


Pamphlet  
.PO-148

**WHY**

Leonid FYODOROV

**WHY  
THE ARMS  
RACE  
CONTINUES**

**WHY**



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2019 with funding from  
Kahle/Austin Foundation

Leonid FYODOROV

# WHY THE ARMS RACE CONTINUES

Novosti Press Agency Publishing House  
Moscow 1983

Translated from the Russian by Sergei CHULAKI

Translation edited by Selena KOTLOBAI

0801000000

© Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1983

## TWO WORLDS - TWO DOCTRINES

Thirty years have passed since the last rumbles of the Second World War ceased, leaving the earth blood-stained and scarred. But even today people in the Soviet Union, in Poland, France and Britain, in Yugoslavia and Ethiopia, in Burma, Indonesia, China, Korea, and many other countries continue to mourn the death of their loved ones, and in Japan victims of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still dying a slow, painful death.

But one recalls the last war not only in order to mourn, but also to honour and pay tribute to those who in the bitter struggle against fascism and militarism protected world civilisation and the future of mankind.

More than 50 million people lost their lives in this most destructive war in human history. Of these 27 million fell on the battlefield.

Sixty-one countries which were inhabited by almost 80 per cent of the world population were involved in that war.

However, the brunt of the struggle against German fascism and Japanese militarism was borne by the Soviet Union, which lost 20 million lives, or 40 per cent of all those who died in the Second World War. Twenty million people killed, and tens

of millions orphaned, widowed and disabled—these figures bespeak untold human sufferings and misery. The war left a deep wound in almost every Soviet family.

The Nazi aggressors razed to the ground hundreds of Soviet cities and towns and more than 70,000 villages, left 25 million people homeless, and destroyed tens of thousands of industrial enterprises. The country lost almost one-third of its national wealth in the war.

But the sacrifices borne by the USSR were not in vain. The Soviet people and their armed forces won in the end, inflicting a crushing defeat upon the fascist aggressor; they upheld the freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland, and carried out their liberation mission. In the war years the heroism and staunchness of the Soviet army and the entire Soviet people inspired other armies and nations.

As we look back over the years and at our country's postwar development we can say with confidence that the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War in many ways marked a turning point in the life of mankind. Great changes have taken place on our planet. A world socialist system has been established over a large territory. The mounting national liberation struggle of the peoples which began in Asia and then spread to Africa and other continents has led to the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. The positions of imperialism have weakened considerably. The correlation of forces in the world arena has undergone radical changes.

But as their influence declines, the imperialists have at the same time become even more aggressive. Immediately after the war they began to regroup their forces.

At a time when Soviet people were engrossed in the work of rehabilitating the country's war-ravaged economy, the United States and Britain began preparing for another war, this time against the Soviet Union. To justify their actions in the eyes of the world they invented a mythical Soviet military threat. To see the utter cynicism of this, one only needs to look at a few figures which clearly show the position the United States found itself in after the war. In the war the United States lost 405,000 men; meanwhile its gross national product almost doubled and it accounted for nearly two-thirds of world industrial output towards the end of the war. After the war the United States was the chief spokesman for the aggressive foreign-policy course of the imperialist states spearheaded against the Soviet Union and countries that had taken the path of socialism.

In the winter of 1945-1946, Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, spent several months in the United States where he had had talks with President Harry S. Truman and senior officials of the Department of State and other politicians. At these meetings the basic idea of a foreign-policy speech which Churchill was soon to make was formulated. On February 10, 1946, Churchill went over the main points of his speech with President Truman, and spent the next several weeks putting the final touches to it at a Florida resort. He delivered the speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, in the presence of the US President. This speech, which fully reflected the views of the ruling quarters in the United States, signalled the beginning of the Cold War. Churchill maintained that the world was threatened by the danger of an imminent new world war and that the danger came mainly from

the Soviet Union which was supported by the international communist movement. He therefore proposed that the United States, Britain and other capitalist countries conclude a military-political alliance. With the full backing of the ruling quarters of the United States, Churchill called for the use of military force against the Soviet Union and urged that this be done as soon as possible while the United States had the atomic bomb and the Soviet Union did not.

In March 1947, the US government proclaimed the so-called Truman Doctrine (which fully accorded with Churchill's foreign-policy scheme) as the national policy of the United States.

The US foreign policy programme spelled out in President Truman's message to US Congress in March 1947, assumed the force of law after it was approved by the Congress and signed by the President in May 1947. The Truman Doctrine envisaged allocating 400 million dollars in 1947-1948 fiscal year for rendering "assistance" of Greece and Turkey under the pretext of alleged "communist threat". The respective agreements with Greece and Turkey were signed in June and July 1947. The Truman Doctrine started off the US policy of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, fanning up international tensions, giving military "aid" to other countries and setting up military bases on the territories of other countries.

In confidential talks Churchill pressed on his listeners the idea that a war against the Soviet Union should be started in two or three years, not later. In a speech he made at a Conservative Party Conference in October 1948, Churchill, as the British press put it, showed his readiness to wage an aggressive war. Political preparations for launching an anti-Soviet course were being made by



the US government, with President Truman taking a personal interest in the undertaking. It is pertinent to recall here that back in 1941, when Truman was a Senator, he said quite frankly that "if we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible. . ." In April 1945, shortly before he became President, Truman said that the United States would be determining policies for the whole world.

One of the best-known documents of the Cold War period was a long memorandum prepared by the US chargé d'affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan, and cabled to Washington in February 1946. The basic provisions of the memorandum George Kennan later included in his article in the magazine *Foreign Affairs*. Kennan, who later admitted that he had never seriously thought that the Soviet Union posed a military threat to anyone, then attributed to the USSR a statement to the effect that countries with different social systems could not live in peace with one another, and he said again and again that the Soviet Union was striving for world domination. Kennan also submitted recommendations of a strategic character according to which US policy should be aimed at bringing about the following political pattern: the West and the capitalist world as a whole should rally around the United States, while the socialist community of states and the world communist movement should cease to exist as factors of world politics as a result of the implementation of a policy of "containment". It is not difficult to see the striking similarity between Kennan's memorandum, Churchill's Fulton speech and the Truman Doctrine, which were to determine the United States's policy in the Cold War years.

Along with defining the political principles of an aggressive anti-Soviet policy the ruling quarters in the United States developed a military doctrine spelling out the objectives and the character of a possible war, how it should be prepared and with what means it should be conducted. Significantly, six months after Churchill's speech at the Conservative Party Conference in October 1948, in which he called for the launching of an atomic war against the Soviet Union, the Western governments, on the initiative of the United States, signed an agreement on the formation of an aggressive military bloc, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (April 1949). Six years later the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted to this bloc as an equal partner. At the same time, the imperialists began to encircle the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with a ring of military bases and to form military blocs in different parts of the world on the pretext of combatting the "communist threat".

The preventive war strategy (1945-1948) indicated the desire of the ruling quarters in the United States to dictate their will from a "position of strength". This stand was backed up by America's monopoly on the atomic bomb. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, which was a senseless act in itself since it could not possibly affect the outcome of the war with Japan, pursued quite a different goal, as was later revealed in a number of frank statements by US politicians of those days. Thus, US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes said that the bomb enabled the US to dictate its terms. Documents made public in the late 1970s showed that back in 1945-1948 the ruling quarters of the United States had worked out more than ten different elaborate plans for launching an attack on the Soviet Union with the

use of atomic weapons. General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the US Army Strategic Air Forces, said that the purpose of these plans was to depopulate large areas of the Earth's surface, leaving only rudiments of man's activity.

On November 3, 1945, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted as its guideline recommendations drawn up by the intelligence department which identified 20 Soviet cities, including the capital of the USSR, Moscow, as possible targets of atomic bombing. The document said that destruction of the principal government departments and their personnel would have a great effect, that the main feature of the atomic weapon was its ability to destroy large concentrations of people, and that atomic strikes at Russia's industrial capacities would be effective only if they were carried out on a mass scale.

US ruling circles rejected all the Soviet proposals on the prohibition of production of nuclear weapons put forward since 1946. In 1949, the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapon, thus putting an end to US monopoly in this sphere. Let us remember this date, for it shows that it was the United States, not the Soviet Union, who first created the atomic weapon. It also shows that the Soviet Union had had to develop the nuclear weapons in order to forestall the unleashing of a destructive war which would have inflicted incalculable calamities on all mankind.

