sections on the main issues considered, although of necessity many important points have been omitted. The main body of the text is comprised of Mr. Vyshinsky's own words. In smaller type are summaries of Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks, in which we have endeavored to adhere as closely as possible to the original text, and also brief editorial commentary to provide the reader with the necessary background and context of the speeches.*



# *Editor's Foreword*

THESE SELECTIONS from the speeches of Andrei Y. Vyshinsky at the Paris Assembly of the United Nations held in the latter part of 1948, and concurrent Security Council sessions, and the May-June, 1949, session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris are presented with the aim of setting forth the Soviet viewpoint on some of the main issues there considered. Mr. Vyshinsky, in 1948 Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister, and leader of the Soviet delegation to the Paris Assembly sessions, has since become the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., which gives his statements increased authority and makes a study of them essential to an understanding of the consistent role of the Soviet Union in seeking to keep the United Nations true to its high purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

The record of our own country at the Paris General Assembly session reveals efforts in the opposite direction. When the United States delegates packed up their unfinished business and came home, they claimed victories over the Soviet Union "on every major issue"—but these victories were not of a nature to strengthen the cause of international co-operation and peace. On the contrary, Anglo-American policies only served to widen the breach between East and West. Instead of leading to mutually satisfactory settlements, these policies resulted in one Soviet proposal after another being voted down in the General Assembly. There has been a great deal of talk about the Soviet "No's" in the United Nations. But the American record of "No's" at this session contradicts the charges that it is Soviet "obstructionism" which has created the difficulties within the U. N.

The "No's" began with American rejection on the eve of the Assembly session of the Soviet proposal, made originally a year before, that both countries should withdraw their troops from Korea. The

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Soviet Union proceeded to take this important step toward peace despite the United States refusal.

The United States also said "No" to continued Soviet efforts to solve the Berlin crisis, making it clear it wanted the crisis to continue, as a pretext for bringing the issue before the U.N. and branding the Soviet Union as "an enemy of world peace."

Opening statements at the Assembly by countries following this Anglo-American line contained attacks of unparalleled ferocity against the U.S.S.R. The Assembly ganged up in the unprecedented action of refusing the U.S.S.R. and the countries of the People's Democracy a single presidency in the six major working commissions, thus violating the U.N. Charter provision for fair geographic representation in these posts.

To the outpouring of hatred and hostility against the Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky gave answer by recommending concrete steps toward implementing previous U.N. decisions on armament reduction, which were dismissed by the Western bloc as "vain and empty propaganda." The highly important Soviet concessions agreeing to simultaneous conventions on outlawry of atom bombs and control of atomic energy were rejected by the U.S. delegation as an "oriental maneuver."

Despite the plain record that chaotic conditions in Greece were the direct result of Anglo-American intervention and the operations of the Truman Doctrine in backing up the terrorist monarcho-fascist government, blame was again placed on Greece's northern neighbors and, by implication, the Soviet Union, and the Soviet proposal to withdraw all foreign troops from Greece was voted down.

Soviet efforts to achieve a more effective Declaration of Human Rights were also defeated.

The Soviet Union alone took a strong stand in support of the interests of Israel, then still an arena of bloody conflict. The Soviet delegation called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and an Israel-Arab settlement on the basis of the original U.N. partition plan. Instead, a Conciliation Commission weighted in favor of the Arabs was set up.

Disregarding the Soviet proposal to withdraw both Soviet and U.S. troops from Korea and provide for free elections to set up a unified all-Korean government, the United States forced through a

resolution recognizing the American sponsored government in Seoul, with a vague provision for withdrawal of American troops "as early as practicable." (While U.S. troops have since been withdrawn, an American military mission remains, and U.S. money and arms are supporting a brutal, reactionary regime in the South.)

New efforts were made to undermine the United Nations by restricting the unanimity principle, or veto power, established in the U.N. Charter provisions for Security Council voting, and the illegal Interim Committee or "Little Assembly," set up to by-pass the Security Council, was continued for another year over Soviet objections.

The applications of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the Mongolian People's Republic for admission to the United Nations met with stubborn opposition from the Anglo-American bloc. This fact was played down, while the Soviet Union was attacked for vetoing the applications of Portugal, Transjordan, Ireland, Austria, Italy, Finland, and Ceylon. Mr. Vyshinsky made clear that it was not a question of opposition to the admission of these states *per se*, but to the policy pursued by the Anglo-American bloc of discrimination against admission of some states, and a policy of favoritism toward others. He pointed out that the Potsdam agreement obligated the signatories to support the admission to the U.N. of the five states with whom peace treaties were subsequently concluded, and that for this reason there was no basis for the Anglo-American position of supporting applications from Italy and Finland while opposing admission of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The U.S.S.R. expressed its willingness to admit Italy and Finland if the latter three countries were also admitted. Austria, it was explained, was not yet eligible under the U.N. Charter, since no peace treaty had yet been signed with that country. In the case of Ceylon, the Soviet Union had asked for more time in order to ascertain whether this country could meet the requirements for membership, but this had been denied.

The hollow "victories" in securing defeat of most of the moves made by the U.S.S.R. at the Paris Assembly session did not add to the prestige of the United States. Soviet policies, on the other hand, won wide support among many of the nations whose forced dependence on the United States compels them to vote with the Anglo-American bloc. The Soviet arms reduction proposal won worldwide acclaim. The dismay spread by the position of the United States

among those sincerely desiring peace became especially evident in the efforts of a group of smaller powers and leading United Nations officials to secure a settlement of the Berlin issue outside of the Security Council, where it should never have been brought up. These negotiations left no doubt as to where the obstructionism lay.

This became all the clearer when the announcement was made on May 5 that traffic restrictions in Berlin would be lifted by both the Soviet and Western occupation authorities, and that a Foreign Ministers' Conference on Germany would be convened. The settlement regarding Berlin could have been reached at any time during the past year. The fact that the United States did not wish a settlement was underlined by the attempt to keep secret the fact of the negotiations on Berlin between Mr. Philip Jessup, U.S. representative in the U.N., and Mr. Jacob Malik, U.S.S.R. Security Council representative. The United States needed the continued crisis in order to put over the North Atlantic Pact, dividing the world into two hostile blocs instead of uniting it for peace.

This was demonstrated by the attitude taken by the U.S. delegation at the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, where they hoped to achieve acceptance of their policy of splitting Germany. This effort failed, due, as Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out, to the firm stand taken by the Soviet Union which was willing to make concessions in order to reach agreement, but not to compromise on the basic principles of the Potsdam Pact for a united, democratic Germany, never again able to threaten the peace of the world. It failed, too, because of the growing world economic crisis brought on by the cold war policy of the Truman Administration and because of the growing strength of the world's peace forces. The results of the Paris Foreign Ministers' Conference, however limited, resulted in an easing of the international tensions, and demonstrated the utter untenability of the grounds on which the North Atlantic Pact is based.

This booklet records only a few aspects of the long and consistent Soviet struggle for peace and international co-operation. It is enough to make clear the determination of the U.S.S.R. to remain faithful to its international commitments, to find the way to peaceful co-existence between the capitalist and socialist systems and safeguard mankind from the horrors of another war.

August, 1949.

J. S.

# Atomic Energy Control and Arms Reduction

THE CONTROL of atomic energy by an international body has been the subject of prolonged debate in the United Nations. On January 24, 1946, the General Assembly passed a resolution dealing with the prohibition of the atomic weapon for mass extermination and urging international control of atomic energy and other new technical developments with a war potential. At this meeting the General Assembly also established a commission to prepare and submit proposals for eliminating the atomic weapon and insuring international control. Later that year, on December 14, 1946, the General Assembly urged the commission to fulfill its tasks in the shortest possible time.

The work of the commission was centered on the Baruch plan for international atomic control, by the insistence of the United States delegation which had submitted it in June, 1946. The Baruch plan, which was based on control of atomic raw materials, envisaged control of atomic energy in successive stages and specified that the United States was prepared to transfer control to an international body only to the extent necessary at each successive stage, thereby indicating that control of the production of atomic weapons would be postponed to the distant future. According to a statement made by Mr. Baruch, manufacture of the atomic bomb would be discontinued, the bombs in existence disposed of, and the information on the production of atomic energy placed at the disposal of an international body only after an appropriate system of control of the bomb was agreed upon and appropriate penalties for violating the regulations of control as an international crime were established.

The Soviet Union had from the beginning taken the stand that the use of atomic energy as a destructive weapon must be separated

from its use for constructive purposes, and that the first step should be a convention outlawing atomic bombs, to be followed by a separate convention providing for control of atomic energy. The Soviet representatives took issue with the Baruch plan device for the elimination of the veto power in atomic matters by turning over to a special atomic commission, operating without the veto power, the right to apply sanctions, maintaining that only the Security Council, where the veto is operative, has this right.

In the course of the discussions on the American plan, the Soviet Union had throughout shown its readiness to make concessions on certain points. It agreed that once the control convention was concluded, its day to day operations would not be subject to the veto. It agreed on the principle of international inspection, to which it had originally objected.

The concrete Soviet proposals were submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission on June 11, 1947, but shelved on American insistence. Not until January, 1948, were the Soviet delegates able to get a point-by-point discussion of their plan. The majority refused to make any concession whatsoever and finally put through a report terminating discussions on the Soviet proposals, a report sharply criticized by Mr. Gromyko as not embodying any adequate analysis of the proposals. On June 22, the United States offered a resolution in the Security Council asking for the approval of the three reports of the Atomic Commission which embodied the American plan. The U.S.S.R. vetoed this resolution, which would have put the stamp of Security Council approval on the United States plan, and would also have suspended the Atomic Commission. The U.S.S.R. later abstained from voting on a resolution providing merely for the passing on of the reports to the General Assembly, and by this abstention left the way open for discussion of the atomic energy question at the Paris meeting.

In his opening speech at the plenary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which opened at Paris, September 25, 1948, Mr. Andrei Vyshinsky, head of the U.S.S.R. delegation, reviewed the activities of the United Nations during the year since the preceding Assembly. He pointed to the failure of the U.N. to carry out the General Assembly's recommendations concerning general reduction of armaments, utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, and acceleration of measures for prohibiting the use of the atomic weapon, as well as on a number of other important issues. He also reviewed the increasing warlike preparations carried on in this

period under the leadership of the Anglo-American bloc in direct contravention of the General Assembly's recommendations.

In conclusion, Mr. Vyshinsky offered, on behalf of the Soviet government, the following proposals for armament reduction:

Noting that practically nothing has been done to this day to carry into effect the Assembly's decision of January 24, 1946, on atomic energy as well as the decision of December 14, 1946, on the principles governing the general regulations and reduction of armaments;

Acknowledging that the prohibition of production and the utilization of atomic energy for war needs is a primary task;

Acknowledging that a general substantial reduction of armaments meets the purposes of the establishment of firm peace and the consolidation of international security and corresponds to the interests of the peoples in reducing the heavy economic burden they shoulder as a result of excessive and evergrowing expenditure on armaments in various countries;

Considering that the great powers—the permanent members of the Security Council—possess the bulk of the armed forces and armaments and bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace and general security;

With a view to strengthening the cause of peace and eliminating the threat of a new war being kindled by the expansionists and other reactionary elements;

The General Assembly recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States of America, Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, and China, as a first step in the reduction of armaments and armed forces, reduction by one-third within one year all the existing land, naval and air forces. The General Assembly recommends the prohibition of the atomic weapon as a weapon intended for aggressive aims and not for defense. The General Assembly recommends the establishment of an international control body within the framework of the Security Council to watch and control the carrying out of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

Speaking before the Political Committee of the U.N. Assembly at Paris on October 1, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky set forth the objections

of his delegation to the American proposals on atomic energy. According to the Baruch plan, Mr. Vyshinsky said:

Discontinuation of the manufacture of the atomic bomb is dependent upon a number of conditions, the fulfillment of which . . . is accompanied by great difficulties and requires a long time.

It would seem that world public opinion, as expressed in the two historic resolutions of the General Assembly of more than fifty nations of the world, has already set itself the task of preparing measures for prohibiting the atomic bomb, eliminating the atomic weapon from national armaments, and establishing atomic energy control, having decided beforehand that it could be used only for peaceful ends. Would it not have been natural under these conditions to pass at least an elementary decision to the effect that in the future the manufacture of the atomic bomb should not take place, cannot be permitted? There is a crying contradiction here, a contradiction between two facts: on the one hand, two resolutions of fifty-odd nations of the world urging measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons which, in fact, predetermine the necessity of such prohibition, and, on the other hand, the fact that the United States does not want to discontinue the manufacture of atomic bombs for which world public opinion and the humane consciousness of nations are already digging a grave.

Is this not the deepest contradiction? Given good will and a firm desire to be consistent and honest with regard to the decisions that were recorded twice in 1946, would it not be the simplest and most elementary thing to say: "Yes, we have encountered a most difficult problem; we have encountered a problem which is itself explosive. We find it difficult to solve this problem at once. We are being criticized for having achieved nothing in the course of thirty months but perhaps thirty more months will be required to solve this most difficult and most grave problem."

Then let us at least, while all of us in good faith wish to find this solution, let us this very minute discontinue the manufacture of these monsters, these furies of hell of atomic war. Why is it that you, the majority, hesitate to discontinue the manufacture of atomic bombs once it has been decided that it is necessary to prepare measures for discontinuing the production of atomic bombs and for



eliminating them from national armaments? Why? What prevents you from at least taking a decision to discontinue the production of atomic bombs? . . .

Is it not a gross departure from the General Assembly's decisions on atomic energy when people who have been charged with this task do not venture to make such a humane, natural, and reasonable decision as that no single state will manufacture any more atomic weapons while preparations of appropriate measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and eliminating it from national armaments proceed?

It is wrong to believe—and this is a grave error on the part of those who so believe—that there is only one state which possesses the monopoly of atomic energy and the atomic bomb. This may result in a very grave and dangerous miscalculation. China has declared that she is unable to manufacture atomic bombs. Perhaps some other states will also say so. But there are states which will not say the same thing, for this would not correspond to the facts.

So it was proposed that all the states should undertake not to manufacture any more atomic weapons until a way is found for implementing the General Assembly's decisions of January 24 and December 14. This proposal, however, was rejected. Yet why cannot such a decision be taken by those who truly strive to eliminate the atomic weapon from the life of mankind?

Turning to an examination of the American proposals, Mr. Vyshinsky charged that they were unrealistic. This, he said, is apparent even in that section which "envisaged nothing more nor less than the establishment of an international control body (I am quoting practically verbatim from Mr. Baruch) as world leader in atomic science and in the practical development of atomic energy, so as to use the tremendous influence connected with its leading position in science, in order to exercise 'legal authority' with which that international body was to be invested under the Baruch plan.

"Is this task of converting the international atomic energy control body into a leader of world science a realistic one?" Mr. Vyshinsky asked: "No, it is not realistic. This idea is harmful because it means nothing but a desire to put scientific thought in a straitjacket, to place science under police surveillance, to deprive it of the possibility of following the road of free development. And nevertheless this

unrealistic and harmful 'idea' was used by the United States representatives as a basis for the so-called plan for an international control system."

The American proposals, Mr. Vyshinsky further charged, clearly proved that the United States refused to place its atomic plants under international control, insisting instead upon control by stages. The Soviet representative on the Atomic Commission, Mr. Vyshinsky stated, had "repeatedly tried to persuade the commission to consider the question of a time limit for establishing control over all enterprises producing atomic materials, beginning with the ore mines and ending with the plants manufacturing the atomic weapon. Yet these attempts failed. This certainly resulted mainly from the fact that the United States representatives refused to discuss even in the most general form the question of time limit and the practical steps for establishing control at such plants. They invariably referred to stages."

Not a single one of the three reports of the Atomic Commission, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out, contained any mention of control over industrial production:

The proposal to establish an international atomic energy control body first and start negotiating on the prohibition of the atomic weapon afterwards—and this forms the gist of the so-called American plan—this proposal in itself exposes the true aims and intentions of its authors. This stand . . . is nothing but an attempt to cover up their unwillingness to have any effective control whatsoever by talk on the establishment of so-called atomic energy control without, however, basing this control on the prohibition of the manufacture of the atomic weapon; it is an attempt to postpone the prohibition of this weapon *ad calendas graecas* [until the Greek calends] which, as is well known, never existed in the Greek calendar.

The Soviet Union holds that the institution of international control over atomic energy must be preceded by the prohibition of the atomic weapon and that the supervision over the fulfillment of this prohibition must precisely be the task of strict and effective international control. The necessity of banning the atomic weapon springs from the very nature of this weapon as a weapon of aggression, designed not for defense but for attack, for the mass annihilation of the peaceful population, for the mass destruction of towns and villages.

Furthermore, Mr. Vyshinsky charged, the American plan seeks to grant the international control body the right to prospect for mineral deposits on the territory of any country in order to ascertain whether there are uranium or thorium reserves present. The plan also seeks control in all related fields; in other words, said Mr. Vyshinsky, it envisages the unlimited right of the international control body to interfere in the entire economic life of any country as well as in the internal affairs of any state:

The American plan . . . denies the possibility of effective control over the production and utilization of atomic energy by means and forces of the sovereign states. The American plan demands that not only enterprises but entire branches of industry, which to some degree or other serve the factories and installations engaged in producing atomic materials, be placed at the disposal or transferred to the ownership of the international control body. The international body . . . is conceived . . . as some kind of international monopolistic atomic supertrust which owns . . . all the enterprises for the production of atomic energy; which obtains the right to the ownership of all raw materials as soon as they are extracted from the entrails of the earth; which will establish norms of concentration and when these are reached will take possession of the basic materials; which will own and administer—this is directly stated in the plan of the United States for the international control body—all the chemical and metallurgical plants in which the basic materials will be processed, and will have the monopoly right to exploit them.

In this connection, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, it would not be out of place to recall the 1947 memorandum issued by the British scientists, which stated that the restrictions envisaged by the American plan "would make it possible to intervene in the economic life of each country to the extent for which there is no need in order to prevent the application of atomic energy for destructive purposes. . . . The United States of America and other proponents of the Baruch Plan should be urged to formulate guarantees insuring such a situation that no plan of inspection should be turned into a carefully elaborated espionage system."

The authors of the American plan, Mr. Vyshinsky added, frankly admit their plan "deals a blow at the sovereign prerogatives of the separate states." They try to justify this on the ground that the prob-

lem of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes cannot be solved otherwise than by the "voluntary and partial relinquishment by certain states of their sovereignty in this field in favor of other states." Assuming that this is so, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, there are a number of other factors to be considered:

In order that a state may consent to relinquish, even only partially, its sovereignty in favor of an international body, it must be given guarantees that this body will truly live up to its purpose, that it will truly be an international control body—and here I must say with all frankness . . . the control body presented here on the basis of the first, second, and third reports of the Atomic Commission as well as the proposals submitted by the Canadian delegation is not an international body. It is an American body where a majority is assured to American influence, and it is precisely in expectation of this influence . . . that all the plans for the organization of this so-called international control body are built.

We are told, "You must concede part of your sovereignty in favor of supreme welfare." We agree. On this are founded all international relations when it is necessary to concede part of something small for the sake of a bigger, more important, more valuable thing, which thus justifies the concession. But to do so certainty is needed that what is in question is truly the "supreme welfare," certainty is needed that the given body will really be international, and that international co-operation will truly be the rule in this body.

If in that body the same methods of work predominate as at this session of the General Assembly or in Committee Number One, can we, the Soviet delegation, count upon that co-operation which is an elementary and essential condition for the giving up of some part of our rights in favor of the international body?

You have seen what happened at this General Assembly. You have elected officers of six committees, but have you displayed the spirit of co-operation which is an essential and elementary requisite for mutual trust when you blackballed the representatives of the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy proposed for leading posts in all these committees? Have you not thereby violated one of the basic principles of international co-operation on which our United Nations Organization stands—respect for participation in

the general work and in the leading bodies of representatives of the minority present here? You have violated this principle. . . .

If in such a small matter [election of chairmen and vice-chairmen of committees] . . . we have encountered such a crude violation of our rights as a minority, then what doubts can there be that in your "international" body, where you will be assured the majority, you will not dictate to us such laws as will augur ill for our industry, our national economy. . . .

We are ready to give up part of our sovereignty for the sake of this supreme welfare, but it is necessary that this be our common supreme welfare. But where is it? It is necessary that it be welfare based on mutual respect, mutual trust, and co-operation. But where is it? Is not the get-tough policy, which was proclaimed and served as a source of inspiration to the majority present, the policy of the United States of America in force now? The get-tough policy may be described as "pressing the knee against the chest and grabbing by the throat." But it will not work. We have a strong chest and there is no knee that could pin us down to the ground, and our throat is also strong.

The Soviet delegation, continued Mr. Vyshinsky, considers untenable the two chief provisions of the American plan—the provisions to prevent concealing of atomic energy and to prevent the seizure for aggressive ends of concentrated nuclear fuel or the seizure of plants producing fuel, or the seizure of mines and other means of production of atomic energy. The American plan, Mr. Vyshinsky charged, violates the fundamental principles of the United Nations:

It ignores the decisions of the General Assembly, does not impose on states any strict international obligations with regard to the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapon. This plan offers no guarantees of results to whose attainment it should strive although the plan tries to substantiate its provisions by scientific and technical considerations. But to make clear what significance the majority of the Atomic Commission attaches to these scientific-technical considerations, it is necessary to remind you about the first report on the scientific-technical aspects of the problems of control, which pointed out that an extensive study of the possible technical measures of control inevitably leads to a consideration of the problem that is not

technical but political in nature. In the final analysis this circumstance is decisive in choosing one or another system of international control, which, of course, does not preclude the necessity of taking into account the scientific-technical demands also.

As to the proposals of the Soviet Union, they proceed from the fundamental premise that it is possible to reach an agreement to establish atomic control on an international scale, on the basis of strict fulfillment of the decisions taken by the United Nations Organization.

The Soviet Union holds that the adoption of its plan, which envisages the conclusion of a convention on prohibition of the atomic weapon and a convention on control over the realization of this prohibition, will constitute a substantial contribution to strengthening international peace and security.

The critics of the proposal on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and in particular the representatives of the United States, tried to substantiate their objections first by claiming that this allegedly would be a "unilateral disarmament" for the United States and, second, by frightening the world with the possibility that this convention would be violated by states bent on aggression.

The first objection holds no water because the proposal to prohibit the atomic weapon concerns all the states, not only the United States, freeing them all from the menace of an atomic war and ensuring international security to them all. In trying to substantiate their objections by referring to possible violation of the convention prohibiting the atomic weapon, the authors of the American plan nevertheless base all their proposals for controlling atomic energy, including measures against atomic raw materials and the concealing and seizing of atomic enterprises, on the principle of international obligations which each state will have to assume under the convention. But the American plan does not ensure the prevention of the threat of concealment of seizure by a state bent on aggression and on the misuse of atomic energy.

The third report of the Atomic Commission indicates clearly that the authors of the American plan proceeded from the premise that "seizure must be recognized by all the countries as a serious violation of the treaty." But while recognizing the necessity for the states which are parties to the agreement or convention on control

to assume international obligations to consider seizure as a serious violation of the international treaty with all the consequences following therefrom, the Government of the United States at the same time refuses to have this demand applied also to prohibiting the utilization of atomic energy for war purposes.

It should be clear to anyone that if the seizure of atomic raw materials or atomic enterprises must be recognized by all countries as a serious violation of the treaty, and this of course is so, then the preparation for the seizure, the attempt to utilize the atomic weapon for war purposes as a result of such seizure must be regarded as the gravest international crime, as the gravest violation of the convention prohibiting the atomic weapon. . . . The prohibition of the atomic weapon is the most important international task. The organization of international control over atomic energy must be subordinated to this task. Prohibition of the atomic weapon, assumption of the obligation on the prohibition of the atomic weapon by all states parties to the convention, would set the object and give a meaning to the system of international control over atomic energy, would lend power and grounds to the activity of the international body for the control over atomic energy.

The tasks of the international control body will consist in ensuring the fulfillment by states, parties to the convention, of the obligations they assumed not to permit the utilization of atomic energy for war purposes. . . .

Camouflaging their unwillingness to prohibit the manufacture and utilization of the atomic weapon, the authors of the Baruch plan and American propagandists are spreading a false version of the Soviet position, alleging that the Soviet Union evades the recognition of the need for control over production of atomic energy. This propaganda, which spreads sentiments hostile to the Soviet Union, is being circulated despite the fact that as long as two years ago Generalissimo Stalin stated that "strict international control is needed" over the production and utilization of atomic energy.

Of course assumption by all states of international obligations means that every state makes a serious concession, relinquishing part of its sovereign rights in favor of the international control body. The Soviet plan of control, however, leaves every sovereign state the right itself to decide how to utilize atomic energy as well as how to con-

duct the investigations for the utilization of atomic energy, but only for peaceful purposes. The Soviet plan prohibits investigations of the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes. In this the Soviet plan differs fundamentally from the plan supported by the majority of the Atomic Commission which envisages the international control body retaining the right to conduct investigations on the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes. . . .

The Soviet Union cannot place itself and its economy at the mercy of such an international body which will act according to the dictates of the majority of this body, a majority pursuing its own ends, its own interests, a body in which, of course, great influence will be exercised by the policy which openly admits that in the field of atomic energy attention must now be concentrated, and is indeed being concentrated, on the use of atomic energy for war purposes. The resistance offered by the United States to the prohibition of the atomic weapon and to the use of atomic energy for war purposes and the frenzied armaments race fully expose the intentions of the ruling circles of the United States. Their sole desire is to have the atomic weapon at their disposal as long as possible with the object of utilizing this weapon as a means of pressure on other countries and people in order to carry out their expansionist plans. They are staking their last hope on the atom bomb, making aggressive plans under the illusion that they may be carried out even if the entire people or the overwhelming majority of the people of the attacking country will be against war, against military aggression undertaken by the reactionary top clique.

