

**A
HISTORICAL
VIEW**

**OF
NEO-
COLONI-
ALISM**

K. BRUTENTS

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CONTENTS

Chapter I. Colonialism Without Empires	5
1. Disintegration of the Colonial System: Collapse of 'Classical' Colonialism	5
2. The Nature and Background of Neo-Colonialism	16
3. The Economic and Social Strategy of Neo-Colonialism.	38
4. The Ideological and Political Doctrine of Neo-Colonialism	67
Chapter II. Forms and Methods of Neo-Colonialism	122
1. Political and Politico-Military Forms and Weapons	122
2. Economic Forms and Weapons	151
3. Weapons of Ideological Expansion	192
Chapter III. The Mainstay of Neo-Colonialism	202
1. Why US Imperialism?	203
2. Dulles's 'Big Stick'	218
3. The 'New Frontiers'	229
4. 'Post-Kennedy' US Policy in Developing Countries	251
Conclusion	301

'Neo-colonialism' is now a widely used term in international political parlance. It owes its origin to the profound changes that have altered the colonial policy of the imperialist powers, and the methods used by them to subordinate and exploit the economically backward countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America at a time when the socialist world community is emerging as a power and consolidating its position and the disintegration of the colonial system has taken place.

Neo-colonialism, as a political, socio-economic and ideological phenomenon, has barely been studied—principally because of its comparatively youthful state, it is still in the process of formation. Moreover, the forms it takes and methods it uses are much more mobile, dynamic and flexible than those of traditional colonialism. It should also be noted that the line between neo-colonialism and 'classical' colonialism is often very blurred and sometimes merely conventional.

But a clear idea of the real nature of neo-colonialist methods and an analysis of the policy pursued towards the 'third world' by its chief practitioner, US imperialism, is becoming increasingly important. This is necessary not purely because of academic considerations but mainly because of the practical problems involved in successfully completing the struggle of the former enslaved countries for complete national and social emancipation. The question of neo-colonialism has also become one of the most sensitive issues in the ideological confrontation between the forces of socialism and national liberation, on the one hand, and imperialism, on the other.

This study examines the basic political, socio-economic and ideological aspects of neo-colonialism.

COLONIALISM WITHOUT EMPIRES

1. Disintegration of the Colonial System: Collapse of 'Classical' Colonialism

It would be natural to begin a study of neo-colonialism by comparing its origin and essential features with its historical predecessor, 'classical' colonialism. Such a comparison is important if one wants to understand the causes of its origin, its peculiarities, as well as its contradictions and its place in the logical evolution of imperialism's colonialist policies.

Colonialism is political and economic subjugation as well as exploitation and spiritual enslavement of countries, which are, as a rule, less developed socially and economically, by the ruling exploiting classes of other countries. The term 'colonialism' is also used to denote colonial *policy*, i.e., a policy designed to impose and preserve, through military, political, economic and ideological coercion, a system of national and colonial oppression, dependence, and exploitation.

Colonialism has a long history. Its first steps can be traced back to ancient Rome and other slave-owning states, which had their own colonial policy. Karl Marx wrote that the formation of merchant capital "...among the trading nations of old and modern times is always directly connected with plundering, piracy, kidnapping of slaves, and colonial conquest; as in Carthage, Rome, and later among the Venetians, Portuguese, Dutch, etc." ¹ Lenin also noted that "colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism." ²

At the same time Lenin emphasized that analysis of colonialism should be approached from an historical point of view and account had to be taken of the fact that every antagonistic formation and the social relations of a given epoch leave *their own imprint* on colonialism, determining its peculiarities. "... 'General' disquisitions on imperialism," he wrote, "which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: 'Greater Rome and Greater Britain.' Even the capitalist colonial policy of *previous* stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital." ³

Accordingly, while speaking of traditional or 'classical' colonialism we usually have in mind the

¹ K. Marx. *Capital*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. III, p. 326.

² V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 22, p. 260.

³ *Ibid.*

era of monopoly capitalism, when the territorial partition of the world had been completed and the imperialist colonial system had taken shape.

Capitalism has always been accompanied by colonial oppression since the period of primary accumulations. But it was under imperialism that this oppression assumed an unprecedented scale and intensity and colonial policy, as Lenin said, became worldwide.¹ At the turn of this century the imperialists engaged in a wild dash to annex territory during which the world was divided up and hundreds of millions of people found themselves under colonial and semi-colonial domination. From 1876 till 1914 five imperialist powers—Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Japan—seized a territory of 22.3 million square kilometres with a population of 236.8 million. In all, by the outbreak of the First World War, colonies and dependencies accounted for roughly 67 per cent of the world's territory and 60 per cent of its population. Whole continents were turned into colonial preserves. Political maps of the period presented mute evidence of the downtrodden state of many different peoples. The colour representing Britain, for instance, covered a good half of Africa and vast territories in Asia.

During the concluding stage of the world's division the *colonial system of imperialism* had finally taken shape as a policy based on political subjugation, economic exploitation and ideological suppression of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which were turned into agrarian and raw material appendages of the capitalist world economy. These rela-

¹ V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 22, p. 254.

tions were forced on them through direct conquest and also through indirect methods. The principal and most typical form of colonial enslavement was direct politico-military domination of the oppressed countries. This form of domination by the metropolitan countries is usually preferred by the imperialists, as it gives them virtually unlimited control over territories they have captured, but for the enslaved peoples it is a most inhuman and repulsive system.

The colonial empires of European capitalist states with those of the United States and Japan laid the groundwork for the colonial system. Moreover, many countries were reduced to the position of semi-colonies, formally, independent politically but enmeshed in a net of financial and diplomatic dependence.¹ On the eve of the First World War semi-colonial status was 'enjoyed' by China, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Siam (now Thailand), and many Latin American countries, etc.

A characteristic feature of the imperialist colonial system was some form of political subordination designed to serve the interests of international finance capital, which had become the decisive force in international affairs, and to provide it with the most favourable conditions for exploiting the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Moreover, the enslavement and plundering of these peoples became, as Lenin showed, a component part of the global 'operations' of finance capital and basically linked to all its other activities.

The countries that fell under colonial domination were incorporated into the imperialist econo-

¹ V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 22, p. 263.

mic system with its international capitalist division of labour. Under imperialism, they retained their importance as markets for the industries of the metropolitan countries, but primarily became spheres for the application of capital. As a result, imperialist monopolies gained a full control over the economies of the enslaved countries.

At the same time colonial exploitation was not based on economic coercion alone. Without political subjugation it would be impossible to indulge in open robbery and extortion such as taxes and administrative and other levies. But it provided, to a significant degree, the basis for 'purely' economic forms of exploitation. The frontier barriers of colonial empires guaranteed finance capital in the metropolitan countries a monopoly or at least a privileged position in the exploitation of the riches of the colonial countries, and protection against competition from imperialist rivals. The terms of trade, the prices of imports and exports, the rules governing the monopolies' access to natural resources, the building and staffing of their factories and the size of the remuneration did not result from the interplay of economic factors alone but developed under the tremendous influence of the colonial administration, which executed, of course, the will of the governments of the metropolitan countries, i.e., of their imperialist concerns.

When capitalism was still in its pre-monopoly stage the gradual transformation of the colonies into markets and sources of raw material for industrial monopolies, the penetration of commodity-money relations, and their involvement in world trade led to the disintegration of pre-capitalist socio-economic forms in these countries, to the emergence and development, although slow,

of bourgeois relations. Under imperialism this process quickened, primarily, because export of capital to the colonies had started. But the imperialist powers acted according to Marx, as an "insentient tool of history." The *deliberate* policy of the metropolitan countries and the colonial authorities was to hinder in every way economic progress and hence the development of capitalism, which were synonymous at that time. As a rule, the colonialists actively supported and sought to perpetuate outdated feudal and pre-feudal relations and did everything to prevent growth of national local business and the building of industry in the colonies, with the exception of the mining industry and certain subsidiary branches.

The imperialists feared the socio-economic consequences of large-scale development of the productive forces. This would inevitably jeopardize their monopolies' complete domination of the economy and the markets of these countries and would lead to the growth of social forces—a working class as well as a national intelligentsia and a national bourgeoisie—capable of challenging their rule.

In their social strategy too the colonialists relied on the forces of the past. They concentrated on a certain section of society—the feudal and tribal nobility—and on compradore groups. They used them as a support in keeping the peasants under submission and in stifling the emerging new class groups and elements which were prepared to lead the fight for national liberation. Thus, in India the British authorities supported the princes (maharajas and rajpramukhs) and landlords (zemindars and jagirdars). In Indonesia the colonialists were closely linked with the sultans;

in the Arab countries, with the pashas and kaid; and in many African countries, with tribal chiefs. By assisting in the plunder and oppression of their peoples, the feudal lords, tribal chiefs and compadore elements coalesced, as it were, with the system of colonial domination. For instance, El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marakesh, one of the biggest Moroccan feudals who on many occasions obliged the French colonial administration by sending his troops to fight Moroccans struggling for freedom, was president and vice-president of a number of French companies operating in North Africa, among them the Chemical and Metallurgical Society of North Africa, the Bi Azer and de Graaf mining societies, and others. In recognition of his 'services to France' he was decorated with the Legion of Honour.

The existence and operation of the colonial system was ensured by three principal factors. First, the omnipotence or at least the decisive role of the imperialist monopolies in all international social relations. Second, the relative passivity of the enslaved peoples, who had not yet woken from their centuries of slumber and did not struggle hard for freedom. Most of the acts against the colonialists, although often heroic, did not involve the broad masses of people and were spontaneous and isolated incidents. Finally, the people had no effective ally and thus found themselves pitted alone against the immeasurably stronger enemy—imperialism.

The Great October Socialist Revolution radically changed this position by questioning all these factors and causing a crisis in the colonial system. The main consequences of this crisis were, *first*, the national and social emancipation of the op-

pressed peoples of tsarist Russia; *second*, the awakening of national awareness, the upsurge of the struggle for national liberation throughout almost the whole colonial and semi-colonial periphery of imperialism; *third*, the successful outcome, for the first time in the 20th century, of major battles fought by the national-liberation movement—the struggle of the Turkish and Afghan peoples, the people's anti-imperialist revolution in Mongolia; *fourth*, the termination, in many semi-colonial and dependent countries, of the process of their enslavement, and the rise of an increasingly active reverse trend towards liberation and consolidation of independence.

It took, however, three more decades before the forces evoked by the October Revolution irreparably undermined the foundations of the colonial system.

Towards the end of the Second World War imperialism suffered a major material, ideological and political defeat and its world dominance came to an end. The general crisis of capitalism became much sharper, while the power and authority of socialism grew immeasurably. The socialist revolution crossed the boundaries of the Soviet Union and Mongolia and a socialist world system was established becoming a decisive factor in world development.

A powerful impetus was given to the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist movement, which spread over almost the entire colonial and semi-colonial periphery of imperialism, embracing broad sections of the population.

The socialist world system became a powerful ally of the national-liberation movement. It not only gave it direct support but as a global coun-

terweight to imperialism, it immobilized the principal forces, including military, of imperialism. Militant solidarity with the national-liberation movement was displayed by the international working class, by Communists throughout the world.

The disintegration of the colonial system began. Since the end of the war up to 1971, the colonialists' flag has been hauled down in 19 Asian countries (excluding South Korea, South Vietnam and Israel), 39 African countries (including Zanzibar), five countries in America, four in Oceania and one in Europe. It took more than three and a half centuries to build the British empire, and only twenty years for it to disintegrate. Today Britain rules over less than three per cent of the population and seven per cent of the territory of its former possessions. By 1968 France had lost 98.8 per cent of the territory and 98 per cent of the population of her empire; the Netherlands, respectively, 92.5 and 99.25 per cent. Belgium, Italy and Japan have lost all their colonial possessions. In all, more than 1,500 million people have freed themselves from colonial and semi-colonial bondage in the past quarter of a century. The world is on the threshold of eliminating the last remnants of the colonial empires.

The break-up of the colonial system was not brought about by a chain of accidental factors or by the 'good will' of the imperialists. It is a deep *natural and irreversible process* reflecting fundamental changes in the international situation: the tremendous strengthening of the positions of socialism and the revolutionary liberation movement and the successes of their anti-imperialist struggle. With the present balance of world forces and

the powerful upsurge of the national-liberation struggle supported by the strong socialist community and by the international working class, the colonial system has no chance to survive. Imperialism *cannot* keep the subjugated countries from attaining national sovereignty and winning political independence. In the postwar years the imperialists have frequently used armed force to prevent the collapse of the colonial system, but all their punitive expeditions have ended in defeat.

The military occupation and repressions of the colonialists against national patriots in Syria, Lebanon, Burma and Morocco were unsuccessful. Victory for the fighters for national independence was the outcome of France's wars against the peoples of Vietnam (1946-54) and Algeria (1954-62), the attack of the Dutch imperialists on the Republic of Indonesia (1947-48), the US imperialists' war against Korea (1950-53), the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt (1956), Belgium's intervention in the Congo-Kinshasa (1961), and the US attack on Cuba (1961). Israel's offensive against the Arab countries in 1967 did not attain its objective either.

Even the wars and bloody 'pacification' campaigns which seemed to develop favourably for the colonialists, as in Kenya, Malaya or Madagascar, could not give a new lease of life to colonial regimes. Finally, special mention should be made of the US imperialists' devastating war in Indochina, which has provided perhaps the most striking evidence of the ineffectiveness of the colonialists' traditional military methods in present-day conditions. In addition, the imperialists have to reckon, to a certain extent, with the fact that armed intervention against national-liberation move-

ments often results in increasing the influence of its staunchest, most resolute anti-imperialist members.

The 'classical' colonialism of colonial empires based on armed violence and direct political and economic domination is a thing of the past. *Its collapse means the disintegration of the colonial system.* This inescapable fact is responsible for the changes in the colonial policy of the imperialists and is the key to understanding the special features of modern colonialism.

In adapting themselves to the changed conditions, the imperialists have begun to adopt a neo-colonialist policy. This does not mean that the imperialists have given up trying to maintain their direct rule over certain countries. Millions of people are still languishing under colonial domination in Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese possessions; the US imperialists still dominate in Puerto Rico and Okinawa; some countries and territories in Africa, Asia and Oceania have not yet freed themselves from British rule, and racia- lists in the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia still terrorize the native population. But these are not features typical of modern colonialism.

Portugal is perhaps the only colonial power to- day which more or less consistently pursues a traditional colonialist policy. But it is an exception confirming the general trend. The main reason why the Portuguese rulers cling so desperately to their colonial empire is the weakness of the economic and social basis of Portuguese colonialism which leaves the latter no hope to preserve its dominant position by neo-colonialist methods. Another factor is the out-and-out reactionary, fascist-like character of the Portuguese regime, which has

firmly linked its future to a colonial policy and colonial wars.

The example of Portugal is revealing in another respect: it emphasizes the fact that the colonialists *can no longer* keep the peoples of colonies and semi-colonies in their former state of bondage. Blind adherence to old forms of colonialism merely postpones the inevitable liberation of politically enslaved countries.

2. The Nature and Background of Neo-Colonialism

The disintegration of the colonial system and the disappearance of colonial empires does not mean the elimination of colonialism. Such phrases as 'the last vestiges of colonialism are being eliminated' or 'colonialism is on the point of vanishing,' which we hear or read sometimes, come from a mistaken conception of commonly used terms, which puts 'colonialism' and the 'colonial system' on the same level. In reality, the colonial system of imperialism is merely an historically concrete and transient form of a broader phenomenon intrinsic to antagonistic societies—colonialism.

In the first place, whereas the colonial system of relations taken as a *total entity* presupposing the existence of this or that form of political dependence, has disintegrated, some important parts of this system, some essential bonds of dependence are far from having been abolished. This factor is put to good use by the imperialists in their efforts to check the advance of national-liberation revolutions.

Imperialists have not reconciled themselves to the loss of their complete domination in Asian, African and Latin American countries, despite the fact that they try hard to convince the world, and especially the peoples of these countries, to the contrary. Western propagandists like to claim that the expulsion of the colonial administration and the evacuation of the colonial powers' troops (represented as 'voluntary withdrawal') means colonialism has ceased to exist.

'Substantiation' of such claims was the object of papers read at an international conference on the role of the developing countries in the modern world held several years ago, by Rupert Emerson, Walter Laquer and other Western colonial experts and anti-communists, who asserted that the question of neo-colonialism is an invention of Moscow. The title of Laquer's contribution, for instance, was "Neo-colonialism—the Soviet Concept."

Officials as well as ideologists play an active part in the propaganda campaign to camouflage neo-colonialism. In March 1964 A. Douglas-Home, the Conservative Prime Minister of Britain at the time, declared that neo-colonialism had no place in Britain's political dictionary; it was a slander which should be allowed to evaporate "like the hot air which it is."¹

The aims of this campaign are served by such demonstrative gestures as the 'abolition,' in Britain and France, for instance, of the ministries for colonial affairs and their replacement by the Commonwealth office in Britain and the Ministry for Overseas Departments and Territories in France. A face-lifting operation was also perfor-

¹ *The Times*, March 21, 1964.

med on the British Colonial Development Corporation, which has since 1968 been called the Commonwealth Development Corporation. Even that respectable newspaper, *The Times*, contributed its bit by renaming the century-old column 'Colonial News' 'Overseas News.'

In fact, having lost their empires, the monopolies are desperately trying to save colonialism, if only partially. And this is *one of the key objectives of modern imperialism*. "In its struggle against the national-liberation movement," the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties declared, "imperialism stubbornly defends the remnants of the colonial system, on the one hand, and, on the other, uses methods of neo-colonialism in an effort to prevent the economic and social advance of developing states, of countries which have won national sovereignty."¹ This policy necessarily arises out of the exploitative nature of imperialism, for which colonialism is a part of the global mechanism for exploiting millions upon millions of people, an important form of its 'normal' functions. Besides, today it is not only a matter of important raw material sources, investment spheres, markets, huge profits, strategic and military bases. The problem of retaining their control over former colonies and dependencies has assumed special importance for the imperialists because of the two systems existing in the world today. They must now, simultaneously, hold these countries within the orbit of world capitalism and save the capitalist structure from new defeats.

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 12.*

Imperialist leaders and ideologists never tire of stressing—and they are all in agreement over this—the tremendous importance the course of events in Asia, Africa and Latin America has for the future prospects of the competition between the two world systems. Many of them even go so far as to say that the trend of development in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is a matter of life or death to world capitalism. This was expressed in most dramatic terms by Harold Macmillan, ex-Prime Minister of Britain, in his widely reported speech before the South African parliament in February 1960: "... The great issue of this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West. Will they be drawn into the Communist camp? . . . What is now on trial is much more than our military strength or our diplomatic and administrative skill. It is our way of life." ¹

Other imperialist leaders have spoken in this tone many times. John Kennedy declared in his foreign aid message to Congress in April 1963 that the economic and social systems which would come to prevail in the developing countries would "determine the political leadership, shape political practices, and mold the structure of the institutions. . . drastically affect the shape of the world in which our children grow to maturity." ²

Addressing the Bundestag in March 1968, the West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger said: "We must declare that our own future largely de-

¹ *The Times*, February 4, 1960.

² *The Department of State Bulletin*. April 22, 1963, p. 592.

pende on favourable development in this new world."

In these circumstances, the imperialists' policy towards the 'third world' is increasingly determined by their attempts to prevent at any cost its progressive development and to involve it in their struggle against democracy and socialism.

Faced with the collapse of their colonial empires, the imperialists have been compelled to set about refurbishing colonialism in order to save it. So *neo-colonialism as colonialism without empires* is pushed to the forefront. It has become the principal form of subjugation and exploitation of the Asian, African and Latin American countries. It dominates the direction of capitalism's policy in the present stage of its general crisis, when imperialism is confronted with the socialist world system and when traditional colonialism is collapsing. This policy, in turn, becomes a basic part of the global strategy of imperialism directed against the world revolutionary process. In fact, neo-colonialism is imperialism's 'reply' to the break-up of the colonial system and to the new balance of forces in the international arena favourable to the struggle of the peoples to win national independence; it is an attempt to achieve the basic traditional and new aims of colonial policy in a changed situation. "Despite the liquidation of the Empire, our interest-economic and political-in what goes on in Asia and Africa is hardly less direct than before," wrote Lord Hailsham, a prominent Conservative leader. Lord Hailsham made no secret about this 'interest' being the 'ultimate absorption' of the developing world "into the community of Western people," but he was quite indignant over attempts "to decry this as neo-co-

lonialism." ¹ Commenting upon France's policy with regard to its former colonial territories, the *Paris Echo* observed that "General de Gaulle has successfully carried through not only 'Operation Departure' but also 'Operation Return and Consolidation.'" ²

Neo-colonialism was born out of a new situation, a new balance of forces in the world and in the former enslaved countries themselves and these factors also determine its character. In some measure they are also connected with the sharp intensification of imperialism's tendencies towards state monopoly.

The existence of the socialist world system has put an end to the dominance of imperialism both in international political and economic relations. Socialist countries give young national states all-round support—political, economic, military and ideological.

In the political field, co-operation between the socialist countries and the newly-freed states creates important prerequisites for consolidating the independence of these states, for independent choice of their own methods of development. In the military field, the socialist countries help the young states strengthen their defence capacity, build up armed forces to protect their independence and national interests. The existence of the socialist community plays an important part in reducing the colonialists' opportunities of using armed force against the 'third world.'

The socialist states actively contribute to the economic development of young states, to their

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, April-June, 1965, p. 410.

² *Echo*, 1^{er} juillet 1965.

efforts to eliminate economic dependence on the imperialist powers. They give these countries vast economic and technical assistance and help in training engineers, technicians and skilled workers and in developing science, culture and health services. In addition, co-operation with the socialist countries provides the former colonies and semi-colonies with a real possibility of resisting and to a certain extent even neutralizing the colonialist aims of the imperialist monopolies. It has become much more difficult for the imperialists to exert economic pressure on the newly-freed countries. Even economic blockade, once a reliable method of 'taming' the insubordinate, has lost much of its effectiveness, as can be seen from the example of the UAR, Guinea or Cuba.

The socialist states are also helping the patriotic forces combat the ideological and cultural influence of imperialism. Their assistance in the training of specialists, in the development of education contributes to a cultural revolution.

The existence of the socialist world system and its co-operation with the young national states tremendously affects the imperialist policy towards the 'third world' and the nature of the relations between the imperialist powers and the young states. Many essential features of neo-colonialism and especially its search for flexible forms are largely determined by this factor and by the fact that neo-colonialism has to subordinate itself to global interests and the designs of the imperialists. The whole imperialist policy towards the former colonies and semi-colonies is conducted with an eye to the socialist community, with a careful weighing up of the definite possibilities for co-operation between the latter and the newly-freed countries

and the force of its attraction for them. This explains the concessions, sometimes important ones, the imperialists make to their former colonies and also the fact that in their relations with the newly-freed countries imperialists are not always guided by considerations of immediate economic benefit.

As *The Times* commented in July 1962, "The Americans tend to see events in Africa in close relation to the strategy of the East-West struggle, and want time-tables for action that they think this strategy demands."¹ The same approach, to varying degrees, has been adopted by other imperialist powers towards Asia and Latin America.

Basic changes have taken place in the former colonial and semi-colonial world itself. The imperialists no longer have to deal with subjugated countries at the mercy of their whims, but with national states which pursue, or at least can pursue an anti-imperialist course, act independently in international affairs, enjoy real sovereignty, and employ the organs of state power for the protection of their national interests. While remaining inside the capitalist world economy, these countries occupy a special place in it. Their economic and political development, no longer totally dependent on the imperialist powers, is *objectively* characterized by profound anti-imperialist trends, and the support and assistance of the socialist system, along with the developing co-operation among young national states, present them with the possibility of breaking away from their subordination to the laws of the capitalist world economy and more or less successfully resisting the dictates of the monopolies.

¹ *The Times*, July 25, 1962, p. 11.

The imperialists are no longer dealing with mute colonial slaves debarred from playing an active part in the process of history, but with people with an awakened sense of national awareness and dignity, who have gained in their struggle for freedom considerable political experience. Anti-capitalist sentiments (true, not always springing from class consciousness) have become widespread among the proletariat and large sections of the peasantry, national intelligentsia and urban petty bourgeoisie, along with a readiness to support socialist slogans.

Neither national governments nor the people in the newly-freed countries will remain satisfied with winning political independence alone. It has become customary to demand an end to economic dependence on the imperialist powers, an elimination of social and economic backwardness and a curb on foreign monopolies. The social development of the former colonies and semi-colonies objectively demands this; it is a natural result of the struggle for national liberation. This demand is voiced, in the first place, by the masses, who want to see the successes won by the national-liberation movement materialized in a tangible improvement in their living conditions, and, in deliverance from oppression, misery and lawlessness.

The politically-conscious part of the working class regards economic liberation from imperialism, eradication of archaic social relations, and economic progress as an essential stage in the fight for the complete national and social emancipation of their countries, for a higher social and material status for the proletariat and all working people. Broad sections of the peasantry hope to be delivered from the burden of feudal and pre-feu-

dal relations, from the lack of land, from the merciless clutches of middle-men and money-lenders and from disastrous price fluctuations.

The intelligentsia is equally deeply committed to working for economic and cultural progress and consolidating national independence. Its members hope that this will give them broader scope to use their abilities and enable them to increase their role in society. Moreover, it is the intellectuals who are particularly sensitive to questions involving defence of national dignity and prestige and development of national culture. It would also be to the interest of the urban petty bourgeoisie to rid itself of the ruinous industrial and commercial competition of foreign companies, and of the domination of middle-men and money-lenders. Psychologically, too, they respond more readily to national, or to be more precise, nationalistic slogans.

The local bourgeoisie also has a stake in genuine national sovereignty, in economic progress, in expanding and 'getting control' of the domestic market. Despite its fear of the people and the strong tendency, shown by some groups, to come to terms with imperialism, the national bourgeoisie is not prepared to forgo political independence or agree to the perpetuation of the inequities that characterize relations of its respective countries with the imperialist powers.

Hence the broad support being given to ideas advocating rapid economic development, increased industrialization, restriction of foreign, especially private, capital, active state intervention in the economy, and establishment of a strong public sector. People frequently see in the latter a form of socialism as well as a vehicle for develop-

ing the national economy. It is also regarded favourably by the majority of bourgeois governments which assign it the role of a self-styled 'aggregate capitalist' and endeavour to use it as an effective instrument of development in the current, initial stage, pending the formation of a local private capital.

Class contradictions are growing rapidly in the newly independent countries. The basis for this is the rapid growth of the process of social differentiation. More and more marked are the divergence of interests among the bourgeoisie and various privileged groups with those of the popular masses, which were not so obvious during the common struggle for liberation. The exploiting, bourgeois section of society with more increasing openness throw themselves into the making of quick fortunes whereas the masses, which have made the greatest sacrifices, still await deliverance from exploitation and misery. Polarization of political positions on the question of which way to develop—towards capitalism or socialism—is becoming more acute. Accordingly, fear of the masses is on the rise among the bourgeoisie, and reactionary trends are entrenching themselves in certain sections.

The reasons for the rise of neo-colonialism and its special features are closely connected with peculiar relationship of imperialism to its former possessions. It has lost direct political domination over many Asian, African and Latin American countries but continues to hold powerful positions in them.

The imperialists possess important means for influencing economic, military, political and ideological affairs in the newly-freed countries. These

include all kinds of unequal agreements imposed back in the colonial years or on the eve of independence; a widespread network of military, naval and air bases; an army of advisers, experts and instructors with which state apparatus, the army, the economy and the educational system are honeycombed; stable contacts with political associates if not direct agents and close links with certain social and political groups, and, last but not least, propaganda channels built up and tested over many years.

The biggest 'trump' in the colonialists' game is the complete social and economic backwardness of the former colonies and semi-colonies and their economic dependence on the imperialist powers. In the social structure and in production relations feudal and pre-feudal forms remain strong and sometimes even predominate. The working class, the most resolute and consistent anti-imperialist force, is relatively weak in most of these countries.

Their economy is weighed down by the aftermath of the recent colonial rule, which hampered development of productive forces and increased backwardness in social, economic, scientific and technical fields. According to the French scientists R. Dumont and B. Rosier, at the end of the 18th century per capita income in Britain was eight times higher than in India. In 1948-49, 150 years later, it was 14.5 times higher.¹

At present the former colonial and dependent countries, with almost 70 per cent of the population of the non-socialist world, contribute only

¹ R. Dumont et B. Rosier. *Nous allons à la famine*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 12.

about one-ninth of the world's industrial output, approximately one-eleventh of the production of manufactured goods and one-fourteenth of the output of the basic branches of heavy industry and account for less than a quarter of the value of trade turnover.¹ Gross national product per head of the population, too, equals but a fraction of that in the developed capitalist states.

Gross National Product in Developed Capitalist Countries and Developing Countries in 1962²

	Population	GNP (thou- sand dollars)	Per capita GNP
Total	2,180,000,000	1,450,000	665
Developed capi- talist countries	670,000,000	1,230,000	1,835
Developing countries	1,510,000,000	220,000	145

In the mid-sixties heavy industry production per head of the population in the developing countries equalled less than one-thirtieth and metalworking industry production, one-fiftieth of that in the imperialist states. According to the French scientist Pierre Gélé (*Plunder of the Third World*), 85 per cent of the exports of the developing countries are composed of raw materials; 5 per cent of crude metals and 10 per cent of manufactured goods, primarily textiles.

¹ V. Rymalov. "Borba za ekonomicheskuyu nezavisimost." *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, No. 1, 1968, pp. 103, 105.

² *World Economic Survey 1964*, No. 4, 1965. *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 4, 1967. *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, August 1967.

There is a glaring discrepancy between the abundance of natural resources and the extremely low level of development of the productive forces in Africa. The continent holds over 58 per cent of the world stocks of aluminium, 50 per cent of gold, 78 per cent of cobalt, 40 per cent of chromium, 35 per cent of phosphorites, 34 per cent of copper, 30 per cent of manganese ore. At the same time, Africa (without the RSA) produces only two per cent of world output of manufactured goods. The average annual income per head of the African population is less than one hundred dollars. In 1965, 82.9 per cent of the adult population in Africa were illiterate, 60.4 per cent in Asia and 29 per cent in Latin America.¹

The pernicious influence of colonialism is also seen in the one-sided, often even monocultural specialization of the economy of the young states, which relies on the production of one or two kinds of industrial or agricultural raw materials or foodstuffs. In 1964 tin made up 73 per cent of the exports of Bolivia; oil, 93.5 per cent of the exports of Venezuela; coffee, 53.1 per cent of the exports of Brazil and 71.9 per cent of the exports of Colombia; rubber and iron ore, 86 per cent of the exports of Liberia; cocoa, 60 per cent of the exports of Ghana; tea, 61 per cent of the exports of Ceylon (1967); groundnuts and their products, more than 90 per cent of the exports of Gambia (1966); groundnuts, 80 per cent of the exports of Senegal and Niger (1968)², and so on. Over 30

¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. *Mobilization of Internal Resources by Developing Countries*. Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/BC 3/28, January 26, 1967.

² *Quarterly Economic Review*, No. 1, 1968.

out of, say, 80 economically undeveloped countries obtain more than half of their foreign currency from the export of *one* crop or raw material, and many others depend on the export of two crops.¹

The young states remain part of the capitalist world economy with its system of division of labour. Their economies are orientated, as a rule, on imperialist powers. More than 70 per cent of the total imports and exports of the former colonies and semi-colonies fall to the share of West Europe, North America and Japan. The latter countries have extended 90 per cent of the state loans received by these new states.

Following independence there has been an appreciable increase in trade among the developing countries themselves, but even now it does not reach one-fifth of their total foreign trade. Still worse is the situation in inter-African trade, which accounts for eight per cent of the foreign trade of the African countries.² "Economically and financially, African nations are more like a series of islands lying off the coast of Western Europe than like parts of a single continent,"³ writes A. Kamarck, Director of the Economics Department of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Imperialist monopolies continue to occupy strong, sometimes dominant, positions in the economy of many newly-freed countries, although in many of the latter one can observe a process to-

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, January-March, 1966, pp. 209-210.

² A. Kamarck. *The Economics of African Development*, New York, Praeger, 1967, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.*

wards strengthening national state and private enterprise to the detriment of foreign capital. These monopolies control most of the extraction of oil, iron ore, chromium, lead, nickel, copper, uranium and a number of other minerals, a considerable part of the manufacturing industry, banks, public utilities, and plantations. In Venezuela, foreign monopolies control 80 per cent of the mining industry, 70 per cent of the oil industry, 70 per cent of the building industry and 35 per cent of internal trade. Sixty per cent of Malaysian tin production is concentrated in the hands of foreign business. In 1964 foreigners owned 98 per cent of industrial enterprises in Senegal.

Investments by US monopolies in Latin America total 10,000 million dollars. Enterprises owned by them employ a million and a half Latin Americans and account for 10 per cent of total commodity output and one-third of the production of goods for export.

In most countries independence was not accompanied by measures to keep out imperialist capital. For instance, K. Kurian, a prominent Indian economist, writes that between 1948 and 1960 foreign investments in India more than doubled, growing from 2,558 million rupees to 5,664 million.¹

The machinery of the world capitalist division of labour, the force of inertia of the established—in a sense, already traditional—economic links, the activity of imperialist monopolies in the newly-freed countries themselves—all serve to streng-

¹ K. Kurian. *Impact of Foreign Capital on Indian Economy*, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1966, pp. 86, 249.

then the trend to keep the former colonies and semi-colonies in the position of the capitalist world's market for finished goods and supplier of raw materials.

One more aspect of the dependence of former colonies and semi-colonies on the imperialist powers has become apparent in recent years. With the scientific and technological revolution, the growing output of synthetic materials and the mounting difficulties connected with agricultural produce of these countries, which have not yet eliminated their industrial backwardness, are gradually losing their role as major suppliers of raw material. Moreover, they are beginning to import large amounts of foodstuffs from developed capitalist countries.

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, in 1966 the developing countries imported about 4, 500 million dollars' worth of foodstuffs, four per cent more than in 1965. And total exports of agricultural products amounted to 5,600 million dollars.

The general economic dependence on the imperialist powers, the widespread survival of outdated social relations, backwardness, the instability and deformed character of the economy adapted, furthermore, to the needs of the imperialist countries and its excessive sensitivity to fluctuations on the capitalist world market show how susceptible the young states are to pressure on the part of imperialist monopolies. And this in turn provides the imperialists with opportunities for exerting *political* pressure and even dictate their wishes.

At the same time, development of state-monopoly capitalism enables the monopolies to employ

more powerful levers of indirect control and to draw upon all the strength of the state in the sphere of economic expansion too. The so-called aid programme comes under this category. As state-monopoly capitalism grows stronger it becomes possible to adapt colonial policy to the interests of immediate economic returns as well as to subordinate it to the interests of the global strategy of the imperialists, using, at the taxpayers' expense, state budgetary funds.

The state-monopoly tendencies of individual capitalist states to step over their national boundaries (the Common Market, etc.) enable the colonial powers to join forces against the national-liberation movement. Their need for joint action derives also from the fact that today none of these powers, even the strongest, can defend the colonial system single-handed. On the other hand, inter-imperialist contradictions are growing stronger and the rivalry and competition of the monopolies for the markets of the 'third world' are increasing.

The forces of national liberation are now incomparably freer to exploit these contradictions, as colonial barriers have been swept and the young states can establish contacts with other capitalist countries.

To sum up, neo-colonialism develops in a situation when:

— colonial empires have disintegrated and the colonial system is breaking up, but in newly-freed countries there still remain some old relations and bounds of dependence while imperialists retain powerful positions in many areas of the political, economic and intellectual life of these new states;

— an entirely new balance of world forces has

formed, in which the socialist system acts as a counterweight to imperialism and gives all-out support to the forces of national liberation, while imperialist policy towards the former colonies and semi-colonies is not governed only by considerations of colonial exploitation but above all by the interests of its world strategy aimed at stopping the development of world revolution, hence it regards the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as a vital base for the expansion of capitalism;

– the opportunities and the stability of imperialism have been thoroughly undermined by the development of the socialist world system, the collapse of colonial empires, and the upsurge of the international working-class movement, but with its powerful military and economic potential it remains a strong and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement;

– the young national states that have sprung up on the ruins of colonial empires enjoy, though in varying degrees, political independence, but being weak and unstable economically, they remain within the capitalist world economic system and depend on imperialism in that respect;

– all the principal social forces in the newly-freed countries favour economic independence (hence the position of their governments on this issue, no matter what the ruling classes are), but they differ as to how to achieve it and as to what direction socio-economic development should take; so we see the struggle for economic liberation developing in conditions of sharpening class contradictions;

– the national as well as political consciousness of the masses and of society as a whole has grown

considerably; however, proletarian forces sufficiently large and authoritative to take the leadership in the liberation struggle of the nation have not yet formed and in the countries continue to operate influential pro-imperialist groups supported often by those sections of the national bourgeoisie which are scared by the upsurge of the popular movement;

— owing to the unprecedented development and internationalization of trends towards state-monopoly, colonialism obtains new, more powerful and often 'collective' instruments for indirectly dictating its wishes, but at the same time it is confronted with the growth of inter-imperialist contradictions and increased inter-monopoly rivalry, which the young national states can and do take advantage of.

In other words, neo-colonialism arises when imperialism is already too weak to deprive the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies of their recently-won national sovereignty and to be able to dictate to them, as before, but is still strong enough to try to exercise indirect control by, mainly, making use of their economic dependence and backwardness, to prevent consolidating their political independence and achieving economic liberation.

These factors in the international situation and in the developing countries themselves determine not only the emergence of neo-colonialism but also its characteristics.

Neo-colonialism is a system of indirect control and exploitation of the economically undeveloped former colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America now possessing national sovereignty and formal independence.

The imperialists have practised indirect control as a method of dealing with the colonies before. More than half a century ago Lenin wrote: "... finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of *transitional* forms of state dependence. Not only are the two main groups of countries, those owning colonies, and the colonies themselves, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, are typical of this epoch." ¹

However, indirect control was not the dominating form of traditional colonialism. Now it is becoming the rule. Besides, the aims of this control as well as the economic, political and ideological approach on which it is based, have considerably changed.

Economically, indirect control is based on the economic backwardness and dependence of the former colonies and semi-colonies on imperialist monopolies, on their unequal, subordinate and peripheral position in the international capitalist division of labour, which neo-colonialism is seeking to perpetuate through the capitalist development of these countries in certain definite ways and within strict limits, by including them in 'supra-national' state-monopoly agglomerations, etc.

In the *political and military* fields, control is exercised through military and politico-military blocs which are formed under the banner of anti-

¹ V. Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 22, p. 263.

communism and into which young states are drawn through various alliances and associations with or without the participation of imperialist states, through bilateral politico-military agreements between imperialist powers and former colonies and semi-colonies, and by setting the latter in opposition to the socialist community.

In *social* relations, neo-colonialism relies on agreement and alliance with certain sections of the national and bureaucratic bourgeoisie who are compelled by their narrow class and selfish interests and fear of the political awakening of the masses to compromise with imperialism.

In the *ideological* sphere, neo-colonialism is intrinsically bound up with anti-communism, and nationalism, with advocacy of the capitalist way of life and 'Western democracy,' eulogy of the fictitious advantages of co-operation with imperialist powers, and insistence on the adoption of models and theories producing 'optimal' socio-economic development, and so on.

Neo-colonialism is a natural, 'legitimate' heir to the surviving political and economic attributes and institutions of 'classical' colonialism. But it adapts them to its needs. It has not entirely rejected the preferred method of the traditional colonialists—armed force. Suffice it to recall the US aggression in Indochina, the landing of US marines in the Dominican Republic, the Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack on Egypt, the Anglo-American-Belgian intervention in the Congo-Kinshasa, and many other incidents to dispel all illusions on this score. Today, however, the military bludgeon is not the colonialists' principal weapon any longer, and there is far less room to swing it in.

Equally important is the fact that, with the ex-

ception of Portugal and the South African and Rhodesian racialists, the colonialists resort to arms principally in order to impose neo-colonialism—and only when this is the one practical way of achieving their goal. Even many of the wars fought in the colonial period, such as those of the British imperialists in Kenya and Malaya and a military campaign against the patriots of Aden and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, were largely aimed at gaining time and paving the way for the establishment of a political structure which would guarantee, to some extent, the development of the newly liberated countries in a direction suitable to yesterday's colonialists.

3. The Economic and Social Strategy of Neo-Colonialism

The economic sphere is of special importance to neo-colonialism. Whereas the system of direct political subjugation and, with it, all or almost all forms of extra-economic coercion have been eliminated, the economic structure of colonialism has remained, for the most part, intact. It provides the principal basis for exploitation of former colonies and semi-colonies by the imperialists and at the same time an instrument which will help them preserve not only economic control over these countries but also their political positions and the direction of both economic and political development. It will be recalled that in 'classical' colonialism direct military and political rule nearly always supported economic domination.

The importance neo-colonialists attach to economics comes from their desire to defeat the na-

tional-liberation revolution in the field where the decisive battles are being fought at this stage. Neo-colonialism is an inevitable enemy of the people fighting for economic independence.

The tremendous role the neo-colonialists assign to economic problems is seen from the fact that in postwar years, when colonial empires were collapsing, almost all the imperialist powers set up government bodies, state and semi-official organizations to specialize in economic relations with the 'third world.' Among them are the Agency for International Development in the United States, the Ministry of Overseas Development and the Commonwealth Development Corporation in Britain, the Ministry of Economic Co-operation in West Germany, the Economic Co-operation Fund in Japan.

In addition there are the state bodies for directing collective economic activities in the developing countries formed in the 'sixties—the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development which includes the United States, and seventeen European capitalist countries, as well as Canada, Turkey and Japan; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the Economic Development Fund; the International Development Association, and various societies for aid to deal with individual countries.

The economic strategy of neo-colonialism has important features distinguishing it from that of 'classical' colonialism. As noted earlier, the imperialists tried their utmost to prevent the economic development of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the growth of national capitalism. They strove to preserve the desperate economic backwardness of their colonies and the

predominance of a pre-capitalist type of society. Local business men were up against not only ruthless competition from foreign monopolies, but the direct prohibitive measures of the colonial administration.

Today the old methods of keeping the Asian, African and Latin American countries as imperialism's economic and political appendages are no longer of any use.

In the first place, it is simply beyond the latter's power to check economic progress in the newly-freed countries, where development of productive forces is a vital necessity. The efforts to eliminate backwardness and to encourage economic progress provided a solid basis for uniting in an anti-imperialist movement broad social forces, including the national bourgeoisie, which now holds political power in many young states. Naturally, the political victory of this movement can only bring about substantial changes in this respect. The imperialists have to reckon with this, all the more so since the fall of colonial regimes, followed by the rise of national states, usually deprives the colonialists of the possibility of checking the economic development of these states by direct, administrative methods.

In pursuit of their neo-colonialist policy, the imperialists set great store by rapprochement with the local bourgeoisie. But any agreement with it would be impossible if it involved their turning their back on economic progress. The imperialists will not be able to find an influential bourgeois group of any kind who would agree to such conditions.

Furthermore, the imperialists themselves are interested in the economic development of the form-

er colonies and semi-colonies—within certain limits, of course. In their efforts to keep these countries inside the orbit of world capitalism and to prevent their adopting a policy of progressive development which would lead to complete national liberation and ultimately to socialism, the imperialists now work to establish capitalist methods in the economy and all other spheres of life. This, in turn, also presupposes certain economic changes. Moreover, imperialist monopolies expect large profits from the expansion of the domestic markets of the young states, in which they hope to preserve dominant or at least firm positions.

In view of all these factors, neo-colonialism accepts, in fact, the inevitability of economic progress in the newly-freed countries. But the imperialists seek to 'localize,' or limit this progress, to place it under their control and, what is particularly important, to direct it along capitalist lines. *A policy of enforcement of capitalist methods is the basis of every, and especially economic, plan of the neo-colonialists.*

The strategic task of inoculating the developing countries with capitalism is formulated clearly enough in many official and semi-official documents. For instance, this was declared the central aim for the entire US policy towards the 'third world' and for American 'aid' in the report of the Clay Committee set up on President Kennedy's instructions.¹ A similar approach is to be found in the French government's paper on co-operation

¹ *The Scope and Distribution of US Military and Economic Assistance Programmes. Report to President of the USA from the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World*, March 20, 1963.

with the developing countries, which stresses the need to concentrate on "affirming an economic (i.e., capitalist-K. B.) order" in these countries with a view to extending to them "the process of common development of the Atlantic economy."¹

Stimulation of capitalist relations of production in the former colonies and semi-colonies serves the dual purpose of retaining these countries in the capitalist system and protecting colonialism.

As the experience of a number of young states shows, the capitalist road holds out no prospect of bridging within a short space of time the economic gap which is responsible more than anything else for their unequal position and exploitation by imperialism.