In 1950, US ruling quarters had to modify their plans for using atomic weapons as an instrument of practical policy and to reassess the strategy of a preventive atomic attack on the Soviet Union. In the early 1950s, it adopted the "massive retaliation" strategy in which a strategic air force capable of delivering nuclear strikes deep in the

enemy rear was assigned the principal role. This doctrine was embodied in the *Dropshot* plan worked out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and adopted on December 19, 1949. The plan provided for a non-stop atomic bombing of 70 Soviet cities for a period of 30 days with a view to killing 2,700,000 people and injuring another four million.

The central idea of the new US military strategy was to achieve a roughly ten to one nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. It was based on President Truman's directive of January 1, 1950, calling for the development of new thermonuclear weapons. The American generals assumed that a preventive atomic strike against the Soviet Union would destroy up to 40 per cent of the latter's industrial capability (including the whole of Soviet oil industry, for example).

The reader may well wonder if these plans were considered seriously or if they were merely a product of the imagination of a few irresponsible individuals. The fact is, however, that all these aggressive designs were worked out in very concrete and practical terms. Why, then, were they not carried out?

The answer to this question can be found in US official documents. For example, a memorandum of the National Security Council of April 1950 pointed out that a surprise attack on the Soviet Union would arouse unfavourable reaction not only among many Americans but also among large sections of the population in other countries. It would therefore be difficult after such a war, the memorandum noted, to establish an international order that would be satisfactory to the United States, and a military victory was unlikely to bring the United States any closer to a victory in the fundamental ideological conflict. In this memorandum, the military and

political quarters in the United States, besides admitting that aggression against the Soviet Union could have undesirable social and political consequences for the United States, also recognized the possibility that its allies in Western Europe would suffer a strategic military defeat. In other words, the American generals had come to the conclusion that they were unable to start a war against the Soviet Union.

In the early 1960s, when the Soviet Union had developed intercontinental ballistic missiles and built an effective air defence system, the Pentagon and the corresponding departments in other NATO countries were compelled to admit that in a war against the Soviet Union the United States would not be able to act with impunity as the launching of such a war was certain to invite a telling retaliatory blow. It should be noted that the Soviet Union adopted for service in its Armed Forces intercontinental ballistic missiles only after the United States had done so. In those days the United States manufactured more intercontinental ballistic missiles than the Soviet Union did, and the ruling quarters in that country continued to regard an all-out nuclear war as the key to their strategy of "flexible response". But now the American strategy provided for "dosed" application of nuclear weapons which depended on the scope of the "military threat", and did not exclude the use of conventional means of warfare in a limited war. In the Pentagon's plans a war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Europe would start with the use of conventional weapons; tactical nuclear weapons would be used in subsequent stages of military escalation and strategic nuclear weapons would be used only in a critical situation.

In the early sixties the Pentagon had at its

disposal about 2,000 heavy bombers while in 1966-1967 it already had over a thousand intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles and 41 nuclear-powered submarines armed with 656 ballistic missiles. At that period the Soviet Union had a little over 600 strategic delivery vehicles of all types. "The Soviet Union was faced with the need of responding to the actions of the United States," said D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defence, in his replies to the questions of a TASS correspondent, "and taking steps to maintain its own defence potential. Only this, and nothing else, was what we were doing in the sixties and the seventies. The USSR was concerned with parity and never thought of having military superiority over the United States."

By the early 1970s, a qualitative parity in strategic armaments had been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. That was when the military and political leadership of the United States, after reviewing its earlier strategic plans, adopted a "realistic deterrence" strategy which was based on achieving qualitative superiority in the entire range of strategic armaments. To this end the Pentagon set in motion numerous programmes for increasing the explosive yield of all types of armaments.

The United States was continuously building up its strategic armaments. The early seventies also saw the deployment of a large number of new weapon systems. Minuteman-1 missiles were replaced by 550 intercontinental Minuteman-3 missiles each with three independently-targetable warheads. Simultaneously, the yield of each warhead was increased and the missiles themselves were fitted with remote retargeting systems. Thirty-one nuclear-powered submarines were armed with 496 Poseidon

C-3 ballistic missiles each carrying from 10 to 14 warheads.

Almost 270 heavy bombers were equipped with 20 SRAM attack missiles each. The late seventies saw the appearance of new nuclear-powered submarines of the Ohio class armed with Trident-1 missiles which have a striking range of 7,400 kilometres. Each missile has a multiple re-entry vehicle with eight independently-targetable warheads. It is expected that 992 Trident-1 missiles will be produced by 1990.

According to the Pentagon's plans in 1989 these submarines will begin to be armed with Trident-2 missiles which surpass the Trident-1 missiles by 50 per cent in striking range, by almost 100 per cent in payload and by four to five times in their accuracy. In the eighties the Pentagon plans to build 13 such submarines each of which surpasses 10 submarines armed with 160 Polaris A-3 missiles.

In 1981 the US Air Force received a new air-based strategic Cruise missile (ALCM-B). This missile is armed with a 200-kiloton warhead and is able to hit a target at a distance of 2,500 kilometres. In order to arm strategic bombers on a mass scale with missiles of this type it is planned to produce 3,780 of them by 1989.

The recognition of the parity in nuclear weapons by the Pentagon was accompanied by an acknowledgement of the illusoriness of relying on the threat of a nuclear attack as a means of exerting political pressure on the Soviet Union. This was confirmed by the then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown shortly before he left his post which was taken over by Caspar Weinberger.

And yet despite this the US government refused to give up the "realistic deterrence" strategy. A con-

cise formulation of this strategy was contained in Presidential Directive 59 signed by President James Carter on July 25, 1980, which envisaged limited nuclear war and listed 40,000 military targets to be hit in the event of a conflict (as against 25,000 targets set down in a previous plan). In the early 1980s the United States had 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads, and the plan of attack on the Soviet Union envisaged different sets of targets to suit different political objectives.

The new Republican Administration which took over in January 1981 has come up with a new military strategy, the strategy of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, this new strategy is aimed at achieving the complete and undisputed military superiority of the United States, at restoring its "leading role in the world", at feuding with the Soviet Union when "defending" its "vital interests" in various parts of the world, and at "prying loose" the socialist community of nations. To reach these goals preparations are being made for a protracted nuclear war. In his inaugural speech President Reagan said: "We will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be..." In line with this thinking the strategic nuclear forces of the United States are now officially called offensive forces. Various strategic plans are being elaborated which would involve the deployment of armed forces equipped with increasingly destructive nuclear and conventional weapons for offensive operations. The aggressive character of the US strategy was confirmed in a statement made in May 1982 by William Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is clear from the statement that US policy continues to be based on a long-term program-



me of arms buildup with the emphasis on the modernisation of strategic nuclear arsenal. The Reagan Administration is planning to spend over a five-year period from 1982 to 1986, over 1,500,000 million dollars for the needs of the Pentagon alone, with 15 per cent of this sum to be used for further modernising strategic nuclear forces.

The idea of a "limited nuclear war" holds a central place in the strategic plans of the US ruling quarters. It envisages an exchange of nuclear strikes on the European continent, and accordingly the Americans are stationing more of their forward-based systems in Europe.

In the seventies US ruling circles started deploying new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. As far back as in February 1969 the Pentagon signed its first contract with the Martin-Marietta Corporation, Orlando Division, for the development of a new theatre war missile. The production of the Pershing-2 missile figured as a special programme in the 1975 US military budget. At that same period a new Tomahawk Cruise missile was being developed. In 1972 the first contracts for the production of the latter were signed with General Dynamics. By concentrating a large number of Pershing-2 missiles and Cruise missiles in Europe, the US also hopes to achieve strategic superiority since the operational range of Pershing-2 missiles is 2,500 kilometres which they can cover in five to six minutes. The radius of action of the Pershing-2A missile now in the process of development will be 4,000 kilometres. Thus in its attempt to establish world domination the United States is counting on its ability to hit the territory of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies as far East as the Ural Mountains without using the intercontinental ballistic missiles stationed in the United States.

The possibility of hitting and destroying the strategic missile forces of the Soviet Union within several minutes, thus depriving the USSR of an opportunity to retaliate, tempts the Pentagon to strike the first blow. Above all, they count on the increased accuracy of the Pershing-2 missiles.

In the seventies, when carrying out the re-arming of its forces, the NATO Council took an official decision at its session in December 1979 in Brussels to manufacture in the United States and to deploy 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 96 Tomahawk Cruise missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany, 160 Cruise missiles in Britain and 48 Cruise missiles each in the Netherlands and Belgium. The decision to deploy 572 American medium-range missiles in Western Europe was accompanied by a promise to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union on reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

Thus the direct confrontation strategy which aims at delivering a first strike and has as its goal total victory in a nuclear war is aggressive to its very core. Proof of this is the discussion triggered in the United States by President Reagan's first major foreign policy statement in May 1982. By refusing to commit the United States not to use nuclear weapons first President Reagan thereby emphasised the aggressive character of the American nuclear strategy.