It is our deep conviction that the peoples of the world cannot tolerate such a situation. The conscience of the peoples cannot tolerate the intentions of those who seek to preserve and use for war purposes the atomic weapon—a weapon of attack, a weapon of aggression, a weapon for the mass annihilation of people. The United Nations Organization, therefore, must take immediate and effective measures to do away with the atomic weapon and other means for the mass annihilation of people and to eliminate the threat of using atomic energy for purposes of mass extermination of the peaceful population.

After further discussion characterized by continued attempts on



the part of the Anglo-American bloc to place all blame for the continued deadlock on the U.S.S.R., and to force through the U.S. plan, the Soviet Union demonstrated the falsity of the accusations leveled against it by making a major concession over its previous position in the interests of reaching agreement. At a session of the Political Committee of the General Assembly on October 2, Mr. Vyshinsky offered a resolution which, instead of the previous Soviet demand that the first step must be a convention outlawing the atomic bomb, to be followed by a convention for its control, proposed that these two measures be taken simultaneously. The first part of the Soviet resolution noted that the Assembly's 1946 resolution advocating work toward disarmament and atomic control had not been carried out. The operative part of the resolution called on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission to continue negotiations on the question of atomic energy, and to:

Prepare a draft convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention on the establishment of effective international control over atomic energy, with a view that both the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and that on the establishment of international control over atomic energy be signed and put into force simultaneously.

Hopes raised by the Soviet proposal were immediately dashed when U.S. delegate Austin, emerging from the committee room, told newsmen: "Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal is an oriental maneuver that doesn't in the least alter or break the deadlock on the issue." Subsequently Mr. Austin issued a formal statement indicating that the U.S. delegation was not prepared to budge an inch on its position to meet this important Soviet concession, and declaring: "It is the view of the delegation that this resolution fails to carry any assurance that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept the central plan of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission."

The debate at the U.N. sessions grew so acrimonious that Mr. Vyshinsky was forced to charge, in a speech delivered October 12, 1948, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, that the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France had "thrown off all restraint in their attacks on the Soviet Union and their speakers transcend all bounds of the permissible." These gentlemen, he declared bluntly, "defame and calumniate the position of the Soviet delegation, and in this way endeavor to undermine confidence in the Soviet Union's proposals."

In the course of this address, Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the U.S.S.R. was falsely charged with unwillingness to divulge the size of its armies and armed forces. He said that his country would provide full information on this if the U.N. adopted the Soviet resolution on arms reduction which explicitly provided that such data be given. He said that his country was "yearning for co-operation" but that this was impossible so long as one side "is bolstered by the atomic bomb."

It was obvious, he stated, that "we have two camps of states, one of which consistently adheres to the position of peace and international security and works for the adoption of decisions which would represent a first step toward real reduction of armaments and armed forces, which would be a first step toward eliminating the threat of a new war and consolidating peace. The other group of states continues the line which it has followed until now and which is characterized by a desire at all costs to postpone, to prevent, the carrying out of measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for a reduction of armed forces at least by the five Great Powers, as the Soviet Union recommends. Is there any need to point out again that the position of this second group of powers is fundamentally contrary to the principles, the spirit, the aims, and objects of the United Nations Organization?"

The charges hurled at the Soviet delegation were carried to such a pitch that Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British delegate, insisted that the Soviet proposals for control of atomic energy and reduction of armaments constituted an aggressive act. "Sir Hartley Shawcross did not shrink from declaring here," Mr. Vyshinsky said, "that whenever the Soviet delegation proffers the olive branch of peace, it does this in so aggressive a manner as though its deliberate intention were to kill any desire on the part of others to accept it. You see, even when such a peaceable step as offering the olive branch is taken, even then aggressive aims and intentions are supposed to lie behind it."

The purpose of these tactics, Mr. Vyshinsky stated, was to prove that the Soviet Union was opposed to international co-operation and agreements with other powers, that the Soviet Union generally regards such co-operation as a tactical trick and that in reality the Soviet Union is in a state of war with the entire world but is masking this by talking about peace. There is, however, a deeper underlying reason for these tactics, Mr. Vyshinsky explained. It could be found in a statement made by Ernest Bevin in the House of Commons on May 4, 1948, when he said that he had always held that the regula-

tion of certain issues with the Soviet Union would be quite possible if it were not for the Communist ideology. We, Mr. Vyshinsky commented, hold a different view:

It is possible to have different ideologies, it is possible to have different social systems, and it is possible to co-operate, given mutual respect for one another, notwithstanding the different ideologies and the different social systems. Hence our desire for co-operation. We, the minority, want co-operation and are striving for it. But on what basis? Not on the basis of dictation. We want co-operation on the basis of mutual respect, of the confidence which springs from mutual respect, the co-operation of equal with equal. The trouble is not in different ideologies or different social systems. War in capitalist society is war between countries with similar economic systems. Generalissimo Stalin said in his talk with Stassen that the "economic systems in Germany and the U.S.A. are similar, yet war broke out between them. The economic systems of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are different, yet they did not fight one another but co-operated in war. . . . If two different systems could co-operate in time of war, why cannot they co-operate in time of peace?"

Mr. Bevin, apparently, holds the very opposite view. Chamberlain tried to come to terms with Hitler. He tried to do so by means of secret negotiations behind the back of the Soviet Union, at the same time that negotiations were proceeding in Moscow with the Anglo-French delegations. . . . Hitler was being prodded to march eastward against the U.S.S.R.; he was being incited to a new war. That is a historical fact. . . . Did the Second World War begin between Communist and non-Communist systems? No. It began within the capitalist system. But its main edge later turned against the socialist state. And this was a colossal mistake, an irreparable historical mistake made by the fascists who attempted to test the strength of the Soviet land and ended in disastrous defeat.

Returning to the problem of atomic energy, Mr. Vyshinsky took note of the charge that the position of the government of the U.S.S.R. was unpredictable. Yet for two years, he said, the Soviet Union has been fighting to have the use of atomic energy for war purposes banned. He continued:

We are seeking a solution of the problem. We submit our proposals and make the necessary concessions for the sake of achieving possible agreement, but we are told: "Why didn't you make your proposals earlier, why didn't you come forward with these proposals before?" When we don't make proposals, we are asked: "Why haven't you made proposals?" When we do make proposals, we are told "Why do you make them?" Such is your logic. We say that it is necessary first to prohibit atomic weapons and then establish control because it is senseless to control what does not exist. But we are told: "No, that is not acceptable. They must be simultaneous." We say, very well, we agree that a convention prohibiting atomic weapons and a convention on control should be signed and put into force simultaneously. Whereupon we are told: "No, first a convention on control must be concluded, and then a convention prohibiting atomic weapons." What can this imply if not an attempt at all costs to find ever new excuses to frustrate the conclusion of both conventions?

Where the fate of mankind is at stake, there must be no obstinacy, no mechanical rejection of proposals that do not affect basic questions of principle. We see no reason to insist, come what may, on our own view when principles are not at stake and when concessions may be made without sacrificing principles. But when we do agree to make concessions, we are asked why we did not agree before. And they take the liberty of expressing all sorts of suspicions regarding mental reservations by which the Soviet delegation is supposedly guided. They take the liberty of hinting that it is difficult to come to terms with us because we are maneuverers.

It is not hard to discern who is maneuvering and who is guided by secret plans. The fact remains that the Soviet delegation deemed that it might, for the sake of possible agreement, refrain from insisting on its original formula and submitted a formula which says that the convention prohibiting atomic weapons and the convention on international control of the carrying out of this decision should be signed and should enter into force simultaneously. The formula provides every possibility of finding a way to agreement. But those who have decided to evade the conclusion of both conventions naturally evade accepting the new Soviet formula. They talk about traps which we are putting in the way and keep looking for new excuses to reject the Soviet proposals.

Speaking before the First Committee of the General Assembly on November 11, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky charged that this obstructive approach toward the Soviet proposal on control of atomic energy was also manifested toward the Soviet proposal calling for a reduction of armaments, which had been introduced at the same time. Guided by a policy of peace and of promoting good neighborly relations, the Soviet Union had proposed that the armaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council be reduced by one-third, Mr. Vyshinsky said. The Soviet Union considers the reduction by the five Great Powers of all their land, naval, and air forces by one-third during one year the first step in reducing armaments and armed forces. The Soviet Union purposely limited its proposal to the five Great Powers because these permanent members of the Security Council possess the overwhelming mass of armed forces and armaments and bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace and general security.

From the very beginning, however, a negative attitude was taken by the other powers to the proposal of the Soviet Union. Among other things, it was charged that the Soviet Union was inconsistent in its policy. Yet on October 7, at a session of the Political Committee of the General Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky had gone to great pains to stress the fact that the Soviet Union had consistently pursued a policy of peace:

From the very first day of its existence, from the very first day of the establishment of power of the workers and peasants in our country, the Soviet government has consistently and untiringly waged a policy of peace, of persevering struggle against aggression, against war psychosis, which is being fomented particularly by reactionary circles in the United States, a policy of struggle against war gambles, against war in any part of the globe. In the old League of Nations the Soviet Union persistently waged a policy of struggle against war, for disarmament and reduction of armaments and consistently and persistently displayed its initiative and supported the initiative of other states. Let us recall that as far back as 1927 the Soviet Union raised in the League of Nations the question of general disarmament; and when that proposal did not meet the due support of the majority, the Soviet Union raised the question of reducing armaments. Thus in 1927 at the first meeting of the fourth session of the Commission on Disarmament, in which the Soviet delegation

participated for the first time, the Soviet Union proposed immediate, general, and complete disarmament. At that time consideration of the proposal was postponed until the next session.

In February, 1928, the Soviet delegation submitted to the commission its draft of a convention on immediate and complete disarmament, in which the proposals of the Soviet delegation of November 30, 1927, were elaborated. Nor was that draft supported by the commission which rejected the Soviet draft and postponed until the next meeting consideration of another draft submitted by the Soviet delegation, namely, the draft on reduction of armaments by half by the bigger countries and by one-third and one-fourth by the smaller countries. The sixth session of the Commission on Disarmament, which opened in April 1929, rejected the second Soviet draft too. . . . The Soviet delegation did everything in its power to secure positive results in the commission's work. But of no avail. The work of the Commission on Disarmament ended in a fiasco. . . .

It would be needless to dwell in detail on all the evolutions of the problem as it passed through the League of Nations. Suffice it to mention that all the efforts of the Soviet government to secure a successful solution of that task, or at least the task of a partial reduction of armaments, did not meet with support in the League of Nations since the peaceful proposals of the Soviet government were at variance with the interests of such influential states as Great Britain and France, which were determining the destiny of Europe at that time. Already then the picture became very clear, very much resembling the picture we are observing now in the United Nations Organization, with the Soviet government exerting fresh efforts to promote measures that would reduce to the greatest possible extent the danger of war and ensure the preservation of peace and security of nations, while these noble undertakings and aspirations encounter stubborn resistance on the part of a considerable number of delegations, and not second-rate delegations but certain leading delegations. It was twenty years ago that Paul Boncour, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French parliament and member of the Second International, opposed the Soviet proposals on the reduction of armaments with the formula which Messrs. Bevin, Spaak, and others are reiterating with schoolboy diligence today, namely, "first security, then disarmament." Somewhat altered now this for-

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mula reads: "First guarantees of security, then reduction of armaments."

The critics of the Soviet proposals went even further, however. They resorted to every sort of counter-argument imaginable, Mr. Vyshinsky charged. They declared, for example, that it was not clear how the measures envisaged in the Soviet proposals should be carried out; that the strength of the armed forces and the amount of armaments owned by the permanent members of the Security Council were unknown; that the machinery for reduction of armaments was not specified; that the proposals did not indicate how an inventory of armed forces and armaments was to be provided; and that effective control of the measures to be taken with regard to reduction was not assured. It was further charged, said Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech before the General Assembly on October 12, 1948, that the Soviet proposal was unfeasible, unrealistic:

In answer to our proposal that the Great Powers reduce their armed forces—land, naval, and air—we are told that this is impossible because the U.S.S.R. has huge armies and that, if the U.S.S.R. were to reduce them by one-third, it would not be of much significance. Such is not the case with the other Great Powers, we are told.

But we, on our part, might also say: you have a huge navy, and if you reduce it by one-third, that too will not be very perceptible because even after your navy is reduced, it will still be bigger than the navies of a number of other states taken together. Moreover, you believe that you are the monopolists of the atomic bomb. That also has some significance in the general balance of armaments. True, you are not very confident of yourselves on this point. But however that may be, the proposal that the armed forces of the five Great Powers be reduced by one-third—I repeat, of the five Great Powers, and not of all the 58 members of the U.N.O.—cannot be made dependent on how this will reflect on the state of the armed forces of one or another state. Reduction is reduction. And inasmuch as it is recommended that the reduction in the case of the five Great Powers shall be equal, the relation of forces will remain the same, but the very fact of a reduction of armed forces would set a limit



to armament building, would serve as a most weighty factor in strengthening mutual confidence in international relations.

But when we recommend a reduction of the armaments of the five Great Powers, Luxembourg gets up and says, I cannot reduce my armaments. But no one, Messrs. Luxembourgiens, is asking you to, and there is no reason for you to get uneasy, for what we are talking about now is a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the five Great Powers and not a universal reduction of armaments.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that the Great Powers can do this without any special difficulty, but that they do not want to, and I shall soon try to show why. Of course, reduction of armaments and armed forces and prohibition of atomic weapons will involve a number of measures of a technical nature. It cannot be denied that there may be certain difficulties here and that, consequently, earnest work will have to be done to remove these difficulties, to clear the way, and create every possibility for the scrupulous carrying out of the adopted decision. But we must categorically repudiate any hint of a ruse on the part of the Soviet Union, of the danger of any traps we are allegedly preparing to put in the way, of any deceit.

Of course, those whose whole mentality is based upon the expectation of traps, deceit, and ruses on the part of their partners cannot in this case either rid themselves of their suspicions. But nobody is suggesting taking people simply at their word.

Naturally, when tackling so serious and big a problem as prohibiting atomic weapons or reducing armaments and armed forces, it is necessary to make provision for all measures which must be taken for controlling the carrying out of the adopted decisions. I cannot refrain from mentioning once more the position of the Soviet Union on this question and the statement made on this score by Generalissimo Stalin, in which he affirmed that we stand for strict international control.

The most diverse arguments are advanced against our proposal for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five Great Powers. The Chinese representative got up here and candidly stated that the Soviet proposals do not suit them because just now a large part of China's territory is occupied by Communist troops and that the present Chinese government needs soldiers, so to speak, for internal consumption, that is, for the suppression of the liberation



movement of the Chinese people. The Chinese representative declared that what is necessary in the case of China is not a reduction but, on the contrary, an increase in armaments. . . .

It requires no great effort, however, to demonstrate the absolute baselessness of the Chinese representative's objections. The United Nations Organization cannot concern itself with China's domestic affairs. These matters which are connected with the internal situation in China, with the civil war in China, cannot be a subject of discussion in the U.N.O. because, I repeat, that is China's domestic affair.

It was therefore strange to hear objections to reduction of armaments raised here, which were not dictated by considerations of foreign policy, such as alone can interest the U.N.O. Of course, if armies are used as a police force and are created not for the protection of a state's frontiers, but to be sent against their own people, it is difficult to expect a sympathetic attitude toward a proposal to reduce armaments and armed forces by one-third. But just think what we get. Proposals are made . . . which should be a first step toward reduction of armaments and should serve as a valuable element in consolidating the peace and security of nations. But instead of responding sympathetically to this proposal in the interests of all peace-loving nations, people get up and argue that the proposal is unrealistic because armed forces are needed for the suppression of the national liberation movement.

Other arguments too were advanced against the Soviet proposals. And here in the front rank was the British delegation, whose representative, McNeil, adduced two basic arguments, as he called them, against our proposals. First argument: it is known, McNeil said, how much money Great Britain is spending on armaments and armed forces, and how many men Great Britain has under arms. Second argument: it is not known how much money the U.S.S.R. is spending on the maintenance of the Soviet armed forces; it is not known how large the Soviet armed forces are. Hence the conditions are unequal. . . . Under these circumstances, it is argued, it is impossible to think of accepting the Soviet Union's proposals.

Mr. McNeil bluntly said that, under these conditions, those who have larger armed forces would derive immediate advantage from this method of reduction, but he gave it to be understood that there were bound to be cases of presentation of false information which

could not possibly be checked—that is, he frankly hinted at possible fraud. True, McNeil at once went on to say that, in spite of the disadvantages which the Great Powers would in that case incur, Great Britain would be prepared to agree to this, if a proper system of inspection, verification, and control were devised.

But the third point of the Soviet proposals precisely does provide for the institution of international control. What, then, is the difficulty?

Seeing, apparently, that this position is untenable, Mr. McNeil is beforehand preparing roads of retreat by trying to repudiate the very possibility of coming to agreement with the Soviet Union regarding a system of control. In other words, first they say: "It is impossible to discuss with you, because you do not accept control." When we say, "No, you are mistaken; look, here we have it written—control," they reply: "Yes, you recognize control but your system of control is no good; you must accept our system of control." If that is what you count on, then you are very naive people.

But how is this way of putting the question to be understood? Does it not bear witness to an unwillingness to achieve any agreement; does it not give reason to think that, even if the Soviet delegation agreed to the proposed Anglo-American system of control, some other excuse or pretext to evade reaching agreement would be found, to refuse to conclude a convention prohibiting atomic weapons and to adopt a decision to reduce armaments and armed forces? Surely neither the government of the U.S.A. nor the government of Great Britain can hope to succeed in simply dictating their conditions to the Soviet Union. If they do, they are very naive indeed. The Soviet Union is not one of those states and the Soviet people is not one of those peoples to whom any conditions and demands can be dictated. This must not be forgotten. We are prepared to discuss and come to an agreed decision on the most difficult issue, but we are prepared to do so only on an equal footing, given an understanding of mutual interests and respect for one another.

But when we are told: accept this system of control, whereby all atomic energy plants, and even plants in allied branches of industry, become the property of some American supertrust passing under the name of an "international control agency"; when we are asked to give other nations permission to scour freely over our land, engage

in "investigations," make aerial surveys and, in general, do things of which we have already been able to form an idea from the dialogue which took place in the Congress of the United States . . . then it must be bluntly said that Messrs. the American and British are knocking at the wrong door.

Nothing good can come of this, dear sirs. We therefore emphatically reject this way of putting the matter, which bears the character of dictation. We cannot agree with this way of putting the matter, all the more in that the system of control worked out by the majority in the commission is also unsatisfactory. It is not a system of international control, but a means of placing the industry and national economy of other sovereign states under American control. That cannot be consented to, and we do not and will not consent to it.

Returning again to the charge that the Soviet proposals for control of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments were unrealistic, Mr. Vyshinsky countered:

When people speak about our proposals being unrealistic, I ask, why was it possible twenty years ago to prohibit the use of asphyxiating, poisonous gases in war? Why, when it was possible in Geneva, on June 17, 1925, to sign a protocol prohibiting the use of poisonous and asphyxiating gases in war, and to prohibit bacterial warfare, is it not possible here, in Paris in 1948, to sign an agreement prohibiting the use of atomic energy for war purposes?

Twenty-three years ago, thirty-three states could sign an act prohibiting gas and bacterial warfare, but today, it appears, the General Assembly cannot, in the name of 58 states, adopt an act of even greater significance and grandeur, one of even greater necessity and more greatly corresponding to the demands of millions of common folk, whose conscience protests against the employment of atomic weapons designed for the mass extermination of human beings and for the destruction of cities. Why?

In the same October 12 speech, Mr. Vyshinsky outlined Soviet objections to the proposal that the question of reduction of armaments should, like that of atomic energy control, be dealt with in stages:

On the ground that it is difficult to work out a plan for the reduction of armaments by the Great Powers, it is now proposed that the Commission on Conventional Armaments should work in stages, that is, that it should first demand information about armaments and then, having received the information, begin to work out possible measures which would be useful in the given cases.

But if this course, the course of stages, is adopted, it would mean still further delaying the decision of the problem, it would mean going away from a decision of the problem.

We propose a different course. We propose the adoption of a decision, and on the basis of this decision, the elaboration of practical and technical measures which would insure the carrying out of the decision and proper control. This is our line. Let us who are sitting here decide to reduce armaments by one-third and let us give instructions for the elaboration of corresponding technical measures. But we are told: "No, that is impossible. We must first have information."

You want information regarding the strength of existing armed forces, you want information as to where they are located? Very well. You want information as to what sums are being spent on armed forces? We can give the answer to that right away. We can say: as regards budgets, there is no mystery there. . . .

We can say, first of all, that the structure of the Soviet Union's postwar budgets reflects—in a general way, of course—the postwar reconversion of the war economy. What does this mean in figures? It means that in 1940, expenditure on the armed forces of the Soviet Union comprised 32.5 per cent of the total budget. In 1944, at the height of the war, expenditure on the armed forces of the Soviet Union comprised 52 per cent of the total budget. In 1946 (the first postwar year), it comprised 23.09 per cent; in 1947, 18.4 per cent; in 1948, 17 per cent.

Consequently, the postwar period in the U.S.S.R. is marked by a reduction of expenditure for military needs and ever-increasing expenditure on the development of the national economy.

You have your suspicions about this? Very well. But then, bear one thing in mind. Are you aware what damage was inflicted on the Soviet Union by the war forced upon us by the Nazi brigands? Are you aware what that damage and destruction caused by this war to

the Soviet Union signify in reality, in material values? Are you aware that the Soviet Union has to remove these effects of war? It needs dwellings because millions of its people have no dwellings; it needs factories because tens of thousands of its factories have been wrecked; it needs railways because tens of thousands of kilometers of railway lines have been destroyed; it needs hospitals because tens of thousands of its hospitals were burned, ransacked, and ruined; it needs tractors because thousands of tractors were carried away or smashed; it needs cultivated areas because cultivated areas were ruined and seed destroyed; it needs horses and cattle because millions of horses were slaughtered.

All this needs to be restored. Otherwise, the country cannot live, breathe, work, perfect itself, progress—and even the bitterest enemies of the Soviet Union cannot deny that we are living, breathing, working, that we are progressing, that we are building and growing. This needs funds. And, therefore, when the Land of Socialism sets itself the tasks as expressed in the Stalin five-year plan of economic rehabilitation and development, the task of expanding the output of agriculture, industry, and consumer goods, and on this basis increasing the national income in the five-year period to nearly half as much again as before the war, creating an abundance of food and consumer goods in the country, insuring the material prosperity of the people of the Soviet Union, and abolishing the ration system—all of which has been nearly accomplished already, after three years' operation of our five-year plan of rehabilitation—then all this requires funds, gigantic funds. And there is no other source for these funds than the source from which military expenditures have also to be met.

Hence the overwhelming proportion of the budgetary funds in this period, since the end of the war, is being spent on peaceful, economic, and cultural measures, and the expenditures on military needs are decreasing and now amount to only 17 per cent.

Citing figures to show that military expenditure in Great Britain in 1948 exceeds any other item of the budget, amounting to about 25 per cent of total expenditure, and that in the United States total military expenditure (for past, present, and future wars) comprises 79 per cent of the total expenditures in the fiscal year of 1949, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that these facts were more cogent than words.

It was also argued, Mr. Vyshinsky said, in a speech to the First Committee of the General Assembly, on November 11, 1948, that international trust was a prerequisite to reduction of armaments. He emphasized that in its armaments reduction proposal the U.S.S.R. undertook to give full information on its armaments and armed forces:

The British delegate stated . . . that were the Soviet government to agree to present, even if only in general outline, information about its armed forces and armaments, a big step would be made in the direction of strengthening international trust. Wishing to display his perspicacity, the British representative added that, of course, the Soviet government would not take this step and, of course, would reject this proposal.

Alas, our prophet failed this time too, since the Soviet government made a perfectly clear and definite statement and put this statement in the form of a concrete proposal incorporated in the draft Soviet resolution, namely, that an international control body should be given complete official information on armaments and armed forces by all the five states and, consequently, by the Soviet Union as well.

But let us assume that the British delegate was right when he said that the Soviet Union merely had to consent to present all information about its armaments and armed forces as a big step forward. We agree to present this information. We have not only announced it from the tribune but recorded it in our draft resolution. This means that the obstacle to the adoption of our resolution is eliminated. In that case, why are you not adopting it? Is it not clear that this again is merely a pretext designed to conceal the unwillingness to reduce armaments, as it is proposed by the Soviet delegation?

The British delegate also did not ignore the question of "veto," repeating all the shopworn arguments against the principle of unanimity which allegedly the Soviet proposal envisages to apply also in the work of the international control body. It is difficult to understand why McNeil had to distort matters, especially after all the explanations which have already been given by the Soviet representative on this score.

Let us recall that in the third report of the Atomic Commission

of June 19, 1946, the place which clearly outlines the position of the Soviet government on this question clearly states:

“. . . The control bodies and the bodies of inspection should exercise their control and inspection functions, operating on the basis of their own rules which should envisage the adoption in appropriate cases of decisions by a majority vote.”