Moreover, if we discount exceptional cases (a particularly favourable combination of geographical situation, natural resources and other internal factors), this prospect of staying inside the capitalist system, inside the so-called Western hemisphere, is growing increasingly less possible. As a rule, the young states where capitalist relations are spreading are not able to check the tendency towards increasing economic gap between themselves and the chief capitalist powers. In 1948-49 the average annual income per head of the population in India equalled one-fourteenth, and in 1959-60, less than one-fifteenth of that in Britain, although during these ten years it grew by 18 per cent. And Britain does not belong to the capitalist countries with a relatively high rate of

¹ *La politique de coopération avec les pays en voie de développement.* Rapport de la Commission d'Étude instituée par le décret du 12 mars 1963 remis au gouvernement le 18 juillet 1963, pp. 46-47.

economic growth. The annual increment in per capita national income in the developing countries equals two dollars as against 60 dollars in the imperialist states. ¹

Dynamics of Gross National Product in Developing Countries and Developed Capitalist Countries in 1950-66
(average annual growth rates in per cent) ²

	1950-55	1955-60	1960-66
Developing countries GNP	4.7	4.6	4.5
Per capita GNP	2.8	2.2	2.0
Developed capitalist countries GNP	4.6	3.2	5.0
Per capita GNP	3.6	2.0	3.6

In 1966, George D. Woods, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, declared that "if the present trends are allowed to continue," the balance of this century will see considerable widening of the gulf between the developing and industrial capitalist countries. ³ As R. Dumont and B. Rosier write, today the average per capita income in the United States is 60 times higher than in the African countries; towards the end of this century if no cardinal changes occur it will be 100 times higher. ⁴

¹ *The New York Times*, April 15, 1968.

² UNCTAD. "Growth, Development, Finance and Aid Synchronization of International and National Policies" (TD/7/ Suppl. 1), October 17, 1967, p. 6.

³ *Foreign Affairs*, January-March 1966, p. 207.

⁴ R. Dumont et B. Rosier. *Nous allons à la famine*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 12.

The capitalist world economic system is repeating its policy of encouraging the economic dependence of former colonies and semi-colonies; it continues to extract through various channels billions of profits which makes inroads in the meager capital resources of the local bourgeoisie. At the same time, customary external sources of primary capital accumulation such as war, indemnities and profits made by exploitation of the colonies are not available to the bourgeoisie of the young states. A complicating factor, in many respects, is the scientific and technological revolution, whose achievements benefit mostly the leading capitalist states.

It is far from smooth sailing for capitalist development in the former colonies, because the usual difficulties and contradictions arising out of the spread of capitalism and its basic defects are aggravated by the colonial character of the socio-economic environment. On this soil grow, for the most part, stunted varieties of capitalism often closely connected with feudal and pre-feudal relations. Local capital shows a strong tendency towards "remaining stuck" in the stage of speculative business ventures and even money-lending operations for a long time, while showing no initiative in investing into industry. It is feeble and at times servile in its attitude towards the foreign monopolies. On the other hand, modern capitalism cannot ensure the absolutely necessary degree of concentration, planned utilization of national resources and mobilization of the people's energies demanded for rapid economic progress and reconstruction in developing countries.

The Western imperialists are pushing the young states towards capitalist development by, firstly,

'exporting' capitalist methods directly through their monopolies and, secondly, supporting local private-ownership and capitalist tendencies. For instance, since 1957 the US government has operated a special Economic Development Fund which grants easy-term loans to private business in developing countries. Similar funds have been established by some other imperialist powers. The private sector in the developing countries is also financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its subsidiary branch, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), set up in 1956 "to specialize in the financing of productive private projects in the underdeveloped countries."¹ It was noted in the IFC report for 1966-67 (published in September 1967) that in the period under review its operations reached a record sum and that Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa remained the principal spheres for the promotion of the private sector of the developing economy.

Measures are being taken to ensure that the inevitable economic development of the former colonies should proceed along capitalist lines without overstepping the limits set by the imperialist monopolies.

First, the imperialists make every effort to steer the young states along the course of private, i.e., 'free enterprise', for this course entails (the extreme limitations of local sources of private capitalist accumulation are reason enough) the direct and widespread involvement of foreign monopolies. National capital in the developing countries is, as a rule, feeble and unable, without special support,

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, January-March, 1966, p. 208.

to compete with foreign trusts, who maintain extensive international contacts and rely on a long-established capitalist international division of labour. In addition, the imperialists hold strong positions in the economy of these countries, which could lead ultimately to imperialist monopolies' full control. From time to time this policy finds expression in statements made by top-ranking officials of the Western powers. As was stated in the joint communique on the meeting between Johnson and Erhard in June 1964, the US President and the German Chancellor were of the opinion that consolidation of the private sector could greatly contribute to the economic progress of the developing countries. They proclaimed the necessity of official assistance as well as foreign private investments in order to achieve this goal. Few months later Johnson dotted the i's by declaring that "private capital (both local and foreign—K. B.) must do most of the job for the developing nations." ¹.

The state sector in developing countries provides an effective instrument for independent economic development and opposition to the foreign monopolies. Naturally, the imperialists regard it as a negative and even hostile factor. For example, commenting upon the United States' refusal to assist India in building an iron and steel plant at Bokaro, the Indian newspaper *Patriot* noted that the West was bringing political pressure to bear upon India in order to change the character of its economy. France, through the Common Afro-Malagasy Organization it largely controls, strives to

¹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, November 9, 1964, p. 676.

prevent 'excessive' state intervention in economic affairs and gradually to oust state capital from industries where it was once invested because of lack of private capital. ¹

The increasingly frequent, of late, instances of the imperialists' support for state initiative, in the economy of young states, loans to state-owned enterprises, and statements by certain imperialist leaders recognizing the 'unavoidability' of development of the public sector in the 'third world' countries do not testify to a fundamental change of policy. But rather to a confirmation of it. Imperialist planners intend that, in cases when private business offers no serious alternative or when there is urgent need for investments in transport, communications or social services—fields having little attraction to private capital but essential for its functioning—the state should act as 'midwife' for capitalism. Thus, it is a question of *temporary* development of state capitalism while the economy is in the early stages and private capital has not gained sufficient strength. Besides, it should be borne in mind that here one of neo-colonialism's most important tasks—the promotion of capitalist methods—is not forgotten but, on the contrary, is being pursued, for the time being in the form of state capitalism. Moreover, this kind of state intervention in the economy becomes an important and in some cases indispensable element in the creating an economic base for the bourgeois-reformist solution to the social problems of the former colonies and semi-colonies.

Take the example of Chile. It has been repeatedly noted by Western observers that the United

¹ *Bulletin de l'Afrique noire*, 1964, n° 314, p. 6383.

States, "so suspicious when the matter concerns invasion of the sphere of private initiative by the state sector,"¹ nevertheless took a very benevolent view of the Chilean government's policy although it practised 'Chileanization' (acquisition by the state of half or more shares) of enterprises of national importance, affecting the interests of American companies. All observers agree that the explanation for this is the fact that the Frei government was pursuing a bourgeois reformist policy designed to prevent revolutionary upheavals.²

The neo-colonialists' changed attitude towards the state sector in the developing countries also indicates a certain flexibility in their policy, which is guided, as far as possible, by the prevailing views of public opinion in these countries.

Second, the colonialists, employing all the instruments of state power, try to preserve and broaden channels of penetration for private monopoly capital, and to ensure it freedom of action and control over the general trends and particular aspects of the economic development of the young states.

The influx of private capital from the imperialist countries into the former colonies and semi-colonies is, as will be shown later on, now smaller in volume than the export of state capital through aid programmes. But private imperialist capital—without mentioning the benefits its investments bring to the monopolies—has an exclusive importance and special advantage for the neo-colonialists. It can penetrate the economic and political affairs of young states to a great extent, es-

¹ *Tribune de Genève*, 27 mai 1965.

² *Ibid.*

establish the most direct links with the section of society of importance to the neo-colonialists, and exert an ideological influence appropriate to its needs. As is stated in an official French government document, a foreign enterprise in "an underdeveloped country becomes a centre of social life, omnipresent and all-embracing."¹

Imperialist governments and monopolies are doing everything they can to create a favourable climate for capital investment in the former colonies and semi-colonies.

In recent years the United States has imposed guarantees on agreements to private investors in 63 of the developing countries. By 1966, the sum total of guaranteed capital investment had reached 2,000 million dollars. Under France's pressure, eighteen states of the Common Afro-Malagasy Organization have introduced investment codes extending additional legal and fiscal privileges and guarantees to foreign (in practice, predominantly French) companies.² Moreover, the Organization has adopted decisions on 'collective' guaranteeing by the member states of private investors against economic and political 'risks.'

The imperialist states themselves grant special privileges and guarantees to stimulate the expansion in the 'third world' of their private capital which is held back by the businessmen's fear of the national-liberation movement, nationalization, etc. The West German federal budget annually earmarks thousands of millions as guarantees to

¹ *La politique de coopération avec les pays en voie de développement*. Rapport de la Commission d'Etude instituée par le décret du 12 mars 1963 remis au gouvernement le 18 juillet 1963, p. 27.

² *Statistique et études financières*, mai 1963, p. 470.

investors. The US government, too, grants special privileges to corporations operating in developing countries. Among other things, it has set up a special fund to guarantee their investments. As E. Hutchison, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Africa of the US Agency for International Development, declared at a press conference, "It is the established policy of the United States government and of AID to foster, encourage, and promote participation by private enterprises in foreign economic development."¹

The state capital of the imperialist powers often partners monopolies in setting up enterprises in developing countries. Here are a few examples from African countries.

In Gabon the deposits of manganese and its extraction are controlled by COMILOG, a concern in which the French State Bureau of Mining and Geological Prospecting holds 22 per cent of the shares, the private French companies—Compagnie el Hadid du Mokta, and some others—29 per cent, and US Steel, 49 per cent. The imperialist state and private sectors participate together in the mining of Gabonese iron ore (Société des mines de fer de Micambo) and uranium (Compagnie des mines d'uranium de Franceville), Tanzanian gold (Tangold Mining), Mauretanian iron ore (MIFERMA), and so on.

In postwar period the increase of the role of private monopoly capital in the economic development of former colonies and semi-colonies has always been, under every American administration, an officially proclaimed task of US imperialism. President Nixon, for example, in his message

¹ *Afrika Report*, December 1964, p. 46.

to Congress concerning assistance to foreign states stressed the necessity to activize private capital initiative, both at home and abroad. With this aim, he suggested to set up a special corporation of private investments abroad which would be co-ordinating the US efforts in rendering assistance to developing countries.

Third, foreign monopolies are doing everything to establish the closest possible ties with local capital, to enmesh it in a network of partnerships. In this way they want to deprive it of freedom of action and retain their control over it, to tie the interests of the local bourgeoisie or at least of a part to their own interests. Another objective is to facilitate and camouflage, through 'partnership,' their expansion into 'third world' countries.

Influential imperialist circles regard 'association' of foreign capital with local capital (implying establishment of control over the latter) as the most reliable and promising. "The more foreign enterprise is Africanized, the less likely it is to be nationalized," writes Vernon Mckay, a noted American financier and politician. "Business initiative such as this operates in the national interest of the United States and in the private interests of the companies concerned. . ." ¹

With the encouragement and active assistance of the imperialist governments, which grant special loans for the purpose, the monopolies increasingly promote the establishment of mixed companies with the participation of local, primarily private, capital, and compel them to go shares with already existing foreign enterprises. A spe-

¹ V. Mckay. *Africa in World Politics*, New York, Harpers and Row, 1963, p. 45.

cial Private Investments Bureau operates in the United States for the purpose of facilitating the merging American and local capital in 'politically unstable areas.' In countries of East, South and Central Africa a number of mixed companies have been set up by Tanganyika Concessions, an influential British colonial firm, and even by such giant trusts as Imperial Chemical Industries, British Motor Corporation and British Petroleum. In West Africa, the British United Africa Company has established mixed firms such as among others West African Portland Cement, Nigerian Plastics and Nigerian Prestressed Concrete.

Several mixed companies have been set up on the Ivory Coast by West German capital: SIBUA (70 per cent of shares belong to FRG), SIFKI, SIFMA and SOKASI. They operate in the wood-working and automobile industries and in the production of palm oil. Some enterprises with the participation of local capital are being jointly organized by French and West German trusts.

In 1958 Malaysia adopted a law granting privileges to companies which create 'new branches of industry.' In six years (1958-64) this status was extended to 14 foreign and 48 mixed enterprises with the participation of Malaysian and foreign capital. In the course of 1966 more than 70 American companies, most of them, mixed, were launched in the country.¹

Active development of a system of 'mixed' companies and strengthening, on this basis, ties between local and foreign capital is taking place in India. In 1956 only seventeen out of a large number of companies set up by foreign capital were registered as mixed; in the early 1960s they ex-

¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 13, 1967, p. 102.

ceeded a thousand. Between 1957 and December 1965 Indian companies concluded 2,358 agreements on the joint establishment of enterprises with foreign partners, among them 408 with American, 663 with British and 348 with German companies.¹

In establishing joint enterprises the imperialists also utilize the export of state capital under 'aid' programmes. 'Mixing' is done in different combinations: with local state or private capital, or with both. For instance, ALUCAM, a bauxite-processing company in Cameroon, is owned jointly by the Cameroonian government, France's Central Bank for Economic Co-operation, and the French monopolies Pechiney and Ugine. The Guinean government and the American Harvey Aluminium Company run Bauxites de Guinée, while shares in Consafric are owned by the Guinean government and a group of European banks: Deutsche Bank (West Germany), Banque Rothschild, Banque de l'Indochine and Banque de Paris and des Pays-Bas (France), and Credit Suisse (Switzerland). An oil prospecting company is owned, on a fifty-fifty basis, by the Italian state company ENI and the Moroccan government. ENI branches operate under the same conditions in Tunisia and Ghana.

Highly characteristic, in this respect, is the activity of the British Commonwealth Development Corporation, most of whose working capital is supplied by the Treasury. It organizes 'development corporations' in former British colonies, enlisting the participation of local private and state investors as well as British (primarily private) ca-

¹ *The Eastern Economist*, November 1964, p. 993. *New Age*, May 29, 1966, p. 12.

pital. In 1960-65 such corporations were set up in Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and the Lesser Antilles. In 1965 British investments in local 'development corporations,' made through the CDC, totalled 132.6 million pounds, almost 4.5 times more than in 1960. Through these corporations the CDC establishes contacts with, and gains influence over, a part of the bourgeoisie and officialdom, to whom it provides additional income and 'cushy jobs' in corporations and branches of British companies, etc.

Fourth, the imperialists are doing everything within their power to prevent the economic development of the young states from basically changing their economic structure and to preserve them as sources of raw materials, commodity markets and spheres of application of imperialist finance capital. Establishment of certain branches of light industry, further development of mining, rationalization of agriculture coupled with increasing its export specialization and rejection of genuine industrialization—all made up the policy the imperialism strove to impose on the newly-freed countries.

In recent years, however, appreciable changes have taken place, not so much in official policy as in the practical attitude of the monopolies towards the question of industrial development of the 'third world.' At present developing countries receive from industrial capitalist states more than a quarter of the latter's export of machinery and industrial equipment. Between 1956 and 1963 United African Company, the largest of the monopolies operating in the African continent, trebled its investments in the manufacturing industry of former British West Africa which was an in-

crease of 18 to 60 per cent of total invested capital.

This is explained primarily by the monopolies' chase after profits, by the inherent nature of competitive struggle, by their desire to capture ahead of their rivals the expanding markets in developing countries as well as by certain changes in the tactics of the imperialist monopolies. They adapt themselves to the changing situation, by capturing *new* and *different* key positions in the developing economy of former colonies and semi-colonies, i.e., in the leading branches of the manufacturing industry.

In this connection it will be recalled that 'backwardness' is a relative term. A level of development which appeared very high half a century ago would be regarded as pathetically low today. This is one of the laws of dynamics, that, naturally, can be fully applied to the problem of the level of backwardness of the Asian, African and Latin American countries and of the economic gap between them and the industrial centres of capitalism, and demands, accordingly, a dialectical understanding of the nature of the problem.

It would be wrong to think that this backward state and economic gap will remain unchanged. On the contrary, they have both somewhat changed compared, let us say, with the 1940s. It appears likely that eventually neo-colonialism will make increasing use of not only the absolute backwardness of the 'third world' but in particular of their relative, technical backwardness. It will concentrate in the imperialist states the most progressive and leading branches of industry which will benefit from the principal achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. Note-

worthy in this respect is the opinion regarding the stand of US monopolies expressed by Georges Dupoy, correspondent of the French newspaper *Figaro* who studied their activity in Peru: "In recent years the Americans have held that the old capitalist pattern—export of raw materials, import of finished goods—does not justify itself any longer. Rich Peruvians ought to develop manufacturing industry in their country which, while not competing with the United States in any way, would enable the latter to devote itself to technically more sophisticated branches."¹ Although such views evidently exaggerate the readiness of the American monopolies to abandon the 'old capitalist pattern,' they seem to be of definite interest from the viewpoint of the broader long-range aspects of the economic strategy of neo-colonialism.

Thus, *the economic strategy of neo-colonialism presupposes certain concessions to the developing countries compatible with its principal economic objectives: exploitation of the former colonies and semi-colonies by imperialism and prevention of the attainment by these countries of economic independence and their entry upon the road of social progress.* In their long-range plans the neo-colonialist policy makers assign to the developing countries the role of 'backward capitalist' areas dependent on the imperialist powers and greatly inferior to them in the level of economic development.

The neo-colonialists are doing their utmost to extend and consolidate their foothold in the newly-freed countries. They do not rely only on their direct agents but mostly on the *social* base: on

¹ *Le Figaro*, 19 octobre 1966, p. 5.

sections and groups whose socio-economic nature and class interests enable the imperialists, in varying degrees, to seek agreement with them. In its approach to the social forces in the Asian, African and Latin American countries neo-colonialism differs substantially from 'classical' colonialism.

As has been noted, the social base of the colonial regimes was, as a rule, feudal and tribal leaders, and also compradore groups. This was in conformity with the system of direct political rule, with the policy of more or less completely freezing the economic progress of the colonies and perpetuating pre-capitalist relations. Even now the colonialists are not prepared to give up all contact with these social groups, or to discontinue their support of the remaining vestiges of feudal and pre-feudal society. But their influence is on the wane. It is being undermined by both economic development and by the growth of national awareness as well as by the national-liberation struggle which shows up the unattractive and unpatriotic role these groups play. In view of this the imperialists are searching for *a new and broader* social base for their policy in the developing countries, being unable and unwilling to stake everything on the forces of the past. The imperialists have set their course on agreement and even alliance with certain sections of the local bourgeoisie and pro-bourgeois groups which is to provide the social base for their neo-colonialist policy. It is on this policy that the social strategy of neo-colonialism is essentially based.

Faced with a new situation in the former colonies and semi-colonies, with the awakening of the masses, the growing role of public opinion and the widespread nationalist feelings, the imperial-

ists are working to secure the co-operation of a social force, less remote from the people than the representatives of feudal and compradore interests, which is capable of exercising a certain measure of influence. Apart from everything else, by concentrating orientation on the bourgeoisie neo-colonialism is carrying out its general policy of promoting the development of capitalist relations.

In most former colonies the establishment of national states is accompanied by the consolidation of the economic and political positions of the local bourgeoisie. In India, for instance, the share of local companies and individual businessmen in total investments in the economy grew from 44 per cent in 1948 to 83 per cent in the mid-sixties. Following independence dozens of large industrial establishments slipped from under British control. Tata, Birla, Tapar, Mookerjee and other representatives of big Indian capital advanced to leading positions in the metallurgical, cement, sugar, paper and other industries.

In the Philippines, the participation of the local bourgeoisie in long-term investment has more than doubled in the postwar period.

In Thailand, local investment in industry alone made up, in the period 1959-65, two-thirds of the aggregate capital of 339 new companies.

In 1965 the Ivory Coast had about 10,000 native planters each of whom owned at least ten hectares of land and five farmhands. Constituting only nine per cent of the farmers in the country, they possessed about 30 per cent of the total cultivated area.

Imperialist politicians assume that the neo-colonialist policy aimed at capitalist development of the young states cannot fail to attract in some deg-

ree influential sections of the national bourgeoisie. In fact, they count on the *class solidarity* of the latter.

In the past years the neo-colonialists have been paying close attention to the so-called bureaucratic or administrative bourgeoisie and the local intelligentsia. The former is on the rise in nearly all the young independent states, and in some of them it is the principal if not the only 'representative' of the bourgeois or pro-bourgeois forces. As the French *Le Monde* wrote, "in Africa the term 'bourgeoisie' is almost a synonym of bureaucracy."

The designation 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is usually applied to certain sections of officialdom, including the highest echelons of state power, who are isolated from, and even hostile to, the people and abuse their authority in order to line their pockets. On a broader plane, the rise of this group can be regarded as one of the ways in which a local bourgeoisie is formed, and its 'practical activity,' as a peculiar form of primary accumulation. Discussing the situation in the Central African Republic, *Le Monde* reported that corruption among the bureaucratic elements in that country, or 'mandarins from Ubangi,' as it called them, "has assumed such proportions that administrative inspectors have devised an unwritten rule which stipulates that legal proceedings should not be started until the damage exceeds 250,000 West African francs." ¹

More striking facts of this kind are provided by the Indian authors S. Dwivedi and G. Bhargava in their book *Political Corruption in India*. They report that, according to the government commis-

¹ *Le Monde*, 4-5 janvier 1966.

sion, Santanama, between 1958 and 1968 illegal licences were issued to a total sum of 23.8 million rupees. These licences were resold to speculators for an estimated 100 million rupees, a large part of which was pocketed by government officials. The Central Board of Revenues reports that with the complicity of public servants the state is robbed every year of 2,300 million rupees in concealed income. Approximately 1,400 million rupees, or about five per cent of all allocations for construction, are estimated to have been misappropriated during the second five-year plan period.

S. Dwivedi and G. Bhargava furnish examples of the corruption of high-ranking politicians. For instance, P. Kairon, Chief Minister of Punjab, helped his two sons become multi-millionaires. In two years the Chief Minister of Orissa increased his fortune from 2,000 to 160,000 rupees, while another leader of the same state managed to make, in ten year's tenure of office, 100 million rupees. Misuse of their functions by politicians reached such proportions that a special government commission suggested introducing a special code of morals for ministers.¹

By virtue of its position and methods of enrichment the bureaucratic bourgeoisie can adopt positions which are extremely anti-national and opposed to the interests of the people.

As far as the intelligentsia is concerned, the imperialists take into consideration its special significance and influence in countries with a scarcity of people with any training and education. In their efforts to influence the broadest possible sec-

¹ S. Dwivedi and G. Bhargava. *Political Corruption in India*, New Delhi, Popular Books Services, 1967, pp. 29-32.

tions of the intelligentsia, the imperialists concentrate on the groups which show pro-bourgeois, anti-democratic and snobbish trends and are attracted to the 'Western way of life.' Nor do they overlook the petty bourgeoisie. They take advantage of its propensity to vacillate politically from one extreme to another which can lead to its becoming a tool of the reactionary forces.

The imperialists employ a whole arsenal of economic, political and ideological means to induce certain bourgeois and pro-bourgeois elements to enter into collusion with them which in effect amounts to their retreat or even capitulation before imperialism, rejection of certain essential national aspirations, and adoption, in some measure or other, of unpatriotic positions.

As an *economic basis of agreement* with the national bourgeoisie the imperialists put forward *neo-colonialist economic aims* which allow and even presuppose a certain degree of growth and enrichment of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, even the limited economic development of Asian, African and Latin American countries envisaged by neo-colonialist policy would considerably extend, as compared with the colonial past, the local bourgeoisie's opportunity to develop and prosper.

What the imperialist monopolies offer the local bourgeoisie is, in fact, a share in the market of the 'third world.' They, of course, do not have in mind sharing on an equal basis but simply the participation of the national bourgeoisie in exploiting the resources of the young countries as a junior partner.

The imperialists' economic concessions, even though forced, serve as a bait in winning over the social strata they need on their side. They are, in

fact, a special form of bribery, which the imperialists always used in their colonial policy. Since the object of bribery is no longer the feudal and tribal nobility but certain sections of the bourgeoisie, including business, the neo-colonialists have changed their methods. This does not fully apply to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, here bribery is often carried out in a more traditional and direct way. Considerable sums from the imperialists' 'aid' stick to their hands and they also take bribes from foreign firms for arranging deals which are often injurious to national interests.

It would seem pointless to offer a platform of unequal co-operation to the bourgeoisie now, when it operates in conditions of national sovereignty and is generally backed by its own state.

But the imperialists expect to exploit the process of social differentiation in the young states and the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie. They are well aware that in a new situation, marked by growing social antagonisms, popular discontent and activity of the progressive forces and organizations, the reactionary tendencies of a part of the national bourgeoisie gain strength while its potential as an anti-imperialist force becomes weaker. Realizing that its class objectives—capitalist development, economic domination of the domestic market and political domination of 'its' people—run counter to the aspirations of the masses, the bourgeoisie is searching for allies in the struggle against them.

That is precisely why the neo-colonialists advance *anti-communism* as an *ideological and political basis* for agreement with the national bourgeoisie. It is a highly effective instrument in winning the latter's allegiance. The imperialists

regard the self-seeking, narrow class tendencies of the national bourgeoisie as an important factor in reaching agreement with its anti-democratic wing.

Nor can we ignore certain peculiar features of the national bourgeoisie which arise from its colonial background and greatly influence its attitude towards imperialism. These are its weakness and political lack of courage, its surviving dread of the power of imperialism, its old ties with foreign monopolies, and finally its efforts to go on benefiting from these ties.

The imperialists increasingly employ various levers to foster the growth of the so-called middle class in the developing countries—businessmen, traders and farmers of the capitalist type, the intelligentsia and officialdom linked with them, and other bourgeois elements. In addition to the above-mentioned forms of economic encouragement they resort to direct bribery, especially in countries pursuing restrictive policies with regard to national capital. They contribute to the corruption of separate sectors of the administration enticing government officials into illegal ways of making it only for the purpose of binding their interests to those of private business and the imperialists. Realizing the tremendous role of, and prospects for, educated young people in the liberated countries, they organize large-scale training of specialists for these countries. They are careful to educate them as the proponents of the 'Western way of life,' and to increase the number of people infected with the virus of private enterprise and willing to become its carriers.

The aim of encouraging capitalist relations and the rise of the 'middle class' and maintaining a

bourgeois political and state structure is also served by imperialist propaganda for 'reforms' in Asian, African and Latin American countries, which has been particularly active in recent years. The US government, for instance, declared 'reforms' to be one of the primary objectives of the so-called Alliance for Progress ('aid' programme to the Latin American countries) which was a complete failure, as is known. The American and, for that matter, the entire Western press admitted that the central idea of the Alliance was to obstruct revolutionary processes in Latin America through prodding on bourgeois reforms.

In countries with national-bourgeois governments the imperialists promote the growth of private proprietary and capitalist elements to fortify the social base of these governments. Where revolutionary-democratic forces are in power, this is done in order to facilitate the struggle against their concentration on social progress. Finally, in countries with puppet regimes the objective of this policy is consolidation and even a certain nationalist evolution of the latter.

Incidentally, the imperialists are by no means always interested in establishing puppet regimes. There is no denying that regimes, which ensure the best possible conditions for colonial rule, have always been preferred. But the entire post-war experience has taught the imperialists that in the present upsurge of the national-liberation struggle puppet regimes are highly unstable. They provide a target for the tremendous power of nationwide protest; their existence serves as a catalyst for the political awakening of the masses and inculcation in them radical ideas and for

the growth of anti-imperialist feelings among the national bourgeoisie whose development these regimes often seriously impede as they fear its claim to power. Let us take as examples the regimes of Nuri Said-Faisal in Iraq, Batista in Cuba, Youlou in the Congo-Brazzaville, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Duvalier in Haiti or the present Saigon clique in South Vietnam.

In other words, puppet regimes frequently frustrate the plans for crushing national-liberation revolutions by reformist or conciliatory methods. For this reason the imperialists often prefer governments headed by conciliatory groups of the local bourgeoisie, as they realize they would not endanger but, on the contrary, help carry out the principal aims of neo-colonialist policy. As *Le Monde* wrote "when dictatorships of the Batista or Trujillo type... tumble down, they pave the way for communism." Touching upon the same subject, Walter Lippmann noted: "As a general rule the most impeccable anti-communist governments are more often than not reactionary, stupid, and corrupt."¹

Nevertheless, puppet dictatorships are kept in power through imperialist support alone in all the three continents concerned. As we see it, there is no contradiction here. To be sure, one should not underestimate both the reactionary sympathies of the imperialist leaders and the fact that their policy of support for bourgeois-reformist regimes is pursued in conditions of a conflict between their striving to completely subjugate Asian, African and Latin American countries, in

¹ *The New York Herald Tribune*, June 17, 1965.

order to implant obedient regimes, and their recognition of 'fragility' and unreliability of such regimes as a tool of neo-colonialist policy. At the same time, there are only a few African countries left where the former colonial rulers refrain from 'innovations,' as they do not yet feel any serious threat to their hegemony. In every other case the imperialists desperately cling to obvious puppet regimes in spite of themselves, largely because they have no suitable alternative or because they fear the 'difficulties' and 'unforeseeable developments' of what bourgeois observers call the transitional period.

The imperialists are desperately afraid that in the process of replacing obvious puppet regimes the Left or patriotic forces will seize the initiative and gain power. This is a particular danger as the reformist and conciliatory parties and groups of the bourgeoisie, above all the petty bourgeoisie, with which they would like to do business are not politically homogeneous and more often than not include fairly influential forces which keep much to the left of the 'official line.'

Hence the problem which faces the neo-colonialists, or, in Lippmann's words, the 'dilemma' which 'confronts continually' the United States: whether to accept the risk involved in removing too discredited groups, or to go on sustaining them. Noting that the former demanded 'a lot more acumen and political courage,' Lippmann concluded: "...Nevertheless, in the task of containing the expansion of communism there is no substitute for the building up of strong and viable states." ¹

¹ *The New York Herald Tribune*, June 17, 1965.

In practice, however, pressed by various factors, including those mentioned above, the imperialist governments do not always act in the way recommended by Lippmann. They do not have complete freedom of manoeuvre in this field, which is due, among other things, to the fact that with the exception of a few particularly servile regimes the pro-imperialist and corrupt governments in former colonies and semi-colonies are gradually acquiring a certain degree of independence. They are often prepared to do everything to survive, even in defiance of their imperialist patrons, causing them additional troubles and difficulties.

4. The Ideological and Political Doctrine of Neo-Colonialism

The neo-colonialists' plan to retain the liberated countries in the system of world capitalism in the capacity of unequal, subordinate members would be impossible to carry out without an extensive ideological campaign designed to prevent the spread of progressive ideas, to influence certain sections of the intelligentsia, the white-collar workers, students and young people generally, and through them other sections of society. This objective determines the essence of the entire ideological and political strategy of neo-colonialism and its main problems.

The great importance the imperialists attach to ideological weapons today stems from the particular nature of neo-colonialism, from the need to replace direct subjugation by indirect and

from the diminishing effectiveness of military suppression.

The character and orientation of the neo-colonialist ideological campaign cannot fail to conform to a certain extent to the situation in the world which is marked by a sharp ideological confrontation of the two world systems, and in the former colonies themselves, where anti-colonialist feeling is high, and where the broad masses, who have undergone a revolution in their national and political outlook in the course of the liberation struggle, started action.

Consequently, the political and ideological doctrine of neo-colonialism is the farthest removed from traditional colonialism. While its heritage is not ignored, it does not conform to the nature or practical aims of neo-colonialism.

'Classical' colonialism openly and demonstratively relied on brute force, on the military power and superiority of the imperialist oppressors. Even if it did need—undoubtedly to a much lesser degree—an ideological and political justification for its dominance, and influence on the colonies, it was little more than open apology for its system of oppression and exploitation which trampled underfoot their traditions of national dignity and culture.

The ideology of traditional colonialism was, in effect, racialism. Although it exerted a certain influence over a certain, very insignificant, part of the population of the colonies, by encouraging a servile attitude towards the foreign conqueror, racialism was not designed for the enslaved peoples. The advocates of colonial adventurism addressed themselves principally to the people

of the metropolitan countries. Extolling the 'white man's mission,' they acted as recruiting agents for colonial expeditions.

The outcome of the Second World War and the downfall of Nazi Germany signified a complete defeat and discrediting of the theory and practice of racialism. In an international situation marked by struggle between the two world systems, by the steadfast advance of the ideas of national and social freedom, the break-up of the colonial empires, substantial changes in the character of colonialism, and the growing struggle of the peoples of the developing countries for complete deliverance from imperialist oppression, racialism can no longer serve as the ideological and political basis of colonialism, as an instrument of ideological expansion in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is more likely to have the opposite effect by adding fuel to the flames of the anti-colonial struggle, all the more so since, by evoking the wrath of the colonial peoples, it has already helped to rouse them against the system of colonial oppression. Nor can racialism serve as an instrument of vindication and propaganda for neo-colonialism in the imperialist countries themselves. And yet the neo-colonialists must have some influence on public opinion in these countries in order to justify their governments' policies towards the 'third world.'

In dire need of an ideological 'cover,' and realizing the utter untenability of racialism in this respect, neo-colonialism has worked out its own strategy for obtaining ideological and political influence. This ideology represents a whole number of ideas and premises relating to both socio-

logy and political theory, which answer the requirements of modern imperialist colonial policy and help to further realization of its aims as well as justify and camouflage its methods.

It would be wrong to believe that neo-colonialist ideology has nothing to do with racialism. It has adopted, in some form or other, a great number of racialist ideas. These have been modified to conform to its peculiarities and requirements, primarily, with the object of camouflaging them.

To look for a more or less comprehensive exposition of this ideology, especially, in 'unadorned' form, would be a waste of time. The different elements which make up the ideological and political doctrine of neo-colonialism often stand far apart as regards methods and relation to other scientific theories. They are to be found dispersed among the works of bourgeois specialists in different fields of knowledge. But for all the eclecticism of the many tenets of neo-colonialist doctrine and of the methods in which it has been united into a single ideology, it is undeniable that a whole system of ideological and political argumentation and vindication of neo-colonialism has emerged and that it is incomparably more involved, flexible, casuistic and sophisticated in approach than the racialist theories.

As distinct from racialism with its advocacy of colonial rule, the neo-colonialist doctrine disassociates itself from the cause it serves and even denies the existence of neo-colonialism. Numerous bourgeois authors take great pains to prove that neo-colonialism is a figment of the imagination and that the term itself has been thrown up

by 'Communist literature.'¹ Brian Crozier, professor of the Royal Institute of International Relations in London and an *Economist* observer, asserts that "the cry of 'neo-colonialism' was just a parrot-cry of adolescence...the crying need is to break away from the colonial past of bitterness and suspicion."² Urging the leaders of the developing countries to establish new, more useful, and fruitful relations with the former imperial powers, he declares, "If all this constituted 'neo-colonialism' then neo-colonialism would be a good thing. But I would prefer to call it interdependence."³ A. Kamarck is equally outspoken, "The Marxist-Leninist idea that underdeveloped countries, including those of Africa, were vital to imperial powers as an outlet for investment no longer has any real basis, even in theory."⁴

The doctrine of neo-colonialism like neo-colonialism itself offers exploitation and a parasitical attitude to society as solutions to the real problems and requirements which the social development of the former colonies and semi-colonies demands. It counts on utilizing the growing social stratification in these countries and the self-seeking interests of the privileged sections of society, while hiding behind talk about 'democracy' and 'freedom.'

What are the main targets of the ideological strategy of neo-colonialism and the main points of its doctrine?

¹ B. Crozier. *Neo-Colonialism. A Background Book*, London, 1964, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ A. Kamarck. *The Economics of African Development*, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 68-69.

First comes anti-communism, the principal ideological and political weapon of neo-colonialism and virtually the lynch-pin of its whole ideology. Anti-communist propaganda is used as a smokescreen to cover the imperialist activities in the colonies. Resistance to 'communist aggression' explains imperialism's expansion in developing countries, its efforts to prevent their independent, progressive development, and its attempts to save colonialism. This is how imperialism seeks to facilitate the implementation of its plans, lull the vigilance of public opinion in the newly-freed countries in regard to the colonialists' manoeuvres, weaken resistance to its subversive actions, and turn back the anti-imperialist tide in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

That is the most traditional use of anti-communism. Shortly after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia the imperialist politicians and ideologists, faced with the growing struggle of the oppressed peoples, frequently circulated provocative reports about 'the hand of Moscow' and the 'intrigues of the Comintern.' It can be recalled that in 1923 the Soviet Union was handed the 'Curzon Ultimatum' (called after its author, the British Foreign Secretary at that time), accusing Soviet representatives in Eastern countries of seditious activities and demanding their immediate recall. In that period the national-liberation movement itself was declared to be the work of Soviet Communists and depicted as something introduced from outside with no roots in the life of the Asian and African countries.

Today, the struggle for national liberation is hardly ever ascribed to 'communist intrigues.'

The tremendous scope of the movement, which has embraced hundreds of millions of people and spread over whole continents, the participation in it of social groups, political parties and leaders who can hardly be suspected of communist sympathies have convincingly demonstrated the falsity of the above-mentioned allegations. Besides, now that, on the one hand, anti-communism has become the principal imperialist propaganda weapon in Asia, Africa and Latin America and, on the other, even the imperialists feel constrained to recognize the national-liberation movement as 'legitimate'—within 'reasonable' limits, of course—to attribute it to Communists would mean contributing to the growth of their authority.

Today imperialist propaganda blames the Communists for all the difficulties and problems the peoples of Asia and Africa are grappling with in their struggle for liberation and independent development. Communists are depicted as an unpatriotic, extraneous, 'imported' force which is insinuating itself into the liberation movement in order to utilize it for its 'special ends' which run counter to the national interests of the peoples of the East.

Prof. W. Rostow, a noted American expert on international problems, declared in his lecture at the University of Freiburg that Communist policy in the developing countries serves the following aims: "to encourage an exaggerated nationalism" and heighten "regional conflicts;" to divert "scarce energies, resources, and talents away from the constructive tasks of modernization;" to damage relations between developing nations and "the more advanced democratic nations"

which could be an important source of assistance; to prevent, wherever possible, the creation of an "effective political democracy."¹

Robert Trumbull, another important writer on these questions, asserts that the main cause of the current economic and political crisis in Asian countries lies in a considerable rise of 'Communist influence,'² while Fritz Schatten, chief of the international department of the West German broadcasting service, claims that Communists 'exploit' the programme of liberation struggle and Afro-Asian solidarity in order to establish control over the forces of national liberation.³

James Reston, the well-known American columnist, adds his comment "...The Communists, as usual, are exploiting this chaos and nationalistic yearnings."⁴

Furthermore, the imperialists still go on declaring that the 'Communist menace,' which they invented, is the main social problem of the developing countries and the chief obstacle preventing them from carrying out their national goals. This enables them to crudely distort the meaning of the revolutionary processes taking place in Asia, Africa and Latin America, by concealing their anti-imperialist direction. Realizing that the trend of developments in these continents has an important bearing on the prospects of the competition between the two world systems, the apologists of colonialism contend that the social life of the developing countries at the present

¹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, April 5, 1965, p. 493.

² R. Trumbull. *The Scrutable East*, New York, 1964.

³ F. Schatten. *Communism in Africa*, London, 1966, p. 277.

⁴ *The New York Times*, September 8, 1965.

stage pivots around the struggle between communism and anti-communism and not the conflict between the forces of national liberation and imperialism, which is alleged to have been resolved with the break-up of the colonial empires.

The colonialists' intentions are clear. They want to force on the public in these countries the anti-communist blinkers in order to disorientate it, to confuse the issue as to who the real adversary is in the fight for national liberation, to blunt the edge of the liberation struggle, to camouflage and justify colonialist policy, especially in its new forms. Their political and ideological tactics are aimed at preventing the newly-liberated peoples from distinguishing who is for and who is against revolutions for national liberation, at disarming them politically and pushing them towards compromising with imperialism.

By raising an anti-communist smokescreen, the imperialists also endeavour to blind the people to their own activities in the colonies which range from armed intervention to the most subtle neo-colonialist manoeuvres. Analyzing the US policy towards the 'third world' and specifically in the Congo, the well-known French journalist Geneviève Tabouis noted that "what has until now been called struggle against subversion is in fact one of the means of establishing... a government system and an economic structure which the Americans regard as the best."¹ This is an apt comment which could be equally well applied to other imperialists.

It would be hard to find an instance when the

¹ *Paris-Jour*, 15 août 1964.

imperialists did not try to present their crude interference in the internal affairs of Asian, African and Latin American countries as a struggle against the 'Communist menace.' It is precisely in this light that the imperialist propagandists have interpreted all major postwar clashes between the forces of national liberation and imperialism. The Dutch aggression against Indonesia, the tripartite attack on Egypt, France's war against the Algerian people, the colonial wars of Portugal, the US intervention in the Dominican Republic, the landing of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan, the disgraceful war now being waged by the United States in Vietnam—have all been presented by colonialist propagandists as a struggle against communism. Anti-communism is also used to camouflage the imperialist policy of forcing countries and peoples to accept corrupt puppet dictatorships as well as numerous examples of economic aggression and political blackmail, etc.

Anti-communism is also a trump card in the neo-colonialist game of exploiting the growing social differentiation and sharpening class contradictions in developing countries. At a time when the rallying of all the anti-imperialist forces in these countries becomes decisive for the national-liberation revolutions and social progress, anti-communism is brought into play to weaken the influence and undermine the positions of the progressive elements in these countries, to isolate them from other groups and sections of the liberation movement and to endeavour to split it. Although anti-communism is directed primarily against Communists, it is used practically against all revolutionaries, and all staunch anti-imperial-

ists. It is not accidental that none of the revolutionary leaders of the struggle for national liberation, patriots and progressives—from Lumumba to Nasser and Ne Win—have avoided the accusation of being Communist. The imperialists prefer to attack such non-Communist patriots in the underhanded way, by calling them 'Communists' or 'pro-Communists' instead of fighters for national independence.

On the other hand, anti-communism is of the first importance to the neo-colonialists' plans with regard to the national bourgeoisie. The imperialists capitalize on the anti-democratic tendencies of certain sections of the national bourgeoisie, on their innate fear of the masses which grows in measure as social contradictions sharpen and on their class hostility towards socialism. With loud cries about the Communist menace and the 'common enemy,' and by playing up in general to the reactionary leanings of this part of the national bourgeoisie, they try to create such an ideological atmosphere which would eventually lead to its compromising with the imperialists.

Lastly, anti-communism is used by imperialists to influence the international positions of the newly-liberated countries. They try to secure their support for imperialist foreign policy, draw them into pro-imperialist military and political alliances and blocs, check the development of their contacts and cooperation with the socialist world and even set them against it. To achieve this the imperialists often call on the class solidarity of the privileged sections of society in power in many of the young independent countries.

In effect the imperialists' objective is to prevent these countries from utilizing any of the advantages they might have gained from the existence of the socialist world system, to deprive them of, or at least restrict, the possibility of their relying on it in the struggle against colonialism. In point of fact, the imperialists are out to turn areas of the former colonial and semi-colonial world into a kind of battlefield for the cold war against the socialist states. They still regard the developing countries as a target of their foreign policy, and a zone for their influence and rivalry.

It is possible to single out certain specific lines and forms of anti-communist propaganda-bearing in mind, of course, that in practice they all intertwine.

In the first place, it should be said that the colonialists direct their blows against Communists and other progressives in the Asian and African countries themselves. As has been noted, they declare Communist parties to be 'neither national nor patriotic.' This is usually a reference to the fact that communists adhere to the principles of proletarian internationalism.

In these accusations slander goes hand in hand with ignorance, and they reflect the narrow-mindedness, typical of imperialist ideologists, which regards patriotism and internationalism as incompatible. Communists do not conceal their allegiance to the interests of the world liberation movement and to its vanguard, the working class; nor do they make any secret of their intention to rally together the peoples of the whole world. But this allegiance and this aim are inseparable from Communists' unshakable devotion

to the national interests of their own people.

Every success of the world liberation movement strengthens the position of every detachment of this movement, of each people fighting for its freedom in its own country, and for this reason conforms to its highest national interests. These interests are also served by the voluntary alliance of free and equal nations which is the objective of communist internationalism. The way to this alliance lies through the elimination of unequal international relations imposed by imperialism, through the winning of national independence by the oppressed peoples, through the liquidation of colonialism and of the privileges of the oppressor nations, through the internationalist unity of the peoples in the anti-imperialist struggle. Therefore internationalism inspires Communists to struggle uncompromisingly against national oppression and inequality and for national liberation.