The Pentagon has openly defied the principle of equality and equal security which is the only basis for international security in our nuclear age. The US nuclear strategy undermines the very foundations of inter-state relations. William Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, revealed the essence of this strategy when he said that the interests of the United States are of a

global nature and they clash with the interests of the Soviet Union. Subsequently published materials on the Pentagon's military plans leave no doubt that the Reagan doctrine is directed at achieving victory in a nuclear war.

D. F. Ustinov gave the following definition of US military doctrine as spelled out in the statements of the leaders of the US Administration and in the Pentagon document *Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance*:

*“First.* The United States should in all respects be military power No. 1. The idea of military superiority has become an obsession. It determines the substance of all the actions of the US government and the demands which the United States presents to its allies. Moreover, superiority is clearly seen as achieving the capability of striking at the Soviet Union whenever and wherever Washington finds it expedient to do so, calculating that a retaliatory blow at the United States will be less powerful than in other circumstances.

*“Second.* Geared to the achievement of superiority are the programmes for building up the strategic offensive forces, nuclear and conventional arms, and the growth of the military might of the United States and NATO in general. The main efforts are concentrated on developing the strategic offensive forces. . .

*“Third.* The United States is drawing other countries in various regions of the world into the orbit of its military preparations and is trying to establish new military blocs. The construction of new military bases and the expansion of existing ones around the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community continue. . .

*“Fourth.* Political and economic actions are being closely connected with military measures, and

propaganda and special measures directed against socialist states are being attuned to the new doctrine. Not stopping short at anything, even if it is to the detriment of its allies and itself, the United States is trying to organise a trade, credit, scientific and technological war against the socialist community.”

Underlying the numerous official statements and experts' comments on US nuclear strategy are two main conceptions.

First, there is the conception of an “incapacitating” blow at the strategic forces of the other side, its command centres, and its communication and operations control systems. By destroying all these targets the United States hopes to forestall a retaliatory attack. This led to the implementation of a sweeping programme for building new intercontinental MX missiles and Trident-2 missiles, and to the adoption of a plan for siting Pershing-2 medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

The second conception is that of a limited nuclear war, which provides for the use in Europe or other regions of the world of a large part of the US nuclear weapons arsenal against the armed forces of the other side or individual targets on its territory. The idea is to confront the other side with the choice of political surrender or assuming the responsibility for escalation of a nuclear conflict to global proportions.

Both conceptions are fraught with danger for mankind. This has been pointed out by numerous experts from many countries. At the second international seminar of physicists held in Italy in August 1982, there was a remarkable unanimity of views among scientists from socialist and capitalist countries who spoke of the need to do everything possible to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. The

participants in the seminar rejected the very idea that any country has the right to deliver a "first strike".

The Pentagon's adventuristic doctrine aimed at waging a "protracted" thermonuclear war and emerging victorious in such a war has aroused much indignation in the United States itself. In a letter of protest to President Reagan fifty members of US Congress pointed out that this strategy would only further escalate the arms race and increase the nuclear threat. Many prominent US political figures have criticised the nuclear strategy of the ruling quarters in the United States. For example, the ex-chairman of the Executive Committee of IBM, Thomas J. Watson, said that the United States was in possession of weapons with tremendous destructive power, and that the two sides had so many of these weapons that the policy Washington had been pursuing was sheer madness.

Thomas J. Watson dismissed as propaganda the assertion of the Reagan Administration that the United States had fallen behind the Soviet Union in nuclear armaments. He emphasised that a basic truth about relations between the Soviet Union and the United States was that they would either live together or perish together and that the only reasonable course was a dialogue between the two countries.

The nuclear adventurism of the Reagan Administration was sharply criticised by Senator Edward Kennedy at a convention of steel workers' union. Nuclear war cannot be "limited" and it would bring death to all mankind, he said. However, the Reagan Administration is spending more time on preparing for a nuclear conflict than on trying to avert it. Since the next presidential election is still a long way off, he continued, Americans should

make it clear to President Reagan that if his government is unable to keep its own nuclear weapons under control it has no right to exist and must go. The first step towards peace on Earth, Senator Kennedy went on, would be an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on an immediate, complete and verifiable freeze on their nuclear stockpiles. Opinion polls and numerous reports indicate that most Americans are opposed to the adventuristic strategy of the Pentagon and want a freeze on the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. A resolution in favour of this idea was supported by more than 200 members of the House of Representatives—just two votes short of the necessary number to carry this resolution. The US Administration also encountered great difficulties in getting the US Congress to agree to allocations for the production of MX missiles.

To counter mounting criticism of the adventuristic nuclear strategy of the US government the ruling quarters in the United States tried to prove that the media had allegedly misinterpreted US military policy. The Secretary of Defense personally sent letters to the more influential figures in the media—30 in the United States and 40 abroad, in particular, in NATO countries—in which he insisted that the main objective of the Reagan Administration was to make sure that the nuclear weapons would never be used again, since nobody could win a nuclear war, that the massive buildup of nuclear forces in the United States was intended to prevent the Soviet Union from “pressing the button”.

Newspapers of different political leanings, both in the United States and in Western Europe, described Weinberger's propaganda ploy as a clumsy attempt to justify the Pentagon's aggressive policy.

They pointed out that his explanations did not accord with the guidelines signed by the Secretary of Defense himself for the coming five years which were sent to the US armed forces at the end of May 1982. According to the guidelines, in the event of a nuclear war the United States must have the upper hand and force the enemy to accept terms favourable to the United States, that the United States must have nuclear forces capable of striking both during and after a protracted conflict. It is perfectly clear that if the US Secretary of Defense had really wanted to convince the world of the Pentagon's peaceful intentions, he could have done so by rescinding his "guidelines". A solemn pledge by the Reagan Administration not to use nuclear weapons first would be the best evidence of its peaceful intentions. And this is just what such prominent political figures as George F. Kennan, former US Ambassador to the USSR, and ex-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara are urging the US government to do.

Their call, published in the influential magazine *Foreign Affairs* in April 1982, sparked a wide discussion on the subject. Replying to criticism of their stand, including that from the Supreme Allied Commander of the NATO forces in Europe, Bernard W. Rogers, they wrote: "A continued reliance on threats that it would be disastrous to execute strikes us as morally insupportable and empty of logic."

This puts the matter in a nutshell. And this is only one of the many similar statements made by American political figures, those who are facing up to the realities of the day and the facts of history. And the facts show that those responsible for the exacerbation of international tensions are the most aggressive imperialist quarters in the United States.

But historical experience also shows that the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is both possible and realistic. To get a better picture of the changing international relations in the postwar period and to see who in actual fact is responsible for the growing military danger, it is necessary to take a look at the substance of the military and political strategy of the Soviet Union and the nature of its military doctrine.

Dmitri Ustinov gave the following definition of Soviet military doctrine: "The just aims of our peaceful foreign-policy course in the international arena find their reflection in Soviet military doctrine too. Its purpose is the defence of the socialist gains and the peaceful labour of Soviet people, of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR and of the security of our friends and allies."

Exposing the attempts of Western politicians and strategists to distort the essence of Soviet military doctrine and to attribute to it expansionist features, Dmitri Ustinov pointed out: "The direction of a military doctrine wholly depends on the class character of the state and its policy. Aggressive, expansionist aims are alien to the Soviet socialist state. Its foreign policy is a policy of peace, friendship and co-operation between nations. From it stems the defensive trend of Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet Union has always been and remains an opponent of concepts of what is called a 'first knock-out blow' and of 'limited' as well as any other kind of nuclear war. The efforts of our country are aimed at precluding both a first strike and any other strike, at averting a nuclear war and removing the very threat of it being ever unleashed."

With the rapid development of nuclear missile



weapons and the possibility that the enemy may launch a surprise attack with the use of such weapons, the Armed Forces of the USSR must maintain a high level of combat readiness and thus be able to deliver powerful retaliatory blows upon the enemy. The Soviet Armed Forces have never waged and will never wage predatory wars, will never attack any state. But they are prepared resolutely to rebuff any aggressor and defend what the Soviet people have built and created. That is why the Soviet military doctrine is concerned with ensuring a high level of combat readiness of the country's Armed Forces.

Leonid Brezhnev warned would-be aggressors, saying that "we shall have a quick and effective reply to any challenge of belligerent imperialism".

At the November plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: "We are for seeking a sound basis, acceptable to all sides, for settling the most complex problems and, above all, of course, the problems of curbing the arms race in both nuclear and conventional arms. But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not so naive.

"We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the West. We are for equality, for taking account of the interests of both sides, for honest agreement. We are ready for this."