It is necessary to recall also the statement on this point made by the head of the Soviet delegation, V. M. Molotov, at the session of the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1946. In reply to similar speeches of opponents of the Soviet proposals, V. M. Molotov stated that “it would be absolutely incorrect to depict matters as though some state possessing ‘veto power’ will be in a position to hinder the exercise of control and inspection.” V. M. Molotov continued: “The Control Commissions are not the Security Council and that is why there are no grounds for saying that some state utilizing ‘veto power’ will be able to hamper control. Every attempt to hamper control or inspection with regard to decisions adopted by the Security Council will be nothing more than a violation of the decisions of the Security Council.”

This means that people are interpreting incorrectly the problem of the so-called “veto” with regard to the work of the international control body. Of course there is a right of “veto” in the Security Council. Whether some people like it or not, it is in the Charter; it is the principle of the Charter and we have the right to defend it as long as it has not been deleted from the Charter. We have the right to fight for it by all means, to employ all measures to make sure that it should not be deleted from the Charter, because it is the cornerstone of the Charter, the cornerstone of the entire United Nations Organization. . . .

The Belgian delegate here today reached the point where he asked to have it explained how one cruiser could be reduced by one-third. I should think that even the Belgian representative could not explain this, all the more so since no one proposes that one cruiser should be reduced by one-third. True, I have seen in a French journal a cartoon depicting three French cavalymen sitting astride one horse; this cartoon carried the caption: “Reduction of the army by one-third.” In the case of the cruiser even this could not be done. But I say that three cruisers could be reduced by one-third, thirty-

three submarines could be reduced by one-third, etc., etc. And this reduction should be effected in one year by experts who are better versed in these affairs than some other people.

Though I am not a specialist in military affairs, I can say beforehand that all this does not represent insurmountable obstacles, all the more so since even the annals of the League of Nations . . . contains much material on this point elaborated some time ago, since the problems of the reduction of armaments, including reduction by one-third, were studied for two decades. . . .

We are told that before accepting the proposal of the Soviet Union on prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction of armaments and armed forces by the five Great Powers by one-third, it is necessary to ensure international trust. But international trust must be ensured also for the adoption of any other proposals. Moreover, the adoption of the Soviet proposals will undoubtedly contribute to strengthening international trust.

We are told that it is necessary to have in advance precise and full information about the quantity of armaments and the numerical strength of the armed forces of all the states concerned. But the Soviet proposals provide for submitting precisely all this required information to the international control body.

We are told that it is necessary to ensure control over the implementation of these proposals. But the proposals of the Soviet delegation precisely point also to the need for organizing control bodies—international control bodies—charged with this task.

We are told that it is necessary to establish international control, particularly with regard to prohibiting the atomic weapon. But the Soviet Union proposes to come to an agreement that two conventions be signed and enter into force simultaneously—on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and on control over atomic energy. This proposal, however, was not adopted; it was not adopted notwithstanding the fact that before the Soviet Union introduced this proposal about simultaneity of the two conventions, the delegations of the United States and Great Britain insisted on precisely such a solution of this problem.

We are told that in general all the requisites for adopting the proposals of the Soviet are not ripe and that, therefore, it is necessary to receive beforehand information on the state of the armed forces



and only then take one or other decision on the substance of the question regarding the reduction of these forces. But the demand for such information is fully covered by the proposal of the Soviet Union to submit to the international control body all information both on armaments and armed forces. This fully exhausts the given question. . . .

Thus there are no serious, businesslike arguments worthy of consideration against the adoption of the proposals of the Soviet Union. . . . What is in question evidently are not the objections which have been submitted, not the artificial pretexts to which the opponents of the Soviet proposals refer. What is in question evidently is that the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain are striving not only to preserve their armaments and armed forces at the present level, but also to assure themselves the possibility of an unhindered further increase of their armaments and armed forces needed by them, like the atomic bomb, in order to realize their plans which have nothing in common with the aims, purposes, and principles of the United Nations Organization. These are aggressive plans. But opposed to these plans are the forces of the peace-loving people.

Herein are the real reasons for the resistance offered by the four Great Powers to the proposals of the Soviet Union. The real reasons for the resistance to the Soviet proposals consist in the very trend of the policy of the leaders of the United States and Great Britain which, as Generalissimo Stalin has said, is a policy of aggression, a policy of unleashing a new war. Here are the real reasons for the vigorous efforts which are being exerted here by the delegations of the United States and Great Britain, and together with them of China and France, to thwart the Soviet proposals.

There can be no doubt that the will of the peace-loving people for peace and international co-operation will gain the upper hand, that this will eliminate all the obstacles which are being piled up by the forces of reaction and aggression. As J. V. Stalin has said, the horrors of the recent war are still too fresh in the memory of peoples and the public forces favoring peace are too strong for Churchill's pupils in aggression to overpower them and to turn them towards a new war.

These are the considerations on the strength of which the Soviet

delegation, confident in the righteousness of its cause and the correctness of its proposals for prohibiting the atomic weapon and reducing armaments and armed forces by one-third by the five Great Powers, confident that these proposals accord with the interests of all peace-loving peoples and will contribute to the cause of peace and security throughout the world, will insistently fight for its resolution and urge the other delegations to support the draft Soviet resolution.

Following the long debate, the Assembly rejected, 39 to 6, the Soviet arms reduction proposal. A counter proposal of the British calling for an Assembly verdict that the U.S.S.R. was responsible for the world's failure to disarm, failed to win support and was withdrawn. The British went along with the United States in accepting a weak Belgian resolution, passed 43 to 6, simply asking the Security Council's Commission on Conventional Armaments to pursue its work, devoting its first attention to formulating proposals for the gathering of information on the level of conventional armaments and armed forces by the member states.

On the question of atomic energy, the Assembly rejected a Ukrainian proposal embodying the plan for simultaneous conventions on destruction of existing atomic weapons and atomic energy control. The United States, however, was unable to force through a flat ratification of its own plan, but was compelled to accept a resolution which, while approving the first three reports of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, asked the six permanent members of the Commission—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, and Canada—to hold consultations to search for a basis for agreement.

# The Berlin Issue

THE FOUR-POWER administration of Berlin derived its legality from the Potsdam agreement which outlined occupation policies for Germany as a whole to be carried out by the four powers in their agreed upon zones pending the final peace settlement. It was agreed that Berlin, as the capital of Germany, although situated in the Soviet zone, should have a special Four Power Administration in which the respective military governments would be represented. The Potsdam Agreement set up the 'Foreign Ministers' Council as the agency through which the peace settlement with Germany would be effected. One of the main provisions agreed upon at Potsdam as essential to the preparations for setting up a new, democratic German state was economic unity among all zones.

From the beginning, the Western Powers pursued a policy of splitting rather than unifying Germany. This was effected through the setting up of Bizonia, which merged the American and British Zones, and subsequently Trizonia, including the French Zone.

The London Foreign Ministers' Conference at the end of 1947 broke on the rock of the Western Powers' unwillingness to reach agreement with the Russians for economic unification of Germany on the basis of the Potsdam decision, and their announced intention of setting up a separate Western German state. Instead of accepting the Soviet proposal to abandon Bizonia in favor of unification, the Western Powers proceeded at once to form an economic government of Bizonia. This was carried further in the winter and spring of 1948 when the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg met, without the Soviet Union, and officially announced their intention of proceeding with the plan to form a separate Western Germany.

At that time the press was full of predictions that the Soviet Union's answer would be to set up a separate Eastern Germany. Instead, the Soviet Union participated in the Warsaw Foreign Ministers' Conference, attended by representatives of Eastern European countries, and joined in a declaration calling for renewed four-power efforts to reach an agreement on the basis of the Potsdam decisions for the setting up of a unified Germany, early conclusion of a peace treaty, and withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces within a year thereafter.

The Western Powers proceeded with their separatist plans and instituted a separate Western currency reform, although the Soviet Union had for some time past been insisting on a unified currency reform policy.

The separate currency reform, by introducing the new Western marks into Berlin, threatened to disrupt the economy not only of the city itself but of the whole Soviet Zone of which it is a part.

It was in answer to this move of the Western Powers that the Soviet Union instituted the traffic restrictions, which the Western Powers characterized as a "blockade," in order to prevent disruption of the economy of Berlin and the Soviet zone. The Soviet authorities offered to supply the needs of the entire Berlin population, so there was never any need for the dramatic airlift organized by the U.S.

From the beginning the U.S.S.R. demonstrated its readiness to reach a settlement of the Berlin crisis. When Four-Power discussions were held in Moscow during the summer of 1948, Stalin himself participated and for the sake of agreement refrained from insisting that plans for a separate Western Germany be postponed as a condition for lifting traffic restrictions. The August 30 agreement reached by the four powers in Moscow provided for simultaneous lifting of the restrictions and introduction of a uniform currency in Berlin.

Directives to this effect were sent to the military governors in Berlin. It is a matter of record, confirmed by Senator Tom Connally, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the negotiations were broken off because U.S. military representatives did not accept the plan.

The Soviet Union thereafter made repeated offers to reach a settlement. The United States turned them down, and on September 27 the United States issued a White Paper charging the Soviet Union with full responsibility for the crisis, and at the same time a note was sent to the U.S.S.R. by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, announcing the Western Powers' decision

to break off further negotiations with Moscow and to bring the issue before the Security Council, which they proceeded to do when the Council met in Paris concurrently with the General Assembly.

Countering the efforts of the three Western Powers to put the Berlin issue on the agenda, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, at a meeting of the Security Council on October 4, 1948, that the entire dispute was outside the province of the Security Council and should be turned over to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which, according to the U.N. Charter, had jurisdiction over the case. Mr. Vyshinsky stated:

The Soviet government deems it necessary to declare that the proposal of the three governments—the United States, Great Britain, and France—to put the question of the situation in Berlin on the agenda of the Security Council is devoid of any ground, since this question does not come within the competence of the Security Council and, therefore, cannot be discussed by the Security Council. The actions of the Soviet authorities against which the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France are complaining were taken only in reply to the latter's actions. The Soviet authorities were compelled to take these actions as a result of the fact that the above three governments carried out in the western zone of Germany a separate currency reform which placed Berlin and simultaneously the entire Soviet occupation zone in a position in which the mass of money notes cancelled in the western zone threatened to pour into Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone of Germany.

Under these circumstances absolutely essential steps were taken in order to protect the economy of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany from disorganization with which it was threatened by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, which refused to consider the interests of the national economy of this zone and its population. The steps taken in this connection by the Soviet military authorities are of a defensive nature against the offensive actions of the three governments which should bear the responsibility for the situation that has arisen in Berlin. Were it not for these offensive actions of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, the Berlin question itself would not have existed, for there would have been no need for the above-mentioned defensive measures.

Beyond any dispute, the question of the Berlin situation is closely connected with the question of Germany as a whole, and the separation of the Berlin problem from the German problem as a whole would be utterly artificial and could result only in wrong decisions not in conformity with the real state of affairs. The placing of the Berlin problem before the Security Council would constitute a direct violation of Article 107 of the U.N.O. Charter which says that "Nothing in the present charter shall invalidate or preclude action in relation to any state which during the second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action."

Thus the Berlin question which forms part of the German problem as a whole, in accordance with Article 107 of the U.N.O. Charter, is to be settled by the governments which bear the responsibility for the occupation of Germany and hence is not to be placed before the Security Council.

Indeed we have a whole series of very important international treaties and agreements with regard to Germany and in particular with regard to Berlin concluded among the four powers—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France. The most important of these international treaties are the agreements among the Great Powers concluded at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences and formulating the political and economic principles to be adhered to in the treatment of Germany. Among these documents we have such important ones as the declaration on Germany's defeat and the agreement on the quadripartite control machinery for Germany. These documents, which represent international treaties and agreements, were signed by the great powers that assumed supreme authority in Germany for the period during which Germany was to carry out the principal provisions of unconditional surrender.

We have several agreements among the above powers with regard to the occupation zones in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin. One should also mention such an important decision of the Berlin Conference of Three Powers, joined later by China and France, as that concerning the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was also charged with the preparation of the peace settlement for Germany, so that the corresponding document could be

accepted by the government of democratic Germany when such a government was formed.

Thus the entire problem of Germany and also naturally the Berlin question, by virtue of the special international agreements and treaties among the great powers, are to be settled by the governments which bear responsibility for the occupation of Germany and, therefore, cannot be considered in any other manner not envisaged by the international agreements signed by the great powers.

This principle is formulated in Article 107 of the U.N.O. Charter, which clearly states that responsibility for the situation on the territory of enemy countries in which the Allied states exercise control is borne by these states. Hence it follows that all the questions arising in connection with the exercise of such control, consequently including also the question of the situation in Berlin, are to be decided by means of direct negotiations among these states which by virtue of the above-mentioned international agreements bear the responsibility for the situation in Germany as a whole and in any part of Germany, in any of her districts and, of course, especially in Berlin, the capital.

A special control machinery for Germany, the quadripartite Control Council as well as the Council of Foreign Ministers, was set up to make decisions on such questions by the international agreements which I have just mentioned. The Council of Foreign Ministers was charged at the same time with the preparatory work for the peace settlement in general, including that for Germany, and also with examining other problems which, upon agreement among the governments represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers, might be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers from time to time.

If one is to adhere to the above-mentioned international agreements and to respect one's signature under these international agreements, one cannot regard as lawful or correct the placing before the Security Council of any German problem, including that of Berlin.

Such a decision would directly violate the U.N.O. Charter and the international agreements, in the first place the agreements signed in Yalta and Potsdam, on the strength of which the German problem is within the exclusive competence of the four powers responsible for the occupation of Germany. There can be no doubt whatever that the problems of Germany are precisely such problems as can be considered and decided upon only in accordance with the procedure

established by the aforementioned international agreements. . . .

The governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France dispose of all the legitimate means for presenting their claims and for settling in a lawful manner any question connected with Germany in accordance with the international treaties signed by these powers. One should not shield oneself with the Security Council in order to renounce the undertakings assumed under several highly important international agreements concerning Germany. One must not renounce the obligations imposed by these international treaties and agreements upon the given states and their governments. One must not try to evade the responsibility for the violation of one's undertakings. The governments of Great Britain, the United States, and France, therefore, should proceed in a lawful manner. And this is the manner prescribed by the international agreements signed by these powers and other powers which joined them. This is a lawful manner. This is the manner which does not violate either the U.N.O. Charter or international treaties signed by the states concerned.

As the three governments have already learned from the Soviet government's note of October 3, the Soviet government proposed the convocation of the Council of Foreign Ministers which is competent to settle the Berlin problem. Is it not strange that the body which functioned for a considerable period of time, meeting at periodic sessions, is now absent, does not exist, now that in the opinion of the three powers there has arisen a complicated and difficult situation requiring authoritative intervention. . . .

This very body which the three powers—and subsequently all five since France and China joined this decision—established for the specific purpose of settling the German problem is absent, is being ignored and circumvented. This question is not given any attention by those very powers which set up this body, which assumed definite obligations with regard to this body and which also charged this body with definite duties in settling the German problem. And yet precisely this procedure for considering the Berlin problem, that is, through the Council of Foreign Ministers, is the only legitimate procedure conforming to the U.N.O. Charter and to the international agreements, respect for which is demanded by Article 2 of the Charter above all from the states which signed these treaties. *Pacta sunt servanda*—pacts are to be observed—this is the fundamental



principle of international law and international co-operation. Kindly comply with this basic requirement. Apply to the body which was set up for this purpose in accordance with the treaties which you yourselves signed and, consequently, discharge the obligation imposed by that treaty upon you.

In their note addressed to the Secretary-General of the U.N.O. the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France assert that the situation in Berlin endangers international peace and security. The note says that the above governments decided to place the Berlin problem before the Security Council so as to eliminate the threat to peace and international security, thus alleging that at present peace and international security are endangered in connection with the Berlin situation. Such statements are, however, unfounded and absurd. As stated in the Soviet government's note of October 3, the assertion of the United States government to the effect that the situation in Berlin endangers international peace and security does not correspond to the real state of affairs and is nothing but a means of pressure and an attempt to utilize the U.N.O. for achieving its own aggressive aims. . . .

Allegations concerning the threat of famine are similarly utterly untenable and constitute merely a method of hostile propaganda. At the request of the Soviet military administration in Germany, as far back as the beginning of July, the Soviet government decided fully to ensure the supply of all the Berlin population.

Marshal Sokolovsky in a published statement to several correspondents of Berlin newspapers, says that hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and more than ten thousand tons of fats were brought to the western sectors of Berlin from the Soviet Union. According to rather incomplete data, up to nine hundred tons of food products, not including coal, textiles, etc., are delivered daily from the Soviet zone into the western sector of Berlin by various means. Nothing endangers the supply of the occupation forces either.

Thus all the above accusations against the U.S.S.R. have no basis, and all rumors of this kind are circulated for the sole purpose of fanning uneasiness, alarm, and war hysteria and by no means for settling the Berlin situation.

The note of the three governments also contains the groundless allegation that the Soviet authorities in Berlin permitted a minority

of the Berlin population to try forcibly to overthrow the Berlin municipality. The Soviet government has officially refuted these unfounded accusations. The Soviet authorities in Berlin received from the Soviet government firm instructions, despite the discontent of the Berlin population at the situation that has arisen, to ensure peaceful conditions for the work of the local Berlin bodies, which was confirmed by V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, on August 30, during the interviews with the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The absurd nature of the above allegations with regard to the Soviet authorities is also evident from the fact that the disturbances mentioned in the note of the three governments occurred in those parts of Berlin which are not within the jurisdiction of the Soviet command and the responsibility for which is consequently not borne by the Soviet command but by the military authorities of the other three sectors of Berlin. Thus the assertion of the three governments similarly does not correspond to reality. Consequently the argument that the situation in Berlin endangers peace and security should also be regarded as utterly untenable. It should also be rejected as one which does not correspond to fact. On the basis of the motives I have expounded, we object to the proposal on the inclusion of the Berlin problem into the agenda of the Security Council.

In their reply to Mr. Vyshinsky's objections, the American and British representatives again insisted that the Berlin situation was a matter for the Security Council. The American delegate also charged that the Soviet government was renouncing the procedure for peaceful settlement established by the U.N. when the Soviet government insisted upon referring the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers. To these charges Mr. Vyshinsky replied on October 5, 1948:

This statement cannot be taken seriously, for one cannot indeed ignore facts, such as the fact that the Soviet government proposes to place the Berlin problem before the Council of Foreign Ministers which, as is known, was formed precisely as the instrument for peace settlements with former enemy countries in general. . . .

The Council of Foreign Ministers itself is an instrument of peace.

The line dividing its competence from that of the Security Council is by no means the line being drawn by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain. They erroneously assert that one of these bodies is an instrument of peace and security of nations while the other is not an instrument of peace and security. This is not the real demarcation line between the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Security Council. Such a conception of the Council of Foreign Ministers would grossly distort the very essence, the very nature of the Council of Ministers as a definite instrument of international co-operation. The real demarcation line is entirely different. And this has found expression in particular in Article 107 of the U.N. Charter.

I must also say that not only the Council of Foreign Ministers but also the quadripartite control machinery set up for Germany is an instrument for ensuring peace and security. The declaration on Germany's defeat and on the assumption by the four occupying powers of responsibility for the administration of Germany, which was signed in June 1945, plainly stated that in exercising supreme authority in regard to Germany assumed by the governments of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, the United States, and France, the four allied governments would take such actions as they would deem necessary for future peace and security, including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, which are most important for preventing the possibility of German aggression in the future.

Is this not sufficient to entitle one to assert, as the Soviet delegation does, that the Council of Foreign Ministers is also an instrument of peace and security, and that it would be utterly unfounded to oppose it in this sense to the Security Council. . . .

And yet they venture to tell us here that the Soviet Union rejects the procedure of peace settlement. From the above it should be clear that, at least in so far as Germany is concerned, the four great powers established special quadripartite bodies (the Control Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers) for ensuring peace and security in the future. Article 107 means precisely that the question of the post-war peace settlement with Germany and of the administration of Germany are within the competence of the foregoing quadripartite bodies.

Those who demolished these bodies, who undermined the possibility for their normal work and who perhaps are now trying to finish them off, should bear the responsibility for refusing, in disregard of the international obligations they had assumed, to make use of these bodies as an instrument of peace and security for Germany.

And this is all the more correct since the Security Council has quite a few tasks connected with the maintenance of peace and security in other parts of the globe, tasks with which unfortunately it has not coped to this day although in these places peace and security are actually endangered. I have in mind the Indonesian problem, the Palestine problem, the Greek problem. Is it, gentlemen members of the Security Council, that you have not enough worries and troubles in strengthening peace and security, and, neglecting this plain duty of yours, you become concerned about problems for the settling of which there has been established a special body and a special procedure based upon international agreements. . . .

We may be told that a peace treaty with Germany does not yet exist, although the Soviet Union has invariably insisted on the earliest conclusion of a treaty while the three Western Powers wish to substitute the occupation statute for it. Nevertheless, even if a peace treaty does not yet exist, there exist the terms of surrender, there exists a declaration on Germany's defeat, there exist highly important decisions of principle concerning the very foundation of the future peace treaty with Germany, there exist the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences determining the entire policy of the occupying powers with regard to Germany. One must not deny this, one must not disregard this. This is not only a legal act but a fact of tremendous political significance, which contains the extremely responsible obligations assumed by the four powers in regard to Germany; obligations which one cannot elude. In his interpretation of Article 107, Mr. Cadogan took the phrase "in relation to any state which during the second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present charter" and tried to interpret it as if the words "in relation" denoted the act in which the enemy state was the object and not merely a venue, as you put it. Cadogan arrived at the conclusion that inasmuch as Germany is not the object of actions which may be considered by the Security Council but merely

a place of action, Article 107 remains in full force and has no relation whatever to the given case!

The same idea was expounded here today by the Syrian representative who spoke about the so-called blockade of Berlin, this myth which was put in circulation for definite purposes. He said that the blockade was not directed against Germany but against the other occupation authorities and that, therefore, Article 107 did not apply.

I recall one case which, I think, may help us to interpret correctly Article 107. An incident occurred last spring in Bremen, which the Security Council probably remembers. The Soviet Colonel Tassoyev was kidnapped by American authorities and turned over to the British authorities and was later found in the building of the British Intelligence Service in London. This happened in Bremen, that is, on German territory but this case has nothing to do with Article 107 because this is an action taken by the American and British authorities in relation to a representative of the Soviet military authorities, and Germany has nothing to do with it. Using Cadogan's language, Germany was merely a place of action, merely a territory on which this action took place, and therefore it would be ridiculous if an attempt were made to refer to Article 107 in this case. . . .

In the present case, however, the situation is entirely different. When a separate currency reform on the German territory is involved, can one say that this does not affect Germany? Is it really true that all these separate unlawful actions of the three Western governments, running counter to the agreed decisions adopted by the four powers, have nothing to do with Germany and that in the given case Germany is merely a "place of action"?

If we recall that the actions in question were taken in pursuance of decisions concerning Germany adopted in London in February and March of this year by the three governments behind the back of the Council of Foreign Ministers, when we discuss the separate currency reform carried out by the three governments in the western part of Germany, when we discuss the removal of equipment from Berlin contrary to all the existent laws and legal and moral rules, when we discuss a whole series of separate actions violating the interests of the national economy of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany and the interests of the population of the Soviet zone, when they undermine Germany's national economy, how can one assert

that all these actions bear no relation to Germany? To whom then does all this bear relation?

It is alleged that this bears relation to the occupation authorities alone. But the thing is that these actions of the occupation authorities are actually and really directed against the interests of the population and the economy of the Soviet zone in Germany, against the agreed decisions which should determine the economic position of Germany and, I should say, even the very destiny of Germany. Therefore it would be strange and absurd to assert that these are merely Anglo-Franco-American actions which bear no relation to Germany, just as it would be absurd to assert regarding the retaliatory defensive measures which the Soviet military authorities were compelled to take, that these measures affected only the occupation authorities but bore no relation to Germany. When steps are taken to disorganize the economy of the Soviet zone and Berlin by means of a separate currency reform, it transpires that that bears no relation to Germany. When, on the other hand, steps are taken to defend the economy, to localize the dangerous and harmful consequences of such an action, it transpires that these defensive measures similarly bear no relation to Germany. This is sophistry, pure and simple. . . .

Article 107 deals with the actions of the governments responsible for the activity of the former enemy state. Article 107 says that the U.N.O. Charter does not invalidate action taken by governments responsible for such action in relation to a state which has been an enemy state during World War II. The actual state of affairs connected with the unlawful and irregular separate actions of the Anglo-Franco-American authorities and with the defensive measures being taken by the Soviet authorities bears a direct relation to Germany, fully corresponds to the meaning of Article 107, and the settlement of this conflict and the examination of all the problems involved in it should proceed in a lawful manner established by the special agreements on Germany.

This lawful manner should be the consideration of the given problem in the Council of Foreign Ministers. We are told that the four powers have been unable to reach any agreement to this day, but I ask you . . . when and where did the Council of Foreign Ministers discuss the Berlin problem? You are raising the question of the situation in Berlin. Kindly tell me, give me the date, the names

of the participants, the subject, the decisions if any, taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers which discussed the situation in Berlin.

Now they again want to circumvent the Council of Foreign Ministers and at any price place this question on the agenda of the Security Council. This haste is very suspicious. We are now facing a situation in which the lawful body set up by the international agreements among the great powers—the Council of Foreign Ministers—is being ignored. Attempts are being made to justify this, alleging that the negotiations held heretofore failed to yield positive results and that, therefore, this question was referred to the Security Council. But such negotiations have not been held. The negotiations on the Berlin problem in the Council of Foreign Ministers have not taken place. What took place were preliminary negotiations, an informal discussion in Moscow. The Council of Foreign Ministers has not said its word.