The Communist parties are parties of a class which is irreconcilably opposed to all oppression and exploitation and, by virtue of this, is capable of being a consistent champion of genuine interests of a nation, a staunch and intrepid fighter against colonialism. The aims of this class fully conform to those of the national-liberation movement. History has vested the proletariat with a special role in this movement. It is its standard-bearer, its vanguard and its most militant contingent. It is capable of achieving a sure and radical solution to the agrarian problem and finally driving foreign monopolies out of the political and economic life of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, that is to say, effecting measures which the national bour-

geoisie in most of these countries cannot bring itself to carry out. The working class is the most consistent patriotic force and its party is the most patriotic national party. This is evidenced by the entire history of the struggle for national liberation.

Equally wrong is the imperialist propagandists' contention that the Communist party is undemocratic. Communists are the party of the masses, of the people, and for this reason alone they believe in democracy. This is true of any Communist party. In the former colonial and dependent countries Communists defend democratic freedoms because they are well aware of their significance to the development of a successful liberation struggle.

The national-liberation movement is profoundly democratic in nature and direction. It is unthinkable that it could wholly achieve its objectives on any other than a democratic basis. The imperialists are irreconcilably hostile towards the aims of the struggle for national liberation. The young national states are relatively weak, and are still weighed down by the aftermath of colonialism. Therefore, if national-liberation revolutions are to be carried through to the end, it is necessary to oppose the colonialists with a united front embracing all patriotic forces. But such a front can only be built up on a voluntary, democratic basis, without subordinating the interests of the broad masses to a privileged class or making them passive tools in the hands of those in power. Therefore the attitude of this front towards democracy determines its future. As the experience of a number of Eastern countries has shown, an attack on democratic free-

doms, which is actually directed against the masses and their political activity, results in a weakening and alienating the national anti-imperialist front.

In waging a stubborn struggle for democracy, Communists uphold the rights of the peoples and not merely narrow party interests. They tirelessly work for the consolidation and extension of democratic freedoms, for developing democracy in every aspect of social life.

Another variety of anti-communism employed by the neo-colonialists is anti-Sovietism, which takes the form of a campaign against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The imperialist propagandists do their utmost to blacken the socialist world, its social system, its economic and political achievements, its policy towards the Asian, African and Latin American countries. Particularly wide currency is given to fantastic allegations as to 'Soviet colonialism' and 'Communist imperialism.' Typical of this type of assertion, for instance, are the statements made by Professor Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University and ex-Chairman of the Council of Foreign Relations of the US State Department, to the effect that what the Soviet Union is after is "control of the African continent, with its manpower and resources,"¹ or by Professor Bosshère of France, who claims that the Soviet Union "pursues a policy of neo-colonialism."² Much

¹ Z. Brzezinski (Ed.). *Africa and the Communist World*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Publications, 1964, Second Edition, p. 12.

² Guy de Bosshère. *Le néo-colonialisme: essai de définition. De l'impérialisme à la décolonisation*, Paris, 1965, p. 416.

attention has been paid in recent years to questions of economic co-operation of the socialist states with the developing countries, with the anti-communist propagandists saying and writing a great deal about the economic 'danger' to the young states allegedly emanating from the socialist community.

It is an established fact that since the attainment of political independence the central task of the struggle of the former colonial peoples has been to win their economic independence from the imperialists. Many young states are rapidly broadening their economic contacts with the socialist states. Hence the frantic efforts of the imperialists to distort the nature of this co-operation and to invoke the great 'danger' supposedly inherent in it. For instance, C. Randall, a leading authority on US foreign economic policy, wrote that "world communism, determined to capture control of the uncommitted nations by fair means or foul, is attempting this vigorously through economic penetration."¹

At the same time neo-colonialist propaganda has been spreading the idea that the socialist states are incapable of rendering the former colonies and semi-colonies assistance that would promote their economic development.²

A theme that has figured prominently in the neo-colonialist, anti-communist campaign of late is one of the 'inapplicability' of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. P. Worsley, head of the chair

¹ *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1961, pp. 13-14.

² *Investment and Development. The Role of Private Investment in Developing Countries*, London, 1965, p. 19.

of sociology at the University of Manchester, asserts that the 'third world' has rejected as unfitting and inexpedient not only the ideology of European capitalism but also the ideology of communism.¹ The unsuitability of 'communist methods' of economic development to the young states is stressed time and again by J. Campbell, President of the large British company Booker Bros, while Prof. P. Sigmund of the United States tries to convince his eventual readers in Asia, Africa and Latin America that "Marxism-Leninism is not the only ideology appropriate to this process" of modernization.²

Bourgeois scientists are keeping their eyes tightly closed to the fact that Marxism has been put to practical test and withstood it with honour in countries with the most diverse socio-economic conditions, thus effectively demonstrating its creative force in transforming virtually every type of social relation that exists in the world.

The October Socialist Revolution is known to have triumphed in a country with a medium level of capitalist development which, however, had already entered the imperialist stage while retaining features of feudal backwardness, and which was a centre of colonial and semi-colonial oppression. Within the boundaries of Russia, Marxism led to socialism both the people who had already tasted all the 'blessings' of capitalism and the people who still lived under the power

¹ P. Worsley. *The Third World. A Vital New Force in International Affairs*, London, 1964, pp. 50-51, 173-174.

² Paul E. Sigmund Jr. (Ed.). *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, New York, London, 1963, p. 37.

of feudal and patriarchal (Central Asian borderlands) and even tribal (regions in the Far North) relations coupled with colonial oppression.

This is not to say, of course, that Marxism-Leninism furnishes ready answers to all the diverse and difficult questions posed by the development of modern revolutions of national liberation, by the social processes taking place in the former colonies and semi-colonies. It is perhaps the crudest vulgarization of Marxism to present it as a text-book which if learned by heart will furnish answers to all problems. Only the ignorant and convinced enemies of communism or people who have turned against it can depict Marxism-Leninism as a set of universally applicable dogmatic truths which are supposed to be equally suitable for the United States and Gabon, for Japan and Haiti. On the contrary, as a profoundly scientific theory, as a guide to revolutionary action, Marxism-Leninism stands out for its creative applying, which demands deep understanding of conditions in every country and in every stage of the struggle, with all the particular features of its development being taken into account.

It is common knowledge that Russian Communists had armed themselves with a basic knowledge of Marxist-Leninist teaching, which helped them find the most effective ways to carry out socialist revolution and subsequently forms and methods to build socialism. The revolutionary vanguard of the peoples of the 'third world' is, undoubtedly, in a more favourable position in this respect as it can draw upon the rich experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and of the entire world liberation move-

ment. However, these peoples too and all progressive forces which rely on the achievements of modern science and world socialism, and on the latter's support, have many concrete complex problems to solve. All the more so since conditions in the young states are very specific and have not yet been submitted to thorough theoretical study. Scientific socialism is the only doctrine which will help in the solution of both immediate and far-ranging problems which affect the development of the newly-freed countries.

Speaking about the factors that contributed towards the victory of the October revolution, Lenin said that Russia had come to Marxism through its own painful experience. This process is inevitable for the young states as well, and they are already being drawn into it, in varying degrees.

Some bourgeois scholars and publicists summarily reject the 'relevance' of Marxism-Leninism to the developing countries. Others arrive at the same fallacious conclusion in a roundabout way. While not denying, in principle, the suitability of scientific socialism to the 'third world,' they concentrate on the 'negative aspects' of socialist development and the 'advantages' of the Western model.

Although anti-communism certainly remains one of neo-colonialism's most dangerous weapons, its effectiveness has tended to decline in recent years. This is due to the growing prestige of the socialist states, the wider access the public in the young states has to truthful information about life under socialism, and the way imperialism has exposed itself by its aggressive policies and unceasing neo-colonialist actions. Other factors

are the staunch patriotism of the Communist parties in the developing countries themselves and their selfless struggle for the interests of the people.

There is no denying that the spread of scientific socialism in the former colonies and semi-colonies will be a complicated and apparently protracted process, what with the extreme backwardness of social relations, the class composition of the population, the numerical weakness of the proletariat in many of these countries, and the limited scale or even absence of any struggle against capitalism. Yet scientific socialism is becoming increasingly attractive to the new nations, a fact which many bourgeois scientists have been compelled to admit. For instance, this problem, among others, is discussed by the authors of *Africa and the Communist World*. "Certain basic Marxist assumptions, particularly the alleged causal relationship between capitalism and imperialism, have become deeply ingrained in the thinking of many of the new élites," writes Z. Brzezinski. He admits that communism exerts a special attraction on the African 'élites,' above all among the intelligentsia; the notion is widespread that "what is now happening in the Communist states has greater historical relevance to them than what has happened in the West."¹ Moreover, to Brzezinski's chagrin, "the Communist idea of 'neo-colonialism' has gained wide acceptance among the African élites... Indeed, the concept of neo-colonialism seems to be displacing Lenin's notions about imperialism as the most popular conceptual stereotype by which

¹ Z. Brzezinski (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

Africans can explain their view of the West's relationship to them." ¹

Going one step further, S. Lens, another American analyst, arrives at the conclusion that anti-communism is a sterile policy. ²

One of the central problems in the neo-colonialist doctrine is that of 'nationalism.' That nationalism is widespread in the 'third world' is universally recognized. It has been and in a large measure remains the banner of not only bourgeois forces but of considerable sections of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie as well, and even of a certain part of the proletariat. Modern bourgeois sociologists in general and especially experts on the 'third world' insist that nationalism has become a major phenomenon of contemporary history. Addressing the 12th World Congress of Historical Sciences, Prof. H. Kohn of New York City University, a prominent American sociologist and historian, declared: "Nationalism is one of the strongest, if not the strongest motivating force in history... We are living in the age of pan-nationalism on all continents." ³

The upsurge of nationalism and its tremendous force are discussed, although in a regretful vein, by the British bourgeois historian and sociologist Arnold Toynbee in his latest series of books,

¹ Z. Brzezinski (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, p. 206.

² S. Lens. *The Futile Crusade. Anti-Communism as American Credo*, Chicago, 1964.

³ H. Kohn. *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, "Comité international des sciences historiques. XII^e Congrès international des sciences historiques, Vienne, 29 août-5 septembre. Rapports." Wien, 1965, pp. 195, 236.

among them *Change and Habit. The Challenge of Our Time.*¹

"Nationalism," declares James Reston, "is the strongest political impulse in this immense area from the eastern Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan."² American historians Arthur Whiteker and David Jordan are of the opinion that mankind is living through an epoch of global pan-nationalism.³ We could go on quoting without end.

There are other, no less important, reasons, for the neo-colonialist ideologists' heightened interest in 'nationalism.' It has become one of the major points of their doctrine and they, as all bourgeois experts, give it the broadest possible interpretation. They try to cover by it the concept of the national-liberation movement. This is not only an inaccurate use of the term arising from an idealistic approach to social factors (although precisely this approach leads to confusion of ideas and policy among *certain social strata*, participating in the national-liberation movement, with the *movement itself*). These ideologists would like to confine the entire national-liberation movement within the narrow boundaries of nationalism, and in this their interests coincide with those of the bourgeoisie in the 'third world.' By doing this they try to reduce the meaning of modern anti-imperialist national movement to the interests and aims of the bourgeois forces, to

¹ A. Toynbee. *Change and Habit. The Challenge of Our Time*, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 112 et. al.

² *The New York Times*, September 8, 1965.

³ A. Whiteker, D. Jordan. *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America*, New York, 1966, p. 1.

belittle the role of the front-rank contingents of this movement and on this basis to narrow the scope, progressive and historical role of the national-liberation struggle. There is no doubt that this interpretation is largely explained by the efforts of the imperialist theorists to build an ideological basis for the neo-colonialists' rapprochement with the national bourgeoisie.

The imperialist ideologists also put out false theories as to the origin of 'nationalism,' i.e., of the national-liberation movement. They remain silent about the real, socio-economic causes—colonial oppression and exploitation—which are responsible for the rise of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle, attributing it to psychological and ideological causes alone. They claim the national-liberation movement is the product of a 'clash' of basically different 'civilizations' (of the West and the East), the result of the ideological influence of the West, its philosophical schools, its system of education, etc.

These views are held by practically all bourgeois scientists writing on the problems of the developing countries, the only difference being that some of them lay emphasis on the alleged 'inferiority complex' arising from technical backwardness, others give priority to the ideological influence of Western 'democratic institutions,' and still others point to the impact of Western technology. "The most important force to emerge from the clash of cultures throughout Asia and Africa is nationalism,"¹ maintain Prof. Benjamin Rivlin and Prof. Joseph Szylviowicz. Calling nationalism

¹ B. Rivlin, J. Szylviowicz. *The Contemporary Middle East, Tradition and Innovation*, New York, 1965, p. 199.

in Asia, Africa and Latin America 'reactive,' Prof. W. Rostow attributes it to the feeling of 'inferiority' the people in the emerging countries have towards the developed countries.¹

Another American author, Charles D. Cremeans, consultant on Middle Eastern affairs to the US government, holds that Arab nationalism originated from contact with the West, which the Arabs treat with a mixed feeling of 'admiration and hostility.'²

Cremeans sees the root of Arab nationalism in the Arabs' injured pride and, of course, in the confrontation of Western and Arab cultures, in the 'Westernization' of Arab leaders.

Finally, according to Prof. W. Hieldebrandt, head of the chair of sociology at the Higher Pedagogical School in Bielefeld (West Germany) and editor-in-chief of the sociological journal *Moderne Welt*, at the basis of the tempestuous processes taking place in the area of struggle for national-liberation lies an unresolved spiritual conflict caused by the clash of Western ideas with local traditions.³

One more explanation of the origin of nationalism is furnished by Arnold Toynbee, who says of the problem that the population of these countries regard nationalism as a bridge enabling them to cross over to the realm of power, greatness and technological progress. "Nationalism,"

¹ The Department of State Bulletin, No. 1345, April 5, 1965.

² Ch. Cremeans. *The Arabs and the West*, New York, 1963, p. 47.

³ W. Hieldebrandt. *Siegt Asien in Asien? Traditionalismus, Nationalismus, Kommunismus, Strukturprobleme eines Kontinents*, Göttingen, 1966.

he writes, "is a kind of infection which the peoples of Asia and Africa have caught from the West. It's a kind of stepped-up tribal feeling, an intensified tribal feeling, which everyone else has taken on because they think that it has been the key to Western power and success." ¹

This interpretation of the national-liberation movement ('nationalism') as a result of a 'clash' between Western and Eastern civilizations, and the impact of Western culture and ideology, etc., makes it possible, *first*, to speak of the 'favourable influence' of metropolitan countries on their possessions, of a 'progressive' colonial policy. As the British bourgeois sociologist J. Sinai affirms, "imperialism was far from being only political domination, racial arrogance and economic exploitation. It was a vivid example of culture contact on a vast scale. . . the most revolutionary event in the centuries-long history of the non-Western peoples," for it "introduced techniques, ideas and institutions that they had never experienced before." ²

The same idea was expounded by Matthias Schmitt, board member of AEG in Frankfurt-on-the-Main, in a paper read at Kiel University's Institute of World Economics. He maintained that under imperialism in the colonies occurred a "systematic acceleration of the development of the productive forces, expressed quite clearly, for example, in British or French policy in Africa." ³

¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, July 24, 1967.

² J. Sinai. *The Challenge of Modernization. The West's Impact on the Non-Western World*, London, 1964, p. 50.

³ M. Schmitt. *Die Historischen Grundlagen der Entwicklungspolitik*, Kiel, 1963. S. 10.

It was the colonialists who, according to Schmitt, created prerequisites for the liberation of the colonies, and therefore it is possible and necessary to keep the former colonies in the sphere of influence of the former metropolitan countries, along with offering them "the partnership of the whole world."

I. Fairbank and A. Craig, professors at Harvard University specializing on the problems of East Asia, and Prof. E. Reischauer, US Ambassador in Japan in 1961-67, wrote a book¹ containing an outright apologia of imperialism. Declaring that the colonies were an 'unprofitable' enterprise, they assert that colonial rule stimulated development of nationalistic trends and thus contributed towards 'modernization.'

As is obvious, neo-colonialist ideologists recognize the 'negative aspects' of the old colonialism, but feel constrained to put up some sort of defence in order to save and bolster up the political prestige of the colonial powers, to prop up the forces in these countries which grew up under the wing of the colonial administration and which now constitute an important basis of support for neo-colonialism.

Second, by declaring the 'nationalism,' the national-liberation movement, as springing from the 'confrontation' of Western and Eastern civilizations, the neo-colonialist ideologists urge the peoples of the developing countries to take the road of the West, the 'progenitor' of the anti-colonial movement, and to absorb its characteristic spirit of 'moderation' and 'compromise.' The simple truth is that 'modernization' means 'West-

¹ I. Fairbank, E. Reischauer, A. Craig. *East Asia. The Modern Transformation*, Boston, 1965, p. 403.

ernization,'¹ writes Prof. H. Gibb in discussing problems of modern development in the Middle East.

Third, this approach makes it possible to get around the issue of colonial oppression and exploitation as being at the basis of the conflict between the imperialist powers and the national-liberation movement, and cover it up by meaningless references to East-West 'contacts.'

In this way neo-colonialist ideologists want both to conceal the anti-imperialist character of the national-liberation movement and to prove that capitalism (and imperialism) is not inseparably linked with colonialism, that the modern capitalist state pursues a different, 'democratic' policy and that the formerly colonial people are wrong when they associate capitalism with oppression and exploitation.

Indicative in this respect is the position of British bourgeois sociologists D. Rooney and E. Halladay. They begin by contending that as a result of intensification of colonial policy in the 19th century "new currents of thought and technical skills were introduced, and Africa was pulled into the mainstream of world history," with the 'fruitful' activity of the colonialists on the continent leading to the massive introduction of "Western trade, the Christian faith, and European techniques."²

In dealing with the motives for the 'colonizing' of Africa, these authors support the version which

¹ H.A.R. Gibb. *The Reaction in the Middle East Against Western Culture. The Contemporary Middle East. Tradition and Innovation*, p. 138.

² D. Rooney, E. Halladay. *The Building of Modern Africa*, London, 1966, pp. 9, 11.

finds the subjective aspirations of Western politicians at the time responsible. Moreover, they try to prove that it is possible to see how colonial regimes originated in Africa by analyzing the philanthropic instincts and desires of the British, French and Belgian politicians and public leaders 'to end the slave trade,' rather than by enumerating the colonialists' atrocities, to which, they say, the question of the nature of colonialism in a broader sense is often reduced. Rooney and Halladay find altruistic motives even in the activities of King Leopold II in the Congo.

This broad interpretation of nationalism enables the imperialist ideologists to criticize the national-liberation movement for its 'reactionary nationalist traits' among which they list, as could be expected, its progressive trends, anti-imperialist character and commitment to social change.

Let us take a closer look at the aspects of nationalism which make the imperialist ideologists so unhappy. They criticize nationalism in the developing countries for 'aggressiveness' (which they attribute to a variety of psychological factors), 'destructiveness,' 'impatience' and especially 'narrow-mindedness and provincialism.' Every label is misleading here. By the 'aggressiveness' and 'destructiveness' of nationalism is actually meant its anti-imperialist impetus, the determined fight for national liberation, against colonialism, and by 'impatience,' the attempts of national patriots to destroy archaic socio-economic formations by revolutionary methods, and to root out the positions of imperialism both in the political and economic life of their countries.

Countless articles and books have been written urging the freedom fighters not to hurry, to be

reasonable and patient, to adopt a conciliatory and reformist approach to the solution of urgent problems. What these pleas really represent is exposed by James Reston when he expounds on the merits of a "natural alliance between America's power and interests, on the one hand, and free Asia's longing for national independence, on the other," and stubbornly insists that "there is no conflict between America's interests and the nationalistic interests of all the border lands." ¹

Finally, the patriotic forces are proclaimed being 'backward' and 'reactionary' because of their adamant stand on the questions of winning and consolidating national independence. Invoking the trends of modern social development, which lead to increasingly close and multiform contacts among nations, bourgeois scientists, publicists and officials maintain that 'absolute' national independence is an anachronism, that ours is the time of 'interdependence' and 'supra-national cooperation.' This thesis is developed at great length, for instance, by H. Cleveland, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations and permanent representative of the United States to NATO, in his book *The Obligations of Power*, where vindication of the US role as world gendarme goes hand in hand with lengthy discourses on the theme that modern science and technology confront mankind with problems which "cannot be contained within national boundaries." ²

In point of fact, bourgeois ideologists and po-

¹ *The New York Times*, September 8, 1965.

² H. Cleveland. *The Obligations of Power*, New York, 1966, p. 99.

liticians try to persuade the developing countries to accept a modified form of dependence on the imperialist West. This is what lies behind their claims that national sovereignty is 'outdated.'

Special attention is paid by them to the socio-economic development of the young states. Here too the tenor of their disquisitions and recommendations conforms to the aims of neo-colonialist policy. Admitting, reluctantly, the inevitability of the economic progress of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, they concentrate on the *direction*—capitalist or non-capitalist—of this development, on its character—reformist—evolutionary or revolutionary, on the order of priorities of particular tasks, etc. Their principal aim is to 'sell' the Western, i.e., capitalist way. While extolling its imaginary advantages over the socialist way, they concede the possibility of deviations from the classical path traversed by the West in the last century.

Many of the numerous works by bourgeois authors on this subject are little more than sheer propaganda and devoid of any attempt to analyze the available social and economic material. We shall examine a work of different kind: *Economic Development*¹ by John Galbraith, former US Ambassador in India and an authority on economics. It is distinguished by the author's exceptional ability for detailed analysis and freedom as far as it is possible for a bourgeois economist, from the taint of ideological preferences and anti-Soviet or anti-communist prejudices and invective. It is also interesting because its moderate

¹ J. Galbraith. *Economic Development*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964.

approach compares favourably with the subjectivism and political bias typical of the mass of bourgeois literature.

The book is devoted to exploring ways of development for the young states. According to Galbraith, the Western model of economic and political development has the following advantages over a system 'founded on Marxism':

- Marxism associates misery with the existence of outdated institutions, whereas the Western view is that in every given instance misery has its specific sources; hence, more effective methods of eliminating it are offered;

- Marxism champions state property; non-Marxism advocates combining private and state property in some economic sectors (power industry, railways, etc.);

- under a system founded on Marxism the means necessary for development are obtained from the impoverished population; in the West they come from without. In this connection the author points out that India has received from the West 7,300 million dollars in loans;

- the Western model makes for successful solution of problems of agriculture; in the socialist countries, they have not been solved;

- finally, "liberty and constitutional process are safer with the Western than with the Marxian alternative."

All these arguments are based on a distorted representation of the experience of socialist countries and, in no lesser measure, of the Western "way of development."

To begin with, Marxism as a theory and as political practice has never associated misery, economic backwardness with any *single* factor,

in this instance with obsolete social institutions. On the contrary, the distinguishing feature of Marxist dialectics which underlies the policy of the Communist parties is that it takes into full account all social phenomena and the interconnections between them, and has a concrete approach to every situation, every country, every aspect of social development. In the case of the developing countries, Marxism-Leninism takes into consideration not only the social and economic relations prevailing in them. It draws attention to the responsibility of imperialism's colonialist policy for these countries' economic backwardness, to the important role of natural resources, the problems of trained personnel, the national and historical traditions—all factors which influence the progress and outcome of the struggle for national liberation. But in order to obtain a correct theoretical assessment of the situation, and to organize effective political action Marxism is able to detach from the multitude of causes and circumstance, the main, decisive factor which makes it possible to employ all the other social and economic factors, the factor destined to be used as the lever of revolutionary change.

Accordingly, Marxism-Leninism singles out the problem of eliminating obsolete social relations and removing the remaining forms of exploitation. Countless historical examples show that this must be done in order to pave the way for rapid socio-political, economic and technical progress and for effective resistance to imperialism.

As a matter of fact, the history of capitalism itself testifies to the correctness of this approach.

The economic, industrial progress of Britain and, later on, of the other European states only became possible after a decisive blow had been dealt to feudal relations. But the most vivid example is furnished, of course, by the historical achievements of the socialist countries. The transformation of backward Russia into a country which produces satellites and spaceships, which plays a leading role in modern scientific and technological progress would have been unthinkable without first abolishing feudal and capitalist exploitation and without establishing progressive social relations.

Incidentally, Galbraith himself admits that a disadvantageous feature of the non-Marxist way consists in underestimation of the retarding role 'the archaic institutions' play. He writes: "...The things we offer are effective and attractive only after the retarding institutions are eliminated."¹

Galbraith makes no startling discovery when he says that Marxism stands for state (public) ownership. In this respect too the correctness of the Marxist stand, the effectiveness of Marxist economic methods have been borne out by the experience of the socialist countries. Under socialism, state property, i.e., property belonging to the whole people and administered in their interests, delivers them from exploitation and makes it possible to mobilize national resources and use them in the interest of economic, technical and cultural progress. Where private ownership exists, a substantial part of these resources is used for non-productive consumption and is dissipated among a handful of big proprietors.

¹ J. Galbraith. *Economic Development*, p. 35.

The need for a strong state sector is all the greater in the developing countries, where, in addition to everything else, it has to become a weapon in the struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialist capital.

Further on, however, Galbraith is guilty of misrepresentation of facts, a characteristic trait of bourgeois scientists and certain local specialists in the developing countries who fall under bourgeois influence. He insists that Marxists object to any participation of the private sector or of the local bourgeoisie in promoting the economic progress of the former colonies and semi-colonies. In reality, Marxism has never opposed the utilization, in the national interest, of private enterprise and even private capital, provided their activity is under the effective control of progressive, patriotic forces and serves not only the profit-seeking interests of the privileged strata but also, to a substantial degree, the national requirements of the countries concerned. Marxists-Leninists do not reject the participation of private capital even in conditions of socialist construction. In the Soviet Union, for example, the private sector played a considerable role in trade and local industry, to say nothing of agriculture, during the New Economic Policy period. Today it is fairly widely represented in the economy of a number of other socialist countries, specifically, the German Democratic Republic.

Nor have Communists ever objected to receiving foreign loans for purposes of economic and social progress. It is true that the Soviet Union solved its social and economic problems without foreign assistance. But it had no other choice

as it was subjected to economic and political blockade by the capitalist world. Today the situation is different. The Soviet Union itself has given and continues to give important financial and technical assistance to other socialist states and has developed extensive economic co-operation with developing countries.

Nevertheless, Marxists have always held that neither loans, nor assistance can replace a country's own efforts to mobilize its national resources. It is these efforts that provide the key to the solution of the vital problems of the newly-freed states. Galbraith polemically refers to the example of India, which has received huge foreign loans. But it is a self-defeating illustration, for foreign credits have not brought about any decided improvement in the Indian economy. The country is grappling with serious problems and is confronted because of its failure to solve acute social problems with an unprecedented aggravation of social contradictions.

There is also nothing original in Galbraith's attempt to use temporary difficulties in the development of agriculture in some of the socialist countries in order to throw doubt on the effectiveness of the entire Marxist-Leninist agrarian policy. But in this case too his arguments are not convincing. In the first place, given a more or less objective approach, even the difficulties he refers to cannot obscure the tremendous achievements of socialist agriculture, the veritable technical and social revolution that has been accomplished in the socialist countries and above all in the Soviet Union, where the countryside has made colossal progress from primitive individual farming to large-scale production based

on modern techniques. Besides, these are temporary difficulties which are being successfully overcome or were overcome, as is evidenced by the results of the last years.

Facts are stubborn things, and for all his partiality Galbraith has to be extremely cautious in his conclusions. Not for nothing does he declare that "one day the Marxian economies may succeed in socializing agriculture."¹

Finally, we come to the question of 'democracy.' To begin with, liberty and constitutional process are not 'safer with the Western alternative.' Anyone familiar with only school history textbooks knows in what political conditions the process of primary accumulation and the rise of capitalism developed. In any event, those were periods of fairly tough dictatorships and not of prospering democracy. Suffice it to recall Cromwell's rule in Britain, the absolutism of Louis XIV and Louis XV in France, etc. In fact, today, democracy in capitalist society is recognized as still purely formal in character and subordinated to the class interests of the bourgeoisie, and also subject to severe restrictions. The political map of the capitalist world is dotted with tyrannical regimes and dictatorships, from the colonels' junta in Greece to the Saigon clique in such a model of Western democracy as South Vietnam.

When put to the test Galbraith's arguments seem far-fetched and unconvincing. They reflect the author's political predilections rather than a genuine objective analysis of the real state of affairs.

¹ J. Galbraith. *Economic Development*, p. 32.

Bourgeois scientists are not content with merely proclaiming, far and wide, the advantages of the 'Western model,' but concentrate at great length on the order of priorities of the economic tasks confronting the developing countries. At first glance, they seem to stand for economic advancement and even industrialization. But their real attitude shows in their insistent recommendation not to rush industrialization but to take the example of Western Europe and North America and develop slowly over a long period of years. Thus, B. Higgins, professor of economics at the University of Texas who specializes on Indonesia, takes great pains to convince the Indonesians of the advantages of the evolutionary way. "There comes a time," he writes, "when a nation must turn from revolution to evolution. . . Evolution is the traditional Indonesian way." ¹

Most bourgeois scientists and publicists treat industrialization of newly-freed countries as primarily construction of a certain number of light industry enterprises and development of the mining industry. As regards building a real industrial base for the national economy, they suggest, referring again to Western experience as well as to the 'special' conditions of the former colonies, at best postponing it till an indefinite future. And often they go even further, virtually rejecting the prospect of industrialization at least within the lifetime of several generations. Such views are expressed, for instance, by L. Mills, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota,

¹ B. Higgins. *Indonesia. The Crisis of the Millstones*, New York, 1963, p. 140.

and the British sociologist J. Sinai.¹

Particular interest is roused among imperialist ideologists by the problem of the state sector. Just as the policy of neo-colonialism, its doctrine has undergone a certain evolution. Development of the state sector is no longer rejected out of hand by the majority of bourgeois scientists and publicists, who now regard it, if not with approval, at least with recognition of its necessity to the economy of these countries. Different viewpoints exist among these experts as well, but they are mostly confined to details. Some of them favour extensive development of the state sector for a more or less protracted period, others accept its temporary development in the initial phase of economic growth, pending the consolidation of private capital. Here is how this problem is treated by such leading imperialist ideologists and policy-makers specializing on the developing countries as Chester Bowles, former US Ambassador in India, and Walter Sheel, for many years Minister of Economic Cooperation and now Foreign Minister to West Germany.

In a lecture read at the Delhi School of Economics in December 1963, Bowles declared that what Marx had written about the horrors of capitalist industrialization with its wage slavery was valid only for the middle of the 19th century, and produced, as an example to follow, the United States as a country where a balance had been achieved and was maintained between economic

¹ See L. Mills. *Southeast Asia. Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics*, Minneapolis, 1964, pp. 206-208. J. Sinai. *The Challenge of Modernization. The West's Impact on the Non-Western World*, London, 1964, p. 216.

and social justice, on the one hand, and rapid economic growth, on the other. His lecture was highlighted by dire warnings about the danger inherent in 'excessive' development of the state sector. As Bowles saw it, this sector should include only those vital enterprises which cannot be financed in any other way—for instance, the infrastructure: trade, railways, schools, the power industry, communications. He emphatically recommended such 'socialist' countries as Britain and Sweden as examples of a 'reasonable' correlation between the private and state sectors. Thereby, Bowles concluded, they have shown the way to the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹

Walter Sheel was even more outspoken. Agreeing with Bowles, he maintained that the state should merely prepare the ground for the expansion of private business. Likewise, 'aid' from the imperialist powers was to be a prelude to private investment.

The main task of Western 'aid' was to provide a stimulus for the imperialist monopolies' activities in the developing countries. At the same time, Sheel pointed out, it should not limit itself to assisting Western capital alone but should support in all possible ways the private business of the recipient countries themselves. The reason for this is explained by Sheel in the following way. A mixed economy tends, as experience shows, to fall under complete state control. Hence the problems how to eliminate this gravitation towards a

¹ "The Battle of Industrial Production," *Eastern Economist*, Annual Number, 1964. New Delhi, December 27, 1963, pp. 1432, 1436.

fully controlled economy, and to go over from a mixed economy to a free market economy. Evidently the prospect of this development is based on growing private initiative, on determined measures to make accumulation in the private sector possible, and the creation of favourable conditions for investment.

In Sheel's view, the governments of the developing countries should waste no time in abandoning whole economic sectors when necessary, which means selling the state-owned plants built during the first stage of economic development to the private sector as soon as it becomes clear that they too are of interest to private business.

Further on Sheel argued that so long as only a few developing countries pursue such policies, gradual reinforcement of private business can hardly be expected to come from this side. On the whole, consequently, the transition from the mixed economy now prevalent in the developing countries to the economy of the free market will not come about as a result of the action of internal forces unless we give direct and open support to private business. The inference is that a thought should be given to such forms of aid as would consolidate private business in the developing countries. For example, the Western countries could grant credits and loans out of aid funds to banks financing private projects. A number of such possibilities are already under study.

Sheel concluded with a direct call for joint action by the imperialist states, the monopoly capital of the Western Countries and Big Business in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. He insists on pooling efforts and refuting, through practical demonstration, the fallacious thesis ac-

cording to which state control ensures order while the free market economy breeds anarchy and exploitation.

Reactionary ideologists leap to attack any measure restricting growth of private enterprise and promoting non-capitalist development. They do so on the spurious plea that state intervention in the economy undermines the principal stimulus to economic development, which only 'free enterprise' can give, 'endangers democracy' and impedes formation of the 'middle class,' this bulwark of all economic progress and social custodian of 'order.' Clearly, what the neo-colonialist ideologists demand is full scope for private initiative, for private and above all foreign enterprise.

Bourgeois scientists specializing in the problems of the former colonial world concentrate on praising the role of private local and foreign capital, recommending that a 'favourable climate' for investment be established and attempting to convince public opinion in the developing countries of the vital importance of private business to their future. "It is of prime importance for governments to maintain policies that encourage private investment," stresses A. Kamarck, and goes on to assert that "economic growth in Africa can to some extent be measured by the shrinkage of the public sector's importance."¹

And here is what Paul Sigmund, an American professor, has to say on this score: "...The difficulty with the nationalist ideology of economic development is that it does not distinguish between the new-style economically productive bu-

¹ A. Kamarck. *The Economics of African Development*, New York, 1967, p. 217.

siness innovators and the old-style non-productive absentee landlords and moneylenders. There is still a lingering suspicion of the businessman's role as essentially exploitative and a hesitancy to recognize his contribution to national development." ¹

What Sigmund has in mind when he praises 'business innovators' is seen from his remark that "the Indian experience seems to demonstrate that as an economy expands, an entrepreneurial class of 'innovators' emerges which can invest and utilize the new surpluses more efficiently than government planners." ²

Those, who are familiar with the Indian experience of recent years and know about the quick growth and enrichment of capitalist groups operating their businesses at the expense of the national interest, will easily draw their conclusions as to the real ideas behind Sigmund's reasoning.

The maximum development of the private sector is also urged by the authors of the voluminous book *The Challenge of Development* which was published in the United States in 1967 under the editorship of R. Word. ³ This attitude is not, of course, the monopoly of American authors. It is 'international,' with representatives of the science, business and special policies of different imperialist countries showing touching unity on this matter.

Foreign investment is vigorously recommended

¹ P. Sigmund Jr. (Ed.). *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, New York, London, 1963, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

³ R. Word (Ed.). *The Challenge of Development*, Chicago, 1967.

by the authors of *Investment and Development*,¹ J. Campbell, W. Clark, Director of the British Overseas Development Institute, and J. Lawdon, manager of Shell Company. In their view, the negative attitude of the governments of developing countries towards foreign investments is merely a habit, a bad prejudice. According to Clark, in some way or other foreign firms present model production centres in the branches in which they operate.

Prof. G. Eisermann, Director of the Institute of Sociology at Bonn University, urges the young Asian and African states to encourage private local and foreign capital and warns the leaders of these states against stepping up industrialization, advising them to concentrate, instead, on agriculture. The hostile attitude of the 'third world' countries towards foreign-owned enterprises, he explains, as being nothing more than hatred of anyone's prosperity.²

Early in 1967 recommendations on giving maximum encouragement to private enterprise in the developing countries were issued by François Peugeot, Chairman of the Federation of the Engineering and Metalworking Industries of France. "Experience shows," he wrote, "that private industry alone can give rise to profitable enterprises. . . The African states should recognize the need to grant guarantees to private capital so that it can be established on their territories. . ." ³ In agreement with other spokesmen of the French

¹ *Investment and Development. The Role of Private Investments in Developing Countries*, London, 1965.

² See G. Eisermann. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Stuttgart, 1964. S. 29-30, 39.

³ *Marchés tropicaux*, 7 janvier 1967.

monopolies, Peugeot considers that industrialization should be based primarily on foreign investments.

Differing from the majority of Western authors, Professor Higgins of the University of Texas, earlier quoted, insists that the public sector should dominate, with private enterprises playing a limited role for the time being.¹ Similar views are held by John Lewis, professor at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C., according to whom "it would be fatal to the over-all effectiveness of the Indo-American relationship for the United States government to become so doctrinaire in this regard that its private-sector preference appeared to be the overriding influence shaping its economic policies towards India."²

However, it would be wrong to overestimate the significance of the views of these experts who are in a minority, all the more so since the distinctions are, for the most part, of a tactical character, involving emphasis rather than the essence of the matter.

The doctrine of neo-colonialism, as neo-colonialism itself, is not devoid of a certain flexibility and dynamism. It is able to adapt itself to changes in colonial policy and to the situation in the developing countries. In its response to the requirements of imperialist policy as well as to the public frame of mind in the former colonies, the ideology of neo-colonialism extends its range of ideas, refurbishes its stock of weapons and occasionally produces new theories. A vivid illustra-

¹ B. Higgins. *Indonesia. The Crisis of Millstones*, New York, 1963.

² J. Lewis. *Quiet Crises in India*, Washington, 1964, p. 321.

tion is furnished by the attention the neo-colonialist ideologists have paid in the last few years to the subject of 'rich' and 'poor' nations and to the various concepts of socialism in the developing countries.

It would be hard now to say definitely which one of the Western bourgeois or bourgeois-liberal experts, or the politicians or ideologists in the developing countries was the one to advance the theory of 'bourgeois nations' and 'proletarian nations' which has been seized upon by imperialist propagandists.

According to this theory, mankind is now divided into rich ('the industrial North') and poor ('the backward South') nations and this is the main watershed dividing the modern world. Its advocates claim that this division or conflict between "North" and South"—sometimes hidden and sometimes apparent—thrusts into the background all the class and social divisions and antagonisms of our time.

National bonds and barriers become of supreme importance thereby ignoring or at least belittling the significance of class and social divisions. To take its exponents at their word, the confrontation between the 'rich' or 'bourgeois' and 'poor' or 'proletarian' nations constitutes the real class struggle of the 20th century. "The very same thing is now taking place in the relationships between nations that a century ago was taking place in the relationships between social classes," writes Prof. P. Moussa of France, one of the first and foremost advocates of this theory.¹

The 'rich' and 'poor' nations theory has latterly been gaining ground in capitalist and especially

¹ P. Moussa. *Les nations-prolétaires*, Paris, 1959, p. 182.

developing countries. In the latter it is advocated by some politicians, public leaders and propagandists, especially the more conservative-minded. "If socialism in the 20th century is to be spoken about at all," President Leopold Senghor of Senegal declared in an interview to *Le Monde*, "it should be understood that the greatest inequality today is not between social classes within one and the same country but between the different countries of the world." ¹

As the Indian weekly *Mainstream* observed, the concept of a 'mechanical division of the world into the 'rich North' and the 'poor South' was strongly reflected in the Algiers Charter worked out by the developing countries as their platform on the eve of the 2nd session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and was manifested at the session itself. ²

However, it is Western scientists, propagandists and the capitalist press who are responsible for spreading the theory of 'rich' and 'poor' nations. "Social injustices on a global scale" are written about, for instance, by the French scientists, R. Dumont and B. Rosier. ³ A feeling of solidarity which unites the poor nations against the 'white,' prospering nations is one of the main themes of the book *The Third World* ⁴ by Prof. P. Worsley of Britain, who maintains that 'the major division' in our world is "that between poor and rich countries." The division of the world into 'well-to-do

¹ *Le Monde*, 31 janvier 1968.

² *Mainstream*, March 9, 1968.

³ R. Dumont et B. Rosier. *Nous allons à la famine*, Paris, 1966, p. 240.

⁴ P. Worsley. *The Third World*, London, 1964, p. 245.

countries' and 'proletarian countries' is regarded as quite an obvious fact by Bernard de Calloch of the national centre of France's ruling party UNR-UDT.¹ A growing antagonism between the 'poor' 'coloured' and 'rich' 'white' nations is emphasised by the American journal *The Nation*.²

At first glance it might appear strange that the neo-colonialist propagandists should so eagerly seize hold of the concept of the 'rich North' and the 'poor South,' as it brackets the imperialist powers with the so-called rich nations against whom stand the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Nevertheless at the present stage the strategic aims of neo-colonialism benefit from the spread of this theory and imperialism from its propaganda impact.

In the first place, this premise does not distinguish between socialist, capitalist, or imperialist states. It lumps them together in the category of 'rich,' 'developed' nations and virtually makes no distinction between them as regards historical position and political attitude towards the former colonies and semi-colonies. Thereby the socialist states, who have attained a high level of development thanks to the advantages of their social system and the heroic efforts of their people, which invariably oppose all manifestations of national and social oppression, and give constant support to the struggle of the dependent peoples to free themselves, are put on the same level with the imperialist states, which subjected hundreds of millions of people to colonial domination, owe much of their strength to colonial exploitation, and bear

¹ *Marchés tropicaux*, 25 février 1967.

² *The Nation*, January 20, 1964, p. 70.

historical responsibility for the backwardness of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In his interview quoted above Leopold Senghor said that in "neo-colonialist policy on the world scale" the socialist states "play the same role as the so-called capitalist countries, even though to a lesser degree."¹ Here the theory of 'rich' and 'poor' nations shows its claws. Its propagandists' aim is to discredit the policy of the socialist states, damage their reputation with the former colonies and semi-colonies, sabotage co-operation between them and the developing countries, and wreck the alliance of world socialism and the forces of national liberation.

At the same time arguments about 'poor' and 'rich' nations help obscure the nature of colonialism and neo-colonialism, the real class and economic basis for colonial enslavement and exploitation, and imperialism's historical responsibility for it. As *Mainstream* pointed out rightly, the "mechanical division of the world into the 'rich North' and the 'poor South'... clearly dovetails with the concept put forward by Western propagandists..."

"The attempt to ignore the deep-seated and cardinal differences that really exist between the social and economic systems of the industrially developed countries of the West and Japan, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union together with its East European allies, on the other, only tends to weaken the positions of the developing countries in their efforts to attain more favourable conditions of international trade and foreign economic aid. This artificial division of the world into

¹ *Le Monde*, 31 janvier 1968.

'rich' and 'poor' countries enables the Western powers to evade material and moral responsibility for the present state of developing countries' economy.

"At the same time, the premise which identifies the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Europe with the states responsible for colonial exploitation in the past and for the economic dependence of the countries of the 'third world' at present, cannot be favourably regarded by the leaders and people of these countries.

"The developed countries in the Western bloc bear historical responsibility for the economic backwardness of the developing states. The Western powers developed their economies in the course of their colonial exploitation. . .

"By all standards of international ethics it is for the Western powers to compensate for the damage done by them to their former colonies and the countries depending on them."¹

Furthermore, the theory of 'bourgeois' and 'proletarian' nations is widely used by neo-colonialist theoreticians as a weapon against the growing spread of the ideas of scientific socialism where national-liberation movements exist. Its premises are offered as a counterweight to the Marxist theory of class struggle and used to prove it 'outdated.'

"It should be said," writes Bernard de Calloc'h, "that the old idea of class struggle within national boundaries on which socialist ideology once rested tends to disappear in favour of a new idea, that of a vast, sometimes considerable, dis-

¹ *Mainstream*, March 9, 1968, p. 15.

tance that lies... between rich and poor nations." ¹

Starting from the same premise, Dr. E. Lambiotte, who interviewed Leopold Senghor, maintains that "the last century's exploitation of the working classes by the rich has apparently been replaced by the exploitation of poor countries by rich countries." ²

This has been a favourite theme since the appearance of the 'rich' and 'poor' nations theory, but special emphasis is laid on it today. Thus, Fritz Schatten writes: "For the African the world is not so much divided into capitalists and proletarians as into rich whites and poor blacks. Similarly, the ideal of many Africans is not an 'international of the toilers,' but an 'international of the coloured peoples.'" ³

In making national relationships and national divisions of supreme importance and belittling the role of class differentiation, the concept of the industrial 'rich North' and the 'poor South' militates, lastly, against growth of the class consciousness of the masses in both the capitalist countries and the former colonies. In this respect too it is useful to neo-colonialism.

Employing arguments borrowed from this concept, some bourgeois ideologists and politicians clamour for 'class harmony' in the developing countries as in 'proletarian nations.' In particular, P. Worsley urges them to take the road of 'populism,' meaning class harmony within the framework of the nation and even of the entire 'third

¹ *Marchés tropicaux*, 25 février 1967.

² *Le Monde*, 31 janvier 1968.