Military and political leaders in capitalist countries often distort the essence and meaning of the Soviet military doctrine. Their arguments are mostly based on two theses. First, it is alleged that the Soviet military doctrine allows for the possibility of delivering a first strike and of seizing Western Europe in a surprise attack; and second,

it is said that the Soviet Union acts on the assumption that a nuclear war is winnable.

The first insidious allegation is "backed up" by references to works by Soviet military specialists dealing with combat tactics in battles should such battles be forced upon the Soviet army by an aggressor. Such works, of course, examine problems of offensive operations which the Soviet Armed Forces might have to carry out in order to repulse an aggressor. This is quite understandable. But the Western "critics" deliberately treat offensive tactics discussed in these works as an offensive strategy, which is downright unfair.

Such claims are exposed by the following description of the Soviet military art given by Dmitri Ustinov: "The development of military art is an involved and complex process which embraces all its components—strategy, operational art and tactics. The scope and complexity of the strategic objectives grow all the time. Weapons have grown more powerful, as has the role of strategic guidance in training and control of the armed forces. The scope of operational art is being extended. New principles of combat operations stemming from improved military technology are coming to the fore. Tactics also undergo major qualitative changes. New types of armaments ensure high fire effect, uninterrupted offensive operations, surprise and instantaneous strikes, constant and flexible combination of fire and movement, and a highly stable and active defence."

The military doctrine of socialist countries has no place for aggressive aims. In their joint declaration of May 15, 1980, the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation pointed out: "We have not, never had and never will have any strategic doctrine other than a defensive one." This was confirmed

once more in the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member-states (1983).

Also groundless are allegations that the Soviet Union is geared towards winning a nuclear war. The Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that a nuclear war would endanger the very existence of human civilisation. It is of the opinion that a nuclear missile war cannot solve any political problems.

“Our position on this issue is clear,” said Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the Report delivered on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union. “A nuclear war—whether big or small, whether limited or total—must not be allowed to break out. No task is more important today than to stop the instigators of another war. This is required by the vital interests of all nations.”

## DISARMAMENT AND DÉTENTE: WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS AGAINST?

In the present-day world conditions it would clearly be unrealistic to call for the immediate signing of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. To achieve general and complete disarmament long preparatory work is needed. It would be necessary first to carry out concrete measures leading to an end to the arms race, reduction of armaments and then their ultimate destruction.

Back in November 1959, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that the problem of general and complete disarmament was the most important problem of our time. A resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1961 said that talks on disarmament should be conducted in accordance with the principles set forth in the joint Soviet-US statement which was submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1961. This statement stressed the need for an agreement on a programme for general and complete disarmament which would include measures to disband the armed forces, to dismantle military bases, to stop the production of armaments, to destroy all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and all delivery vehicles, etc.

Thanks to the Soviet Union's efforts in the '60s and '70s, a number of important multilateral agreements have been concluded which have a restraining effect on the nuclear arms race. These include the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1972), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972), and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977).

The Soviet Union had put forward similar proposals back in the days of the Cold War. As has already been mentioned, in 1946 it called for a ban on the production and use of atomic weapons and submitted a corresponding draft convention to the United Nations. Also in that year the Soviet delegation at the United Nations put forth a proposal on a universal reduction of armaments. However, the ruling quarters in the United States and some other imperialist countries, pursuing a "position of strength" policy spearheaded against the Soviet Union and other socialist states, stubbornly opposed all constructive moves in this direction. While not coming out openly against disarmament, they obstructed the discussion of the Soviet proposals at the United Nations which they called utopian and

unrealistic. On their part the imperialist states made proposals whose adoption would enable them to conduct a policy of diktat. For example, the imperialist countries proposed that all nuclear energy sources be placed under an international body which would be virtually controlled by the United States. The Soviet proposals to limit and reduce conventional armaments and armed forces were countered by proposals submitted by NATO countries which were clearly directed at weakening the positions of the socialist states. The attempt to torpedo Soviet disarmament proposals was carried to such absurd lengths that representatives of imperialist states at the United Nations sometimes turned down their own proposals just because the Soviet Union accepted some parts of them. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union set forth a number of important peace initiatives calling for a ban on atomic weapons, a reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the countries most powerful from the military point of view which were also permanent members of the UN Security Council, the conclusion of a five-power pact for the strengthening of peace, the convening of a world peace conference to discuss universal reduction of armaments, the setting up of nuclear-free zones, and for a ban on nuclear weapon tests. Other Soviet proposals were concerned with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a cut-back in military budgets, and general and complete disarmament. To create a favourable atmosphere for the implementation of these proposals, the Soviet Union, back in the 1950s and 1960s, carried out three unilateral reductions of its Armed Forces. In 1958, the USSR unilaterally suspended nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere.

The imperialist states responded to all these initiatives by continuing the arms drive and applying

pressure tactics with regard to the socialist states.

It was only in conditions of détente which was brought about in the 1970s thanks to the tireless efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that some progress was made in the field of disarmament. Among the measures aimed at reducing the danger of a nuclear war a special place is held by documents on strategic armaments signed by the Soviet Union and the United States. To preclude the possibility of nuclear conflicts between them the USSR and the US concluded agreements on the prevention of nuclear war. These agreements remain important today because they contain commitments which create the necessary conditions for further limiting and finally ending the nuclear arms race.

The Peace Programme adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress and further elaborated at the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses forms the basis of such important Soviet foreign-policy initiatives as the proposals on the non-use of force in international relations and a permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the signing of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests, a ban on the production of chemical weapons and their eventual destruction, the signing of an international convention prohibiting military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, and a ban on the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Special mention should be made here of the Resolution on Non-Use of Force in International Relations and a Permanent Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons adopted at the 27th Session of the UN General Assembly (1972) on the initiative of the Soviet Union.

In September 1976 at the 31st Session of the UN

General Assembly the USSR put forward a proposal to sign a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations and submitted a draft of such a treaty. A document presenting Soviet foreign-policy initiatives in a more general form was submitted to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in May 1978. In it the Soviet Union called upon all UN member-states to take immediate steps to stop the arms race. The Soviet government pointed out the need to stop further quantitative and qualitative growth of armaments and armed forces. To carry out a comprehensive disarmament programme the Soviet Union proposed that the following measures be implemented without delay:

to end production of nuclear weapons of all types;

to end production of and to ban all other types of mass destruction weapons;

to stop development of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive force;

to forbid an enlargement of the armed forces and the conventional arms stockpiles of the countries which are permanent members of the Security Council, and also of the countries with which they have concluded military agreements.

The Soviet proposals should be acceptable to all states sincerely interested in disarmament. In the first place, these proposals covered all types of weapons and armed forces, and so their implementation would not in any way alter the correlation of forces between states and would take into account the existing structure of their armaments and armed forces. Secondly, the Soviet proposals were so designed that they could be carried out in full and in part.



The Soviet initiatives in the field of disarmament were countered by the decision of the NATO Council at its session in May 1978 to adopt a fifteen-year programme of an arms race, thus clearly signalling that it had no intention to reduce armed forces or armaments. Moreover, the NATO Council at that session allocated vast sums for the modernisation of different systems of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The problem of ending the nuclear arms race, particularly in its practical aspect, is obviously a very complex one. That is precisely why the Soviet Union proposed in 1978, as a first step, the cessation of production of nuclear weapons of all types to be followed by a reduction and then complete destruction of their stockpiles. The Soviet Union has consistently called for starting negotiations on this problem as soon as possible. Regrettably, the United States and other nuclear powers have all but ignored such calls. This negative position of the Western powers is in sharp contrast to the opinion of the great majority of nations which support the Soviet proposals.

While the Soviet Union is for a radical solution of the disarmament problem, which means banning for all time all nuclear weapons, eliminating them from the arsenals of states, and banning the use of force in general, it at the same time believes it necessary to take partial measures to curb the arms race. It may be recalled in this connection that the Soviet Union was the first nuclear power which came out for ending all nuclear weapon tests. That was in 1955. From 1977, the Soviet Union held talks with the United States and Britain with the aim of drafting a treaty on total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In the course of these talks the Soviet Union said that it would recognize the

validity of the treaty even if only three states (the USSR, the USA and Britain) out of the five nuclear powers acceded to it. The period of effectiveness of the treaty in this case would clearly have to be specified, and the treaty would be really effective only after the other nuclear powers had also signed it. This constructive approach facilitated the talks. However, in late 1980 the United States and Britain broke off these tripartite talks, and soon after, in 1982, President Reagan announced that the United States did not want them resumed.

