

VITAL PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME¹⁰

Yuri Yuriev

THE EVOLUTION
OF NATO



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About the Author

YURI YURIEV, BORN 1930, M.SC. (HISTORY)
SENIOR RESEARCH WORKER
AT THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
AUTHOR OF ARTICLES,
PAMPHLETS AND BOOKS ON
WESTERN EUROPE
AND EAST—WEST RELATIONS.

YURI YURIEV

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OF NATO**

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Historical events, just like huge buildings, should be viewed from a distance. This makes it possible to get a better perspective, understand the true proportions, and, ignoring insignificant details, concentrate on the most essential elements.

Now that more than 15 years have passed since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, the arguments used by ruling circles of the United States, Britain and France to justify the formation of NATO have become ineffective and lost all cogency.

The North Atlantic Treaty gave legal and political weight to the break-up of the anti-Hitler coalition. The appearance of NATO signified that the West had taken a stand in the "cold war" trenches having proclaimed the Soviet Union its main enemy.

During the 16 years of NATO's existence, the correlation of military and socio-political forces on our planet has undergone great changes. And within the Atlantic alliance itself there have been sharp differences in appraising its activities, the problems facing it and its future.

What, then, is the role of NATO in the policies of the Western states? What is in store for this alliance? These are the questions we are dealing with in this pamphlet.

FEARING SHADOWS OR PURSUING THEM?

No sooner had the US State Department begun to draft the North Atlantic Treaty than it was evident against whom it was spearheaded. The treaty was engineered in the stifling atmosphere of artificially provoked alarm over the alleged "threat of invasion" from the East

looming over Western Europe. It was no easy task to create such an atmosphere after the last war, in which the Soviet people had displayed untold staunchness and heroism and suffered the greatest losses in the fight against nazi barbarism, winning the respect and admiration of peoples the world over. It required the prolonged efforts of a costly propaganda machine on both sides of the Atlantic.

For days and hours on end the fear that Russians would use force to impose Soviet system on all countries was implanted in the minds of the common people in the West. This fictitious threat of a Soviet military attack has always been the corner-stone of NATO propaganda. All speeches, articles and books by NATO official propagandists are based on this premise.

In determining the main direction of the campaign to prepare the ground for setting up NATO and cementing the alliance for many years, US foreign policy-makers had to reckon with the psychology of the people to be taken in by this campaign. The soil of the European continent had been soaked in blood: Europeans had gone through the misery of two world wars in the 20th century.

These tragic events have left an indelible imprint on the hearts and minds of the Europeans. An acute sense of insecurity, scepticism and disbelief—this was the psychological profile of many people in Western Europe during the first post-war years when the war wounds were still raw. This made it much easier for US diplomacy to engineer the North Atlantic alliance.

In both world wars the United States occupied the advantageous position of third party during the most trying, bloody battles. And only at a concluding stage of the war did it become directly involved in military

operations and send its troops overseas, thereby getting in on the post-war settlement. Therefore, the urge for a closer union of the Old and New Worlds became a sort of *idée fixe* for many European policy-makers who were ready to make serious concessions to the United States to bring it to pass.

After the war Germany, Italy and Japan were dropped from the list of the Great Powers, while Britain and France emerged seriously weakened. This has radically changed the thinking of US policy-shapers to a global scale. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 marked Washington's complete abandonment of isolationism. From then on the sphere of US interests embraced every region of the world. The Vandenberg resolution passed by US Senate on June 11th, 1948, sanctioned, for the first time in US history, United States' direct participation in regional alliances outside the American continent. This was tantamount to assuming far-reaching responsibility, including military commitments, in times of peace.

WHY THE MYTH OF POSSIBLE INVASION FROM THE EAST!

The United States had to find some pretext for the American and world public to justify the presence of its political and economic advisers and military contingents on the territories of other countries. All the more so since the memory of foreign occupation was still fresh in the minds of European peoples. And a pretext was found. American occupation turned to be an act of generosity agreed upon in answer to European

insistence on the need to frustrate the aggressive schemes of a certain power.

This was how the myth of a threat to Western Europe from the East arose. It became evident from the very beginning that the myth smacked of a definite American flavour. Propaganda on the need for the North Atlantic Treaty harped on the allegedly crying disproportion between the military forces of Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and Western states, on the other, aggravated by their unequal strategic positions (maximum depth of the front east of the Elbe and minimum—to the west). This concept ignored the fact that the socialist countries have no aggressive motives whatsoever. Scholastic arguments substituted for a sober appraisal of the real state of affairs. During the debate on ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty on June 25th, 1949, Monsieur Robert Schuman, the then French Foreign Minister, told the French National Assembly: "The feeling of insecurity is not always a result of the already assessed menace of an aggression that is being prepared. The violation of equilibrium of forces, when supported by a more powerful side and not compensated by international guarantees is enough for creating the state of insecurity."

The authors of such concepts came to the corresponding conclusions that it was necessary to fill the military vacuum between the Elbe and Atlantic as quickly as possible, legalize the permanent deployment of US troops there, step up the rearmament of the West European countries, and build a unified US-West European military machine with a unified command, agreed strategy and standardized equipment.

Robert Endicott Osgood, American scientist, wrote in 1962, in *NATO. The Entangled Alliance*:

“The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4th, 1949, formally registered a widespread belief on both sides of the Atlantic, ...that Soviet encroachment upon Europe could be prevented only if the United States associated herself, in a firm and formal entanglement *before* the outbreak of war, with the efforts of Western European nations to defend themselves.”¹

In the drive to form NATO the United States resorted to propaganda, promises of economic aid (we shall dwell on this further on), appeals to the sentiments of the West European bourgeoisie, alarmed as it was by the socio-political changes in Eastern Europe. NATO firmly cemented the class solidarity of US and West European ruling circles.

Since signing the North Atlantic Treaty the fallacy of the assumption that Western Europe was threatened by invasion from the East has become clear to all sober-minded persons.

Moreover, far from supporting the absurd idea of the “export of revolution” Soviet ruling quarters, on the contrary, consistently and resolutely denounced it as a manifestation of dangerous adventurism hostile to Marxist-Leninist teaching and emphasized that revolutions are a result of radical socio-economic processes *inside* a given country. Any unbiased informed person knows that a modern war is unthinkable without thorough psychological preparation of the people. Moreover, Soviet economy geared to the steady improvement of people’s living and cultural standards in no way resembles a war economy which calls for production

¹ Robert Endicott Osgood. *NATO. The Entangled Alliance*. The University of the Chicago Press, 1962, p. 28.

of the means of destruction, in accordance with the well-known principle of "guns instead of butter."

The concept of Eastern Europe's alleged military superiority, fraught with temptations for one group of countries and posing a threat to the western part of the continent, has not stood the test of time.

For many years US NATO strategists have been repeating that the US nuclear monopoly is the only protection that keeps defenceless Western Europe from being overrun by the Soviets. And many European statesmen have echoed them. This was the pretext for demanding that NATO member-states in Europe create mighty conventional forces within a very limited period of time to save Europe from the constant threat of a new occupation.

However, the actual correlation of forces between the two camps in the European continent during NATO's existence has refuted these claims. The majority of West European countries were not too eager to comply with the State Department and Pentagon directives to step up their conventional forces, preferring to invest capital in their war-ravaged economies.

At the same time the USSR, faced with US atomic blackmail, had to create its own mighty rocket-nuclear weapons, within the shortest possible time, capable of striking the aggressor in any part of the globe.

If one is to follow orthodox "Atlantic logic," Soviet tanks should have long ago forced the Elbe, if not the English Channel, because the "balance of fear," which the West began to talk about right after the Soviet Union launched its first sputniks, to a considerable extent nullified American nuclear deterrent. On the contrary, the international situation in Europe improved markedly with the collapse of the US nuclear monop-

ly, and the armament programme for the NATO countries in the early 50's was far from fulfilled.

As a result, even the most ardent supporters of NATO, who had greatly contributed to its formation, had to admit the myth of the Soviet invasion threat wouldn't hold water.

George F. Kennan, former US Ambassador to Moscow, rightly considered one of NATO's "godfathers," wrote a notorious article for the June 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* in which he put forward the "containment of communism" doctrine that served as the ideological, political and military basis for the formation of NATO and its strategy.

At the time Kennan demanded that the USA regard the USSR not as a partner but a rival on the world scene. But some ten years later Kennan had to sing another tune. "We must get over this obsession," he wrote in the February and March 1958 issues of *Harper's Magazine*, "that the Russians are yearning to attack and occupy Western Europe." And he went on: "...The strengthening of NATO cannot be a substitute for negotiations, nor can NATO itself provide either the source of authority or the channel for negotiating process."

Raymond Aron of the French *Le Figaro*, who is known in the USA as a West European Walter Lippmann, wrote a very pertinent article in the paper's May 22 and 23, 1965, issues. A most active proponent of NATO and rabid anti-communist he, nevertheless, had to admit that "no one thinks the Soviet armies would invade Western Europe the day the US soldiers left it." Raymond Aron also stressed that "no one believes that the Soviet Union envisages a military march to the Atlantic... The Soviet Union is not military-minded,

the Western bloc's military resources are big enough and the whole world, including the Russians, dread thermonuclear weapons... Under these conditions we needn't fear Soviet aggression against Western Europe." ¹

WHAT ADVANTAGE IS THERE TO "SITUATION OF STRENGTH?"