³ F. Schatten. *Communism in Africa*, London, 1966, p. 330.

world.' That this ideological line suits both the national bourgeoisie and the neo-colonialists hardly needs proving.

On the other hand, bourgeois ideologists address their 'rich' nations theory more and more to the people in the capitalist countries, assuring them that they belong to the privileged minority of humanity and therefore must forget about inter-class frictions and conflicts and uphold this 'privileged' position, their standard of living and civilization against encroachment by 'poor' nations.

There has been a steady increase in the number of works devoted to 'national socialist' as well as nationalist theories which have gained a dominating influence on the political attitudes of the young states. At first bourgeois specialists and propagandists adopted a purely negative attitude towards these ideas remaining staunch defenders of private enterprise. But the great popularity of these ideas in developing countries made many bourgeois ideologists realize that private enterprise unsupported by the public sector cannot establish capitalist relations, and finally a closer look at these theories themselves induced the neo-colonialist ideologists to change their mind. After their initial fright they realized that 'national socialism' represents incongruous and heterogeneous, often inherently contradictory, concepts which are so far from scientific socialism that there is no reason to identify them with communism, or with Marxism-Leninism.

Nowadays few bourgeois research workers reject socialism of the 'national type' out of hand, as J. Sinai does. Admitting that "socialism has become the predominant ideology" in the deve-

loping countries, and noting, with some irony, that "kings and maharajas, wealthy landlords and rich merchants, princes and playboys, saints and sinners, students and their teachers, illiterate peasants and workers, all have declared themselves to be socialists,"¹ he categorically states that these countries stand in no need of socialism, and backs up his contention with references to their backwardness.

In point of fact, J. Sinai rejects non-capitalist development as well, saying that socialism "can only be, if at all, a post-capitalist development" and that "the only genuine form of socialism... is that which stands on the shoulders of capitalist attainments."²

While most of the advocates of neo-colonialism recognize the correctness of the concepts of 'national socialism' and at times even praise them, they, nevertheless, try to make sure they develop in a reactionary direction, so that they inhibit growth of class-consciousness among the working people in the developing countries, and are converted into a weapon for confusing the masses.

Neo-colonialist propagandists who make a point of supporting various reactionary types of 'national socialism,' try to emasculate the progressive, anti-imperialist nature of other non-proletarian theories of socialism, to implant anti-communist ideas in them, and counterpose them to scientific socialism.

To this end, along with standard anti-communist propaganda coupled with cries about the 'inap-

¹ J. Sinai. *The Challenge of Modernization. The West's Impact on the Non-Western World*, London, 1964, p. 180.

² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

plicability' of Marxism-Leninism to the 'non-European,' specific conditions of the former colonies and semi-colonies, reactionary ideologists make wide use of the 'national distinctiveness' premise contained in these theories of socialism. Not in the least embarrassed by the obvious falsity of such a stand for spokesmen of the imperialist West, which did its utmost to smother the national distinctiveness and culture of the peoples of Asia and Africa, they declare that only these concepts accord with the specific requirements of the developing countries.

"If it (Africa) chooses to be socialist, it will become so in its own way,"¹ write the French African experts Jean and René Charbonneau. And Fenner Brockway, British Labour leader writing on developing countries, offers this vision of 'national socialism' in Africa: "It will be an African socialism evolved from African conditions, distinctive in pattern and philosophy, but integrally socialist because progressively it will give to the people the wealth they create, equality in everything which makes for human fulfilment, and the fraternity of a co-operating society."²

Reactionary authors laud the advantages of 'national socialist' doctrines over the Marxist-Leninist theory of scientific socialism. Declaring that "the modernizing nationalists have developed an alternative set of ideological assumptions and propositions," P. Sigmund stresses that "this ideology is in many ways superior to Marxism-Leninism, since it is more pragmatic and more related

¹ Jean et René Charbonneau. *Marchés et marchands d'Afrique Noire*, Paris, 1961, p. 143.

² F. Brockway. *African Socialism*, London, 1963, p. 124.

to the problem of modernization than are the simplistic dogmas derived from the experience of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe which comprise the Marxist-Leninist solution.”¹

Another tactical aim is to disparage the Communist parties' stand on this issue, to ascribe to them a negative attitude towards national types of socialism which arouses in their supporters hostility or at least mistrust towards Communists.

As we know, Communists do not impose their ideology on any one. They understand the historical and social conditions that give rise to national types of socialism, and they support all its progressive manifestations and features. But reactionary authors cannot refrain from challenging the sincerity of the position of the Communist parties, nor from attributing subversive intentions to them. To quote Fritz Schatten again, the Communists hope that “African socialism will soon expose itself as a mere rhetorical facade erected by the men who hold power in Africa and that the African masses will soon see for themselves how little substance there is in the ideology,”² and then they will take advantage of the resulting situation.

‘Democratic’ terminology, obtrusive advertizing of the so-called free world and the Western way of life, of the ‘democratic’ character of imperialist policies and especially of their ‘unselfish concern’ for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America make up the standard equipment of neo-colonialist propagandists. But neo-colonialist

¹ P. Sigmund Jr. (Ed.). *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, New York, London, 1963, p. 37.

² F. Schatten. *Communism in Africa*, London, 1966, p. 52.

ideology is penetrated by demagogic statements on which its arguments are often based and which cover up its real character and aims.

In the main the ideology of neo-colonialism is distinguished by its hypocrisy and habit of covering things up. None of its ideas are put into circulation without being dressed up in false colours first. Defence of neo-colonialism is disguised as concern for social progress and friendship among nations. Advocacy of dependence on the imperialist powers goes under the banner of fighting for 'equal interdependence.' And actions to obstruct the independent economic progress of the young states and the development of the state sector are undertaken on the plea of defence of democracy.

Here we find reflected the problems and inner weakness of neo-colonialist ideology as well as the symptoms of the malady that has afflicted its 'parent'—colonialism itself, which has fully discredited itself in the eyes of the peoples.

FORMS AND METHODS OF NEO-COLONIALISM

1. Political and Politico-Military Forms and Weapons

Some of the political and politico-military forms and weapons of neo-colonialism¹ can be traced back to colonial times, others have taken shape in the post-colonial period. In the first case it, naturally, is the relations between the newly-freed states and the former metropolitan countries which are involved.

It should be said that many political and politico-military forms and instruments of neo-colonialism (economic, incidentally, as well) were

¹ It stands to reason that dividing neo-colonialism into political and economic forms is to a certain extent conditional. Some neo-colonialist forms are of a 'mixed', politico-economic character. Besides, certain political instruments serve economic purposes as well, and vice versa. Nevertheless, methodologically this division justifies itself, on the whole, and in most cases the lines can be drawn distinctly enough and with good reason.

'prepared' and created by the metropolitan countries during their colonial rule.

In the first postwar years the 'preparation' of neo-colonialism was, for the most part, a spontaneous process rather than a deliberate policy, with the prerequisites being created primarily by the objective results of colonial rule, to which neo-colonialism became a 'legitimate' successor, as well as by certain hangovers from this rule itself.

Subsequently, however, while colonial regimes still existed, the imperialist powers pursued a *deliberate and single-minded* policy designed to prepare and ensure the establishment of neo-colonialism. A corresponding political structure was set up; groups and persons suitable to the imperialists were installed in power. Simultaneously, or before proclamation of independence, agreements were concluded which put the seal of legality on the unequal relations of the future 'independent' state with the metropolitan country and gave special privileges to the latter.

The new state's constitution and internal structure, its rights and the relationships of ethnic groups, its frontiers were all adapted to safeguarding the interests of the metropolitan country, in such a way as to obstruct, as far as possible, the internal development of the young state and in order to create sources of friction and conflict between them which would enable the former colonial power to act as arbiter. This aim lay behind the division of British India into Pakistan and India in 1947 and Britain's 'renunciation' of its Mandate to Palestine in 1948. It was also the British colonialists who imposed on Nigeria a federal arrangement based on setting the principal tribes against one another and giving the domi-

nant role to the reactionary emirs of the North. Almost immediately after independence this system became a source of strife which facilitated the interference of the British colonialists in the internal affairs of the country. Imperialist intrigues ultimately drove the country to civil war.

A similar attempt was undertaken in Kenya. As a counterweight to the Kenya African National Union which led the national-liberation struggle, the British colonialists engineered the establishment of the Kenya African Democratic Union, which advocated autonomy for some tribes. Their plan, however, was foiled by the resistance of the patriotic forces.

In 1953, in Central Africa more than ten years before its countries won independence the British imperialists created the artificial Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, hoping to retain their dominance there with the help of the ruling white minority in Southern Rhodesia. But in this case too the intentions of the Colonial Office were frustrated by the liberation movement. Equally short-lived was another creation of the British colonialists, the Federation of Malaysia, set up with a view to exploiting antagonisms between the Malayan and Chinese national groups. In 1965 Singapore quit the federation.

In 1959, seeking to preserve control over the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, Britain established the so-called Federation of South Arabia. Having installed in power local sultans, obedient feudal rulers, and having organized an administrative apparatus and an army, the British colonialists thought they had effectively checked patriotic forces. But neither the sultans nor the

British troops which protected them could prevent the collapse of the federation, upon whose ruins the People's Republic of Southern Yemen came into being on the eve of 1968.

The Foreign Office has been toying with the idea of setting up one more federation in that region, incorporating the Arab emirates and British protectorates in the Persian Gulf area. The Arab peoples will have to work hard in order to thwart the designs of the British imperialists.

Before granting independence Britain forced many of its colonies and protectorates into signing agreements on military and political co-operation. Such was the case with Cyprus, Malaya, Jordan, Libya, Kenya, Tanganyika, Ghana, Nigeria and other countries.

As a result, British officers remained in command posts in the armed forces of these countries, and in some instances British garrisons also stayed on. British troops are known to have been used to suppress disturbances among Kenyan and Tanganyikan troops. British officers continue to serve in the armies of some African states, and in a number of other former British possessions they act as instructors.

Britain kept hold of military bases and garrisons in Malaya, Cyprus, Singapore, Malta and the Maldive Islands, and reserved to itself the right to use the airdromes and seaports of Kenya and to send its troops there, twice a year, 'for training.' In 1966 more than two-thirds of the 170,000 British servicemen maintained overseas were stationed in African and Asian countries. The British imperialists counted on retaining for a long time military bases in Aden, in some Arab principalities.

ties in the Persian Gulf area, and on Indian Ocean islands.

Some new-born states found themselves directly dependent on Britain financially. Under agreements concluded with them, British subsidies ensured—at least in the first years following independence—the balancing of the budgets of these states. A similar method is still widely employed by France with regard to a number of its former colonies whose independence was proclaimed a decade ago.

The most 'monumental' of the neo-colonialist measures carried through by Britain was the establishment of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in which were included most of the countries and territories constituting its colonial empire. (Later on the word 'British' was shamefacedly dropped as being too strongly reminiscent of recent colonial relations). The Commonwealth was conceived as a fairly close political and economic agglomeration. As a result of many years of colonial rule Britain had become for its colonies not only the political but also financial and economic centre. The proclamation of independence could not change this state of things overnight, not even during a short space of time. The British colonialists took advantage of this situation in order to draw their former colonies and semi-colonies into the Commonwealth, which was intended to keep them under their influence.

Persistent attempts to build a similar alliance were made by French rulers. In 1958 they organized the French Community into which France drew its colonies in West and Equatorial Africa. However, the Community proved so unviable that by 1960 it had to be 'renovated,' with its mem-

bers acquiring the right to become independent states within the Community provided they signed special agreements with France which seriously restricted their sovereignty. Although the Community itself remained stillborn, the agreements its members concluded with France provided the latter with effective levers of influence in these countries—Gabon, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Congo-Brazzaville, the Malagasy Republic, and Senegal. In fact, without France's permission these countries often could not and some still cannot decide fundamental questions involving foreign policy, defence, finance, economy, higher education, etc.

In particular, these agreements committed 'both Parties' to providing information, and consultations, co-ordination of viewpoints and actions on major foreign-policy problems. How this works out in practice we know.

Moreover, France undertook to represent members of the Community in countries and international organizations where they are not yet represented, and to defend their interests and those of their citizens. No basic change in the situation was effected by granting the governments of these countries the right to send instructions to French diplomatic and consular representatives, which they can do *only through the French government*.

Similar treaties were forced upon former French possessions in Tropical Africa which stayed outside of the Community. In addition, France concluded 'mutual defence' agreements with almost all of its former colonies in 'Black' Africa, with the exception of Guinea, Mali and Upper Volta. It goes without saying that in this case too the term

'mutual' is used to cover up the one-sided advantages and privileges which France obtains.

According to Maurice Ligaut, a legal expert, the military co-operation agreements between France and its former African colonies, although regarded as "an indication of France's departure, should actually be analyzed as adaptation of French presence in Black Africa to the new political situations stemming from nationalism."¹

For example, under the Franco-Senegalese agreement the armies of both 'Contracting Parties,' in reality, the French army only, can move freely on the territory of the signatories to the agreement, in their air space and territorial waters, use all their harbour, railway, road, air transport, postal and radio communication facilities, and can even demand from the state the right to requisition them for its own purposes.²

At the time of writing, French garrisons are still maintained in Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Gabon, Senegal, the Malagasy Republic and Cameroun. Their function was demonstrated during the events of 1964 in Gabon, when French paratroops came to the rescue of the pro-French government of President Leon Mba. French units also intervened in behalf of the Youlou regime in the Congo-Brazzaville in 1960, in Cameroun in 1960 and 1961, in Niger in 1963, in Mauritania, and again in Gabon in 1960, then in Chad in 1969-70. In an attempt to calm down French public opinion angered by the interference of French paratroopers in Gabon, the Minister of Information, A. Peyrefitte, declared that "France acted in keep-

¹ *Fraternité*, 21 février 1964.

² *Ibid.*

ing with obligations precisely formulated in the agreements on co-operation.”¹

France kept hold of naval bases in Dakar (Senegal), Diego-Suarez (the Malagasy Republic), Douala (Cameroun), and an air base in Fort-Lamy (Chad). It uses military airdromes in Mauritania, the Central African Republic, Cameroun and Ivory Coast.

Unequal military and economic agreements were forced by the United States upon the Philippines in connection with the proclamation of their independence. The United States reserved the right to use for 99 years twenty-three bases. It set up a number of military strongholds there, among them a huge air base at Clark Field.

The United States also secured important export-import advantages and its monopolies were granted privileges which ensured their continued domination in the Philippine economy.

The binding character of the economic and trade obligations imposed on the Philippines can be judged by the speech of the Philippine delegate at the 2nd session of the UNCTAD (February-March 1968). It is all the more striking as he represented a government whose loyalty to the United States can hardly be called in question.

According to the Philippine delegate, the US-Philippine agreement on preferences gave complete freedom of action to US monopolies on the market of his country, throwing it open to American goods. He stressed that the agreement had proved to be a Trojan horse and, far from helping his country create new branches of industry with an export potential, had led to the stagna-

¹ *L'Humanité*, 27 février 1964.

tion of industries which catered to the domestic market.

Another, perhaps more essential part of the politico-military forms and methods of neo-colonialism, is directly connected with the colonial period and therefore they are not exclusive monopolies of the former metropolitan countries. Having taken shape in the 'post-colonial' period and being orientated on formally independent countries, these forms and methods have some new features and are not so deeply stamped with traditional colonialism. Among them, special mention should be made of the weapons of 'collective' neo-colonialism.

A desire to pool efforts, to employ collective methods is a typical feature of neo-colonialism. This is not to say that in the past when imperialist powers were represented by colonial monopolies the colonialism was compounded of a number of separate 'national' colonialisms. With the emergence of neo-colonialism the 'international' character of colonialism has been accentuated, and not only with regard to its objective foundations but also and above all in the subjective respect. *Although the striving for colonial monopoly continues to manifest itself with great force, there are clear indications of the colonialists' tendency to unite and co-ordinate their efforts in the fight against the national-liberation movement.*

What has given rise to this tendency? First of all, the fact that the future of the 'third world' has assumed primary importance for imperialism as a whole, and that the implantation of capitalist relations in that area has become a function of the entire capitalist world. It is dictated, furthermore, by it being no longer possible for the colo-

nial powers to resist single-handed the powerful national-liberation movement supported by the socialist world.

It is indicative that even the United States, which used to pursue a largely one-sided policy of colonial expansion (especially economic expansion in the guise of 'aid'), has been compelled to actively seek the assistance of other imperialist states.

By openly appealing to its NATO allies for help in the struggle against the Cuban revolution the United States admitted the need for their interference in a region which it had long regarded as its exclusive domain. The participation of the European powers and Japan as well as of international financial organizations was envisaged by the architects of the Alliance for Progress. US rulers have repeatedly appealed to other imperialist powers for their support and have tried to draw them into the war in Vietnam. Since the early 'sixties the United States has been purposefully steering a course towards 'internationalizing' aid and co-ordinating the economic policies of the imperialist powers with respect to the 'third world.' This trend is gaining strength as the problems confronting the United States in connection with the Vietnam war increase. Noting the active role of the US government in setting up the Asian Bank, A. Roseman, assistant dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, wrote in the American journal *Current History*: "For the immediate future, the bank's primary utility to the United States will probably be in obtaining wider burden-sharing for economic assistance in Asia and greater co-ordination in the planning and po-

licies of the various bilateral aid programmes." ¹

If matters have taken such a turn for the United States, what remains for the other, less powerful imperialist states, to do? They often frankly try to share their former monopoly power with other states in order to 'interest' them in their colonial policy and to secure their support in the struggle against the national-liberation movement. France, for instance, strives to utilize, within the Common Market network, the resources of other European states and above all of West Germany to bolster up its positions in Africa.

The trend towards colonialist 'integration' is also stimulated by deep processes taking place in the world capitalist economy and in the entire imperialist system which is brought about by the fact that state-monopoly capitalism increasingly operates beyond its national boundaries, establishing 'supranational' combinations, which, however, immediately aggravate inter-imperialist contradictions.

It is true that during the heyday of colonial piracy the imperialists concluded agreements and co-ordinated their actions. Witness, for instance, the suppression of the Yihochuan uprising in China at the beginning of the 20th century. But these were, as a rule, short-lived agreements on concrete matters that pertained to some definite country. Besides, these agreements covered, for the most part, regions not yet monopolized by any particular power and were dictated, as a rule, not so much by the inability of individual imperialist states to quell the resistance of the patriots as by the mutual distrust of the colonial predators, by

¹ *Current History*, January 1968, p. 1452.

their desire to tie the hands of their 'partners' and block their way to the object of expansion, and by reluctance to leave the wolf alone in the sheep-fold. ¹

Thus, that which was an exception in the past is now practised on an unprecedentedly large scale.

The Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression against Egypt, the financial and technical support given to the colonial wars of France and Portugal, the US-British intervention in Middle Eastern countries in 1958, the overthrow of the patriotic government of Patrice Lumumba in 1960, the Anglo-American-Belgian landing in Stanleyville in 1964, the 'support' and even participation of Australia, New Zealand, West Germany, Japan and some Western states in the US war in Vietnam, the joint actions of the United States, Britain and West Germany against the Nkrumah government and in support of the reactionary military coup in Ghana, the co-ordination of efforts of the same states against the Left forces in certain African states, the measures taken by imperialist powers to help the regime that came to power as a result of the military coup of September 1965 in Indonesia—these are only some of the examples of politico-military manifestations of 'collective' colonialism in the past ten to fifteen years.

Despite the deep-seated contradictions existing between them, the imperialists strive for *long-term* co-ordination of their actions over *whole areas* and at times even of the *whole former co-*

¹ Incidentally, now as well this consideration plays a certain role in the development of forms of 'collective' colonialism.

lonial periphery. There have been frequent and special talks on this subject between the leaders of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and other countries.

Co-ordination is conducted within the framework of both 'general' imperialist alliances such as NATO, and politico-military and politico-economic blocs and organizations embracing certain regions of Asia and Africa. In most of these organizations there are several Eastern countries among the members; this imparts these organizations their definite neo-colonialist character and direct neo-colonialist functions.

NATO is the principal weapon of 'joint' colonialism, a function which has been constantly consolidated and extended throughout the existence of the Atlantic bloc. Within NATO the imperialist powers have discussed all or almost all major problems affecting colonial policy during recent years and often managed to co-ordinate their actions in areas where a struggle for national liberation is going on.

For instance, the question of West Irian has been considered, with the result that joint pressure was brought to bear on Indonesia to induce it to be 'reasonable' and not to 'rush things' in liberating the colony. The discussion of the question of the Portuguese possessions in India led to the decision to brand India as aggressor for having driven Salazar's forces from its land.

The NATO Council planned measures against Cuba and discussed on many occasions the Vietnam problem and the situation in the Middle East and in Africa. Since 1958 there has existed a special NATO committee entrusted with shaping imperialist policies towards the African continent.

Its members are the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Portugal, Italy and Belgium.

The war against the Algerian people was waged with the direct and indirect assistance of NATO, with American weapons and in large measure with American financial support. With the consent of the Atlantic command French imperialists sent to Algeria almost their whole army (which formed part of the NATO contingent and was equipped with weapons from NATO depots), while NATO troops took over many of its duties in France itself.

There is little doubt that weak and backward Portugal could not maintain its grip on millions of Africans and massacre patriots in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique without the support of its NATO allies and without American weapons. "Portugal can hold out only thanks to assistance from NATO countries,"¹ pointed out E. Mondlane, Chairman of the Mozambique Liberation Front, who was later on assassinated by the neo-colonialists. Admissions to this effect can be found from time to time even in the Western bourgeois press. The French *Le Monde* noted, for instance, that 'friendship and support still extended by the NATO allies' enable Portugal to resist the inevitable and to cling to its empire.²

The position of NATO is important not only for the future of the Portuguese colonies but for the existence of the entire colonialist and racist belt in the south of Africa. The sinister shadow of this organization looms behind the attitude of the racialists, who are more and more bra-

¹ *Izvestia*, March 27, 1968.

² *Le Monde*, 17 mars 1964.

zen in challenging world public opinion. "Today NATO, and not only Portugal, South Africa and rebel Rhodesia, is in a state of war with Zambia," President Kaunda declared at a press conference convened in Lusaka in April 1968 in connection with the bombing of Zambian villages by Portuguese aircraft. "NATO is waging a war against freedom and independence," continued Kaunda. "NATO is fighting on the side of Nazism rearing its ugly head in this part of the world."¹

A neo-colonialist tactical ruse devised in NATO headquarters and committees and applied increasingly is to use, as the spearhead of neo-colonialist penetration into regions where the anti-colonialist sentiments are particularly strong, states who have no or very little colonial past. The peculiarity of the situation is that the expansion of these states, which pursue, firstly, of course, their own 'national' imperialist aims, serves as a form of attack by imperialism as a whole. Neo-colonialism derives advantage from the fact that capital from these states is received with less caution in many Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Formerly the role of vehicle and first echelon of neo-colonialist expansion was played almost exclusively by West Germany, Japan and Italy, and in Africa also by Israel. West Germany, a state long ago deprived of colonies, operates behind a thick demagogic smokescreen of false anti-colonialism. Japanese monopolies are relatively untainted from the spoils of African and Latin American countries. Italian capital is regarded by certain nationalist groups in some young states as 'the lesser evil' in view of the relative weak-

¹ *Izvestia*, April 20, 1968.

ness of Italian imperialism. Israel's trump card is its position as a small state and the anti-Arab feelings in some African states which are adroitly exploited by its emissaries. It often happens during 'joint' neo-colonialist operations in African countries that West German, Japanese, Italian or Israeli firms and state organizations are in the forefront while the American monopolies who have been the instigators act behind the scenes. A similar 'division of labour' is characteristic of the operations of Japanese monopolies in certain South-East Asian countries.

A novel feature of this activity, primarily in African countries, is the participation of small NATO countries, such as Norway and Denmark, and also Canada, which are expanding their co-operation in economic, cultural and—especially in the case of Canada—military fields. One of the likely reasons for this is the growing distrust of Japanese and West German capital.

NATO committees deal with both politico-military as well as economic aspects of neo-colonialism. For instance, they discussed the question of stimulating private investment from imperialist states in Asia, Africa and Latin America and drew up plans for doubling their annual exports.

The functions of collective neo-colonialism, although on a regional basis only, are performed also by the aggressive Pacific Security Pact (ANZUS), as is evidenced, among other things, by the active participation of all its members in the war against the Vietnam people.

Blocs, such as SEATO and CENTO, in which newly-freed countries participate jointly with imperialist powers are another major politico-military variety of 'collective' colonialism. Formerly

the unequal agreements forced by the imperialists on Eastern countries were, as a rule, *bilateral*. This form of colonialism has not lost its importance yet, which is testified to not only by the treaties concluded by France and Britain with their former possessions but also by the United States' military agreements with Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Tunisia and Liberia, to say nothing of its bilateral military agreements with the countries of Latin America, in majority of which the Pentagon has its military missions.

However, in conditions of today, blocs which bind young states to *several* imperialists states,¹ although the strings attached to all of these blocs are invariably pulled in Washington, are perhaps more characteristic of a politico-military form of neo-colonialism or at any rate more essential to it.

It should be noted, in passing, that some of the above-mentioned bilateral agreements of the United States with African and Asian countries in effect supplement the CENTO or SEATO agreements.

Colonialist politico-military alliances are knocked together under the banner of fighting the 'Communist menace.' But that is no more than a screen designed to conceal the real aims of their instigators. What are these aims? First, to turn the territory of the member-countries into strategic spring-boards and to set up or preserve military bases in these countries. Second, and this is

¹ The persistent attempts of the USA to secure the establishment of an OAS 'inter-American' armed force show that in Washington's Latin American policies as well there is a trend to put military colonialist actions on a 'collective' basis.

the main thing, to ensure that the imperialists can use these blocs as instruments of military and political control over the former colonies themselves and as a weapon against the national-liberation movement. In addition, the imperialists count on the participation of Asian countries in colonialist actions in order to provide those responsible for these actions with a cover and make them appear as a struggle of 'Asians against Asians.' As *The New York Times* commented, SEATO is "more than a mechanism for the exercise of United States power in the protection of the region."¹

With the help of these blocs and their mechanism the imperialists support regimes directed against the people's interests, exert a serious influence on the internal and foreign policy of the countries drawn into aggressive alliances, and spread their tentacles to the armed forces of the young states, in which the army plays a particularly important role. The member countries are forced to join in the armaments race, with all the extremely unfortunate political and economic consequences this entails. The military establishment grows to inordinate proportions, with foreign advisers trying to inject it with the most reactionary views and develop it as a barrier to any progressive measure.² The involvement of Eastern countries in colonial alliances, and in the imperialists' military bases on their territories serves,

¹ *The New York Times*, June 20, 1966.

² Analyzing the reasons for the United States' usually favourable attitude towards the armaments race in the countries belonging to the Organization of American States, *The New York Times* observer, Herbert Matthews, explains—and this explanation is fully applicable to the Asian countries participating in imperialist blocs—that one

in addition, as a certain 'guarantee' of the investments of foreign monopolies.

Finally, military blocs are called upon to alienate their Asian members from the socialist states and to sow discord among the developing countries.

Here are some facts from the record of CENTO and SEATO testifying to their colonial and pro-imperialist character: the preparation, in 1956-57, of intervention against Syria and, in 1958, against the Iraqi revolution; the actual assistance extended to the Anglo-American intervention in the Middle East in 1958; the support of the puppet regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam; the utilization by the US military of the territory of member states of blocs for anti-Soviet espionage; the violation of the neutrality of Laos and the imposition on that country of a right-wing unrepresentative government; the subversive actions against Indonesia; and the provocations against Cambodia and other neutral Asian states.

The war in Vietnam which, all observers agree, had a stimulating effect on SEATO showed that these blocs are an obvious form of neo-colonialism.

At a time when many of Washington's European allies tried to dissociate themselves from its disgraceful war in Vietnam, SEATO members, and not only Australia and New Zealand, but also two out of its three Asian members (Thailand and

of the principal aims is "to win friends and influence with the officer corps... because the military are almost always in a position to make or break governments. They are anti-Communist... This helps to create a political stability that the United States wants to see." (*The New York Times*, November 6, 1966.)

the Philippines) sent their troops to South Vietnam, with Thailand, moreover placing nearly the whole of its territory at the disposal of the United States as a base for operations against the Vietnamese people. Thus these states gave the US imperialists the moral support, so important to them in their rapidly growing international isolation, and also the opportunity of taking cover, if only partly, behind the 'participation' of Asian countries in the Vietnam aggression.

It should be stressed that despite all the efforts of the imperialists their plans for enmeshing newly-freed countries in military alliances have to all intents and purposes come to nothing. Struggle against them has become one of the main forms of defending national independence. After Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact in 1958 only five Asian countries remained in the imperialist military groups. For instance, out of the eight members of SEATO only three—Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan—are Asian states. Moreover, the largest of the young national Asian states have adopted a policy of neutrality.

As regards blocs with the participation of African countries, the neo-colonialists have failed to establish a single one. Their plans for a Mediterranean pact with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria as its members have remained on paper.

Even in the countries which did join aggressive alliances the movement of protest against them is gaining momentum in step with the consolidation of the national forces, the relaxation of international tension, the exposure of the 'Communist menace' myth, etc. Taking part in this movement are not only the popular masses; it is often joined by sections of the local bourgeoisie and some pri-

vileged groups. A strong impetus to the development of political feelings, particularly in CENTO countries, has been provided by the Vietnam war, which has strikingly demonstrated both the colonialist role of aggressive blocs and the danger of being drawn, through them, into imperialist military gambles.

The blocs are slowly disintegrating because of internal contradictions, particularly those between their imperialist members and also between the latter and Asian countries. All these processes have already largely paralyzed CENTO, whose Asian members have sharply curtailed their military activity within the framework of the bloc.¹ They have refused to declare their support for the US intervention in Vietnam, condemned Israeli aggression against Arab states, and embarked upon a policy of improving relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. Commenting on the conclusion of the Soviet-Iranian arms deliveries agreement, *The New York Times* noted that "Iran's agreement to accept Soviet military aid was merely further, though dramatic, evidence that the eight-year-old Central Treaty Organization of the Middle East had long since outlived its military role."² Even the convening of CENTO sessions regularly has become a problem.

Serious disagreements exist in SEATO, especially on such an acute problem, considering the sphere of action of this bloc, as the Vietnam war. Three members of the alliance—Britain, Pakistan and France—refused to send their troops to Viet-

¹ For the full realization of the significance of this fact, it should be remembered that these countries have bilateral military agreements with the United States.

² *The New York Times*, February 11, 1967.

nam, with Pakistan withholding support for US Vietnam policy and the French government speaking out sharply against it. At recent SEATO sessions Pakistan was represented only by an observer, while France's seat remained vacant.

Nevertheless, the imperialists go on trying to strengthen and expand existing blocs and set up new ones. Active measures are being taken by them to counteract the centrifugal tendencies existing in SEATO. They have not given up their intention of patching together a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO) and establish a similar bloc in the Mediterranean. They also continue their backstage preparations for the establishment of an 'Islamic pact.'

In June 1966 the so-called Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was set up, consisting of Japan, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia. Although its organizers hastened to declare that its objective was not military but political, economic and social co-operation, thereby leaving 'the door open to neutrals,'¹ this did not delude anyone. Four of the nine ASPAC members participate in SEATO, three are pro-American puppet regimes, and one is a major imperialist power. Essentially it is one of the blocs whose consolidation is one of the important problems facing the neo-colonialist policy-makers.

ASPAC is to serve as a connecting link between SEATO and ANZUS. Not for nothing did *The New York Times* write in connection with its establishment that "Western officials are welcoming new regional bodies as valuable support for the

¹ *The New York Times*, June 20, 1966.

existing over-all defence shield provided by the United States and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization." ¹ The aims pursued by this bloc can be clearly seen from the communique issued at its third session, held in Canberra in the summer of 1968, which stressed the need for a guarantee of the 'security' of Asian and Pacific countries and expressed solidarity with the Saigon clique and the South Korean puppet regime of Park Chung Hee. ²

Attempts are being made to extend the membership of ASPAC. Particularly persistent efforts are being undertaken with regard to Indonesia, which, as the Indonesian press reported, received a corresponding proposal from Japan. ³

At the beginning of 1968 the ruling circles of some Southeast Asian states, acting obviously on Washington's orders, came forward with plans for a new military bloc. This was the main subject of the talks which General Praphas Charusathien, Prime Minister of Thailand, held in Manila, Taipei and Seoul in March 1968. With the same purpose, as the British *Financial Times* reported in the same month, the Australian ministers for external affairs and defence visited a number of Asian countries. Characteristically, the advocates of the new pro-imperialist bloc suggest using the Asia and Pacific Council as its nucleus. Activity increases round projects for military groupings as the US defeat in Vietnam becomes more and more obvious.

One of the instruments of neo-colonialism is the Organization of American States. It consists

¹ *The New York Times*, June 20, 1966.

² *Canberra Times*, July 30, 1968.

³ *Jakarta Times*, August 2, 1968.

of the United States and the Latin American countries (with the exception of Cuba, expelled from this organization under US pressure in 1962), most of which fully or in decisive measure depend on North American imperialism. The US government covers two-thirds of OAS expenditure, and its administrative apparatus is staffed primarily with US officials.

The very structure of the organization, which has brought together in one cage the imperialist boa and its prey, predetermines the character of the OAS as an instrument of massive pressure on the internal and foreign policy of the Latin American countries, a weapon of struggle against the liberation movement in the continent, and at the same time a convenient screen for the expansion of US monopolies. While SEATO ensures, to a certain degree, an Asian facade for US imperialism in Asia, the OAS provides it with a Latin American cover for police actions in the Western hemisphere.

The OAS undertook, for instance, to defend the actions of the US military who in January 1964 shot down Panamanian citizens demonstrating peacefully for their country's sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Moreover, it gave its blessing to the US armed intervention in the Dominican Republic, and US marines were partnered by troops of three other OAS members which in the name of an 'inter-American force' crushed the rebellion.

Since the intervention in Santo Domingo US imperialists worked hard to strengthen and expand the military side of OAS activity. They wanted to build, in the guise of an 'inter-American armed force,' a permanent police corps that would act in the interests of the United States but with

the mandate of the Latin American countries themselves, thus relieving Washington of at least part of the unpopular gendarme work on the continent. The United States also intends to strengthen its control over Latin American countries and their armed forces, to place the military resources of these countries directly at the service of the struggle against the revolutionary forces in the Western hemisphere and eventually, if possible, beyond its confines.

Also closely connected with the policy of neo-colonialism is the emergence of regional political and politico-economic groupings of states which have recently won independence. There are no imperialist powers among their members, as a rule, but it is precisely these powers which are the instigators or even direct organizers of these groupings.

Nevertheless, not even these alliances, to say nothing of other regional organizations in developing countries, can be regarded as simply a form of neo-colonialism. It would be more correct to say that neo-colonialism is trying to subordinate them to its interests, and where it succeeds it does its utmost to keep them in this position. Imperialism's usual practice when establishing these organizations, as in many neo-colonialist undertakings, is to immediately concentrate on helping to solve some of the real requirements of the former colonies and semi-colonies. By exploiting their genuine interest in extending mutual political, economic and cultural contacts, and developing regional co-operation they gain credit.

Hence the peculiarity of many of these organizations lies in their having been built on the contradictory basis of neo-colonialist and *objective-*

ly anti-colonialist interests, although the latter are often (at least in the initial stages) kept suppressed and hardly ever make themselves felt. But by virtue of precisely this fact these organizations can and often do become an arena of struggle between the imperialist and nationalist forces.

This, of course, does not apply in equal measure to all regional organizations of developing countries. For example, OCAM (the Common Afro-Malagasy Organization) was established on the basis of essentially unchanged relations of dependence on France and, on the whole, emerged as a pro-colonialist grouping. With the help of OCAM France supplemented its dominant positions in the member countries with 'centralized' control over them, creating a collective, outwardly African, tool for maintaining a system that suits it. The example of OCAM also shows how the objectively progressive, for the most part, process of drawing together young states on a regional and economic basis, the establishment of uniform legal, customs and fiscal regimes and the removal of other obstacles to reciprocal trade and economic contacts, conducted in conditions of neo-colonialist dominance, benefit primarily imperialist monopolies.

A different situation developed in the Arab League, where, despite the intentions and efforts of the imperialists, the patriotic forces gradually won fairly strong positions. To be sure, the colonialists have not given up their attempts to use the League for their own interests or at least immobilize its activities. But the progressive Arab states actively resist this.

Anti-imperialist tendencies are growing increasingly also among the OAS members.

In the past few years the neo-colonialists have redoubled their efforts, especially in Asia, to promote establishment of regional political and politico-economic alliances under their influence.

In July 1966 the Association of South-East Asia (ASEA) consisting of Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines was founded. In August 1967 it was disbanded, and replaced by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which included the same countries plus Singapore. Later on Indonesia was drawn into ASEAN and attempts were made to involve Ceylon and Cambodia.

Although ASEAN is an avowedly economic and cultural organization, the imperialists are clearly trying to use it as a political lasso for catching non-aligned countries. With its help they hope to enlist the participation of Indonesia and other uncommitted Southeast Asian countries in the political strategy of ASPAC and, through it, of aggressive blocs. Judging by all the facts, the task for the future is to push the members of this organization towards military co-operation both among themselves and with ASPAC countries.

Indicative, in this respect, is the statement made in March 1968 by Prime Minister Abdul Rahman of Malaysia at a press-conference in Jakarta. He said that the Association of Southeast Asian states could be put to military uses, but first it had to implement its economic and cultural programmes. After that it could go over to broader tasks. The American newspaper *Christian Science Monitor* was more specific when writing that according to official sources, if, as Washington hoped, the present trend for regional co-operation in the economic, social and political fields was sustained, the vast arc extending from Japan

and Korea through Indonesia to Australia and New Zealand would serve as a powerful rampart in defence against Communist penetration. The paper also reported that, in the opinion of W. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and other officials, these groupings, although they couldn't stand comparison with NATO, nevertheless gave reason to hope for building a new, more closely united Asia capable of shouldering the burden of the Vietnam war, resisting the 'aggressive aspirations' of Communist China, and offsetting the consequences of the British withdrawal and the current shortage of US economic aid funds. It remains to be added that, according to the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, the ASEAN session held in Jakarta in August 1968 discussed, along with economic, social and cultural matters, also international problems in general, including security in Southeast Asia.

The revival of the imperialists' interest in regional organizations is due to several factors. First of all, the obvious instability and even critical situation affecting such blocs as CENTO and SEATO and the improbability of their attracting new members from the young states or of establishing new military alliances with the participation of imperialist powers. The aggression in Vietnam has seriously impaired the overall positions and policies of the imperialists in Southeast Asia, overstrained the resources of imperialism, above all US imperialism, and restricted its capacity to act the part of international gendarme in that area. But at the same time the war in Vietnam has contributed towards revival of the old bugbear—the 'Communist menace.'

Indonesia's new regime and its anti-communist crusade have also contributed to certain changes in the situation in Southeast Asia and provided new prerequisites for exploiting the slogan of anti-communism.¹ The great-power policy pursued by the Mao Tse-tung group has given the imperialists new trump cards.

On the other hand, the process of economic construction and the economic and trade problems which beset the developing countries have made problem of regional co-operation more urgent.

In taking advantage of this situation, the neo-colonialists try to build regional groups which are influenced by them and overtly or covertly are anti-communist. By using every opportunity to proclaim the economic and cultural objectives of such alliances, they definitely encourage their establishment. But their principal efforts are concentrated on promoting political and ultimately military co-operation and co-ordination among the members of these alliances and associations, in which non-aligned countries are united with members of aggressive pacts. They also hope to dictate, with the aid of obedient governments, the economic policies of the states-members to the regional groupings.

A growing role in the plans of regional co-operation in Asia is played by Japan. An indication of the mission US rulers have mapped out for Japan in this connection, and which evidently does not run counter to the interests of at least a part of the Japanese monopolies, is contained in

¹ In this connection *The Japan Times* (March 28, 1968) plainly stated that the trend for regional co-operation had appeared in Southeast Asia after the attempted Indonesian coup of September 30, 1965.

the article "Japan's Changing Role in Asia" printed in *US News & World Report*. It said that "it is this new Japan—a strong leader backed by both economic and military might—that many Americans hope will become the keystone of future security in Asia, easing the US burden there."¹

It should be mentioned that the imperialists' intentions in regard to certain regional organizations have been seen through and are actively resisted.

2. Economic Forms and Weapons

Considering the importance of the economic sphere to neo-colonialism, economic weapons occupy a special place in its arsenal, playing a fundamental role not only in the realization of its economic tasks but also in the attainment of its political aims both strategic and long-term as well as concrete and specific.

Neo-colonialism's principal economic instrument is 'aid' schemes to developing countries. Moreover, it is the most effective of the neo-colonialist weapons generally, in view of the continued economic dependence of these countries and the economic difficulties they are experiencing. Under the heading of 'aid,' a disarming term used by imperialist propaganda to make this highly dangerous weapon appear more respectable, come foodstuff deliveries under the US programme of 'surplus' disposal, loans, subsidies, commercial and other credits, and technical assistance.

Both as an instrument for furthering the econo-

¹ *US News & World Report*, March 25, 1968, p. 64.

mic expansion of imperialist monopolies, and to a much greater degree than all other instruments, the general aims of colonial policy, aid programmes ensure to a large extent the functioning and effectiveness of the other forms and methods of colonialism.

Between 1963 and 1969 the export of capital to newly-independent countries from the capitalist states participating in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development totalled 76,535,900,000 dollars, with 'aid' accounting for over 60 per cent of this sum.¹

Some kinds of 'aid,' such as loans and subsidies, were known and used before. Technical assistance too has its predecessors in the history of the exploitation of the Eastern countries. But in its present form 'aid' is undoubtedly a new and peculiar phenomenon. It can be said to reflect, fairly accurately, the character and contradictions inherent in neo-colonialism itself. For example its relationship to traditional colonialism, from which it has inherited certain traits, although it relies on indirect and more 'liberal' forms of control and dependence; its tendency to put first the strategic interests of imperialism coupled with its insatiable desire to make immediate profits. It also pursues a straight course in carrying on imperialist policy aims in the 'third world' and shows great flexibility and skill in finding concrete forms and ways to advance these aims. Then there is its desire to preserve and consolidate as far as possible the position of the imperialist monopolies in

¹ Based on *Examen 1970: Aide au développement. Efforts et politiques poursuivis par les membres du Comité d'aide au développement*. Décembre, 1970, OCDE.

the former colonies, while, simultaneously, following a policy of promoting the inevitable economic development of these countries.

There are some new aspects even in such a traditional form of 'aid' as state loans. It goes without saying that their socio-economic nature, their imperialist nature remain unchanged. It is export of capital, but of a special kind, largely because it is stimulated, directed and regulated not only by economic but also and above all by political motives, by the interests of the world class struggle, and to some extent also by inter-imperialist contradiction. It is indicative that by the beginning of 1965, 39 per cent of the total sum of state loans provided by the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan to developing countries—and these ran into thousands of millions—were granted interest-free or at one per cent per annum, i.e., at a rate equalling one-fifth to one-seventh of the usual, 'commercial' loan issued by private banking capital.

On the whole, in 1962-66 the OECD countries issued state loans to developing countries, under bilateral agreements, on the following terms: ¹

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Nominal rate (per cent)	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.6	3.1
Average term (years)	24.5	25.1	28.4	22.3	23.5

Subsidies and 'grants,' the so-called gratuitous assistance, as well as the deliveries of American

¹ *Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review*, pp. 76, 184, 185.

foodstuffs under Law No. 480¹ are even more political in character and are used as instruments of direct influence. The deliveries of foodstuffs, especially about 60 per cent of the receipts from sales which goes to governments and private business in loans, can also be characterized, with some reason, as a form of export of capital.

Excluding the United States, the highest proportion of 'aid' is usually found to be supplied by the 'old' colonial powers, which is added confirmation of the political character of these subsidies. The latter have their origin in the recent colonial past, and are used to back obedient or outright puppet regimes.

Of no lesser political importance is the so-called technical assistance, which includes the sending of experts and teachers, the training of personnel, both on the spot and by providing scholarship grants to universities and colleges in imperialist states, and supplying technical information, etc.

The table below contains data about sending specialists to developing countries and the training of personnel under state programmes of technical assistance in 1962-66.²

¹ These deliveries are made within the framework of a programme hypocritically called 'Food for Freedom.' In 1964, 10.8 per cent of the receipts from the sale of 'surplus' food was spent on 'grants,' 20.6 per cent on the maintenance of American institutions and personnel abroad and to cover part of the cost of market research, 17.7 per cent on 'joint defence' needs, 59.1 per cent on loans to the governments and the private sector of the importer countries, and 2.6 per cent on subsidies for economic development.

² *Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review*, p. 197.