The militaristic policies of the United States and its NATO partners stand in sharp contrast to the realistic programme of peace for the 1980s formulated at the 26th Congress of the CPSU (1981). The clear-cut Soviet proposals set forth at the Congress and also after the Congress met with worldwide support. This is confirmed by the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly (1981) which adopted the Soviet-sponsored declaration "Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe". This important political document called on UN member-countries to pledge that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The declaration said that states and statesmen who first resort to the use of nuclear weapons would thereby commit the gravest crime against humanity. It also condemned as contrary to moral principles and to the lofty ideals of the United Nations any doctrines that permitted first use of nuclear weapons and any actions that might push the world closer to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.

Regrettably, the United States and its military and political partners did all they could to torpedo what is probably the most important political decision that the United Nations has taken in the past several years. In an interview given to a

*Pravda* correspondent on October 21, 1981, Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that it would be a good thing if the US President too made a clear and unequivocal statement rejecting the very idea of the use of nuclear weapons. The US Administration has in effect declined to respond to this call. All it did was to issue a statement saying that in a nuclear war everybody would suffer. In fact, this amounts to saying that a nuclear war is possible and is a far cry from an outright condemnation of nuclear war as an instrument of policy.

In an effort to avert the threat of a nuclear war the Soviet Union put forward an important initiative at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982. In a message to the General Assembly Leonid Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union hereby undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and this commitment was to become effective immediately after it was announced in the UN General Assembly. The message reads:

“In taking this decision, the Soviet Union proceeds from the indisputable fact, which plays a determining role in the present-day international situation, that should a nuclear war break out, it could mean the destruction of human civilisation and perhaps the end of life itself on Earth.

“Consequently, it is the supreme duty of leaders of states aware of the responsibility for the destinies of the world to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used.

“The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the decision of the Soviet Union will be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear states. If the other nuclear powers assume an equally precise and clear-cut obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be

tantamount in practice to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether, which is favoured by the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world."

In their speeches at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament most of the delegates pointed out that by taking this bold and practical step—the decision not to be the first to use nuclear weapons—the Soviet Union provided a new angle from which to consider the whole complex of problems connected with disarmament.

At that session the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly its Memorandum "Averting the Growing Nuclear Threat and Curbing the Arms Race", in which it outlined a programme of practical measures. The Soviet Union proposed that a programme for phased nuclear reductions be worked out. Of special importance is the Soviet Union's acceptance of control by the International Atomic Energy Agency over some of the Soviet civilian nuclear installations. This proposal was welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned states and a number of Western countries.

The Soviet Union also submitted to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament a proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, which drew a broad political response. Participants in the session pointed out in their speeches that the draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union, which took into consideration the wishes of other states, including their proposals on monitoring the observance of the convention, made it possible to take a decisive step towards reaching an international agreement on disarmament.

In its summing-up document the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament voiced

ed deep anxiety over the looming threat of nuclear war the prevention of which continued to be the most urgent task of the day. The UN General Assembly called upon all countries to study as soon as possible the proposals aimed at averting nuclear war.

Contrary to this constructive stand the United States and some of its NATO allies did all they could to prevent the UN General Assembly from taking concrete measures to curb the continuing arms drive. Meanwhile, the United States and its NATO partners failed to make any practical proposal on disarmament. President Reagan's proposal on convening an international conference to discuss methods of comparative analysis of military budgets, put forward at the General Assembly, had in fact no bearing on disarmament as such. President Reagan also had nothing to say on the question of not using nuclear weapons first. Thus, he merely confirmed that the military doctrine of the ruling quarters in the United States is essentially aggressive since it does not rule out the possibility of using nuclear weapons first and is in fact based on such a possibility.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher supported the American position on nuclear war with particular fervour and made many pronouncements to this effect. Most countries, however, did not accept this position because it failed to recognize the arms race as one of the causes of the mounting tensions in the world which might lead to a full-scale war.

The isolation of the Reagan Administration and some of its NATO political allies in the international arena was particularly evident at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly. That session once again showed that in the opinion of the great

majority of nations the Soviet proposal formed a good basis for joint actions by states to avert a nuclear catastrophe.

The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved a resolution "Immediate Cessation and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests". The Soviet Union submitted the draft of an appropriate treaty and proposed that a broad comprehensive approach be made to this problem.

On the initiative of the Soviet delegation the UN General Assembly called on all nations possessing nuclear weapons to desist, from an agreed date and pending the conclusion of a treaty, from all nuclear tests in order to create favourable conditions for formulating the terms of this document. The only countries which opposed this proposal were the United States, Britain, France and the People's Republic of China.

The adoption of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would be a very important step towards lessening the danger of nuclear war.

The prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the United States could preserve the life and health of many Americans. Shortly before the question of ending and banning nuclear weapon tests was put to the vote the American association of war veterans against atomic tests published some alarming statistics. From 1945 to 1963 the Pentagon deliberately irradiated about half a million US servicemen. The "experiments" aimed at studying the effects of nuclear weapons on unsuspecting people led to tragic results: many died and others are still suffering from incurable cancer and severe nervous disorders.

As was noted at the session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union had submitted a very

timely proposal to redouble efforts aimed at eliminating the danger of nuclear war and at ensuring the safe development of the nuclear power industry. As is known, even the short-term effects resulting from the destruction of one large atomic power station are comparable to radioactive contamination from a one-megaton nuclear bomb. The resolution adopted at the session denounced the Israeli air force attack on an Iraqi installation for peaceful nuclear research.

The USSR and the other socialist countries were co-sponsors of a resolution, "The Nuclear Weapon in All Its Aspects", which was adopted by the UN General Assembly. It pointed out that the US doctrine of a "limited" use of nuclear weapons and the American concept of "protracted" nuclear war have enhanced the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted two resolutions calling for the freezing of nuclear arsenals without delay. These resolutions warned about the disastrous consequences of the nuclear arms race and called upon all the nuclear powers simultaneously to halt the production of nuclear systems and the creation of new nuclear warheads. The non-aligned countries, as well as the socialist nations, sharply criticised the position of the United States and some of its NATO partners who voted against the resolutions, excusing their stand by pleading the Soviet nuclear threat and the need to "rearm" first and negotiate afterwards. The UN General Assembly pointed out that the Soviet Union and the United States maintained rough parity in the military field.

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which reaffirmed the need to conclude a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Among those who opposed this resolution

were the United States, the twelve NATO member-countries, Israel and Japan.

The UN General Assembly also approved a resolution tabled by the socialist and non-aligned countries on the need to speed up the talks on an international accord directed at preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space. Only the US delegation voted against its adoption.

The UN General Assembly, also by an overwhelming majority of votes, approved a resolution welcoming the course of implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted back in 1970 on the initiative of the Soviet Union. This resolution calls upon all nations to work towards the realization of the provisions contained in the Declaration. The Assembly declared itself in favour of drawing up a code listing crimes against peace and the security of mankind, also international conventions banning the enlistment, utilisation, financing and training of mercenaries. The UN General Assembly, in the face of the opposition of the US delegation, overwhelmingly adopted resolutions which denounced Israel's aggression against Arab countries and branded as an act of genocide the monstrous massacre in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila.

Assertions to the effect that Soviet foreign-policy initiatives are nothing but a propaganda exercise and that the Soviet Union's rejection of a first-strike option is impossible to verify sound less and less convincing as time goes by.

The Soviet government's decision to undertake the commitment not to be the first to deliver a nuclear strike points to the consistent nature of Soviet foreign policy. From the point of view of the strategy and tactics of the Soviet Armed Forces, the decision not to use nuclear weapons first has global



implications. Whereas in the past the Soviet Union expressed its readiness not to use nuclear weapons against countries which had renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons and had none on their territory, now the Soviet Union's pledge not to use nuclear weapons first extends to all countries. Pointing out this important distinction Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov said: "This means that in building our Armed Forces we shall devote still greater attention to the task of preventing a military conflict from turning into a nuclear conflict. This task, with all its different aspects, has become part of our military effort. Any specialist on military questions would understand that this task imposes still greater responsibility and more exacting requirements in the matter of military training of troops and command personnel, determining the types of weapons and establishing still tighter control so as to rule out the possibility of any unauthorised launching of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic."

The ruling quarters in the United States and NATO leaders are trying to justify their actions with talk about a "balance of terror" very much along the lines of the propaganda scheme set forth by the "founding fathers" of the Cold War, Churchill and Truman.

To justify the arms race and the arms buildup ruling quarters in the United States and its NATO allies have invented a mythical Soviet threat. They spare no effort in their attempt to convince the world that the Soviet Union allegedly enjoys superiority in conventional armaments.