Is it then wrong to say that the three governments which applied to the Security Council pursue aims that have nothing in common with the actual desire to settle the German problem?

Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal to turn the matter over to the Council of Foreign Ministers was rejected, and the Security Council voted nine to two—the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine voting against—to put the matter on its agenda. A draft resolution was then presented to the Security Council by six of its members. This represented a distinct step backward by the Western Powers in relation to their previous agreement on Berlin. Taking the position that they would not negotiate "under duress," *i.e.*, while the "blockade" still continued, although they had for months been negotiating under these conditions, they insisted on the lifting of restrictions before the regulation of the currency situation. In voting against this resolution on October 25, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that it was counter to the directive of August 30 to the military commanders of the four zones, which had been agreed upon by the four great powers.

The directive of August 30 provided for the lifting of restrictions with regard to communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones and also with regard to freight traffic to and from the Soviet zone in Germany; the directive further provided that simultaneously the German mark of the Soviet zone would be made the sole currency for Berlin and that the Western "B" mark would be withdrawn.

The draft resolution, however, agreed only in part with the foregoing directive, Mr. Vyshinsky charged. It agreed only in that restrictions should be lifted immediately. The second part of the resolution, the part concerned with currency reform, did not agree with the directives, he insisted, since it provided for a lapse of time before it would be effected.

The United States policy on Berlin met considerable opposition in Paris, especially among the smaller nations. The United States, while seeking acceptance of the resolution on Berlin, was unable to persuade anyone to introduce a resolution accusing the U.S.S.R. of threatening the peace. Six "neutral" nations headed by Dr. Juan Bramuglia of Argentina, acting President of the Security Council, sought an East-West compromise outside the Security Council. A new agreement for simultaneous actions on the blockade and currency regulation acceptable to the U.S.S.R. was reached, but after apparently accepting it, the U.S. backed down and pushed its own resolution through the Security Council. After its adoption, the neutral nations continued their efforts, but the United States rejected all Soviet concessions. U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie and Assembly President Herbert Evatt sent a joint communication to the heads of the four powers on November 13. Basing themselves on the Mexican resolution unanimously passed by the General Assembly on November 3, which called upon the great powers "to renew their efforts to compose their differences," they urged the four powers to take immediate steps to resolve the Berlin question, and the peace settlement, and appealed for personal contact of the heads of the powers for over-all improvement of relations. The note was generally interpreted as a distinct victory for the Soviet position, since it failed to insist that the "blockade" be lifted before further steps could be taken. Mr. Vyshinsky's answer indicated the positive attitude of the U.S.S.R. to continued negotiations and especially to a meeting of the heads of the major powers. The three Western Powers, however, rejected the suggestions for further negotiations in their replies, while blaming the Soviet Union for continuing the crisis, and insisted that the matter must remain within the Security Council.



# Intervention in Greece

IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED that it was Winston Churchill who first gave the order for armed intervention in Greece when, in late 1944, British tanks and planes and guns were ordered to Athens to shoot down the Greek patriots who had liberated their country by their own efforts, thus contributing greatly to the Allied cause. Through British armed intervention these Greek patriots, comprising not only Communists but all democratic elements, and having the overwhelming support of the Greek people, were driven into the hills as "bandits," to be exterminated. With the help of British arms the monarcho-fascist elements and Axis collaborators were placed in positions of power which gave them the possibility to rig subsequent elections in their own favor. America took over Britain's role through the inauguration of the infamous Truman doctrine in April, 1947, and since then American money, arms, and military personnel have supported Greek reaction in its war against the Greek people. Greek living standards have plunged downward, repression and terror have mounted, trade unions and all democratic elements have been stamped out, and the guerrillas are more numerous than ever.

The Soviet Union and the Ukraine had originally, in 1946, brought the issue of British intervention in Greece before the Security Council as a threat to the peace. No action was taken. Instead, the Anglo-American bloc, alleging that Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania were responsible for the troubles in Greece, forced through a resolution providing for the establishment of a Balkan Investigating Commission to establish that Greece's northern neighbors were supporting the guerilla movement. The subsequent reports issued by this committee, charging that such aid had been established, were based on evidence so flimsy it would be thrown out by any reputable court.

On October 21, 1947, the General Assembly established the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans (U.N.S.C.O.B.) to act as mediator and conciliator between the government of Greece and the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, and to conduct political observations.

The report of this committee, presented to the Paris Assembly, sought to place the responsibility for continued chaos in Greece on aid to the Greek guerillas allegedly furnished by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, with the implication that the Soviet Union was indirectly backing outside intervention in Greek affairs.

Mr. Vyshinsky sharply opposed placing the report of U.N.S.C.O.B. on the agenda of the Assembly, charging that "the institution of a Balkans Committee represented direct interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states and thereby constituted a violation of one of the basic principles of the United Nations."

Basing themselves on the report of U.N.S.C.O.B., the United States, Great Britain, France, and China sponsored a draft resolution condemning Greece's northern neighbors for aiding the guerrillas as constituting a threat to the peace in the Balkans, approving the activities and reports of the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans and continuing its life for another year, and calling on Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to co-operate peacefully with Greece in the settlement of their disputes and with U.N.S.C.O.B., heretofore boycotted by the three governments.

At the meeting of the Political Committee of the General Assembly on October 28, devoted to a discussion of the Four-Power Resolution on the Greek question, Mr. Vyshinsky subjected the work of the Balkans Committee to a sharp analysis. He charged that the committee had done everything but what it should have done as authorized by the recommendations made by the General Assembly. Instead of acting as a mediation body, the committee set itself up as an investigation commission although this was contrary to, and at variance with, the decisions of the General Assembly. The committee, he declared, "authorized its observers to conduct investigations without, however, giving thought to the staff and means needed to cope with such a task, without considering all the difficulties which confronted and were bound to confront the committee when investigating incidents in the complex situation that has prevailed for three years now in the relations between Greece and her three northern neighbors."

John Foster Dulles, the United States representative, and Hector

McNeil, the British representative, exerted no little effort to whitewash the work of the committee. Addressing himself to the British representative, Mr. Vyshinsky asked whether Mr. McNeil thought the actions of the committee proper, and then proceeded to show why they were not. Mr. Vyshinsky charged:

These actions were improper because, when setting itself a task so tremendous, responsible, and complex as investigation of clashes and incidents on the frontiers between Greece and Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, the Committee should have had the appropriate means and staff for the purpose, and it itself should have been qualified to conduct the investigation. Such conditions provided, the committee could have ventured to guide the 28 observers enlisted in the capacity of investigators on particularly important cases involving frontier incidents and not only incidents, but not infrequently, as the Bulgarian representative here has said, direct military attacks by Greece on the territory of Bulgaria, on the territory of Albania, and in certain instances, on the territory of Yugoslavia. . . .

You will see from the Australian reservation—which, from my point of view, is all the more interesting since the Australian delegation can in no way be suspected of particular sympathy either for Greece's northern neighbors or for the Soviet Union, which, in the opinion of the sponsors of the Balkans Committee, seems to be the cause of all the evil in the Greek issue—you will see that the Australian delegation was obliged to refrain from endorsing the conclusions formulated in Chapter 3 of the report. Yet Chapter 3 represents the most substantial section in the entire report of the Balkan Committee. . . .

This reservation says that, in the Australian delegation's opinion, it was unnecessary and undesirable to arrive at categorical conclusions founded either on assumptions of observers who had no access to three of the four countries concerned, or on the testimony of witnesses produced by only one of the four governments concerned. . . .

The Soviet delegation maintains that the Australian reservation undermines one of the mainstays underlying the committee's conclusions that the present situation in Greece allegedly represents a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and to peace in the Balkans, and that the conduct of Albania, Bul-

garia, and Yugoslavia was incompatible with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. . . .

If we are to believe McNeil, it would seem that when the Balkans Committee . . . ignored its basic tasks and substituted other tasks for them, ignored its basic duties and substituted others for them . . . but began indulging in other matters and poorly fulfilled these unlawfully assumed duties, lacking as it did the means to cope with these important new duties, functions and tasks, mention of these impermissible facts is qualified as "legal casuistry." . . .

Dulles claimed here that the committee had received 86 reports from eyewitnesses, that it had the testimony of more than 700 witnesses and that, as a result, it had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the Greek guerrillas fighting the Greek government were receiving great help and support from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, which allegedly were supplying the guerrillas with war and other materials. If we turn to the documents submitted by the Balkans Committee and the proofs cited in these documents to confirm the charges leveled against Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, if we subject this material to an unbiased appraisal, the result will inevitably be a bitter disappointment.

It goes without saying that none of us have had the opportunity to analyze all the 700 pieces of testimony, the more so since this so-called testimony, as I have learned by examining a considerable number of these documents, represents in very many cases a resumé of the evidence, and not authentic records of the witnesses' testimony. It is well known that a resumé can be so compiled as to substitute an unfavorable aspect of reality with deductions and inferences of all kinds.

Nevertheless, we have thoroughly examined a heap of the so-called documents and the testimony given by a number of witnesses. As a result, we are firmly convinced . . . that the Balkans Committee failed to cope with its task.

Mr. Dulles and Mr. McNeil had praised the work of the Balkans Committee, however, saying the work of the observers was splendid, said Mr. Vyshinsky. Mr. Dulles, Mr. Vyshinsky went on, cited an incident that was supposed to have occurred on the Greek-Yugoslav border. Upon closer examination, it turned out that Mr. Dulles

had combined two of the episodes mentioned in the report and had added a little spice of his own. Subjecting the Dulles statements to further scrutiny, Mr. Vyshinsky continued:

Dulles states further: "On July 11 there was artillery fire; on July 12, mortar fire, and on July 18, machine-gun fire from Albanian territory against Greek national army units." I declare that there is nothing in the documents of the case to show that artillery fire was conducted on July 11, mortar fire on July 12, and machine-gun fire on July 18 from Albanian territory. Dulles again failed to give the source of his information, mentioning neither the page nor the number of the document. If we turn to report A/644, we find that the report records an episode which took place in July, namely, on July 11 and 12, and is described as follows:

"People crossed the frontier between Greece and Albania at the border post freely and without formality. Although the nationality of the persons crossing this frontier line cannot be established," the Balkans Committee writes on the basis of its observations, "it may be assumed" (that "may be assumed" is wonderful) "that they were Greeks crossing into Albania, or Albanians crossing into Greece, or both."

From what documents did Mr. Dulles take the data about the shootings of July 11 and 12? There are no such data in the reports. . . . Mr. Dulles also spoke of mortar fire allegedly conducted from Bulgarian territory on August 7, 1948. If we turn to Supplementary Report A/644, Point 56, we find the following:

"Approximately eight shells of the Greek national army fired against the guerrillas in Greece accidentally fell on Bulgarian territory at 19 hours on August 6 and under analogous circumstances at 13 hours on August 7; about seven shells exploded on Bulgarian territory." (Dulles said nothing about this fact.) "At 13 hours on August 7, guerrilla mortars fired at Greek territory from positions located approximately 400 yards from the frontier on the Bulgarian side. Artillery fire which wounded observers on August 7 was conducted from positions situated in Bulgaria."

We shall not as yet take up the question as to how unbiased are these reports of observers who put down as an accident the shelling of Bulgarian territory by the Greeks. In the given instance we merely

wish to note the fact that Dulles for some reason "forgot" to mention the shelling of Bulgarian territory by Greek guns. This fact, which is by no means unimportant from the standpoint of an objective record of events, is worthy of some attention. That is how Mr. Dulles quotes the documents of the Balkans Committee to which he refers in order to confirm the adoption of the measures proposed in the resolution of the four observers.

The committee, as numerous facts have shown, was not discriminating in dealing with the witnesses it questioned and did not place very high demands on them as regards the authenticity of their evidence.

In the reports and documents of the Balkans Committee one comes across not a few references to witnesses listed under code numbers. It is not known who these people are, what their names or positions are; they occur simply as Witness No. 6(W)<sub>110</sub>, 6(W)<sub>112</sub>, 6(W)<sub>116</sub>. What sort of witnesses are these, who can find them and verify their evidence?

And what do the observers say about the testimony of Witness 6(W)<sub>110</sub>? They say that although "this witness was rather stupid," they considered his testimony "credible." In reference to Witness 6(W)<sub>112</sub> they also say that "although the witness proved quite stupid and slightly intoxicated, we arrived at the opinion that he was sincere and we had no reason not to believe him." One could think that the more stupid the witness, the more indispensable and necessary he became for the observers. This may sound like a joke, but it is a fact. And I am not so sure that among the 700 witnesses you will not find a couple of hundred of such stupid but sincere witnesses. . . .

One of the committee's documents (No. 16/205) contains, on the instance of the Greek side, a resumé of the testimony of 18 witnesses to the effect that there are camps in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia where Greek guerrillas undergo training, get medical treatment, and from where they are sent back into Greece. Of these 18 witnesses half are guerrillas who have been taken prisoner and the other half are guerrillas who surrendered to the Greek troops of their own free will. It is well known that some of them were tried by Greek courts and sentenced to death. And it is the testimony of such witnesses that is being used to corroborate accusations ad-

vanced against their countries. To this we may add that the Greek witnesses, most of them captured guerrillas, were, according to the information in the report, for a considerable time in the hands of the Greek authorities and were interrogated, as the same report says, most frequently in the presence of a Greek liaison officer. One can well imagine how the impartiality and objectivity of this testimony could be insured under such conditions. Nevertheless, the Balkans Committee accepts the testimony as perfectly objective, impartial, truthful and credible. . . .

There was an Observers' Group No. 2. In one of the documents of this group, No. 2/16/K, we read the following lines: "Aug. 29. A mule path running eastward from the frontier post leads to Albania; although it rained last night, one could clearly see that the path had been used recently. The fact that a lot of chocolate wrappers littered the frontier path led to the conclusion that this spot may be used by guerrillas for rest."

What splendid proof—if ever and anywhere one finds chocolate candy wrappers, that means that guerrillas were there. This is worthy of a satirist's pen.

We have been dealing with the credibility of the evidence, but a large amount of the material that I have examined deserves no credence at all, and this circumstance could not be concealed even by the Balkans Committee itself. The main defect in such testimony by witnesses consists in that they saw nothing for themselves and mainly went by hearsay; but, according to English law, hearsay testimony cannot be considered fully credible evidence.

Mr. Vyshinsky then cited several examples of sheer hearsay evidence which was designed to prove that Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav nationals had fought with the Greek guerrillas and that the Greek guerrillas had received munitions and supplies from these countries. Any conscientious approach to facts, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, scatters to the winds the so-called evidence of the Balkans Committee, which juggles the facts, describes events unscrupulously, attempts to substitute assumption for truth, and the desired for the existing. Moreover, Mr. Vyshinsky charged, it was obvious to any trained observer that much of the evidence was derived from misinformation in the press and repeated by rote. Mr. Vyshinsky then

called attention to certain testimony that was strikingly incredible even to the uninitiated:

This in particular refers to the testimony given by juvenile witnesses, of whom there were also a good number in this case—boys of 15 or 16. One such witness, the 15-year-old Sokratis Takos, mention of whom you may find on page 179 of the report, was described by the commission as a "surrendered bandit." And so this boy, whom his captain had sent on some combat assignment to display valor, this 15-year-old boy, inflamed by a desire to display valor, did accept this assignment. Further, evidently carried away by his own story, he says that the Bulgarians applauded him when he was passing near some Bulgarian frontier post, that three cabins stood within one kilometer from the Bulgarian frontier and that "this was the rendezvous for 15 guerrillas." He further testified that these 15 "guerrillas" were awaiting him and several of his companions and had prepared a fine dinner for them. Next, he says, explosions were suddenly heard and he understood that this was a guerrilla attack on a train. Next he begins to describe the attack on the train. The mines, the explosion of which he heard during dinner, he says, were planted by the guerrillas who attacked the train and then fled "to our side," shouting that regular Greek troops were approaching. And that is the whole story.

And it is such childish testimony that is collected by the observers, one of whom, according to the French delegate, appears to have been lying in a ditch and trying to determine by the sound of whining bullets in which direction they were flying—from left to right or right to left. I certainly do not envy the position of that French warrior who was obliged to creep into a deep ditch and from it attentively to listen to whining bullets, so as later to be able to declare in his dispatch that the bullets were flying from Albanian territory to Greek territory. Nevertheless, these observers, who for the convenience of observation hide in all sorts of ditches, very eloquently and graphically described various episodes, resorting for this purpose to the testimony of 15-year-old boys. . . .

Who was the chief inspirer of those witnesses? Who formulated the charges which are now preferred by the Balkans Committee? It was the Greek general staff. How do I arrive at that? What is the



basis for my conclusion? I proceed from the reports of the Balkans Committee, from its own assertions.

Here are the facts. The Greek general staff accused Greece's northern neighbors of actively assisting the Greek guerrillas. What proofs are supplied for these assertions? The following proofs. The Greek general staff declares that "the high degree of planning and control in guerrilla actions in Epirus" proves that the guerrilla commanders had foreign officers as their advisors. That means to say that if the guerrillas act skillfully and are able to plan their military actions and, furthermore, control the actions of their military units, this proves that they have foreign, that is, Bulgarian, Albanian, or Yugoslav military advisors. This assertion was so cynical and so artificial that even the observers had to admit that "neither the nature of the operations nor the various statements made to Greek officers by guerrillas and refugees provide any direct proof that foreign officers were co-operating with the guerrillas."

The observers acted quite skillfully; they did not give direct proofs. Maybe they availed themselves of circumstantial evidence? If such circumstantial evidence exists, why was it not presented? Why did the observers not say: "There are no direct proofs but we have circumstantial evidence?" This they have not said because they have no circumstantial evidence either. . . .

Just look at the blunders in logic made by the observers and, following them, the Balkans Committee itself. The report, for instance, says: "According to witnesses' testimony, gravely wounded guerrillas were transported to a village near the frontier and thence transferred to Albania." May it be mentioned in passing that the identity of these witnesses is unknown, just as how, when, and by whom this testimony was obtained. But suppose these were the most reliable witnesses. What then? The military advisors noted in their report that very few wounded guerrillas were captured in that case. This is the first circumstance. The second consists in that there were no proofs that wounded guerrillas could be discovered somewhere in the mountains. We have, therefore, two circumstances: few wounded guerrillas were captured and there was no proof that any wounded guerrillas had been evacuated to the mountains. Proceeding from these two circumstances, the observers arrived at the conclusion that the rest of the wounded guerrillas had been transferred to Albania. What logic!

Turning to the question of whether Bulgaria and Albania could be accused of refusing to resume diplomatic relations with Greece, as Mr. McNeil had charged they had, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that this question had been dealt with at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. Even at that time it had been clear that it was not the fault of Albania and Bulgaria that diplomatic relations had not been resumed. Mr. Vyshinsky further contended:

And indeed, was it not the Greek government that on August 21, 1946, presented Albania with such a demand as the satisfaction of the Greek claims to Northern Epirus as a preliminary condition for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Greece? And was it not quite natural for Albania to declare to the Greek government in connection with this demand that the Greek government "must give up its unsubstantiated claims," give up its aggressive plans directed against the People's Republic of Albania. . . . The question of the territorial demands of the Tsaldaris government with regard to Albania and Bulgaria has its history testifying to the steady aggressive designs of the present Greek government.

One cannot help recalling that at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 the Tsaldaris government tried to ascertain whether it would not be possible to seize Northern Epirus from Albania, whether it would not be possible to seize from Bulgaria the valley which lies north of the Rhodope Mountains. . . .

The solicitations of the Tsaldaris government were resolutely turned down in the Political and Territorial Commission by a majority of eight to two, and one of these two was Greece, while several members, including Great Britain, abstained. Evidently, the Tsaldaris government, which in 1947 again raised the demand before Albania regarding Northern Epirus, did not take into account the lesson taught it at the Paris Conference. It continues to harbor aggressive designs against its northern neighbors.

And in the face of such facts, the United States and Great Britain are demanding that Albania and Bulgaria agree to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Greece. But how, under such circumstances, while being objective and unbiased, can any one demand from Albania and Bulgaria that they should agree to a resumption of diplomatic and good-neighborly relations with a country whose

government openly demands the seizure of part of the territory of these states in order to annex it? I do not know and cannot imagine the existence of a government that would agree to have diplomatic relations with the government of a country that strives to seize part of its territory. . . .

For the Soviet delegation the question is quite clear. Taking into account the facts and real circumstances certified by documents and attested in the mind of every one of those before whose eyes these facts are taking place, the Soviet delegation and the Soviet Union give the following answer to the question put here: The responsibility for all the above-mentioned facts, for the situation brought about in Greece, rests with the Greek government which does not conceal its territorial claims and its aggressive aspirations to foreign territories; the responsibility rests and must rest with the governments of other countries who support these territorial claims, who encourage these adventurist attempts to tear away a slice of foreign territory, attempts which of themselves testify to any aggressive policy and represent by themselves a threat to peace and security.

The Greek question, Mr. Vyshinsky stated, cannot, however, be considered apart from the international situation as a whole. "Mr. Dulles," Vyshinsky continued, "took upon himself the task of disclosing this connection, of indicating the reasons that led to the Greek crisis, and of explaining this crisis from the viewpoint of world events. This task, however, proved beyond Mr. Dulles' powers." We have already seen what threat there is to the territorial integrity of Greece, Mr. Vyshinsky continued; let us now examine the threat to the political independence of Greece:

Mr. Dulles sees this threat in the fact that in Greece Communists are allegedly attempting to overthrow the government by force, and to achieve this are receiving aid from other countries which, according to Mr. Dulles, are under the control of Communists. . . . Mr. Dulles saw a connection between the events in Greece, between the wild orgy of terror and violence—which pursues a single aim, namely, to stifle and crush the democratic movement of the Greek people fighting for their independence and for liberation from foreign domination—and the general condition of foreign political rela-

tions throughout the world in the fact that, as he said, the "events in Greece are merely a part of a general attempt to spread the power of Soviet communism over the entire world. . . ."

This, Mr. Vyshinsky said, was an old song. The only thing that had been added, he said, was the charge that it was not only the Communists in other countries but the Communist governments of these countries that were supporting rebellions in other lands. Yet two years before, this slander was refuted at the General Assembly when definite evidence had been presented by those who had visited Greece and seen for themselves that the Greek democratic movement was a movement of national resistance, a nationwide movement.

The nationwide character of the Greek resistance movement, continued Mr. Vyshinsky, can also be judged by the "horrifying statistics on victims of Greek reaction, those tens of thousands of Greek patriots who are languishing in captivity on the bare rocks of Psitalia and other uninhabited islands of the Aegean Sea, in prisons and places of exile inside Greece, where hundreds and thousands of the best people of the Greek nation are being systematically wiped out by mass shootings, people whose only crime is that they are patriots and are fighting for freedom and the independence of their country."

Yet Mr. Dulles tried to scare credulous people with fairy tales about the spread of Soviet communism all over the world, Mr. Vyshinsky continued:

I have already said that these are old, wild ravings. It is well known that whenever a people's liberation movement, the struggle of a people for democracy, for progress, for national independence, for national freedom, against old, moribund classes or ruling cliques arises in any country, and when these dying classes or cliques can no longer cope with the danger threatening them, they and their friends begin to howl to the entire world about the "hand" of foreign Communists who, they allege, are inciting the struggle against the given country, against the so-called lawful governments of the Tsaldaris type and the groups from which these governments draw support. These provocative ravings are doomed to failure and have invariably failed, as they will fail in the future. . . .

The no less wild raving about the alleged attempt to spread the power of "Soviet communism" all over the world, Mr. Vyshinsky

continued, stems from the ignorance of those who do not understand what a tremendous role the development of productive forces and the relations of production based upon these forces play in the history of society. Nor do they understand, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out, the role played in this development by new social ideas, new political institutions, and the new political power required to abolish the old forces, the old relations of production. The new relations of production, he went on, demand a revolutionary transformation of existing social relations. This has been true all through history. This was the case in the seventeenth century when the English revolution took place under Cromwell. This was the case in the eighteenth century when the American revolution triumphed under Jefferson's leadership. It is equally true of the situation that has arisen in the countries of the old world. The reasons, Vyshinsky emphasized, "should be sought where they really lie, namely, in the class contradictions of modern states which give rise to social and political conflicts that accompany the development of social relations, that have been constantly observed in the history of mankind since the day when classes appeared, and that have invariably ended in the victory of the people's movement for liberation." That is why, he added, the charges of Mr. Dulles were ridiculous.

The situation in Greece, Mr. Vyshinsky emphasized, was the result of Anglo-American intervention in the internal affairs of Greece and also the result of the struggle going on within the country between the democratic forces and the anti-democratic forces that resist economic, social, and political progress. It is a matter, he said, of eliminating the obstacle that cannot be eliminated, as history teaches, except by breaking the old relations.

But Mr. McNeil has revealed, Vyshinsky pointed out, that Great Britain has "strategic interests" in Greece; this explains why Great Britain failed to withdraw her troops from Greece although she had promised to do so nearly three years ago. And the United States, he charged further, is also guided by strategic interests in Greece. Mr. Vyshinsky cited specific instances to support this contention, quoting among others a statement by Paul Porter, former head of the American mission in Greece, to the effect that political disagreements among the Greek people have been intensified since the Truman Doctrine was put into operation. Even Mr. Truman was forced to admit that economic conditions in Greece have deteriorated in connection with the protracted military struggle and that the bulk of American aid had to be expended on non-productive measures.