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Students and trainees from developing countries	40,137	43,827	57,339	62,771	69,505
Specialists from developed capitalist states	79,298	82,016	87,681	91,594	104,396

This kind of 'aid' provides wide opportunities for penetration into various spheres of life in the young states, for the indoctrination of young people and for the extension of contacts with the local intelligentsia. In Liberia, for instance, American 'assistants' control six out of the existing twelve departments (ministries). In April 1968 an agreement was signed prolonging the stay of the American administrative personnel for another two years.¹

Special importance is attached by the neo-colonialists to infiltrating the armed forces and military academies with their experts. According to professors John Lovell of Indiana University and Eugene Kim of Western Michigan University, more than ninety countries send their military personnel for training to the United States. The ideological and political nature of this aspect of imperialist 'aid' is openly discussed in their book. "An obvious case in point is the great number of Asian military men who come to the United States for instruction at various American institutions. This kind of direct contact with the American

¹ *Liberian Age*, April 9, 1968.

environment and American ideas has been at a rate of some 8,000 foreign military personnel per year in recent years. . . Furthermore, in their own countries, indigenous military personnel in large numbers work side by side with American or other foreign military personnel." ¹ As for the Latin American states, between 1950 and 1965 31,632 officers from their armed forces were given training at US military schools.

Technical assistance figures prominently in the general structure of 'aid' by the imperialist powers, especially some of them. In 1964 it claimed 39.7 per cent of France's expenditure on 'aid' and 16.8 per cent of Britain's ², thus keeping going a type of relationship reminiscent of the colonial era. Closely connected with this is also the effort of these states to localize the whole of their technical assistance and 'aid' principally within the confines of their former possessions, whereas the sphere of action of other imperialist powers, above all of the United States, is much broader.

The nature and purpose of 'aid' programmes and the fact that they are motivated and sometimes regulated by political as well as economic considerations, is responsible for another important feature which is their *state* character.

Even at the highest degree of its concentration and centralization private monopoly capital does not have sufficient power and the necessary levers to perform the principal class functions of 'aid' in the context of the struggle between the two world

¹ John P. Lovell and C. I. Eugene Kim. *The Military and Political Change in Asia. Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XL, N 1, Spring and Summer 1967, pp. 118-119.

² *Commonwealth Survey*, Vol. 9, 1964, p. 483. *Revue juridique et politique*, n° 3, 1965, p. 343.

systems and the problem confronting the newly-freed countries of what road of development to take. Nor is it able to guide itself in sufficient measure by the supreme, long-term strategic interests of capitalism, as a whole, to act as the agent of capital as such.

Private capital does not keep to a course which can bring purely economic benefits only after a long—what is more indefinitely long—space of time, but is guided primarily by the stability of the political situation in a given country. Still less is it in its nature to engage in unrenumerative, to say nothing of losing, operations in the interests of a long-sighted policy. Private capital would not flow *en masse* into areas where there exists a real danger of nationalization. Moreover, as can be seen from the experience of Guinea, Algeria, Ghana and some other 'third world' countries, repatriation of foreign private capital is by no means an exceptional phenomenon.

It's different with state-monopoly capital, the spearhead of the neo-colonialist drive. Therefore, no matter on what terms 'aid' is provided—more or less onerous, with obvious political strings attached or without them—it invariably serves the designs of the neo-colonialists. That is the gist of the matter.

In many developing countries foreign state capital receives a less guarded and hostile reception than private investment by monopolies. This is taken advantage of by the neo-colonialists for penetrating these countries, for consolidating, on the whole, the imperialist positions of monopolies, and in countries like ARE for filling, at least partially, the vacuum left after the nationalization of private enterprises. As a specific state form

of export of capital and as one of the 'functions' of imperialist states which has assumed a stable character in recent years,¹ 'aid' could only result from the heightened role of state-monopoly capital in the leading colonial powers.

It is possible to single out certain principal aims and directions in neo-colonialist policy which are served by 'aid' programmes—bearing in mind, of course, that in practice they are all intertwined.

First and foremost, these programmes are to promote the spread and strengthening of capitalist relations in the 'third world,' to bind it more securely to the capitalist world by using new forms of unequal and dependent relations, by keeping the young national states within the political system of imperialism or returning them to its fold. As has been pointed out above, this was the central task of the Alliance for Progress, one of the most far-reaching, purposeful and widely publicized imperialist 'aid' programmes.

Here is how the West German journal *Internationales Afrika-Forum* assesses, in habitual anti-communist language, the aims of American 'aid' to Africa: "Everything points to a clear-cut concept: to try to protect Africa against falling under communist rule and against communist subversion through stabilizing the social and economic conditions in the major countries."²

The auxiliary function of US 'aid' is admitted and regarded as natural even by American politicians of liberal views, such as Chairman of the

¹ It is not without reason that, as has been noted, all leading imperialist states have set up special bodies, more often than not at ministerial level, to deal with these matters.

² *Internationales Afrika-Forum*, August 1967.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. W. Fulbright. "Whatever the extent of its humanitarian motivation and effect," he wrote, "our material assistance to the less developed countries... is one of a number of instruments of policy by which the West seeks to bolster its own security, by fostering a world environment in which our kind of society, and the values in which it is rooted, can survive and flourish." ¹

French statesmen are equally candid on this score. Jean de Broglie, Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs, declared in 1963 that the 'underlying purpose' of French 'aid' was to create a counterweight to the "possible attractive force of communism." ²

The desired effect, i.e., stimulation of capitalist forms, is achieved by the spontaneous influence 'aid' exerts on the economic relations of the developing countries with imperialist states. It leads to intensification of economic and commercial contacts between them, maintaining and consolidating the traditional forms of relations and the market orientation of the former colonies, their 'attachment' to definite suppliers of equipment and to consumers of raw materials. Suffice it to say that 70 to 90 per cent of 'aid' funds go on imports from imperialist powers.

But the main thing is that 'aid' becomes an instrument of direct and active *political* influence, or, to be more precise, pressure on the internal and foreign policy of the young states, often being accompanied by conditions of an obviously non-

¹ *World Perspectives on International Policies*. Ed. by W. Clemens Jr., Boston, 1965, p. 68.

² *Journal officiel de la République Française*. Débats parlementaires. Sénat, 6.XI. 1963, p. 2262.

economic character; it is used to give direct support to puppet regimes, to partners in aggressive military blocs and governments willing to follow imperialist policy, and to bribe, directly or otherwise, a part of the ruling circles and certain social groups in the developing countries.

According to *Internationales Afrika-Forum*, West German assistance to former colonies and dependencies pursues the following principal aim: "enforcement of the Hallstain doctrine's right of sole representation." This assistance "constitutes, in addition, an instrument of German trade and economic policies," facilitating West Germany's efforts "to secure, for a long period of time, solid markets, to make investments there." ¹

Highly revealing statement, though couched in very cautious terms, was made by E. Hutchinson of the US Agency for International Development: "AID gives preference in its assistance programme to countries with moderate and stable governments." ²

The distribution of imperialist 'aid' speaks for itself. In 1951-65 the Chiang Kai-shek clique alone received from the United States economic 'aid' valued at 1,600 million dollars, or 150 dollars per head of the population of Taiwan. ³ And total foreign 'aid' to Taiwan, counted per head of the population, amounted to 7.68 dollars in 1951-62, 6.16 in 1963 and 4.33 in 1964. ⁴ South Vietnam and South Korea were similarly aided. "Economic and technical assistance to South Vietnam is the

¹ *Internationales Afrika-Forum*, August 1967.

² *Africa Report*, December 1964, p. 8.

³ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 27 Januar, 1968.

⁴ Manubhai Shah. *Developing Countries and UNCTAD*, Bombay, 1968, Statistical Table No. 6.

largest single operation in the American foreign aid programme," *Current History* noted in January 1968. Almost half of the entire AID personnel working abroad is to be found in South Vietnam. According to AID Administrator William Gaud, 'the lion's share' of the foreign 'aid' appropriations requested by the US government in the 1968/69 fiscal year was designed for Vietnam.

Or take this figure: in ten years between 1957 and 1967 US 'aid' to Israel totalled about 500 million dollars, or 180 to 200 dollars per head of the population.¹

Equally indicative is the direction of the main flow of military aid. The bulk of it goes to puppet regimes or US allies in aggressive blocs in Asia: South Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, etc.

The US is the major supplier of the military aid to Israel which unleashed an aggressive war against the Arab countries.

On the other hand, considerable amounts of 'aid' go to such countries as India in Asia and Nigeria in Africa, which do not join aggressive alliances and are not ruled by puppet regimes but are regarded as vital to the positions of capitalism in these respective areas. More than 90 per cent of the 'aid' allocations assigned by the US government in 1968/69 was intended for 15 countries and less than 10 per cent for the remaining 40 countries, with South Vietnam and India being the largest recipients.

Countless facts could be cited testifying to the 'aid' being used as an instrument of pressure on

¹ *Look*, March 19, 1968, p. 63.

young national states. Many of these cases have received wide publicity.

Promises of 'aid' were used by the US State Department to compel the Latin American governments to sever relations with Cuba. In August 1963 the House of Representatives adopted a resolution according to which no 'aid' would be given to countries which would fail to break economic contacts with Cuba within sixty days.

Dollar handouts were the payment for every new contingent of South Korean troops sent by the Seoul authorities to South Vietnam. Financial assistance was promised to the Philippines and Thailand to draw them into this revolting war against the Vietnamese people.

American 'aid' to Cambodia is known to have been accompanied by brazen interference in the domestic affairs of that country, which resulted in its being rejected by the Cambodian government in 1963. The Indonesian government also rejected it in 1964 and the Algerian government, in 1967.

Denial or termination of 'aid' has been frequently used to call to order or punish 'recalcitrants.' Following Egypt's turning down, in 1956, of their political demands, the United States and Britain went back on their promise to finance the Aswan Dam project and proceeded to launch a veritable economic war against the Egyptian people. French assistance was discontinued when, in 1958, Guinea left the French Community and demanded independence.

American 'aid' was denied to Guyana (then 'British') when the progressive government of Cheddi Jagan was in office, but the United States

reversed its stand after this government had been deposed.

The same was the case with Ghana. Immediately after the military coup which overthrew the progressive regime in that country the United States hastily organized, jointly with Britain and West Germany, emergency food and financial assistance which had been denied to the Nkrumah government and which had, needless to say, a number of political strings attached to it. Equally promptly came the agreement of the United States and, following it, of other Western powers and Japan to renew 'aid' to Indonesia after the coming to power of anti-communist forces there.

The United States reduced to one-eighteenth its assistance to the UAR in the 1964/65 fiscal year in retaliation for its support of the Congolese patriots. And in 1967, as President Nasser noted in his interview in *Look*, the United States 'abruptly' stopped foodstuffs deliveries to that country with the obvious intention of causing serious or even insurmountable currency difficulties.¹ In November 1966 the State Department openly threatened discontinuation of 'aid' to Guinea in reply to its government's decision to expel Peace Corps members from the country. US official spokesman declared then that as a result of this action the future of the aid programme for Guinea was uncertain.

'Aid' as a tool of political dictation has been used even with regard to US allies in military blocs. One of the victims of American blackmail is, for instance, Pakistan. When President Johnson announced, in July 1965, postponement of the

¹ *Look*, March 19, 1968, p. 63.

session of the Consortium that organized 'aid' to Pakistan and suggested discussing 'other matters' in the period of postponement, this was universally interpreted as a demonstration of displeasure with changes in Pakistan's foreign policy and an attempt to call it to heel. In point of fact, the reason for this 'postponement' was not concealed by the United States itself. Shortly before Johnson's announcement F. Talbot, then an Assistant Secretary of State, declared that the United States was deeply concerned over Pakistan's foreign policy moves and that this could induce a revision of the 'aid' programme.

The Pakistani press indignantly reacted to the United States' attempt to use economic assistance as a means of pressure on the country's foreign policy. And the then President Ayub Khan, declaring that Pakistan was seeking friends and not masters, stressed that economic assistance should be dictated by purely economic considerations.

In March 1968 Britain turned down Zambia's request for financial assistance amounting to 28 million dollars. Calling this decision reasonable, *The Daily Express* (March 22) urged President Kaunda to follow the example of President Banda of Malawi. It will be recalled that Malawi is almost the only African state which fraternizes with the South African racialists and Portuguese colonialists and opposes a united front of the countries on that continent against the hangovers of colonial rule in Africa.

The Bonn government is acting in agreement with its imperialist allies. In 1965 it unilaterally nullified its aid and technical training agreement with Tanzania after the government of that country had consented to the opening of the consulate

of the German Democratic Republic in Dar es Salaam. Ceylon was threatened with similar sanctions in 1964 in connection with its government's decision to raise the GDR trade mission in Colombo to consular level.

Furthermore, 'aid' is employed to force open doors to the private capital of imperialist countries, which is being effectively barred by many young states. In February 1966 *Le Figaro* carried an article headlined "Aid to Underdeveloped Countries." Its author, General Béthouart, wrote that "direct financial assistance can and so far must be provided on a temporary basis in order to break the present deadlock, restore confidence and create sound foundations of a liberal national economy. That is the only solution of the problem that agitates us. It is private capital and not the wasteful and too often fruitless generosity of aid givers that will banish misery and hunger."¹

Most likely *Le Figaro* voiced the 'rigid' viewpoint of the more militant and impatient groups of monopoly capital, but the article was doubtlessly expressive enough of the general attitude of the imperialist leaders as a whole.

'Aid' is often made directly conditional on the recipient's pledge to create a favourable climate for foreign capital, to guarantee it against nationalization, etc. The Alliance for Progress programme, for instance, stipulates that a considerable part of the promised billions will come in the form of direct private investments. This provision has already been incorporated in a number of agreements between the United States and Latin American countries.

¹ *Le Figaro*, 3 février 1966.

Denial of 'aid' is a form of sanctions against those who dare to infringe on the interests of imperialist monopolies. In 1963, following the nationalization of the property of American oil companies in Ceylon and the rejection by the Ceylon government of their inordinately high demands for compensation, 'aid' to Ceylon was suspended, to be renewed in 1965, after the signing of the compensation agreement between the new Ceylonese leaders who had replaced then the progressive government of Mme. Bandaranaike, and the companies concerned.

France discontinued, and at the time of writing has not yet recommenced, its 'aid' programmes to Morocco and Tunisia in retaliation for their nationalization measures prejudicial to the interests of the French settlers and industrialists.

Reprivatization and the return of nationalized enterprises to foreign monopolies were virtually made a condition for the resumption of imperialist 'aid' to Indonesia, and the Indonesian government has been taking steps in this direction. Many enterprises, among them the rubber plantations of the American company Goodyear and the property of the Anglo-Dutch Unilever, have already been returned or are in the process of being returned to their former owners. A special law on foreign investments has been passed, giving access to the Indonesian economy to the monopolies of the United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands and other states. Among them are the biggest American banks—the Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank, which have already opened up offices in the country.

The expansion of private capital is facilitated

also by the economic consequences of 'aid.' This is not just a question of the already mentioned overall effect but of concrete changes in the economy of its 'beneficiaries' connected with the choice of field for investment and with the distribution of 'aid' among appropriate spheres and branches. This distribution is clearly designed to improve conditions for the activity of foreign capital and, as a secondary objective, for local businessmen and to create certain economic prerequisites indispensable for this activity but not very profitable from the viewpoint of private capital (the infrastructure, the training of skilled labour, etc.).

The bulk of 'aid' is spent on developing the infrastructure (roads, harbours, airports, means of communication, water supply, etc.) and on expanding the production of mineral and agricultural raw materials, i.e., on preserving the structure of the economy as it was established during colonial rule. Indicative in this respect is the distribution of the 'aid' of the Common Market's European Development Fund among the African countries associated with it and some dependent and colonial territories, although allowance has to be made in this case for the particularly backward state of these countries. According to the EEC Commission, 'aid' provided before January 1, 1968 was distributed as follows (in per cent):¹

'Renovation' of agriculture	48.8
Infrastructure	34.1
Education and vocational training	9.8
Public health	5.8
Industrialization	1.3
Other purposes	0.2

¹ *Commerce du Liban*. 27 janvier 1968.

Finally, 'aid' is used to give direct support to the private capital of imperialist monopolies in the form of joint financing of projects in developing countries. A typical example of co-operation between private and state imperialist capital is furnished by the terms of the contract for (agreed upon at the end of 1961) Project Volta in Ghana, providing for the erection of an aluminium works by Volta Aluminium Company, a consortium set up for this purpose by the American Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation (90 per cent of the shares) and the Canadian Reynolds Metal Company (10 per cent), which will become co-owners of the works, and the financing of the construction of the works' power station on the Volta River by the Ghanaian government (35 million pounds), the United States (13.2 million pounds), Britain (5 million pounds) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (16.8 million pounds).¹

The US Agency for International Development is authorized to cover up to 50 per cent of the expenditure on research conducted jointly with American companies for the purpose of ascertaining the expediency of private ventures. Private firms can borrow up to 25 per cent of the foreign currency received by the US government as payment for agricultural 'surplus' deliveries.

Incidentally, it must be recognized that the influence of 'aid' on the export and penetration of private monopoly capital is to a certain extent contradictory. There are some aspects unfavoura-

¹ *The Economy of Ghana*. Directed and edited by W. Birmingham, J. Neustadt, E. N. Omaboe, London, 1966, pp. 396-397, 402.

ble to private capital which are independent, of course, of the imperialist powers' wishes. The very possibility of borrowing from a state-owned source strengthens the reluctance of influential leaders in the young states to fling the doors wide open to foreign businessmen and enables them to make fairly exacting demands on the latter. In addition, state loans and credits are granted, as a rule, on easier terms. In other words, in some respects state capital *objectively* acts as a competitor to its private counterpart.

One more important effect of imperialist 'aid' is to stimulate growth of local capital and of its ties with foreign capital.

This is done in different ways. Out of 1,200 million francs received by states and dependencies in the franc zone from France's Central Bank for Economic Co-operation in 1962-64, 40.8 per cent went to the private sector and 40 per cent to enterprises with mixed capital.¹

In all its 'aid' programmes for India the United States has pursued a rather consistent policy of supporting the development of private enterprise. In 1966-67 it worked persistently to ensure that the large fertilizer plants to be built within the framework of its 'aid' should be erected, contrary to the intentions of the Indian government, in the private sector. The US Agency for International Development finances joint undertakings by American and Indian companies.

Nor should we underestimate such a 'function' of imperialist 'aid' as financial exploitation of former colonies and dependencies. On the whole, it

¹ *L'Usine nouvelle*, n° 48, 1964, p. 157.

enables the imperialist powers to make solid profits at the expense of the economically backward countries. With the colossal indebtedness of these countries to capitalist states, their interests payments alone come to huge sums.

Between 1957 and 1967 the total indebtedness of the developing countries grew 4.5-fold, from 10,000 million to 45,000 million dollars.¹ That of the Latin American countries to the United States doubled. Payments on foreign debts swallow up three-quarters of the liquid assets of these countries.²

Interest and principal payments on loans and credits have been growing throughout the 1960s. They amounted to 2,000 million dollars in 1961, 2,200 million dollars in 1962, as much in 1963, 2,900 million dollars in 1964 and 3,100 million dollars in 1965. The same holds true of dividends and profits generally.³ In 1966 states-members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee—received, in interest and principal payments, 1,225 million dollars as against 717 million dollars in 1964.⁴

According to G. Woods, former IBRD President, if all interest and principal payments and dividends is taken into account, the back flow of capital from the developing countries reaches 6,000 million dollars annually and equals half of

¹ *The New York Times*, April 15, 1968.

² *Ibid.*

³ JD/7 Suppl. 1, 17 October 1967, p. 91 E/4374, 26 May, pp. 18, 29. IBRD, IDA Annual Report 1965-66, Washington, 1966, p. 33.

⁴ *Le Monde*, 19 octobre 1966.

the amount of capital flowing into them.¹ And since payments go on increasing, if the current trends remain, in fifteen years the back flow will even up with the influx.²

As can be seen from data published by the Indian government, from 1964/65 to 1967/68 India's payments on foreign 'aid' loans rose by 40 per cent, from 254 million to about 350 million dollars; in 1964/65 they equalled 10.7 per cent of the influx of foreign 'aid,' including deliveries under Law No. 480; in 1967/68 they rose to 24.5 per cent.³

Lastly, it should be stressed that although all its principal objectives have a class, anti-socialist and anti-liberation nature and are therefore, in principle, of general importance to the imperialists, and although it is often realized in forms of collective neo-colonialism, in practice 'aid,' as the whole of neo-colonialist policy, serves first and foremost as an instrument for the expansion of a *definite* imperialist power. This is its immediate task. The general imperialist functions of 'aid' can be performed only in the form of a struggle to consolidate the positions and influence of a given imperialist state and, as a rule, to the detri-

¹ The reference is to both state aid and private investments. In this connection, attention should be called to one more propaganda device of the Western press and statistics which is based, in part, on some methodological premises of bourgeois political economy: it is inclusion under the 'aid' rubric, and accordingly laudation as well-nigh a charitable deed, of private monopoly investments.

² *Foreign Affairs*, January-March 1966, pp. 211-212.

³ *Economic Survey 1967/68*. Government of India, New Delhi, 1968.

ment of the specific interests of its imperialist partners. "It seems fair to us," writes Bernard de Calloc'h, "that our efforts in behalf of other peoples should bring France, in the economic plane, for instance, orders for French machines, employment for French specialists, and in the cultural plane, preference given to the French language."¹

When indisputable facts are cited in an analysis, to prove that 'aid' encourages and stabilizes obedient regimes, smoothes the path for foreign capital and facilitates its establishment of mixed companies, stimulates exports and capture of markets, this invariably means in terms of political and economic reality regimes obedient first of all to a *definite* power ('the donor'), privileges to *its* finance capital, strengthening the influence of *this* capital on local business, expanding the exports of this power, and so on, and so forth.

There is good reason why 'aid' is negotiated on a bilateral basis: it provides the donor with the best possibilities for utilizing it in *its own* interests.

Only one-tenth of the nearly 90,000 experts from capitalist states who worked in developing countries in 1964 had been sent under multilateral agreements.

¹ "German development aid," *Internationales Afrika-Forum* pointed out in its August 1967 issue, "has the central aim which, in contrast to American aid, is not all-embracing and is not determined by the interests of the security of the entire Western world, but is confined to a rather limited but highly important sphere: enforcement of the Hallstein doctrine's right of exclusive representation. . . German development assistance constitutes, in addition, an instrument of German trade and economic policies."

'Aid' Under Bilateral Agreements and Through International Organizations, 1961-65 (\$000,000's)¹

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Total value	5,535	5,597	5,673	5,657	5,980
Under bilateral agreements	4,695	4,963	5,272	5,186	5,449
Through international organizations	840	634	401	471	531
Share of means provided on a bilateral basis (% %)	84.8	88.7	93.0	91.7	91.1

Certain data about the geographical distribution of 'aid' is of interest. In 1964, 66 per cent of British bilateral 'aid' went to Commonwealth nations. Besides, Britain's former colonies and protectorates received 21.7 per cent of all subsidies and loans granted by Britain. In the same year France gave its former colonies 90.5 per cent of its state assistance under bilateral agreements.²

These facts cannot be construed as denying the increasingly obvious efforts to 'collectivize' neo-colonialist 'aid'. The American rulers' stand on this issue, for instance, is based on their desire to limit the opportunities for using 'aid' as a weapon of inter-imperialist, especially anti-American, competitive struggle. The United States is acting

¹ Based on *UN Statistical Yearbook 1966*, New York, 1967, p. 681.

² *Commonwealth Survey* No. 8, 1965, p. 392; *Problèmes économiques*, n° 899, 1965, p. 1.

on the assumption that its economic, political and financial potential will enable it to occupy a dominant position in collective colonial organizations and to control other imperialist powers.

The reason France tried to canalize through the Common Market West Germany's operations in its former African possessions, or Britain allows other imperialist powers to put capital into local development corporations it has set up (the West German Service Agency, for instance, participates in such corporations in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda), is to restrict the freedom of action of their imperialist competitors, and to see they are kept under a certain measure of control.

In recent years certain features and trends have become apparent in the policies and practices of 'aid' which are of interest as indication of its future development. Particularly conspicuous is a certain levelling off or even overall reduction of 'aid,' accompanied by a growing emphasis on the need for the developing countries to rely more on 'normal' external sources of financing, i.e., private monopoly investment. For the fiscal year 1968/69 the US government asked Congress to appropriate 2,981 million dollars for military and economic 'aid,' the smallest sum ever asked for during the twenty-one years of the 'aid' programme's existence. But even that sum was cut by 33 per cent, to 1,968,950 dollars. In 1969-70 this sum was cut again, though insignificantly. "The world pattern of economic aid to the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is undergoing a fundamental change," *The New York Times* commented. "Most of the major donor nations are levelling off or reducing their governmental economic and technical assistance

programmes... The developing countries are being advised by the United States and other Western countries to rely more on private business as a source of foreign credits and investment." ¹ And although Robert McNamara, the new President of the IBRD, announced that the bank was "about to begin a major expansion of lending to the less-developed countries to help offset a downtrend in the aid programmes of the United States and some other industrial countries," ² this will hardly have any appreciable effect, if only because of the much more rigid financial and economic terms laid down by the World Bank.

The share of subsidies and grants in the total volume of 'aid' is dwindling. Between 1962 and 1964 France reduced its 'gratuitous assistance' by 12 per cent and Britain, by 18 per cent. The same trend has been evinced by the United States. On the whole, subsidies and similar forms of 'aid' constituted 70.8 per cent of all means provided by the OECD states under bilateral agreements in 1963 and 1964, 65.6 per cent in 1965, and 63.6 per cent in 1966. ³

Even grants for military assistance have been reduced. The trend here, according to H. Hovey, for many years a Pentagon official in charge of questions on military assistance, is as follows (\$000,000's): ⁴

¹ *The New York Times*, August 5, 1968.

² *Ibid.*, August 7, 1968.

³ *Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review*, pp. 184, 185.

⁴ H. Hovey. *United States Military Assistance. A Study of Policies and Practices*, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 184.

Year	Grants	Direct sales	Credits
1957	2,078	72	7
1963	1,765	861	46
1974 (planned)	1,391	960	62

The general reduction of imperialist 'aid,' the decreasing share of grants and subsidies are more and more often explained by the currency difficulties experienced by the capitalist world, and by the United States' tremendous expenditure in Vietnam. Besides, after recovering somewhat from the panic of the 1950's, imperialist leaders and strategists are beginning to recognize that the struggle about the future and direction of the majority of the young states—towards capitalism or socialism—will be a long-drawn-out affair and that its outcome can hardly be decided overnight.¹

Hence, on the one hand, the increasing attention paid by the neo-colonialists to the problem of the economic and social evolution of these states. On the other, they try to put economic relations on a more commercial basis, more 'normal' for capitalism, and—this is added confirmation of the obviously political character of 'aid' and espe-

¹ A trend characteristic of the present-day imperialist 'aid' policy was thus described by *The New York Times* on September 4, 1966: "The concept of a massive effort to help everyone and to check Communism everywhere has given way to a selective approach pinned to aid to key states, encouragement of economic regionalism and confidence that Communism is not going to sweep Africa tomorrow." (My italics—K.B.)

cially grants and subsidies – to obtain a sharp growth of investment by imperialist monopolies, while taking account of their social impact as well.

To cap it all, influential imperialist leaders are somewhat disappointed with the results so far achieved by 'aid' programmes.

The neo-colonialist direction of 'aid,' its latent threat to the political independence and to the prospects of economic liberation of the developing countries have not remained a secret to the general public in these countries and to their leaders. As President Nyerere of Tanzania put it, not only is 'aid' utterly insufficient, but most of it is barely related to the real aims of development, being very often used to support tottering governments favoured by the donors. And at times, Dr. Nyerere added, the reasons behind it are even less worthy of respect.

The imperialist nature of 'aid' is sometimes admitted by Western leaders, propagandists and scholars. Speaking at a conference in Dar es Salaam in September 1964, a British 'aid' expert, William Clark, noted that aid can be granted from a desire to secure advantages in the cold war, from the need to promote exports or to bring the former colonial relations into conformity with the new situation.

Internationales Afrika-Forum is of the same opinion. The purpose of aid, it pointed out in the above-quoted issue, is "not to promote development but to be used as an instrument of a policy... The same can be said about credits for deliveries and private investment. It is business in the development field. The private businessman

and supplier delivers commodities and invests capital all over the world, but ultimately always in his own interest, never for the sake of the developing country. When his government underwrites him it employs a classical means of promoting exports exclusively in the interest of its own economy." ¹

Why, then, despite the neo-colonialist character of 'aid,' do the governments of many national states, including those whose patriotic motivations are unquestionable, declare their interest in it?

The answer should be sought in the economic position of these states, as well as in the contradictory, to a certain extent, nature of 'aid' itself. The former colonies have inherited such a state of economic backwardness and poverty, such meagre sources of accumulation that a certain inflow of finance from outside is evidently inevitable if a major economic advance is to be achieved. Indisputably, some aspects of 'aid' can further to a certain extent the development of the productive forces. And the national governments of Asian and African states hope—whether with good reason or not is another matter—to put to good use precisely these aspects of 'aid' while effectively rejecting its neo-colonialist trends. Thus the problem of 'aid' often becomes an issue in the struggle between the patriotic and pro-imperialist forces.

Although the introduction of state 'aid' on a vast scale has been one of the principal features in the export of imperialist capital in the postwar decades, private monopoly investment remains an

¹ *Internationales Afrika-Forum*, August 1967.

indispensable instrument for exploiting the former colonies.

According to the OECD bulletin, out of 83,282,300 thousand dollars allocated (on bilateral basis or through international organizations) to 'third world' countries in 1960-69 from the United States, France, Britain, West Germany and Japan, which are the main exporters of capital, 53,004,500 thousand dollars, or 63.7 per cent, came from governments and 30,277,800 thousand dollars or 36.3 per cent, from private sources.¹ As regards the export of capital by individual imperialist powers in this period, the ratio between state and private sources was as follows (\$000,000's):

	USA	France	Britain	FRG	Japan
State capital	33,296.9	8,607.7	4,479.7	4,365.5	2,254.7
Private capital	13,868.1	5,539.5	4,213.0	4,830.7	1,826.5
Total	47,165.0	14,147.2	8,692.7	9,196.2	4,081.2
Share of state capital in total (% %)	70.6	60.9	51.5	47.5	55.3
Share of private capital in total (% %)	29.4	39.1	48.5	53.5	44.7

In the postwar years the imperialist governments have been particularly active, both at home

¹ Based on *Examen, 1970. Aide au développement. Efforts et politiques poursuivis par les membres du Comité d'aide au développement*, décembre 1970, OCDE.

and in developing countries, in trying to stimulate the export of private monopoly capital. Evidently these measures are having some effect, though slow and unstable. At any rate, statistical data show a definite trend towards increase in the share of private investment in the total export of capital to developing countries. This is due both to these measures and, in no lesser degree, to cut-backs in 'aid' allocations by some capitalist states.

Between 1961 and 1965 American direct private investments in Asia, Africa and Latin America registered a 30 per cent increase, from 11,600 million dollars to 14,900 million. And in Africa (without the RSA), in the period 1950-64 they grew almost 8-fold, though remaining relatively small in volume.¹

In 1965 West German private long-term investments in developing countries were more than double the 1963 figure.² Between 1961 and 1965 their direct investments in Africa rose from 170 million marks to 449.3 million.

Behind these figures can be found a highly uneven geographical distribution of private monopoly capital in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which varies from a levelling off or even reduction, resulting from an outflow of capital and nationalization of monopoly property, of the sum total of private foreign investments in some countries and areas, to an intensive inflow into others. As a rule, private monopoly capital steers clear of zones where the national-liberation movement has become strong or

¹ *Survey of Current Business*, August 1964, pp. 10-14; September 1965, pp. 23-25.

² *Development Assistance Efforts and Policies*, September 1966, pp. 153-154.

revolutionary upheavals are brewing. It is attracted to countries with 'stable' pro-imperialist regimes in which it can hope to operate on the most profitable and more or less uncontrolled basis.

For example, 60 per cent of American private investments in Southeast Asia is concentrated in the Philippines. In fifteen years, from 1950 to 1965, they grew 3.5-fold, from 149 million dollars to 529 million.¹ Between 1960 and July 1967 US private investments in Taiwan rose by 108 million dollars.²

In the African continent, not counting the RSA, Liberia is the strongest centre of attraction to American companies, while in the case of France it is its former colonies which now comprise the Afro-Malagasy Organization.

The monopolies, as before, are investing heavily in the mining industry and trade. In recent years, however, there has been an increase in private investments in branches of the manufacturing industry.

Thus, direct US private investments between 1962 and 1968 in the manufacturing industry of Latin America, Asia and Africa increased more than twofold and in the mining and metallurgical industry they comprised about 30 per cent.

The imperialist monopolies continue to extract enormous profits from economically backward countries. The relevant data are, as a rule, withheld or belittled. However, some idea of the size of these profits can be gained from *The Times* report³ on the gains made in 1966 by the largest

¹ *Current History*, January 1968, p. 11.

² *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Januar 27, 1968.

³ *The Times*, September 1, 1967. See P. Dutt. "Crisis of British Neo-Colonialism". *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1968.

British concerns specializing in neo-colonial exploitation (in pounds sterling):

British Petroleum	242 million (a return of 20 per cent on capital)
Shell Oil	205 million (14 per cent)
Imperial Chemical Industries	102 million (8.5 per cent)
Unilever	57 million (11.5 per cent)

In 1965 US monopolies operating in Latin America received 1,170 million dollars from their direct investments, or a return of almost 13 per cent on capital invested.¹

According to K. Kurian, a noted Indian economist, in 1948-60 even the repatriated part of the profits of foreign monopolies in India, which averaged 261 million rupees per year, exceeded the average annual inflow of private foreign capital (208 million rupees) in the same period.²

In many cases the rate of profit is much higher. Some of the French companies in Upper Volta and other former French possessions in Africa are 'earning' returns of up to 300 per cent on capital invested. Noting that key branches of the economy in many West African countries "are almost exclusively French-owned," the West German author, Karl Erdmann, minces no words in stating that "what all this means financially will never be possible to reckon, but this (i.e., the huge profits. - K.B.) explains why France can afford to allocate 1.88 per cent of its national income for development assistance."

¹ *Panorama Economico Latinoamericano*, 1967, No. 234, p. 5.

² K. Kurian. *Impact of Foreign Capital on Indian Economy*, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1966, p. 214.

Trade is another major weapon of the neo-colonialists, which they can use owing to trade relations inherited from the colonial and semi-colonial era, and the economic importance of these relations for the young states.

The imperialist powers continue to dominate the foreign trade of the developing countries. In mid-sixties they delivered more than 90 per cent of the machinery and industrial equipment imported by these countries, about 80 per cent of other manufactured products, almost 60 per cent of foodstuffs, and more than 50 per cent of raw materials. Their share in the exports is seen from this table (\$000,000,000's):¹

	1955		1960		1966	
	\$	% %	\$	% %	\$	% %
Total exports	22.86	100	25.81	100	35.72	100
Exports to developed capitalist countries	17.11	74.9	19.78	76.6	27.81	76.9

Moreover, imperialist monopolies act as intermediaries or producers and suppliers (sometimes they are both) simultaneously in the export and import of developing countries. Therefore, especially in view of the monocultural or in any case undiversified structure of the latter's export system, the imperialists can bring serious economic and political pressure to bear upon these countries by reducing the purchases or forcing down

¹ *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*. UN, New York, November 1967.

the prices of their staple export items.

This is exactly what happened when the United States cancelled its contract for sugar with the aim of bringing Cuba to its knees. But their intentions were thwarted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries which began to import large quantities of Cuban sugar. For several years running, foreign monopolies tried to damage the Nkrumah government by maintaining a 'bear pool' in regard to the price of cocoa beans, with the result that in 1965 they dropped to the level of the depressed 1930s. Whereas in the 1954/55 economic year the sale of 210,000 metric tons of cocoa beans brought 85.5 million pounds of sterling, in 1964/65 a crop almost triple in size—590,000 tons—was worth only 77 million pounds.¹

In order to multiply their profits, imperialist monopolies make wide use of the growing gap between the prices of raw materials, in which the former colonies continue to 'specialize,' and manufactured goods. This process has its objective causes, such as the diminishing role of raw and auxiliary materials in establishing the cost of industrial goods in conditions of the modern scientific and technological revolution.

But there is also a subjective factor which is the monopolies' policy of maintaining prices at an artificial level that enables them to plunder the developing countries in both the import and export spheres.

In 1960-66 the prices charged for manufactured goods exported by imperialist powers to developing countries grew by another 7 per cent,

¹ K. Nkrumah. *Neo-Colonialism—the Last Stage of Imperialism*, London, 1965, p. 10.

but there was no increase in the prices of the raw materials they imported. At the same time, their exports of raw materials rose in price by 13 per cent. As a result, the developing countries sustained tremendous losses.

According to US data, in 1966 the index of export-to-import prices in the case of the industrially developed states was 104 (1958=100), i.e., remained favourable for them. But the position of the developing countries worsened.¹

Between 1955 and 1965 the price of Egyptian cotton dropped by 30 per cent, whereas that of American cotton, though of inferior quality, decreased by a mere 12 per cent.²

In the period from 1961 to 1966 the annual losses suffered by the developing countries due to the rise in prices averaged 2,200 million dollars, which equalled about 38 per cent of the value of aid received by them from developed capitalist countries and international financial organizations.³

As a result of all these changes, the young states often have to double their exports to purchase an equivalent amount of industrial goods. A drop in the prices of coffee, cocoa and bananas alone cost the Ivory Coast, for instance, 1,000 million new francs, and another 200 million francs was lost because of costlier imports needed for economic development.⁴ In mid-fifties, 14 bags of

¹ *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, June 1967, p. XIX.

² *World Marxist Review*, No. 1, 1967, p. 6.

³ *International Trade and Development Survey 1967. Report by UNCTAD Secretary-General*, Part I, p. 34 (TD/5, November 15, 1967).

⁴ *Le Monde*, 9-10 avril 1967.

coffee could buy a jeep. Ten years later a jeep cost 39 bags.

In exploiting the former colonies and semi-colonies through the channels of trade wide use is being made of the system of preferences, of the trade and financial mechanisms of the Commonwealth and of the sterling, franc and Common Market zones. 'Aid' operates in the same way. It is conditional, apart from everything else, on the commitment of the recipient country to realize the means granted it almost exclusively on the market of the imperialist donor state. This frequently results in the developing country overpaying large sums for commodities sold on terms obviously disadvantageous to it.

For example, H. Johnson, professor of economics at the University of Chicago, points out that in 1965 purchases in the United States within the framework of 'aid' cost Pakistan 13.5 per cent more compared with prices on the world market.¹

All told, because of the imperialist powers' policies the developing countries lose in the sphere of foreign trade 14,000 million to 16,000 million dollars annually. Small wonder that, as the Delhi session of UNCTAD in February-March 1968 showed again, the imperialists refuse to introduce any substantial changes in their trade relations with the 'third world.'

If one takes into account that approximately another 6,000 million dollars is syphoned off the developing countries every year in profits from private investments and in interest and principal payments for 'aid,' the tribute paid by these coun-

¹ H. G. Johnson. *Economic Policies Towards Less Developed Countries*, Washington, 1967, p. 83.

tries to the imperialist monopolies adds up to the astronomical sum of 20,000 million dollars to 22,000 million. Since all state 'aid' totals 6,000 million dollars annually, it can be safely said that 'aid,' the neo-colonialists' instrument for enslaving young states, is *actually financed out of a fraction of the means the imperialists pump out of these states themselves.*

As we have seen, many economic forms and methods of neo-colonialism and other instruments which the imperialists are trying to adapt to the same purpose have come into being and are functioning on the basis of joint participation of several or even almost all imperialist states. Here mention should be made above all of the European Economic Community (the Common Market), and not only because it is an organization with *politico-economic* functions. Called into being by the national and 'European'—and in some instances anti-American—interests of the monopolies of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, this 'supranational' state-monopoly agglomeration also has an obvious neo-colonialist bias.

With the EEC are 'associated' 18 African countries—Madagascar, Chad, Gabon, Upper Volta, Togo, Somali, the two Congos, the Central African Republic, Cameroun, Senegal, Dahomey, Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Mali, Ruanda, and Burundi. Other African countries have special agreements with it.

Through 'associations' the monopolies of a number of European states bent on fortifying their positions in the capitalist world system vis-a-vis other imperialist trusts, want to entrench themselves on a considerable part of the African

continent so as to be able to continue exploiting the resources of African countries and dominating their markets. It will be recalled that in the course of the diplomatic struggle that preceded the establishment of the Common Market Robert Schuman, ex-Prime Minister of France and one of the initiators of European 'integration,' whetted the appetite of prospective imperialist partners by promising that "France will leave Europe a legacy of its African colonies." By means of 'associations' the Common Market countries have been building up a form of collective colonialism more unfamiliar and therefore less odious in the eyes of the Africans, designed to help direct the economic and political development of the 'associated' countries along lines suitable to the 'Six.'

The 'association' agreement, signed in Yaoundé, Cameroun, on July 20, 1963, envisaged certain 'preferences' to the African states concerned as regards the sale of tropical goods in the Common Market countries, as well as the granting of loans and credits to them—730 million dollars in 1963-68—out of the EEC fund. The 'associates,' in turn, gave Common Market goods preferential access to their markets and lifted import quotas and customs duties on them.

The superficially attractive term of 'association' facilitates, in fact, the economic as well as political penetration by West European monopolies. It is natural to expect that in such a more or less closed grouping of developed European industrial states and economically backward African countries the former will act as suppliers of industrial goods and as a force shaping the character of economic relations, while the latter will be doomed to the role of suppliers of agricultural

and mineral raw materials to industrial states to whose needs they will inevitably have to adapt themselves.

The very basis of 'association'—guaranteeing to African exports an apparently stable and favourable market in the countries of the 'Six' in exchange for giving their manufactures a clear field—tends to perpetuate the economic specialization of the 'associated' countries as an agrarian and raw material appendage of imperialist economies, and puts a new obstacle in their way towards achieving economic independence. This is particularly effective as 'preferences' concern only unprocessed products thereby creating further impediments towards the development of manufacturing industries in the 'associated' countries. Moreover, the Yaoundé agreement provides for the relinquishing by the African signatories of part of their sovereignty in vital spheres of economic life such as control of foreign trade and accumulations, and choice of investment projects.

Five years later, the OCAM Secretary-General, Falilou Kâne, declared in Abidjan that the differentiated tariffs on some processed agricultural products from the 'associated' countries were an obstacle to their industrialization and that "it would be quite wrong to say that the African countries are satisfied with the implementation of the Yaoundé convention."¹

In other words, a typically colonial division of labour injurious to the African countries is not only preserved but accentuated. As *Horoya*, the organ of the Democratic Party of Guinea, pointed

¹ *L'Afrique nouvelle*, 25-31 juillet 1968.

out, "the Common Market aims to keep the African economy undeveloped."¹

Whereas before each one of these 'associated' countries had to deal principally with the capital of the metropolitan country alone, today they are confronted with a more or less united front—despite the contradictions—of the powerful Common Market monopolies. Understandably, this further complicates the tasks of the struggle against dependence, and for elimination of economic backwardness, for industrialization and the establishment of a diversified economy.

The 'associates' have been largely deprived of that effective instrument for stimulating economic activity—protectionism. In addition, their dependence on the decisions of the Common Market governing bodies (on which they are not represented) and the high customs fence separating them from non-members of the Common Market restrict their freedom of manoeuvre in external economic activity.

'Association' hampers development of inter-African trade. Take this example: the 'associated' neighbours of Nigeria and Ghana impose a tax on their cigarettes four times higher than that on cigarettes imported from Common Market countries. Moreover, the 'association' of half of the African states with the EEC enables the imperialists to promote and aggravate discord between African countries, to set the 'associates' against other African states, which makes it more difficult for them to join forces against neo-colonialism. It should be borne in mind, for instance, that the Yaoundé agreement envisaged the in-

¹ *Horoya*, 10 février 1965.

roduction of not only customs preferences for the tropical goods of the 'associated' countries but so-called external duties on imports from other African states (for example, 20 per cent on bananas, about 10 per cent on coffee, 11 per cent on vegetable oil and butter, etc.).

'Association' also impedes economic co-operation between the African countries and the socialist states.

The imperialist planners expect the 'association' agreement to exert a decisive influence on the *trend of development* in the African countries concerned, and to smooth the path for the establishment of capitalist relations. The opportunities 'association' gives to the neo-colonialists in this respect can be duly appreciated if one takes into consideration the serious influence the Common Market has on the economic life of the 'associated' members. It is responsible for the formation of political and social pressure groups, intensified penetration of foreign capital and finally—considering the extreme backwardness of the African countries—the tremendous role played by the character and orientation of external economic contacts which determine economic development in these countries.