This can be answered this way. In the first place the allegation is untrue, and there are many facts which refute it. The NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries maintain parity in conventional arma-

ments. Secondly, the Soviet Union is working for the limitation of such armaments and proposes that a mutually acceptable solution to these problems be found. As Yuri Andropov said in a speech on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the Soviet Union is prepared to agree "that the sides should renounce first use of conventional, as well as nuclear arms".

## THE KEY TO WORLD PEACE

For many years the Soviet Union had worked for the conclusion of an agreement with the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments. The first such agreement was reached in 1972 with the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I). These two agreements recognized the parity of strategic forces of the USSR and the USA. The signing of such important documents was possible because they were based on the principle of equality and equal security. Significantly, the two sides were not deterred by the fact that the structures of their nuclear armaments were different, which made it impossible to establish equality for each individual type of weapons. But that was not really necessary. For the principle of equality and equal security does not mean that there should be established equal levels for all types of weapons. What it means is that measures should be carried out to bring about limitation of strategic weapons with account taken of the interests of both sides.

Immediately after the signing of SALT I Treaty the Soviet Union said it was ready to start negotia-

tions on drafting a new, still more comprehensive agreement on the limitation of strategic armaments. The talks went on for nearly seven years without any progress being made because the representatives of the US military-industrial complex at the talks tried in every way to obtain unilateral advantages for the United States thus departing from the principle of equality and equal security. It was solely owing to the constructive approach of the Soviet Union at the talks that SALT II was signed, finally, in June 1979.

The SALT II Treaty was by far the most detailed and comprehensive of all arms limitation treaties, for it covered not merely peripheral military systems but whole arms complexes that made up the backbone of the military might of both countries. The treaty provided for a reduction in the number of ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles. The initial level of these weapons was set at 2,400 from the time the treaty came into force, with their number on either side to be reduced to 2,250 in the course of one year. The treaty imposed limitations on the number of strategic ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, limiting them to 1,320 on either side. It also provided for about 20 curbs on existing nuclear missile weapon systems, including the limitation of their yield and the possibilities of their modernisation and modification. The treaty also prohibited any attempts to modify light intercontinental ballistic missiles as heavy missiles and to develop ICBM rapid-action launchers.

After the signing of SALT II in Vienna in June 1979, the Soviet Union and the United States declared that they did not seek nor would they seek, military superiority, because this could destabilise

the situation and jeopardise their security. The Soviet Union adheres to this principle to this day. In a statement published on June 22, 1979, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR appreciated SALT II, pointing out that "the Soviet Union is prepared to honour all its commitments in the belief that the other side will do the same. This will make it possible to start in the near future the next round of talks on the limitation of strategic armaments."

However, SALT II has never been ratified and put into effect. In fact President Carter refused to uphold a treaty which he himself had signed. For eighteen months the White House sabotaged the process of limitation of strategic armaments. It was only in June 1982, when, after much pressure from the Soviet Union, talks were started on limitation and reduction of strategic armaments.

As Dmitri Ustinov pointed out shortly after the beginning of the talks, the Soviet delegation had been instructed to conduct negotiations with a view to reducing and limiting strategic armaments. But in order to reach such an agreement, he said, it is necessary that:

— both sides conduct talks with due consideration of each other's legitimate interests, in keeping with the principle of equality and equal security;

— that all the positive elements earlier achieved in the sphere of SALT be preserved;

— that the talks really pursue the aim of limiting and reducing strategic arms, and not serve to cover up an arms buildup or the upsetting of the existing parity;

— that all channels of the strategic arms race in every form be reliably blocked.

This approach, which takes different patterns of Soviet and American armaments into consideration, calls for an all-round review of all the components of the strategic potential. The Soviet negotiators made the following cardinal proposals:

Quantitative reductions must be effected in co-ordination with the qualitative limitation of strategic armaments. Such measures aim to rule out any possibility of one side obtaining unilateral advantages through modernisation of military technology.

The creation of new types of strategic weapons must be either banned or drastically limited in accordance with the parameters agreed on by the partners in the talks, notably by a mutual commitment not to deploy long-range sea- and air-based Cruise missiles.

Strategic weapons must be quantitatively frozen and their modernisation must be sharply restricted as soon as the talks begin.

During the talks neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, must undertake actions that could destabilise the strategic situation.

The proposed agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is expected to retain everything of positive value which was achieved in the course of the previous negotiations.

The structure of the strategic armaments of the Soviet Union differs from that of the United States. Soviet land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are armed with about 70 per cent of existing warheads, while the American land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles carry about 20 per cent of US warheads. On the other hand, more than 80 per cent of the American warheads are either submarine-launched or carried by heavy bombers, which is several times more than the number carried by

the corresponding vehicles of the Soviet strategic forces.

In spite of all these structural differences, the strategic potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States are balanced. The leaders of the previous Washington Administration in 1979-1980 (James Carter, Harold Brown, Cyrus Vance) acknowledged this obvious fact. But President Reagan and US Defense Secretary Weinberger have since 1981 been contending that there is no such thing as rough parity in the strategic armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States. Examining the reasons for these ill-founded contentions Dmitri Ustinov said: "The point is that Washington has now set itself the aim of disrupting this parity and achieving military superiority. Even an approximate deadline for achieving this, the year 1990, is mentioned. This is the rub of the matter."

Moreover, the US Administration has grossly violated its earlier commitments not to create any additional ICBM launchers, as set down in the SALT I Interim Agreement and in SALT II. The Americans have even drafted a decision on producing 100 MX missiles armed with a thousand independently targetable nuclear warheads. The yield of each such warhead is 600 kilotons, i.e. thirty times as great as that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The placement of these missiles in new silos would be tantamount to creating new missile launchers. The utilisation of Minutemen silos for the MX missiles would require an expansion of such silos. In both cases this would violate the terms of the SALT II Treaty.

The deployment of land-based MX missiles, submarine-launched Trident missiles, and long-range Cruise missiles of all basing modes, and the utilisation of outer space for military purposes all go

to constitute the aggressive US policy programme for the 1980s. By the year 1990 the United States is planning to have about 20,000 nuclear warheads in its strategic nuclear forces alone. Commenting on this fact Dmitri Ustinov said: "All this taken together can hardly be assessed as anything but a programme of preparations for a general nuclear war."

It is against the background of this programme of an unbridled arms drive that President Reagan's proposal of May 9, 1982, should be viewed, as it deals with a drastic reduction of strategic armaments in a very one-sided way. The US Administration proposes that the two sides reduce only their intercontinental ballistic (land-based and sea-based) missiles. Should this proposal be accepted, it would then affect mainly the Soviet ICBMs and much less the strategic armaments of the US. In practical terms acceptance of the US proposal would reduce the number of warheads carried by Soviet ICBMs by some 50-60 per cent as well as the actual number of Soviet missiles of this type. At the same time the Pentagon would be able to increase the number of warheads on its land-based ICBMs, and to deploy the latest of its missiles, substituting them for the more obsolescent strategic weapon systems scheduled for scrapping. In addition to this the large arsenal of nuclear warheads carried by US heavy bombers would not be reduced at all.

The Soviet proposals rest on the need to preserve the existing parity in weapons. The USSR is prepared to reduce its strategic weapons by more than 25 per cent, with the United States naturally making similar cuts in its own armaments. Moreover, both countries must have an equal number of strategic weapon delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union also proposes that the two sides considerably



reduce the number of nuclear warheads and limit modernisation of nuclear weapons as much as possible.

All these clear-cut proposals, aimed at creating a realistic basis for reducing strategic nuclear arms, were formulated by Yuri Andropov in a speech delivered on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. "Our proposals refer to all types of strategic weapons without exception, and envisage reduction of their stockpiles by many hundreds of units," he said. "They close all possible channels for any further arms race in this field. And that is only a start: the pertinent agreement would be the point of departure for a still larger mutual reduction of such weapons, which the sides could agree upon, with due account of the general strategic situation in the world."

The Soviet Union took a constructive approach at the Soviet-American talks, which began back in December, 1981, on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe. Since then the Soviet Union has maintained this position, which envisages the reaching of agreement on the basis of the equality and equal security of both sides.

The Soviet Union takes into account the actual state of affairs with regard to the medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe. Each side has about an equal number of missiles and nuclear-capable bombers with an operational range of 1,000 or more kilometres. As for the number of nuclear warheads these delivery vehicles can carry, the NATO countries have almost 50 per cent more than the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union proposed that both sides renounced all types of medium-range weapons targeted on Europe. It also expressed its readiness to hold talks on the withdrawal from Europe of all

nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical weapons.

The stand taken by the United States and its NATO partners, and their response to the Soviet proposals and in fact to the course of the negotiations in Geneva showed that they were not prepared to take this radical step. But as time went by the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe became more and more acute. In that situation the Soviet Union submitted a compromise proposal aimed at halting the growing nuclear confrontation and opening the way for nuclear disarmament in Europe. It called for a reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons down to one-third their present size by both sides.

This agreement would cover all medium-range weapons targeted on Europe. Should the Soviet proposal be accepted, Europe would be cleared of a large number of Soviet and US medium-range nuclear weapons.

In assessing and comparing the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, one should always bear in mind that in the matter of balance of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is represented by the United States, Britain and France, whereas the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is represented only by the Soviet Union, since no other member-country of this organisation has nuclear weapons. The governments of Britain and France have repeatedly declared that their nuclear weapons are part of the general nuclear military potential of NATO. Therefore, whether or not the British and French governments wish to sign an appropriate agreement, their medium-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (about 270 missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft) should be covered by any agree-

ment on nuclear armaments in Europe, just like the US medium-range weapons deployed in Europe or intended for Europe.

This stand taken by the Soviet government has the unanimous support of the Soviet people and the people of the countries of the socialist community. It has been welcomed by broad sections of the population in the West as an alternative to the aggressive military plans of the United States and NATO. However, some political leaders in the United States and in a number of European NATO countries are trying to discredit this peaceful alternative. What arguments do they use for that? We shall cite just one example: the Soviet missile known in the West as SS-20 has, according to them, upset the nuclear strategic parity in Europe and as a result NATO is faced with the necessity to deploy additional 600 or so new missiles in Western Europe.

This argument is completely groundless. In the first place, the SS-20 missile is not considered a strategic weapon by the Soviet Union since it cannot reach the territory of the United States. It has merely replaced the obsolescent SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This modernisation of medium-range nuclear weapons does not increase the Soviet military potential as a whole.

Each SS-20 missile is armed with three independently targetable warheads as compared to one on the old type of missile. Still, the summary yield of three warheads of an SS-20 missile is less than that of the old missile warhead. This fact was admitted in the reports of the US Secretary of Defense to US Congress. The modernisation of Soviet nuclear weapon systems has not created a qualitatively new strategic situation in Europe. The action radius of the new missile is the same as of the old one. The deployment of each SS-20 missile is accompanied

by the dismantling of one or two old missiles which are not deployed in any other region.

Secondly, it is wrong to assume that the SS-20 missiles have given the Soviet Union superiority in medium-range weapons in Europe.

The Soviet medium-range nuclear weapon systems consist of land-based SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and medium-range nuclear-capable bombers. Altogether the Soviet Union has about 1,000 delivery vehicles. NATO's medium-range nuclear weapon systems consist of American medium-range bombers and fighter-bombers (more than 700), and the nuclear weapons of Britain and France (land-based S-2 and S-3 missiles, submarine-launched Polaris ballistic missiles and M-20 missiles and nuclear-capable bombers—a total of 300). All these weapon systems with an action radius of 1,000 to 4,500 kilometres can reach the territory of the USSR.

Now a few words about the question of a moratorium, or "freeze" (as it is called in the West), on nuclear armaments. This question is becoming increasingly complex because of the Pentagon's ambitious plans.

In an effort to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and to ensure conditions for reaching agreement with the other side, the Soviet Union has advanced a concrete proposal: first, to refrain from deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear weapons, and second, to "freeze" all weapons already deployed.

The Soviet Union has furthermore expressed its readiness to reduce unilaterally a certain number of medium-range nuclear weapons stationed in the European part of the country in the event the other side agrees to such a moratorium. In a speech at the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions on

March 16, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev said that the Soviet government had decided unilaterally to "freeze" the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union.

Dmitri Ustinov convincingly proved that the assertions, contained in the US President's speech of November 22, 1982, that the Soviet Union had a superiority in strategic armaments and in medium-range nuclear weapons were completely groundless. He gave an authoritative reply to the President Reagan's statement that the Soviet Union was allegedly violating the unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. Said Dmitri Ustinov: "I declare quite categorically: the USSR is true to its word. It is not deploying the above-mentioned missiles in the European part of the USSR and is unilaterally even reducing them considerably. That is the truth. And Washington will not succeed in casting doubt on our policy."

It goes without saying that all these Soviet initiatives will yield results only if the Reagan Administration responds in a constructive way and in a spirit of good will. Unfortunately, good will and constructive steps are not the hallmarks of the position of the present US Administration. All the new Soviet proposals have been rejected outright under various pretexts. For example, it is alleged that since Soviet missiles can be moved to any place, even those sited East of the Ural Mountains, they can still be targeted on many areas of Western Europe.

All such arguments are merely an attempt to beguile public opinion, for no mention is made of the fact that the Soviet proposals provide for the limitation and then reduction of the number of specific missiles targeted on specific objects. Any

military expert will tell you that the SS-20 missiles cannot be moved instantaneously over long distances, from one continent to another. Bearing in mind the actual state of things, the Soviet government has proposed that the two sides come to an agreement on withdrawing medium-range nuclear weapon systems to the agreed position.

The Soviet proposals clearly state that the Soviet Union is ready to conduct negotiations on the limitation and reduction—on a reciprocal basis—of medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in the eastern part of its territory with any country possessing nuclear weapons vis-a-vis Soviet missiles.

Still valid is the Soviet proposal that an agreement be signed on the renunciation of all types of nuclear weapons aimed at various targets in Europe, both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. Regrettably, the US Administration has not given any answer to this proposal.

The Soviet Union also proposes another variant of an agreement: for the USSR and NATO countries to reduce their nuclear armaments to one-third of their present level. It is well known that the US Administration countered this Soviet proposal with their "zero" option, which envisages the liquidation of all Soviet medium-range missiles not only in the European, but also in the Asian part of the USSR, while the nuclear weapons of the NATO countries deployed in Europe will even grow in number. One may well ask: how could the US Administration seriously expect the Soviet government to agree to unilateral disarmament? Now, citing the failure of talks which it itself wanted to wreck, the US Administration is planning to carry through NATO's decision on the deployment of 600 American missiles in Western Europe. "The future will show if this is so," Yuri Andropov said in his

speech on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union. "We, for our part, will continue to work for an agreement on a basis that is fair to both sides. We are prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France—and not a single one more. This means that the Soviet Union would reduce hundreds of missiles, including tens of the latest missiles known in the West as SS-20. In the case of the USSR and the United States this would be a really honest 'zero' option as regards medium-range missiles. And if, later, the number of British and French missiles were scaled down, the number of Soviet ones would be additionally reduced by as many.

"Along with this there must also be an accord on reducing to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear-capable aircraft stationed in this region by the USSR and the NATO countries."

There should also be a single approach in determining the actual balance of conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Admittedly, it is more difficult to do for two reasons. Each side has a large number of different systems of armaments, with the Warsaw Treaty countries having an advantage in some of them and the NATO countries in others. But, in spite of the different structures and different organisations, and in spite of a certain difference in the number of divisions and weapons, the levels of conventional armaments of the two blocs are roughly the same. According to official data for January 1, 1980, the land forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries consisted of 792,500 and 796,700 men respectively, and the air forces—of 198,500 and 182,300 men.

The correlation of conventional armed forces should also be assessed on the basis of a comparison of combat-ready divisions which could be committed at the very start of hostilities without additional mobilisation measures. In Europe the Warsaw Treaty countries have 78 such divisions and NATO, 94 divisions. Here NATO has a clear advantage. It should also be noted that a full-strength NATO division has about 20,000 men as against 11,000 in a division of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

The correlation in the tactical air forces of NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries is as follows: the Warsaw Treaty countries have more combat aircraft, but NATO has superiority in the combat capability of air force support and in the number of helicopters.

NATO countries can match Warsaw Treaty countries in the total number of tanks (25,000). NATO countries (including Spain) have more than 17,000 tanks in active service and 8,000 stored in depots (1,500 in the United States and 6,500 in Western Europe).

Such is the actual correlation of the conventional armed forces of NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries in Europe.

Now, what about the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, talks which have been going on for nine years?

At these talks the socialist countries take a constructive stand. They support the Polish draft agreement, submitted for consideration on February 18, 1982, on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and on additional measures to be taken at the first stage of disarmament. This document is important in



that it sums up the results of many years' discussion and of the compromise reached. It includes the proposals to which much importance is attached by representatives of the West European countries, the United States and Canada, which are direct participants in the talks and whose armed forces and armaments are subject to limitation and subsequent reduction. These proposals envisage first of all a phased reduction process in which first only the land forces will be reduced, and initially only those of the USSR and the US, with a freeze being imposed on the number of troops of the participating countries in Central Europe for the duration of the first agreement.

The socialist countries proposed (and this was stated in the draft) that the ultimate objective of the talks, namely, a two-stage reduction of the total strength of the army personnel of each side to an equal level, be specified and put on record. The draft agreement also calls for the establishment of the maximal number of air force personnel.

Under the draft agreement at the first stage of the proposed reduction the Soviet Union and the United States are to cut back their troops (and corresponding armaments) by 20,000 and 13,000 respectively and to withdraw them to their territories within one year. At the same time, all the direct participants in the talks are to freeze their armed forces in Central Europe for a three-year period during which the first agreement will be in force and take upon themselves an obligation to reduce them at a later (second) stage.

In addition, the draft agreement contains a number of practical measures to promote trust and understanding between the participants in the talks: the Soviet Union and the United States are to

inform each other about the beginning and end of the process of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe at the first stage; temporary control posts are to be set up to monitor the process of reduction and withdrawal of troops and armaments; there will be an exchange, on the basis of reciprocity, of information about the size of the armed forces of the participating countries in Central Europe including those indicators regarding which exchange had already taken place. The draft agreement also provides for a mutual exchange of information about all troop movements involving more than 20,000 men within the confines of the areas where such reductions will be effected, and about large-scale military exercises.

To monitor the observance of this agreement the draft proposed by the socialist countries provides for the use of national technical means of verification and for consultations between the participants in the event doubt should arise with regard to fulfillment of the commitments assumed.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are ready to reduce their armed forces even by half provided the existing correlation of forces is maintained, so that such reduction will not favour one side to the detriment of the other.

What was the response of the United States and some other NATO countries?

There was no reaction from the US delegation. Instead, it once again raised the so-called question of numbers, that is, of the strength of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation land forces in the zone of proposed troops reduction. The NATO representatives disputed the figures provided by their Warsaw Treaty Organisation counterparts. However, they were unable to back their clearly exaggerated estimates with any convincing facts or arguments. This

is not really surprising considering the fact that among the NATO experts themselves there is no agreement with regard to the number of troops in their own countries.

Significantly, these experts consider quite acceptable a margin of error of up to 10 per cent in assessing the strength of armed forces: a rather obvious device for minimising the number of the NATO troops.

In the course of the long drawn-out talks in Vienna, the two sides exchanged statistical information and agreed that the number of troops on either side was roughly the same.

Admittedly, the size of reduction of the land forces of the Soviet Union and the United States cannot be determined by the number of their troops in Central Europe. The proposed agreement on a freeze of the armed forces of the participating countries in a specified area of Europe does not require any precise data on the number of troops, and the signing of the first such agreement to reduce the number of troops of both sides to 900,000 men each would undoubtedly help ease the tense international situation.

At the 27th round of the Vienna talks which ended in mid-July 1982, the NATO countries, after a long period of silence, submitted their own draft treaty on a mutual reduction of armed forces in Central Europe. They made no reference to the draft treaty submitted by the socialist countries and put forward no new proposals themselves. They even took a step back by abandoning their previous idea of a phased reduction of armed forces over a period of four to five years and proposing that the process of troops reduction be extended over a seven-year period and carried out in four stages.

The NATO countries adhered to their old position with regard to the size of troop reductions, deliberately ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union had withdrawn 20,000 servicemen from the German Democratic Republic in 1979-1980, and insisting that a further 30,000 Soviet troops be withdrawn. At the same time they offered to reduce US troops by a mere 13,000, in spite of the fact that over the past five years the number of US servicemen in the Federal Republic of Germany has increased by 35,000.

The NATO representatives at the talks also blocked agreement on the so-called accompanying measures. For example, they continued to insist on a package of measures that is unacceptable to the Warsaw Treaty countries since it went far beyond the zone of arms reductions (covering, for example, a considerable region of the European part of the Soviet Union).

NATO's stand on the question of reduction of armaments is particularly unhelpful. In spite of the previous preliminary agreement on preparatory consultations, the NATO countries excluded the subject of arms reduction from their draft altogether. This stand can only be interpreted as a desire to step up the arms race and as a rejection of the idea of arms reductions. For clearly a reduction in the strength of army personnel alone will not lead to military détente.

In determining their position the Soviet Union and other socialist countries proceed from the assumption that it is possible to reach positive results at the Vienna talks. Given a desire on the part of all the participants in the talks to reach an agreement a treaty could be signed which would not impair the security of any one state and would provide for an opportunity to reduce armed forces

and armaments in Central Europe. The draft treaty tabled by the socialist countries could serve as a basis for a mutually acceptable agreement the aim of which would be to consolidate military and political stability and security in Europe.

All the foreign-policy initiatives and specific proposals of the Soviet Union aimed at the limitation of the arms race are in the final count leading to the consolidation of peace in the world.

## CONCLUSION

From what has been said above it is entirely clear who has been challenging whom, who has started and is continuing the arms race which is proceeding at an ever more rapid rate. In the mid-1940s the United States developed an atomic bomb which it used against the civilian population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when there was no need for it from a military point of view. The proposals later put forward by the Soviet government on the prohibition of the use of nuclear energy for military purposes were rejected by the US government. In view of the growing threat to the national security of the USSR the Soviet government decided to take countervailing measures and developed an atomic bomb in the late 1940s.

In the mid-1950s on the excuse of having "fallen behind in bombers" the Pentagon started a propaganda campaign and in this way set in motion a crash programme for the building of strategic bombers. It was only after a whole armada of these planes had been built that Washington officials admitted that the Pentagon had deliberately exaggerated the number of Soviet bombers three to four times over. To strengthen its defences the Soviet

Union had to create its own strategic bomber force. But it did that only in the late 1950s.

In the mid-1950s the Pentagon launched a programme for the building of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. At that time no one in the world had them. And again the Soviet Union was compelled to start building nuclear-powered subs of its own, but that was in the late 1950s.

In the early 1960s, the United States started to build nuclear-powered air-capable ships. The Soviet Union did not have them at that time; nor does it have them now.

In the mid-1960s Pentagon proceeded to equip the submarine missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles. In the Soviet Union the production of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles began only in the mid-1970s.

It should also be noted that already in the late 1970s the United States began manufacturing neutron weapons. The Soviet Union has no such weapons.

Thus, the Soviet Union, in the entire period since the end of the Second World War, has never been first to develop and make new types of weapons.

The USSR has never sought to achieve military superiority over others, and its military measures never go beyond what is necessary for ensuring its own security and the security of its allies. This has repeatedly been emphasised by Soviet leaders.

The foreign policies of the Soviet Union and of the United States are also poles apart. In the early 1980s the United States broke off the talks initiated by the Soviet Union on such issues as the banning of chemical weapons, prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean, the limitation of the sales and deliv-

ery of conventional armaments, and on anti-satellite systems.

All this goes to show that the defensive character of the Soviet military doctrine and of the strategy and tactics of the Soviet Armed Forces based on this doctrine and aimed only at repulsing aggression and threats from the imperialist powers, finds its full expression in the military and technical policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not initiate the development of weapons of mass destruction that threaten the existence of life on Earth. Before it was forced to work on the development of such a weapon, the Soviet Union tried again and again to achieve complete and universal prohibition of the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. However, no solution to this problem had been found owing to the fault of the ruling quarters in the United States which has thus assumed a grave responsibility for the launching of the production of different types of nuclear weapons.

The history of the postwar period provides a clear-cut answer to the question of who is actually responsible for the arms race.

Today the question whether the Soviet Union has a superiority in nuclear missiles and in conventional armaments over the United States, as the Pentagon insists, is of vast importance, for it is allegations such as this that have given rise to the myth about the "Soviet military threat". In actual fact, a balance has been achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union both in nuclear and conventional armaments. This is the opinion of many unbiased experts. For example, a brochure published by the American Information Centre for Nuclear Problems points out that a rough parity exists between the United States and the Soviet Union.



Significantly, this conclusion is shared by broad sections of world public opinion. The adventurist policy pursued by the military-industrial complex for a nuclear buildup and confrontation with the Soviet Union has come under mounting criticism in the United States itself. According to US opinion polls, anti-war and peace sentiments in that country are stronger than ever before. Seventy-three per cent of Americans support the call for the renunciation by all nuclear powers of the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and 86 per cent of Americans think that the United States and the Soviet Union should sign an agreement on the reduction of nuclear armaments.

Why does the arms race go on? There is only one answer to this question: because the ruling quarters in the United States are bent on further heightening tensions in the world, thus pushing the world closer to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.

## DATE DUE / DATE DE RETOUR


CARR MCLEAN

38-297

на английском языке

Цена 25 коп.

TRENT UNIVERSITY



0 1164 0282528 9