It was well known, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, that the United States had already spent over 800 million dollars on Greece:

A recent issue of the well-known *United States News and World Report*, a journal usually sufficiently well-informed about American affairs, carried an article pointing out that last year American aid to Greece in arms and ammunition was such that if the total sum were divided by the number of guerrillas, the result would be equivalent to \$8,000 per guerrilla, or twice as much as it costs to maintain a fully equipped American soldier for one year. The journal adds, however, that "the guerrillas not only have not been destroyed but have grown in number."

These, Mr. Vyshinsky stated, are the facts that cannot be shaken—much less eliminated—by the fairy tales of Messrs. Dulles and McNeil. He continued:

No measures connected with the interference of the American or British authorities, or of both together, in the internal affairs of Greece, are able to improve the situation in Greece; the situation will not improve until the Greek people, liberated from foreign intervention and the royalist-fascist internal regime, are given an opportunity to solve the Greek question themselves. No measures, however ferocious and despotic they may be, can give the suppressors any positive results, because in Greece it is not a matter of a rebellion of a handful of "extremists" against a government allegedly recognized and supported by the Greek people, but of a nationwide movement of liberation.

If that were not so, why cannot Mr. McNeil give an intelligible answer to one simple question: how could it happen that for three years "a handful of rebels" has been offering such effective resistance to the entire army of the Greek government which enjoys tremendous support in finances, supplies and arms, including tanks and aircraft, shells, instructors, and officers of various kinds, entire units of American and British armed forces and their general staffs? They absolutely fail to understand how absurd are their explanations that the three-year heroic, successful struggle of the Greek democrats

against the royalist-fascist regime in Greece is due to foreign propaganda and some sort of aid from the northern neighbors of Greece. One can judge what sort of aid this is from the report of the Balkans Committee.

Yet, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, if we listened to John Foster Dulles, it would appear that the peaceful regulation of international relations is being prevented only by the Soviet Union, despite the fact that the Soviet Union is withdrawing its troops from Korea and has none of its troops on foreign territory except for occupation forces provided for by Allied agreements. The United States, on the other hand, said Mr. Vyshinsky, maintains hundreds of bases in all parts of the globe and military strategic interests in Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, and other areas.

One may, therefore, ask, Mr. Vyshinsky pursued, whether the draft resolution of the four governments—the United States, Great Britain, France, and China—submitted to the Political Committee, provides any way out of the Greek situation. The answer to this question, he said, is that it does not:

And it cannot, for it is guided by that which Mr. McNeil accidentally gave away here—the strategic interests of certain states which have taken in tow as their allies certain other states, and are now striving by joint efforts to solve the Greek question in such a way as really to coincide with their strategic, economic, and political interests which are guided by an insatiable striving for world domination.

The Soviet delegation is therefore against such a resolution. . . .

At a subsequent session of the Political Committee and again at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky repeated his charges that the findings of the Balkans Committee did not conclusively prove that the three sovereign states bordering on Greece—Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia—had in any way interfered in the situation in Greece or that they were violating the recommendations of the General Assembly.

Mr. Vyshinsky reiterated, that the aim of the Special Balkans Committee is to cover up Anglo-American intervention in Greek affairs. He offered a concrete program for settlement of the Greek

issue, which called for dissolution of the Special Balkans Committee, and withdrawal of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel:

The Soviet delegation submits proposals of a different kind. It will recommend to Greece, on the one hand, and to Bulgaria and Albania, on the other, to establish diplomatic relations, the absence of which has a negative effect on relations between these countries.

It recommends to the governments of Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania to renew the previously operating conventions or to conclude new ones concerning the regulations of frontier questions, and also to regulate the question of refugees in the spirit of mutual understanding and the establishment of good neighborly relations.

It recommends to the Greek government that it carry through the necessary measures to insure the elimination of any discrimination with regard to citizens of Macedonian and Albanian nationality dwelling on Greek territory, with a view to according them the opportunity to use their native language and to develop their national culture.

It insists that the General Assembly recommend that all foreign troops and foreign military personnel in Greece be recalled.

The Soviet delegation, bearing in mind the negative results obtained by the so-called Special Balkans Committee, insists that the General Assembly adopt a resolution regarding the termination of the activity of this committee.

The Soviet delegation recommends to the governments of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia that at the end of six months they report to the United Nations Secretary-General in order to inform the member states of the United Nations of the fulfillment of the aforementioned recommendations.

The Assembly rejected this Soviet proposal, and approved, 47 to 6, the Four Power Resolution calling upon Greece's three northern neighbors to cease aiding the guerillas, and it approved continuing the work of the Special Balkans Committee.



# The Principle of Unanimity, or Veto Power

THE QUESTION of the principle of unanimity, or veto power, came before the General Assembly in the form of a draft resolution offered by the United States, Britain, France, and China for restricting the principle of unanimity by labeling as "procedural," and hence not subject to the veto, a number of questions coming within the competence of the Security Council. The resolution was based on proposals by the Interim Committee (the so-called "Little Assembly"), an organization set up over the opposition of the Soviet Union for the express purpose of by-passing the Security Council by taking up matters within the latter's competence and settling them without the unanimity principle being applied. The Soviet Union has boycotted this body from the beginning, as being contrary to the U.N. Charter, and opposed having its report placed on the agenda.

Also presented to the Assembly was an Argentine proposal to call a Constitutional Convention of all members of the United Nations for the purpose of either eliminating or restricting the veto by amendment of the Charter, and an Australian resolution for its restriction.

Alleged Soviet "abuse" of the veto power has been one of the charges consistently leveled against the U.S.S.R. by the Anglo-American bloc in an effort to transfer to the Soviet Union the blame for their own undermining activities in the United Nations.

It is important to note that the principle of unanimity was not the invention of the Soviet Union. At the time the United Nations was originally projected, all the big powers were agreed that the adoption of this principle in voting procedure was the only possible guarantee of peaceful settlements. It was recognized as a primary obligation of the Great Powers to reach agreement among themselves on whatever

issues arose among them, no matter how long the process might take, and not to bring issues to a vote until such agreement had been reached. The difficulties in the United Nations have arisen because the Anglo-American bloc, instead of utilizing the organization in accordance with its Charter as "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations" has sought to organize within it an anti-Soviet majority.

The Soviet Union had at first held that the most effective voting method would be the requirement of big power unanimity on all matters. At the Yalta Conference, however, Marshal Stalin accepted a compromise formula devised by President Roosevelt, putting certain limitations on the veto. This is embodied in Article 27 of the U.N. Charter which reads:

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by the affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under Paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

It is well known that without such a provision the United States Senate would never have ratified the U.N. Charter, since without the principle of unanimity the United States would have been put in the position of being bound by the decisions of other nations with which their own representative was not in agreement, even to the extent of committing U.S. armed forces.

Mr. Vyshinsky presented the Soviet viewpoint on the veto at the meeting of the Special Political Committee of the U.N. Assembly on November 30, 1948:

It may be said that the young United Nations Organization is always in the midst of ceaseless campaigns which are conducted under the slogan of struggle against the veto. Matters have gone so far that certain members of the United Nations Organization claim credit for waging a struggle against the veto—against the principle of unanimity of the Great Powers laid down in our Charter and constituting one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Organization. Those members of the United Nations are not ashamed to come out openly at the Security Council and elsewhere against the unanimity principle, inspired and encouraged by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain. . . . One

would think that struggle against the unanimity principle actually is some sort of service to the United Nations. . . .

In this campaign against the veto, representatives of small countries have been supported by representatives of states that initiated the unanimity rule, the veto—the representatives of the United States and Great Britain—although neither of these two acted with such crude frankness as those whom they supported. Yet the explicitness and clarity of their position aimed against the unanimity principle cannot be denied. Yesterday, for instance, Mr. Cohen, representative of the United States, stated that all of the four permanent members of the Security Council who are the authors of the draft resolution submitted to the Political Committee had declared their readiness to abstain from using their privileged voting power in connection with the admission of new members. Cohen also alleged that the use of the "veto" in this connection was a serious injustice to a number of states eligible for membership in our organization. This certainly was an outright condemnation of the unanimity principle—condemnation based on a denial of this principle as a method of co-operation in the United Nations Organization.

Now matters have gone so far that Cohen, the representative of the United States, declares that the United States is ready to accept the formula of the Interim Committee which urges agreement to the effect that all decisions of a non-procedural character enumerated in the second conclusion of the Interim Committee be carried by the votes of any seven members. But the Charter demands that these votes include the concurring votes of the five permanent members.

Such an attitude certainly runs counter to the United Nations Charter, constitutes a gross violation of the Charter and is a call for and an incitement to gross violation of the Charter, which envisages the adoption of decisions by seven votes of the Security Council members only on procedural questions. Mr. Cohen, of course, knows all this very well. Nevertheless he says here that the veto renders the activity of the Security Council impossible and creates a necessity for Security Council members to look for other ways within the limits of the Charter for maintaining peace and security. But Mr. Cohen also knows very well that "other ways" cannot be found "within the limits of the Charter," that other ways can be found only outside the Charter and in contradiction to the Charter of the United

Nations Organization. The American representative added that "the question of efficient functioning of the Security Council, the question of the Security Council's incapacity to act are extremely important questions influencing the cause of maintaining peace and security. . . ."

Thus, the representative of the United States connects the question of the so-called "veto" with the question of the Security Council's "incapacity to act." According to Mr. Cohen, the Security Council cannot act because the veto is in force at the Security Council. Naturally, the quite definite conclusion is drawn from this that the veto, that is, the unanimity principle, must be done away with, and this is the aim for which the representatives of the United States and Great Britain, as well as some others who support them in this effort, are striving.

Reviewing the history of the unanimity rule, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that it was introduced at the initiative of President Roosevelt in his message to Stalin on December 14, 1944. It did not, however, grant the members of the Security Council any new right, since this right had been enjoyed by the members of the Council of the League of Nations. In this connection, said Mr. Vyshinsky, it was interesting to recall the declaration of the Four Powers at the San Francisco conference on June 7, 1945:

The 1945 declaration of the four powers stated that the unanimity rule which must be observed during voting in the Security Council on non-procedural questions includes, strictly speaking, two most important elements: (1) the requirement of the concurring votes of all permanent members; (2) the requirement of the concurring votes of two non-permanent members.

Indeed, for the adoption of a decision it is necessary to have seven votes, and it is not sufficient to have five votes of all the permanent members, which would actually place the Great Powers in a privileged position, but it is necessary to have two more votes of the non-permanent members. This means that, by refusing to join a unanimous decision of the five Great Powers on some non-procedural question, several non-permanent members of the Security Council could actually veto the agreed decision of the five powers.

Thus we have two kinds of veto. This must be known and remembered by those who, distorting historical truth, permit themselves to say that the unanimity principle grants a privilege to the five, which may settle all questions at the Security Council as they like. This, gentlemen, is wrong and incorrect because it is not by five votes of the permanent members, even if they concur, that all questions at the Security Council are decided, but by the five votes plus two concurring votes of non-permanent members. Precisely this is pointed out in the San Francisco four-power declaration.

In view of this state of affairs, how is it possible to say that the veto means dictatorship of the five, or even of one of the five who can impose his veto?

The right of veto, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, is not a privilege but an obligation which follows from the supreme and special responsibility which the five Great Powers bear for the peace and security of nations. Referring again to President Roosevelt's message to Stalin, Mr. Vyshinsky stated:

In that message Roosevelt described the permanent members of the Security Council as the "main keepers of peace," who must assume moral leadership and must act unanimously in all decisions of the Council without endangering their rival interests. In that message President Roosevelt wrote that this would make much more acceptable for all nations a general draft which, of necessity, must assign to the great Powers a special role in maintaining peace by means of force. . . .

In that letter everything commands attention—that the five Great Powers are declared the main keepers of the peace, that without their unanimity it is impossible to maintain and consolidate this peace, and that in maintaining peace the five Great Powers play a special role, particularly when they will have to use force for maintaining peace. It is not fortuitous that Article 47 of the United Nations Charter, dealing with the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council, lays down that the Military Staff Committee shall consist of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, or their representatives. This explains the meaning of the formula used by President Roosevelt in the letter cited above when he spoke

of the special role of the Great Powers in maintaining peace by means of force. . . .

In that letter Roosevelt also wrote that, in view of the main responsibility of the permanent members, it cannot be expected in the conditions now prevailing in the world that they assume the obligation to act in such serious matters as the maintenance of international peace and security in compliance with a decision with which they do not agree. The only practical method, therefore, to enable the Security Council to adopt a decision by a majority vote is to provide for the unanimity of the permanent members—on non-procedural questions—plus the concurring votes of at least two non-permanent members. For all these reasons, as is pointed out in President Roosevelt's letter, the four sponsoring governments agree to this formula and submit it to the conference as necessary for setting up an international organization through which all peace-loving nations would be able to bear most efficiently their joint responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Thus, the principle of unanimity was recognized to be the main requisite for the creation of the international organization itself.

The main political tendencies, the aims and tasks of the unanimity principle were outlined in this message of the late President of the United States. A broader picture, however, is provided by another document which should be recalled now since many seem to be forgetting it or have already forgotten it. I have in mind the statement of the American delegation at the Yalta Conference on February 6, 1945, made by former Secretary of State Stettinius. The statement of the American delegation contains an analysis of the proposal of President Roosevelt. It is pointed out in this analysis that this proposal is in full accord with the special responsibility of the Great Powers for the maintenance of universal peace, and this proposal demands unconditional unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all the important decisions pertaining to the maintenance of peace, including all economic and military compulsory measures. . . .

It is necessary to note also that this American statement emphasized two important aspects of the question on the procedure of voting and on the veto.

The first moment, or the first element, as it was termed in that

statement, is that unanimity of all permanent members is necessary for maintaining universal peace.

The second element emphasized in the statement is that it is extremely important for the people of the United States that justice should be assured for all members of the organization. In conclusion, the statement pointed out that the task which the United States government sets itself is to reconcile these two elements.

Mr. Vyshinsky reminded his audience of Molotov's warning, delivered before the Paris conference in 1946, that renunciation of the veto power would facilitate the creation of narrow groups and blocs among the Great Powers. At that time Molotov also pointed out that the veto made it difficult for an aggressor to consummate deals behind the back and against the interests of peace-loving countries. The struggle against the veto, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, is not accidental. It "reflects the struggle between the two main trends in foreign policy and in international life as a whole. One trend is international co-operation, for which the United Nations Organization serves, can and must serve as a basis." It is precisely the enemies of peace and democracy who seek to undermine the veto by trying to "liberalize" it, he charged. They wish to shake the foundation and thus the entire edifice of the United Nations because they realize that as long as the United Nations Organization exists intact, it is an obstacle to the unleashing of a new war. The struggle being waged over the veto, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, makes it evident how aggravated the contradiction between fundamental political principles has become; it is a struggle, on the one hand, between the principle of international co-operation and, on the other hand, the desire of some influential groups to free their hands for an unbridled struggle for world domination. That is why there is so much fuss about the alleged abuse of the veto by the Soviet Union.

Turning to an examination of some of the charges made, Mr. Vyshinsky analyzed the charge made by Mr. Cadogan of the British delegation, that the Soviet Union had vetoed the proposal to admit Ceylon to the United Nations. Mr. Cadogan, however, could produce neither a resolution nor minutes to this effect, Mr. Vyshinsky stated:

What was in question was that consideration of the admission of Ceylon be postponed until the receipt of the information the Soviet

representative had requested. Nevertheless, on the insistence of the representatives of the United States and Great Britain, the question was put to a vote, and the Soviet representative voted against the attempt to consider the substance of the question in spite of the fact that he had merely asked that the matter be postponed for a while pending the receipt of additional information concerning the state status of Ceylon.

So you see what a misuse of the veto power we have been guilty of. But if we are going to talk about misuses, it will be found that it was not the representative of the Soviet Union who misused the veto power, but those who, in breach of the rules of political tact and of the elementary spirit of co-operation, would not agree to postpone for a short time consideration of the question of admitting Ceylon to the United Nations Organization so as to give one of the members of the Security Council the opportunity to study the data relating to this question. The abuse was committed by those who demanded and insisted that a decision be adopted immediately as dictated by them. And when a question is put to the vote on this basis and the Soviet representatives votes against it, we are told: "There you have an example of the abuse of the veto power."

In using the veto on the Berlin question, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, the Soviet Union acted in self-defense. And in the case of the proposal that would have created an investigation commission in regard to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union objected on the ground that the committee was intended for intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union was also charged with abusing the veto in the question of admitting Italy to the United Nations, Mr. Vyshinsky added. But the truth of the matter is, he said, that the Soviet Union never objected to admitting Italy but to the policy of benevolence and favoritism shown to one state while a policy of discrimination was pursued toward another with the same grounds for admission to the United Nations.

In all these cases, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, the veto power prevented infringement of the principles of the Charter:

This is the reason that the opponents of this right are endeavoring to abolish it by all sorts of artificial means, wishing to bring it to naught so as to have a free hand to admit one state today and refuse admittance to another state tomorrow. . . .



It is against this that the veto principle is used, the principle of unanimity which gives the right not to permit such arbitrary rule by a group of states, not to permit two or three states to act against the interests of all peace-loving nations and of the organization as a whole.

I shall remind you what Molotov said at the 1946 Paris conference: "The veto prevents two, three, or even four powers from coming to terms among themselves and acting against one or another of the five main powers."

This is what and whom the veto hinders. This is who suffers from the veto. This is for whom it is so necessary to eliminate this veto. This is who at present sighs that the hour has not yet struck when it would be possible to knife the veto in the back. Nevertheless, while sighing, they are already sharpening knives in order to use them when they think the time is suitable for this crime. This will in fact be a crime, because such an act threatens to destroy the United Nations Organization which cannot exist unless the relations inside the United Nations are based not on the dictate of one group of states towards others, but on mutual respect, on the necessity of coming to terms, on the necessity of achieving agreed decisions. . . .

One must understand finally how wrong the Chinese representative was when, clearly having the Soviet Union in mind, he stated yesterday that a certain permanent member of the Security Council considers the veto an instrument of its national policy. It would be more correct to say that the veto is not an instrument of the national policy of the Soviet Union, which uses the veto by virtue of the same rights as the other permanent members of the Security Council . . . but a means of struggle against the anti-democratic, aggressive course of foreign policy pursued by certain permanent members of the Security Council. In such circumstances the veto is an inevitable, necessary and natural weapon of self-defense in the hands of the minority against the omnipotence of the majority.

To understand all that has been said, one must know that such principles as that of deciding matters according to a majority vote cannot be transferred mechanically to international relations. The United Nations General Assembly is not a legislative body. It is an international conclave of representatives of sovereign states. This was made clear by Stettinius to his colleagues in the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee. He said that in the majority of cases criticism of this rule of voting is due to the fact that people forget that the United Nations is not a federation or a world state, and that the procedure of voting by sovereign member-states cannot be considered on the same basis as the procedure of voting in parliaments of states or in Congress.

"When peoples and governments," Stettinius told the American senators, "will in future years acquire experience and confidence in the world organization, I hope that they will learn how to use or adapt the principles and technique of democracy to international affairs in far greater measure, but I believe that it would be fatal to endeavor now to go beyond that which the nations are obviously prepared to carry out today."

At present, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, the struggle against the veto is being masked by references to the effect that abuse of the veto cannot be tolerated:

These are absolutely artificial statements devoid of any foundation. To confirm the correctness of such an assertion allow me to give two examples. The so-called "veto" was used for the first time in 1946 in London, during the Security Council's discussion of the problem of withdrawing troops from Lebanon and Syria. At that time drafts of Security Council decisions concerning the withdrawal of troops from these countries were submitted in a spirit which did not permit a settlement of this problem. The Soviet delegation insisted on a more accurate, clear, and definite formulation which would guarantee the sovereign interests of these two small states that were defending themselves against one state, a great power. Our proposals were rejected and the Soviet representative voted against this resolution. That was the "veto"—the first "veto."

What happened afterwards? Did further events realize the desires of the British and French delegations, who at that time endeavored to pass a resolution with a stipulation that withdrawal of troops should be preceded by a special agreement between the French government and the governments of Syria and Lebanon concerning the fate of their privileges in these countries? It did not turn

out as they wished, but in such a way that they were obliged to withdraw their troops, both British and French, without these agreements. It turned out as the Soviet Union demanded. They were forced to act not in the manner set forth in the British and French drafts of this rotten compromise resolution which the Soviet representative could not accept, but in the manner insisted upon by the Soviet representative, that is, unconditional withdrawal of their troops. And it was effected. Did not the use of the veto then do good to Syria and Lebanon and serve the cause of defending their sovereignty and defending the principles of the United Nations Charter? And now they are trying to make it appear as if this was allegedly an abuse of the veto power. Mr. Cadogan went to the trouble of counting up the number of times the Soviet delegation used the veto, declaring that this had happened 28 times. He deliberately "made a mistake" so that his words should have a stronger effect on gullible people. He left out one minor "detail," namely, that we were obliged to use the veto several times—from four to seven times—on one and the same question, in view of the fact that these questions were brought before the Security Council again and again.

Mr. Vyshinsky cited as illustration the case of Franco Spain. On this issue the Soviet Union used the veto four times to prevent the admission of an admittedly fascist regime to the United Nations. Here again, it can hardly be said, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, that the use of the veto had done harm or that the veto had been abused.

The opponents of the veto power had established the Interim Committee over the objections of the Soviet Union. This committee, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, had compiled a list of 98 questions which it proposed should be settled according to the rules for procedural questions, *i.e.*, without the veto, although in the main they are not procedural. The Interim Committee, he charged, chose a very simple method in compiling this list:

First, it has taken separately all those questions which, since they concern procedure, should be settled simply by seven votes in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 27. Second, it has enumerated a series of other questions which cannot be settled in this way and has suggested settling these questions too in the same manner.

This is what is called a "solution of the problem." Indeed, quite an original solution of the problem. The Charter states that procedural questions are settled in one way while non-procedural questions are settled in another way. The Interim Committee says: procedural questions are settled in accordance with the Charter while non-procedural questions will also be settled in the same way as procedural questions. This is an obvious violation of the Charter. . . .

If you choose to revise the Charter, you must adhere to the procedure provided for this purpose by the Charter. The Charter lays down that it is necessary to call a conference to approve the changes, which then have to be duly ratified. You, however, do not want this. You wish to revise the Charter and violate the procedure established by the Charter for introducing any changes. And this you call "not touching the Charter and not undermining the Charter?" . . .

In other words, a whole series of complicated, acute political problems is to be put to vote and settled not in accordance with the rules instituted by the Charter for settling such questions, but, contrary to the Charter, by a simple majority of seven votes, in violation of the basic principle of unanimity. It is suggested not to reckon with the opinion of other permanent members of the Security Council, not to strive to achieve unanimity between the five chief powers, which is both the foundation and the guarantee of peace and the security of nations. . . .

In San Francisco the initiators of the new international organization came to agreement that the very decision of whether a question is one of procedure or not should be settled by a qualified majority, that is, by seven votes, including all the permanent members. . . .

Now the representatives of the United States and Great Britain which signed this declaration three and a half years ago tell us that it is not binding upon them. It may not be binding on everyone, but it is binding on the four powers that proclaimed this declaration, adopted it, and have not rejected it officially, or at least have not denounced it. . . .

We, the Soviet delegation, consider ourselves bound by all the international agreements signed by the Soviet Union so long as we have not agreed to revise them, or so long as we have not denounced them. . . . And if the San Francisco declaration is in force, then it should be implemented and respected. And therefore it is perfectly

clear when one is asked: "Is this a procedural question or not?" there can be no answer other than that based on the declaration adopted in San Francisco on June 7, 1945. . . .

Taking into consideration that the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council during the adoption by the Council of decisions on non-procedural questions constitutes a paramount requisite of the effectiveness of the actions of the United Nations Organization in the development of co-operation among the nations and the maintenance of international peace and security, the Soviet delegation voices the conviction that the Security Council will in the future take due cognizance of its experience during the past period to create conditions which, wherever possible, would facilitate the adoption of agreed decisions.

The Soviet delegation will submit the corresponding draft resolution and will defend it before the committee and the General Assembly, for it is firmly convinced that agreed decisions between all the members of the United Nations Organization represented in the Security Council can be achieved as often and as speedily as possible, not by excessive regulation and formalization of questions, but by strengthening to the maximum the spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation, as well as by taking into account the experience gained during the work of the Security Council in the past.

On December 4, after concluding discussions on the question of Security Council voting procedure, the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly took action on the various proposals before it. The Argentine proposal for a convention to revise the Charter in order to eliminate the unanimity principle was rejected, as was an Australian proposal for far-reaching restrictions on the veto.

The resolution of the American, British, French, and Chinese delegations, recommending that the Security Council should regard a number of questions pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security as procedural and settle them contrary to paragraph 5, Article 27 of the Charter, without applying the principle of Great Power unanimity, was then passed by the usual majority.

The Soviet delegation then insisted that the following resolution presented by Mr. Vyshinsky be put to a vote:

1. The General Assembly considers it particularly important that all states—the United Nations—strive for further strengthening of

the prestige of the United Nations Organization in accordance with the lofty principles of the Charter recognized by all peace-loving nations.

2. Considering the united effort of the big and small nations particularly important in promoting friendly relations among them and in strengthening general peace and security, the General Assembly calls the United Nations to extend international co-operation on the above foundation, avoiding needless regimentation and formalism in the activities of its agencies and facilitating practical achievements in the political, economic, and cultural co-operation of the nations.

3. Considering that the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council when passing decisions in the Council constitutes the primary condition for ensuring the effectiveness of the actions of the United Nations Organization in promoting co-operation of the nations and in maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly expresses the certainty that in the future the Security Council will accordingly take stock of its previous experience and in the necessary cases apply the method of consultation and seek to facilitate agreed decisions.