It would be naive to think that in such conditions the Common Market and the 'association' will remain instruments of purely economic neo-colonialist influence. "Let it be frankly admitted that the association of the Overseas States with the EEC is a *political* action," declared M. Rabemananjara, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Malagasy Republic. "It would be useless and dangerous to disguise this profound truth

under the technicalities of economic schemes."¹

Thus, the Common Market is an economic as well as political instrument of 'collective' neo-colonialism. Its political purposes are, on the one hand, to further the economic aims of the neo-colonialists and, on the other, to sustain the pro-Western orientation of the 'associated' countries (or win them over to it), to help, if only indirectly, the conservative political forces in these countries.

3. Weapons of Ideological Expansion

As far as the means of ideological penetration are concerned, there can hardly be any comparison between neo-colonialism and its historical predecessor. Traditional colonialism had practically nothing even remotely resembling the powerful propaganda machine new colonialism has built and uses. Equally incomparable is the scale of the neo-colonialist ideological campaign. Dozens of broadcasting stations, hundreds of films, thousands of books, tens of thousands of television programmes and articles in periodicals with more than a million strong circulation promote ideas that suit the neo-colonialists' interests. All this activity, designed for instant or delayed political impact, is so closely geared to neo-colonialist policy that it has virtually become an integral part of it.

Particularly characteristic in this respect are the operations of the United States Information Agency, the biggest propaganda centre of modern im-

¹ *Aspects of European Integration. An Anglo-French Symposium*, PEP, London, p. 45.

perialism. At the end of 1964 C. Rowan, its director at that time, declared that its programmes were thoroughly planned so as to secure in every given country support for US foreign-policy aims and that its information scheme, designed for propaganda effect, was a vital element of the US "first line of national defence." In August 1965, when urging Congress for allocations to expand their propaganda to African countries, the USIA bosses emphasized that their objective was to sway the political thinking of the leaders of new Africa.

It operates in more than a hundred countries, primarily those of the 'third world,' where it runs nearly 130 centres (more than half of them in African countries) and publishes about 90 newspapers and magazines. Its personnel in the United States alone numbers 3,000. It concentrates on the 'élite,' intellectuals and students and is flooding Asian, African and Latin American countries with books, pamphlets and articles, which it distributes through its libraries and information centres. In 1960 it published 108 books with a total circulation of 1.5 million. In 1963, the respective figures were 1,514 and 12.7 million. In those three years it distributed more than 37 million propaganda booklets in Latin America alone.

Nor are broader sections of the population in the developing countries forgotten. Taking into consideration the low level of literacy there, the agency relies principally on radio, television, cinema and various kinds of exhibitions. It rents 200 cinema-houses and 8,000 film projection outfits. Full-length films and monthly newsreels are made on its orders in the United States and shipped to Asia, Africa and Latin America. In

more than 70 countries it organizes television programmes. Its Voice of America broadcasts in almost forty languages, including some which are rare and tribal dialects. There are also special programmes recorded in more than sixty languages.

And yet the agency is sharply criticized by influential US leaders and by the American press for having failed to prevent the tremendous growth of anti-American feeling. Stating that in a large part of the world America's name was being dragged through the mud, the *Chicago Tribune* pointed to deficiencies in US image-building abroad and declared that few of the USIA men were worth anything.

Similar work, though on a much lesser scale, is being carried on by the propaganda centres of other imperialist powers. For example, in the course of eighteen months in 1963 and 1964 France sent to Tropical African countries 600,000 periodicals, 110,000 books and 1,650 films. It finances the building of cultural centres in a number of African countries and gives technical assistance to local news agencies and newspaper publishers. Intensive propaganda in the languages of many Asian, African and Latin American countries is conducted by the West German government's broadcasting station Deutsche Welle.

Active efforts are being undertaken to infiltrate the information media of the developing countries themselves. The imperialist states are very willing to train journalists for young states, to equip radio and TV networks for them, etc. For example, in May 1968 the West German Friedrich Ebert Fund handed over to the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation a fully-equipped TV studio

in Accra. It had also arranged for the training of its Ghanaian staff in West Germany.

In the interests of propaganda, official bodies of the Western powers organize, both in their own countries and in young national states, a wide variety of seminars, festivals, exhibitions, 'friendship trips,' and so on. Here are, for instance, the themes of some of the seminars held in the course of the "German-African Week" which was organized by the West German authorities at the end of 1962 and which lasted 45 days instead of the planned week: "Africa and World Communism," "Western Democracy and African States," "West German Assistance to Africa," "How to Boost Crop Yields in Africa," etc.

A special place in the neo-colonialist policy of ideological penetration is occupied by the US Peace Corps, which was inaugurated on March 1, 1961 as one of a series of enterprises in the 'third world' countries envisaged by Kennedy's 'new frontiers' policy. Following the United States' example and recommendations, similar organizations were set up in West Germany (Development Service¹), Britain, France (Volunteers of Progress), Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands (Man to Man Service), Japan, and the Scandinavian countries. The Peace Corps remains the biggest of these organizations. Its personnel exceeds that of all of them put together.

The Peace Corps acts as a government organi-

¹ In March 1968 the West German Bundestag adopted a special law on the statutes of the Development Service. It lays down, among other things, that all reservists who volunteer for the Service and spend at least two years in developing countries will not be drafted into the Bundeswehr.

zation with its own administration both at home (central headquarters and regional divisions) and abroad (group leaders in every country where its 'volunteers' are working). It is financed out of the federal budget. Questions on where to send Peace Corps teams are decided at inter-government level, sometimes at the summit, as was the case with the decision on sending more 'volunteers' to Somali which was part of the agreements concluded in the course of Somalian Prime Minister Mohammed Egal's visit to the United States and a result of his talks with President Johnson in March 1968. As is known, a progressive government, which came to power in 1969, put an end to the Peace Corps activity in Somali.

The importance the American rulers attach to the Peace Corps is seen from the fact that every year the US President reports to Congress on its activities. In the 6th such report, submitted on March 1, 1968, President Johnson wrote that more than 12,000 Corpsmen were serving in 57 countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania and another 6,000 to 7,000 were undergoing preliminary training in the United States.

Speaking in Lexington in February 1965 on the occasion of the centennial of the University of Kentucky, Johnson announced a programme of bringing, within the next four years, the numerical strength of the Corps to approximately 25,000. At the time of writing, this programme seems well on the way to realization. Significantly, the United States Congress, where the government's 'aid' bills have been meeting, especially in recent years, with serious resistance and, as a rule, considerably scaled down, the appropriations requested by the White House for the needs of the Peace

Corps are usually fully endorsed. Thus in 1968/69 it received 112.8 million dollars.

The Peace Corps, just as its counterparts in other capitalist countries, is a specific ideological weapon of colonialism. It recruits 'volunteers'—predominantly young people—who after a course of training and briefing at home go to developing countries as teachers, doctors, doctor's assistants, builders, etc. The 'volunteers' are instructed not to limit themselves to purely professional pursuits but to mix and even merge with the local population, to make friends with them and take part in and organize cultural, educational, athletic and other social activities.

Thus a convenient cover is provided for the propaganda and ideological indoctrination of the local population, especially young people, for educating pro-American personnel as well as for plain intelligence work which cannot be counted the least important aspect.

A revealing light is shed on the political and ideological functions of the Peace Corps by a book written by its organizer and first director, Sargent Shriver, brother-in-law of President Kennedy. In his appropriately titled book *Point of Lance*, he leaves no doubt as to what purpose this weapon is to serve. The mission of the Peace Corps volunteers, he writes, is to help enhance the authority of the United States; they should act not merely as skilled workers but as representatives of a definite way of life. On the whole, the Corps is to influence the choice of the path of development by the newly-freed countries and to prevent their going over to the 'communist camp.'¹

¹ Sargent Shriver. *Point of Lance*, New York, Harper and Row, 1964, pp. 50, 8.

The Peace Corps symbolizes some of neo-colonialism's typical traits with its striving to work under the cover of assistance to the developing countries, of disinterested help and anti-colonialist ideas and its parasitical tendency to feed on the needs of these countries. A dangerous weapon of ideological and political penetration whose employment is facilitated by the extreme shortage of skilled personnel in the developing countries, the Peace Corps pretends to be an unselfish organization of enthusiasts and enlighteners who are driven by a desire to help the young nations.¹

To impart a democratic appearance to the Corps and thus facilitate its penetration into the developing countries, its leadership makes a special point of recruiting Negroes and other US citizens of non-European descent. According to Sargent Shriver, Negroes occupy 7.4 per cent of executive posts in the Peace Corps (as against 0.7 per cent in other government institutions) and make up 24 per cent of the rank-and-file personnel, compared with 5.5 per cent in other institutions.

The neo-colonialist activity of the Peace Corps has already caused a series of incidents involving its 'volunteers.' Public opinion in many young states is increasingly suspicious of the Corps. Exposure of some of its members' unwarranted actions has been accompanied by the expulsion of Peace Corps teams from Nigeria, Ghana, Cyp-

¹ Incidentally, it is not excluded that there are volunteers who find alien the neo-colonialist tasks imposed on the Peace Corps by the imperialist policy-makers. But even this, in the final analysis, serves these tasks, by helping to disguise the real nature of the Peace Corps.

rus, Guinea, Gabon, Peru, Ceylon and other countries.

The principal targets of the neo-colonialist ideological drive are the intelligentsia and young people, particularly students. Being aware of the special role of these groups in the developing countries, the neo-colonialists endeavour to pursue a 'forward-looking' policy orientated on people who in the future may come to figure prominently in political and economic affairs, or even occupy a leading position in the government.

The young people in these countries stand out for their deep involvement in political activity and account for a large share of the population. As for the intelligentsia, its influence with them is, as a rule, incomparably greater than in more developed societies. The extremely low proportion of specialists and in general people with any degree of education, the tremendous cultural gap between them and the rest of the population, who remain victims of illiteracy and ignorance, make education a particularly important advantage which helps enhance the authority of the intelligentsia. Moreover, its connection with the administrative apparatus and often with the army equips the intelligentsia with an additional and important means of influencing events in the peculiar conditions of the 'third world' countries.

The imperialists see that the young people from developing countries have fairly wide access to their educational establishments. In 1966/67, for instance, nearly 60,000 Africans were studying in Western Europe and the United States.¹ Needless

¹ A. Kamarck. *The Economics of African Development*, New York, Praeger, 1967.

to say, education there goes hand in hand with intense ideological indoctrination.

The neo-colonialists, who already hold strong positions in the educational system of the developing countries, continue to send their lecturers there, specifically through the Peace Corps and similar organizations and on an especially wide scale under the auspices of 'technical assistance' programmes. According to the French journal *Perspective*, lecturers number 29,000 out of the 43,000 specialists employed in the system of French technical assistance to North African countries.¹

In August 1968 the teaching staff of the University of Delhi set up a "Front against US imperialist penetration" with the aim of exposing all forms of American penetration of the university and rallying public opinion against it.

Wide use is also made, for purposes of ideological expansion, of the frequent 'goodwill' missions to Asian, African and Latin American countries and appropriately organized trips of political and public leaders, students and intellectuals of these countries to imperialist states.

The ideological campaign unprecedented in scale directed towards the developing countries is catered for not only by the wide ranging state propaganda machinery of the imperialists but by all sorts of private institutions and organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, Carnegie Corporation, etc.

In promoting their ideological and political penetration and the recruitment of agents the colonialists have secured the aid of the church with

¹ *Perspective*, 29 juillet 1967.

its missionaries, officials from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and Right-wing Social Democrats. Since 1957 the ICFTU has run a special 'international solidarity' fund to organize conferences on trade union problems and training courses in developing countries. In Uganda, India and Mexico the ICFTU maintains regional trade union schools.

Science has also been put to work, with numerous scientists engaged in studying the objectives of imperialist propaganda: the socio-economic conditions and political situation in the developing countries, the climate of public opinion, national traditions, psychological peculiarities, etc. This research will provide a basis for working out more effective propaganda forms, methods and directions.

Furthermore, through the agency of various imperialist funds and institutions numerous seminars, colloquies and conferences are organized where neo-colonialist ideas are disseminated and exert their influence on scientific discussions and exchanges. Finally, the personal contacts of many bourgeois scientists, specialists and publicists are used in every possible way to influence certain sections of society in the developing countries.

The neo-colonialists continue their indefatigable search for new ways to further their ideological penetration of the former colonies, and to adapt their propaganda to the situation and moods existing in these countries. This line of action is an increasingly important feature of the entire neo-colonialist policy, and the danger it presents to the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America grows accordingly.

THE MAINSTAY OF NEO-COLONIALISM

Some ten years ago, when speaking at the American Academy of Political and Social Science, George Allen, an Assistant Secretary of State and Director of the US Information Agency during the Eisenhower Administration, somewhat startled his audience when he confided some of the ideas his colleagues were harbouring in regard to the problems connected with the fight against colonialism: "Isn't it too bad that we can't take a great wad of chloroform and put three-fourths of these villagers back to sleep and let them wake up gradually so that the developed part of the world can help them in a more orderly way? This sudden revolution of expectations, with everybody wanting to get on the bandwagon and join the twentieth century overnight, is extremely difficult to cope with."¹

The architects of US foreign policy, however,

¹ *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1961, p. 6.

do more than merely dream of 'putting back to sleep' the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. They act by using every weapon at their disposal and making desperate efforts to modernize the colonial system in order to save it from complete collapse. US imperialism is the mainstay of neo-colonialism and the chief practitioner of neo-colonialist policy. US monopolies pursue this policy throughout the entire 'third world,' which is beyond the powers of the other imperialist states.

"The events of the past decade have laid bare more forcefully than ever the nature of US imperialism as a world exploiter and gendarme, as the sworn enemy of liberation movements," the communist and workers' parties stressed at the Moscow Conference in June 1969.¹

1. Why US Imperialism?

It is because of US imperialism's present position in the capitalist world that it has become colonialism's principal defender. Moreover, its whole history has prepared it for this role.

During the war and after it the United States became the principal modern capitalist power, concentrating in its hands the major share of the capitalist world's economic, financial and military potential. The centre of world reaction shifted to the United States. As a result, a certain 're-division' of the capitalist world in favour of the United States took place. The US monopolies

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Prague, 1969, p. 17.

claimed the role of leader of the capitalist and developing countries, and world supremacy. In his *Obligations of Power*¹ H. Cleveland, an Assistant Secretary of State in 1961-65 and former US permanent representative to NATO, openly called for the United States to appoint itself world gendarme.

The intensified colonial expansion of the United States reflects its desire to achieve a 'repartition' of the world and world supremacy. Between 1950 and 1969 US private investments in the economically underdeveloped countries increased several times over, totalling more than 20,000 million dollars in 1969.

To this should be added state loans and credits amounting to more than 40,000 million dollars, as well as thousands of millions dispensed as 'gifts' and direct military 'aid.'²

For instance, direct private US investments in Africa rose from less than 300 million dollars in 1950 to 1,610 million dollars (without the RSA) in 1967.³

Even according to American, obviously underestimated figures, these investments bring fabulous profits.

According to Jacob Kaplan (for twenty years one of the foreign 'aid' administrators) investments in the Venezuelan and Middle Eastern oil extracting industries alone bring the United States 1,500 million dollars annually, a return of

¹ H. Cleveland. *The Obligations of Power. American Diplomacy in the Search for Peace*, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 16, 141.

² *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1968, p. 797.

³ R. Emerson. *Africa and United States Policy*, New York, 1967, p. 34. *Survey of Current Business*, No. 10, 1968, p. 24.

Direct Private US Investments in Developing Countries¹
(\$,000,000)*

Region	1950*	1955*	1960**	1962*	1964	1966	1968	1969 (preliminary)
Latin America	4,445	6,233	8,387	8,472	8,932	9,854	11,033	11,667
Africa	287	582	925	1,246	1,629	2,078	2,676	2,971
Asia (without Oceania)	1,000	1,626	2,291	2,495	3,062	3,891	4,724	5,190

* excluding undertakings of an international character

** including direct investments in Cuba

¹ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1961, p. 867; 1963, p. 856; 1965, p. 858; 1968, p. 792.
Survey of Current Business, October 1970, p. 28.

**Profits to US Monopolies from Direct Investments
in Developing Countries (\$,000,000)¹**

Region	1950	1955	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1969 (preliminary)
Latin America	513	671	641	761	895	962	1,218	1,274
Africa	35	71	-17	34	301	338	593	684
Asia (without Oceania)	297	551	853	1,017	983	1,010	1,271	1,450
Total	845	1,293	1,477	1,812	2,179	2,310	3,082	3,408

¹ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1961, p. 867; 1965, p. 858; 1968, p. 792.
Survey of Current Business, October 1970, p. 29.

25 per cent.¹ Last but not least, the US monopolies are the greatest beneficiaries of the unequal conditions of trade existing between the imperialist states and 'third world' countries.

In addition to the actual domination in Taiwan and the occupation of Japan's Pacific islands, which have been turned into Pentagon bases and atomic weapon depots, the US imperialists have entrenched themselves in South Korea and South Vietnam. By elbowing out the 'great' colonial powers of the past, the United States has acquired strong influence in areas which have until recently been the domain of these powers—Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. While stepping up their expansion, the US monopolies have redoubled their efforts to pry Britain out of Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Ghana, France out of the Maghreb countries, and other former French colonies in Africa, Belgium out of the Congo (Kinshasa), the Netherlands out of Indonesia, and so on. As General de Gaulle declared at a press conference on July 23, 1964, Washington's pressure was directly or indirectly felt whenever sovereignty was transferred from the colonial powers to native regimes.²

For instance, US investments in Congo (Kinshasa) doubled after the proclamation of independence. As *Le Monde* commented, "in South Vietnam and in the former Belgian Congo the United States has virtually replaced the former patron powers."

A typical feature of US expansion in the 'third

¹ Jacob Kaplan. *The Challenge of Foreign Aid. Policies, Problems and Possibilities.* N.-Y. Washington, London, 1968, p. 306.

² *Le Monde*, 25 juillet 1964.

world' is that it is developing during a powerful upsurge of the national-liberation movement, the disintegration of colonial empires and in the heat of the struggle between the two world systems. The US imperialists are aware of this and try to gain what advantage they can out of it. While they attack the positions of other colonial powers and 'replace' these powers in their traditional areas of influence, they use the plea that they are defending the interests of the entire 'free world.' They are, of course, guided primarily by their desire to expand as well as by their intention to struggle against the national-liberation movement and the forces of democracy and socialism throughout the world. The US imperialists claim that they are better equipped than the other imperialist powers to 'control' the course of events in newly-freed states and to utilize their resources in the fight against the socialist camp.

Having become the principal force in defending the position of imperialism, the United States assumes this role also in the former colonies and semi-colonies. It assumes the functions of colonialism's principal defender and acts as the chief enemy of independence and social progress in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

It stands to reason that in its relations with the other imperialist powers concerning policy towards the 'third world' the United States does not and cannot be guided solely by its desire for expansion, or by the logic of inter-imperialist contradictions, by its aim to clear the deck for its monopolies. It has to reckon with the fact that these powers are its allies in the global confrontation with the socialist system and that it needs

their assistance in the fight against the national-liberation movement. Rupert Emerson, a noted American expert in colonial policy matters, stressed in an article in *Foreign Affairs* that US policy in the 'third world' is strongly influenced by the fact that the colonial powers are "the principal allies of the United States," and that "NATO, embracing these powers, is the cornerstone of the coalition which the United States has shaped."¹

Acting as a world gendarme, US imperialism committed aggression in Korea, shielded the Chiang Kai-shek clique with its bayonets in Taiwan, carried out armed intervention in the Middle East in 1958, landed its marines and paratroopers in the Dominican Republic, and launched a barbarous war against Indochina. The United States was the power behind the scenes during the Israeli attack on the Arab states.

As the wealthiest and economically strongest imperialist power, the United States possesses the most effective economic weapons for implementation of neo-colonialist policy. It often acts as the 'sole banker for all,' directing into newly independent countries a flow of investments which become a kind of Trojan horse to the US monopolies. The United States is the chief supplier of 'aid' to economically undeveloped countries, which it attempts to make financially dependents by bringing certain political and social groups under its influence.

The United States had no direct connections with a large part of the colonial world and, in contrast to the European colonial powers, did not suffer direct economic losses as a result of the enslaved countries winning independence

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, January 1962, p. 305.

which has eliminated the most extreme forms of economic plunder. It is easier for the American monopolies to put up with a certain decrease in the colonial 'tribute,' and with a certain measure of economic development in the young states.

It is also important to remember that the United States is less associated than Britain, France and other colonial powers with the forces of the past in the Asian and African countries and can be more persistent and determined in wooing the national bourgeoisie.

The United States has ample experience of colonial piracy and exploitation. Wall Street propagandists boast about the traditions of the American revolution and war of independence and make as much as they can of the myth about the United States being untainted by colonialism. But history testifies to the contrary. The development of American imperialism has been connected uninterruptedly with colonial expansion and with plunder of people throughout the Old and New worlds. In addition to the 'invisible' empire built up by the American monopolies on the basis of indirect forms of exploitation and subjugation, they have acquired a classical colonial empire of their own patterned on the 'old' order.

In 1945 the territory of US possessions (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) comprised 300,000 square kilometres and the population, 22 million. US possessions today are inhabited by a total of 29 million people.

US capitalism had hardly thrown off its subjection to Britain when it embarked on a career of colonial piracy, although for a long time it was too weak to compete with the major colonial powers.

In 1801 the United States had already begun a war against the North African state of Tripoli and forced it to accept an unequal trade treaty. Four years later US warships were sent against Tunisia, and another ten years later Algeria became a victim of American military force. When he signed the outrageously unfair trade treaty, the Bey of Algiers asked the American representative for a document formally certifying that he had been compelled to accept this agreement under the muzzles of American guns. And such a document, the American historians, L. Wright and J. Macleod write, was given him.

Throughout the 19th century the United States pursued an expansionist policy in Africa aimed at seizing political and economic positions and subjugating the African people. This policy did not go so far as to become involved in the participation in the armed imperialist dismemberment of Africa only because the European colonial powers were stronger then, especially in that part of the world. But during the Second World War the United States turned to good advantage the landing of its troops in North Africa and the weakening of contacts between the West European powers and their African colonies in the interest of its economic, political and military expansion.

The exploitation of the Latin American continent which became US colonial suburb was one of the principal factors responsible for the rise of American imperialism. On dozens of occasions US marines acted as the 'supreme arbiter' in relations between Latin American countries and the North-American 'democracy.' General S. Butler, once Commandant of the Marine Corps, openly boasted in his memoirs that he had 'helped' make

Honduras 'a good place' for the American Fruit Company in 1903, Mexico and especially Tampico 'a safe place' for American oil interests in 1914, and Haiti and Cuba a 'decent place' for National City Bank revenue collectors. Cyrus Sulzberger, a prominent American journalist, called that period an era of a brutal and cruel imperialism. It will be recalled also that the United States started the first war of the monopoly capitalism's period. This was the war against Spain for a redivision of colonial holdings.

In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt submitted an interpretation of the notorious Monroe doctrine which gave the United States the right to intervene in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere in order to forestall intervention by others. Thereby, Prof. E. May of Harvard wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, the United States assumed the role of 'policeman for the Hemisphere.'¹ Roosevelt boasted then that he would show those Dagos (a contemptuous term for Mexicans), that they would be made to 'behave.' What all that meant in practice is described in Butler's memoirs. Since Theodore Roosevelt, the term the 'big stick' has been part and parcel of the political and diplomatic vocabulary.

Professor May tries to find 'humane' reasons for nearly every one of the United States' interventions in the Western Hemisphere. But he too is compelled to admit the widespread conviction in these countries that "one can point to no place on the map and declare: There the nation did good."²

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, July 1963, p. 759.

² *Ibid.*, p. 761.

Finally, the development of US capitalism is inseparable from the ruthless exploitation of the 'internal colony,' above all the millions of Negroes shipped in by slave-traders, whose profits, incidentally, also contributed towards the accumulation of capital in the United States. An appropriate comment was made by Cyrus Sulzberger, when he declared that American colonialism is, sociologically speaking, inside the United States and emphasized the need for decolonization in the country.¹

US imperialism is a past-master in camouflaging colonialist policies. This, of course, does not testify as its apologists aver to the United States' 'democratic' or 'humane' attitude towards the peoples of the underdeveloped countries. When they found it necessary and possible—as in the Philippines—the US imperialists used 'classical' methods, with 'classical' ruthlessness. What matters is another thing. By virtue of a number of historical factors, above all because of its comparatively late emergence upon the scene of global imperialist expansion, the United States could not build a colonial empire similar to those possessed by the European powers. The world had been carved up already. The way to the raw material riches and markets of the Orient was blocked by the frontier barriers of colonial empires. At the same time, the United States possessed more powerful economic instruments of subjugation. That was why the US imperialists employed, along with open and crude methods, more disguised and subtle tactics for subjugating and exploiting countries which had formally won political indepen-

¹ *The New York Times*, October 3, 1962.

dence. This applied first of all to Latin America, which became an authentic testing-house for devising new methods for furthering US colonial policy. The well-known British publicist, T. Mende, had every reason to define US policies towards these newly-freed states as attempts at their 'Latin-Americanization.'

American colonial policy has always been distinguished for its hypocritical and demagogic propaganda, which provides the new forms of colonialism with the covering shield it needs. Here is a typical example. In 1906, when sending US troops to Cuba, Theodore Roosevelt declared: "We must try to make (the Cubans) understand that our purpose is not to interfere with the design of limiting their independence, but to interfere so as to enable them to retain their independence . . . to help them so manage their affairs that there won't be the slightest need of further interference on our part."¹ US official language did not even contain the word 'colony' meaning a territory seized by the United States. The expansion of US monopolies was always clothed in pseudo-democratic garb and conducted to the accompaniment of anti-colonial demagoguery.

US monopolies, vitally interested in removing the barriers erected by the colonial powers to protect the frontiers of their empires, advanced the 'open door' doctrine, began to make use of the fight for freedom for their own ends and to pursue colonial expansion under the slogan of anti-colonialism.

¹ Quoted by E. R. May in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1963, p. 763, from E. Morison et al. (eds). *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Cambridge, 1951-54, p. 1138.

The US imperialists employ these tactics on an especially large scale today, taking advantage of the fact that the rapacious nature of Yankee imperialism is not so well known in Asia and Africa as in Latin America. Although the United States often received considerable chunks of colonial booty from the European powers the Asian and African peoples were not so aware of what part it had played in plundering their countries.

US colonial possessions were comparatively small, and American imperialism had considerable room for manoeuvre and for pursuing its policy in a more roundabout way. In relations with Asian and African countries, *Foreign Affairs* noted, nothing prevented the United States from applying less stereotyped methods for the attainment of its aims.¹

The particular features which are characteristic of the United States as a colonial power determine its policy in respect to the peoples fighting for independence and social progress, against colonialism. As an imperialist power, the United States is deeply hostile towards the national-liberation movement. Besides, the US rulers, who set the tone in NATO, are deeply interested in strengthening this aggressive bloc in which almost all former colonial powers are united.

Hence, where the question of the imperialism's positions as a whole is being decided or 'Atlantic solidarity' (i.e., the imperialist collusion of the NATO states) is at stake, the United States acts, as a rule, in a united front with the old colonial powers. It did so, for instance, on the issue

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, July 1958, pp. 645-646.

of nationalization of the Suez Canal, trying, jointly with Britain and France, to impose on the Egyptian people a colonialist consortium composed of those who used the canal. The United States supported the rule of the Portuguese colonialists in Goa and called India an 'aggressor' when it forced them to withdraw from its territory. The United States is in fact helping Portugal to hold on to its colonial empire, to wage a barbarous war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

Acting hand in glove with Britain, the United States organized intervention in the Arab East. American support was given to Belgium's hostile actions against the young Republic of the Congo. The United States is in full sympathy with Britain's support of the Rhodesian racialists, and does its utmost to prevent adoption of effective measures against the racist-colonialist regime in South Africa.

It should be noted that while supporting, at different stages, the colonial policies of other imperialist powers, the United States has usually endeavoured to utilize the economic and military difficulties created by these policies and the aggravation of internal contradictions in order to establish influence over them.

Thus, the postwar policy of the United States towards the 'third world' has always had a double objective: to crush the national forces and to supplant its colonialist rivals. This objective was achieved, for instance, when it became the mediator between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and then between Britain and Iran. US mediation in the conflict over the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company resulted in an agreement

which seriously infringed the national interests of Iran and weakened the position of Britain, whereas US capital received access to Iranian oil by acquiring 40 per cent of the shares in the new consortium.

The United States went out of its way to induce France to continue its 'dirty' war against the Vietnamese people. In that period it contributed 800 million dollars annually to the French treasury to keep the Vietnam war going.¹ At the same time it established contact with the Ngo Dinh Diem clique and helped it consolidate its position. As a result, half of Vietnam did not win freedom, while France was actually ousted from the country. France's positions were also undermined in Laos, where, again, US imperialists replaced it.

The failure of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt, about which the United States had been informed and which it virtually supported, was exploited for advancing the 'Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine' directed not only against the national-liberation movement being waged in the Middle East but also against the positions of Britain and France in that area.

The US rulers generously supported, with money and with weapons, the genocidal war of French imperialism against the Algerian fighters for freedom, hoping, with good reason, that it would weaken both France and Algeria. France was the principal recipient of American military aid. Most of the weapons used by the French troops in Algeria were of US make. In a special message to the US President, the King of Morocco asked the USA to end their assistance to Fran-

¹ Marcus Childs in *The Washington Post*, August 24, 1965.

ce for it helped it to continue the war in Algeria.¹

Along with doing its utmost to drag out the conflict in Algeria, the United States sought contact with the Algerian bourgeois nationalists so as to pave the way for the massive penetration of its monopolies and in order to consolidate their positions in North Africa as a whole.

The United States supplies weapons to Portugal, enabling it to conduct military operations in its African possessions. At the same time it tries to promote contacts with a group of the Angolan nationalists. The same policy was pursued by the USA in Congo (Kinshasa). While assisting in Belgium's actions against the Congolese patriots, it worked hard to undermine the influence of its Belgian allies and smooth the way for US monopolies. Commenting upon the commencement of the US-financed United Nations assistance programme in Congo (Kinshasa), *The Wall Street Journal* wrote on October 3, 1961 that US officials hoped this would help break Belgium's long-standing supply monopoly in that colony.

The double aim of US colonial policy is directed by the United States—and sometimes it succeeds—at hoodwinking some quarters in the developing countries into thinking that its efforts to oust other imperialists are anti-colonialist in intent.

2. Dulles's 'Big Stick'

US imperialism definitively took upon itself the function of principal defender of colonialism in

¹ *The New York Times*, April 22, 1960.

the nineteen-fifties, when John Foster Dulles cast his sinister shadow over its foreign policy. US monopoly capital which he represented advocated the use of armed violence and police methods in international relations. Its aggressive and rash policy was appropriately expressed in his ill-starred 'brinkmanship,' 'containment' and 'liberation' doctrines. These views could also be found in US imperialism's colonial policy.

Despite the notorious 'Point 4' of the 'Truman doctrine,' proclaimed in 1949, envisaging economic aid to underdeveloped countries, emphasis in US policy towards that part of the world was on military matters.

In their approach to the problems of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, the US ruling circles paid practically little attention to the social and economic processes taking place there and viewed these problems exclusively in the context of the tasks and prospects of a global and, moreover, armed conflict with 'communism,' whereas the 'third world' itself was regarded as one of the theatres of this conflict. In its attempts to stem the national-liberation movement the US imperialists resorted in the first place to armed force, unconcealed blackmail, intimidation and other methods characteristic of 'classical' colonialism. This policy was inspired by the aim to preserve—if possible in its original shape—military and political control over the former colonies. This is evidenced by many actions undertaken by US imperialism in that period. In 1950-53 it waged war against the Korean people. In 1954, after France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Dulles tried to talk Britain into joint armed intervention in Vietnam. In the same year the United States—as

American sources openly admitted later on¹—prepared the invasion of Guatemala and the overthrow of the patriotic government of Arbens. In 1957 intervention against Syria was prepared and a coup in Indonesia was organized. In the summer of 1958, in reply to the revolution in Iraq, the United States sent its warships to the shores of the Lebanon and landed its marines there. Several months later the United States conducted demonstrations of military strength and heightened the tension in the Taiwan area.

Seeking to slow down, if not to halt, the development of the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependencies, and also taking care not to irritate its Atlantic allies, whose interests had already suffered from US penetration into newly-independent countries, the US government opposed the immediate granting of independence, especially in Africa. Its foreign policy-makers persistently warned against the 'danger inherent in premature independence,' a thesis which was stressed over and over again by Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade in 1953, and re-emphasized by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer in October 1957. Although by that time Ghana had already won independence and other African countries were on the point of proclaiming it, Palmer recalled Dulles's formula of 'orderly' transition from the colonial status to independence and declared that it was "a matter of the greatest importance that the word 'orderly' be emphasized in this connection. Only in a politically stable Africa will responsible, moderate and positive elements emerge—in contrast to the

¹ *The New York Times*, April 1, 1963.

extremist, disruptive, and negative nationalism which poses such dangers for us all." ¹

Referring to that period in one of his first speeches as president, John Kennedy noted that the United States had for too long a time appeared as a defender of the *status quo* in the underdeveloped countries, no matter how intolerable this *status quo* might be. ²

Dulles's department exerted tremendous efforts to corral newly-freed states into aggressive politico-military blocs designed to serve as a weapon in the struggle against the socialist states and as an instrument for retaining the neo-colonialists' control over their former possessions. SEATO and CENTO were set up. Intense activity centered around plans for a Mediterranean pact and an alliance of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, the Sing-man Rhee clique, the Philippines and Malaya, and so on. Countries that had adopted neutralist positions were ostracized and rudely attacked. US leaders unashamedly called neutralism 'immoral.' They openly vilified India and other countries in an effort to detract them from the course they had adopted.

In violation of the Geneva agreements on Indochina, the United States tried to force Laos to abandon its policy of neutrality, involve it in its military plans and start a civil war in the country. It inspired the activities of the Right-wing anti-national government of Boun Oum-Nasavan which sabotaged these agreements, and poured its military personnel into the country.

¹ Quoted by V. McKay in *Africa in World Politics*, New York, 1963, p. 341.

² *The New York Times*, May 26, 1962.

US 'aid' to economically undeveloped countries was intended to be used to draw these countries into military blocs, stimulate military spending, step up the armaments race, establish a military set-up and encourage militarist cliques. In the 1950s 80 to 90 per cent of this 'aid' went on direct military purposes. In 1958, for instance, the Asian countries tied to the United States by military agreements received nine times more funds than neutral countries.

The comparatively small part of US 'aid' officially designed for economic purposes was provided at a high rate of interest and had other one-sided commitments attached to it. More often than not, it was used for construction of non-productive enterprises and to prevent development of the state sector. In September 1967 the US Agency for International Co-operation that was in charge of 'aid' declared that it would not, as a rule, agree to the financing of public-owned manufacturing and mining industries. Moreover, in many respects this aid took the form of a dole or bribery to privileged groups in the countries concerned, who embezzled and otherwise misappropriated much of it (military 'aid' as well). In fact that 'aid' was actually an instrument for the legalized corruption of top officials, certain sections of the government apparatus, and reactionary political groups in newly-freed countries.

With its blatant bullying and arrogant demonstrations of force, openly anti-communist and aggressive cold war slogans, resistance to fundamental socio-political changes in the former colonies and semi-colonies, the aims of US imperialism were shown for what they were and the support it relied on from the national-liberation

movement was drastically reduced. The forces which agreed to collaborate with the US imperialists did not differ much, in fact, from the collaborators of the colonial era. All over the world, Rupert Emerson had to conclude, the United States had come to be allied "with Right-wing dictators and authoritarian regimes."¹ In an interview to the *US News & World Report*, Chester Bowles, a prominent figure in US diplomacy, admitted a decline in US prestige in the Asian, African and Latin American countries and declared that this had happened "primarily because on too many occasions and in too many areas we have associated ourselves with the *status quo*, which is clearly doomed. We attempted to freeze outdated, vulnerable political situations in the face of a revolutionary storm." In analyzing the Dulles-Eisenhower policies, he pointed out that the US government must have considered any change to be for the worse. Trying to prevent actually inevitable changes, it often irrevocably associated itself with the forces of the past and lost contact with the forces of the future.²

Dulles's policy brought defeat after defeat to the US leaders. It did not, and could not, produce the desired effect at a time when the socialist system had become a powerful international factor and was increasingly obstructing the imperialists' war machine, and when the tide of the national-liberation movement had reached an unprecedented height. The development of world affairs

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, January 1962, p. 309.

² *US News & World Report*, November 21, 1960, pp. 104-106.

demonstrated more and more clearly the untenability of Dulles's course. Only a few young states allowed themselves to be drawn into military blocs, whereas the rest opted for neutralism and adhered more and more to an anti-imperialist line. Crude pressure and threats were often counter-productive. The attempts to force Egypt to its knees by military, economic and diplomatic means were frustrated by the resistance of the Egyptian people, who received the complete backing of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The only result was to strengthen the revolution of national liberation in Egypt, the liberation struggles in other Arab countries, the development of co-operation between these countries and socialist states, and to weaken the positions of imperialism in that area.

Despite attacks from the imperialists the stand of the countries that had adopted neutralism was winning increasing recognition. India's voice acquired international authority. Greater strength was won by independent Indonesia. The attempts to install there reactionary forces in power fell through. "Experience with neutralism. . .," wrote Prof. Cecil Crabb, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Vassar College, "had tended to confirm (1) that all attempts by the United States to intimidate neutralist states, to coerce them, to isolate them, to discipline them, or otherwise seek to 'convert' them into unwilling allies were doomed to failure; (2) that such attempts more often than not produced the opposite results from those intended by the State Department, by creating new opportunities for communist ties with neutralist countries; and (3) that whatever Americans might think of non-alignment as a di-

plomatic philosophy, the ideology was firmly established and was gaining adherents." ¹

At the same time, the corrupt pro-colonialist unrepresentative regimes which the colonialists had managed to implant in some of their former colonies were tottering, a process which neither the participation of these regimes in imperialist military blocs nor all-out imperialist support could stop. The revolution of July 1958 swept away the Nuri Said-Faisal regime in Iraq. In June 1960 the Syngman Rhee clique was toppled in South Korea, which Dulles had promised to turn into a 'showcase' of Asian democracy. ²

In keeping with the natural laws of social development, public discontent and mass movements continued undermining the reactionary regimes of Boun Oum in Laos, Menderes in Turkey, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam and other privileged social forces of the past on which Dulles's policy had been based. There was emerging on the political scene, with increasing vigour, a new exploiter class, the national bourgeoisie, with its own political and economic ambitions.

Problems of economic development were coming to play a greater, if not a decisive, role in the life of the newly-independent states. In such circumstances the doctrine of 'military containment,' of the 'mailed fist' was obviously no longer of any use. It was out-of-date and irrelevant. The state sector which had been born out of necessity, went on growing, and Washington by openly attacking it, not only failed to prevent its develop-

¹ C. Crabb. *The Elephants and the Grass. A Study of Non-Alignment*, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 187.

² *The Times*, March 19, 1963.

ment, but merely succeeded in further discrediting US policy in the eyes of the public in the developing countries.

The serious setbacks suffered by US policy, the rapid rise of the national-liberation movement, which was knocking down the props with which US imperialism was trying to shore up colonialism, finally induced Dulles and his department to launch a certain reappraisal of their policy and to search for new methods of struggle against the oppressed peoples' liberation movement. One of the manifestations of this search and even of a shift away from the habitual approach was the offer of considerable economic 'aid' to India, made despite extreme displeasure with India's foreign policy, which was constantly under attack from US politicians and statesmen.

Another example is the notorious Dulles-Eisenhower 'doctrine,' promulgated in 1957. It was essentially a political hybrid, explained by the 'transitional' conditions in which it was hatched. In it the United States openly proclaimed its intention to resist by military means the national aspirations of the Arab peoples—and here it followed the usual path of the colonial powers, treading in the footsteps of Dulles's old policy. At the same time the architects of the 'doctrine' clearly demonstrated a desire to come to terms with certain bourgeois circles and expand the social base of US influence in the Arab countries, by means of political manoeuvring, anti-communist demagoguery, and promises of financial handouts. But the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine came too late. The concessions and other enticements it contained were hopelessly out of tune with the times. Again its authors had failed to assess correctly the scale

of the national-liberation struggle. As regards the proposed financial 'aid,' the Arab countries were promised, on certain conditions, 200 million dollars, which was no more than another sop in no way related to the real economic needs of the Arab world.

The still-born doctrine was rejected by almost all Arab states, and as the failure of its authors' calculations to win over new, influential forces in the Arab East became obvious, the violence inherent in the doctrine began to be increasingly and openly applied. In this connection a British bourgeois newspaper commented, not without malice, that the entire history of Pax Britannica had not known such an instance of deliberate use of the navy for diplomatic purposes comparable to that of the American 6th Fleet in the East Mediterranean. President Eisenhower, the newspaper added, did not use merely a page from Lord Palmerston's book. He swallowed the whole volume.

Nevertheless it is a fact that the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine began a new stage in US policy towards some of the real problems confronting the young states, by adapting itself to the new realities and replacing old tactics by new. However, this process was exceedingly slow and uncertain, retarded by the fossilized foreign policy views of the Dulles-Eisenhower collaboration and by the dogmatic approach of important sections of the US Administration which had accepted these views.

The continued setbacks suffered by US policy, along with the systematic decline of its prestige, the steady advance of the national-liberation movement and the consolidation of contacts be-

tween young states and the Soviet Union resulted in the Dulles policy being subjected to increasingly harsh criticism in the United States itself, especially from Democratic Party leaders. Although the latter were mostly guided by electoral considerations, influential sections of the American bourgeoisie were becoming more and more aware that US 'omnipotence' was just another myth and they wanted to disassociate themselves from an attitude of blind belligerence and find ways of adapting to the new international situation. In hundreds of books, articles and speeches Walter Rostow, Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, Kenneth Galbraith, Edwin Reischauer, George McGhee and many other retired diplomatists and influential writers, prominent businessmen and university professors (the Harvard crowd, as the US press called them) who later on made up the Kennedy 'team' or perhaps brain-trust,¹ severely criticized the Dulles-Eisenhower policy for being futile, old-fashioned, unimaginative and inflexible, and urged a drastic revision. Their credo was formulated in some measure by Chester Bowles, who said in one of his speeches: "What is required is a new, tough-minded understanding of the forces that are shaping the world... We need a fresh, bold approach to the problems of economic and political development in Latin America, Asia and Africa."²

¹ For example, A. Stevenson became US Representative to the UNO; C. Bowles, an Under-Secretary of State; W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council; K. Galbraith, US Ambassador to India, and E. Reischauer, US Ambassador to Japan.

² *The Department of State Bulletin*, April 3, 1961, pp. 182-183.

During the election campaign the views of these critics of Dulles and Eisenhower, and their political demands became known as the 'New Frontiers' policy towards the underdeveloped countries and was one of the planks in the presidential candidate's platform.

Thus, the 'New Frontiers' policies were not formed accidentally, as the result of the good intentions and inspiration of some American politician. *They were the result of a most profound crisis and the bankruptcy of Dulles's policy of defending at all costs the system of colonial oppression and exploitation, the brutal suppression of the national-liberation movement, and the arbitrary affirmation of US hegemony in the former colonial periphery of imperialism.*

3. The 'New Frontiers'

The Dulles-Eisenhower period was followed by the five-year tenure of office of John Kennedy, one of the most dynamic and intelligent presidents in US history. His name is associated with the 'New Frontiers' programme designed to lead American policy out of the blind alley in which it had found itself at the close of the Dulles era.

An essential feature of the 'New Frontiers' period was the tremendous importance attached to the outcome of the struggle between the two systems, to the dynamics and trend of the social and political development taking place in Asia, Africa and Latin America and to the demands to put an end to the habit of underestimating this development which Kennedy's advisers considered had been a feature of American policy up to then.

In fact, scarcely any other US government had paid so much attention to countries where national-liberation movements were developing as did the Kennedy Administration. Latin America and Africa were among the first objects of special concern in American policy.

The 'New Frontiersmen' believed that US policy should not only be guided by tactical considerations but also and above all by strategic objectives—keeping the newly-independent states within the orbit of imperialism, consolidating bourgeois social relations. Bearing in mind these tasks, and realizing that the inevitable economic development and the rise of new political and social groups in the former colonies and dependencies undermined the position of the forces of the past, the 'Kennedy team' insisted that the United States should stop clinging to these forces and cease being the upholders of the *status quo* in the 'third world.'

The 'New Frontiers' programme declared that in order to ensure an 'orderly transition' to independence the United States should assume leadership of national revolutions, identify itself with the wind of reformist change¹ and, moreover, become its vehicle if not motivating force.

Stripped of its propaganda garb, the programme revealed quite clearly its real purpose, which was to establish control over the national-liberation movement, keep it within the limits of moderation and order compatible with the interests of the US monopolies, and to 'turn the tide' in the developing countries.²

¹ *The New York Times*, January 7, 1963.

² *To Turn the Tide* was the title of a book of Kennedy's speeches that appeared in 1962.