The correlation of forces of the two systems, especially in Europe, in the course of the last 20 years gives abundant food for various irresponsible assumptions and conjectures which appear in the Western press, as a rule, inspired by intelligence agencies, military departments and circles close to war industry tycoons. These assumptions either overestimate the military might of the socialist countries in an attempt to intimidate the man in the street, get an increase in military allocations and step up the arms drive or underestimate it sharply.

These fluctuations reflect a profound inner contradictions in the Western approach to the socialist countries from the very start of the cold war, an approach that could be termed a "position-of-strength" policy. This policy was clearly defined by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson in his talk with representatives of American big business in the White House on February 16th, 1950. He said: "The only way to deal with the Soviet Union, we have found from hard experience, is to create situations of strength."

This line of thought and action was backed by hypocritical complaints about the West's alleged weakness and Soviet perverseness. It was claimed that cont-

¹ *L'Enterprise*. No. 509, June 12th, 1965.

roversial issues could be negotiated only after an equilibrium of forces had been achieved.

Inasmuch as no one could so far, with even a minimum of precision, ascertain the exact limits of mustering military strength for defensive purposes, the Acheson formula boiled down to a call for using ultimatums and dictate in dealing with the USSR.

Professor Coral Bell in his work *Negotiations from Strength* (New York, 1963) put it very aptly when he said that the idea of negotiations from strength presupposes not achieving a questionable and hypothetical equilibrium between the parties concerned but in effect creating a highly superior force.

“The idea of ‘peace through strength’—through overwhelming strength—is the basis of present Western policy...”—wrote Sebastian Haffner, British journalist, in the *Observer*, in November 1951, right at the time the Acheson formula was being tested on the battlefield in Korea.

In the United States there have been repeated demands not to stop short of a preventive war against the USSR, in carrying through the “position-of-strength” policy. The most active proponents of this policy were Truman’s Secretary of Defence, Louis Johnson; Secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, who advocated that the USA should become “the first aggressors for peace;” and during the Eisenhower presidency—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, and Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Carney.

The adventurist schemes of US military leaders and the whole “position-of-strength” policy were not aimed at settling outstanding issues with the Soviet Union, but at revising the political results of World War II, liquidating socialist gains in East European countries, tear-

ing some Soviet republics away from the USSR and, last but not least, suppressing revolutionary socialist movements wherever they might take place.

Alastair Buchan, Director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, and Philip Windsor of the same Institute, admitted in their work *Arms and Stability in Europe* (London, 1963) that the stationing of Western powers' troops in Berlin can be regarded as a symbol of their determination never to agree to the present social order in East European countries.

Naturally, the peoples of the European socialist countries could not remain indifferent to the schemes of Western policy-makers and strategists. It is a well-known fact that the last war took a much heavier toll in the Soviet Union and a number of East European countries than elsewhere. Twenty million lives, hundreds of demolished towns and razed villages—such was the horrible price paid by the USSR for victory over fascism. The grief and suffering of the Soviet and many other East European peoples during the war were so great that it will remain engraved in the minds of people for generations to come. These peoples could hardly be expected to stand by calmly watching the formation and activities of NATO which again has split the European continent into two opposed blocs.

The distrust of the peoples of the socialist countries with regard to NATO aims and intentions was greatly intensified in the early 50's, when US leaders switched over from the Kennan formula of "containment" of communism to the Dulles concept of "roll-back" of communism and "liberation," which strongly smacked of direct preparations for a preventive war. This concern was naturally enhanced by signing of the Paris

agreements in 1954 on rearming Federal Germany and her inclusion in NATO. This actually meant that the country which had twice unleashed world wars and whose leaders had time and again stressed their unrestrained hostility towards the existing territorial and political status quo in Europe, had become one of the NATO leaders.

Wary of being caught unawares once again the East European countries began to take defensive counter-measures. In 1955, when West Germany was incorporated in NATO, a defensive organization of the Warsaw Treaty countries came into being. Thus, a colossal war machine began to take shape in the very heart of Europe.

The emergence of so dangerous a situation was the direct outcome of the "position-of-strength" policy that began with NATO's formation. It turned Europe into a powder keg that only needed a spark to kindle a terrible flame.

Nevertheless, NATO initiators were no nearer to accomplishing their main purpose. An attempt to "roll back" socialism, to make it retreat under the threat of force is now more dangerous than ever before, in fact, it is tantamount to suicide.

The present NATO crisis testifies to the bankruptcy of its military and propaganda arsenals. It signifies, and this is most important, the failure of its political and economic aims. The United States was trying to unite the biggest West European and American countries on the basis of anti-communism, to lure their right-wing leaders into submitting their foreign policy to US control with prospects of settling the West's inner contradictions at the expense of the socialist countries. This would have created the prerequisites for Washing-

ton's unrestrained hegemony, first in the West and then throughout the world, which would eventually have become "Pax Americana."

Economically the NATO leaders set out to force the USSR and other socialist countries to engage in an excruciating arms race that would ruin them economically, and at the same time to restore West European economy without having to compete with the United States on the world market.

Time has shown that the NATO leaders were unable to achieve either of these aims. Stubborn attempts to settle these problems have only resulted in a new round of conflicts, mutual distrust and suspicion. This has been borne out, in the first place, by the controversy over determining the most suitable strategic doctrine of NATO.

IF IT IS GOOD FOR THE USA IS IT GOOD FOR THE WEST?

Charles Wilson, former president of General Motors and later US Secretary for Defence, once remarked: "What is good for General Motors is good for the United States."

In the first years after signing the North Atlantic Treaty, when US prestige was at its highest, Washington's motto was a slightly modified version of Wilson's formula—"What is good for the United States is good for all Western countries." In his book *The Troubled Partnership* (New York, 1965) Professor Henry A. Kissinger wrote: "A decade and a half of hegemony have

accustomed us to believe that our views represent the general interest." NATO served as sort of driving belt between the White House, State Department and the Pentagon, on the one hand, and Western Europe's ruling quarters, on the other.

The history of diplomacy teaches us that firmness and effectiveness of military alliances have always been inversely proportional to the size and the scope of the obligations assumed by the participants. "The wider the system of collective security," wrote Henry A. Kissinger in his article *Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age* (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1964), "the most various were the motives animating it and the more difficult the task of obtaining common action proved to be. The more embracing the alliance, the more intense and direct must be the threat which would produce joint action. This traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age.

"...The enormous risks of nuclear warfare affect the credibility of traditional pledges of mutual assistance."

The aptitude of these remarks is confirmed by the growing contradictions within NATO where relations between partners can be described as anything but idyllic.

In the late 40's and early 50's, perilous US actions capable of provoking an uncontrolled conflict caused widespread alarm in West European countries who rightly thought they would have to bear the brunt of the consequences. This alarm was all the greater because, as rumours had it, the Pentagon intended to apply what is known as the "periphery strategy," which meant that American troops would be deployed in the outer bases (North Africa and the British Isles) from which

they would "liberate" the European continent by means of devastating nuclear raids.

Such "liberation" would actually mean the complete destruction of all life in Europe, let alone organized society. Therefore, after the French paper *Le Monde* published a secret report of US Admiral William M. Fechteler on the periphery strategy, a movement became widespread in France and some other West European countries to withdraw Europe from the zone of a possible nuclear conflict.

To nip defeatism in the bud, raise US prestige and step up pressure on the socialist countries John Foster Dulles advanced the doctrine of "massive retaliation." This envisaged that any major armed conflict with the USSR would be won by the West at the very beginning through a nuclear blow delivered by US strategic bombers at the Soviet Union's vital centres. In 1953-55 Washington tried several times to pursue the brinkmanship policy and resort to nuclear blackmail in connection with hot spots in the Far East (Korea, Taiwan, Indo-China).

However, the launching of the world's first sputnik by the USSR on October 4th, 1957, demonstrated utter bankruptcy of the "massive retaliation" doctrine with regard to East-West relations or allied relations within NATO ensuring US hegemony in the alliance. The Soviet Union's intercontinental and global rockets with nuclear warheads capable of striking the aggressor in any part of the globe, signified that for the first time in US history, that country would be faced with untold devastation, should war break out.

The hope of returning Europe to the state existing before 1939 and roll back socialism by force has vanished. Thus, one of the main factors rallying the

NATO partners around Washington and serving as the chief aim of the alliance, has collapsed.

At the same time the peaceful policy of the USSR and the other East European socialist countries, based on the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, neutralizes the "threat-from-the-East" concept propounded by NATO leaders. A considerable expansion of economic, trade, cultural, scientific and parliamentary contacts between the two parts of Europe refutes the assertion that an iron curtain has allegedly divided the continent like an impenetrable wall.

In their book *Building the Atlantic World* (New York, 1963) three Americans, Robert Strausz-Hupe, James S. Dougherty and William R. Kinther, wrote: "...not all Western statesmen are immune of 'peaceful coexistence'; and the Atlantic peoples have become so used to living with the nuclear stalemate that they can no longer envisage that it might be broken. Fear alone will no longer keep NATO together."

The shift in the correlation of forces of the two systems has resulted in an ever deepening distrust between the NATO partners. Each one of them has less trust in its allies, fearing to be dragged, contrary to its will and interests, into a risky adventure, on the one hand, and on the other—of being left to its own resources in trying to achieve its own ends.