British delegate Sir Alexander Cadogan opposed voting on the Soviet resolution, arguing first that it repeated the resolution of the Four already adopted, and then, reversing himself, that it contradicted this resolution. When the Soviet draft was finally voted on, the U.S. and British delegations succeeded in getting it rejected. However, they mustered only 23 votes, less than half of the 58 U.N. members. The delegations of the U.S.S.R. and the countries of the people's democracy voted for the Soviet draft; nine delegations abstained, and others were absent. The issue did not reach the General Assembly.

The General Assembly, however, did vote to continue the Interim Committee in being for another year. The U.S.S.R. delegations and those of the people's democracies indicated that they would continue to boycott it as an illegal body.

# Human Rights

IN 1947, when Committee No. 3 of the United Nations started work on a Declaration of Human Rights, representatives of the Soviet Union took an active part in preparing the draft, which became known as the Geneva draft, taking its name from the city in which the committee began its work. This draft was subsequently changed. While the final result was found commendable on the whole, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that it contained a number of shortcomings, among which are its formal legal nature and the absence in it of any measures which would facilitate realization of the basic freedoms and human rights that it proclaimed. Speaking before the Paris General Assembly on December 9, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky enumerated some of the objections to the draft found by the Soviet delegation and suggested a number of amendments. Taking Article 4 of the draft as an example of the formal, legal nature of the draft, he declared:

Article 4 of the draft declaration of human rights . . . reads: "Every man has the right to life, liberty, and inviolability of person." The abstract nature of this article is too obvious to require comment. What strikes one is that this draft, in speaking of such an exceedingly important question as the right of man to life, liberty, and inviolability of person, does not set itself the aim of specifying even the most elementary measures the state must adopt to facilitate, I do not say ensure, the exercise of these rights.

The Soviet delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky continued, tried to overcome this weakness by introducing an amendment which declared

that "the state must insure each person protection against criminal encroachments on his rights, provide the conditions preventing a threat of death from starvation and exhaustion," but this amendment was rejected. Citing another example of the formal legal nature of the draft, Mr. Vyshinsky discussed Article 23 which proclaims the right to social maintenance and to realization of the rights necessary in the economic, cultural, and social spheres for upholding the dignity of man and the free development of his personality. One can only welcome the fact that such a problem was raised, Mr. Vyshinsky said, but actually there is a tremendous discrepancy between what the authors of the article wanted to say and what they did say. What was left in the final draft, he continued, was only the "vestigial appendage of something important but invisible." He continued:

The article lacks the main essential—specific mention of the fact that society and the state are obligated to take measures to insure an opportunity for free development of the individual in the economic, social, and cultural spheres. All this is cast aside. Only the odds and ends, or that which in Russian fairy tales is called "horns and hoofs," remained.

The Soviet delegation proposed to adopt an article stating that social insurance . . . of hired labor, that is, factory and office workers, must be effected at the expense of the state of each country. Here the Soviet delegation put this problem on a practical footing, pointing out concretely the sources for covering the necessary expenditures in order that the working people could enjoy the benefits of social insurance, the benefits of social maintenance. The Soviet delegation says: the state is one source; the employers, who derive profit by exploiting the workers, are another. It is in this way that the working man is to be provided with a pension and other maintenance in case of disability, old age, sickness, etc.

It would seem that this is a perfectly natural and concrete way of putting the question. However, it met with furious resistance on the part of the majority of this committee, and this majority rejected this amendment too. . . .

Instead of adopting the path onto which the Soviet delegation has endeavored throughout to steer the work of committee No. 3—a path of concrete, positive settlement of the question pertaining to



the recommendations, if only of a purely moral nature, to be made to the states and for them to follow—the committee preferred to take an abstract path strewn with florid phraseology which would have been more in place 150 years ago, and today cannot appeal to anyone, since all these phrases and formulas of the epoch of the French revolution, the epoch of the American revolution and the English revolution of the seventeenth century have by now faded because life has shown that all these high-sounding formulas conceal a brutal reality which destroys fetishes and illusions.

The third article to which the Soviet delegation objects, continued Mr. Vyshinsky, is Article 20 which reads: "Every man has the right to freedom of convictions and freedom to express them. This right includes freedom to adhere to these convictions without interference, and freedom to seek, receive, and disseminate information and ideas by any means and irrespective of state boundaries." The greatest danger in this article as it stands is that it permits any ideas, including the ideas of fascism, to be disseminated. This the Soviet delegation cannot countenance, Mr. Vyshinsky declared:

It is not permissible to allow men with flaming torches who are out to burn our homes and to take our lives to roam freely through the streets of cities. We do not recognize such freedom and we cannot agree that our declaration on behalf of the United Nations should proclaim such freedom to disseminate the ideas of Hitler and Goebbels.

We are told: but we will fight fascist "ideas" with our ideas. But, gentlemen, you who advocate such unrestricted freedom said the same before, when *Mein Kampf* and similar criminal literature was written and propagated. You said that then and fought, of course, in your own way. But what was the final outcome of this struggle? Were you able to prevent by this struggle the incursion of the Hitlerite plague? No, no and no.

On the contrary, while you, prompted by the lofty motives of the impossibility of restricting anyone's freedom, even that of fascist killers and fiends, remained calm and immersed in philosophical contemplation, the cutthroats and murderers sharpened their knives, recruited men into their gang, organized their bands, drafted their

plans of assault, waiting for the moment when it was most opportune to strike.

You can fight with ideas, and you are in duty bound to fight with ideas against that which runs counter to your ideas, but these are "ideas" which represent a social danger, which are unworthy of being called ideas, and the means of struggle against this danger are not only the human word but also law, inexorable criminal law.

That is why we insisted on excluding the possibility of disseminating fascist "theories" and so-called "ideas," insisted that it is impermissible to use freedom of speech and the press for the propaganda of hostility among nations, for propaganda of fascism and aggression.

But these demands of ours in the committee also remained a voice crying in the wilderness. The majority adopted precepts against which we objected most vehemently.

Of course, you are the majority of the Assembly. But the time will come when perhaps the majority will see that it made a grave error. But we, who remained in the minority, do not want to, cannot, and dare not make such errors. Our duty to our people obliges us not to agree to the way the question is presented in the draft of Committee No. 3, for we recall the horrible picture of the recent war, in the course of which millions of our brothers perished at the hands of the fascist executioners who enjoyed the freedom of unrestricted and unhampered dissemination of their monstrous and fiendish "ideas" in some countries.

Another substantial shortcoming of this article is that it limits itself to a mere proclamation of the rights to freedom and dissemination of ideas, but says nothing about the means for disseminating noble ideas—not brigand, fiendish, fascist "ideas" to which this article opens a wide road—but to really noble, exalted ideas, ideas born in garrets, ideas with which the finest men of the world have enriched mankind. One could name hundreds of such people who were too poor freely to disseminate their ideas, not to mention the fact that these ideas encountered the resistance of the ruling classes and society.

This article of the draft keeps silent, shamefacedly silent, about the ways and means with the aid of which the freedom proclaimed by the declaration could be enjoyed.

I should like to remind you of the historic speech on the draft constitution of the Soviet Union delivered by J. V. Stalin in 1936,

in which he pointed out that when freedom of speech, assembly, and the press is mentioned, some people forget that all these freedoms may become a mere empty sound for the working class if deprived of a possibility of having at its disposal suitable premises for meetings, good print shops, a sufficient stock of paper, etc., that is, everything that it has in our great country. This passing over in silence of the ways and means by which it is alone possible really to enjoy this freedom and to have an opportunity in practice to disseminate one's noble ideas and theories—this passing over in silence is a big shortcoming of the article which I am now discussing.

In an effort to eliminate this shortcoming from the declaration, the Soviet delegation proposed that it be supplemented with the words: "In order to insure the right to free expression of opinions to considerable sections of the population, as well as their organization, the state renders them co-operation and assistance with the material means (premises, printing presses, paper, etc.), necessary for publishing democratic organs of the press." This proposal, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, was rejected ostensibly on the ground that to grant broad circles the material means mentioned would in substance amount to an encroachment on freedom of thought by the state, but what it really means, he continued, is depriving the masses of the opportunity to conduct cultural, educational, and political activity directed at defending the interests of the masses independently of the capitalist newspaper monopolies.

The Soviet delegation also proposed an amendment to Article 21 which reads: "Every man has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association." To give this article teeth, the Soviet delegation proposed that it read: "In the interests of democracy, freedom of assembly and meetings, street processions and demonstrations, organization of voluntary societies and unions should be guaranteed by law. All societies and unions and other organizations of a fascist and anti-democratic nature, as well as their activity in any form, are banned by law under threat of punishment." This, Mr. Vyshinsky said, was a truly practicable article with a profound political content. It, too, was rejected. But, Mr. Vyshinsky commented:

One cannot but note that, when this proposal of the Soviet delegation was rejected, such strange arguments were advanced as, for

example, that the concept of "fascism" or the concept of an "organization of a fascist type" is not sufficiently clear. There were even some odd people who went so far as to ask the question: What, indeed, is fascism? What is an organization of a fascist type?

Is it necessary once again to expose the utter untenability and hypocrisy of such arguments, aimed, essentially speaking, at thwarting legitimate demands which fully accord with the interests of democracy and the peace and security of nations, the demands to take real and effective measures against a resurgence, and all the more so against the development of fascist and anti-democratic societies, unions, and organizations? . . . The struggle against fascism . . . has left too deep scars on the peoples of the democratic countries for the obviously artificial and false argument that the concept of "fascism" is allegedly "unclear and indefinite" to be cited so shamelessly.

The Soviet proposal that Article 28 of the draft, which covers the right to participate in cultural life and in scientific progress, be supplemented with several words needed to show that science must facilitate the interests of peace and democracy suffered the fate of the other Soviet proposals, Mr. Vyshinsky stated.

As his final example of the shortcomings of the draft declaration, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed to the fact that the draft does not contain a single mention of the right of each man, "regardless of whether he belongs to a racial, national and religious majority or minority of the population, to his national culture; to tuition in schools in his native language; to the use of this language in the press, meetings, courts, civil service and public places." The original Geneva draft had contained a timid clause to that effect, Mr. Vyshinsky noted, but this was deleted in the final version.

Because of all these shortcomings, Mr. Vyshinsky concluded, the Soviet delegation proposes that the adoption of the declaration on human rights be postponed until the following session of the General Assembly and that the shortcomings be improved in the interim.

The following day, December 10, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky again took the floor to clarify the position of the Soviet delegation. In analyzing the draft declaration further, he declared:

One of the serious shortcomings patent in the draft declaration

. . . is the lack of any mention of the connection between human rights and the problem of state sovereignty. This is explained in considerable measure by the fact that the theory of renouncing state sovereignty has again come to life . . . an utterly incorrect and fallacious theory that the principle of state sovereignty is a reactionary and allegedly obsolete idea, and that rejection of this principle of state sovereignty is allegedly one of the essential requisites for international co-operation.

The draft declaration of human rights seems to meet half-way these really reactionary views and theories directed against the sovereignty of states and hence completely contradicting the principles of the United Nations Organization. The draft declaration marks in this respect a new stage in the campaign against state sovereignty.

Sometimes we hear objections to the effect that questions pertaining to the state should not be touched upon in the declaration on human rights inasmuch as this declaration is dedicated to the rights of man. But one cannot agree with a stand of this kind, if only because human rights are inconceivable outside of the state. The very concept of rights is a concept of a state. More than that, human rights are unthinkable unless they are upheld and protected by the state. Otherwise human rights will resolve into a sheer abstraction, an illusion without meaning which, as we know, is easy to create but which vanishes just as easily.

The attempt to vilify state sovereignty by identifying it with absolute sovereignty is the manifestation of a reactionary spirit, Mr. Vyshinsky charged. Quoting from Pradier-Fodere's *Course in International Law*, Mr. Vyshinsky defined state sovereignty as the "right of the state to direct development by itself and for itself in order to achieve its own aims without any external interference, the right to manifest and exercise its will, acting in the domain of its jurisdiction without any hindrance on the part of an outside force, the opportunity to uphold its rights and fulfill the duties which are the essential and most important foundation of each free society, acting in its sphere really independently and never serving as an instrument in the hands of another state." He went on:

Propaganda against state sovereignty covered up by the claim that what is in view is absolute sovereignty and not sovereignty in

general is nothing more than ideological preparation for the final political surrender of one's own country to a more powerful state, to the latter's economic might.

One must be on guard against such molding of public opinion aimed at breaking the will to resist plans of world domination which are threatening the economic and political independence of other states, especially the weaker states. We are against such propaganda which is digging the grave for the independence of states and the well-being of nations. . . .

This, I repeat, signifies capitulation before a stronger state whose aspirations to world domination are still obstructed by state sovereignty which serves as a weapon protecting the weaker countries against the greed of more powerful states, for the state sovereignty of the former, although undermined at the very root by measures like the Marshall Plan, the establishment of the Western European political bloc, etc., nevertheless still preserves its force and significance.

Turning to the question of what the declaration on human rights should really be like, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that it should meet two basic requirements:

1. The declaration on human rights should insure respect for human rights and for the basic freedoms for all, irrespective of race, nationality, social position, religion, language, and sex, in conformity with the principles of democracy, state sovereignty, and the political independence of a given state.

2. The declaration on human rights should not merely proclaim rights but should guarantee the exercise of such rights, taking into account, of course, the specific economic, social and national features of each country.

It is not enough to limit oneself to recording only the formal rights of citizens; it is necessary not merely to proclaim that all citizens are equal, but it is essential also to guarantee the exercise of this right by providing certain material means, as well as by legislative measures. Naturally, a document like the declaration on human rights . . . cannot be expected to pursue the same aims as a constitution. Nevertheless, a declaration on human rights should be built in

such a way as to overcome these narrow formal bounds, the abstract nature of those principles which are included in the declaration on human rights. At the same time it is, of course, necessary to take into account the specific economic, social, and national features of each country, for unless this is taken into account, it would be impossible to solve the present task and to find practical ways of giving effect to the proclaimed declaration.

The draft declaration, Mr. Vyshinsky' declared further, ignores the cardinal principle of a declaration on human rights, namely, the right of nations to self-determination, on the equal rights of every people and every nationality within the framework of one state:

It is common knowledge that the constitutions of capitalist countries proceed from the premise that races and nations cannot be equal, that there are nations with full rights and nations without full rights and that, in addition, there is a third category of nations or races, for example in the colonies, which have even fewer rights than the nations without full rights. . . .

Article 2, although proclaiming equality irrespective of race, nationality, language, etc., confines itself to the generality that man must possess all rights. This, of course, is utterly inadequate. Even more inadequate is Article 3 of the draft which is limited to generalizations concerning the extension of rights proclaimed in the declaration to the peoples of trustee and non-self-governing territories.

The delegation of the U.S.S.R. cannot but draw attention to the fact that the draft . . . completely overlooks such an exceedingly important question as that of the rights of every people and every nation to national self-determination.

This right, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, is a tremendous achievement of the national policy of the Soviet Union, inspiring the Soviet delegation to recommend that the experience gained in solving the national problem in the Soviet Union be taken into account. Unless the declaration includes an article covering the right of every nation and every people to self-determination, he emphasized, the declaration on human rights will not answer its purpose. Without stipulating that "states responsible for the administration of non-self-govern-

ing territories, including colonies, must facilitate the exercise of this right, guided by the principles and aims of the United Nations with regard to the peoples of these territories," the declaration would be far from complete and far from satisfactory, Mr. Vyshinsky warned.

The Soviet delegation also proposed substituting for Article 22 of the draft a text stating that "Every citizen of any state, irrespective of race and color, nationality, social status, property status, social origin, language, religion, or sex should have the right to participate in the government of the state." We propose, Mr. Vyshinsky said, that:

Article 22 should state that every man has the right to elect and be elected to all bodies of authority on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, as well as equal opportunity with other citizens to hold any state and public office in his country. These questions are not duly reflected in the present wording of Article 22. It is not sufficient to declare that every man has the right to participate in governing his country or state. It should be stated that each citizen of any state has the right to participate in the administration of the state; it should be stipulated that he has the right to elect and be elected to all bodies of state authority and not only on the basis of universal, equal, and secret suffrage but also on the basis of direct suffrage. . . .

The proposal of the Soviet delegation also points out that property, educational, or any other qualifications restricting the participation of citizens of any state in the elections of representative bodies are incompatible with the above principle. . . .

The delegation of the U.S.S.R., moreover, proposes that after Article 30 of the draft declaration on human rights, a new article with the following content should be included:

"The rights and basic freedoms of man and citizen enumerated in the present declaration are guaranteed by the laws of the various countries. Any violation or limitation of these rights, direct or indirect, is a violation of the present declaration and is incompatible with the lofty principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter."

Why can this article not be accepted? Why do obstacles arise when we raise the question of introducing an article of this kind in the declaration? This article speaks for itself; it calls for the rights and basic freedoms of man and citizen to be guaranteed by the



laws of the state; it proclaims any violation or restriction of rights, direct or indirect, to be a violation of the present declaration; it recognizes such violations as being incompatible with the lofty principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Why can this not be said? Why is an article that fully conforms to the spirit and the principles expressed in the United Nations Charter unacceptable?

Such are the highly important precepts which should be included in the Declaration on Human Rights if it is to satisfy the desires of millions upon millions of ordinary people, the desires of all peace-loving nations for the establishment and consolidation of the basic freedoms and rights of man, for democracy and progress, peace and the security of nations.

Mr. Vyshinsky's statements refute the charges that the Soviet stand on the Declaration of Human Rights arose from lack of concern for the rights of the individual human being. They show that, on the contrary, the Soviet representatives were seeking a document that should not be made up of vague generalities, but should carry with it guarantees to insure the implementation of its aims. When the Declaration, constituting the first part of a projected three-part International Bill of Rights, came before the General Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky sought to gain postponement of the question until the following Assembly session, in order to allow time for further consideration and improvement. Failing that, he asked the Assembly to accept a series of amendments, as outlined in part in the portions of his speech published above, which were also rejected. In the final vote, which resulted in the adoption of the Declaration, the Soviet Union and the countries of the People's Democracy abstained. This abstention registered not so much disagreement with the statements contained in the Declaration as disapproval that it did not constitute a more effective step toward realization of U.N. Charter obligations to promote universal observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

# Council of Ministers' Meeting on Germany and Austria

IN ITS WHITE PAPER on the North Atlantic Pact issued on March 19, 1949, the State Department cited Soviet policies in Berlin as one of the main reasons making the pact necessary. It charged that the "blockade" imposed by the Soviet Union "created a situation gravely endangering the peace."

The ease with which settlement of the Berlin situation was achieved once the State Department was ready to settle it made it clear that the crisis had been artificially prolonged by the United States in order to put over its aggressive military alliance. This was further proved by the fact that the Administration deliberately concealed the fact that negotiations on Berlin were successfully proceeding between Philip Jessup, U.S. delegate to the U.N., and Soviet U.N. delegate Jacob Malik, during the period the pact was being readied for signature. It was the Tass announcement that such negotiations were taking place that finally brought them to the attention of the American public after five weeks of concealment. The agreement, finally announced on May 5, provided for the simultaneous lifting of traffic restrictions by both sides. Such an agreement would have been possible at any time during the past year had the United States really desired agreement.

The agreement also provided for the calling of a Foreign Ministers' Conference on Germany. The Council of Foreign Ministers, the only organ competent to deal with the peace settlement for Germany under the Potsdam Agreement and the United Nations Charter, had been inactive for a year and a half, due to United States policies.

The desire of the United States not to reach a four-power agreement on Germany on any basis except that of Soviet surrender to the terms of the Western Powers was apparent from the fact that the

United States organized as a preliminary step a three-power conference in Paris of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France to plan a united front against the U.S.S.R.

The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers opened in Paris on May 23, attended by Dean Acheson, U. S. Secretary of State, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and their advisers and experts. The United States delegation included Philip Jessup, John Foster Dulles, Robert Murphy, and Charles Bohlen. The Soviet delegation included Army General Chuikov (defender of Stalingrad), A. A. Smirnov, A. E. Bogomolov, V. S. Semenov, and B. Podtserov.

The Ministers approved the following agenda for the session:

1. The unity of Germany, including economic principles, political principles, and Allied control.
2. Berlin and the currency problem.
3. Preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.
4. Treaty with Austria.

After approval of the agenda, Mr. Vyshinsky raised the question of the expediency of establishing a date when the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet, with China taking part, to discuss the question of the peace treaty with Japan. It was decided to defer consideration of this question until a later session. However, when the matter came up subsequently, the Western Powers refused to take action. They preferred to leave the matter in the hands of the eleven-power Far Eastern Commission, although its functions, according to the Potsdam Pact, were only to develop policies relating to Japan's fulfillment of surrender terms, and all peace settlements were under the jurisdiction of the Council of Foreign Ministers composed, in each case, of representatives of those states which had accepted the surrender terms of the enemy state concerned.

On May 24 the Ministers proceeded to a consideration of item 1 on the agenda. Mr. Vyshinsky was the first to take the floor.

Mr. Vyshinsky reminded the Council that this was not the first time that the representatives of the four Powers had encountered the problem of the economic and political unity of Germany. During the war, at the Crimea Conference, the leaders of the three great Powers—the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, and Great Britain—had already devoted their main attention to this problem. They set themselves the cardinal historic task of destroying German militarism and Nazism and creating the guarantee that Germany

would never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. Mr. Vyshinsky continued:

This was, as we all know, on the eve of the defeat of Hitler Germany. Two months later at the Potsdam Conference, after Hitler Germany surrendered, a new agreement was reached on the economic and political principles of co-ordinated policy of the Allies with regard to Germany. The Potsdam Conference proclaimed as the cardinal aim of the policy of the four Powers with regard to Germany the reconstruction of Germany on a democratic and peaceful foundation proceeding from the recognition of Germany as a single political and economic unit. This found its expression specifically in the decision to establish a number of German administrative departments headed by state secretaries. . . .

This policy had to insure the liquidation of German militarism and fascism, had to insure the development of German peaceful industry, agriculture, and the entire national economy of Germany, and had to insure the development of internal and foreign trade, and economic relations between Germany and other countries which would have facilitated meeting both the needs and peaceful requirements of the German people and the fulfillment of their obligations to the Allies.

The further development of the principles of this policy on Germany, Mr. Vyshinsky went on, found its expression in the decisions taken in 1947 at the Moscow Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers when the ministers of France, Great Britain, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. arrived at the conclusion about the need to prepare measures aimed at establishing a provisional all-German Government. "I stress," Mr. Vyshinsky said, "an all-German Government."

Mr. Vyshinsky reminded the Council that the Moscow Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers had defined in detail the powers of the future central German government, stressing that this government "will be competent to take legislative and executive measures in order to ensure the necessary unity." He pointed out further that what was in question was political unity and legal unity. The delegations of the four Powers had placed within the competence of the central government such questions as the emission of money and coins, co-ordination of banking, taxation, control of exports and imports and of foreign currency as well as foreign trade and cus-

toms. The representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and Great Britain had placed within the competence of the central German government, in addition to the above, measures for control over the deliveries of food, distribution of shortage foodstuffs and raw materials, planning of industry, control over labor conditions, wages and prices, and a number of other questions of importance to all of Germany.

Mr. Vyshinsky also reminded the Council about the agreement concerning the control machinery in Germany already prepared by the European Advisory Commission. Under this agreement supreme authority in Germany on all questions concerning Germany as a whole was to be exercised jointly by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied armed forces in Germany's Zones of Occupation, for which purpose the four Commanders-in-Chief formed a supreme control agency called the Control Council. The tasks of the Control Council included:

1. Ensuring appropriate co-ordination in the actions of the Commanders-in-Chief in their Zones.
2. Drafting of plans and reaching agreed decisions on main military, political, economic, and other questions, for all of Germany.
3. Control over the German Central Administration.
4. Guidance through the respective agencies of the administration of Greater Berlin.

Mr. Vyshinsky declared:

Such were the four major spheres of problems which imposed on the Control Council definite duties. From this it can be seen that the entire machinery of the Control Council was geared to effecting the demilitarization and democratization of Germany, to facilitating the reconstruction of Germany into a single, democratic, peace-loving state. Throughout the activity of the Control Council the Soviet government invariably strove for the realization of these tasks. It rightly considered the activity of the Control Council organized in conformity with the above tasks as the primary condition for preventing the danger of the revival of German aggression, for the democratic reconstruction of Germany, and for meeting the legitimate demands of the Allied states which had suffered from German aggression. The stand of the Soviet Union on the question of German reparations is well known. However, on all these questions the

Council of Foreign Ministers has not yet been able to reach agreed decisions.

Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that the governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France have taken to the path of trilateral decisions and measures in obvious contradiction to previously adopted decisions on the German question. Among such measures was the plan for establishing a West-German government designed to seal the splitting of Germany, a plan designed to oppose the western part of Germany to the rest of Germany. Similar aims were also pursued by the decisions adopted by the governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France in Washington in April of 1949 on the fundamental principles for fusing the three Occupation Zones of Western Germany, decisions on the so-called Occupation Statute for Western Germany, as well as the trilateral agreement on establishing a control agency for the Ruhr. Mr. Vyshinsky stated:

As for the Ruhr, the Soviet government as early as the Potsdam Conference proposed to recognize that the Ruhr industrial area, as an inseparable part of Germany, must be under the joint control of the U.S.A., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and France. The Soviet government proposed then to set up for the Ruhr industrial area for a definite term a special Allied Council of representatives of the above-mentioned Powers.