The new policy supported reforms designed to take the wind out of the revolutionary movement's sails, stimulate development of capitalist relations and consolidation of bourgeois groups—not, of course, on a scale and in forms which would endanger the dominant position of the American monopolies. It also regarded it necessary to take account of the aspirations of the national bourgeoisie, the principal social vehicle of capitalist development in the newly-freed countries, to come to terms with it—by making some economic and political concessions if necessary—and to find a common language with 'nationalism,' which Kennedy's men saw as the principal anti-communist force in the 'third world'. The 'New Frontiers' ideologists believed that reaching an understanding with these forces would help preserve and enhance the United States' influence in the developing countries, expand its social base and end its fatal association with the obviously puppet forces whose precarious position was becoming increasingly evident. At the same time it would boost capitalist development in these countries.

The idea, lastly, was to stop giving preference to the most reactionary military and terroristic as well as puppet regimes and to turn for support to reformist, bourgeois governments willing to toe the American line.

Whereas Dulles placed reliance, primarily, on force of arms, the 'New Frontiersmen,' while not abandoning this policy completely, concentrated, chiefly, on economic weapons. It was hoped that the imperialist monopolies, backed by the power of world capitalism and their positions in the former colonies and semi-colonies, the achievements of the modern scientific and technological revolu-

tion, and by taking advantage of the weakness and 'backwardness' of local capitalism, would retain control of the 'third world' in the foreseeable future.

One of the most ambitious and widely publicized measures of the Kennedy Administration was the so-called Alliance for Progress, whose programme was proclaimed by the President himself on March 13, 1961 and five months later adopted at the OAS economic conference at Punta del Este. As was openly admitted by US officials, the Alliance had been formed with the intention of staving off new revolutionary upheavals in the Western Hemisphere.

The charter of the Alliance committed the recipients of US aid to effect political and social reforms of a bourgeois character. The US government declared, through President Kennedy himself, that each recipient government should "seriously undertake to the best of its ability on its own those efforts of resource mobilization, self-help, and internal reform—including land reform, tax reform, and improved education and social justice—which its own development requires and which would increase its capacity to absorb external capital productively."¹

An official target was set of obtaining an average annual 2.5 per cent increase in national production per head of the population. The United States undertook to provide the Latin American countries in the course of the next ten years, jointly with international financial organizations and other imperialist powers, 20,000 million dollars

¹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, April 10, 1961, p. 511.

for speeding up their economic and social development.

The Kennedy government officially adopted a stand in favour of bourgeois, parliamentary, 'representative' regimes and against military coups in the countries of Latin America and other 'third world' areas. On several occasions it put this policy to practice by using the economic levers, among others, of the Alliance for Progress. Invoking the repeatedly and loudly proclaimed fact that the United States recognized the right of the newly-independent countries to freely choose the path of their development, the Kennedy Administration attempted to strengthen contacts not only with bourgeois regimes but also with states where revolutionary forces were in power. In place of the undisguised and futile hostility towards the governments of the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and others and the furious accusations of 'communism,' characteristic of Dulles's policy, the new Administration adopted a more flexible policy designed to influence development in these countries and prevent rapprochement of their leadership with scientific socialism.

Bearing in mind the largely unsuccessful attempts to draw newly-freed countries into military blocs, the Kennedy Administration modified the official—and not only official—attitude of the United States towards the neutralist policy chosen by the overwhelming majority of former colonies. The 'New Frontiers' strategists based their reasons for calling on the United States to stop its hostility towards the non-aligned countries, first and foremost, on the fact that this policy had not produced any effective results and most young states refused to join aggressive alliances. They

also pointed out that this policy failed to take into consideration the position of influential sections of the national bourgeoisie and made it difficult to reach agreement with them.

As Geneviève Tabouis wrote, "the Kennedy Administration laid the basis for a new American policy towards some neutral countries."¹ No longer regarded as anathema, as they were in the Dulles era, these countries were now assured of US 'respect,' 'understanding' and even support for their policy of non-alignment. In a speech in Kansas City in December 1961, Chester Bowles, then an Under-Secretary of State, declared that the USA ought to respect the authority of the countries that had chosen the neutralist course and help them achieve stability and strength. In a number of instances these official proclamations were backed up with corresponding political and economic actions. 'Friendliness' towards India was exhibited with particular ostentation. It can also be recalled that Kennedy's government signed the Laos neutrality agreement.

A new approach was adopted towards 'aid,' which came to be regarded as an active catalyst for developing capitalist relations. Not infrequently aid under the Alliance for Progress and from other sources was made conditional upon measures encouraging economic growth, the propagation of capitalist forms and consolidation of bourgeois and pro-bourgeois groups.

Also in Kennedy's time the idea was advanced and began to be put into practice of 'concentrating' aid by granting the major share of it to a few states of 'key' importance in certain areas which

¹ *Paris-Jour*, 29 novembre 1962.

were selected to be showcases, such as Brazil in Latin America, India in Asia and Nigeria in Africa. The United States' attitude towards the state sector in the developing countries, formerly absolutely negative, was reversed, and it stated its readiness to render financial assistance to enterprises in this sector, to embark on a policy of economic planning and construction of factories, including some for manufacturing. "There is now much greater insistence on self-help and economic planning (no longer shunned as 'socialism') and a much more sophisticated attitude towards neutrals," *The Times* commented on October 8, 1962. American officials went even further and began to stress the 'need,' as Chester Bowles did in Lagos in October 1962, for the state sector and planning in the former colonies and dependencies. The Agency for International Development started financing state-owned projects, such as a large dam and hydropower station in Ghana, a power station in Libya, a number of factories in India, etc.

There was a considerable increase in the proportion of aid allocations for economic development requirements.

In his message on foreign aid submitted to Congress in April 1963 the President pointed out—though with an important reservation, wherever conditions permit—that henceforth the emphasis would be primarily on economic rather than military assistance.¹ The share of subsidies in foreign aid funds diminished, but the terms on which loans were granted were considerably extended

¹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, April 22, 1963, p. 593.

while the rate of interest reduced. In September 1961 the US Congress adopted, on the proposal of the government, a law authorizing it to grant development loans not only at a low rate of interest (2 to 3 per cent), but even interest-free.

While working to enhance the role of government 'aid' the Kennedy Administration was taking energetic measures to step up the expansion of private American business, to which the 'New Frontiersmen' attached paramount importance in their plans for influencing the socio-economic structure of the developing countries.

In the above-mentioned message on foreign aid greater participation of private investment and other non-Federal resources in the assistance given to the underdeveloped countries was regarded as a central aim of the entire aid programme. "The primary new initiative in this year's programme," it pointed out, "relates to our increased efforts to encourage the investment of private capital in the underdeveloped countries. Already considerable progress has been made fostering US private investment through the use of investment guarantees. . . and by means of cost-sharing on investment surveys, loans of local currencies, and other measures. . . Administratively, our ambassadors and missions abroad, in their negotiations with less-developed countries, are being directed to urge more forcefully the importance of making full use of private resources and improving the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign. . . The Agency for International Development will also strengthen and enlarge its own activities relating to private enterprise." The message also stressed the special importance of 'active

participation' of US capital in promoting economic progress jointly with businessmen in the developing countries.¹

The Kennedy government introduced new concessions to stimulate American private investment in the young states. American businessmen were given government guarantees of investments totalling many hundreds of millions of dollars. An active role for imperialist private capital was envisaged also in the Alliance for Progress programme. In addition, the Alliance itself was used to smooth the way for American private investors.

The Kennedy government made special efforts to co-ordinate the imperialist powers' policies on behalf of collective colonialism, both political and, especially, economic. State Department leaders and the President himself conducted series of talks for this purpose with the leaders of other imperialist powers. All measures were taken to strengthen and broaden the activities of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, founded on US initiative. It was this period that saw the establishment of consortia and 'clubs' for aid to Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Turkey, Indonesia, etc. Soon after Kennedy's inauguration his special envoy, Averell Harriman, made a tour of Europe for the purpose of obtaining the European powers' acceptance of the programme of "strictly planned aid to the underdeveloped countries" worked out by the new Administration. As Kennedy, himself, revealed before a group of economists from ten Latin American countries, his government was trying to secure the participa-

¹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, April 22, 1963, pp. 595-596.

tion of the European powers and Japan in the Alliance for Progress.

While promoting in every way the interests of 'Atlantic solidarity' the 'New Frontiers' politicians sought at the same time to disassociate themselves as demonstratively as possible from the colonial powers' efforts to preserve at least some remnants of their empires, principally in Africa. The British *Foreign Report* commented that the intention was to abandon the traditional stance of onlooker conditioned by ties with the colonial powers, and to come out in support of African nationalism—within definite, strictly delineated limits. This attitude was inspired by the same line of 'identification' with the new forces in the developing countries and to no lesser extent by the desire to hasten the ousting of the 'allies' from their colonial holdings and 'open up' new regions for American capital. The Kennedy Administration was particularly anxious to demonstrate its change of tactics through the US representatives in the United Nations during discussions on colonialism. For instance, in contrast to previous years, the US delegation joined the socialist and Afro-Asian countries in voting for resolutions condemning the Portuguese colonialists.

In the course of the struggle for power the policy-makers of the 'New Frontiers' criticized Dulles and his associates for underestimating the ideological aspect of the struggle for increasing the United States' influence in the newly-freed countries and for failing to make proper use of ideological weapons. It was perhaps precisely the ideological sphere that the advocates of the 'New Frontiers' had in mind in the first place when they spoke of the need to impart an offensive charac-

ter to American policy, to carry the fight to enemy ground, etc. They regarded as ineffective the sterile malignant anti-communism of the Dulles era and demanded to make an accent on the criticizing of communist policy in the developing and neutral countries and of 'Soviet colonialism,' on the launching of a large-scale 'friendship' campaign with the young states, and intensifying propaganda for the American ideals of 'democracy' and free enterprise.¹ They maintained that ideological work should be on a more flexible and broader basis with account being made of the increased national awareness in the young states, while avoiding demonstrations of arrogance and paternalism, but boldly playing up to nationalist and even chauvinistic elements in these states.

When the Kennedy Administration took office it immediately got down to essentials on the ideological front. Not only was the scale and machinery of propaganda designed for the 'third world' greatly expanded but there was an important change in its nature. A number of major foreign policy measures were carried out by the government to further its propaganda aims. It launched a mammoth propaganda drive ('Operation Friendship') designed to win the allegiance of the developing countries. As part of it, the State Department and other government agencies organized a campaign of 'fraternization' with Africa, unprecedented in scale and hypocrisy. Among those who participated in this campaign, which often sank to the barnstorming level, were high-ranking American diplomats, members of the armed forces, students and even show business

¹ *The New York Times*, July 8, 1961.

stars, such as Louis Armstrong, the Negro trumpet player and band leader. Reporting on his concert tour of West African countries, France Presse openly stated that Armstrong was undertaking it "under the aegis of the US government to strengthen friendship between the United States and African states." The State Department was hastily recruiting Negroes to represent the US in Africa. The government urged private Negro colleges to train more specialists in international relations, with special emphasis on Africa. American official representatives in the developing countries began to affect a 'friendly' and 'democratic' attitude, stressing their 'respect' for the ways and customs of the local people. They profusely spoke about their 'admiration' for Africans' contribution to world civilization and the readiness of the United States to 'learn' from them. A speech couched in this, almost sycophantic manner was delivered, for instance, upon his arrival in India by the new US Ambassador, Kenneth Galbraith. And Assistant Secretary of State, Mennen Williams, was reported to have joined Africans in a dance to the accompaniment of tom-toms. His behaviour was so obviously calculated to please and flatter that it was even remarked on by American journalists. Another initiative characteristic of the new style was the visit of F. Russell, the US Ambassador to Ghana, which was carried out with due publicity, to a hospital in Accra with the entire embassy staff where they donated their blood for transfusion.

With unparalleled enterprise and persistence, the 'American way of life' was advertized by radio, the press and by carefully organized and guided trips of Asians, Africans and Latin Ame-

ricans to the United States. USIA radio programmes to Asia, Africa and Latin America were given double time and new radio stations were set up for the purpose.

Ordinary American citizens, tourists and students were recruited for advertizing the 'American way of life.' As *The New York Herald Tribune* reported on December 6, 1962, at the opening of a national seminar for organizing student trips abroad, Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General at the time, declared point-blank that "even if you're nice, good-looking and eager, if you can't tell America's story well, it's better that you 'stay in bed' rather than travel abroad." The propaganda campaign for the 'third world' directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was stepped up. Their internal position, foreign policy and attitude towards former colonies were slanderously misrepresented. But in a departure from the past, this propaganda was more sophisticated, with much effort being put into giving it some semblance of objectivity.

In American propaganda's approach towards the problems of the developing countries themselves the more aggressive and primitive forms of anti-communism were relegated to the background, but efforts were redoubled in advocating 'democratic values' (by which was meant, in the final analysis, the Western way of life), with emphasis invariably made on the right of every nation to decide its own destiny and on the United States' 'friendship' with all the peoples who had won freedom and independence. Never before had demagoguery been used by American propaganda and diplomacy more extensively than in that period.

One more major undertaking in the ideological field was the establishment of the Peace Corps, although its organizers went out of their way to stress that it had not been conceived as an instrument of diplomacy, propaganda or ideological warfare.

It goes without saying that all these changes in the United States' foreign policy did not affect its basic character. As James Reston wrote in *The New York Times* (July 18, 1961), they were rather changes of accent and degree.

Furthermore, the 'Kennedy team' by no means rejected the whole of Dulles's heritage. Very often it acted contrary to its own, officially proclaimed and widely publicized principles. The 'New Frontiersmen' recognized the impropriety and ineffectiveness of armed violence as the principal instrument of US policy in Asian, African and Latin American countries, but they never eliminated it from the arsenal of weapons to be used against individual contingents of the national-liberation movement. The continuance of this policy was shown particularly clearly during revolutionary, 'explosive' situations when the struggle had become acute, a distinct polarization of social forces had taken place, and the 'carrot and stick' and 'kid glove' policy had misfired.

The Kennedy government continued to patronize some obviously corrupt and reactionary regimes—for instance, in South Vietnam, Saudi Arabia—and took recourse to threats, demonstrations of military strength and even direct armed intervention. Writing to Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 on the occasion of the Vietnamese New Year, Kennedy promised him continued American assistance. Moreover, in referring to the Saigon clique,

Kennedy did not feel any shame in declaring that their valour and selflessness had given one more glorious chapter to the long history of their country. According to Arthur Schlesinger, American historian who was one of Kennedy's special aides, it was precisely after Taylor's and Rostow's mission in 1961 that the United States' direct military invasion of South Vietnam began.¹

At the end of 1961 the United States sent its warships to the shores of the Dominican Republic. Although officially directed against the Trujillo clique, this action showed, as the American press noted, that the United States had not abandoned gunboat diplomacy in Latin America. Similar methods were employed by the Kennedy government to intimidate the national-liberation forces in the Arab countries.

In the spring of 1963 the 6th Fleet staged military exercises in the East Mediterranean with a view to demonstrating, as *The Washington Post* wrote on May 10, that the United States would not permit the overthrow of the monarchy in Jordan or Saudi Arabia. In this connection, and also having in mind the American government's official assurances on that score, the conservative bourgeois Lebanese newspaper *Al-Anwar* declared that President Kennedy was beginning to use the language of Dulles, Eisenhower and Harry Truman. And *The Times* of London (March 6) wrote about Kennedy's intention to post the United States as a policeman relying on his own judgement.

The militarist forces in countries of the Western

¹ A. M. Schlesinger. *The Bitter Heritage. Vietnam and American Democracy. 1941-1966*, Boston, 1967, p. 23.

Hemisphere continued to receive American military aid. The Kennedy government kept up the policy of hostility towards Cuba. Moreover, its first days in office were marked by an attempted armed attack on the Republic.

The new Administration initiated the formation of special 'anti-guerilla' forces designed to fight 'communist aggression,' i.e., to suppress national-liberation movements. Specialists from these troops not only acted as instructors in the armies of Latin American countries but on some occasions, as in Guatemala and Colombia, took part in operations against the local guerillas.

Lastly, striking evidence of some of the peculiar features of the Kennedy government's policies and methods is provided by its attitude towards the progressive regime that was in power in British Guiana (now Guyana) in the early 1960s. In 1962 Kennedy declared that the United States supported the idea that all nations are free to choose whatever type of government they like. Mr. Jagan, he went on to say, elected recently to the post of Prime Minister of British Guiana, is a Marxist. But the United States has nothing against his election, for it is the result of fair balloting from which he has emerged victorious. However, as testified by Cheddi Jagan in an article published by Prensa Latina in April 1968, soon after this statement the Kennedy government attacked his regime simultaneously from three different points. It put diplomatic pressure on Britain to delay granting independence to Guyana and to change the country's electoral system, and on the Venezuelan government, to renew its claims to two-thirds of Guyana's territory. Meanwhile the CIA was organizing demonstrations, strikes and

rebellions as well as a marine and air blockade to topple the government of the People's Progressive Party or at least provide Britain with a pretext to refuse granting independence as long as that government was in office.

The change of attitude towards neutralism was not followed up by abandoning attempts to influence the policy of the non-aligned states. The only difference was that now these attempts were made on the plea of fighting for 'genuine neutrality.' The non-aligned states were urged to be at least 'equidistant' from the imperialist powers and the socialist countries, which in practice would be tantamount to giving up the anti-imperialist struggle. Moreover, this 'influence' often assumed a high-handed form, as was the case with the participants in the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries.

Soon after the conference, during the signing of the bill on foreign aid, Kennedy declared unequivocally: "It is my belief that in the administration of these funds we should give great attention and consideration to those nations who have our view of the world crisis. . ." In his comments on this, *The New York Herald Tribune* observer, David Lawrence, wrote on October 4, 1961: "It was really more than a hint. It was a straight-forward piece of advice to the 'neutrals' . . ." And *Le Monde* noted on September 14 that such a statement by Kennedy "the day after the Belgrade conference was interpreted everywhere as evidence of Washington's hardening position with regard to some non-aligned countries."

Nor were efforts given up to draw former colonies into aggressive blocs, build new pro-colonial-

ist alliances, and employ 'aid' as a means of pressure. For instance, Alliance for Progress allocations to Latin American countries were made conditional upon these countries' attitude towards Cuba and the US government's aggressive anti-Cuban policy. 'Aid' was also used as blackmail in Indonesia, India, Ceylon, Pakistan and other countries.

The Kennedy Administration stoutly defended the interests of American private investors in 'third world' countries. When Argentina decided, in November 1963, to annul contracts with American oil companies, the US government was reported by American news agencies to have demanded 'fair' compensation and warned that nationalization could lead to a reduction or complete discontinuance of the US aid and of American private investments. It also found it necessary to send the President's special envoy, Averell Harriman, there. As was stated by the Chilean University Students Federation, the United States threatened to terminate Alliance for Progress aid unless the Chilean government 'froze' for twenty years the taxes due from the large North American companies owning copper mines in Chile.

Although the new Administration stopped using some of the crudest anti-communist propaganda methods, it fully retained anti-communism itself as a major ideological and political instrument of policy towards the 'third world.' The rise of the struggle for national liberation was no longer explained by 'communist intrigues,' but Communists began to be accused of the 'excesses' in the movement, and the hullabaloo about 'resistance to communism' and 'communist aggression' remained a favourite method for camouflaging actions direct-

ed against the national interests of the young states and against the progressive and democratic forces in these states. It can be recalled that Assistant Secretary of State Mennen Williams unashamedly declared after one of his African voyages that he had discovered signs of a communist penetration plan under way in Africa.

The 'Kennedy team' set for itself the task of pooling and co-ordinating the efforts of the imperialist powers in the pursuit of colonialist policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It follows that the 'New Frontiers' policy-makers were most determined in defending above all *American* interests, promoting *American* expansion and elbowing out America's imperialist competitors. Moreover, the very demand for 'better co-ordination' was dictated by the desire to establish some measure of US control over the actions of the other imperialist powers. And this could only result in an aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions. On the other hand, the Kennedy government never dared to break with the policy of the old colonial powers, specifically in Africa, limiting itself, as a rule, to spectacular gestures. Portugal went on using US-made weapons in the war against its African colonies. Nor did the new Administration withdraw its support of the RSA.

As for the real changes made in the 'aid' programmes by the Kennedy government, they were actually forced upon it by circumstances. They originated from a desire to stimulate capitalist development in the young states and to find a common language with the nationalist forces. A tremendous role was also played by the growth of economic co-operation between developing and socialist countries and the bitter experience of

unsuccessful attempts to bring pressure to bear on Egypt in connection with financing the Aswan High Dam, of the economic blockade of some countries, and so on. The American press was frank in pointing out that, for instance, the decision to grant a loan to Ghana for the erection of a dam and power station on the Volta River was adopted only because the US government thought "it was better to have the West rather than the Soviet Union move in with aid to Ghana." In remarking on this *The New York Times* added on December 16, 1961, that "officials recalled the case of Egypt's Aswan High Dam in 1956, when the United States withdrew its support of the project and the Russians stepped in." Reverting to the subject on December 27, the paper said that "there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union's own programme of foreign economic 'assistance' makes ours more urgent as a matter of practical politics, quite apart from its desirability as a matter of political philosophy."

For all that, the Kennedy Administration's policy towards the Asian, African and Latin American countries was not entirely unsuccessful—if only because it was devoid of some of the more threadbare concepts and obviously outdated dogmas of Dulles's time, and was planned and implemented by more competent, capable and energetic people. In some countries the United States managed to slow down the development of the revolutionary process and the growth of anti-Americanism, foster dangerous illusions among the national bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and some sections of the petty bourgeoisie regarding basic changes allegedly taking place in US policy and the onset of the 'era of co-operation' between

the United States and the developing countries, and to facilitate monopoly penetration of some areas of the 'third world.' It made progress in co-ordinating some of the political and economic activities of the imperialist powers in the young states.

All that, however, did not go beyond the bounds of partial successes of a purely tactical nature, whereas, it will be recalled, the 'Kennedy team' set for itself much more ambitious tasks—to 'straddle' the revolutionary process, to change the principal trend of social development in Asia, Africa and Latin America from the intensification and deepening of the anti-imperialist struggle and consolidation of links with the socialist world to compromise and rapprochement with the West, above all with the United States. But here the Kennedy Administration suffered a complete failure. This is understandable, in view of the absolutely utopian character of the attempt to reverse the march of history, of the plan to 'canalize' or even turn back the revolutionary development in areas fighting for national liberation.

The principal drawback of the 'New Frontiers' policy was that it overestimated the strength of American imperialism and its ability to pursue a carefully weighed, thoroughly co-ordinated 'uniform' policy. At the same time it underestimated the counteracting factors, such as the acuteness of contradictions between imperialism and the 'third world,' the scale of social ferment in the developing countries, the potentialities of the revolutionary forces in them, and the intensity of inter-imperialist rivalries. The interest of the young states in developing relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the

strength of the already established ties were also wrongly assessed.

The 'New Frontiers' policies were designed to meet *gradual, evolutionary* and therefore drawn-out modification of the pre-capitalist structures in the former colonial countries, and to be put into effect in a kind of socio-economic 'preserve' protected against social upheaval. But history—if we take the 'third world' as a whole—will not allow enough time for this; also, social development in the young states with its many-sided and intense contradictions is full of potential revolutionary explosion. The reformist plans of the 'Kennedy team' came up against the 'impatience' of the masses, against the determination of the revolutionary forces to win complete national and social emancipation. Their struggle received full support from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist world system, which actively resisted the neo-colonialist designs of the 'New Frontiersmen.'

In these circumstances the latter often displayed great indecision and inconsistency in carrying out their own policy. They laboured under the fear that the reforms they proposed might slip from under their control and set off a chain reaction of more profound social change.

The Alliance for Progress did not produce the desired effect. The much-advertized consolidation of 'democratic institutions' did not materialize either. In 1962-63 alone constitutional governments were deposed by military coups in six Latin American countries.

At the other end of the former colonial world, in Southeast Asia, the liberal strategists of the 'New Frontiers,' the mealy-mouthed apostles of democracy found no better solution than letting

the United States sink deeper and deeper into the quagmire of a hopeless war against Indochina.

The forces of revolution and social progress strengthened their positions in many countries. It was during Kennedy's presidency that radical patriotic forces achieved considerable success in Brazil; the United Arab Republic, Mali, and Algeria began to develop along socialist lines and Left-wing trends gained strength in a number of other young states. If the fact is added to this that those years saw a major qualitative turn towards further development and consolidation of ties with the socialist states, it will become clear that the attempt 'to turn the tide' in the former colonial world miscarried.

4. 'Post-Kennedy' US Policy in Developing Countries

Not much time had elapsed after the murder in Dallas, before new 'accents' became obvious in the United States' policy towards Asia, Africa and Latin America. One of the first indications of the new change was the appointment of Thomas Mann to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. A 'pragmatist' and 'realist,' as the American press called him, Mann supported a 'firm hand' policy, against the 'blind' and 'invariable' support of constitutional governments, assistance to and solidarity with the military regimes in Latin America. In a speech made at Indiana University in July 1964, Mann declared that had the United States unconditionally supported all constitutional governments under all circumstances, it would have had to do every-

thing in its power to depose Castillo Armas.¹ Mann's pronouncements were backed up with statements by the new President, who used the very first opportunity to announce—with an obvious allusion to the habit of his predecessor—that he was not going to sit in a 'rocking chair,' i.e., tolerate vacillations and contradictions in his Latin American policy, but would follow a 'tough line.'

As the Johnson Administration began to act it became clear that these statements reflected a new, 'rigid' line of policy. The first signal came at the beginning of 1964 with the US troops shooting at a demonstration of Panamanian patriots in the Panama Canal Zone. In April of the same year the US government sent warm greetings to Castello Branco, head of the reactionary Brazilian generals' junta that had deposed President Goulart. The United States virtually pledged solidarity with the officers responsible for military coups in Bolivia and Salvador and established relations of friendship and mutual understanding with some of the most reactionary dictatorships in Latin America. "With the United States' unmistakably benevolent—to say the least—attitude, sabre rattling began to echo throughout the continent," aptly commented the Uruguayan newspaper *Clarín* (June 29, 1966).

And in May 1965 the US government carried out what public opinion in Latin America and, indeed, in fact, throughout the world regarded as

¹ The reference is to the US-organized invasion, in 1954, of Guatemala by detachments led by its agent Castillo Armas for the purpose of deposing the democratic government of Jacobo Arbenz.

a revival of gunboat diplomacy: ¹ claiming that it wished to protect the lives of American citizens and other foreigners, ² it sent paratroops and marines to the Dominican Republic.

More than that, in justifying its aggression against the Dominican people, the US government declared that it would not tolerate the emergence of one more communist state, 'a new Cuba' in the Western Hemisphere. By making this statement, which diplomats and journalists promptly termed 'the Johnson doctrine,' the US government openly claimed the right to determine—by brute force if necessary—the path of development of the Latin American countries. Or, in the words of *The Washington Post* (November 24, 1965), "the essential point is that in the event of a Communist-inspired coup there will be intervention, whatever it is called." ³

The position of the executive authority was supported and 'elaborated on' by the US legislature. On September 20, 1965 the House of Representative endorsed, with the State Department's approval, the resolution tabled by Selden, Chairman of the House Sub-Committee for Latin American affairs. In accordance with it one or several signatories of the inter-American mutual assistance treaty could exercise the right to individual or collective self-defence, take measures, down to the use of armed force, to prevent or resist inter-

¹ *The Washington Post*, May 2, 1965.

² Shortly afterwards this lame excuse was replaced with the traditional invocation of 'communist menace.' The falsity of both versions is exposed by the American publicist, Bruce Ladd, in his book *Crisis in Credibility* (1968, p. 92).

³ *The Washington Post*, November 24, 1965.

vention, domination, control or colonization in any form on the part of the subversive forces known as international communism and their agents in the Western Hemisphere.¹ The resolution is so vaguely worded as to provide justification beforehand for any aggressive intervention by Yankee imperialism in the domestic affairs of countries in the Western Hemisphere. That the United States is not mentioned directly can hardly delude any one. It is clear that the United States, alone, is capable of committing (as it has already done more than once) armed intervention in the Western Hemisphere.

However, the extremely unfavourable reaction of world and Latin American public opinion to the aggression in Santo Domingo compelled the new American government to search for ways of building an organization that would enable it to carry out its intervention in the guise of 'collective Latin American action.' Securing the support of the military rulers of Brazil, Argentina and some other countries, US diplomacy laid before the OAS a proposal on the establishment of a permanent inter-American armed force, a project which would also impart permanency and a definite organizational structure to the reactionary police functions of the armed forces in many Latin American countries.

In other areas of the former colonial world, too, the Johnson government reverted to what *The Christian Science Monitor* (July 15, 1966) called the rigid principles of US postwar policy. The most striking evidence of this was, of course, the armed intervention in Southeast Asia.

¹ See *Congressional Record*, September 20, 1965, p. 24347.

As noted above, the United States had ever since the Dulles era pursued a policy of flagrant interference in the affairs of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. But the Johnson Administration went immeasurably farther than its predecessors. It unleashed a full-scale war against the Vietnamese people—perhaps the most predatory and barbaric war in the history of US imperialism and in any event the biggest imperialist war against the liberation movement of the Asian peoples.

The US imperialists did not limit themselves to armed intervention in South Vietnam. Treacherously and without any declaration of war, they began bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and invaded Cambodia. The United States did everything to instigate war in Laos and its aircraft were sent on bombing missions against the Pathet Lao forces. The United States' allies in SEATO and ANZUS were under constant pressure to send additional consignments of cannon fodder to Vietnam. The US armed forces freely used their territories.

Johnson's aides worked hard to prove that the Vietnam war had been forced on him as an unwanted legacy. But in fact this war, although initiated by Johnson's predecessors, was not a chance episode or an abnormal deviation from the political line of his Administration in 'Eastern affairs' but a logical element, and this is convincingly confirmed by another 'Johnson doctrine,' this time his 'Asian' policy. American observers and diplomats regarded it as one of the most important foreign policy acts of Johnson Administration. Here is how it was characterized by one of the President's advisers, according to the *US News & World Report*: "Other Presidents

made their marks in Europe when Europe was weak following World War II. President Johnson will make his mark in Asia, where the course of history will be charted. This President's greatest foreign-policy contribution will be in the East, not in the West. This will be his mark on history." ¹ Johnson, the magazine said, was determined "to make a 'new Asia' his mark on history." *The Washington Evening Star*, for its part, calling the doctrine daring, pointed out that the sources of Johnson's intervention in Vietnam could be found, in some form or other, in Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, but the new policy with respect to Asia was purely Johnsonian.

The fundamentals of the 'Asian doctrine' are considered to have been set forth in several speeches by Johnson and in subsequent amplifications by his advisers and high government officials. Speaking in White Sulphur Springs on July 12, 1966, Johnson declared, for instance: "Asia is now the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order—and for life itself. . ." ² In the opinion of the American and the entire Western press, the key-note of the President's speech was the statement that since history was making a turn towards Asia, "the United States for the first time formally accepts its full responsibilities as *the leading Pacific power-in-fact*" (my italics—K. B.) ³. It was setting out on a great journey, demanding for itself a Great Power role in the Orient, no less demanding than is its long ac-

¹ *US News & World Report*, August 8, 1966, pp. 30, 32.

² *The Washington Post*, July 13, 1966.

³ *Ibid.*, July 19, 1966.

cepted leadership of the Atlantic world. The chief objective of the long and widely publicized trip to Asian and Pacific countries undertaken by Johnson in the autumn of 1966 and which *Le Monde* (October 20) called "indisputably the most sensational of all voyages that have ever been organized for a President of the United States" was to popularize the brand-new doctrine and drum up support for it from the United States helpmates in the Vietnam war.

Divested of its salesman's terminology and diplomatic reservations, the 'Asian doctrine' boiled down to an open claim to the right to direct the course of events in Asia, to dictate the trend of development of the Asian countries.

The phrases about the United States' 'special responsibilities', about it being 'the leader' and 'leading power,' to say nothing of more outspoken statements by many US leaders and even more, Washington's practical steps, leave not a shade of doubt on this score.

The 'Asian doctrine' had three main aspects and, accordingly, envisaged three main lines of activity for the United States and its Asian satellites; these are: military, politico-ideological and economic. The military aspect meant that the United States should act as a 'shield' behind which the countries of that region could set up regional organs and develop their economies.¹ In other words, the American big stick was to guarantee a situation wherein the revolutionary and genuinely democratic forces would be smothered or pressed back and all the intermediate and

¹ *US News & World Report*, August 8, 1966, p. 30.

vacillating elements would have to accept a reformist, conciliatory and pro-American orientation. *The Washington Evening Star's* frank comment (July 15, 1966) was that the United States intended to use its might in Asia the way it had used it in Europe to create stability under conditions best suiting US interests. The *political* aspect presupposed efforts to secure support for the doctrine on the part of a maximum number of Asian countries, the setting up of Asian states against the socialist countries, the 'pulling up' of the non-aligned Asian states to SEATO and ANZUS members through drawing them into all kinds of political, economic and 'cultural' associations and unions. The *economic* aspect boiled down to the establishment, in addition to the existing 'aid' programmes, of economic (primarily regional) organizations, associations and clubs and the financing of definite regional development projects called upon to facilitate the realization of the political objectives of the 'doctrine' and at the same time stimulate economic development in the capitalist direction, along the road of reformist changes designed to forestall or eliminate revolutionary situations.

The *military* aspect was represented primarily by the aggression against the people of Vietnam. Through drawing some Asian countries into it the United States has been trying, among other things, to activate the SEATO bloc. A part of the press in the United States and other capitalist countries tends to regard the 'Asian doctrine' as a derivative of the intervention in Vietnam. Moreover, they point to the fact that, chronologically speaking, the doctrine made its appearance when the war was already in full swing.

However, there is little ground for such assumptions. One cannot deny that the logic of the development of the Vietnam war played its part and that there is a connection between that war and the 'Asian doctrine' but the connection worked more the other way round. The war against the liberation movement of the Vietnamese people is above all the result and instrument of the same great-power designs of US imperialism which invented the notorious 'Asian doctrine.' That the Vietnam war was unleashed before these designs had been thoroughly worked out and proclaimed in the form of a special 'doctrine' does not change the essence of the matter.

The correctness of this conclusion is confirmed by statements to be found in many American and European organs of the press and in the comments of high-ranking State Department officials. For instance, *The Washington Evening Star* noted that Washington viewed the Vietnam war in a much broader context within the framework of which the United States wanted to create a peace-loving and co-operating Asia.¹ Speaking in San Francisco on January 20, 1967, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy openly declared that a number of 'favourable' events would not have occurred in Asia without what the United States had already done in Vietnam, and explained that he meant, among other things, the setting up of the Asian and Pacific Co-operation Council (ASPAC), the Asian Development Bank and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the events in Indonesia.

¹ *The Washington Evening Star*, July 15, 1966.

Finally, President Johnson himself spoke out in the same spirit. Addressing a State Department conference on foreign policy matters arranged for leading executives of Big Business on December 4, 1967, he asserted that the situation in Southeast Asia had changed in a favourable direction and that the United States' firmness in Vietnam was the main cause of the change.

The military ramifications of the doctrine included also intensive promotion of close military co-operation with a number of Asian countries, with Australia, New Zealand and also with Japan, which meant in practice the establishment of a certain measure of US control over their armed forces, forcing these countries to step up military preparations, and frantic construction and expansion of a network (some of it jointly with Britain) of US military, naval and air bases in this area of the world. In addition to Vietnam, military complexes on the islands of Guam, Midway, Wake, Okinawa, Taiwan and in Thailand have been hastily constructed. A whole chain of US bases has been planned for islands in the Indian Ocean.

Realization of the political and economic aspects of the doctrine presupposed active utilization of 'associations' of Asian countries, including those with US participation, and various other forms of 'regional co-operation.' It should be noted that encouragement of 'regional co-operation' was persistently emphasized by the Johnson Administration as a characteristic of its policy towards the entire former colonial and semi-colonial world. In their exegesis of the Presidential 'State of the Nation' message for 1967, high-ranking White House officials stressed that the Unit-

ed States was working to bring about a transition from the national to the regional approach and to multi-national projects in Latin America as well as in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

The developing countries are known to show an increasing inclination in favour of regional co-operation, which can bring them substantial political and economic advantages. But the United States has always associated its own, imperialist designs with the idea of regional co-operation. The character and general trend of these designs can be seen clearly enough by the fact that prominent American officials present the OAS as a model of regional co-operation and consider that new regional groupings should ultimately form some new organization similar to the Organization of American States.¹

Through regional associations US imperialists plan to create new channels for influencing the internal and foreign policy of both states which participate in military blocs or adhere to a pro-Western line and non-aligned countries, to draw these countries closer to the US foreign policy course, and to prevent or resist, with the aid of the collective machinery of these associations, possible 'undesirable' changes in the foreign policy of their members. They also hope to use these regional associations to push through some unpopular measures which they regard as highly important in the expectation of producing an original Latin American, African or Asian model collective to help them carry out these measures.

Furthermore, in the present situation the United States finds the economic advantages of regional

¹ *The New York Times*, June 20, 1966.

co-operation an important factor in creating more favourable conditions for capitalist development in the newly-freed states and in mobilizing, for this purpose, the means of its imperialist partners and of the young states themselves. Finally, some economic associations and inter-state economic projects of the developing countries often furnish additional opportunities for the penetration of US monopoly capital.

Washington was the driving force behind the establishment, in June 1966, of ASPAC. Washington also had a hand in activating and expanding ASEAN.

The United States inspired and actively supported the idea of setting up the Asian Development Bank with a capital of 1,000 million dollars. The US government announced a contribution of 200 million dollars, aiming to secure the leading position in the bank. Washington also agreed to help finance the Mekong development project, a move that was accompanied by an exceptionally noisy amount of propaganda. American rulers made every effort to involve as many countries as possible in the project, and to ensure it with, at least, minimal success and at the same time maximum publicity. Apart from this, the United States announced its readiness to invest 1,000 million dollars in other joint projects of the same type.

A salient feature of the 'Asian doctrine' and of the 'regional co-operation' it envisages is the exceptionally significant role, in some respects of primary importance, assigned to Japan. This reflects the US imperialists' desire to make fuller use of Japan's potentiality in realizing their plans, and their hope to 'hide' behind its back in car-

rying out the more 'difficult' measures, when the obvious participation of the sufficiently discredited United States might frighten away Asian states. At the same time Washington's strategists realize that Japanese monopolies have grown strong enough and are prepared to embark on a course of broader expansion.

From Japan, the US press stressed, "emanates the primary local stimulus" to the development of regional organizations of the ASPAC type. Japan took the initiative in setting up the Pacific Bank, invested in it as much as had been promised by the United States, and secured for its representative the post of the bank's president. Characteristically, it was to Japan that the United States made insistent appeals to increase economic 'aid' to Indonesia and its contribution to the special fund of the Asian Development Bank, giving as explanation its balance of payments difficulties. With this aim in view the Assistant Secretary of State, Eugene Rostow, visited Japan in January 1968. Japan is becoming the principal creditor of South Korea, Taiwan and other Southeast Asian states. For instance, in 1966-67 it granted to South Korea credits totalling 1,000 million dollars. As Prof. W. Lockwood of Princeton University wrote with gratification in the December, 1967 issue of *Fortune*, the new initiatives now emanating from Tokyo are forerunners of Japan's return to a more positive leading role in Asian affairs after twenty years' postwar passivity.

Analyzing the course of events in Asia and the development of 'regional co-operation,' Alexis Johnson, former US Ambassador to Japan and at that time a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, stressed: "In all of this, one of the most encou-

raging factors is the degree to which Japan is assuming, and the other countries are accepting, its increasing leadership." In his opinion, Japan was increasingly adopting "a role of constructive leadership and responsibility in Asia".¹ Japan's 'new role' in Asia was spoken about in the Johnson-Sato communique issued after the Japanese Premier's visit to the United States in November 1967, the visit which initiated a new stage in US-Japanese partnership in Asia and in Japan's involvement, under the aegis of the United States, in neo-colonialist policies in that part of the world. Japan began to take part in the realization of not only the economic and political but also the military aspects of the 'Asian doctrine.'

It goes without saying that in their collaboration with the United States the Japanese rulers also pursue their own aims, which contain the seeds of serious disagreements with their American protectors. Whereas the United States intends to use Japan in putting into effect its policy, the Japanese monopolies calculate that with US support they will meet with no great obstacles in carrying out *in their own* interests political, economic and military expansion in Asia.

Mention should also be made of one more barely defined line of the 'Asian doctrine.' This doctrine is not devoid of definite calculations connected with possible changes in US-Chinese relations on the basis of the anti-socialist and nationalistic impetus of the Mao Tse-tung group's policy. The policy-makers of the 'Asian doctrine' have on more than one occasion hinted at 'rewards' that

¹ *US News & World Report*, October 10, 1966, pp. 100, 102.

could materialize if the trend of developments turned in that direction. As *The Washington Post* stressed on July 19, 1966, in this doctrine the 'big stick' which was being brandished at China was partnered by a 'big carrot.'

The growing readiness of the US rulers to resort to blackmail and even armed violence in struggling against the national-liberation movement was also demonstrated quite clearly in the Middle East, where the Kennedy government unhesitatingly defended the privileges of American monopolies, not stopping at demonstrations of military strength and other forms of crude pressure, which, on the whole, it preferred to avoid. The succeeding administration began to increasingly use the 'positions-of-strength' policy and considerably expanded the area in which it was applied. Pressure on the United Arab Republic was increased. One of the manifestations of this was the discontinuation of, first, foodstuffs deliveries and then, of all other American 'aid.' For several years the International Monetary Fund, under US pressure, refused to grant a loan to the UAR. Syria also was subjected to open blackmail by US suspension of 'aid.' There was an intensification of subversive activities against the Republic of Yemen and a substantial increase in financial assistance, arms and food deliveries to the royalists.

As distinct from its predecessors, the Johnson Administration began to practise open military co-operation with Israel. It intensified US participation in arming Israel and did everything else to help build up its offensive potential. In point of fact, the Johnson government assigned to Israel the function of a military stick raised against the

Arab world, particularly progressive states, and against the forces of national liberation in the Middle East. And when Israel's war machine went into action, Washington sided with the aggressor.

The US leaders did everything to prevent the Security Council from taking effective measures to nip the aggression in the bud. And when it was nevertheless stopped, they went to work both inside and outside the UN to torpedo the efforts that were being made to secure withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territory. With alarming irresponsibility the United States continues to this day to arm Israel.

During Kennedy's presidency the United States virtually turned into the leading neo-colonialist force in Africa. The Johnson government reduced the scale and intensity of US penetration of the continent. Moreover, it began to be said in US official quarters, and admitted by Mennon Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs at that time, on March 18, 1965 that the United States was prepared to become the second great power after the former colonial countries for the African countries. Leading members of the American Negro bourgeoisie objected to such an abrupt change of policy, so the government, with an eye on the approaching elections, decided to send Vice-President Humphrey, at the end of 1967, on a good-will tour of nine African countries.

The Vietnam problem was primarily responsible for the change in the US African policy. As the US imperialists had got thoroughly stuck in Vietnam, and were concentrating all their at-

tention on carrying out their 'Asian doctrine,' they could no longer devote the same amount of their forces and means to their policies in other sectors and were compelled, among other things, to revise temporarily their strategy in Africa. A contributing factor was the US rulers' desire to avoid, while the Vietnam war was going on, further complications in their relations with other imperialist powers. Furthermore, the opinion began to spread among them that in view of the utter backwardness of the African countries the trend of their development was not likely to take definite shape in the near future, and the United States would be able to stage a 'comeback' without having lost the possibility of establishing its predominant influence in the continent.

The 'loss of tempo' in US African policy in no way signified a slackening of interest or attention. It is noteworthy that in the course of only one year, 1967, Johnson received in the White House the heads of state or government of nine African countries—Ephiopia, Morocco, Malawi, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Niger, Ghana and Cameroun. Military co-operation with African states was stepped up. At the beginning of 1967 more than 3,000 servicemen from these states were undergoing training in the United States.

On May 26, 1966, the United States, in a speech made by the President, came out vigorously in favour of 'regionalism' in Africa. It attempted to penetrate the African Development Bank, but came up against the resistance of Africans bent on upholding its independent African

character.¹ Acting upon the principle of 'selective approach,' which was winning increasing approval, Washington paid special attention to 'key' countries or those where, in its opinion, the outlook for its policy was the brightest.

Washington's inclination to adopt 'tough' methods against fighters for freedom was shown in Africa as well. In November 1964 the United States took an active part in landing paratroops in Stanleyville. American personnel and planes piloted by CIA agents, recruited from Cuban counter-revolutionary emigrants, were dispatched to participate in the hostilities against the Congolese patriots.

Subversive activities against progressive regimes on the continent were markedly increased. We have already mentioned the hostile actions against the UAR. Strong pressure was brought to bear on Algeria, specifically in connection with foodstuff deliveries. The US imperialists definitely had a hand in the military coup in Ghana. It was hardly over when the US government hastened to promise deliveries of foodstuffs to the military regime, although only four months before it had flatly rejected President Nkrumah's request for them.