In 1957-59, US ruling circles renounced the "massive retaliation" doctrine for the concept of "flexible response." It shifted emphasis from the immediate use of strategic nuclear weapons on a global scale to limited local wars fought with conventional arms at first, then with tactical nuclear weapons only resorting to the strategic rocket-nuclear weapon at the last stage.

Professor Kissinger and General Maxwell Taylor were the most active advocates of this concept. Armed with this doctrine American diplomacy brought more pressure to bear on NATO's European member-states to make them build up conventional forces ("shield") leaving the United States with the monopoly on rocket-nuclear weapons ("sword").

Europe, especially France, gave this doctrine a cold reception. Outstanding French military experts, such as Generals Pierre Gallois and de Bauffre rightly pointed out that the US military concept was prompted by the desire to protect US territory from retaliatory blows should a world thermonuclear war break out, while Europe would be turned into a devastating battlefield.

Trying to avoid the danger of limited wars on West European territory the US allies demanded a return to the "massive retaliation" doctrine.

The Americans declared in response that doubts as to the reliability of US nuclear obligations on the European continent would devalue these obligations as a deterrent in the eyes of the potential enemy and enhance the danger of war.

Debates on the effectiveness of the NATO military machine and its adequacy as a deterrent looked rather strange; all the more so as they became more caustic when the scarecrow of "Soviet invasion" ceased to alarm the people of Western Europe. A British political leader is said to have uttered a very sarcastic remark that "NATO is a non-existent shield to protect from an imaginary danger."

Since hope of using the NATO nuclear "sword" to settle differences in the West at the expense of the East has vanished, this sword has begun to be used for squaring accounts between the Western allies themself-

ves. The more catastrophic the consequences of wielding the sword, the hotter the rivalry around its hilt. The right to hold this hilt has become the determining factor of the political weight of certain Western powers within NATO, their ability to avoid being dragged into their partners' adventures and at the same time have these partners' support on the world scene.

"The military disputes which perennially shake NATO," wrote Ronald Steel in his book *The End of Alliance* (New York, 1964), "the arguments as to who shall be permitted to have a trigger finger on the Bomb, and who shall die in the defence of whose interests, is only part of the problem of the totally new relationship that now exists between America and Europe."

This problem becomes especially acute when attempts are being made to coordinate allied interests in regions outside the sphere of NATO: Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the 40's and early 50's, when the old colonial empires were crumbling, the European metropolitan countries were stubbornly trying, without much success, to persuade the United States to provide active assistance in the fight against the national-liberation movement (which they termed "Soviet infiltration") in the name of Atlantic solidarity.

Washington ruling circles, however, have taken rather an ambiguous position. The United States claimed that Western supreme interests called for filling vacuum formed by the withdrawal of the old colonial powers as quickly as possible. And the USA usurped the mission of filling this vacuum. Such was the background of the behind-the-scene diplomatic manoeuvring in the Suez crisis of 1956, which shook the very foundations of NATO.

The infidelity and perfidy of the overseas ally embittered many people in France during the Algerian war. The right-wing deputy Pierre André, speaking in the National Assembly, said that although he had always been an active supporter of NATO he thought the time had come to decide whether France should remain in the alliance... "We cannot," he said, "be a good ally on the Elbe and simultaneously an enemy against whom a secret struggle was being waged in Tunisia and Algeria."

Now the situation has completely changed. The colonial system's collapse has not brought the USA the desired results; the young independent states which were once possessions of the European powers did not become vassals of Washington, tied to it with economic or political strings.

The developing nations have become a major force on the world scene. Their policy of non-alignment and neutrality is becoming ever more popular, casting doubt on the reliability of NATO's regional appendages—CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS and OAS, mainly the products of US strategy. At the same time, profound socio-political changes going on in the young states make them choose a non-capitalist path of development to rid themselves of age-old backwardness and poverty.

In an attempt to stem the irrepressible process, that has possessed hundreds of millions of people (yesterday considered powerless pawns on the chessboard of imperialist policy), the United States is more and more often resorting to the use of force. It is the United States, and not the West European powers, that has now found itself in the quagmire of protracted, expensive and hopeless colonialist adventures. Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam—these are the mi-

lestones on the shameful road of US foreign policy during the last few years.

WHEREIN LIES EUROPEAN SECURITY?

The Pentagon and State Department have fully realized that their adventurist policy causes the growing isolation of the United States on the international scene. Therefore they divided duties between themselves; the former informs the US European allies of perpetrated aggression, while the latter uses all means possible to get this aggression approved and supported by NATO.

State Secretary Dean Rusk, addressing the Council of World Affairs, Cleveland University, on March 6th, 1965, said that "Europe and the North Atlantic Community cannot preserve their security merely by holding a line across Europe. Their common security is involved also in what happens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia and the Western Pacific... The United States must be prepared to see Europe, reviving its strength and confidence, play a larger role in joint decisions in these ventures." (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1965, p. 581).

The talk about Europe playing a larger role in "joint decisions" cannot, of course, be taken at face value. What it actually amounts to is a polite ultimatum: West European countries will have to take part in actions undertaken by the United States of its own accord.

Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, stressed that "American decisions

about the conduct of the war in Vietnam have been made entirely without consultation with European partners, including Britain." (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1965, p. 581.) If we are to believe this statement, the state of affairs appears very grave for these decisions are capable of seriously aggravating the situation not only in South East Asia but in the whole world, which will naturally affect the interests and security of West European countries.

Remembering well US diplomacy intrigues at the time the colonial empires of the European powers were crumbling, the ruling circles of many former metropolitan countries are not willing to support US aggressive policy in Asia, Africa or Latin America. More than that, they often try openly to dissociate themselves from it.

The US dirty war in South Vietnam, bombing raids on North Vietnam, intervention in the Congo and the Dominican Republic have been sharply criticized in France, the Scandinavian countries and elsewhere in Europe. General de Gaulle has taken a firm stand in favour of withdrawing all foreign troops from Indo-China, calling the second Geneva Conference of 14 states and neutralizing the Indo-China states under international guarantees. Even in Britain, allied to Washington by common colonialist intentions east of Suez (South Arabia, Malaysia), there is a growing discontent with US adventurist policy; any approval of it provokes centrifugal tendencies already strong in the Commonwealth.

Recent events have demonstrated NATO's impotence to co-ordinate, on a global scale, the policy of its European member-states with that of the USA. The more the NATO partners' interests are drifting apart—be it

problems of the European continent or wider issues—the more the NATO mechanism is becoming a tool for the stronger allies bringing pressure to bear on the weaker ones. Naturally, political and strategic differences within NATO have turned into disputes on its structural principles, wrangling for key posts, and important procedural matters.

One of NATO's characteristic features was the setting up, in peacetime, of joint staffs, bodies for standardizing armaments, strategic planning, military preparations and co-ordinating foreign policy. The guiding principle of NATO, since the signing of the Treaty, has been military integration, that is subordination of the NATO armed forces to the joint command which has always been headed by the US generals—Eisenhower, Ridgeway, Gruenther, Norstad and Lemnitzer. Thus, considerable part of "Atlantic" armies have lost their national character which, naturally, has impaired the state sovereignty of NATO member-states.

In addition to the joint command with its staffs stationed in France, political, economic and strategic planning bodies have been set up. Questions of armaments, their standardization, distribution of expenses between partners were discussed at sessions of these bodies. The setting up of this integrated apparatus was prompted by the need to thriftily spend the alliance's resources, to prevent their dissipation, and ensure proper organization and unity of will and action in adopting and implementing strategic and tactical decisions.

But in actual fact these provisions turned to be a screen for US hegemony in NATO. The United States, relying on its overwhelming military and industrial superiority, especially in the field of rocket-nuclear

weapons and means of their delivery, regarded the alliance the way one who holds the controlling block of shares regards petty shareholders. It is the Americans that set the tone in the NATO bodies.

“NATO’s European headquarters,”—wrote the military observer of the French *Le Monde*, Jean Planchais,—“have become what the public thinks of it, namely—a US headquarters. Of course, officers of the 15 countries of NATO have been assigned important posts. But major decisions, the most essential information remains in the American hands.” One witty official has introduced a special mark for documents to be circulated—*A.E.O.* (American Eyes Only).”

Professor Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Centre for International Affairs at Harvard University wrote that “in the case of NATO, the decisions regarding strategy and forces have been a constant source of debate and friction. One cause is the changing military technology and limited experience and knowledge. Another is the disparity in influence and responsibility among the NATO members. The failure to agree on the most suitable strategy for deterrence and defence has impaired the readiness of some European members to demand added sacrifices from their citizens.” (*Shaping the Future. Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition.* New York—London, 1964).

In September 1958, soon after he came to power, General de Gaulle sent confidential letters to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister McMillan demanding that a special body be set up to plan Western strategy and policy on a global scale, both within NATO and outside its sphere,— the so-called Atlantic triumvirate. Having met resistance the French President changed his tactics: from a frontal attack he switched over to

a siege. His main target was the basis of NATO's present structure—the principle of military integration of the partners' armed forces. And his main task was to win over to his side as many West European countries as possible to change this structure.