Mr. Vyshinsky stressed that the Soviet government attached and continues to attach great importance to the question of the Ruhr, considering as incorrect a situation in which the Ruhr, which is of exceedingly great importance militarily and industrially, is outside of international control on a quadripartite basis. Also incorrect is the fact that the Control Council in Germany has been removed from considering and settling issues relating to the Ruhr province, particularly from control over the production and distribution of coal and steel which plays a decisive part in the entire economy of Germany. Mr. Vyshinsky proposed that organization of an international control agency for the Ruhr, consisting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., with participation in the Allied Council of other states bordering on Germany, namely Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, for consultation on questions connected with production and distribution of the Ruhr output, as well as repre-

sentatives of the German economic agencies, would be a reliable means for insuring due international control over the Ruhr.

Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the Soviet government still stands for establishing economic and political unity of Germany, and believes that this trend should be followed in its activities by the Control Council which is called upon to exercise supreme authority in Germany during the period of occupation and to insure the implementation of demilitarization and democratization of Germany, as well as her reconstruction into a single, peace-loving, democratic state. In concluding his speech, Mr. Vyshinsky submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers the following concrete proposals:

1. With the aim of insuring economic and political unity of Germany: (a) to restore the activity of the Control Council of Germany on the former basis, as an agency called upon to exercise supreme authority in Germany; (b) to restore the Inter-Allied Kommandatura in Berlin for co-ordinating city-wide measures in administering Berlin and for insuring the normal life of Berlin as a whole.

2. Considering at the same time that it is impossible to effect the economic and political unity of Germany without establishing a single German central agency in whose jurisdiction would be problems of economic and state development which are of importance for Germany as a whole, to recognize as necessary: (a) setting up an All-German State Council on the basis of the German economic agencies now existing in the Eastern and Western Zones; (b) restoring the All-Berlin City Council.

The question of the date of elections to the All-Berlin City Council is to be referred for consideration to the Inter-Allied Kommandatura of Berlin.

With Secretary Acheson in the lead, the Western Powers rejected all these Soviet proposals. Mr. Acheson took the position "no retreat to Potsdam." While insisting that the Western Powers had lived up to the Potsdam Agreement and that the U.S.S.R. had not, he in fact admitted the abandonment of the Potsdam Agreement in claiming that "the Potsdam Agreement failed disastrously in the past." Mr. Vyshinsky responded to the objections raised to his proposals by Messrs. Acheson, Schuman, and Bevin, on May 25:

. . . Mr. Acheson assured us that United States policy toward

Germany proceeded from the Potsdam decisions and that, essentially speaking, all that the Potsdam Agreement stipulated had already been carried into life in the American Occupation Zone: denazification and demilitarization had been almost completed, all war criminals had been brought to book and punished and, as Mr. Acheson said, "the German people are already acting on democratic principles." True, Mr. Acheson immediately made a reservation, from which it followed that the task of denazification and demilitarization had been *almost* carried out and that in Western Germany not all but *many* agencies were functioning on the basis of the laws and principles of a democratic state.

This reservation is naturally of no small importance, as it introduces an essential correction to the optimistic picture painted of the state of affairs in the Western Occupation Zones of Germany. . . .

As far as Mr. Bevin is concerned, he openly stated here that the British government "had always bent every effort in order fully to adhere to the conditions fixed by the Potsdam Agreement of 1945." Mr. Bevin at this point referred to clause "c" of paragraph 15 of the Potsdam decision, which speaks of the necessity of establishing Allied control in order to insure equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several Zones, so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

Only one thing remains incomprehensible and that is: Why did Mr. Bevin single out clause "c" from the whole paragraph 15, and did not seemingly attribute importance to the other clauses of this paragraph? Why specifically did he not recall clause "a" of the same paragraph 15, which speaks about the necessity of carrying out the program for industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, or clause "d" of the same paragraph, which speaks of control over German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named in this Agreement? . . .

For some reason Mr. Bevin made no references to paragraph 14 either, which states that "during the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit," or to other paragraphs of this extremely important section of the Potsdam Agreement which laid down the economic principles of the policy of the occupation



powers with regard to Germany. Be that as it may, all three—the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, and Britain—made, as the basis of their yesterday's speeches, the admission that the principles stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement were obligatory for them and for the policy of their governments with regard to Germany.

They, however, bypassed in their speeches of yesterday such highly important principles of the Potsdam Agreement as the principles of economic and political unity, although it is precisely this question that is on the agenda of the present session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. More than that, they declare that the realization of German unity had turned out to be impossible and that Germany, as Mr. Acheson said yesterday, had "absolutely automatically disintegrated into separate cells." As Mr. Acheson said yesterday, this disintegration was followed by a process of restoration in the same automatic manner—first Bizonia was established, then Trizonia and, as Mr. Acheson explained, all this occurred due to the "impossibility of having a united Germany. . . ."

M. Schuman said yesterday that the re-establishment of the Allied Control Council in Germany did not solve the problem, while Mr. Acheson called the re-establishment of quadripartite control a step backward. . . .

How can one, however, explain the fact that it was only in April, 1949, that an agreement was signed in Washington on tripartite control in Germany which established that a supreme commission, as this commission was called, would function, consisting of representatives of the United States, Britain, and France—the sponsors of this agreement—the commission to consist of one high commissioner from each Power, and that it would be the supreme Allied control agency?

Thus it seems that tripartite control is timely and quadripartite control untimely. It seems that tripartite control is a step forward and quadripartite control a step backward. What does this signify? Does not this signify that, when speaking of the untimeliness and inexpediency of re-establishing the Allied Control Council on a quadripartite basis, they in essence oppose precisely quadripartite control, that is, control with the participation of the Soviet Union? . . .

This is why the Soviet delegation can in no way recognize as

convincing those arguments which were advanced here against our proposal to restore the activity of the Control Council on a quadripartite basis. Naturally it may be said: "We are against restoring the activity of the Control Council because in the Control Council decisions must be adopted not by a majority vote but on the unanimity principle. This shackles us; this you see is unacceptable. It must be recalled, however, that the Washington Agreement on tripartite control also provides for a unanimous decision on a series of questions. . . .

Yesterday we heard here an indication to the effect that the creation of Bizonia and Trizonia represented progress toward securing the unity of Germany. But if the establishment of a central German government is really being sought, of which Mr. Bevin spoke here yesterday, then one cannot but note that the consummation of the creation of a bizonal or trizonal system of administration is not a very suitable method for facilitating the creation of an all-German government.

Mr. Acheson, as could be understood yesterday, takes a negative attitude toward the proposal of the Soviet delegation to create an All-German State Council. The Soviet delegation's proposal consists of establishing, on the basis of the German economic agencies now existing in the Eastern and Western Zones, an All-German State Council as an economic and administrative center of Germany with governmental functions in the above-mentioned spheres of economic and state development, with the supreme authority of the Control Council preserved.

Mr. Acheson is inclined to regard this proposal as a step backward. Is this so in reality? In reality the Soviet delegation's proposal to create an All-German State Council constitutes a step forward along the road to establishing the unity of Germany.

Indeed, can the economic and political unity of Germany be secured without the establishment of a single German central agency? An All-German State Council should, under present circumstances, be such a single German central agency with governmental functions, under whose jurisdiction would be questions of economic and state development of significance for Germany as a whole, with the supreme authority of the Control Council preserved.

Allow me to put this question to my colleagues: Does such an

agency exist at present, does an agency which could be a central all-German agency exist at present? You cannot say that such an agency exists, because in fact it does not. In such a case how can one say that the creation of such an all-German agency is a step backward? We are told: This is a step backward because we in the West have gone further.

I repeat, however, there is no central all-German agency in the West, and therefore those who consider that they in the West have gone further are mistaken. Moreover, in the West, as everybody well knows, steps are being taken, not toward setting up such an all-German central agency, but precisely in the opposite direction—from the creation of an all-German central agency to the creation of zonal agencies of power, no matter what you may call them, be these agencies bizonal or trizonal, nevertheless they are zonal agencies. . . .

It was said here yesterday that one cannot ignore what already exists and that one should proceed from the real state of affairs. If this reproach is cast at the Soviet delegation, then this is an unjust reproach. Because clause "a" of paragraph 2 of the Soviet delegation's proposals submitted yesterday to the Council of Foreign Ministers, says quite clearly "to set up an All-German State Council on the basis of the German economic agencies now existing in the Eastern and Western Zones." . . .

While the delegations of the Western Powers continued to advance vague and indefinite objections to the Soviet proposals, they failed to put forth any constructive proposals of their own. The Western Powers sought to make it appear that in emphasizing matters of economic unity, the Soviet Union was evading the issue of an all-German state. Answering a question by M. Schuman as to why the Soviet proposal spoke of German economic agencies and not of others, Mr. Vyshinsky at the May 26 session explained that this was because ". . . other suitable German agencies do not at present exist in the Occupation Zones. The Soviet proposal is based on what there is in reality. The U.S.S.R. government deems it necessary to construct Germany's unity from the material on hand, to erect the building from those bricks that exist."

He made it clear that the Soviet proposal envisaged utilizing these existing agencies as a basis for giving the German people the

opportunity of settling for themselves questions of state development as well as economic questions.

Hinting at the Bonn Constitution, Mr. Acheson expressed dissatisfaction that the Soviet delegation excluded from its arguments the "basic law" which was recently "brought into life." He said that the Soviet proposals in his opinion "boil down in general to the re-establishment of the Allied Control Council, where decisions would be taken on the basis of unanimity." Thus he made clear that his main objection was to the principle of unanimity in the Control Council as contrasted to the principle of deciding matters by majority vote. Mr. Vyshinsky replied:

The deciding of problems on a unanimity principle is the usual method applied at international conferences where representatives of equal, sovereign states take part and where it is necessary to come to terms and not prescribe one's decisions by a majority vote. One cannot agree with Mr. Acheson who called the unanimity method a "worthless method." We deem as correct our method which provides for equality of all parties at international conferences.

Mr. Vyshinsky further noted that the Washington agreement on trilateral control also provides for unanimity in deciding all important issues relating to demilitarization of Germany, control over the Ruhr, restitutions (return of enemy-looted property), reparations, decartelization, foreign trade, foreign interests in Germany, foreign relations, etc.

"Why is trilateral control on the basis of the unanimity principle permissible and quadripartite control impermissible?" Mr. Vyshinsky asked. He further called attention to the clause in the agreement on trilateral control containing a very strange rule granting the parties to this control the right of vote proportionally to the funds appropriated by the respective governments for West Germany:

He who allocates the greater sum correspondingly obtains the greater number of votes in deciding issues. Besides, if the joint export-import agency or the joint foreign currency agency is interested in this particular question then, according to what is written in the agreement, the decisive vote belongs to the United States. Truly a real "one-man unanimity" in the direct sense of the word! One vote of the U. S. decides the issue. This is far from a democratic

way of settling matters. . . . A good rule was established in Potsdam and it is better to revert to the forgotten good rule than seek to establish a bad new one, similar to what is written in the agreement on trilateral control adopted in Washington in April 1949.

Because Mr. Acheson had, on the previous day, devoted much of his speech to extolling the economic situation in the Western Zones of Germany, Mr. Vyshinsky cited a number of facts and figures to throw another light on the situation:

According to the data published by the Statistical Administration of Bizonia the price index for foodstuffs increased within the period from June, 1948, to the beginning of 1949 from 123.5 to 152.2. The price index for manufactured goods increased within the same period from 175.6 to 216.2, while the general index increased from 154.8 to 190.6. The 1938 prices are taken as 100. Naturally this could not but influence the cost of living index of a worker's family. If we take the 1937 level for 100 then the cost of living index in 1946 went up to 125.1, which in January, 1948, rose to 125.9, reaching 144.1 in December, 1948. According to the data of the Hamburg Statistical Administration, the cost of living index of a worker's family now amounts to 190 in comparison with 1938.

Mr. Vyshinsky also noted that unemployment in the Western Zones of Germany had grown considerably. According to data published in the British press in early May, within the last five months the number of unemployed increased 2.5 times. Citing a series of facts characterizing the economic situation in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, Mr. Vyshinsky said:

It stands to reason that it cannot be said that the process of restoration and development of the German industry in the Soviet occupation zone did not encounter difficulties. . . . Among such difficulties is first of all the circumstance that for a considerable period of time Eastern Germany received neither coal nor coke nor metal nor rolled goods from the Western Zones of Germany. Nevertheless as early as March, 1949, industrial output in the Eastern Zone reached 96.6 per cent in comparison with 1936. Production of brown coal had in 1948 already surpassed the 1936 level. Generation of electric power, mining of iron ore and the production of glass and knitted goods exceeded the 1936 level.

Mr. Vyshinsky further emphasized that the successes achieved in the restoration of national economy in East Germany are explained to a considerable extent by the fact that normal trade and economic relations were established with the countries of Eastern and Southeast Europe. The U.S.S.R. supplied the Eastern Zone of Germany with grain when there was a shortage there, and with fats, mineral fertilizers, tractors, lorries, agricultural machinery, metal, rolled goods, and other kinds of materials and raw materials. Mr. Vyshinsky continued:

It is important to note that the recovery of East Germany's economy is being effected without any external debt which would be a heavy burden on the Eastern Zone of Germany. The granting of aid to East Germany is not accompanied by a growth in deficit of which we heard mention here from our colleagues—the representatives of the Western Powers—when they spoke of the state of affairs in Trizonia. The 1948 budget of the Eastern Zone had a favorable balance of 700 million marks.

Mr. Vyshinsky emphasized that simultaneously taxes are being cut in the Eastern Zone—they have gone down by over 30 per cent—while at the same time a big increase is registered in the budget allocations for promoting public health, education, and other spheres of cultural development.

After several days of further discussion in which the Western Powers continued their stubborn refusal to make any concessions with regard to the Soviet proposals, on May 28 the United States, Great Britain, and France submitted their proposals concerning the question of Germany's unity.

Presenting the draft on behalf of the three powers, Mr. Bevin described measures taken by the Western Powers in Trizonia as "progress" on the basis of which they now wished to go forward.

The draft decision proposed the establishment of a "federal government for the whole of Germany." It stated that the unification of Germany must be effected in accordance with the "Bonn Fundamental Law" (meaning the so-called constitution of the West German state adopted in Bonn and endorsed by the U.S., British, and French occupation authorities), to which it proposed the lands of Eastern Germany should adhere. The draft further provided for extending the "Occupation Statute" on a quadripartite basis to the

whole of Germany. (The statute, it should be remembered, continues the occupation of Germany for an indefinite time.)

Envisaging radical revision of the Potsdam provisions for quadripartite Allied control, the draft emphasized that control must be exercised by a "supreme commission" adopting decisions by a majority vote excluding exceptional cases subject to mutual agreement. Thus the Western representatives sought to insure in advance the formation of an agency in which, having at their disposal an assured majority of votes, they could decide questions to their own liking.

The draft also contained a repudiation of the Yalta Agreement on reparations in the statement "No reparation deliveries from current production or at the expense of existing stocks will be demanded."

Answering the contention of Messrs. Bevin, Acheson, and Schuman in supporting these proposals, that it was necessary to give the Germans the possibility "to govern themselves," Mr. Vyshinsky asked why these delegations had not considered this task immediate and timely a year and a half before. He reminded them that at the London sessions of the Foreign Ministers' Council in December, 1947, the U.S.S.R. had been unable to gain the support of these three powers for the position that the Germans must actively participate in preparations for self-government. He also noted that the three powers' stress on the fact that they were all agreed on these proposals might create the impression that they were asking "the fourth party to regard their proposals as an accomplished fact."

At the May 28 session, Mr. Vyshinsky presented the detailed Soviet criticisms of the proposals:

These proposals do not raise the question of drawing up an all-German constitution by democratic means, but speak of the Soviet Zone adhering to the so-called Bonn constitution which, as is known, was drawn up in violation of the democratic principles by an artificially picked group of people who acted in an atmosphere of complete secrecy. It is known that the German people were deprived of the opportunity to take part in the discussion of this constitution. At the same time this so-called constitution was drawn up under open pressure of the occupation authorities of the Western Powers which essentially dictated the main provisions of this constitution.

In this way a federative system is being imposed on the German people against which German democratic circles are protesting, and

this is fully understandable since the plan for the federalization of Germany is a plan not for uniting but dismembering Germany.

It is also important to point out that the so-called Bonn constitution does not contain any provisions which would restrict the dominating role of the German monopolies and junkerdom which were the inspirers and organizers of German aggression and served as the mainstay of the Hitlerite regime.

This alone proves that this constitution can by no means be regarded as democratic.

The proposal to extend the so-called Bonn Constitution to all of Germany is nothing else but an attempt to impose on Eastern Germany a system instituted without the participation of the population of Eastern Germany and without the participation of the Soviet Union, which, in conformity with the Potsdam Agreement, bears responsibility for this zone. This proposal also ignores the fact that the German people in the Soviet Zone have already expressed their attitude to the future organization of Germany in the draft constitution drawn up by the People's Council and discussed by the entire people.

Paragraph 3 of the draft of the three powers contains the proposal to put in operation throughout Germany the so-called Occupation Statute drawn up in Washington. This proposal means in fact renunciation of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and prolongation of the occupation regime for an indefinite term. Paragraph 1 of the Occupation Statute is limited to mentioning only "the period of time during which prolongation of occupation is necessary."

The attempt of the three powers to present matters as though this Occupation Statute also aims at "enabling the German people to exercise democratic self-government," as it is stated in the communique of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France concerning the Washington negotiations, fully contradicts in contents this statute.

It is known that according to the statute (articles 2 and 3) highly important functions of state administration comprise the monopoly of the occupation authorities, while the German people are removed from any participation whatever in exercising those highly important functions. The introduction of such an Occupation Statute



contradicts the interests of the German people, who, as is known, are striving for the earliest conclusion of the peace treaty and termination of the occupation regime. It also contradicts the tasks of a peace settlement in Europe.

As for the proposal of the three powers pertaining to the question of reparations and the German enterprises, acquired, as it is put in the text of the above proposal, "by some other foreign power or on its behalf," this proposal does not deal with the question of Germany's unity now discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. One cannot but mention, however, that while insisting on the return of the above enterprises, the three powers at the same time keep silent about the extensive penetration of American and British monopoly capital, with the help of the occupation authorities, into the economy of Western Germany, and in the first place in the Ruhr industry. The proposals of the three powers attempt to make the unity of Germany conditional upon the "principles" enumerated in paragraph 2 of the proposals of these powers. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to point out that such an attempt is groundless inasmuch as the exercise of democratic freedoms for the entire population, except the fascist elements, has already been insured in the Soviet Zone. As for the situation existing in the Western Zones, the so-called "freedom" there means in reality persecution of democratic parties and organizations, and freedom of activity for big monopolies and circles which in the past supported Hitlerite aggression.

The proposal to go over in the quadripartite control agency (the so-called Supreme Commission), from the principle of unanimity established by existing agreements to deciding questions by a majority vote, has in view not a policy of cooperation among all powers occupying Germany but a policy of *diktat*. Such a policy cannot be successful with regard to the Soviet Union.

Our general conclusions are that this proposal does not testify to the desire of these powers to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on such an important issue as the unity of Germany. At the same time these proposals run counter to the legitimate interests of the German people and their striving for the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty and termination of the occupation regime.

The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to reject these pro-

posals of the three powers which run counter to the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. . . .

At the May 31 session, Mr. Vyshinsky continued his analysis of the proposals of the three Western Powers. At the beginning of his speech Mr. Vyshinsky dwelt on the failure of the so-called Occupation Statute, which it was proposed to extend to the whole of Germany, to place any kind of limitation as the period of Germany's occupation.

In this connection Mr. Vyshinsky drew attention to the declarations made by responsible military leaders of the United States, Britain, and France. He recalled that as far back as April, 1946, Field Marshal Montgomery had expressed the opinion that the occupation of Germany would continue for at least ten years. In September, 1946, addressing American soldiers in Berlin, General Eisenhower emphasized that the occupation of Germany would be a long affair. Commander-in-Chief of the American occupation forces in Germany, McNarney, declared in February, 1947, that occupation must last for 15 years and added that for certain powers, France for instance, such a period may in his opinion seem to be too short. General Clay who replaced McNarney deemed it necessary to reassert in his speech at the meeting of the Anglo-American Association of Journalists in Paris in 1947 that occupation would go on for 10 years and maybe for 25 years. Certain representatives of the French circles were in favor of a still longer period of occupation. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the French occupation forces in Germany, General Koenig, said that he considered it necessary to occupy Germany and administer it for 50 or 60 years. Mr. Vyshinsky continued:

Evidently the authors of the Occupation Statute did not set themselves the task of refuting such arguments and maybe even demands of responsible authorities of their military departments. I deem it necessary to remind you of this since Mr. Bevin said that the Occupation Statute had been drawn up by military people and that he, as I understood him, had nothing whatever to do with this matter. I would like to compare such facts: on the one hand, the military maintain that the period of occupation must be a long one, 10, 25, or even 50-60 years; on the other hand the Occupation Statute makes no mention at all of the period of its operation. Now when we have found out from Mr. Bevin's statement that the Occupation Statute is

the fruit of the creative efforts of the military people, it becomes clear that the period of occupation is not mentioned in the Statute for the reason that this Statute aims at leaving Germany in a state of occupation for a very long period. However, how does this tally with the assertions of the representatives of the Western Powers to the effect that they are seeking to hand over to the Germans themselves the greater amount of the function of administering Germany?

Referring to M. Schuman's contention that the actions of the Western Powers in their Zones of Occupation had been a "logical development" of the Potsdam Agreement, Mr. Vyshinsky insisted that everything done in the Western Zones within the past eighteen months was a direct violation of that agreement, citing facts to show how the policies of the Western Powers had led to the splitting of Germany.

On December 2, 1946, the governments of the United States and Britain signed an agreement to fuse the two zones. This agreement on Bizonia served to deepen the split in the Control Council, and led to increasing disunity, directly contrary to the Potsdam Agreement, which provided for the restoration of Germany's unity with supreme authority in Germany effected during occupation by the quadripartite Control Council.

On February 12, 1947, the American and British commanders, renouncing the Potsdam provision for quadripartite conduct of decartelization of Germany by the Control Council, unilaterally put into effect law No. 56 on decartelization.

On April 19, 1947, a separate Anglo-Franco-American agreement was signed on export and distribution of the Ruhr coal—a fresh violation of the Potsdam Agreement. On May 29, 1947, the United States and Britain set up in Bizonia an Economic Council, an Executive Committee, and a number of other Bizonal agencies with extensive powers of a state character—measures constituting a gross violation of the four-power agreement. On September 10, 1947, a separate Anglo-American agreement on the Ruhr was signed.

The tripartite Anglo-Franco-American conferences on the German problem which took place in February and March, 1948, and then later on in London adopted a series of decisions nullifying the Potsdam Agreement.

In the Control Council on March 20, 1948, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet occupation zone asked the other three Commanders-in-Chief to inform the Control Council of the decisions

taken in London. When this information was refused the meeting was adjourned.

Mr. Vyshinsky declared that it was this series of trilateral divisive actions which led to the destruction of the quadripartite basis of control of Germany, and to the Occupation Statute, consolidating trilateral control, and the so-called Bonn Constitution.

Continuing his criticisms of the three-power proposal, Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the federalization principle as expressed in the Bonn Constitution grants extensive powers to the local *länder* governments at the expense of weakening the central government.

Answering implications on the part of Mr. Bevin that the Soviet government had abandoned its previous advocacy of an all-German government, Mr. Vyshinsky said that his government had never renounced its proposals on this matter, introduced at the 1947 Moscow and London Foreign Ministers' Conferences, but rejected then by the U. S., Great Britain, and France.

Mr. Vyshinsky explained that the Soviet government now proposed to set up an all-German State Council in the capacity of an agency preceding the creation of an all-German government on the basis of universal democratic elections, in order to facilitate the possibility of achieving joint agreement. If the three powers would consent to take as a basis for discussion the proposals on this question advanced by the Soviet delegation at the Moscow and London sessions, then the Soviet delegation would gladly discuss measures to set up an all-German democratic government.

On June 1 the Foreign Ministers agreed to pass on to the second item on the agenda, "Berlin and the Currency Question." Before them was the Soviet proposal for the restoration of the Berlin city-wide Magistrat and the Inter-Allied Kommandatura in Berlin functioning, as established at Potsdam, on the basis of unanimity. Messrs. Acheson, Bevin, and Schuman reiterated their position that the principle of unanimity should apply only in strictly limited cases.

Referring to Mr. Acheson's statement to the effect that U. S. representatives are in Berlin and occupy their sector by right, on the basis of international agreements, Mr. Vyshinsky said:

This is a very important assertion. If the United States really is in Berlin by right ensuing from international agreements, then from this follows the obligation for the United States government to adhere to these agreements and not present the matter in such a light as if these agreements do not exist. If these agreements were

erased then that legal ground of which Acheson spoke would be lost. If there are no international agreements then how can the right emanating from these agreements and defined by them exist? I have no intentions of disputing the fact that the American, British, and French occupation authorities are in the respective sectors of Berlin by right of international agreements. These occupation authorities are in Berlin not just simply to be there. They are there in order to carry out definite functions in administering Berlin and the international agreement provides for a quadripartite basis of this administration.

Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the U.S.S.R. delegation proposes not to institute a new Inter-Allied Kommandatura in Berlin on some sort of new principles but to restore this Kommandatura so that it would function in compliance with the international agreement constituting the source of right in this sphere.