On October 1967 General Ankrah, Chairman of the National-Liberation Council of Ghana, was received at the White House. In greeting his guest, President Johnson called him a 'champion of freedom.'

This attitude towards the Ghanaian military regime was indicative also of the United States' readiness to treat Africa, as the Johannesburg *Star*

¹ *The Washington Post*, August 30, 1966.

put it (March 15, 1966), with a much greater share of pragmatism. In African affairs, too, although not so frankly and not on such a scale as in Latin America, the Johnson Administration was gradually abandoning its preference for constitutional governments. In the words of the above-mentioned newspaper, it began to bank much more heavily on political stability rather than formally democratic institutions, and was prepared to tolerate and even welcome the establishment of military dictatorships.

This growing desire for 'stability' influenced, in some measure, the United States' attitude towards racist regimes. Whereas the Kennedy Administration sought to disassociate itself on this issue from the European colonial powers and display an understanding of Africa's feelings, the new government, while not missing an opportunity to officially condemn racialism, as Humphrey did during his African trip, adopted, in effect, a policy of supporting the South African and Rhodesian racials. The United States opposed sanctions against the RSA and refused to put a limit on US capital investment in that country or reduce other forms of contact with it. It also supported Britain's policy of compromise with the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

It is indisputable that important changes in United States policy towards the 'third world' were made by Kennedy's successor. At the same time, Johnson retained many basic elements of the 'New Frontiers' policies. I have in mind, of course, not only the general nature and the chief objective of US policy towards the developing world, but also some of the major *lines* and *methods* used to attain this objective. The new

government, by no means, gave up trying to ensure 'stability' in the newly-independent countries through a reformist bourgeois reconstruction under the general surveillance of the imperialists, especially the US imperialists, and in alliance with the forces of 'moderate nationalism.' The shedding, in some instances, of the democratic cover and reliance on military regimes did not mean an attempt to freeze, as a more or less far-reaching solution, the archaic *status quo* with all its revolutionary potentiality. Although in reality this is what often happened, because of the policies and social set-up of some militarist dictatorships. Nor did it mean an exclusive bias towards military regimes or rejection of the well used slogan 'representative democracy,' or of support for stable, reformist, bourgeois, especially anti-communist, governments prepared to collaborate with the United States.

Although a 'firm' regime was perhaps more agreeable to the political inclinations of influential members in Johnson's Administration, their support of military regimes was dictated primarily by pragmatic reasons. Unlike the 'Kennedy team,' the Johnson Administration virtually refused to adopt any *position of principle* on this question. US rulers are guided by their own interests and are prepared to support *any* regime, to rely on *any* force capable of resisting revolutionary change—but *within the framework of the same, unalterable general goal*. The sword of militarism is called upon not only to behead progressive forces but to guarantee political 'stability' in the 'transitional period' of affirmation of capitalist relations, by consolidating the power

of pro-American groups, more and more necessary since the number of representatives of the so-called middle class whose encouragement has been and remains one of Washington's major concerns, is growing within the armed forces of the developing countries. At the same time, as the example of some Latin American, African and Asian countries shows, Washington is ready, wherever possible, to support 'stable' bourgeois conciliatory regimes and in such instances often acts to frustrate any encroachment on them by the military.

Imperialism's 'accursed' problem of how to ensure a 'smooth' transitional period for a gradual bourgeois transformation, of how to prevent the development of events which would weaken the moribund social structures and lead to the destruction of the entire foundation of unrepresentative rule, and to the break-through of Left-wing elements into the resulting vacuum remains unsolved. Kennedy's advisers thought it possible to take the risk of allowing this period to evolve under a 'representative democracy' and of providing the local pro-bourgeois forces with greater scope for nationalist manoeuvring under the comparatively 'liberal' supervision of the United States. The 'post-Kennedy' American rulers decided that these tactics were not suitable, and gripped by a mortal fear of the radical elements in the former colonies and semi-colonies, they rejected the risk involved, and adopted a policy of 'rigid' US supervision, with a considerable limiting of the scope of the reformist experiment, and a less tolerant attitude towards the anti-American trends among the reformist forces. Noteworthy in this connection is the evidence of the Tunisian jour-

nal *Jeune Afrique*, which pointed out in its issue of December, 1965 that today's Washington, in contrast to Kennedy's, was classifying 'reformist movements' as well, singling out from among them those which 'opposed communism.' In other words, the Johnson Administration found unacceptable and condemned one more segment of the social forces in the developing countries.

However, Washington did not give up the aim of socially restructuring the newly-freed countries along bourgeois-reformist lines, or of achieving a compromise of some sort with the national bourgeois forces. Moreover, it can be said that one of the purposes of the United States' shows of strength was to 'teach a lesson' to the forces of national liberation, to bolster up the conciliatory groups in the young states and prod the vacillating elements towards compromise and pro-imperialist orientation.

In the opinion of American observers, some essential features of the course steered by the Johnson Administration in Asia and which ultimately 'evolved into the 'Asian doctrine' had already become evident, in varying degrees, during Kennedy's presidency. Among these they mention the greatly increased interference in Asian affairs, the growing utilization of Japan as an instrument for carrying out US imperialist plans in Asia, the forming of all kinds of economic and cultural 'associations,' etc.

The Johnson Administration continued to support the Alliance for Progress. US government leaders emphasized on many occasions, as Johnson himself did, when he addressed the OAS foreign ministers in September 1967, that the Alliance for Progress was the chief weapon of the

policy of the United States and its allies in Latin America. The United States not only allocated the sums promised by Kennedy but took on additional commitments and declared its readiness to continue the programme till 1980. Special efforts were also undertaken to increase the inflow of American private capital into Latin America, which was always regarded as decisive for the success of the Alliance.

Nor did the Johnson government abandon such an essential element of the 'New Frontiers' line as the semi-officially tolerant or even positive attitude towards the policy of non-alignment—accompanied, to be sure, by persistent attempts to make this policy 'open' to the West and not to the East, i.e., virtually to divest it of any really anti-imperialist character.

It also kept to their flexible policy with regard to the states of progressive national orientation. Like the 'New Frontiersmen,' the Johnson Administration took into account the transitional character of government in these states and abstained from hastily condemning them as 'communist.' In doing so it proceeded not only from an evaluation of the actual situation. It also understood that such an attitude would interfere with its efforts to put these countries back on the road of capitalist development and to help bring about the 'Thermidorian' degeneration or overthrow of progressive regimes. Typical example of this tactic was the visit of General Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Burma, to the United States in September 1966. In the course of his visit US leaders and President Johnson, personally, indefatigably emphasized the United States' 'full understanding' of the

policy pursued by Burma (which is known to adhere firmly to a neutralist line) and 'Burma's right to shape its own form of development.' This aspect of the matter was called attention to by experienced American journalists. Recalling that four years ago, when Ne Win became head of the Burmese government, Washington saw in him a dangerous neutralist and a potential Communist puppet, *The New York Times* commented in an editorial (Sept. 11) that "the Eisenhower-Dulles years when neutralism was considered almost on a par with communism in the cold war have gone into history. . ." Times had changed indeed if a President of the United States wined and dined and sang praises of the most neutral of all the neutralist Asian leaders who, in addition, was a militant socialist.

While intensifying in every way subversive activities against progressive regimes (activities which the policy-makers of the 'New Frontiers' had not shun) the US government continued to render 'aid' to Guinea and Tanzania, undertook steps towards rapprochement with Mali, and from time to time made friendly gestures in respect to Algeria and the UAR.

Although the Johnson government made much more frequent use of 'aid' as an instrument of pressure, it did not abandon the new features which the Kennedy Administration had introduced in the manner of operation. It also continued to stimulate US monopoly investments in the developing countries. The December 13, 1967 press-bulletin of the US Agency for International Development reported that American private operations in developing countries had been underwritten by the government to the tune of 4,000

million dollars. The trend towards fairly large-scale investment in manufacturing industries, which had already become evident in Kennedy's time, now fully came into its own. In Latin America, for instance, US investments in manufacturing industries reached 30 per cent of all US direct private investments, as against only a few per cent in the first postwar years.

Much greater encouragement was given to local private enterprise. In 1966-67 the sum total of loans granted by the virtually US-controlled International Finance Corporation which operates, primarily, in the developing countries to promote growth of the private sector, increased by almost 50 per cent. Moreover, special attention was paid to establishing and stepping up co-operation between American capital and the local bourgeoisie.

The Johnson government was as solicitous as its predecessor in backing up its policies ideologically. Its propaganda resounded with some of the 'New Frontiers' favourite themes. Great stress was put on the United States' 'recognition' of the right of the former subjugated peoples to shape their own destiny; adulation of these peoples' civilization and proclamation of the US readiness 'to learn from them'; defence of American 'democracy' and attempts to prove the anti-democratic character of communism; and assertions that Marxism does not take into account the peculiarities of the developing countries and is therefore not suitable for them. Support was being increasingly given to the activities of the Peace Corps. In March 1968 it had about 21,000 members, of whom more than 12,000 were in

57 countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania.

Finally, the Johnson government attached great importance to co-ordinating the actions of the imperialist powers in the zone of the national-liberation struggle, and it was not its fault that this aspect of its activities proved the least successful. Its line, on this question, was set out in detail by Dean Rusk in his Cleveland speech in March 1965. Stressing that one of the central aims of 'Atlantic partnership' was to help the developing countries achieve progress, he insisted on the need to harmonize the policies of the members of the Atlantic alliance, to co-ordinate an assistance programme. In March 1965 Averell Harriman visited Europe with the special mission to discuss, as the British *Guardian* reported on March 24, methods with the help of which the Western powers could pursue concerted policies in Africa. On US initiative the policy of the Western powers in specific regions of the former colonial and semi-colonial world was discussed in NATO committees. The United States acted together with Britain and West Germany in support of the military coup in Ghana and against the progressive forces in Kenya, and sought to secure Britain's participation in working out a collective strategy in regions of the Arab world and "to the East of Suez."

Thus, the Johnson government's policy vis-a-vis the 'third world' did not mean a break with the 'New Frontiers.' It was rather a political hybrid, an attempt to combine these objectives of the 'New Frontiers' with the simultaneous application, mainly in order to ensure the success of these objectives, of certain violent and aggres-

sively anti-communist tactics which, to a large extent, can be traced back to Dulles's times. In different periods of postwar development, the United States has concentrated on first one and then another aspect of its policy towards the national-liberation movement. At a time when Indochina is in the throes of war, the brutal and aggressive features of US policy stand out in all their horror. But this should not obscure other, perhaps no less dangerous, aspects of this policy.

Many American and European publications, referring to the dominant position occupied by the former US president in the system of executive power, tended to explain the evolution of 'post-Kennedy' US policy, primarily, by the change of administration, by the personal qualities of President Johnson. Bourgeois observers wrote a great deal about his 'toughness' and dislike of a 'softhearted' policy. It is hard to say to what degree these appraisals of the 'style' and personal qualities of the man who stood at the helm of the American state (which are, of course, of considerable importance) were correct.

In any event, the changes in the United States' policy towards the 'third world' were primarily due to other, more profound factors of both a national and international character. First, contradictions in the 'New Frontiers' policy by the time of its principal architect's death approached the verge of crisis. Even during the time when US policies were beginning to be refashioned in keeping with President Kennedy's directives, the 'New Frontiers' doctrine met with disfavour and even hostility from certain American circles. Foremost among them were the US diplomatic and Pentagon 'hawks,' who believed that brute

force was the only method of dealing with the forces of social and national emancipation. They were given the close support of monopolies which traditionally operated in the 'third world,' especially, in Latin America. With their firm links with the socio-political structures that existed in these countries, they regarded any reform as a threat to their privileges. A definite role was also played by the passivity which existed throughout the principal sections of the state that had grown accustomed, over the years, to Dulles's methods.

These forces took advantage of the definite disappointment that was felt by influential groups in the American business with the results of the 'New Frontiers' policy in the developing countries. Demands for a revision of this policy began to be heard in the US and became more and more insistent.

Secondly, the US ruling circles were impelled towards this reappraisal by their incorrect assessment of certain international events and certain internal processes taking place in the developing countries. Here we mean, first of all, the chauvinistic, splitting and anti-Soviet policy of the Mao Tse-tung group which had led to the international isolation of China and damaged the anti-imperialist front. Peking's hegemonic ambitions had created a more favourable climate, especially in Asia, for the imperialists' attempts to involve the developing countries in all sorts of 'associations' and to push them towards militaristic aims. The more outspoken Western writers commented openly on the fact that because of China's position some countries—those of Southeast Asia, for instance—were coming to

depend too much on the United States.¹

Certain imperialist leaders in the United States interpreted this as a general shift in the balance of world forces, and in any event an opportune moment for counter-offensive action, and for a return to aggressive methods, in areas fighting for national liberation where the negative influence of the Mao Tse-tung group's attitude had made the strongest impact.

The adherents of the 'firm hand' policy also invoked some of the processes taking place in the developing countries themselves. In the first years of their independent existence these countries were confronted with formidable difficulties, most of them connected with the aftermath of colonialism. Their experience showed that the problem of eradicating the deep ties of dependence linking the young, especially African, states with the imperialist powers and, even more, the final choice of the direction their social development should take, was not only a complicated affair but one that in many cases required much time. More acute in the developing countries had become social contradictions. And some bourgeois-nationalist groups in their search for a base of support against the peoples, and to obtain 'aid,' had begun to follow a policy of compromise with the imperialist West.

With this starting point, the critics of the 'New Frontiers' concluded that the United States should stop 'wooing' the developing countries and cast off its 'unfounded fear' that any day now they would become sufficiently self-reliant, would eliminate their dependence on the West and fall

¹ *International Affairs*, April 1967, p. 287.

into communism's arms. They maintained that the situation called for a more extensive use and demonstration of strength in regard to Asia, Africa and Latin America, particularly because Kennedy's liberal methods had not produced the desired effect. The 'tough-liners' were only further strengthened in their opinion when in some newly-independent states the reactionaries supported by imperialism had managed to deal strong blows to the progressive forces, taking advantage of the latter's weaknesses and errors. Regarding such events as an indication that now it was the West's turn in Asia and Africa,¹ the advocates of a change of course saw in them a confirmation of their view of the national-liberation movement as a weak component of the world revolutionary process and its zone as the most suitable ground for counter-offensive operations. The Johnson Administration virtually adopted this thesis and used it as the basis for 'third world' policy.

Special mention should be made of the effect of the Vietnam problem. Although the escalation of the American intervention in Vietnam into a large-scale war reflected in itself the United States' transition to a 'tough' policy, there also existed an inverse connection. One of the principal incentives towards bringing about this switch-over had come from the fact that the Vietnam policy had landed a number of US presidents in an obvious dead end. Equally important, the dirty war encouraged a trend for brute violence in US foreign policy, as a whole, especially with respect to the developing countries, strengthened

¹ *The Economist*, March 19, 1966.

the position of the Pentagon and those sections of the civil administration which swore by the 'big stick' policy, and inspired a dangerous over-estimation of the United States' possibilities on this score. This was the ground which gave rise to the spurious concept of the United States as the preponderant world power, sponsored by Prof. Brzezinski. One could treat this thesis as merely the product of a wild flight of fancy were it not originated by one of the American policy-makers and used to prove the United States' 'right' to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

Actually the Johnson Administration's course in the area of the national-liberation movement—in the sense of both the results achieved and especially of its impact on the future possibilities of US policy in that area—was a step backwards from that of the 'New Frontiers.' Its foreign-policy doctrine as applied to the 'third world' countries overrated even more than the 'New Frontiers' programme, the possibilities of the United States. This is particularly true of one of its central starting points according to which changes had occurred in the international arena and especially in the 'third world' favouring the global, superpower ambitions of the United States. In reality, no changes favourable to imperialism had taken place in the overall correlation of forces in the world. On the contrary, these years have witnessed the steady growth of the strength, international prestige and influence of the socialist countries. And the events in China, however lamentable, did not halt this process.

Despite certain setbacks, the national-liberation

movement, too, was in the ascendant. More countries eliminated their colonial regimes and won national statehood. In 1964-67 the number of young national states grew by another 12, making a total of more than 60. In many countries the struggle reached a higher stage, being now aimed at achieving economic liberation from imperialism and social progress. The progressive forces in the newly-independent countries were being hardened in battles against the forces of imperialism and internal reaction, in the first conflicts between classes.

The young states increasingly tended to pursue an independent foreign policy, with the imperialists finding it increasingly difficult to call the tune in foreign policy. Their contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist states continued to develop.

On the contrary, the imperialist world had to contend with increased political and economic difficulties and sharper social conflicts and inter-imperialist contradictions. New positions were won by the working class. Democratic movements and youth activities reached an unprecedented scale. To cap it all, the United States became one of the focal points of socio-political troubles and upheavals in the capitalist world.

Equally fallacious was the view that the United States would, nevertheless, manage to prevent development of the former colonies along the revolutionary road by continuing the 'New Frontiers' strategy with its political 'softness' replaced by political 'toughness.' Walter Lippmann pointed to this error when he wrote, characterizing Johnson's 'Asian doctrine' as 'messianic megalomania,' that it was "preposterous to think that we can re-

gulate and determine the course of the revolutionary upheaval through which the peoples of Asia are fated to pass. . .”¹

As noted above, the Johnson cabinet, like its predecessor, banked, primarily, on a historical ‘manoeuvre’: ‘moderate,’ reformist, bourgeois evolution of the developing countries in conditions of pro-American orientation. But its policy was based in a still greater measure than Kennedy’s “on erroneous assumptions about the nature of the development process” and underestimated “the degree of revolutionary fervour sweeping the underdeveloped world. . .”² By virtue of this it was often counter-productive, further aggravating the contradictions between the United States and the developing countries.

It is true that sometimes military threats and flagrant pressure could obtain a certain effect. The ‘tough’ line helped inflict a temporary defeat on the progressive forces in several Asian, African and Latin American countries, and to ‘tighten the screws’ on a few others. Unstable elements among the patriotic forces and a tendency for conciliation gained strength among some of the groups who were apt to vacillate or capitulate. But on the whole, the Johnson Administration by somewhat modifying US ‘supervision,’ accepting the services on a large scale of military and conservative groups, showing mistrust to relatively radical, reformist bourgeois elements, and grabbing every now and then its big stick, narrowed

¹ *The Washington Post*, November 17, 1966.

² Prof. H. Wiarda of the University of Massachusetts in *The Nation*, February 19, 1968, p. 241.

down the field of manoeuvre, which had already come up against tremendous objective and subjective difficulties during the Kennedy era.

The New York Times (August 21, 1965) detected this fundamental weakness in the administration's course. Analyzing the position of the Alliance for Progress, it put its destiny and the outlook for the United States' policy in the Western Hemisphere in a direct connection with the degree of political independence and the kind of political experimentation Johnson was prepared to tolerate in Latin America. It wondered how many social changes could take place before the United States began to look askance at them, what measure of caution one had to exercise in the choice of an ally during the overthrow of a military regime, and what degree of independence foreign policy could reach before the suspension of US aid.

The slipping of the US ruling circles back to the morbid complex of anti-communism, the 'panic' (as *The New York Times* put it) demonstrations of strength following every action by radical patriotic elements, the obvious readiness to resort to arms could not but complicate the position of those in the newly-freed countries who championed an 'orderly,' 'conflict-free' transition to capitalism. In point of fact, the Johnson Administration's 'toughness' led to the accumulation of a still greater anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist charge in the developing countries, sowing the seeds of new revolutionary sprouts. *The Washington Post* (July 15, 1966) was quite right in observing that the US administration's use of the military stick was reducing still more the number of foreign supporters of its policy. John-

son's policy dispelled the illusion, so carefully cultivated in the young national states by the 'Kennedy team,' that the United States was ready to renounce gunboat diplomacy, respect the right of the emergent nations to independent development and pursue a policy mindful of their interests.

Additional difficulties, especially in Latin American countries, were created by military cliques and other reactionary privileged groups. It was natural for the military oligarchies to strengthen their positions while Johnson's 'pragmatic' policies and his desire to rely on 'strong governments' were being followed. By adroitly and unscrupulously exploiting the old bogey, the 'communist menace,' they were able to heighten their resistance to any bourgeois reforms, even the most modest ones. Sometimes the 'gorillas' upset the plans of Washington itself, presuming to act against its directions. Commenting upon the failure of the United States' protests against the deposition of President Arturo Allia of Argentina to 'impress' those responsible for the coup, *The Chicago Sun and Times* (July 15, 1966) pointed to the generals' being aware that the US government publicly denounced military dictatorships but ended up supporting them, that it was so horrified by anything even remotely resembling a Left government that it would stand by the militarists. The result is a situation not unlike a vicious circle. US backing prolongs the existence of the very same regimes whose policy prepares the revolutionary explosions which the Alliance for Progress is called upon to prevent. And the Alliance itself, *Le Monde* wrote, "is being reduced to the position of the social cause

for the policy from strength." ¹

The inglorious and hopeless Vietnam war brought about an unprecedented decline of US prestige in the young states and gave rise to a powerful upsurge of anti-colonialism which affected even the conciliatory members of society. The increasingly obvious colonialist character of the intervention, the brutalities of the American military (indicative, among other things, of its racist disdain for the suffering of the Asians and for their lives), the constant escalation of the intervention which almost seems to mock at the growing demand of public opinion, including that of the developing countries, for an end to the aggression—resulted in the moral and political isolation of the United States in the 'third world.' At the same time, the course of the war in Vietnam, where the US imperialists in spite of a massive military campaign have not achieved their aim of 'curbing' the patriots, exploded the myth about the omnipotence of the United States and demonstrated anew the tremendous potentialities of the liberation struggle today. Moreover, the Vietnam war limited the possibilities for US intervention in other areas where a struggle for liberation is going on.

Serious setbacks were suffered by the Johnson government in the Middle East. Its plans, which were based on using Israeli aggression to deprive the Arab peoples of much of their anti-imperialist victories, halt the progressive development of the advanced Arab states and weaken their links with the socialist countries, did not materialize.

¹ *Le Monde*, 25 septembre, 1967.

Instead, the United States' position in that area was seriously undermined.

Also an obvious failure were Washington's efforts to direct events along a 'safe' course in its own backyard, Latin America. The seeds of revolutionary upheavals were germinating, both in countries where attempts were being made to carry through plans for a reformist type of development and in countries plagued with military dictatorships. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had good reason to conclude, in a survey issued on January 13, 1968, that economic and social conditions for revolutionary outbursts were ripe in the Latin American countries. Recent events in Chile, Bolivia and Peru corroborated the US Congressmen conclusion.

Contradictions between the United States and its Atlantic allies continued to grow which provided new obstacles to the organization of collective neo-colonialist action. This was, first of all, the result of processes natural to the capitalist world. But the Johnson government's policy towards the 'third world' also served to sharpen inter-imperialist contradictions. The United States' intervention in Vietnam did not receive any real support, in fact, from any of its Atlantic partners—with the exception of perhaps, Britain and West Germany—and the persistent attempts of the Johnson government to secure such support only broadened the divergencies. Moreover, the Johnson government was also unable to *objectively* reckon with its allies' views, to the extent Kennedy had, as the gap was too wide between their positions on such questions as that of Vietnam which was almost the principal problem facing the Administration.

The Johnson policy line came under severe criticism in the United States itself. The 'liberals,' quite naturally, led the criticism, with the 'New Frontiers' policy-makers and active supporters being among the most vocal critics. They accused the Washington leadership of having departed from some of the important principles of Kennedy's policy, and reminded Washington that there were legitimate grounds for revolution in some Latin American and Asian countries and that the task was to direct these uprisings along a peaceful channel rather than to stand in their way.¹ They opposed indiscriminating aggressive anti-communism and regarded as a grave error the hostile attitude towards the patriotic movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America only because they enjoyed Communist support.

As could be expected, the sharpest criticisms were levelled by the 'liberals' at the Johnson government's role in the Vietnam war. A typical sample of their stand was contained in *The New York Times* editorial of March 12, 1968, which harshly criticized the "course of escalation of this unpopular, unnecessary and unproductive war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy and for the wrong reasons."

The critical attitude towards the Johnson government's 'third world' policy was not confined to the active advocates of the 'New Frontiers' policies. It was stimulated by the course of the Vietnam war and gradually spread to other sections of the American bourgeoisie and representatives of monopoly capital, which began to feel growing distrust towards the Administra-

¹ *The New York Times*, July 2, 1965.

tion and its ability to achieve the principal aims of US imperialism in the developing world. Increasing discontent was also displayed by the monopolies which had no special interests in Asia, Africa or Latin America. They did not approve of the 'excessive' attention given by the White House to these areas.

The negative attitude shown by the US legislative bodies in the last months of Johnson's tenure of office towards his major proposals pertaining to the developing countries was, to a certain degree, a reflection of all these feelings and not only the result of the pre-election atmosphere. It will be recalled that Congress cut by more than one-third the funds requested by the government for 'aid' programme and authorized the lowest allocations in the twenty-one years of its existence. It also refused to earmark 200 million dollars for the United States' contribution to the Asian Development Bank—regardless of the fact that the government had already announced the United States' participation in it.

The uncrowned kings of America were adamant in demanding serious changes in Washington's policy towards the developing world. This policy which originated, primarily, as a solution to the contradictions and difficulties that beset the 'New Frontiers' government, not only failed to resolve these contradictions but increased the factors which gave rise to them and created new ones. In this respect Johnson's presidency constituted just one more phase—and one of the least successful—in the postwar efforts of US imperialism to prevent the complete national and social emancipation of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. It showed once again that a task such

as this is beyond the powers of the US imperialists or imperialism as a whole, for it runs counter to the trend of social development, to the aspirations of hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who are beginning to take an increasingly active part in modern social, political and economic life.

In January 1969 Richard Nixon became the 37th President of the United States. It, however, by no means, follows that every change of guard at the White House is accompanied by a thorough critical analysis of American foreign policy, nor that every new president introduces substantial changes in it. The new president had to review the US policy not because of the inter-parties competition, but mainly due to serious fiasco in international affairs.

Already in the first days of the new president's rule the American press was full of reports, although often contradictory, about a painstaking reassessment of policy being made by Nixon's advisers and about major changes in the offing. There was talk of a trend for a reduction of the boundless commitments and overblown foreign policy of the United States, for a deflation of excessive promises,¹ which would be tantamount to an at least partial admission of the inability of US imperialism to act as an international, unrepresentative and anti-communist policeman. This trend was quite clearly reflected in the interview granted by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's chief foreign policy adviser, to the West German magazine *Der Spiegel*. "Even at the beginning of the 1960s," Kissinger said, "a thought could still

¹ *The New York Post*, February 8, 1969.

be given to a kind of globally-based 'new deal.' But the world of today has become more complex. Now the task is not to build a Pax Americana any longer. The world order depends today not only on what America wants."¹ There is no doubt that such comments reflect an obvious concern for areas where there is a struggle for national liberation, for it was primarily the intervention in Asia that undermined the position of Johnson, whose policy, as *The Christian Science Monitor* noted on February 6, 1969, got bogged down in the jungle of Vietnam.

That changes in the United States' 'third world' policy were impending was reaffirmed by the new President himself, who declared, for instance, at his press conference on March 4, 1969, that the policy of the United States towards Latin America required certain changes.² It was with a view to drafting such changes that the Nixon government sent Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York on a 'fact-finding' trip to Latin America.

The crux of the matter is, however, exactly what kind of changes are contemplated. Some articles in the American press and statements by a number of leading politicians and ideologists show clearly enough that influential and aggressive-minded US imperialists only want changes which would ensure smoother and more successful neo-colonialist policy. For example, they call for limiting the 'direct involvement' of the United States in Asian affairs, for lightening its 'Asian burden'—only so it can be imposed on

¹ *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 4, Januar 1969. S. 74.

² *The Washington Post*, March 5, 1969.

'Asians themselves' and its Asian chestnuts can be pulled out of the fire with Asian hands. These leaders have been responsible for the demands for a basic change in the form of economic 'aid' to the developing countries so as to make any aid even more dependent on and directly linked with the foreign policy designs of the US imperialists.

As was very soon proved, the new Administration took exactly that course, *modifying some of the methods of implementing US policy in the developing countries while preserving and consolidating its neo-colonialist, expansionist nature and aims.*

The basic principles of the new Administration's foreign policy were first stated by President Nixon in July 1969 before a group of correspondents on the island of Guam and were immediately dubbed the 'Nixon doctrine' or the 'Guam doctrine.' The new policy line was more explicitly outlined in a lengthy document—the President's foreign policy Message to Congress of February 1970.

The key part of the message reads: "...the United States will participate in the defence and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programmes, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defence of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interests."¹

¹ *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's. A New Strategy for Peace. Congressional records.* Office of the White House Press Secretary, February 18, 1970, p. H 926, V. 116.

Characteristic of the new doctrine was its special stress on the qualified nature of the US 'partnership' with its allies, which was described as a 'new approach.' The doctrine made it clear that allies of the US must mobilize their own resources and possibilities to the utmost, must first help themselves, if they wished to receive US support.

In other words, the 'new approach' and the 'Guam Doctrine,' as a whole, reflect the striving of American imperialism to make its allies and satellites share the 'burden' falling to its lot as self-styled international gendarme, to 'internationalize' the conflicts and interventions resulting from the aggressive, expansionist and neo-colonialist policy of the USA. Without abandoning the role of 'policeman' in their attempts to crush the revolutionary liberation movements, particularly those in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries, the US imperialists would also like to involve other countries to a greater extent in these efforts. This 'new' course of American imperialism was dictated not by any temporary or special situation arising or that might arise in some part of the world, but by a long-term programme of fundamental significance.

That the 'Guam doctrine' did not imply any revision of American foreign policy or any change in its goals was hastily emphasized by the US State Department. Secretary of State W. Rogers went out of his way at the SEATO session held in July, 1970, to dispel the apprehensions felt on that score by Washington's Asian puppets. He stressed that the sole aim was to reduce US military forces in some areas where the situation was such that this could safely be done and that

in no sense was this a result of any lack of US determination or an indication of its desire to renounce American commitments ensuing from previous agreements.

Not a great deal of time has passed since the 'Guam doctrine' was proclaimed but events have already proved the correctness of the assessment of the doctrine as being an imperialist manoeuvre that threatened the interests of peace, security, sovereignty and the independence of peoples.

It is obvious that the 'Nixon doctrine' was called forth by the failures experienced by the US in its intervention in Vietnam. On the other hand, it was in Vietnam, in particular, and in Indochina, in general, that the imperialist and neo-colonialist nature of the doctrine became most obvious.

The so-called 'Vietnamization' policy pursued by the US in South Vietnam is a direct result of the 'Nixon doctrine.'

The Nixon government has not renounced its course of continuing the criminal and inhuman war against the heroic Vietnamese patriots, nor has it abandoned its attempts to enforce the Saigon puppet clique upon South Vietnamese people. But in contrast to the Johnson Administration, this government has claimed its 'firm determination' to gradually withdraw US troops from Vietnam, placing the burden of the war on the army of the Saigon puppets actively backed by the US armed forces. With this aim in mind the American imperialists are feverishly trying to increase the strength of the Saigon army, to equip it with modern weapons and to expand their financial and other aid to the Saigon government.

As for the 'withdrawal' of American troops from Vietnam, it has been carried out in such a way that no substantial change has occurred in the character or scale of the US presence in that country. By the beginning of 1971, almost two years after Vietnamization was started, over 350,000 American troops still remained in South Vietnam. Moreover, President Nixon and US Secretary of Defence Laird have repeatedly stated that, 'in case of necessity,' the US troops already withdrawn would be returned to Vietnam. According to the bourgeois press, the White House programme envisaged the maintenance of a considerable American force in South Vietnam for an indefinite period of time.

Along with Vietnam, other countries of Indochina have been turned into a kind of proving-ground for the Nixon doctrine. Hardly a year had passed after President Nixon in his Guam statement promised to avoid 'New Vietnams,' before the US government, under the false pretext of "defending American soldiers' lives in Vietnam," spread the war to neutral Cambodia which was invaded by American troops. The Nixon Administration has actually escalated the US aggressive war in this area.

Thus, the US aggression has involved the entire Indochina Peninsula in the war. It has once again revealed the expansionist nature of American imperialism and has exposed the danger to peace inherent in its attempts to impose its will on the peoples of other countries.

The outburst of public indignation all over the world, the unprecedented scope and strength of the protest movement in the USA, and the discontent with the Nixon government's policy which

spread even to some people in American ruling circles—all these factors combined to make Washington withdraw its troops from Cambodia. But American aggression in that country and in Laos has been continuing. US aircraft continue to bomb the territory of Cambodia, attacking not only its armed patriotic forces, but also the peaceful civilian population. The forces of the US puppet governments are carrying on ground operations and trying hard to form a new military bloc of Saigon-Bangkok-Pnompenh encouraged by US promises of overall support with finance, weapons and other means. Thus, the neo-colonialist nature of the Nixon doctrine, designed to make 'Asians fight Asians' in the interests of the US monopolies, is being exposed in practice.

The American press has repeatedly claimed that the new Administration's course towards Israel is an example of the application of the Nixon doctrine in the Middle East. The Republican government, on Nixon's inauguration day, pledged itself to pursue a 'balanced policy' in the Arab East, and to take into consideration the vital interests of both Israel and the Arab states.

President Nixon's foreign policy message to Congress also contained a pledge to develop cooperation with all countries of the area and to strive for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. But in actual practice US ruling circles continue to assist Tel Aviv in every way, encouraging it to annex the occupied Arab territories and backing its new military ventures. The unceasing flow of offensive weapons and equipment supplied to Israel by the US and the American attitude towards political settlement of the Middle East issue bear this out. American imperialism is

still trying to deal a blow at the liberation movement of Arab peoples and to secure for itself a dominating position in the Middle East, particularly because of the possibility of exploiting the vast oil resources of this area.

The Nixon Administration has been paying increasing attention to the African continent. It considers that the policy towards Africa of the preceding Administration was 'ineffective' and in need of complete revision. The result of US Secretary of State Rogers' trip to ten African countries at the beginning of 1970 should be viewed in the light of Republicans' search for a 'new' political approach to Africa. A report on US relations with Africa in the 1970's, published by Rogers together with Nixon's foreign policy message, give an idea of the major changes in the US political line towards Africa. These changes are aimed at making the US 'presence' on the continent less noticeable and at achieving US goals there mainly through the policy of making others pull the chestnuts out of the fire. This is what the 'Guam doctrine' means when applied to Africa.

The plan is to promote firmly established capitalist relations of neo-colonial type in 'specially selected' 'key' African countries. In this way the Washington strategists try to secure US strongholds and reliable allies in Africa and to use them for 'implanting' American capital there. They also reckon on reversing the progressive, independent development of African countries which have embarked on the non-capitalist road. One of the principal recommendations to governments of young African countries contained in the Rogers'

report is to open all gates to US private investment.

The US Republican Administration also proclaimed a 'new' political attitude towards Latin America. And, characteristically, US political commentators started speaking of a 'new' doctrine, this time the 'Nixon-Rockefeller doctrine'. Its main ideas were contained in Nixon's speech delivered to the Inter-American Press Association in October 1969, as well as in a detailed report made by Nelson Rockefeller after his tour of Latin America as a special envoy of the US President.

The United States declared its plan to meet half-way certain demands of the Latin American countries in the sphere of economic and trade relations. The US concessions, however, were not of the type that would affect the interests of the US monopolies on the continent. And, besides, some of the US promises were of a kind that would most likely stay only on paper.

Washington made it clear that the leading part in the economic development of Latin American countries should not be played by 'aid,' but by investments of private capital from the US. Elaborating this idea in his report, Nelson Rockefeller suggested that a kind of a super-monopoly be set up in the USA, a corporation to look after US private investments abroad. This super-monopoly, by manipulating private investments and utilizing the US government's aid in its own interests, would be able to provide the most favourable conditions for the further penetration of US business into Latin America.

Military and political aspects of the 'new' doctrine were specified in Rockefeller's recommenda-

tions. In a very direct form the report stated that the Latin American governments should be encouraged to take upon themselves a greater share of the responsibility for their own defence whenever a 'dangerous situation' developed in their countries. The term 'dangerous situation' implied here a 'threat of Communist penetration' and 'subversive activity' which is how the report described the anti-imperialist liberation struggle of Latin American peoples.

The Rockefeller report declared the strengthening of the 'security forces,' namely, of the state machine of repression in the countries of Latin America, as the task of vital importance. The report advised that the USA should express its readiness to render additional 'aid' in training and equipping these forces of repression.

Thus, the 'new' policy towards Latin American countries proclaimed by the US Republican Administration is notable for its pronounced neo-colonialist character. It is aimed at preventing a social and political explosion in Latin America which would threaten the US position and the dictatorship regimes there and at weakening 'continental nationalism' which is opposing US imperialism. The close connection between the 'new' policy of the US in Latin America and the 'Guam doctrine' is quite obvious. Progressive patriotic forces in Latin America justly detected in this policy a Latin American variant of 'Vietnamization' applied to social and political conflicts.

By introducing just a few changes into the forms of implementation of US policy in former colonial and semi-colonial countries, by getting rid of 'super-commitments' and correcting the

'shortcomings' and 'errors' of the Johnson government, the present Republican Administration is trying to make US neo-colonialism more effective.

The mounting difficulties with which US policy is confronted in the developing world are least of all connected with the subjective shortcomings or mistakes of any president or his advisers. They are *objectively* conditioned by, and arise from, the deep-set contradictions and corroding weaknesses of American neo-colonialism and of neo-colonialism as a whole. They cannot be overcome by tactical manoeuvring, partial modifications and improvements in the forms of this policy without fundamentally changing its essential character.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the strategy of neo-colonialism and of the weapons it uses leads inevitably to the conclusion that the Asian, African and Latin American peoples are faced with a real and very dangerous adversary. Concealing its aims behind a cover of anti-communist and democratic phraseology, neo-colonialism, with its powerful political and especially economic instruments of subjugation, and policy of capitalizing on the class egotism of a section of the propertied strata in the newly-freed countries, constitutes a very serious menace to the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies.

At the same time, recent experience shows that neo-colonialism is being worn down by grave internal contradictions and weaknesses, as well as by the powerful forces of national and social emancipation. As Leonid Brezhnev said at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969, "The resistance of the peoples of the newly-independent

countries to the policy of neo-colonialism creates a new and important front of the anti-imperialist struggle." ¹

The neo-colonialists pin their hopes upon the development and victory of capitalist relations in the young states, but their own efforts to keep this capitalism 'backward' and weak, largely or even fully dependent on the major centres of the capitalist world, are having a counteractive effect. Their policy is aimed at the political and economic consolidation of the 'middle class,' of the local bourgeoisie, at transforming them into the leading and 'friendly' force in areas where a struggle for national liberation exists while at the same time they try to keep the consolidation of these groups within definite limits. All this *objectively* boomerangs against their plans, complicates the prospects for the development of capitalist relations in the newly-freed countries, and makes local capitalism more vulnerable to attack by anti-capitalist forces.

The fact is that the policy of restricted capitalist development, designed to keep the progress of productive forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America within a certain limit and to preserve the imperialist monopolies' control over this process, endangers the ultimate aims of neo-colonialism, and reflects a fundamental contradiction in neo-colonialist economic and social relations. In this sense, like traditional colonialism and imperialism as a whole—and perhaps even in greater measure than they—neo-colonialism contains an element of self-destruction.

By stimulating—deliberately or, more often, in

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow 1969.* Prague, 1969, p. 143.

spite of itself—a certain, even if limited, development of the productive forces in the young states, neo-colonialism encourages the development of economic and social prerequisites which lead to a struggle against itself, to the strengthening of social forces opposed to it (the national bourgeoisie) or even capable of becoming its grave-digger (the working class).

The imperialists' policy of alliance and co-operation with influential groups of the national bourgeoisie comes up against formidable obstacles. They arise from the objective contradiction between the interests of local capitalism and the ambitions of the international imperialist monopolies. There is serious friction between neo-colonialism and the national bourgeoisie both in economic and political spheres.

In as much as neo-colonialism relies on the collaboration of the imperialist powers in the fight against the national-liberation movement, many of its measures tend to be undertaken collectively, but here inter-imperialist rivalry plays its part as a counteracting influence. Far from abating, the scrimmage around the colonial pie becomes more intense as the monopolies' opportunities for colonial expansion decrease.

In addition, neo-colonialism itself becomes a factor in aggravating inter-imperialist contradictions. Formerly, the metropolitan countries could exercise undivided control within the confines of their colonial empires, and retain their colonial monopoly even when the correlation of forces changed to their disadvantage and they grew weaker than their imperialist partners and rivals. Today, when neo-colonialism has come to the fore, the unevenness of the development of ca-

pitalism manifests itself more directly (although often in new forms) in the colonial policy of the imperialist powers. In this situation neo-colonialism becomes an instrument for a redivision of colonial influence—primarily for the United States and for West Germany and other imperialist powers which lost their colonies as a result of defeat in the Second World War, but, of course, not only for these powers alone.

The experience of recent years warrants the conclusion that the co-ordinated actions of the imperialist powers in countries where a movement for national liberation exists are diminishing rather than the reverse. This is due both to the intensification of inter-imperialist contradictions and in some measure to the fact that in view of the obvious prospect of a long-drawn-out struggle over determining the direction socio-economic development should take in the newly-independent countries, and taking into consideration the difficulties experienced by the progressive forces in some of these countries, every imperialist power increasingly tends to act according to its own interests.

Efforts to pursue a long-range policy towards the newly-freed countries come up against contradictions between the prospective plans of the imperialists, their interests as a whole, and the immediate interests of individual monopolies.

These erosive internal contradictions certainly affect the future of neo-colonialism, but national and social emancipation will be the decisive factor. Here we include primarily the popular masses, the Communist and all revolutionary and progressive parties and organizations in areas of struggle for liberation, and national states that

emerged or won independence as a result of the disintegration of the colonial system.

Neo-colonialism leads to a sharpening of contradictions between imperialism, on the one hand, and the 'third world' states, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other.

The fact that neo-colonialism operates in conditions where colonial regimes have been, in general, eliminated makes it possible to enlist in the struggle against it the patriotic feelings and social energy of the masses, and the support of instruments of state power. Needless to say, the effectiveness of these levers depends on the social system existing in the country concerned, on the character of the state and the class nature of the forces in power, on the policy they pursue at home and abroad.

Since neo-colonialism's chances for expansion are connected, primarily, with the existence of capitalist relations in the 'third world,' the surest way of fighting it lies in carrying out a fundamental transformation of society by breaking with the capitalist system, and developing socialism.

We know from past history that in former colonies and semi-colonies where socialist revolution triumphed neo-colonialism was effectively checked. Its opportunities are also considerably restricted in countries that opted for non-capitalist way of development, although the neo-colonialist threat is very real there and the problem of combating it remains of vital importance. Success in this struggle virtually depends on the same factors that determine the prospects of social progress in these countries. These include the presence of an advanced revolutionary party

which directs social progress and the national state, cohesion of all anti-imperialist forces, democratization of social life and stimulation of the political activity of the masses, a resolute anti-imperialist foreign policy, and promotion of close friendly relations and all-round co-operation with the socialist countries.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to ignore the national bourgeoisie in organizing resistance to neo-colonialism. Its potentialities in this respect are far from exhausted. In view of the existence of contradictions between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, some of its influential sections can act as a force opposed to neo-colonialism. It is true that it can only wage a limited struggle that is objectively restricted in its aims.

As L. Brezhnev stressed in the Central Committee's Report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "The patriots of countries still burdened by the colonial yoke are continuing their courageous fight for liberation.

"As to our country, it fully supports this just struggle. The USSR's political and economic co-operation with the liberated countries has been further developing in the last few years. Our trade with them is growing. Dozens of industrial and agricultural enterprises have been built in many countries of Asia, and Africa with our participation. We have also been making a contribution to the training of personnel for these countries. All this is being done in the mutual interest."¹

¹ L. Brezhnev. *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1971, p. 24.

Hence, alliance of the forces of national liberation with the socialist states, with the international working class is indispensable to victory in the fight against neo-colonialism.

It should be noted also that the course and outcome of this fight can be considerably influenced by the extension of contacts between young states, by their close unity and co-operation against the imperialists.

Neo-colonialism, which is trying to put back the clock of history and check the process of eradicating all forms of national oppression, cannot win, although it is still capable of scoring temporary successes. Without doubt, neo-colonialism is simply colonialism in retreat and headed for destruction. But it would be naive to expect its defeat to come automatically because it lacks a future. No matter how rotten the neo-colonialism may be socially and historically, it will not collapse without a struggle. Only as a result of a concerted efforts of all the world forces of national and social emancipation will this latest imperialist form of national oppression and exploitation be eliminated, as its predecessor was.

К. Брутенц
НЕОКОЛОНИАЛИЗМ И ЛОГИКА ИСТОРИИ
на английском языке

Цена 77 коп.