In criticizing Atlantic military integration General de Gaulle and his supporters point out that the army is first of all an instrument for carrying out the policy of a national state. Inasmuch as NATO is not a supra-government, its integrated army can become an instrument in the hands of the strongest of its participants, namely, the United States. Thus, the less powerful partners of the USA will be deprived of the main instrument protecting their interests which do not always fully coincide with those of the United States. In a nuclear age, fulfilment of allied commitments can be tantamount to suicide. The handing over of sovereign rights to defence to supra-national bodies would mean not only renunciation of the country's responsibility for her own security but would discredit the country in the eyes of the citizens, who do not wish to make sacrifices for the sake of some international organization, let alone a foreign power. France's position testifies to the growing contradictions between NATO member-states. Speaking at a press-conference on September 9th, 1965, President de Gaulle outlined his country's attitude to pressing international issues. He said, among other things, it was a grave mistake to think that France could not act independently on the world scene. Certain NATO members would like to see France submerged in the federation which is called European, but which, in essence, would be Atlantic.

France, President de Gaulle said, cannot allow anyone to dictate to her, she cannot renounce her own

independent policy of joining associations she wishes and retaining full freedom of action. President de Gaulle declared further that no later than in 1969 the integration stipulated by the North Atlantic Treaty, which puts France in a position of secondary importance and allows a foreign power to decide her fate, will cease to exist.

This statement by President de Gaulle showed France's intention to shore up her international prestige and defend her national interests. Development of French contacts and exchanges with the Eastern countries and a new course in French-Soviet, French-Rumanian and French-Polish relations testify to this.

Not confining herself to theoretical arguments alone France has begun to implement practical measures for withdrawing her airforce and navy from under NATO's integrated command. By the end of 1965 only two French divisions and several squadrons of fighter-planes remained under NATO command. More and more hints appear in the French press that the North Atlantic Treaty as a document, and NATO as a permanent military organization are two different things; if the former can be prolonged, the latter has become obsolete and should be radically reformed.

Michel Bochet, head of the French delegation at the 11th annual parliamentary conference of NATO, held in New York in October 1965, submitted a report sharply criticizing US domination in NATO. Bochet said that last year was marked by constant contradictions between NATO members on political and strategic concepts.

In March, 1966, France sent NATO member-countries a memorandum advising them of her intention to withdraw from the Allied Command, by July 1, 1966,

all her land troops and airforce units stationed in West Germany. Simultaneously, France is recalling her representatives from the Supreme Headquarters of Atlantic Powers in Europe and the Supreme Headquarters of the European Army. She has also demanded that the headquarters of these two commands (in Rocquencourt and Fontainebleau) be removed from French territory and the bilateral agreements with the USA on the status of US headquarters, bases, communication lines and a pipeline be revised.

The French Government believes, the Memorandum went on to say, that since these agreements have ceased to accord with present conditions she is compelled to fully restore her sovereignty over French territory. In other words, France is no longer willing to tolerate a situation whereby military units, installations and foreign bases on her territory are under the jurisdiction of any authorities but French.

US attempts to bring pressure to bear on France and organize a united front of NATO member-states against her have been futile.

Analyzing the foreign policy of Gaullist France competent observers believe that it would be a mistake to reduce the Paris position to just personal factors, such as drive for outward prestige. They are inclined to think that the French President's "rebellion" reflects very profound tendencies in the West.

Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in his book *Prospects for the West* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963) wrote:

"The current crisis in the Western alliance is not a petty quarrel over prestige or personalities. It is a debate on the fundamental question of how the Western community is to be organized now that Europe's post-

war dependency on the United States is at the end. The demand of a resurgent Europe for a status in the world commensurate with its new strength is a natural historical development which is based on much more permanent foundations than the personality and ambitions of General de Gaulle... If we are to cope with the Gaullist challenge, we must begin by recognizing the true sources of its power. The 'new reality,' as Walter Lippmann has defined it is that Western Europe has outgrown the dependence upon America, which began with the First World War, and will no longer accept American pre-eminence in European affairs."

If some of the American leaders have acknowledged this unpleasant fact, then tendencies in Western Europe for a search for an independent foreign policy course are indeed getting ever stronger.

ECONOMIC NECESSITY OR ECONOMIC ABSURDITY?

The formation of NATO, especially of its integrated apparatus dominated to all intents and purposes by the State Department and Pentagon, would not have passed so smoothly had it not been for the rather firm economic foundation of the Atlantic countries' military and political bloc.

Western Europe ravaged by World War II needed food, raw materials, equipment and capital to restore her economy and was not able, as before, to pay for imports with industrial goods. Added to this was a sharp curtailment of incomes from overseas capital investments, freight and tourism. The colonies enveloped in flames of revolt ceased to be reliable sources

of raw materials and markets for Western Europe. The gold reserves of West European countries shrank considerably due to enormous military expenditures and inflation. In 1947, they amounted only to 7,000 million dollars, which did not exceed the West European overall trade deficit for the same year.

In these circumstances radical programmes of struggle against the impending economic catastrophe became more and more popular. They included the mustering by the state of all economic resources, nationalizing key branches of economy, democratic control over production and finances, a policy of strict economy. Naturally, this course, which would have ensured a comparatively swift way out of economic difficulties with a just distribution of burdens between various social strata, was not to the liking of the propertied classes. They launched a campaign with a view to convincing the Europeans that only the immediate and large-scale assistance of the United States could get Europe out of economic difficulties.

This campaign had no little effect on the minds of many Europeans who were frightened by the prospects of further privations and the danger of *étatisme*. They enthusiastically hailed the speech of General George Marshall, the then US Secretary of State, at Harvard University on June 5th, 1947. To many at that time the Marshall Plan seemed manna, an act of generosity on the part of the great overseas ally in the anti-fascist struggle, repayment of the rich New World's debt to war-ravaged, poverty-stricken Mother Europe.

Very soon, however, inflated enthusiasm subsided. It became clear that US aid to Western Europe had been prompted by strict economic necessity and not by any humane motives. Production capacities of Ame-

rican industry, expanded colossally by war orders, did not correspond to the home market despite its enormous capacity. From October 1948 to October 1949, US industrial production dropped more than during the first year of the 1929-'33 crisis. To maintain production capacities at the level of normal profitability new vast foreign markets were needed.

War, that constant consumer, was no more. The devastated countries of the European continent were insolvent. By the end of the 40's, about 70 per cent of the world's gold reserves (excluding the socialist countries) had been concentrated in the United States. If the USA had continued to drain Europe of gold it would have caused heavy inflation and imminent revolutionary upheavals.

Under the circumstances US Big Business thought it much more profitable to export surplus goods on credit terms, or even in the form of grants, than sharply curtail production and cause an unprecedented severe crisis.

The USA not only tried to acquire, at suitable price, the moral prestige of "saviour of Europe" but also in exchange for the Marshall Plan to get substantial compensation from Europe in the form of economic and especially military and political concessions.

The bilateral economic agreements concluded within the framework of the Marshall Plan gave the United States the long-awaited opportunity to break, if only partially, West European customs barriers without any counter-obligations to renounce American traditional super-protectionism. These agreements made it possible for the United States to get hold of European strategic raw materials and invest American capital in the most profitable branches of West European economy. Money

obtained from American deliveries was backed by an equivalent fund in local currency which could be disposed of by the head of the Marshall Plan administration in the given country.

The ultimate end of the complicated conditions and reservations accompanying American aid was to encourage would-be buyers of US goods and prevent them from becoming dangerous competitors, on the one hand, and on the other, to turn the countries favoured by the Marshall Plan into the backbone of a military-political grouping under the Washington aegis, spear-headed against the USSR and the other socialist countries. The mechanism of aid which has legalized unceremonious interference of foreign bureaucracy in the domestic affairs of member-states was to lay the ground for setting up the future integrated machine of NATO.

This machine could start functioning, however, only after the aid, and then the entire economies of the recipient countries had been geared to a war footing. It was the armaments drive that turned to be the magic wand for the United States, enabling it to solve what might be considered an insoluble problem: to help restore the economies of its junior partners in NATO, preserving at the same time their dependence on Washington and preventing West European industry from competing with American industry on the world markets. Undoubtedly American deliveries have played a certain, although secondary, role in restoring and reconstructing the recipient countries' economies. For instance, in France, in 1948-50, American aid accounted for no more than 18 per cent of capital investments. At the same time the influence of aid on the militarization of these countries' economies was enor-

mous. Military expenditures of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Italy amounted to 5,500 million dollars in the 1948-49 fiscal year, while US aid totalled 4,000 million dollars.

Beginning with the autumn of 1948 economic aid under the Marshall Plan began to be supplemented with military aid which gradually became predominant. During a time of dollar scarcity this aid was the main source for paying off the chronic deficit of the balance of payments. Therefore the West European countries' leaders were compelled, along with the aid, to agree to demands to increase military expenditures and the numerical strength of armed forces within the NATO framework.

This diverted means from reconstruction of industry, retarded the lowering of production costs and hampered the competitive power of European goods on foreign markets, thereby preventing the West European countries from doing away with the trade balance deficit, the main source of dependence on dollar aid. Unproductive military expenditures put additional strain on the budgets causing inflation, raising prices and impeding exports.

The United States was far from feeling any alarm: the "mutual security" programme and other kinds of military aid guaranteed big orders for the American war industry, whereas back-breaking obligations forced on Western Europe hampered her emergence as competitor on the world markets, and financial dependence on the United States made her heed Washington's political directives.

Apart from that, expenses on the maintenance of NATO European soldiers and production of armaments were, according to American estimates, considerably

less than corresponding expenses in the United States and therefore proved their value. Small wonder that soon after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, American diplomacy began to force on West European countries new and ever more difficult commitments for stepping up armaments and armed forces.

The Swiss scientist, J. Babel, has estimated that wars and preparations for war have cost humanity 115 trillion dollars; enough to create human civilization anew. War expenditures are especially great at the present time, when new expensive military techniques and equipment have replaced the old.

NATO member-states have spent over 1,000 thousand million dollars on their armies.

The burden of military expenditures is especially heavy for smaller NATO countries. Norway's military spending, for example, rose from 370 million kroner in 1949 to 1,108 million in 1960. All in all, Norway spent over ten thousand million kroner for military purposes during the first 10 years of NATO existence.

A similar picture can be observed in Denmark whose spending exceeded nine thousand million kroner during the same period.

The NATO-sponsored arms race caused a rise in taxes and prices in Norway and Denmark, diverted many workers, large production capacities and valuable raw materials from peaceful labour and retarded the development of important branches of industry. Naturally, inflated military expenditures had a negative effect on housing construction and social welfare.

NATO generals claim that the lion's share of military expenditures goes to strengthen defence against the "danger from the East." But no such danger ever existed for the Norwegian, Danish or any other people.

Thus, enormous amounts of money, labour and valuable materials have been wasted. This is now understood by ever growing numbers of Norwegians, Danes, and other Atlantic nations.

WHO IS TO SHOULDER THE BURDEN OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES?

In the mid 50's, new features appeared in the economic relations between the USA and its NATO partners. Restoration of the war-ravaged economy of Western Europe (the Marshall Plan was instrumental in this), its radical reconstruction on a modern technological basis, the overcoming of inflation of the first post-war years, setting up of trade and economic groupings of the Common Market type, all this has enhanced the importance of West European countries within NATO. Their sabotage of NATO military programmes was largely instrumental in this: if the Lisbon programme (to form 50 fully equipped divisions by the end of 1952) had been fulfilled, Western Europe would have found itself in an economic abyss.

Meanwhile, US absolute economic superiority over the West European countries was becoming a thing of the past. If the United States still surpassed all its NATO allies in the gross social product by 30 to 40 per cent, it became inferior to them with respect to trade, exports and gold reserves. Although US trade balance remained active, its balance of payments developed a deficit, which was growing due to enormous expenses incurred in the maintenance of almost a million soldiers and hundreds of military bases abroad, assistance to pro-American regimes in some developing countries

and private capital investments in foreign, especially West European, countries. The stream of gold, which, during the war and first post-war years, was flowing from Europe to America, has now turned backwards: during the last 15 years, US gold reserves have dropped from 24.6 thousand million dollars to 13.8 thousand million, that is from 70 to 30 per cent of all capitalist countries' gold reserves.

These economic shifts can to a considerable degree explain changes in the relations between the United States and Western Europe as compared with the period of the latter's heavy financial dependence on Washington. The termination of the Marshall Plan and other programmes of economic and military nature deprived NATO of its initial economic foundation. Confined now to purely military and political tasks NATO was gradually losing its stability and began to resemble a pyramid turned upside down.

No wonder US leaders are displeased with the present state of affairs and are taking various measures to restore NATO's economic foundation as well as American hegemony inside the alliance. If previous economic factors (the Marshall Plan) helped the United States to engineer a military political alliance under its aegis, now it is the United States that is trying to use this alliance to solve economic and financial problems at the expense of its allies.

The programme for restoring NATO, worked out in Washington, envisaged maximum acceleration of the arms drive. During the period from 1949 to 1963, the NATO countries' military expenditures increased almost 7-fold, reaching an astronomical figure of 73,446 million dollars. In 1964, these countries' armies numbered 5,848 thousand men.

Now the United States is concerned with the problem of how to distribute this financial and military burden between the 15 NATO countries. The US military budget is 2.5-3 times bigger than the military budgets of all its West European partners put together. Inasmuch as the gap in their economic potentials is now narrower than it used to be, the Americans insist on evening out the share of military expenditures in the gross national product on both sides of the Atlantic (according to their estimates this share in the United States amounts to 10 per cent and in Western Europe to less than 5 per cent) and deciding on a surcharge for some "rich" countries with the highest per capita national income. Military expenditures are interpreted as a kind of progressive income tax on NATO countries. Lawrence C. McQuade, Special Assistant to the US Secretary of Defence, wrote in the *London International Affairs* in January, 1964, that NATO countries should, within the next five years, increase their military budgets by at least 10 per cent.

The most zealous American politicians, however, go much farther in their demands. They maintain that each country has unused resources of various kinds, such as an army of unemployed or partially used production capacities, which should also be brought to serve NATO's needs.

Apart from additional military expenditures and the money used for aid to the developing countries the United States has presented Europe, which in their opinion has become too rich, with one more bill charging it for radical reorganization of trade relations between countries on both sides of the Atlantic.

After World War II US diplomacy and business circles exerted a great deal of effort to encourage eco-

conomic integration of Western Europe. Abolition of customs barriers between groups of West European countries, unification of their tax systems and economic policy and similar measures would, according to Washington's calculations, contribute to bigger sales of American goods and the export of capital to Europe. At the same time, the setting up of a supra-national executive apparatus of integrated associations, transferring to it the most important rights of member-states, has the aim of consolidating NATO's inner structure, setting off Western Europe against the Eastern part and tying up West European economy with that of the United States.

Time has shown, however, that development of European integration is far from what its overseas sponsors expected. The setting up of a customs union of six European countries has created a barrier for American exports, while the merging of financial and industrial groups of the Six has placed European affiliations of American firms at a disadvantage. The splitting of Western Europe into the Six and the Seven (the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association) far from strengthening, undermined NATO's unity still further.

Under pressure of all these factors far-reaching plans for settling trade and political contradictions with Western Europe have appeared in the United States. These plans envisage the merging of the two opposed trade blocs by means of Britain's entry in the Common Market, breaking, with her help, of the customs barriers of the Six and lowering tariffs in US trade with West European countries by means of talks within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the so-called Kennedy round.

These plans were accompanied by high-sounding slogans of "interdependence" and "Atlantic partnership," which called for full equality between NATO's two mainstays on both sides of the Atlantic, more rational use of resources, specialization of production on an international scale and so on.

Along with redistribution of military expenditures and revision of trade relations the United States resorted to cutting its import programme (the "Buy American" slogan) and tourism abroad. It was trying to get the system of international accounts revised and demanded the special privilege of being able to draw money from the International Monetary Fund to make good the deficit in its balance of payments.

American diplomacy has mustered all means at its disposal to effect this programme. The United States leaders do not stop at direct blackmail threatening European countries with the revision of their military commitments in regard to Western Europe should the latter resist.

In his book *Old Myths and New Realities* (New-York, 1964) Senator Fulbright wrote: "The United States, which has committed itself to a unified defence of the West, will not of its volition abandon Europe, but this does not mean that it cannot be driven from Europe.

If our partners pursue protectionist trade policies and decline to carry a proportion of the military and foreign aid burdens commensurate with their resources, the United States will be left with no choice but to reduce its commitments."

IS NATO'S ECONOMIC BASIS SOUND?

Not waiting for the final solution of conflicts between the United States and Western Europe in the sphere of interstate relations, American big business is taking its own urgent measures, the main one being mass export of US private capital to West European countries by means of buying up the local enterprises' shares and organizing American firms' affiliations. The relatively high rate of economic growth in Western Europe in the 50's and early 60's, the lower wages compared to the USA, the highly skilled labour force, the volume and prospects of a solvent market—all this was bound to interest overseas businessmen. Import of American capital into Europe, pictured at the time as a factor of economic and technical progress, made it possible for the United States to jump over the Common Market external customs barrier and conquer it from within, taking advantage of the absence of tariffs in the trade between the Six.

In a little more than 10 years US direct private investments in West European countries have increased from 1.7 thousand million dollars to 11.5 thousand million. Western economists have estimated that by 1975 this figure will have reached 24 thousand million dollars. According to *News Week*, American investments in the USA net a 9 per cent profit annually, while investments in Western Europe bring in 12 per cent and sometimes even 35 per cent. In the five years between 1959-63, the USA got back as profit 93 per cent of its investments abroad made during the same period.

But neither this "majestic plan" nor new influx of dollars could shore up NATO's economic foundation.

There is nothing surprising in the failure of an attempt to consolidate NATO on the "Atlantic partnership" basis. A military alliance founded on the "position-of-strength" policy is essentially a tool in US hands to dominate its militarily and economically weaker allies. And paradoxical as it may seem, US military might is in the end the cause of its weakness. Colossal military expenditures undermine the economic and financial system of the USA and its power to compete on world markets.

West European countries are well aware of the dire consequences of overstraining their finance for they have just extricated themselves from chronic inflation. Therefore they either refuse, under various pretexts, to increase their military spending or demand in exchange a radical revision of NATO's present structure, that is participation in deciding major political and military matters which used to be the monopoly of Washington. American threats to withdraw their troops from Western Europe have failed to stop centrifugal tendencies in NATO. On the contrary, they have enhanced them, giving rise to new doubts as to the value and reliability of US foreign policy commitments.

American complaints of the unjust distribution of Western defence burdens, that is the upkeep of NATO military forces, their calls for a more proportionate contribution are met with unreserved discontent in Western Europe. Even those economists and politicians who are NATO's advocates, point to the absurdity of US claims. The share of military budget in the gross national product, with due account of the per capita national income, is far from exhaustive an index for ascertaining the burden of unproductive expenses of a country. Of greater importance is the absolute volume

of industrial and agricultural production. What is accessible to a country with huge-scale serial production is disastrous for an industrially weaker country, where production costs are higher. Specialization and cooperation of the war industry within the framework of NATO are fraught with turning West European armies into minor tools of the Pentagon to perform the most difficult, dangerous and humiliating functions.

In the sphere of international trade, too, the settlement of "Atlantic disputes" is meeting with great difficulty. Lengthy negotiations in Brussels about Britain joining the European Common Market reached an impasse in January, 1963, because of General de Gaulle's veto. The Geneva talks within the GATT framework on the mutual lowering of tariffs by the USA and Western Europe (the Kennedy round) have been indefinitely postponed bringing the USA no tangible results. The majority of the West European countries do not wish to renounce their customs protection if the Americans are not going to meet them half-way, for the Western Europe's balance of trade with the dollar zone is chronically passive and the conditions of competition are too different on both sides of the Atlantic.

Under the circumstances the expenses of US troops in Europe (about 400,000 men) and the influx of American private capital are the two main factors contributing to the accumulation of gold and currency by the Europeans and the decrease of their debts to the United States. But these two factors can in no way be regarded as a guarantee of Europe's economic stability and prosperity.

The crisis of the US balance of payments and the steady shifting of American interests to other regions of the globe—Asia, Africa and Latin America—where-

Washington has assumed the expensive duties of world gendarme, cast doubt on the expediency of American troops in Europe. Meanwhile, with the development of rocket-nuclear technique the military value of US troops in Europe has gradually decreased; they are now regarded not so much as a real striking force but as a symbol of US resolution to act in complete accord with its allies in any armed conflict.

But, as already stated, the Europeans do not trust this "resolution." Moreover, the present US military-strategic doctrines, fraught with the danger of turning Western Europe into a field of devastating battles, make Europeans doubt the desirability of American troops on their territory. Influential circles in Western Europe are more and more often voicing the opinion that inasmuch as the withdrawal of US troops from Europe is inevitable, the sooner it takes place the better, for it will deprive Washington of its weapon of bringing pressure to bear on its NATO allies and help the rapprochement between the European countries with different social systems.

The second source of paying off the European trade balance deficit—influx of American private capital—is also becoming less profitable. When the West European economy was growing rapidly and was in need of money, local industrialists were not in the least alarmed by the constant stream of dollars; more than that, they even asked overseas businessmen to invest capital so as to be able to re-equip industry and get new foreign markets. However, with the boom of the 60's drawing to a close the situation began to change: the competition of American companies' affiliations has increased in West European markets. Apart from that, constant influx of foreign capital tends to bolster in-

flation tendencies which are eating away West European finances. The European Treasuries have begun to be threatened by the withdrawal of American capital should the economic situation become unfavourable. This threat is applied with regard to countries that do not give the most favoured nation treatment to American capital. Finally, the takeover by US big business of a number of key positions in the most important branches of West European industry and the seizure of a considerable part of the agricultural market in Western Europe give Washington one more opportunity to exert political pressure.

The "coca-colonization" of West European economy (as the penetration of American capital in Western Europe is called ironically) is facilitated to a great extent by the large disproportion in the financial might of the companies on both sides of the Atlantic, concentration of American investments in such key industries as oil-processing, chemical, electronic and automobile, as well as the US lead in research work.

American plans for reorganizing the international credit and payment system have come under mounting criticism. The United States proposed that a "pool" of hard currencies be set up within the framework of the International Monetary Fund, with the United States having the right to practically uncontrolled disposal of the Fund's money. However, France countered this move with the demand to introduce a new international pay-unit directly based on its gold equivalent. And distribution of these units should be effected not by the International Monetary Fund dominated by the Americans, but by the "Club of the Ten," an organization of industrially developed capitalist countries which

sides with France, the creditor-countries fully controlling the use of the Fund's money.

France's decision to turn henceforth the dollars she gets into gold, her persistent demands to raise the price of gold and do away with the present artificial parity of dollar (35 dollars per oz) and return to the gold standard, dealt a telling blow at US currency still playing a predominant role in world capitalist trade. Implementation of even a part of these proposals would seriously hamper American capital's export to Western Europe.

The failure of American diplomacy's "majestic plan," aimed at tying West European economy to the United States and thereby strengthening Washington's shattered leadership in NATO, is quite natural. More and more Europeans are coming out against the squandering of money on an arms race, for an end to the uncontrolled influx of American capital and goods to their countries. They are calling for the channelling of money into reconstruction of economy in order to compete with the United States on the world markets.

At the same time we are witnessing the crumbling of artificial barriers and discrimination in trade between Western Europe and the socialist countries forced by the United States on its NATO allies at the height of the cold war.

The committee for drawing the lists of "strategic" goods prohibited for export to the USSR and the other socialist countries had, under pressure of business circles, time and again to curtail these lists, while NATO's embargo on favourable trade with the East and on granting long-term loans was a fiasco. Thus, NATO's economic foundation is more and more at loggerheads with real life.

WHAT WEST

GERMANY'S PARTICIPATION IN NATO LEADS TO?

When the North Atlantic Treaty was being signed its sponsors categorically denied any possibility of including West Germany. They went so far as to hint that the alliance would be not only an anti-Soviet instrument but also an additional guarantee against the resurgence of German militarism. The then Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schuman, speaking in the National Assembly during the debate on the Treaty ratification, said: "I have been asked time and again whether it would be possible to allow West Germany to enter NATO. This question cannot be asked not only now but in the future either. Germany has no peace treaty. She has no arms, will not have any... France and her allies cannot even think of Germany being allowed to participate in NATO as a nation capable of her own defence or the defence of other nations."

These words now seem rather strange, to say the least. The people who uttered them must be either childishly naive (which, in terms of politics, is worse than a crime) or utterly cynical. Today West Germany is the biggest military power in West Europe; it has an army half-a-million strong equipped with the latest in war techniques.

This was the result of contradictions between the victor-powers and their blind policy of anti-communism which has been cunningly used by German militarism.

The Ruhr steel magnates, the generals steeled in aggressive world wars, reactionary bureaucracy permeat-

ed with the chauvinist "Greater-Germany" spirit, remnants of the nazi leadership apparatus who escaped justice—they are the ones who constituted the biggest part of anti-Soviet forces in post-war Europe. It was they who occupied key positions in the government bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany. The creation in Europe of a military-political bloc, under the US aegis, spearheaded against the USSR, was bound to compel its leaders sooner or later to turn to the services of those who were well experienced at waging wars against the Soviet Union and who, despite their double defeat, still harbour illusions of revenge.

The split of the anti-Hitler coalition was a starting point of the revanchist forces resurgence.

These forces do not confine themselves to offering their services to an anti-Soviet crusade; they also resort to blackmail hinting at the possibility of "finding a key to reunification in the East" and a return to what almost amounts to the Rapallo policy.

There are many statesmen in the West who fear the turning of yesterday's aggressor into a present and future ally. However, they are under the impression that Federal Germany's inclusion in NATO can firmly tie her to the West.

It should also be borne in mind that the creation of NATO and the beginning of the Korean war (1949-50) unleashed an unprecedented armaments race, with the United States setting the fashion. The burden of military expenditures which NATO member-states had to shoulder (at the time many of them were waging colonial wars) seriously slowed down the rate of their economic reconstruction and worsened their position on foreign markets. Under the circumstances West Germany, who was free of that burden, found herself

in an extremely favourable position. That is why the idea of a "German contribution to the West's military effort," put forward by US diplomacy as a plan of German rearmaments, has found positive response among certain business circles in Western Europe who hoped, with Bonn entering the armaments race, somewhat to alleviate their own burden and level out competition opportunities.

The leaders of NATO member-countries have tried many a plan for Federal Germany's remilitarization. Its basic principle was military integration, an organic merging of the West German army with the armed forces of the Atlantic powers. Some people thought it would bind West German aggressive circles hand and foot and guarantee the allies from any unpleasant surprises.

It was envisaged at first to limit this integrated organization to the six countries of Little Europe creating the "European Army" which would incorporate the smallest possible contingents of West German troops, headed by joint staffs.

However, as the first draft was discussed these "smallest contingents" grew to several divisions. The public in France rightly considered the European Defence Community an instrument for liquidation of the French army, which at the time was waging a bloody war in Indo-China, and the joint staffs—a tool enabling Federal Germany sooner or later to grab the dominating position in Little Europe. It was for this reason that the French National Assembly refused to ratify the draft of the treaty on August 30, 1957.

The 1954 Paris Agreements signed under strong US pressure (it was then that John Foster Dulles uttered his notorious remark about "an agonizing reappraisal

of basic US policy in Europe") sanctioned West Germany's rearmament in a slightly different form. The country was allowed to build a national army (Bundeswehr) with its own structure and command but fully incorporated in an integrated mechanism of NATO. This inclusion, along with the constant presence of British troops on the continent as well as a number of limitations for the Bundeswehr (it could not exceed 500,00 men, or 12 divisions; navy tonnage was limited; manufacture of long-range bombers, submarines, rockets, magnetic mines was prohibited, except for special permission; production on its territory of atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons should not be started) were bound to give the US West European allies guarantees of security.

Control over the observance of the guarantees as stipulated by the Paris Agreements should have been exercised by the bodies of West European Union consisting of the six countries of Little Europe and Britain, who, following the United States it would seem broke away from the age-old tradition of "splendid isolation." The authors of the Paris Agreements asserted that incorporated in NATO, West Germany would not be able to threaten her Western neighbours and allies, draw them, contrary to their will, into a dangerous adventure in the East, or seek a separate deal with any of them. But even during the first decade of the Paris Agreements (1955-65) the real value of these paper guarantees became quite obvious.

Availing themselves of the desperate straits France was in due to the seven-year Algerian war, and Britain's financial difficulties the Bonn leaders were step by step gaining the key military and political positions in Western Europe. In doing so, Bonn diplomacy first and

foremost took advantage of East-West contradictions and tried to drive a wedge between the USA and the USSR. Federal Germany constantly blackmails the United States maintaining that the West Germans are disappointed with the West and threatening refusal to be the NATO advanced detachment and the growth of neutralist tendencies.

This blackmail bore fruit. American scholars, R. Strausz-Hupe, J. S. Dougherty and W. R. Kinther, already quoted, wrote that "West Germany's contribution to NATO in terms of men and territory is vital for the defence of Western Europe... The reduction of the German Federal Republic to a secondary NATO power would deprive the United States of a most important ally on the European Continent and give rise to neutralist forces in the Federal Republic."

At the same time Bonn is quite willing to profit from contradictions between Western member-states of NATO. France was the main object of Bonn's diplomatic activity in 1958-63. Lamenting the unreliability of American commitments, bullying Western leaders with the spectre of a direct American-Soviet agreement over their heads and at their expense, West German rulers torpedoed the talks on normalizing the situation in West Berlin, concluding a non-aggression pact between the two European military groupings and other measures aimed at easing tension in Europe.

Bonn needed this flirtation with France to arouse jealousy in the US State Department, seriously alarmed by the French Fronde in NATO, and to gain its own ends. When contradictions between Paris and Washington have gone too far West German diplomacy hurried again to switch over to the "orthodox-Atlantic" course, hoping to get in exchange the role of the main

US partner in Europe, which up to now has been played by Britain. Thus the "Paris-Bonn axis", thought to be the pivot of Little Europe, is being replaced by the "Washington-Bonn axis" as the NATO pillar.

The United States is particularly interested in West Germany because it wants to have a reliable bulwark of struggle against the socialist countries. Moreover, the very existence of the Bundeswehr must, according to US politicians' calculations, increase sharply the West European countries' dependence on NATO, for it is only the United States that can counterbalance German might and influence within the alliance. On the other hand, the considerable financial opportunities of the Federal Republic of Germany and her industrial potential make Bonn a desirable partner for the United States in overcoming its balance of payments crisis, strengthening the dollar, and fighting the protectionist tendencies of the Common Market directed by France, especially at a time when US forces are scattered in South-East Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Under these circumstances, NATO proves to be for German militarism not an iron trap, as some Western politicians and journalists claimed, but an ideal nutrient medium.

Each year brings fresh evidence that the Paris Agreements' guarantees are a mere scrap of paper. The NATO control bodies are of a very illusory nature. The limitations concerning the West German Navy were officially reconsidered in 1963; she was allowed to build ships of up to 6,000-ton displacement and big submarines. The 12 Bundeswehr divisions, the last being formed in April 1965, have become NATO's main shock force on the European continent. West German leaders are becoming more and more persistent in their drive

for nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the British Rhine Army deployed in West Germany, which should have consisted of no less than four divisions, is being curtailed due to Britain's financial difficulties.

The problem of arming West Germany with nuclear weapons, which has become the focus of European and world politics, deserves special attention. To understand its importance for the fate of peace the world over it is necessary to examine the political aims of West Germany's participation in NATO.

Former Chancellor Dr. Adenauer, in a number of his public speeches addressed to the Bundestag and Christian-Democratic Party congresses, frankly admitted that Germany's participation in NATO was bound to create "positions of strength" in the talks with the USSR and compel the latter to agree to Germany's reunification on Bonn's conditions, that is absorption of the German Democratic Republic and revision of the Oder-Neisse border line. This has become the cornerstone of West German diplomacy, which is persistently striving to make Germany's NATO allies agree to her revanchist programme; without this, Bonn leaders claim, Germany's membership in NATO becomes meaningless.

This aggressive revanchist line causes serious alarm among the West European public who have not the least intention of risking the danger of a devastating war to satisfy the revenge-seeking aspirations of Federal Germany. To pacify alarmed Europeans Bonn has invented a version that all talk about reunification is nothing but a part of the election campaign needed by the government to rebuff attacks of the opposition. To make it more convincing Dr. Adenauer made a statement, at the signing of the Paris Agreements, to the effect that Germany would refrain from using force for

the country's reunification or revision of existing frontiers.

As time passed NATO's position on the German question became utterly contradictory. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have time and again declared that any encroachments on the territorial integrity of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Bonn's main targets, will be met with the combined might of the Warsaw-Pact countries' armed forces and will inevitably provoke a world thermonuclear war.

On the other hand, all West German leaders, without exception, be they in the office or in the opposition, are one in stressing that the supreme goal of Federal Germany's policy is German reunification by annexing the German Democratic Republic, and seizing Poland's and Czechoslovakia's western lands. Herr Seehofer, Federal Minister of Transport, declared that the German east included not only the Elbe and the Oder but also Bohemia and all lands the Germans had ever inhabited. Herr Meyers, Prime Minister of the land North Rhine-Westphalia, who is also a member of the leadership board of the Christian-Democratic Union, said that not a single sound-minded German would ever agree to a German reunification other than on the basis of the Reich's frontiers as of 1871.

A question naturally arises as to how West German leaders expect to attain these goals. Dr. Adenauer answered it way back in 1952, before West Germany's rearmament became a *fait accompli*. Speaking in Heidelberg on March 1st, he said: "When Russia will face a rearmed Germany she *will* be willing to negotiate." After the Paris Agreements came into force Dr. Adenauer became more aggressive. At a meeting of the

Christian-Democratic Union in West Berlin on October 12th, 1956, he declared: "We *shall* talk with the Russians but only after we are armed to the teeth."

Thus, it appears that peaceful reunification à *la Bonn* is nothing more nor less than an attempt to dictate its will under the threat of force. An ideal example of such "peaceful settlement" is, in the opinion of West German diplomats, the Munich deal which gave away Czechoslovakia to Hitler (incidentally, Herr Seehofer continues to assert that the shameful Munich documents, which were a prologue to World War II, are valid to this day). The "position-of-strength" policy on which NATO's activities have always been based, has found its most ardent champions in Bonn.

The Second World War experience was not lost on them, of course. It would be an exaggeration to assert that there are only maniacs at the helm of state in Federal Germany, who would wish any day now to resume the lost war by entering into direct armed conflict with the USSR and its allies. Today's West Germany, with its very vulnerable geographical position, especially in view of the combat might of modern weapons, its limited resources and unstable international status, can in no way be compared to Hitler's Third Reich exercising control over the greater part of Europe. Likewise, the Soviet Union of the 60's differs in many respects from the USSR of the early 40's although even then it was able to inflict utter defeat on the Hitler Wehrmacht.

It does not mean, however, that West German leaders consider the aims they proclaim unrealizable. The West German press, as well as politicians and diplomats persistently claim that revision of the territorial and political results of World War II necessitates: first,

thwarting any friendly contact between the USSR and its former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the USA, Britain and France; second, setting up the closest possible alliance between Federal Germany and the Western powers; third, forcing on the latter the Bonn aims with regard to the German question through NATO's integrated apparatus. Dr. Adenauer said on July 11th, 1960: "If the German people preserve their unity and remain faithful to the West, the day will come when East Prussia will again acquire freedom."

Dr. Schroeder, West German Foreign Minister, has pointed out in one of his statements, that West Germany alone cannot solve the tasks facing her but she can and must solve them together with all her allies.

At a meeting in Düsseldorf on August 28th, 1960, Dr. Ludwig Erhard declared: "We do not stand alone in the world. Thanks to our policy we maintain our strong political and military alliance with the eight states of the free world. This alliance becomes ever closer. We could not be worthy of this significant moment if we failed to remember our brothers and sisters who, with unshakable fidelity, continue to live in their Fatherland and suffer from material and spiritual oppression... We shall not forget Silesia."

Any unbiased person can see that these statements, permeated as they are with the spirit of revenge signify the desire to use, sooner or later, the whole military apparatus of NATO for bringing pressure to bear on the USSR and the East European socialist countries. The most diverse means are employed to achieve this goal: anti-communist hysteria, speculation on economic, political and military differences between the Western powers, which enables Bonn to decide the outcome of the struggle for leadership in NATO, and lastly, gra-

dual takeover of the most important positions in the integrated armed forces of NATO.

Back in the early 60's there were 233 West German officers, including 18 generals, holding leading posts in NATO. Under the pretext of a too small territory for deploying and training the Bundeswehr, Federal Germany secured military bases, airfields, proving grounds, etc., in France, Britain, Spain, Portugal and some other countries.

The strictly planned and implemented aggressive course pursued by Federal Germany is aimed at a close coalescence, through NATO's integrated command, of the Bundeswehr with the armies of Germany's NATO allies, which would make it possible for Federal Germany to force on them her strategic and political concepts, mainly a revision of the Second World War results.

This is precisely why military integration which, according to its advocates, was to bind Bonn hand and foot, is most actively supported by West German leaders. They see in it an opportunity to talk and act on behalf of all NATO members on the question of the German settlement, to try to intimidate the USSR and other socialist countries, if they refuse to agree to Bonn's territorial claims, with a world thermonuclear war into which all the fourteen NATO members would willy-nilly be drawn.

This is the way broad circles of the world public regard Federal Germany's drive for nuclear weapons. Formerly, when West Germany's rearmament was not officially sanctioned, Federal German leaders refused to have anything to do with the very idea of joining the nuclear club. But a year and a half after signing the Paris Agreements—in the autumn of 1956—Chancellor Adenauer was demanding that the Bundeswehr be

supplied with rockets with nuclear warheads. The main reason advanced was the fact that West German soldiers would allegedly lose all confidence in their strength, would be gripped by a feeling of defeatism aggravated by a humiliating realization of their unequal position with regard to other NATO members, and recruitment of the army would be seriously hampered by popular scepticism as to its real value.

Soon Bundeswehr units started training in launching American tactical rockets of the "Honest John" and "Corporal" type. True, the rocket warheads were kept in US army depots. But three years had hardly passed when the West German press and the speeches of Bonn leaders became full of hints that it would be desirable to allow the German Federal Republic to take part in deciding on the use of NATO nuclear arsenal (American, British or French). Complaints were again voiced about unequal position, in addition to veiled threats to switch over to a neutralist course, etc. This time there were also hints that the Europeans, West Germans for one, had lost faith in US commitments in Europe, especially after the Soviet Union possessed thermonuclear weapon and inter-continental rockets, which, should the war break out, would make US backing of their NATO allies doubtful.

This tactics already tested by the Weimar Republic, and later by Hitler's Third Reich, boils down to representing ever fresh concessions to German militarism by the victor-powers as acts of "restoring justice" and "equality," without which the "moderate," sensible and peace-loving elements would be removed from the country's leadership and their place taken by rash extremists. The actual situation, however, was just the opposite. Each new concession to the German brass in-

creased the prestige and influence of the militarists who very soon were beyond the control of their Western patrons, resulting in many an unpleasant surprise.

However, the Munich tragedy had evidently no effect on many Western statesmen who, just like émigrés at the time of the Restoration in France, "forgot everything and learnt nothing." How then is one to explain the fact that beginning with the 60's the main US political trend in NATO has been to promote various versions of Bonn's entry into the nuclear club.

The Norstad plan of turning NATO into the fourth nuclear power by transferring US Polaris submarines to the allied command, the plan of creating a multilateral nuclear force with the participation of a limited number of countries—the formation of a fleet consisting of 25 surface ships with mixed crews and armed with Polaris rockets, the British plan of setting up the Atlantic nuclear force which will include British rocket-carrier planes, and then the McNamara plan—the creation of a special committee of four to five NATO leading member-states for working out the nuclear strategy of the alliance, all this helps the Bundeswehr generals put their finger on the trigger of the mass-destruction weapon, the miraculous weapon Hitler dreamed of just before his ignoble death in the Reich's chancellory bunker.

The Washington or London authors of such plans are, of course, free to think that if Federal Germany, the only European country not concealing her territorial claims, has a say in NATO's collective nuclear affairs it will be, perhaps, the only way to prevent Bonn from acquiring its own nuclear weapon (Chancellor Erhard has been quite outspoken on this score).

But this is a false illusion. Nuclear weapon prolife-

ration is not, nor can it be, a fatal inevitability in Europe, where the consequences of the last war are so far seen and felt, and where there are still many smouldering charred logs ready to produce a new and more devastating fire.

People of good will, irrespective of their political creeds or religious beliefs, are vitally interested in staying off a new catastrophe.

SOME RESULTS

We have briefly examined some of the aspects of NATO's evolution during the last 15 years or so.

We have to admit that NATO has greatly contributed to turning Europe into a rocket-nuclear powder-magazine ready to explode at any moment. Thousands upon thousands of millions of dollars spent on the arms race were not enough, as could be expected, to hurl Europe a quarter of a century back by means of the "position-of-strength" policy.

Now that the achievement of the principal political and military goal of NATO does not seem at all feasible, there is an opportunity for a new approach to the problem of European security, namely, the creation of an all-European security system as proposed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Concern for the future of Europe, for the vital interests of all European peoples urgently demands that an end be put to the cold war once and for all.

Free contact between peoples on both sides of the Elbe in countries with different socio-economic and political systems is not only possible but imperative.

People of good will are trying to find an alternative to the policy of engineering closed military blocs,

fraught with the danger of a new world war. The first step to this would be a guarantee of the territorial integrity and inviolability of European states, non-interference in their internal affairs no matter how plausible the pretext might be. There can be no genuine relaxation of tension in Europe if one of the military and political alliances set up there, or certain members of such an alliance, openly declare their aim to be the revision of the status quo, recarving the continent's map and effecting a change of the socio-political systems of some states.

Luckily, these claims are expressed by very limited circles in countries that are far inferior in might and influence to those vitally interested in averting a new, devastating conflict. Unity of action in isolating and extinguishing the potential hotbeds of war is the essence of the all-European system of collective security. When we say "collective security for the whole of Europe" we do not mean that it should be directed against anyone in Europe or outside it. This security system differs from the blocs of the NATO type in that it is aimed *solely* at settling the problems fraught with the danger of world conflagration. Among them the problems of frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries remain the principal ones. As soon as territorial inviolability and sovereignty of all European countries are genuinely guaranteed in Europe the danger of a new war will immediately recede.

Everybody knows that the focal point of tension in Europe is Germany, the country which started both world wars. During the post-war period two sovereign German states with different social systems were formed on the territory of the former Third Reich. Naturally, all problems pertaining to relations between them

should be settled by the Germans themselves. It is impermissible for one of these states to take upon itself the task of deciding the fate of the other and what's more, to threaten to wipe it off the face of the earth. Naturally enough, Democratic Germany's allies cannot allow this abnormal situation to develop unhindered and pledge to render all possible assistance. Consequently, the all-European security system suggests the settlement of the German problem not by means of military blocs, which is absolutely impossible, but by creating the conditions for such a settlement that would not encroach on anyone's interests. One of these conditions would be a peace treaty concluded with the two German states, doing away with the vestiges of the last war. On the basis of this treaty the controversial problem of West Berlin could also be solved.

Another aspect of normalizing the European situation concerns military alliances as instruments for settling existing differences. There is an inner logic in the relations between big military-political groupings, which presupposes a retaliatory reaction to the search for that unattainable "position-of-strength" and attempts to obtain unilateral advantages. This only serves to heighten tension.

It is high time to start dismantling the war machine in the very heart of Europe. All Europeans who cherish civilization are bound to be alarmed at the possibility of a conflagration which can be started accidentally or intentionally.

To prevent this, to reach a *détente*, the USSR and East European socialist countries have time and again put forward proposals worthy of attention. The most important among these proposals are:

1. To withdraw foreign troops and abolish military ba-

ses on foreign territories.

2. To disengage the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.
3. To conclude a non-aggression pact between these two groupings.
4. To reach the German peace settlement.

On September 24th, 1965, the head of the Soviet delegation submitted to the 20th UN General Assembly session a draft declaration on the inadmissability of interference in the internal affairs of countries and on the protection of their independence and sovereignty.

The Soviet Government called on all states to adhere in their international relations to principles of mutual respect and non-interference in the domestic affairs of one another, be it of an economic, political or ideological nature.

In submitting its draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union was guided by the desire to reach, within the shortest possible time, an agreement on complete prohibition and abolition of all kinds of nuclear weapons within the framework of universal and complete disarmament under strict international control, to contribute towards the lessening of international tension as well as the strengthening of trust between states and thereby facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on universal and complete disarmament.

Unquestionably, the adoption of this and similar proposals would eventually lead to the strengthening of trust between nations, to setting up a system of collective security on a regional and world scale, and liquidating military blocs.

Soviet Foreign Minister, A. Gromyko, reflecting the Soviet and other European peoples' point of view, has said that the acute situations in South and South-East Asia as well as in some other parts of the world cannot

overshadow European security problems. The post-war frontiers in Europe have been fixed once and for all and cannot be revised. The Soviet Union will not tolerate any change in the frontiers. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated uniting the efforts of European states in the interests of their security, developing their cooperation on an all-European basis.

In essence, NATO has not been able to solve any major European, let alone world, problem. The evolution of NATO has convincingly shown that military blocs cannot solve political, economic or ideological problems, that they should give way to an all-European and world system of collective security.

The Warsaw-treaty countries have time and again stated that they are ready to abolish their defence alliance if NATO member-states follow suite.

Now it is up to the West to take the next step.