Mr. Vyshinsky then reminded the Council that on January 18, 1946, the four commandants representing the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, and France approved the regulations of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura of the city of Berlin. Paragraph 3 of these regulations states: "Only unanimous decisions adopted by the representatives of all four powers are valid. Questions on which agreement is not reached will be submitted to the higher authorities for settlement. Not one single document containing diverse viewpoints and requiring settlement will be submitted to the Control Council without preliminary examination at a meeting of commandants." Citing other instances of joint agreement on the unanimity principle, Mr. Vyshinsky remarked that it could not be otherwise:

. . . Because administration of a city where there are four authorities cannot be effected without concurrence among these authorities. Such a situation cannot be allowed when three authorities would do one thing and the fourth another, just as, of course, one cannot subjugate the will of one occupying authority to the decisions of the other three merely because three is arithmetically greater than one. Therefore, the unanimity principle which was made the cornerstone of activity of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura is the only correct one. That is why we propose restoring the quadripartite Kommandatura on its former basis. . . . One cannot use an international

agreement in such a way that one part, interesting and advantageous to one of the parties, is recognized, while the disadvantageous part is rejected. An agreement is an agreement. It is an international act, and it must be taken as a whole and not cut up into bits.

Mr. Acheson, in his reply, insisted that it was not possible to function on the basis of unanimity, attempted to prove that the Inter-Allied agreements on which the Kommandatura was based did not require the unanimity principle, and made it clear the U. S. delegation would accept only a system whereby the decisive voice would belong to the Western Powers commanding a guaranteed majority vote. Mr. Vyshinsky cited chapter and verse of international agreements signed by U. S. representatives to refute Acheson's position. In a subsequent speech, Mr. Vyshinsky showed that in 1945 the Inter-Allied Kommandatura, functioning on the unanimity principle, had been able to reach agreement on 167 of 217 questions considered; in 1946, on 70 out of 199. If, in 1947 and 1948, matters worsened, this was not because the method was wrong, but because of the political atmosphere that surrounded the work of the Kommandatura. He pointed out that the cessation of the work of the Kommandatura had been caused not by the failure of the unanimity principle, but because of the action of American Commandant Howley in withdrawing from deliberations without explanation or apology.

On June 7, Mr. Vyshinsky analyzed the Soviet and the U. S. proposals on the basis for restoration of the Berlin city-wide Magistrat by authorizing the four allied Commandants to hold free city-wide elections under quadripartite control. Since no Magistrat would exist prior to the elections, formation of a commission consisting of Germans to conduct the elections would be necessary. The Soviet Union proposed that such a commission be set up on a parity principle, *i.e.*, on the basis of equal representation of the Soviet sectors and the Western sectors. Such an arrangement, said Mr. Vyshinsky, would be fair because Western policies had split Berlin in two parts, both of which should be represented. The Soviet delegation found unacceptable the U. S. proposal that the election commission be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commandants of each of the four sectors, which would give an obvious advantage to the Western Powers. For, as he pointed out later, the German population residing in the three Western sectors is not divided by any administrative positions. The three Western sectors constitute a

single entity in economic and administrative respects, with a single police force, a single banking system, single transport, a single management of industries and a single Magistrat to which elections were held, with a single ticket for the entire Western part of Berlin and not for each separate sector.

Mr. Vyshinsky said the Soviet Union also considered it necessary to extend the functions of the city Magistrat and restrict those of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura, although wishing to retain more responsibility for the latter in guaranteeing the normal life of Berlin than the U. S. delegation. Mr. Vyshinsky continued:

To realize the aims of co-ordinating and guaranteeing normal life of Berlin, the U.S.S.R. delegation proposes restricting the functions of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura by placing the overwhelming majority of questions under the jurisdiction of the City Assembly and Magistrat. Such are questions bearing on the supplying of Berlin, municipal transport, finances, including the budget, credits, prices, taxation, fuel, electric power, communications, appointment and dismissal of leading executives of the Berlin city-wide administrative bodies, police and maintenance of law and order, etc. All such questions come within the jurisdiction of the City Assembly of Deputies and the Berlin city-wide Magistrat and are dependent on the Inter-Allied Kommandatura only with regard to control over the activity of the Berlin municipality in the corresponding spheres.

Among the questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura should be only questions of control over how the 1946 provisional constitution is complied with, supervision over the confinement of war criminals convicted by the Nuremberg International Tribunal, certain questions relating to public security and those questions of an economic and administrative nature the settlement of which is linked with the measures undertaken by the occupation authorities.

One need only compare the aforesaid proposals of the U.S.S.R. delegation concerning the functions of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura with the United States proposals to become convinced that the American delegation and the British and French delegations supporting it seek to attribute to the Inter-Allied Kommandatura a different character when they include such questions within the



jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura as the demilitarization, deconcentration, decartelization, reparations, restitution, etc.—questions coming within the jurisdiction of the Control Council, and do not include within the jurisdiction of this Kommandatura questions bound up with control over provisioning of Berlin with fuel, food, transport, communications, electric power, etc. In such a situation it becomes clear how unfounded and deprived of any ground whatever are the attempts of the American delegation to oppose the Soviet proposals by claiming that allegedly, according to these proposals, not one single question in Berlin can be decided without the Allied Kommandatura. . . .

On June 9, Mr. Vyshinsky took up the question of currency for Berlin:

I would like to recall in brief the contents of the agreement reached on August 30, 1948: Item "a" of this agreement provided for lifting the restrictions in communications, transport, and trade between Berlin and the Western Zones and also for freight traffic to the Soviet Zone of Germany and back. On the basis of this the subsequent agreement was reached on May 5, 1949, and was later put into effect on May 12. The aforementioned restrictions have already been lifted in the Soviet Zone. Thus the first part of the agreed-upon decision of August 30, 1948, has been fulfilled. Item "b" of this agreement reads: "The German mark of the Soviet Zone will be introduced as a single currency for Berlin and the Western mark will be removed from circulation." This second part of the directive of August 30, was not put into effect.

Mr. Vyshinsky then recalled the fact that on the basis of these two provisions the Military Governors in Germany had been instructed to hold consultations with a view to "take in the shortest possible time detailed measures necessary for the implementation of those decisions." They were instructed to prevent discrimination or actions aimed against the holders of Western marks in connection with the exchange of these Western marks issued in Berlin. These marks were to be accepted in exchange of German marks in the Soviet occupation zone at a rate of one for one.

Mr. Vyshinsky further recalled that the question of a single currency for Berlin was the subject of discussion by the United



Nations Security Council on the initiative of the United States, Britain, and France:

On November 30, 1948, the Security Council instructed the technical committee for the currency and trade of Berlin to draw up such measures and recommendations as would contribute to the settlement of this issue. Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Syria, and a representative of the United Nations General Secretary participated in the work of the committee.

The committee worked from November 30, 1948, till February 11, 1949. On December 23, 1948, it offered recommendations based on the principles previously agreed upon by the four Powers. . . . These recommendations attracted great interest on the part of the representatives of the four Powers. But at that time they failed to reach an agreement. . . . Thus the proposals of the Soviet delegation on the currency problem in Berlin are the following:

1. To introduce a single currency for the whole of Berlin;
2. To accept as a single currency for Berlin the German mark of the Soviet occupation zone as agreed upon in the directives of August 30, 1948, prepared jointly by the four Powers—Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, with all the consequences as pointed out in those directives and which proceed from the same decision;
3. While drawing up the provisions on the activity of the quadripartite financial commission and while discussing these functions to accept as a basis the recommendations of the technical committee of December 23, 1948.

The representatives of the Western Powers who spoke after Mr. Vyshinsky, far from manifesting readiness to reach agreement on a single currency for Berlin on the basis of the quadripartite decision of August 30, 1948, refused to make any proposals of their own, or to examine this question at all. Mr. Acheson declared that the United States government "does not believe itself bound by the directive of August 30, 1948." He further alleged that it was "absolutely impossible to introduce a single monetary system for a divided Berlin." Messrs. Schuman and Henderson joined Acheson's view.

Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that refusal to discuss this question

could only mean a determination to hold to the position of perpetuating and deepening the splitting of Germany.

Thus the representatives of the Western Powers frustrated discussion of the question of introducing a single currency for Berlin, though the four-power agreement of May 5 envisaged that this question had to be settled by the Foreign Ministers' Council.

The representatives of the Western Powers also displayed considerable reluctance to consider Item 3 of the Agenda, on the Peace Settlement with Germany. Mr. Bevin especially advocated that the matter be postponed, raising all sorts of objections on the ground that no draft treaty had been presented, no procedure had been established, etc.

Mr. Vyshinsky said that at each previous Foreign Ministers' meeting Mr. Bevin had likewise found all kinds of obstacles hindering preparation of a peace treaty. Admitting that many difficulties existed, Mr. Vyshinsky insisted that none of them were insurmountable. He said the U.S.S.R. was prepared to submit concrete proposals and had expected all the other delegations to submit their proposals.

Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out further that when the Council of Foreign Ministers was established in Potsdam, it was stressed that the Council would be used for preparing a peace treaty for Germany. He declared:

The peace treaty for Germany constitutes the high road for liquidating the aftermath of war not only for Germany but also for all peace-loving nations in Europe. This is the road for the economic and political recovery of Germany, the road for her development as a united peace-loving democratic state. Hence, not only the German people are interested in the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty, but also all the peoples who strive for the establishment and consolidation of peace on the democratic principles laid down in Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.

Mr. Vyshinsky further reminded the Council that Germany held an important place in the system of international economy:

Germany cannot remain outside of international intercourse, beyond the bounds of the comity of democratic states. Such a status is intolerable to the German people and harmful from the standpoint of the interests of all peace-loving peoples of Europe and the entire

world. During the four years which passed after the defeat of the Hitlerite war machine and the liquidation of the Hitlerite state, substantial achievements in democratic reconstruction have been registered in Germany. The conclusion of a peace treaty would ensure further progress in this direction, since this would create favorable conditions for the further growth and consolidation of the democratic forces throughout Germany, for the consolidation of the democratic principles in the administrative system and in the public life of Germany, for reinforcing the will of the German people to establish international co-operation with all democratic countries of the world.

Mr. Vyshinsky reminded the Council that the Soviet government, as early as at the fifth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in 1947, proposed to commence without delay drafting the peace treaty for Germany. In doing so the U.S.S.R. delegation pointed out that the further postponement of settling this issue was impermissible and that it was impossible to deprive the German people of the right to a peaceful and independent existence. The Soviet government had proposed then that the governments of the Four Powers present within two months of the Council of Ministers meeting drafts of the fundamental provisions of the peace treaty for Germany. This proposal, however, was not supported by the other ministers who even evaded discussing it.

On the other hand the United States delegation at the conference of deputies of Foreign Ministers in London in 1947 made a proposal whose trend was directly opposite to the task of the earliest preparation of the peace treaty. It proposed to prepare instead of a peace treaty a so-called "international statute."

Since then the idea of an "international statute" has been taking stronger root among the leading circles of the United States, Britain, and France, while the idea of the peace treaty has withered more and more. In the final count, instead of a peace treaty, the Occupation Statute, signed in Washington by the U.S.A., Britain, and France, appeared.

Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that some months before, at the Third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, an important resolution was adopted which was unanimously supported also by the delegations now present at the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. This resolution of November 3, 1948, stated that the United Nations could not fully achieve its aims until the process

of eliminating the aftermath of World War II was completed and until all the peace treaties were concluded and put into force. This resolution proposed to the four Powers that they should redouble their efforts, in the spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding, so that the final settlement of the consequences of war and the conclusion of all peace treaties could be achieved in the shortest possible time. Mr. Vyshinsky said:

It should be understood that without the swiftest conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany the implementation of the resolution is impossible. It should be understood that the earliest preparation and conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany fully accords with the interests of all the peace-loving peoples. The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany will be of paramount importance, not only for the destiny of the German people, but also for the destiny of all the other peoples of Europe and the entire world.

The Soviet Union's proposal, offered by Mr. Vyshinsky, provided a concrete basis to start work on the German peace treaty. It called upon the Governments of the Four Powers to submit drafts of the peace treaty with Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers within three months, that these drafts provide for the withdrawal from Germany of the occupation forces of all Powers within one year after the signing of the peace treaty, and that examination of the procedure for the preparation of the peace treaty be completed at the present session.

The Western Powers rejected the Soviet proposal and Mr. Acheson characterized the draft procedure it outlined for the preparation of the peace treaty as "an absolutely criminal waste of time." The Western Powers particularly objected to the draft treaty containing any stipulation as to the term of stay of the occupation troops in Germany, leading Mr. Vyshinsky to comment:

Evidently the American, British, and French delegations are trying to keep Germany occupied for a lengthy period, and unambiguously forewarn against "unfounded hopes" for a short period. It was not fortuitous that Mr. Acheson hinted that the peace treaty may be signed fifty years from now! As far as the U.S.S.R. delegation is concerned, it proposes that the preparation of the peace treaty be speeded up, and specifically that drafts of the peace treaty be submitted within three months—a fully practicable period.

Ten days of secret sessions took place following the discussion of the German Peace Treaty, as a result of which limited agreements were reached on some German problems, and a more inclusive agreement on a peace treaty with Austria. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministers agreed to set the date of another Council meeting on the German question at the September meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. Of the utmost importance was the fact that the conference marked substantial progress toward rehabilitation of the authority of the Council of Foreign Ministers as the mechanism to work out peace settlements for postwar Europe—the basic task for which the Council was created by the Potsdam agreement.

The Council of Foreign Ministers issued a communique of the results of their Sixth Session on June 30, which contained the following text of their decision on the German and Austrian questions:

#### 1. THE GERMAN QUESTION

Despite inability at this session of the Council of Foreign Ministers to reach agreement on the restoration of the economic and political unity of Germany, the Foreign Ministers of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States will continue their efforts to achieve this result and, in particular, now agree as follows:

1. During the course of the fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to be convened next September, the four governments, through their representatives at the Assembly, will exchange views regarding the date and other arrangements for the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the German question.

2. The occupation authorities, in the light of the intentions of the Ministers to continue their efforts to achieve the restoration of the economic and political unity of Germany, shall consult together in Berlin on a quadripartite basis.

3. These consultations will have as their purpose among other things, to mitigate the effects of the present administrative division of Germany and of Berlin, notably on the matters listed below:

A. Expansion of trade and development of financial and economic relations between the Western zones and the Eastern zone and between Berlin and the zones.

B. Facilitation of movement of persons and goods and exchange of information between the Western zones and the Eastern zone and between Berlin and the zones.

C. Consideration of questions of common interest relating to the administration of the four sectors of Berlin, with a view to normalizing as far as possible the life of the city.

4. In order to assist in the work envisaged in paragraph 3, the respective occupation authorities may call upon German experts and appropriate German organizations in their respective jurisdictions for assistance. The Germans so called upon should exchange pertinent data, prepare reports and, if agreed between them, submit proposals to the occupation authorities.

5. The governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States agree that the New York Agreement of May 4, 1949, shall be maintained. Moreover, in order to promote further the aims set forth in the preceding paragraphs, and in order to improve and supplement this and other arrangements and agreements as regards movements of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern zone and the Western zones and between the zones and Berlin, and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities, each in its own zone, shall be obliged to take the necessary measures to insure normal functioning and utilization of rail, water, and road transport for such movement of persons and goods and such communications by post, telephone, and telegraph.

6. The occupation authorities will recommend to the leading German economic bodies of the Eastern and Western zones to facilitate the establishment of closer economic ties between the zones and more effective implementation of trade and other economic agreements.

## 2. THE AUSTRIAN TREATY

The Foreign Ministers have agreed:

A. That Austria's frontiers will be those of January 1, 1938;

B. That the treaty for Austria shall provide that Austria shall guarantee to protect the rights of the Slovene and Croat minorities in Austria;

C. That reparations shall not be exacted from Austria but that Yugoslavia shall have the right to seize, retain, or liquidate Austrian property, rights, and interests within Yugoslav territory;

D. That the Soviet Union shall receive from Austria 150 million dollars in freely convertible currency to be paid in the course of six years;

E. That the definitive settlement shall include:

1. Relinquishment to Austria of all property, rights, and interests held or claimed as German assets, and of war industrial enterprises, houses and similar immovable property in Austria, held or claimed as war booty, on the understanding that the deputies will be instructed to define more accurately the categories of war booty transferred to Austria (with the exception of those oil assets and D.D.S.G.—Danube Shipping Company—properties transferred to the Soviet Union under other paragraphs of Article 35 of the Treaty, indicated in the U.S.S.R. proposals of January 24, 1948, as revised and retained in general under Austrian jurisdiction). Accordingly the assets of the D.D.S.G. in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, as well as 100 per cent of the assets of the Danube Shipping Company in Eastern Austria in accordance with the list to be agreed upon by the deputies, will be transferred to the U.S.S.R.

2. That rights, properties, and interests transferred to the U.S.S.R., as well as the rights, properties, and interests which the U.S.S.R. cedes to Austria, shall be transferred without any charges or claims on the part of the U.S.S.R. or on the part of Austria. At the same time it is understood that the words "charges or claims" mean not only credits or claims arising out of the exercise of allied control of these rights, properties, and interests after May 8, 1945, but also all other claims, including claims in respect of taxes. It is also understood that the reciprocal waivers by the U.S.S.R. and Austria of charges and claims apply to all such charges and claims as exist on the date when Austria formalizes the rights of the U.S.S.R. to the German assets transferred to it and on the date of actual transfer to Austria of the assets ceded by the U.S.S.R.

F. That former German assets which have become the property of the U.S.S.R. shall not be subject to alienation without the consent of the U.S.S.R.

G. The deputies shall resume their work promptly for the purpose of reaching agreement not later than September 1 on the draft treaty as a whole.

On his return to the Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky summed up the results of the conference in an interview published in the Moscow *Izvestia* and *Pravda* of June 30. He reviewed the situation preceding the conference, pointing out that for many months the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France had been seeking, in gross contradiction of the Potsdam Agreement, to gain control of the Western part of Germany and utilize it for anti-democratic imperialist ends. He described the efforts of these powers to obtain the approval of the Council of Foreign Ministers of their splitting activities with regard to Germany. He outlined their proposals to the effect that the Eastern Zone of Germany simply join the so-called Bonn Constitution, accept the Occupation Statute and subjugate itself to the dictate of the three Western governments. They did not succeed, Mr. Vyshinsky declared, in view of the firm stand taken by the Soviet delegation, and were forced to look for another way out, which he described as follows:

The need to look for another way out was, of course, not unexpected for the United States, Great Britain, and France, since the failure of the line of Anglo-Franco-American policy toward Germany was already evident to them. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that new proposals of the three Western delegations on the German question appeared. These proposals not only contained no hint that the policy hitherto pursued by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France with regard to Germany was correct, but on the contrary spoke outright of the necessity to exert efforts to restore the economic and political unity of Germany in order to achieve, at the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, a result which could not be attained in this respect at this session.

This, of course, can in no way be called confirmation of the correctness of American policy towards Germany, as official representatives of the United States government are now seeking to prove in their latest pronouncements devoted to the results of the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. In reality the agreement on the German question reached at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers seriously diverges from the original Anglo-



Franco-American proposals and plans. If one carefully reads the communique of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it is not difficult to see in the communique adopted by the four Ministers the basic ideas of the proposals which were submitted by the Soviet delegation in the Council of Foreign Ministers during the very first days of its work.

Mr. Vyshinsky then set forth the proposals made by the Soviet delegation, as recorded in this chapter, and continued:

All these proposals of the Soviet delegation, however, encountered stubborn resistance from the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Even the proposal to complete the work of preparing the procedure for drafting the peace treaty was not adopted, on the pretext that the draft procedure already existing was obsolete and allegedly required fundamental revision. However, not one of the Ministers—and first and foremost the American Foreign Minister, Mr. Acheson, who more than anyone else objected to discussing at that session the question of the peace treaty with Germany—could say what precisely had to be changed in the draft procedure mentioned. From the above it is clear that the Soviet Union at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers consistently adhered on the German question to its stand of principle which fully accords with the Potsdam Agreement on the German question.

As a result, the three Western delegations had to change their line. They were compelled to think of another foundation for settling some questions pertaining to Germany than the above-mentioned memorandum. The Soviet proposals in the final analysis constituted such a foundation.

No matter how the three Western governments may try to deny this, the fact remains that the communique agreed upon among the four Ministers is drawn up in the spirit of the Soviet proposals!

Is not this confirmed by the second point of the communique, which reads that "the occupation authorities, in the light of the intentions of the Ministers to continue their efforts to achieve the restoration of the economic and political unity of Germany, shall consult together in Berlin on a quadripartite basis"? Is not this also

shown by other points of the communique which provide for such measures as quadripartite consultations on the administration of Berlin, particularly of German experts in the consultations, the establishment of closer economic ties between the leading German bodies of the Eastern and Western zones, expansion of trade between the zones as well as between Berlin and the zones, etc.†

These points represent an obvious departure by the three Ministers from their former stand, which consisted in settling German questions without the participation of the Soviet Union, as was agreed upon among themselves by the governments of the United States, Britain, and France in London in 1948 and confirmed this spring 1949 in Washington. Now, at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the governments of the United States, Britain, and France deemed it necessary to agree to quadripartite consultations on the German question, instead of the tripartite consultations which they began to practice during the last two years, crudely violating the principle of the Potsdam Agreement.

In this connection one cannot but dwell on the part of Mr. Acheson's statement at a press conference in Washington on June 23 on the results of the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, at which Mr. Acheson asserted that the efforts of the United States were directed to granting the Germans "freedom in their own affairs" and "relaxing the control of the occupation authorities," and that the U.S.S.R. did not dare to act in this way.

But this assertion is not serious and is devoid of foundation. Indeed, if things were as Mr. Acheson said, how is one to explain the fact that both he and his Western colleagues resolutely objected to all the proposals of the Soviet delegation directed precisely at restoring the unity of Germany and giving the Germans "freedom in their own affairs"! Did not the Minister of the United States, and the Ministers of Britain and France supporting him, reject the proposal of the Soviet delegation to establish a German State Council for the whole of Germany on the basis of the German economic agencies operating in the Western and Eastern zones? Did they not also reject another proposal of the Soviet delegation—to recommend the German economic agencies in the Eastern and Western zones to set up a co-ordinating economic agency?

Did not the Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and

France refuse to render the necessary co-operation in setting up such an agency and in its activity, on which the Soviet delegation insisted? Did not they also reject the Soviet proposal to restore the all-Berlin Magistrat, and the proposal of the U.S.S.R. to recommend the leading German economic agencies in the Eastern and Western zones to set up economic representation having among its aims that of developing trade and the economic activity in general of these German agencies?

Lastly, did not the delegations of the United States, Great Britain, and France reject the proposals of the Soviet Union to prepare the peace treaty with Germany and to establish a short term for the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Germany? As for the question of setting up an all-German democratic government, did not the three Western Ministers show at the Paris session how undesirable the formation of such a government is to them?

How, in the light of all these indisputable facts, could Mr. Acheson permit himself to say, contrary to obvious fact, that the United States was seeking to grant the Germans "freedom in their own affairs" while the Soviet Union did not want to grant the Germans "freedom in their own affairs"?

At the same press conference Mr. Acheson said that he proposed to seek the explanation of what happened in Paris in the progress that had been achieved in the restoration of Western Europe. I consider it necessary to say on this score that if one is to reckon with facts known to the entire world, one has to speak not of the successes but of the failures of the Marshall Plan. Indeed, if the Marshall Plan has proved to be successful, what is to explain the fact that the author of this plan has been removed from the post of Foreign Minister of the United States and replaced by another Minister? I think that precisely the failures of the Marshall Plan should be regarded as one of the reasons for the departure of the three Ministers at the Paris session from their original so-called "firm policy."

As for the question of the Austrian treaty, the Paris session succeeded in reaching agreement on this issue owing to the fact that the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France had to change their stand in this matter and withdraw their objections to the legitimate demands of the Soviet government with regard to former German property in Eastern Austria. It was pre-

cisely the refusal of the three Western governments to recognize the legitimate rights of the Soviet Union to this property that was the main stumbling block to agreement on the Austrian question, though the Foreign Ministers' deputies alone devoted more than 160 meetings to discussion of the Austrian treaty.

The agreement on the treaty with Austria also settled other important issues which were in dispute between Yugoslavia and Austria. Yugoslavia was ensured her economic interests by the transfer to her of Austrian property on Yugoslav territory. The protection of the rights of the Slovene and Croat National minorities in Burgenland, Carinthia, and Styria was also secured. As for Yugoslav territorial claims on Austria, it should be said that already, two years ago—that is, long before the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers—representatives of Yugoslavia conducted secret negotiations behind the back of the Soviet Union with the representatives of Britain, Mr. Noel Baker, and Minister of State Mr. Hector McNeil, but did not obtain any concessions from them. It is clear that the Soviet government cannot assume any responsibility for the consequences of such backstage negotiations.

Speaking of the results of the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, one should mention the most important result—that is the undoubted failure of the policy of splitting Germany, of aggravating international relations, and the undoubted success of the line of policy of restoring the unity of Germany, of improving international relations, for international co-operation.

As for the question of preparing the conditions for the convocation of the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in this matter, as is known, there were some mutual concessions both on the part of the three Western governments and on the part of the Soviet government. The Soviet government declared that it was ready to remove transport and other restrictions if the three Western governments in their turn would agree to remove their transport and other restrictions, give up the boycott of co-operation of the four governments, and agree to restoration of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The three governments agreed to these concessions.

I think that in future, too, it will be necessary to make certain mutual concessions compatible with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement.